Dokumen - Tips - Civil Procedures Case Digest PDF

I.
Civil Procedure
Noli Alfonso, et al. vs. Sps. Henry and Liwanag Andres, G.R. No. 139611, October 4, 2002
Mariano L. Gumabon, et al. vs. Aquilino T. Larin, G.R. No. 142523, November 27, 2001
Tung Chin Hui vs. Rufus B. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 137571, September 21, 2000
William P. Chan vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 138758, July 6, 2000
Perla S. Zulueta vs. Asia Brewery, G.R. No. 138137, March 8, 2001
General Provisions — Jurisdiction of Courts
The rule is that where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a
controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new
legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. The exception to the rule
is where the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as
to actions pending before its enactment. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no
retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of the
statute.
Lourdes E. Bengzon vs. Amado G. Inciong, G.R. No. L-48706, June 29, 1979
Latchme Motoomull, et al. vs. Joffre dela Paz, et al., G.R. No. L-45302, July 24, 1990
PNB vs. Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr., G.R. No. 173615, October 16, 2009
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts
decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
Renald F. Vilando vs. HRET, et al., G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149, August 23, 2011
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the
courts from resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1) there is
a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) there is an exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires formation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.
Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011
Copyright 2012 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. and Accesslaw, Inc. Philippine Law Encyclopedia 2012 1
Courts will decide a question, otherwise moot and academic, if it is "capable of repetition, yet
evading review." The question on Limkaichong's citizenship is likely to recur if she would run
again, as she did run, for public office, hence, capable of repetition.
Renald F. Vilando vs. HRET, et al., G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149, August 23, 2011
It may also be pertinently stressed that "jurisdiction" is different from the "exercise of
jurisdiction." Jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decision
rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants and
the subject matter, as in the case of the courts a quo, the decision on all questions arising therefrom
is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment, which does not affect its authority to decide the case,
much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case.
Bernabe L. Navida, et al. vs. Teodoro A. Dizon, Jr., et al., G.R. Nos. 125078, 125598, 126654,127856 &
128398, May 30, 2011
The rule is that the active participation of the party against whom the action was brought, coupled
with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or administrative body where the action is
pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the
resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or body's
jurisdiction.
Megan Sugar Corp. vs. RTC of Iloilo, Branch 68, et al., G.R. No. 170352, June 1, 2011, citing Marquez
v. Secretary of Labor, 253 Phil. 329, 336 (1989)
The law governing jurisdiction is Section 19 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7691 . . . Conformably with the provision, because an action for reconveyance or
to remove a cloud on one's title involves the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, exclusive original jurisdiction over such action pertained to the RTC, unless the assessed
value of the property did not exceed P20,000.00 (in which instance the MTC having territorial
jurisdiction would have exclusive original jurisdiction). Determinative of which regular court had
jurisdiction would be the allegations of the complaint (on the assessed value of the property) and the
principal relief thereby sought.
Heirs of Sps. Teofilo and Elisa Reterta vs. Sps. Lorenzo and Virginia Mores, G.R. No. 159941, August
17, 2011
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from determining a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to its
resolution by the latter, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact.
Rosito Bagunu vs. Sps. Francisco & Rosenda Aggabao, G.R. No. 186487, August 15, 2011
It may not be amiss to reiterate the prevailing rule that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies
where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of
the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within
the special competence of an administrative agency. In such a case, the court in which the claim is
sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the
case without prejudice.
Samar II Electric Coop., Inc., et al. vs. Ananias D. Seludo, Jr., G.R. No. 173840, April 25, 2012
Corollary to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is the principle of exhaustion of administrative

remedies. The Court, in a long line of cases, has held that before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative processes
afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving
the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction,
then such remedy must be exhausted first before the court's power of judicial review can be sought.
The premature resort to the court is fatal to one's cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of
waiver or estoppel, the case may be dismissed for lack of cause of action.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons.
The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier
disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and
convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been
completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity
to correct its error and dispose of the case.
True, the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies are subject
to certain exceptions, to wit: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the
doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably
prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule
impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have
to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the
application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts
violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong
public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings.
The resolution of conflicting claims of ownership over real property is within the regular courts'
area of competence and, concededly, this issue is judicial in character. However, regular courts
would have no power to conclusively resolve this issue of ownership given the public character of
the land, since under C.A. No. 141, in relation to Executive Order No. 192, the disposition and
management of public lands fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Director of Lands, subject
to review by the DENR Secretary.
While the powers given to the DENR, through the Bureau of Lands, to alienate and dispose of
public land do not divest regular courts of jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted by
occupants or applicants (to protect their respective possessions and occupations), the respondents'
complaint-in-intervention does not simply raise the issue of possession — whether de jure or de
facto — but likewise raised the issue of ownership as basis to recover possession.
Rosito Bagunu vs. Sps. Francisco & Rosenda Aggabao, G.R. No. 186487, August 15, 2011
Rule 1, Sec. 2 - In what courts applicable
The Rules of Court apply to all courts, except as otherwise provided by the Supreme Court.
Regional Trial Courts are not precluded from conducting hearings on matters on which the parties
need to be heard, even in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction. cdasia
Lamberto Casalla vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 138855, October 29, 2002
Rule 1, Sec. 3 - Cases governed
Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure apply to all
actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil procedure
have suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that the criminal
proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Considering that
Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reason
to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.
Concepcion Cuenco Vda. De Manguerra, et al. vs. Raul Risos, et al., G.R. No. 152643, August 28, 2008
An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the
court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established
rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the
status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings
are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted
generally upon an application or motion.
Patricia Natcher vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 133000, October 2, 2001
The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a
declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as "one by which a party sues another for the enforcement
or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong" while a special proceeding is "a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." It is then decisively
clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the
petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay, et al. vs. Roy S. Del Rosario, et al., G.R. No. 124320, March 2, 1999
It is axiomatic that the Rules of Court, promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effect
of law. More importantly, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or
certain proceedings taken, are absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and the
orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. Strict compliance with such rules is mandatory
and imperative. Only strong considerations of equity will lead us to allow an exception to the
procedural rule in the interest of substantial justice.
Minda Villamor vs. People of the Phil., G.R. Nos. 172110 & 181804, August 1, 2011
Rule 1, Sec. 4 - In what cases not applicable; suppletory character
It is true that Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules can be applied in a
"suppletory character." Suppletory is defined as "supplying deficiencies." It means that the
provisions in the Rules of Court will be made to apply only where there is an insufficiency in the
applicable rule.
