2.1.
Noscitur a sociis ("a word is known by the company it capacity negotiated and concluded insurance contracts for
keeps")
When a word is ambiguous, its meaning may be determined by
reference to the rest of the statute.
Aisporna v. CA [GR L-39419, 12 April 1982 (113 SCRA 459)]
Facts: Since 7 March and on 21 June 1969, a Personal Accident
Policy was issued by Perla Compania de Seguros, through its
authorized agent Rodolfo Aisporna, for a period of 12 months with the
beneficiary designated as Ana M. Isidro. The insured died by violence
during lifetime of policy. Mapalad Aisporna participated actively with
the aforementioned policy.
For reason unexplained, an information was filed against Mapalad
Aisporna, Rodolfo’s wife, with the City Court of Cabanatuan for
violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act on 21 November 1970, or
acting as an agent in the soliciting insurance without securing
thecertificate of authority from the office of the
Insurance Commissioner. Mapalad contends that being the wife of
true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and
that policy was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had
called by telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo,
was absent and so she left a note on top of her husband’s desk to
renew. On 2 August 1971, the trial court found Mapalad guilty and
sentenced here to pay a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. On appeal and on 14
August 1974, the trial court’s decision was affirmed by the appellate
court (CA-GR 13243-CR). Hence, the present recourse was filed on
22 October 1974. On 20 December 1974, the Office of the Solicitor
General, representing the Court of Appeals, submitted that Aisporna
may not be considered as having violated Section 189 of the
Insurance Act.
Issue: Whether Mapalad Aisporna is an insurance agent within the
scope or intent of the Insurance Act
Held: Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of
the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases
should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the
whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole.
In the present case, the first paragraph of Section 189 prohibits a
person from acting as agent, subagent or broker in the solicitation or
procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring
a certificate of authority so to act from the InsuranceCommissioner;
while the second paragraph defines who is aninsurance agent within
the intent of the section; while the third paragraph prescribes the
penalty to be imposed for its violation. The appellate court’s ruling that
the petitioner is prosecuted not under the second paragraph of
Section 189 but under its first paragraph is a reversible error, as the
definition of insurance agent in paragraph 2 applies to the paragraph 1
and 2 of Section 189, which is “any person who for compensation
shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section.” Without
proof of compensation, directly or indirectly, received from the
insurance policy or contract, Mapalad Aisporna may not be held to
have violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act. “Under the Texas
Penal Code 1911, Article 689, making it a misdemeanor for any
person for direct or indirect compensation to solicit insurance without
a certificate of authority to act as an insurance agent, an information,
failing to allege that the solicitor was to receive compensation either
directly or indirectly, charges no offense. In the case of Bolen vs.
Stake,19 the provision of Section 3750, Snyder's Compiled Laws of
Oklahoma 1909 is intended to penalize persons only who acted
as insurance solicitorswithout license, and while acting in such
compensation. It must be noted that the information, in the case at
bar, does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance
contracts by the accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for
compensation. This allegation is essential, and having been omitted, a
conviction of the accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in
our jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of the
crime must be alleged and proved. After going over the records of this
case, we are fully convinced, as the Solicitor General maintains, that
accused did not violate Section 189 of the Insurance Act.”
DAI-CHI ELECTRONICS MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, Metro Manila and ADONIS C.
LIMJUCO, respondents.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court of the following orders of the RTC, Branch 156, Pasig,
Metro Manila, in Civil Case No. 63448: 1) Order dated September20,
1993, dismissing the complaint of petitioner on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy. On July 29,
1993, petitioner Dai-ichi Electronics Manufacturing Corp. filed a
complaint for damages with the RTC, Branch 156, against ADONIS C.
LIMJUCO, a former employee for violation of par. five of their Contract
of Employment dated August 27, 1990, which provides: That for a
period of two (2) years after termination of service from EMPLOYER,
EMPLOYEE shall not in any manner be connected, and/or employed,
be a consultant and/or be an informative body directly or indirectly,
with any business firm, entity or undertaking engaged in a business
similar to or in competition with that of the EMPLOYER. Petitioner
claimed that LIMJUCO became an employee of Angel Sound
Philippines Corporation, a corporation engaged in the same line
of business as that of petitioner, within two years from his resignation
from petitioner's employ. Petitioner sought to recover liquidated
damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00), as provided for in their contract.RTC dismissed the
case. In its Order dated September 20, 1993, it ruled that it had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy because the
complaint was for damages arising from employer-employee relations.
