CHAPTER SEVEN ORGANIC SOLIDARITY AND CONTRACTUAL SOLIDARITY 1 1s true that inthe industrial societies that Spencer speak fj just as in organied societies, social harmony comes e+ ‘cnially from the division of labor! Tt is characterized by w ‘e-operation ‘which is automatically produced. through the pursuit by each individual of his own interests. Te suies that each individual conserate himself to 8 special function in order, by the foee of events to make himself wolidary with others. Is this not the distinctive sign of ongunized societies? But if Spencer has justly noted what the prinepal ease of socal solidarity in higher societies is, he has misunderstood ‘the manner in which this eause produces its effet, and, ae- conlingly, misunderstood the natare of the latter. In short, for him industrial solidarity, ashe calls it, presents ‘the two following characters ‘Since it ie spontancous, it does not require any’ cersve force cither to produce or to maintain it, Society does not have to intervene’ to assure the harmony which is selfestablaed, Spenecr says that each man ean maintain himself through his ‘work, can exchange hit produce forthe goods of another, can Tend ‘asistanee and receive payment, can enter into some ‘asointion for paren some enterprise, smal ot large, without ‘obeying the direction of society in is totality? ‘The sphere of ‘toed action would thus grow narrower and narrower for it would have no other objeet than that of keeping indiduals “nS x38 ORGANIC AND CONTRACTUAL SOLIDARITY 201 from disturbing and harming one another. ‘That is to say, it would have only a negative regulative fore Under these conditions, the only remaining link between ‘men would be that of an absolutly free exchange. "As Spence? says, all industrial affairs take place through the mum of free exchange, and this relation becomes predominant in suclety In 0 far an individual activity becomes dominant. ‘But the normal form of exchange isthe contract. "That is why in proportion to the deeline of ilitarian and the ascendancy of industrial, power as the gateway to authority becomes of less importance and free activity ineeases, and the relation= ship of contract beoomes general. Finally, in the fully de- veloped industrial type, this relationship becomes universal ‘By that, Spencer does not mean that socioty always rests on an implicit or formal contract. The hypothesis of «socal contract is irconellable withthe notion ofthe division of labor. ‘The greater the part taken by the latter, the more completely must Rousscau's postulate be renounced. For in onder for such a contract to be posible itis nocexary that, a a given ‘moment, all individual wills diet themselves toward. the ‘common bases of the soial organization, and, consequently, ‘that each particular conseience pose the politieal problem for itself inal ts generality. But that would make it neowssary for each individual to leave his special sphere, so that all might equally play the same role, that of statesman and eonstituents. ‘Th, thie the situation when society maker a contract: if adhesion is unanimous, the content ofall eonscenoes sential. ‘Then, in the measure that socal solidarity proceeds frm such ‘caute, it has n0 relation with the division of labor. ‘Nothing, however, los resembles the spontaneous, automatic solidarity which, according to Spencer, distinguishes industrial societies, for he tees, on the contrary, in ths eonseions pursuit of socal ends the eharactritie of mitary scitien® Such &2m DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY ‘contract supposes that all individuals are able to reprownt in thomzelves the general condition of the collctve life in oder to make a choice with knowledge. But Spencer understands that such a representation gots beyond the bounds of selenoe in its aotual state, and, consequently, beyond the bounds of fonstence, He is s0 convineed of the vanity of reflection tren iis applied to much matters that he wishas to take them fovay even from the legislator, to say nothing of submitting them to publie opinion. He belleves that social life, just as all Ife in general, can naturally organize iteif only by an Tincansious, spontaneous adaptation under the immedinte pressure of needs, and not aeoonling to rational plan of re fective Intelligence, He does not believe that higher societies can be built according toa rigdly drawn program, “Thus, the conception of «socal contact is today difealt to defend for it has no relation to the facts. ‘The observer does not mect it slong his toad, #0 to speak. Not only are there no soeieties which have such an origin, but there is none ‘whose structure presents the least taco of contractual organ- faation, Tt je neither a fact acquired through history nor a tendeney which grows out of historial development. Hence, torejuvenat this doctrine and accredit it, it would be necessary to qualify as a contrat the adhesion which each individual, ti adult, gave to the society when ho was born, solely by reason of which he continues to lee. But then we would have to term contracts! every action of man which is not deter rined by constraint." Tn this ight, there is no society, neither present nor past, which isnot of hes not been contractual, for ther is none whith could exist solely through pressure. Wehave fiven the reason for this above. TT it has sometimes boen thought that force was greater previously than it is today, that is beeause of the ilsion which atttbutes to a coercive Teme the smal plage given over to individual Hberty in lower Societies Tn reality, soda life, wherever itis nomml, is spon- “eT fri Pte dn ein ont esr ie ORGANIC AND CONTRACTUAL SOLIDARITY 210 taneous, and iit is abnormal, it cannot endure. The individu! abdicates spontaneously. Tn fact, itis unjust to speak of abdication where there Is nothing to abdieste. If his lange tnd somewhat warped interpretation is given to this wont, no distinction ean be made between diferent social typew land if we understand by type only the very defined juridical tie which the word designates, we can be