GSIS, et al. vs. Dinnah Villaviza, et al., G.R. No. 180291, July 27, 2010
It should be underscored that the nature of an election protest case differs from an ordinary civil
action. Because of this difference, the Rules of Civil Procedure on demurrer to evidence cannot
apply to election cases even "by analogy or in a suppletory character," especially because the
application of said Rules would not be "practicable and convenient."
Gelacio P. Gementiza vs. Comelec, et al., G.R. No. 140884, March 6, 2001
The failure of the extant election laws to reproduce Section 218 of the Election Code of 1971
does not mean that execution of judgment pending appeal is no longer available in election cases. In
election contests involving elective municipal officials, which are cognizable by courts of general
jurisdiction; and those involving elective barangay officials, which are cognizable by courts of
limited jurisdiction, execution of judgment pending appeal under Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court are permissible pursuant to Rule 143 of the Rules of Court, which is now Section 4, Rule 1
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Roberto D. Ramas, et al. vs. Comelec, et al., G.R. No. 130831, February 10, 1998
Rule 1, Sec. 6 - Construction
Time and again, we have stressed that procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of the
litigants; the rules were established primarily to provide order to, and enhance the efficiency of, our
judicial system. While procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary
periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are
necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. The timeliness of filing a
pleading is a jurisdictional caveat that even this Court cannot trifle with. Viewed in this light,
procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have
prejudiced a party's substantive rights; like all rules, they are required to be followed.
Francisco A. Labao vs. Lolito N. Flores, et al., G.R. No. 187984, November 15, 2010
However, there are recognized exceptions to the strict observance of procedural rules, such as:
(1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the
defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack
of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not
be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without
appellant's fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the
name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise
of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be an
effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation
for his/her failure to comply with the rules.
Saint Louis University, Inc. vs. Evangeline C. Cobarrubias, G.R. No. 187104, August 3, 2010
The strict enforcement of the rules of procedure may be relaxed in exceptionally meritorious
cases. Whether a case involves an exceptionally meritorious circumstance can be tested under the
following guidelines: Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the
suspension of the Rules of the most mandatory character and an examination and review by the
appellate court of the lower court's findings of fact, the other elements that should be considered are
the following: (a) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (b) the merits of the case,
(c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension
of the rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and
(e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Arsenio Z. Locsin vs. Nissan Lease Phils. Inc., et al., G.R. No. 185567, October 20, 2010, citing
Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152766, June 20, 2003
Susan Fronda-Baggao vs. People of the Phil., G.R. No. 151785, December 10, 2007
Francisco Dee vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133542, January 29, 2004
Systems Factors Corp. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 143789, November 27, 2000
Public Estates Authority vs. Jose F. Caoibes, et al., G.R. No. 132426, August 19, 1999
Marcelino Tan, et al. vs. Jose Renato Lim, et al., G.R. No. 128004, September 29, 1998
Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. Helen Bautista Ricafort, et al., G.R. No. 132007, August 5, 1998
While Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides for a liberal construction of the rules in
order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding, the same can not be used as a vehicle to ignore the Rules at will and at
random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues and their just
resolution.
Aneco Realty and Development Corp. vs. Landex Development Corp., G.R. No. 165952, July 28, 2008
Dee Hwa Liong Electronics Corp., et al. vs. Emelinda Papiona, G.R. No. 173127, October 17, 2007
Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146559, August 13, 2004
Section 6, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that rules shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding. Indeed, rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate justice.
Roberto Lastimoso, et al. vs. Jose J. Asayo, G.R. No. 154243, December 4, 2007
Virginia Real vs. Sisenando H. Belo, G.R. No. 146224, January 26, 2007
Teresita B. Mendoza vs. Beth David, G.R. No. 147575, October 22, 2004
Ma. Teresa Vidal vs. Ma. Teresa O. Escueta, G.R. No. 156228, December 10, 2003
The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense and are used only to
help secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim
would be defeated. They should be liberally construed so that litigants can have ample opportunity
to prove their claims and thus prevent a denial of justice due to technicalities.
Marcelo R. Soriano vs. Sps. Ricardo and Rosalina Galit, G.R. No. 156295, September 23, 2003
As expressed in Alberto vs. Court of Appeals, "(w)hat should guide judicial action is the principle
that a party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or
defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities. . . . (T)he rules of
procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict
and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed."
Rosa Yap Paras, et al. vs. Ismael O. Baldado, G.R. No. 140713, March 8, 2001
Medina Investigation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144074, March 20, 2001
Republic of the Phil. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003
Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice and, therefore, they
should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The exception is that, while the Rules are
liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting
appeals are strictly applied. As an exception to the exception, these rules have sometimes been
relaxed on equitable considerations. Also, in some cases the Supreme Court has given due course to
an appeal perfected out of time where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it, but
only when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of equity
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Teodora Buenaflor, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 142021, November 29, 2000
Unity Fishing Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145415, February 2, 2001
It is now settled that rules of procedure apply even to cases already pending at the time of
their promulgation. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights does
not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive
application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general
rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
Anita Cheng vs. Sps. William and Tessie Sy, G.R. No. 174238 July 7, 2009
We have indicated many times in the past that a primary factor in considering technical and
procedural objections is the nature of the issues involved. We have been strict when the issues are
solely confined to the parties' private interests and carry no massive ripple effects directly affecting
the public, but have viewed with liberality the technical and procedural threshold issues raised when
grave public interests are involved. Our liberality has even gone beyond the purely technical and
procedural where Court intervention has become imperative. Thus, we have recognized exceptions
to the threshold issues of ripeness and mootness of the petitions before us, as well as questions on
locus standi. We have also brushed aside procedural technicalities where the issues raised, because
of the paramount public interest involved and their gravity, novelty or weight as precedents deserve
the Court's attention and active intervention.
Liberal Party vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 191771, May 6, 2010
Indeed, we have relaxed the procedural technicalities introduced under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC in
order to serve substantial justice and safeguard strong public interest. . .
It is a well-settled principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend
to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. In deciding a case, the
appellate court has the discretion whether or not to dismiss the same, which discretion must be
exercised soundly and in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, taking into account the
circumstances of the case. It is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse
a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than
dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression
of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.
Mid-Islands Power Generation Corp. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 189191, February 29, 2012 citing Tan v.