Citing Article 217(4) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended
by R.A. No.6715, respondent court stated that it is the Labor
Arbiter which had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case.
ISSUE: Is petitioner's claim for damages one arising from employer-
employee relations?
HELD: We answer in the negative.
Article 217, as amended by Section 9 of R.A. No. 6715, provides as
follows:
Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) Except as
otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30)
calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for
decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic
notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or
non-agricultural:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages
arising from the employer-employee relations; (Emphasis supplied)
In San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,
161 SCRA 719 (1988), we had occasion to construe Article 217, as
amended by B.P. Blg. 227. Article 217 then provided that the Labor
Arbiter had jurisdiction over all money claims of workers, but the
phrase "arising from employer-employee relation" was deleted. We
ruled thus:
While paragraph 3 above refers to "all money claims of workers," it is
not necessary to suppose that the entire universe of money claims
that might be asserted by workers against their employers has been
absorbed into the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters.
In the first place, paragraph 3 should be read not in isolation from but
rather within the context formed by paragraph 1 (relating to unfair
labor practices), paragraph 2 (relating to claims concerning terms and
conditions of employment), paragraph 4 (claims relating to household
services, a particular species of employer-employee relations), and
paragraph 5 (relating to certain activities prohibited to employees or to
employers). It is evident that there is a unifying element which runs
through paragraphs 1 to 5 and that is, that they all refer to cases or
disputes arising out of or in connection with an employer-employee
relationship. This is, in other words, a situation where the rule
of noscitur a sociis may be usefully invoked in clarifying the scope of
paragraph 3, and any other paragraph of Article 217 of the Labor
Code, as amended. We reach the above conclusion from an
examination of the terms themselves of Article 217, as last amended
by B.P Blg. 227, and even though earlier versions of Article 217 of the
Labor Code expressly brought within the jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiters and the NLRC "cases arising from employer-employee
relations," which clause was not expressly carried over, in printer's ink,
in Article 217 as it exists today. For it cannot be presumed that money
claims of workers which do not arise out of or in connection with their
employer-employee relationship, and which would therefore fall within
the general jurisdiction of regular courts of justice, were intended by
the legislative authority to be taken away from the jurisdiction of the
courts and lodged with Labor Arbiters on an exclusive basis. The
Court, therefore, believes and so holds that the "money claims of
workers" referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 217 embraces money
claims which arise out of or in connection with the employer-employee
relationship or some aspect or incident of some relationship. Put a
little differently, that money claims of workers which now fall within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters are those money
claims which have some reasonable causal connectionwith the
employer-employee relationship (Emphasis supplied).
MAGTAJAS V. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORP
FACTS: P.D. No. 1869 authorized PAGCOR to centralize and regulate
all games of chance.
LGC of 1991, a later law, empowers all government units to enact
ordinances to prevent and suppress gambling and other games of
chance.
STACON: These two should be harmonized rather than annulling one
and upholding the other. Court said that the solution to this problem is
for the government units to suppress and prevent all kinds of gambling
except those that are allowed under the previous law
MAGTAJAS VS PRYCE G.R. NO. 111097, JULY 20, 1994
Facts: PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro
City. It leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties
Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same, and prepared to
inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season.
Civil organizations angrily denounced the project. Petitioners opposed
the casino’s opening and enacted Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting
the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing business
permit to the establishment for the operation of the casino, and
Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of the casino and
providing a penalty for its violation.
Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that
they both violated Presidential Decree No.
1869. Petitioners contend that, pursuant to the Local Government
Code, they have the police power authority to prohibit the operation of
casino for the general welfare.
Issue: WON the Ordinance Nos. 3353 and 3375-93 are valid.