sure that no te of this kind has ever existed between individuals and society, ‘But if higher societies do not rest upon a fundamental con= tract which sets forth the general principles of political ie, they would have, oF would be eonsidered to have, according to Spencer, the vast system of particular contracts which link individuals as @ unique basia. ‘They would depend upon the ‘oup only in proportion to their dependence upon one another, and they would depend upon one another only in proportion to conventions privately entered into and freely concluded. Social solidarity’ would then be nothing else than the spon taneous accord of individual Interests, an seoord of which contracts are the natural expression, “The typical social ration would be the economle, tripped ofall regulation and resulting from the entirely fre initiative of the parties "In short, society would be solely the stage where individuals ex- ‘changed the produets oftheir labor, without any action property socal coming to rgulate this exchange, Is this the character of societies whose unity by the division of labor? If this were so, we could with justioe doubt their stability. For if interest relates men, it is never for more than some few moments. Tt ean ereate only an exter- tal link between them. In the fact of exchange, the various agents remain outside of each other, and when the business ‘nas boen completed, ench one retires and ie Teft entre on his ‘own. Conseienees are only superially in contact; they neither penetrate each other, nor do they adhere. If we lok further into the matter, we shall see that this total harmony of interests conceals latent or deferred conflict. For where Interest is the only ruling force each individual finds him-21 DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY self i a slate of war with every other since nothing comes to rly the egos, and aay truce in this eternal antagonism ‘would not be af fong duration. ‘There is nothing les constant Than interest. Today, i¢ unites me to you tomorrow, i wil make me your enemy. Such a eause can only ive Hae to transient relations and passing associations. We now unver- stan how neoesary i 8 to se if this i really the nature of| ‘onganieslidarity. Tn no respect, according to Spencer, does industrial ncety ‘exit in a pre state. Its. partially ideal type which slowly cdnenguge isl i the evolutionary process, but it has not yet bon completely realized. Consequently, to rightly attribute tori the qualities we have just boen discussing, we woul have tovestablsh systematically that societies appear ina fashion as fomplete a they are elevated, discounting eases of regression Tis fit armed that the sphere of social nctvity grows smaller and smaller, to the great advantage of the individu But co prove this proposition by real instances not enough to ite, as Spencer does, some eases where the individual has ‘yen efectively emancipated from collective infence. These feunples, numerous as they may be, ean serve only as lus trations, nd ae, by themselves, devoid of any demonstrative fore. It is very possible that, inthis rspett, social action thas regressed, bat that, in other respects, it hasbeen extended, and that, ultimately, we are mistaking a transformation for a Aisappearanee. The only way of giving objective prof isnot to cite some facts taken at random, but to follow historically, from its origins until recent ines, the way in which social action has essentially manifested itself, and to see whether, in time, it has added of lost volume. ‘We know that this i lave, ‘The obligations that society imposes upen its members, as inconsequential and enduring as they may be take on a jsdical form, Consequently, the relative dimensions of this system permit ut to measure with exactitude the relative extent ‘of social aetion ‘But it is very evident that, far from diminishing, i grows ORGANIC AND CONTRACTUAL SOLIDARITY 206 igeater and greater and becomes more and more complex. ‘The more primitive x code is, the smaller its volume. On the contrary itis as large as it ls more resent, "There ean be no doubt about this. To be sure, it does not result in making the sphere of individual activity smaller. We must not forget ‘that if there is more regulation ia ie, there more life in seneral. ‘This is sulfiient proof that social discipline bas not been relaxing. One of its forms tends, itis true, to regress fs we have altwady seen, but others, much richer and mel more complex, develop in its place. If repressive law les grand, restittive law, which originally did ot exist at all, keeps growing. If society no longer Impases upon everybedy certain uniform practices, it takes greater are to define and ‘equate the special relations between different soclal functions tnd this activity is not smaller because itis diferent. ‘Speneer would reply that he had not insisted upon the diming= tion of every kind of eontrl, but only of postive control. Lat ts admit this dstnetion, Whether it be positive or negative, the control is none the less socal, and the prneipal question J to understand whether i has extended itself or contract, Whether It be to command or to deny, to aay Do this or Do not 4 tat, i society intervenes more, we have not the right to say that individual spontaneity auiees more end more in all spheres. If the roles determining conduct have multiplied, whether they be imperative ar prohibitive, se not true that it dopends more and more completely on private initiative, But has tis distinction itslf any foundation? By positive control, Spencer means that which commands ation, while negative control commands only abstention. As he sayy: A rman has a peeo of land; F cltivate it for him either wholly or in part or else impose upon him either wholly or in part the way in which he should cultivate it. This i a postive control. On the other hand, I give him neither anor advice about its cultivation; T simply do not molest my neighbors frop oF trespnss upon my neighbor's land, or put rubbish on his clearing. This is a negative control.” The dliferenoe is