Ballena, G.R. No. 168111, July 4, 2008
We cannot allow a patently wrong judgment to be implemented because of technical lapses. This
ratiocination is in keeping with the policy to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action or proceeding.
Mangontawar M. Gubat vs. NAPOCOR, G.R. No. 167415, February 26, 2010
But while we have so ruled, we recognize nonetheless that the right to appeal is an essential part
of our system of judicial processes, and courts should proceed with caution in order not to deprive a
party of the right to appeal. We invariably made this recognition due to our overriding concern that
every party-litigant be given the amplest opportunity to ventilate and secure the resolution of his
cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. This line of rulings is based, no less, on the Rules
of Court which itself calls for a liberal construction of its provisions, with the objective of securing
for the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. In this line
of rulings, we have repeatedly stressed that litigation is not merely a game of technicalities. The law
and jurisprudence grant to courts — in the exercise of their discretion along the lines laid down by
this Court — the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory
character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an end to litigation speedily and the
parties' right to an opportunity to be heard.
Sps. Heber and Charlita Edillo vs. Sps. Norberto and Desideria Dulpina, G.R. No. 188360, January 21,
2010
Poverty cannot be used as an excuse to justify petitioners' complacency in allowing months to

pass by before exerting the required effort to find a replacement lawyer. Poverty is not a
justification for delaying a case. Both parties have a right to a speedy resolution of their case.
Noli Alfonso, et al. vs. Sps. Henry and Liwanag Andres, G.R. No. 166236, July 29, 2010
While the court has the power to relax procedural rules "for persuasive and weighty reasons," this
does not mean that "[they] are to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may
have prejudiced a party's substantive rights." Just like any other rule, "[procedural rules] are
required to be followed except for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed."
Jovina Dabon Vda. de Mendez vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 174937, June 13, 2012
Rule 2 - Cause of Action
Conrado Pineda, et al. vs. Pedro T. Santiago, et al., G.R. No. 143482, April 13, 2007
Rule 2, Sec. 1 - Ordinary civil actions, basis of
A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential elements of a
cause of action, namely:
(a) The legal right of the plaintiff;
(b) The correlative obligation of the defendant; and
(c) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.
If the allegations of the complaint do not aver the concurrence of these elements, the complaint
becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
Evidently, it is not the lack or absence of a cause of action that is a ground for the dismissal of the
complaint but the fact that the complaint states no cause of action. Failure to state a cause of action
may be raised at the earliest stages of an action through a motion to dismiss, but lack of cause of
action may be raised at any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of the
stipulations, admissions, or evidence presented.
Dolores Adora Macaslang vs. Sps. Renato and Melba Zamora, G.R. No. 156375, May 30, 2011
Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are really different from each other.
On the one hand, failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading, and is a
ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, lack of cause action
refers to a situation where the evidence does not prove the cause of action alleged in the pleading.
Dolores Adora Macaslang vs. Sps. Renato and Melba Zamora, G.R. No. 156375, May 30, 2011
Failure to state a cause of action is different from failure to prove a cause of action. The remedy
in the first is to move for dismissal of the pleading, while the remedy in the second is to demur to
the evidence, hence reference to Sec. 5 of Rule 10 has been eliminated in this section. The
procedure would consequently be to require the pleading to state a cause of action, by timely
objection to its deficiency; or, at the trial, to file a demurrer to evidence, if such motion is
warranted.
Dolores Adora Macaslang vs. Sps. Renato and Melba Zamora, G.R. No. 156375, May 30, 2011, citing
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Volume 1, Ninth Revised Ed. (2005), p. 182
Rule 2, Sec. 2 - Cause of action, defined
A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. The essential
elements of a cause of action are: (a) the existence of a legal right in favor of the plaintiff; (b) a
correlative legal duty of the defendant to respect such right; and (c) an act or omission by such
defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff with a resulting injury or damage to the plaintiff
for which the latter may maintain an action for the recovery of relief from the defendant. Although
the first two elements may exist, a cause of action arises only upon the occurrence of the last
element, giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or other
appropriate relief.
Philip Turner, et al. vs. Lorenzo Shipping Corp., G.R. No. 157479, November 24, 2010
DBP vs. Silverio Q. Castillo, et al., G.R. No. 163827, August 17, 2011
With respect to identity of cause of action, a cause of action is defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the
Rules of Court as the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. This Court has
laid down the test in determining whether or not the causes of action in the first and second cases
are identical, to wit: would the same evidence support and establish both the present and former
cause of action? If so, the former recovery is a bar; if otherwise, it does not stand in the way of the
former action.
Goodland Co., Inc. vs. Asia United Bank, et al., G.R. Nos. 195546 & 195561, March 14, 2012
Subject to certain qualification, and except as otherwise provided by law, an action commenced
before the cause of action has accrued is prematurely brought and should be dismissed. The fact that
the cause of action accrues after the action is commenced and while the case is pending is of no
moment. It is a rule of law to which there is, perhaps no exception, either in law or in equity, that to
recover at all there must be some cause of action at the commencement of the suit. There are
reasons of public policy why there should be no needless haste in bringing up litigation, and why
people who are in no default and against whom there is as yet no cause of action should not be
summoned before the public tribunals to answer complaints which are groundless. An action
prematurely brought is a groundless suit. Unless the plaintiff has a valid and subsisting cause of
action at the time his action is commenced, the defect cannot be cured or remedied by the
acquisition or accrual of one while the action is pending, and a supplemental complaint or an
amendment setting up such after-accrued cause of action is not permissible.
Philip Turner, et al. vs. Lorenzo Shipping Corp., G.R. No. 157479, November 24, 2010, citing Surigao
Mine Exploration Co., Inc. v. Harris, 68 Phil 113 (1939)
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, as amended, defines a cause of action as the act or
omission by which a party violates a right of another. A cause of action exists if the following
elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law
it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to
violate such right; and, (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of
the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the
latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.
Pioneer Concrete Phil., Inc., et al. vs. Antonio D. Todaro, G.R. No. 154830, June 8, 2007
Kenneth O. Nadela vs. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 149627, September 18, 2003
Progressive Devt. Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123555, January 22, 1999
Rule 2, Sec. 4 - Splitting a single cause of action; effect of
(Section 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court) proscribes a party from dividing a single or indivisible
cause of action into several parts or claims and instituting two or more actions based on it.