Held: No. CdeO is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes
indicated in the LGC. However, ordinances should not contravene a
statute. Municipal governments are merely agents of the National
Government.Local Councils exercise only delegated powers conferred
by Congress. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal powers
higher than those of the latter. PD 1869 authorized casino gambling.
As a statute, it cannot be amended/nullified by a mere ordinance.
2.2. Ejusdem generis ("of the same kinds, class, or nature")
When a list of two or more specific descriptors is followed by
more general descriptors, the otherwise wide meaning of the
general descriptors must be restricted to the same class, if any,
of the specific words that precede them. For example, where
"cars, motor bikes, motor powered vehicles" are mentioned, the
word "vehicles" would be interpreted in a limited sense
(therefore vehicles cannot be interpreted as including airplanes).
PHILIPPINE BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION vs CA, August 8, 2000;
Purisima, J:
FACTS:On July 21, 1989, the petitioner received an assessment from
the CIR for the
paymento f d e f i c i en c y a m us e m e n t t a x i n t h e a m o u n t o f
P 5 , 8 6 4 , 2 6 0 . 8 4 ( i n c l u d i n g 7 5% surcharge and 25% interest for
2 years). The petitioner contested the assessment but it was denied
by the CIR. The Court of Tax Appeals also dismissed the subsequent
petition of PBA. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the CTA
so the petitioner filed this petition for certiorari. Petitioner’s arguments:
-Jurisdiction to collect amusement taxes of PBA is vested
with the local government and not the national government. It
argues that they should be included in the enumeration provided
by Section 13 of the Local Tax Code of 1973.
-Commissioner’s issuance of BIR Ruling No. 231-86 and BIR
Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 8-88 -- both upholding
the authority of the local government to collect amusement
taxes -- should bind the government or that, if there is any
revocation or modification of said rule, the same should operate
prospectively.
-Income from the cession of streamer and advertising spaces to VEI
should not be subject to amusement taxes
-In case they are made liable to pay the deficiency
amusement tax, they should not be charged with the 75%
surcharge.
ISSUES:
1. WON the amusement tax on admission tickets to PBA
games a local tax –NO2.WON BIR Ruling No. 231-86 and
BIR RMC No. 8-88 binds the government – NO3.WON income
from the cession of streamer and advertising spaces to VEI
is subject to amusement taxes - YES4.WON the
petitioner should be charged with amusement tax – YES
HELD:
1. Sec 13 of the Local Tax Code indicates that the
province can only impose a
taxo n a d m i s s i o n f r o m t he p r o p r i e t o r s , l e s s e e s ,
o r o p e r a t o r s o f t h e a t e r s, cinematographs,
concert halls, circuses and other places of
amusement. The authority to tax professional
basketball games is not therein included, as the
same is expressly embraced in PD 1959, which amended
 PD 1456, wherein it is clear that the "proprietor, lessee
or operator of. . . professional basketball games" is
required to pay an amusement tax equivalent to
fifteen per centum(15%) of their gross receipts to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, which payment is a national tax.
While Section 13 of the Local Tax Code mentions "other
places of amusement", professional basketball games
are definitely not within its scope. Under the
principle of ejusdem generis
In determining the meaning of the phrase
"other places of amusement", one must refer to
the prior enumeration of theaters, cinematographs,
concert halls and circuses with artistic expression
as their common characteristic. Professional basketball
games do not fall under the same category as theaters,
cinematographs, concert halls and circuses as the
latter basically belong to artistic forms
of entertainment while the former caters to sports and
gaming. Also, a historical analysis of pertinent laws does
reveal the legislative intent to place professional
basketball games within the ambit of a n a t i o n a l
tax. Previous laws (PD 871 by PD 1456 and
P D 1 9 5 9 ) s h o w s a recognition that the amusement
tax on professional basketball games is a national,
and not a local, tax.2 . C o m m i s s i o n e r ’ s i s s u a n ce
of BIR Ruling No. 231-86 and BIR
M e m o r a n d u m Circular No. 8-88, both upholding the
authority of the local government to collect amusement
taxes cannot bind the government. The government
cannot be never in estoppels, particularly in matters
involving tax. It is a well-known rule that erroneous
application and enforcement of the law by public
officers do not preclude subsequent correct application of
the statute, and that the Government is never estopped by
mistake or error on the part of its agents.3 . P D 1 4 5 6
provides that for the purpose of the
a m u s e m e n t t a x , t h e t e r m g r o s s receipts’
embraces all the receipts of the proprietor, lessee or
operator of the amusement place. That definition of gross
receipts is broad enough to embrace the cession of
advertising and streamer spaces as the same
embraces all the receipts of the proprietor, lessee or
operator of the amusement place.4.The issue on the
payment of surcharge was never posed as an issue
before the respondent court so it must necessarily fail.