Ernesto C. Del Rosario, et al. vs. Far East Bank and Trust Company, et al., G.R. No. 150134, October
31, 2007
Splitting a single cause of action consists in dividing a single or indivisible cause of action into
several parts or claims and instituting two or more actions therein. A single cause of action or entire
claim or demand cannot be split up or divided so as to be made the subject of two or more different
actions.
A single act or omission may be violative of various rights at the same time, such as when the act
constitutes a violation of separate and distinct legal obligations. The violation of each of these rights
is a cause of action in itself. However, if only one right may be violated by several acts or
omissions, there would only be one cause of action. Otherwise stated, if two separate and distinct
primary rights are violated by one and the same wrong; or if the single primary right should be
violated by two distinct and separate legal wrongs; or when the two primary rights are each broken
by a separate and distinct wrongs; in either case, two causes of action would result. Causes of action
which are distinct and independent, although arising out of the same contract, transaction or state of
fact may be sued separately, recovery on one being no bar to subsequent actions on the others.
Isidro Perez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157616, July 22, 2005
A claim cannot be divided in such a way that a part of the amount of damages may be recovered
in one case and the rest, in another. The rule was aimed at preventing repeated litigations between
the same parties in regard to the same subject of the controversy and to protect the defendant from
unnecessary vexation. Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa.
Bank of America vs. American Realty Corp., G.R. No. 133876, December 29, 1999
If a party-litigant splits his single cause of action, the other action or actions filed may be
dismissed by invoking litis pendentia, pursuant to Sec. 1(e), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. This is in relation to Section 4, Rule 2 which provides for the cause and effect of this
practice.
As a general rule, therefore, the second case filed should be abated under the priority and time
rule, for this is a declaration of public policy against multiplicity of suits.
Dasmariñas Village Assn. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127276, December 3, 1998
Rule 2, Sec. 5 - Joinder of causes of action
United Coconut Planters Bank vs. Sps. Samuel and Odette Beluso, G.R. No. 159912, August 17, 2007
Well-settled is the rule that since a cause of action requires, as essential elements, not only a legal
right of the plaintiff and a correlative duty of the defendant but also "an act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said legal right," the cause of action does not accrue until the party
obligated refuses, expressly or impliedly, to comply with its duty.
It bears stressing that it is only when the last element occurs that a cause of action arises.
Accordingly, a cause of action on a written contract accrues only when an actual breach or violation
thereof occurs.
China Banking Corp vs. CA, G.R. No. 153267, June 23, 2005
The above provision presupposes that the different causes of action which are joined accrue in
favor of the same plaintiff/s and against the same defendant/s and that no misjoinder of parties is
involved. The issue of whether respondents' claims shall be lumped together is determined by
paragraph (d) of the above provision. This paragraph embodies the "totality rule" as exemplified by
Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129 which states, among others, that "where there are several claims or
causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount
of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether
the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions."
Pantranco vs. Standard Insurance, G.R. No. 140746, March 16, 2005
Multiplicity of suits should be avoided if the filing of a separate and independent action to
recover a claim would entail proving exactly the same claim in an existing action. It can not
however, be avoided when the cause of action in the two complaints are distinct and separate from
each other.
Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81024, February 3, 2000
Manuel Silvestre Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 111715 & 112876, June 8, 2000
Rule 3, Sec. 1 - Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant
Gloria Santos Dueñas vs. Santos Subdivision Homeowners Asso., G.R. No. 149417, June 4, 2004
Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Solidbank Corp., G.R. No. 134049, June 17, 2004
Parties may be either plaintiffs or defendants. The plaintiff in an action is the party complaining,
and a proper party plaintiff is essential to confer jurisdiction on the court. In order to maintain an
action in a court of justice, the plaintiff must have an actual legal existence, that is, he, she or it
must be a person in law and possessed of a legal entity as either a natural or an artificial person, and
no suit can be lawfully prosecuted save in the name of such a person. 05plpe
The rule is no different as regards party defendants. It is incumbent upon a plaintiff, when he
institutes a judicial proceeding, to name the proper party defendant to his cause of action. In a suit
or proceeding in personam of an adversary character, the court can acquire no jurisdiction for the
purpose of trial or judgment until a party defendant who actually or legally exists and is legally
capable of being sued, is brought before it. It has even been held that the question of the legal
personality of a party defendant is a question of substance going to the jurisdiction of the court and
not one of procedure.
Sulpicia Ventura vs. Francis J. Militante, et al., G.R. No. 63145, October 5, 1999
There can be no legal duel in court when the one who demands satisfaction from the alleged
offender is not even the offended party.
Stefan Tito Miñoza vs. Cesar Tomas Lopez, et al., G.R. No. 170914, April 13, 2011
Rule 3, Sec. 2 - Parties in interest
Speed Distributing Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 149351, March 17, 2004
The afore-quoted rule (Section 2, Rule 3) has two requirements: 1) to institute an action, the
plaintiff must be the real party in interest; and 2) the action must be prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest. Necessarily, the purposes of this provision are 1) to prevent the prosecution of
actions by persons without any right or title to or interest in the case; 2) to require that the actual
party entitled to legal relief be the one to prosecute the action; 3) to avoid a multiplicity of suits; and
4) to discourage litigation and keep it within certain bounds, pursuant to sound public policy.
Jose Max S. Ortiz vs. San Miguel Corporation, G.R. Nos. 151983-84, July 31, 2008
Sps. Anthony and Percita Oco vs. Victor Limbaring, G.R. No. 161298, January 31, 2006
The established rule is that a real party in interest is one who would be benefited or injured by the
judgment, or one entitled to the avails of the suit. The word "interest", as contemplated by the Rules,
means material interest or an interest in issue and to be affected by the judgment, as distinguished
from mere interest in the question involved or a mere incidental interest. Stated differently, the rule
refers to a real or present substantial interest as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future,
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. As a general rule, one who has no right or interest
to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action.
Jose Max Ortiz vs. San Miguel Corp., G.R. Nos. 151983-84, July 31, 2008
The rules of court define a real party-in-interest as "the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Every action,
therefore, can only be prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest.
Celestial Nickel Mining Exploration Corp. vs. Macroasia Corp., G.R. Nos. 169080, 172936, 176226 &
176319, December 19, 2007
Rule 3, Section 2, of the Rules of Court provides explicitly that every action must be prosecuted
and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.
Eduardo L. Rayo vs. Metropolitan Bank, et al., G.R. No. 165142, December 10, 2007
In Re: Reversion / Recall of Reconstituted Titles in Tarlac Registry of Deeds, G.R. No. 171304, October
10, 2007
This provision has two requirements: 1) to institute an action, the plaintiff must be the real party
in interest; and 2) the action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.
Necessarily, the purposes of this provision are 1) to prevent the prosecution of actions by persons
without any right, title or interest in the case; 2) to require that the actual party entitled to legal relief
be the one to prosecute the action; 3) to avoid a multiplicity of suits; and 4) to discourage litigation
and keep it within certain bounds, pursuant to sound public policy.
Interest within the meaning of the Rules means material interest or an interest in issue to be
affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the
question involved. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the
court as the plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is
dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.
Rural Bankers Association of the Phil. vs. Ma. Rosario Tanghal-Salvana, G.R. No. 175020, October 4,
2007
Sps. Anthony and Percita Oco vs. Victor Limbaring, G.R. No. 161298, January 31, 2006
Real party-in-interest is a concept in civil procedure and is expressly defined in the Rules of
Court.
Leah M. Nazareno, et al. vs. City of Dumaguete, et al., G.R. No. 168484, July 12, 2007
Joel G. Miranda vs. Antonio C. Carreon, G.R. No. 143540, April 11, 2003
According to Sec. 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, a real party-in-interest is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit.
Samahang Magsasasaka ng 53 Hektarya vs. Wilfredo G. Mosquera, et al., G.R. No. 152430, March 22,
2007
The established rule is that a real party in interest is one who would be benefited or injured by the
judgment, or one entitled to the avails of the suit. The word "interest," as contemplated by the Rules,
means material interest or an interest in issue and to be affected by the judgment, as distinguished
from mere interest in the question involved or a mere incidental interest. Stated differently, the rule
refers to a real or present substantial interest as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future,
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. As a general rule, one who has no right or interest
to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action.
Mayor Dagadag vs. Tongnawa, G.R. No. 161166-67, February 3, 2005
Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the
decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.
By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a
future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest." "To qualify a person to be a real
party-in-interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real
owner of the right sought to be enforced."
Stefan Tito Miñoza vs. Cesar Tomas Lopez, et al., G.R. No. 170914, April 13, 2011
The party-in-interest applies not only to the plaintiff but also to the defendant. "Interest" within
the meaning of the rules means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree
as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. A real
party in interest is one who has a legal right. Since a contract may be violated only by the parties
thereto as against each other, in an action upon that contract, the real parties-in-interest, either as
plaintiff or as defendant, must be parties to the said contract. The action must be brought by the
person who, by substantive law, possesses the right sought to be enforced.
Ma. Teresa Vidal, et al. vs. Ma. Teresa O. Escueta, G.R. No. 156228, December 10, 2003
"Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest. This means that the action must be brought by the person who, by substantive
law, possesses the right sought to be enforced.
Alvin Tan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127210, August 7, 2003
Even as a taxpayer, petitioner does not stand "to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the
suit." Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done
by the government. It bears stressing that "a taxpayer's suit refers to a case where the act
complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds from taxation."
Joel G. Miranda vs. Antonio C. Carreon, et al., G.R. No. 143540, April 11, 2003
To have legal standing, therefore, a suitor must show that he has sustained or will sustain a
"direct injury" as a result of a government action, or have a "material interest" in the issue affected
by the challenged official act. However, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus
standi requirements and has accorded certain individuals, not otherwise directly injured, or with
material interest affected, by a Government act, standing to sue provided a constitutional issue of
critical significance is at stake. The rule on locus standi is after all a mere procedural technicality in
relation to which the Court, in a catena of cases involving a subject of transcendental import, has
waived, or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers,
voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been personally injured
by the operation of a law or any other government act.
Dennis A. B. Funa vs. Reynaldo A. Villar, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012
The Court laid out the bare minimum norm before the so-called "non-traditional suitors" may be
extended standing to sue, thusly:
1) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or

that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
2) For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the
election law in question;
3) For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
4) For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of
infringes their prerogatives as legislators.
Dennis A. B. Funa vs. Reynaldo A. Villar, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012 citing David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424, May 3,
2006
Under Rule 3, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, a real party in interest is defined as "the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit." "Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in
issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved,
or a mere incidental interest. The interest of the party must also be personal and not one based on a
desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party. Real interest, on the
other hand, means a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a
future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.
VSC Commercial Enterprises vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121159, December 16, 2002
A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. And by real interest is meant a present substantial
interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or
consequential interest.
Shipside Incorporated vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143377, February 20, 2001
Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action "must be
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest." This means that the action must
be brought by the person who, by substantive law, possesses the right sought to be enforced and not
necessarily the person who will ultimately benefit from the recovery.
Gilda C. Lim vs. Patricia Lim-Yu, G.R. No. 138343, February 19, 2001
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Universal International Group of Taiwan, G.R. No. 131680,
September 14, 2000
Eliseo Fajardo, Jr. vs. Freedom to Build, G.R. No. 134692, August 1, 2000
Teofista Babiera vs. Presentacion B. Catotal, G.R. No. 138493, June 15, 2000
Philippine Trust Co. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124658, December 15, 1999
Any decision rendered against a person who is not a real party in interest in the case cannot be
executed. Hence, a complaint filed against such a person should be dismissed for failure to state a
cause of action.
Alfredo N. Aguila vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127347, November 25, 1999
If the suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss
may be filed on the ground that the Complaint states no cause of action (Sec. 1(g), Rule 16).
Eduardo Balagtas vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109073, October 20, 1999
By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or
a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.
Emiliano R. "Boy" Caruncho III vs. Comelec, et al., G.R. No. 135996, September 30, 1999
Clearly, a suit filed by a person who is not a party in interest must be dismissed.
Angela C. Tankiko, et al. vs. Justiniano Cezar, et. al., G.R. No. 131277, February 2, 1999
The purposes of this provision are: 1) to prevent the prosecution of actions by persons without
any right, title or interest in the case; 2) to require that the actual party entitled to legal relief be the
one to prosecute the action; 3) to avoid a multiplicity of suits; and 4) to discourage litigation and
keep it within certain bounds, pursuant to sound public policy
Allan C. Go vs. Mortimer F. Cordero, G.R. No. 164703, May 4, 2010
A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real
party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action.