2.3. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius ("the express
mention of one thing excludes all others")
Items not on the list are impliedly assumed not to be
covered by the statute or a contract term.[3] However,
sometimes a list in a statute is illustrative, not
exclusionary. This is usually indicated by a word such
as "includes" or "such as."
G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994 MARTIN CENTENO,
petitioner, vs. HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS, Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10,
and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS : In the last quarter of 1985, the officers of a civic organization
known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a
fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay,
Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno, the chairman of the
group, together with Vicente Yco, approached Judge Adoracion G.
Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of
P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation was made without a
permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development As a
consequence, based on the complaint of Judge Angeles, an
information was filed against petitioner Martin Centeno, together with
Religio Evaristo and Vicente Yco, for violation of Presidential Decree
No. 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law, before the Municipal Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch and docketed as Criminal Case No.
2602 On December 29, 1992, the said trial court rendered judgment
finding accused Vicente Yco and petitioner Centeno guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and sentencing them to each pay a fine of P200.00
ISSUE : WON charitable purposes can be construed in its broadest
sense so as to include a religious purpose
HELD : Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that
the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence
excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim
"expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Where a statute, by its terms,
is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or
construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the
premise that the legislature would not have made specified
enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its
meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned All
contributions designed to promote the work of the church are
"charitable" in nature, since religious activities depend for their support
on voluntary contributions. However, "religious purpose" is not
interchangeable with the expression "charitable purpose Accordingly,
the term "charitable" should be strictly construed so as to exclude
solicitations for "religious" purposes. Thereby, we adhere to the
fundamental doctrine underlying virtually all penal legislations that
such interpretation should be adopted as would favor the accused It
does not follow, therefore from the constitutional guaranties of the free
exercise of religion that everything which may be so called can be
tolerated. It has been said that a law advancing a legitimate
governmental interest is not necessarily invalid as one interfering with
the "free exercise" of religion merely because it also incidentally has a
detrimental effect on the adherents of one or more religion. Thus, the
general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, which does not
involve any religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay
the collection of funds, is not open to any constitutional objection,
even though the collection be for a religious purpose. Such regulation
would not constitute a prohibited previous restraint on the free
exercise of religion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its
exercise
SARIO MALINIAS, vs.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
TEOFILO CORPUZ,ANACLETO TANGILAG and
VICTOR DOMINGUEZ, G.R. No. 146943, October 4, 2002
FACTS: On July 31, 1998, Sario Malinias and Roy S. Pilando, who
were candidates for governor and congress representative positions,
respectively, filed a complaint with the COMELEC's Law Department
against Victor Dominguez, Anacleto Tangilag and others for their
violation of the following laws:1. Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646;
and2. Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. Blg. 881.Dominguez was then
the incumbent Congressman of Poblacion, Sabangan, Mountain
Province. Corpuz was then the Provincial Director of the Philippine
National Police in Mountain Province while Tangilag was then the
Chief of Police of the Municipality of Bontoc, Mountain Province. The
petitioners said that due to said violations, their supporters were
deprived from participating in the canvassing of election returns as
they were blocked by a police checkpoint in the course of their way to
the canvassing site at the Provincial Capitol Building in Bontoc,
Mountain
Province. Among the private respondents, only Corpuz and Tangilags
ubmitted their joint Counter-Affidavit, wherein they admitted that they
ordered the establishment of checkpoints all over the province to
enforce the COMELEC Gun Ban and its other pertinent rules pursuant
to COMELEC Res. No. 2968 purposive of the maintenance of peace
and order around the vicinity of the canvassing site. Also,
they said that the presence of the policemen within the said area is to
prevent some groups who were reportedly had the intention to disrupt
the canvass proceedings. They claimed that such a response was not
unwarranted as this has already happened in the past, wherein, in
fact, the petitioners were among them.