A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or
that the public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is wastage of public
funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. A person suing as a taxpayer,
however, must show that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public
funds derived from taxation. He must also prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury because of the
enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. In other words, for a taxpayer's suit to prosper,
two requisites must be met: (1) public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political
subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed
and (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act. In light of the foregoing, it is apparent
that contrary to the view of the RTC, a taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its
validity. As long as taxes are involved, people have a right to question contracts entered into by the
government.
Manuel N. Mamba, et al. vs. Edgar R. Lara, et al., G.R. No. 165109, December 14, 2009
[L]egal standing in suits is governed by the "real parties-in-interest" rule under Section 2, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court. This states that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party-in-interest." And "real party-in-interest" is one who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. In other words, the plaintiff's
standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.
Jose L. Atienza, et al. vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010 citing David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006
Anent locus standi, "the rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges
"such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions." In public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general public,
asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action. The plaintiff may be a person
who is affected no differently from any other person, and could be suing as a "stranger," or as a
"citizen" or "taxpayer." Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that
public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Of greater
import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound
inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.
Lawyers against Monopoly and Poverty vs. Secretary of Budget and Management, et al., G.R. No.
164987, April 24, 2012
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the
constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also
taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by
taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of
public moneys.
Lawyers against Monopoly and Poverty vs. Secretary of Budget and Management, et al., G.R. No.
164987, April 24, 2012 citing Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331, 342-343 (1960)
Rule 3, Sec. 3 - Representatives as parties
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the
suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total lack
of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation, namely Section 3, Rule 3 and Section
2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. In fact, in the case of Gochan vs. Young, this Court recognized the
legal standing of the heirs to represent the rights and properties of the decedent under administration
pending the appointment of an administrator.
Teodora A. Rioferio vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129008, January 13, 2004
For the protection of the interests of the decedent, this Court has in previous instances recognized
the heirs as proper representatives of the decedent, even when there is already an administrator
appointed by the court.
Virginia O. Gochan vs. Richard G. Young, G.R. No. 131889, March 12, 2001
Rule 3, Sec. 6 - Permissive joinder of parties
Joseph Ejercito Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division) and People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
148560, November 19, 2001
Rule 3, Sec. 7 - Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties
Ma. Valentina Santana-Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120176, July 20, 2001
Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, defines indispensable parties as parties-in-interest

without whom there can be no final determination of an action. As such, they must be joined either
as plaintiffs or as defendants. The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil
action requires, of course, the joinder of all necessary parties where possible, and the joinder of all
indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non for the
exercise of judicial power.
Victoria Regner vs. Cynthia R. Logarta, et al., G.R. No. 168747, October 19, 2007
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, defines indispensable parties as parties-in-interest

without whom there can be no final determination of an action. As such, they must be joined either
as plaintiffs or as defendants. The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil
action requires the joinder of all necessary parties where possible and the joinder of all
indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non for the
exercise of judicial power.
Simplicio Galicia, et al. vs. Lourdes Manliquez, et al., G.R. No. 155785, April 13, 2007
Marcelino Arcelona vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102900, October 2, 1997
An indispensable party has been defined as one: [who] must have a direct interest in the
litigation; and if this interest is such that it cannot be separated from that of the parties to the suit, if
the court cannot render justice between the parties in his absence, if the decree will have an
injurious effect upon his interest, or if the final determination of the controversy in his absence will
be inconsistent with equity and good conscience.
There are two essential tests of an indispensable party: (1) can relief be afforded the plaintiff
without the presence of the other party? and (2) can the case be decided on its merits without
prejudicing the rights of the other party? There is, however, no fixed formula for determining who
is an indispensable party; this can only be determined in the context and by the facts of the
particular suit or litigation.
Speed Distributing Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 149351, March 17, 2004
Andrea D. Domingo vs. Herbert Markus Emil Scheer, G.R. No. 154745, January 29, 2004
Drianita Bagaoisan, et al. vs. National Tobacco Administration, G.R. No. 152845, August 5, 2003
A person who is not a party to an action may be impleaded by the defendant either on the basis of
liability to himself or on the ground of direct liability to the plaintiff.
China Banking Corporation vs. Mercedes M. Oliver, G.R. No. 135796, October 3, 2002
It is clear that the presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with
jurisdiction, which is "the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case." The
absence of indispensable parties renders all subsequent actuations of the court null and void,
because of that court's want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present. 05plpe
Rebecca T. Cabutihan vs. Landcenter Construction & Development Corp., G.R. No. 146594, June 10,
2002
Metropolitan Bank vs. Floro T. Alejo, G.R. No. 141970, September 10, 2001
Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as those who are parties in
interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. They are those parties who
possess such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights,
so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence. A party is indispensable if his interest in
the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought is inextricably intertwined with the other
parties' interest.
Leonis Navigation Co., Inc., et al. vs. Catalino U. Villamater, et al., G.R. No. 179169, March 3, 2010
Rule 3, Sec. 8 - Necessary party
2002
Rule 3, Sec. 9 - Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded
The rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal
of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be
added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action
and/or at such times as are just. If petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the
order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the plaintiff's/petitioner's failure
to comply therewith.
Rene B. Pascual vs. Jaime M. Robles, G.R. No. 182645, December 15, 2010
Heirs of Jose B.L. Reyes vs. Justice Demetrio G. Demetria, A.M. No. CA-01-32, January 23, 2002
The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any
stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of
a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the
plaintiff's failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be
indispensable.
Pamplona Plantation Co. vs. Tinghel, G.R. No. 159121, February 3, 2005
Rule 3, Sec. 10 - Unwilling co-plaintiff
Ramon Ramos vs. Heirs of Honorio Ramos, Sr., G.R. No. 140848, April 25, 2002
Rule 3, Sec. 11 - Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties
Union Bank vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131729, May 19, 1998
Ma. Linda T. Almendras vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110067, August 3, 1998
Sps. Eligio and Marcelina Mallari vs. Ignacio Arcega, et al., G.R. No. 106615, March 20, 2002
2002
Mabayo Farms vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140058, August 1, 2002
China Banking Corporation vs. Mercedes M. Oliver, G.R. No. 135796, October 3, 2002
Under Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a
ground for the dismissal of an action, thus:
The proper remedy is to implead the indispensable party at any stage of the action. The court,
either motu proprio or upon the motion of a party, may order the inclusion of the indispensable
party or give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint in order to include indispensable
parties. If the plaintiff ordered to include the indispensable party refuses to comply with the order of
the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own
motion. Only upon unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to include or to amend is the
action dismissed.