COMELEC’s Ruling:
After investigating the allegations, COMELEC ruled to dismiss the
petition against the respondents for insufficiency of evidence to
establish probable cause. Malinias filed an MR but it was also denied
for failure of adducing additional evidence thereon. Not satisfied with
the same, Malinias filed to SC a petition for review on certiorari on this
case.
ISSUE: Did COMELEC abuse its discretion in dismissing
the complaint for lack of probable cause?
RATIO DECIDENDI OF SC: No. SC AFFIRMED the decision of
COMELEC and found the conduct of its investigation and ruling on the
case to be in accord with its jurisdiction and duties under the law. In
this case, COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion as
there is nothing capricious or despotic in the manner of their resolution
of the said complaint, hence, SC cannot issue the extraordinary writ
of certiorari.
On the said violations, the only evidence that was successfully
presented by the petitioner is the mass-affidavits of his supporters,
which were considered self-serving and cannot be admitted by the
court thus, the same are not enough to prove his claims. Also, the
allege violation of the respondents of Sec. 25 of R.A. 6646and Sec.1.
232 of B.P. Blg. No. 881 are not included in the acts defined as2.
punishable criminal election offenses under Sec. 27 of R.A. 6646 and
Sec. 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. No. 881, respectively. Here, Sec. 253.
merely highlights one of the rights of a political party or candidate
during elections whereas, the violation of Sec. 232,which enumerates
the persons who are not allowed inside the canvassing site, can only
be subjected to an administrative disciplinary action and cannot be
punished by imprisonment as provided for under Sec. 264 of the same
law. Moreover, it is clear in the defense of the respondents that they
did not violate Sec. 261 (i), a criminal offense, which prohibits any
officer or employee of political offices or police force from intervening
in any election campaign or from engaging in any partisan activity
except to vote or maintain public order. In the said defense, the
respondents said that setting up the checkpoints was done to enforce
the COMELEC's firearms ban, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No.
2968 and not to prejudice any candidate from participating in the
canvassing. As such, the actions of the respondents are deemed
lawful and not in excess of their authority.
Ruling related to Statutory Construction
Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio unius estexclusio
alterius, there is no ground to order the COMELEC to prosecute
private respondents for alleged violation of Section 232of B.P. Blg.
881 precisely because this is a non-criminal act."
It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of
one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.
The rule is expressed in the familiar maxim, expressio uniusest
exclusio alterius.The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is
formulated in a number of ways. One variation of the rule is
the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is
implied. Expressium facitcessare tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its
terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not,
by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in a
number of ways. One variation of the rule is the principle that what is
expressed puts an end to that which is implied. Expressium
facitcessare tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is expressly
limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction,
be extended to other matters.
SAN PABLO MANUFACTURING CORP. vs CIR Statutory
Construction – Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius
San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation (SPMC) was assessed a 3%
tax on its sales of corn and edible oil as manufactured products – this
is pursuant to Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code. Said corn and edible
oil products were sold to United Coconut Chemicals (UNICHEM) who
in turn exports these products and sell them abroad.
SPMC invoked that it is exempt from the tax as it invoked the same
Section of the 1987 Tax Code which provides in part:
xxx Provided, however, That this tax shall not apply to rope, coconut
oil, palm oil and the by-product of copra from which it is produced or
manufactured and desiccated coconut, if such rope, coconut oil, palm
oil, copra by-products and desiccated coconuts, shall be removed for
exportation by the proprietor or operator of the factory or the miller
himself, and are actually exported without returning to the Philippines,
whether in their original state or as an ingredient or part of any
manufactured article or products: xxx (underscore added by
uberdigests)
SPMC’s interpretation of the law is as follows:
That there is indeed a 3% tax on edible oil products;
But that said tax exempts manufacturers who export these edible oil
products;
That SPMC is considered to be an exporter because it sells the oil
products to UNICHEM, its purchaser, who then exports the oil
products.
ISSUE: Whether or not SPMC’s interpretation is correct.
HELD: No. The legal maxim “Expressio Unius est Exclusio
Alterius” applies. Nowhere in the law was “corn oil” included in the
enumeration of tax exempt exported products. Nor did it mention to
exempt a manufacturer who, though not directly exporting its edible oil
products nevertheless sells said product to a purchaser who does
export. Where the law enumerates the subject or condition upon which
it applies, it is to be construed as excluding from its effects all those
not expressly mentioned. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom
and a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the
very language of the statute cannot be placed therein. The rule
proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made
specific enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict
its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
2.4. DISSIMILUM DISSIMILIS EST RATIO
The courts may distinguish when there are facts and
circumstances showing that the legislature intended a
distinction or qualification.
LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, petitioner, vs. FLORENCIO G. SALES,
JR., THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ELECTION
OFFICER DIONISIO F. RIOS and PROVINCIAL SUPERVISOR NOLI
PIPO, respondents.
G.R. No. 124893
Subject: Public Corporation
Doctrine: Qualification of Elective Officers (SK)
FACTS: Petitioner Lynette Garvida seeks to annul and set aside the
order dated May 2, 1996 of respondent COMELEC en banc
suspending her proclamation as the duly elected Chairman of the SK
of Barangay San Lorenzo, Municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte.
– On March 16, 1996, petitioner applied for registration as member
and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo.
The Board of Election Tellers, however, denied her application on the
ground that she being then twenty-one years and ten (10) months old,
exceeded the age limit for membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan
as laid down in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824.
– On April 2, she filed a “Petition for Inclusion as Registered
Kabataang Member and Voter” with the MCTC. In a decision dated
April 18, 1996, the said court found petitioner qualified and ordered
her registration as member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan.
The Board of Election Tellers appealed to the Regional Trial Court.
The presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, however, inhibited
himself from acting on the appeal due to his close association with
petitioner.
– On April 23, Garvida filed her certificate of candidacy for the position
of Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan, Barangay San Lorenzo,
Municipality of Bangui, Province of Ilocos Norte. In a letter dated April
23, 1996, Election Officer Rios, per advice of Provincial Election
Supervisor, disapproved petitioner’s certificate of candidacy again due
to her age. Petitioner, however, appealed to COMELEC Regional
Director Asperin who set aside the order of respondent Rios and
allowed petitioner to run.
– On May 2, respondent Rios issued a memorandum to petitioner
informing her of her ineligibility and giving her 24 hours to explain why
her certificate of candidacy should not be disapproved.
– Earlier and without the knowledge of the COMELEC officials, private
respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a rival candidate for Chairman of
the Sangguniang Kabataan, filed with the COMELEC en banc a
“Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy”
against petitioner Garvida for falsely representing her age qualification
in her certificate of candidacy. The petition was sent by facsimile and
registered mail on April 29, 1996 to the Commission on Elections
National Office, Manila.
On May 2, 1996, the same day acting on the facsimile, respondent
Rios issued the memorandum to petitioner, the COMELEC en banc
issued an order directing the Board of Election Tellers and Board of
Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend the proclamation of
petitioner in the event she won in the election.
– On May 6, 1996, election day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as
against private respondent’s votes of 76. In accordance with the May
2, 1996 order of the COMELEC en banc, the Board of Election Tellers
did not proclaim petitioner as the winner. Hence, the instant petition
for certiorari was filed on May 27, 1996.
– On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed
petitioner the winner for the position of SK chairman, Barangay San
Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The proclamation was “without
prejudice to any further action by the Commission on Elections or any
other interested party.”
– On July 5, 1996, petitioner ran in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng
mga Sangguniang Kabataan for the municipality of Bangui, Ilocos
Norte. She won as Auditor and was proclaimed one of the elected
officials of the Pederasyon.