Leonis Navigation Co., Inc., et al. vs. Catalino U. Villamater, et al., G.R. No. 179169, March 3, 2010
Misjoinder of parties does not warrant the dismissal of the action.

Littie Sarah a. Agdeppa, et al. vs. Heirs of Ignacio Bonete, G.R. No. 164436, January 15, 2010
Failure to implead an indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. In such a
case, the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by
order of the court, on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or
such times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party
despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the
petitioner's/plaintiff's failure to comply.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Mamindiara P. Mangotara, et al., G.R. Nos. 170375, 170505, 173355-56,
173401, 173563-64, 178779 & 178894, July 7, 2010, citing Vda. De Manguerra v. Risos, G.R. No.
152643, August 28, 2008
Rule 3, Sec. 12 - Class suit
In order that a class suit may prosper, Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires the
concurrence of three (3) essential elements, namely: (1) that the subject matter of the controversy is
one of common or general interest to many persons; (2) that the parties are so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the court; and (3) that the action be maintained by parties who
will fairly and adequately represent the class.
MVRS Publications vs. Islamic Da'wah Council, G.R. No. 135306, January 28, 2003
Rule 3, Sec. 16 - Death of party; duty of counsel
Ramon A. Gonzales vs. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., et al., G.R. No. 144891, May 27, 2004
Asuncion Macias, et al. vs. Mariano Lim, et al., G.R. No. 139284, June 4, 2004
City Sheriff, et al. vs. Alfaro Fortunado, et al., G.R. No. 80390, March 27, 1998
Ang Kek Chen vs. Amalia R. Andrade, AM RTJ-99-1504, November 16, 1999
Maria Mercedes Nery, et al. vs. Gabriel Leyson, et al., G.R. No. 139306, August 29, 2000
The purpose behind this rule is the protection of the right to due process of every party to the
litigation who may be affected by the intervening death. The deceased litigant is herself or himself
protected as he/she continues to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal
representative of his estate.
Antonio C. Sumaljag vs. Sps. Diosdidit and Menendez M. Literato, et al., G.R. No. 149787, June 18,
2008
Failure of a counsel to comply with the Section 16 of Rule 3 is a ground for disciplinary action.
Crisologo C. Domingo vs. Severino Landicho, et al., G.R. No. 170015, August 29, 2007
Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of Court. This rule allows substitution
by a legal representative. It can be gleaned from the citation of this rule that movant/intervenor
seeks to appear before this Tribunal as the legal representative/substitute of the late protestant
prescribed by said Section 16. However, in our application of this rule to an election contest, we
have every time ruled that a public office is personal to the public officer and not a property
transmissible to the heirs upon death. Thus, we consistently rejected substitution by the widow or
the heirs in election contests where the protestant dies during the pendency of the protest.
In Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias, we recognized substitution upon the death of the protestee but
denied substitution by the widow or heirs since they are not the real parties in interest. Similarly, in
the later case of De la Victoria v. Commission on Elections, we struck down the claim of the
surviving spouse and children of the protestee to the contested office for the same reason. Even in
analogous cases before other electoral tribunals, involving substitution by the widow of a deceased
protestant, in cases where the widow is not a real party in interest, we denied substitution by the
wife or heirs.
Ronald Allan Poe vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P.E.T. Case No. 002, March 29, 2005
The death of a client immediately divests the counsel of authority. Thus, in filing a Notice of
Appeal, petitioner's counsel of record had no personality to act on behalf of the already deceased
client who, it bears reiteration, had not been substituted as a party after his death. The trial court's
decision had thereby become final and executory, no appeal having been perfected.
Domingo Carabeo vs. Sps. Norberto and Susan Dingco, G.R. No. 190823, April 4, 2011
The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the
damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarily
and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while
in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property
and rights of property affected being incidental.
Domingo Carabeo vs. Sps. Norberto and Susan Dingco, G.R. No. 190823, April 4, 2011, citing Bonilla v.
Barcena, G.R. No. L-41715, June 18, 1976
Rule 3, Sec. 19 - Transfer of interest
State Investment House vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106795, November 16, 1999
Section 19 of Rule 3 of Rules of Court uses the word "may" to denote that the substitution of
parties on account of transfer of interest from the original party to another is discretionary.
Intestate Estate of the Late Nimfa Sian vs. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 168882, January 31, 2007
Rule 3, Sec. 20 - Action on contractual money claims
Vivencio M. Ruiz, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 116909, February 25, 1999
Purita Alipio vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134100, September 29, 2000
Natalia Realty vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126462, November 12, 2002
Melencio Gabriel vs. Nelson Bilon, et al., G.R. No. 146989, February 7, 2007
Rule 3, Sec. 21 - Indigent party
Tokio Marine Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., et al. vs. Jorge Valdez, G.R. Nos. 150107 & 150108, January
28, 2008
Teofilo Martinez vs. People of the Phil., G.R. No. 132852, May 31, 2000
Rule 3, Sec. 22 - Notice to the Solicitor General
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. La Suerte Cigar, G.R. No. 144942, June 28, 2001
Rule 4 - Venue of Actions
While stipulations regarding venue are considered valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in a
contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of
Court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words.
Pacific Consultants International Asia, Inc., et al. vs. Klaus K. Schonfeld. G.R. No. 166920, February 19,
2007
Rule 4, Sec. 1 - Venue of real actions
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide an answer to the issue of
venue. Actions affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest therein (real actions)
shall be commenced and tried in the proper court that has territorial jurisdiction over the area where
the real property is situated. On the other hand, all other actions (personal actions) shall be
commenced and tried in the proper courts where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides.
Generosa Almeda Latorre vs. Luis Esteban Latorre, G.R. No. 183926, March 29, 2010
A real action, under Sec. 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, is one that affects title to or possession
of real property, or an interest therein. Such actions should be commenced and tried in the proper
court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is
situated. All other actions are personal and may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any
of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides,
or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Yahya M. Tomawis vs. Rasad G. Balindong, et al. G.R. No. 182434, March 5, 2010 citing Orbeta v.
Orbeta, G.R. No. 166837, November 27, 2006
Exclusive venue stipulation embodied in a contract restricts or confines parties thereto when the
suit relates to breach of the said contract. But where the exclusivity clause does not make it
necessarily all encompassing, such that even those not related to the enforcement of the contract
should be subject to the exclusive venue, the stipulation designating exclusive venues should be
strictly confined to the specific undertaking or agreement. Otherwise, the basic principles of
freedom to contract might work to the great disadvantage of a weak party-suitor who ought to be
allowed free access to courts of justice.