ISSUES: 1) WON the COMELEC en banc has jurisdiction to act on
the petition to deny or cancel her certificate of candidacy. (not pubcor)
2) WON cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the ground that
she has exceeded the age requirement to run as an elective official of
the SK is valid
HELD: 1) Section 532 (a) of the Local Government Code of 1991
provides that the conduct of the SK elections is under the supervision
of the COMELEC and shall be governed by the Omnibus Election
Code. The Omnibus Election Code, in Section 78, Article IX, governs
the procedure to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy.
In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
provides that a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy for an elective office may be filed with the Law Department
of the COMELEC on the ground that the candidate has made a false
material representation in his certificate. The petition may be heard
and evidence received by any official designated by the COMELEC
after which the case shall be decided by the COMELEC itself and that
the jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies
with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a
Division may only be entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the
required number of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or
ruling is not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions to
reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC
in Division are resolved by the COMELEC en banc. It is therefore the
COMELEC sitting in Divisions that can hear and decide election
cases.
In the instant case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to
any of its Divisions upon receipt of the petition. It therefore acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it
entertained the petition and issued the order of May 2, 1996.
The COMELEC en banc also erred when it failed to note that the
petition itself did not comply with the formal requirements of pleadings
under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Every pleading before the
COMELEC must be printed, mimeographed or typewritten in legal size
bond paper and filed in at least ten (10) legible copies. Pleadings must
be filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the COMELEC
personally, or, by registered mail.
In the instant case, the subject petition was not in proper form. Only
two (2) copies of the petition were filed with the COMELEC.[19] Also,
the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution on the basis of the
petition transmitted by facsimile, not by registered mail.
2) The Katipunan ng Kabataan was originally created by PD 684 in
1975 as the Kabataang Barangay, a barangay youth organization
composed of all residents of the barangay who were at least 15 years
but less than 18 years of age. RA 7160 changed the Kabataang
Barangay into the Katipunan ng Kabataan. It, however, retained the
age limit of the members laid down in B.P. 337 at 15 but not more
than 21 years old. The affairs of the Katipunan ng Kabataan are
administered by the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) composed of a
chairman and seven (7) members who are elected by the Katipunan
ng Kabataan. The chairman automatically becomes ex-officio member
of the Sangguniang Barangay. A member of the SK holds office for a
term of three (3) years, unless sooner removed for cause, or becomes
permanently incapacitated, dies or resigns from office.
Under Section 424 of the Local Government Code, a member of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) an actual
resident of the barangay for at least six months; (c) 15 but not more
than 21 years of age; and (d) duly registered in the list of the
Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay list. Section 428 of
the Code requires that an elective official of the Sangguniang
Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) a qualified voter in the
Katipunan ng Kabataan; (c) a resident of the barangay at least one (1)
year immediately preceding the election; (d) at least 15 years but not
more than 21 years of age on the day of his election; (e) able to read
and write; and (f) must not have been convicted of any crime involving
moral turpitude.
For the May 6, 1996 SK elections, the COMELEC interpreted Sections
424 and 428 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in Resolution No.
2824 and defined how a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan
becomes a qualified voter and an elective official… voter must be born
between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and (c) a resident of
the Philippines for at least one (1) year and an actual resident of the
barangay at least six (6) months immediately preceding the elections.
A candidate for the SK must: (a) possess the foregoing qualifications
of a voter; (b) be a resident in the barangay at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the elections; and (c) able to read and write.
Except for the question of age, petitioner has all the qualifications of a
member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and a candidate for
the Sangguniang Kabataan.
Petitioner’s age is admittedly beyond the limit set in Section 3 [b] of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. Petitioner, however, argues that
Section 3 [b] of Resolution No. 2824 is unlawful, ultra vires and
beyond the scope of Sections 424 and 428 of the Local Government
Code of 1991. She contends that the Code itself does not provide that
the voter must be exactly 21 years of age on election day. She urges
that so long as she did not turn twenty-two (22) years old, she was still
twenty-one years of age on election day and therefore qualified as a
member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and as candidate for
the SK elections.
Section 424 of the Code sets a member’s maximum age at 21 years
only. There is no further provision as to when the member shall have
turned 21 years of age. On the other hand, Section 428 provides that
the maximum age of an elective SK official is 21 years old “on the day
of his election.” The addition of the phrase “on the day of his election”
is an additional qualification. The member may be more than 21 years
of age on election day or on the day he registers as member of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective official, however, must not be
more than 21 years old on the day of election. The distinction is
understandable considering that the Code itself provides more
qualifications for an elective SK official than for a member of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. The courts
may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances showing that
the legislature intended a distinction or qualification.
The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more
than 21 years of age on the day of his election is very clear. The Local
Government Code speaks of years, not months nor days. When the
law speaks of years, it is understood that years are of 365 days each.
One born on the first day of the year is consequently deemed to be
one year old on the 365th day after his birth — the last day of the
year. In computing years, the first year is reached after completing the
first 365 days. After the first 365th day, the first day of the second 365-
day cycle begins. The phrase “not more than 21 years of age” means
not over 21 years, not beyond 21 years. It means 21 365-day cycles. It
does not mean 21 years and one or some days or a fraction of a year
because that would be more than 21 365-day cycles. “Not more than
21 years old” is not equivalent to “less than 22 years old,” contrary to
petitioner’s claims. The law does not state that the candidate be less
than 22 years on election day. The requirement that a candidate
possess the age qualification is founded on public policy and if he
lacks the age on the day of the election, he can be declared ineligible.
Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications
prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office.
Ineligibility is not one of the grounds enumerated in Section 435 for
succession of the SK Chairman.
To avoid a hiatus in the office of SK Chairman, the Court deems it
necessary to order that the vacancy be filled by the SK member
chosen by the incumbent SK members of Barangay San Lorenzo,
Bangui, Ilocos Norte by simple majority from among themselves. The
member chosen shall assume the office of SK Chairman for the
unexpired portion of the term, and shall discharge the powers and
duties, and enjoy the rights and privileges appurtenant to said office.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed and petitioner Lynette
G. Garvida is declared ineligible for being over the age qualification for
candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan,
and is ordered to vacate her position as Chairman of the Sangguniang
Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The
Sangguniang Kabataan member voted by simple majority by and from
among the incumbent Sangguniang Kabataan members of Barangay
San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte shall assume the office of
Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui,
Ilocos Norte for the unexpired portion of the term.
2.5. CASUS OMISSUS
Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person,
object, or thing omitted from an enumeration in a statute
must be held to have been omitted intentionally. This
needs two laws. In expressio unius, it’s just the
enumeration you are looking at, not another law.

COA V. PROVINCE OF CEBU, G.R. NO. 141386. NOVEMBER 29,

2001;
FACTS:In the audit of accounts conducted by the Commission on
Audit (COA) of the Province of Cebu, it appeared that the salaries and
personnel-related benefits of the teachers appointed by the province
for the extension classes were charged against the provincial
SEF. Likewise charged to the SEF were the college scholarship
grants of the province. Consequently, the COA issued Notices of
Suspension to the province of Cebu, saying that disbursements for the
salaries of teachers and scholarship grants are not chargeable to the
provincial SEF.
ISSUE:Whether or not the salaries and personnel-related benefits of
public school teachers appointed by local chief executives in
connection with the establishment and maintenance of extension
classes; as well as the expenses for college scholarship grants, may
be charged to the Special Education Fund (SEF) of the local
government unit concerned.
HELD:Undoubtedly, the legislature intended the SEF to answer for the
compensation of teachers handling extension classes. Under the
doctrine of necessary implication, the allocation of the SEF for the
establishment and maintenance of extension classes logically implies
the hiring of teachers who should, as a matter of course be
compensated for their services. Every statute is understood, by
implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to
effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers,
privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral
and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred
from its terms. Ex necessitate legis. Verily, the services and the
corresponding compensation of these teachers are necessary and
indispensable to the establishment and maintenance of extension
classes.
Indeed, the operation and maintenance of public schools is
lodged principally with the DECS. The SEF may be expended
only for the salaries and personnel-related benefits of teachers
appointed by the local school boards in connection with the
establishment and maintenance of extension classes. With
respect, however, to college scholarship grants, a reading of the
pertinent laws of the Local Government Code reveals that said
grants are not among the projects for which the proceeds of the
SEF may be appropriated.