Restrictive stipulations are in derogation of the general policy of making it more convenient for
the parties to institute actions arising from or in relation to their agreements. Thus, the restriction
should be strictly construed as relating solely to the agreement for which the exclusive venue
stipulation is embodied. Expanding the scope of such limitation on a contracting party will create
unwarranted restrictions which the parties might find unintended or worse, arbitrary and oppressive.
Moreover, since convenience is the raison d'etre of the rules on venue, venue stipulation should
be deemed merely permissive, and that interpretation should be adopted which most serves the
parties' convenience. Contrawise, the rules mandated by the Rules of Court should govern.
SMC vs. Monasterio, G.R. No. 151037, June 30, 2005
By express provision of Section 417 of the LGC, an action for the enforcement of the settlement
should be instituted in the proper municipal or city court. This is regardless of the nature of the
complaint before the Lupon, and the relief prayed for therein. The venue for such actions is
governed by Rule 4, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. An action for the
enforcement of a settlement is not one of those covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure in civil
cases; hence, the rules on regular procedure shall apply, as provided for in Section 1, Rule 5 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Real actions, as so opposed to personal actions, are those which affect the title to or possession of
real property. Where a contrary claim to ownership is made by an adverse party, and where the
relief prayed for cannot be granted without the court deciding on the merits the issue of ownership
and title, more specifically so as to who, between the contending parties, would have a better right
to the property, the case can only be but a real action.
2002
Atlantic Erectors vs. Herbal Cove, G.R. No. 148568, March 20, 2003
Rule 4, Sec. 2 - Venue of personal actions
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide an answer to the issue of
venue. Actions affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest therein (real actions)
shall be commenced and tried in the proper court that has territorial jurisdiction over the area where
the real property is situated. On the other hand, all other actions (personal actions) shall be
commenced and tried in the proper courts where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides.
Generosa Almeda Latorre vs. Luis Esteban Latorre, G.R. No. 183926, March 29, 2010
A real action, under Sec. 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, is one that affects title to or possession
of real property, or an interest therein. Such actions should be commenced and tried in the proper
court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is
situated. All other actions are personal and may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any
of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides,
or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Yahya M. Tomawis vs. Rasad G. Balindong, et al. G.R. No. 182434, March 5, 2010 citing Orbeta v.
Orbeta, G.R. No. 166837,November 27, 2006
The general rule on the venue of personal actions, as in a case for damages, is embodied in
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court… The rule, however, finds no application where the parties,
before the filing of the action, have validly agreed in writing on an exclusive venue.
Auction in Malinta, Inc. vs. Warren Embes Luyaben, G.R. No. 173979, February 12, 2007
Uniwide Holdings, Inc. vs. Alexander M. Cruz, G.R. No. 171456, August 9, 2007
The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is given to plaintiff but not to
plaintiff's caprice because the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court. The rule on venue, like
other procedural rules, is designed to insure a just and orderly administration of justice, or the
impartial and evenhanded determination of every action and proceeding. The option of plaintiff in
personal actions cognizable by the RTC is either the place where defendant resides or may be found,
or the place where plaintiff resides. If plaintiff opts for the latter, he is limited to that place.
Aniceto Saludo, Jr. vs. American Express Int'l Inc, G.R. No. 159507, April 19, 2006
An action for damages being a personal action, venue is determined pursuant to Rule 4, section 2
of the Rules of Court.
Davao Light vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111685, August 20, 2001
2002
Anita Mangila vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 125027, August 12, 2002
Atlantic Erectors vs. Herbal Cove, G.R. No. 148568, March 20, 2003
Rule 4, Sec. 4 - When Rule not applicable
Section 2 of Rule 4 is, however, qualified by Section 4 of the same rule which allows parties,
before the filing of the action, to validly agree in writing on an exclusive venue.
Uniwide Holdings, Inc. vs. Alexander M. Cruz, G.R. No. 171456, August 9, 2007
The Rules of Court provide that parties to an action may agree in writing on the venue on which
an action should be brought. However, a mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough to
preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be able to show that such
stipulation is exclusive. Thus, absent words that show the parties' intention to restrict the filing of a
suit in a particular place, courts will allow the filing of a case in any venue, as long as jurisdictional
requirements are followed. Venue stipulations in a contract, while considered valid and enforceable,
do not as a rule supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. In the
absence of qualifying or restrictive words, they should be considered merely as an agreement on
additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.
Rule 5 - Uniform Procedure in Trial Courts
Sps. Michaelangelo and Grace Mesina vs. Humberto D. Meer, G.R. No. 146845, July 2, 2002
Rule 5, Sec. 1 - Uniform procedure
Rule 6, Sec. 5 - Defenses
Reynaldo T. Cometa vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124062, January 21, 1999
Alibi is indeed a good defense and could certainly exculpate a person accused of a crime.
However, this is true only if the accused's alibi strictly meets the following requisites:
1. His presence at another place at the time of the commission of the crime; and
2. The physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime.

People of the Phil. vs. Cleofe V. Baroquillo, et al., G.R. No. 184960, August 24, 2011
This Court has ruled consistently that alibi is an inherently weak defense and should be rejected
when the identity of the accused is sufficiently and positively established by the prosecution.
Moreover, for alibi to overcome the prosecution's evidence, the defense must successfully prove the
element of physical impossibility of the accused's presence at the crime scene at the time of the
perpetration of the offense. Physical impossibility in relation to alibi takes into consideration not
only the geographical distance between the scene of the crime and the place where accused
maintains he was, but more importantly, the accessibility between these points. . . . By physical
impossibility, we refer to the distance and the facility of access between the situs criminis and the
place where he says he was when the crime was committed.
People of the Phil. vs. Cleofe V. Baroquillo, et al., G.R. No. 184960, August 24, 2011, citing People vs.
Bihag, Jr. and Hilot, 396 Phil. 289 (2000)
It is well-settled that since alibi is a weak defense for being easily fabricated, it cannot prevail
over and is worthless in the face of the positive identification by a credible witness that an accused
perpetrated the crime.
People of the Phil. vs. Cleofe V. Baroquillo, et al., G.R. No. 184960, August 24, 2011, citing People vs.
Bihag, Jr. and Hilot, 396 Phil. 289 (2000)
Jurisprudential rules and precepts guide this Court in assessing the proffered defense. One, alibis
and denials are generally disfavored by the courts for being weak. Two, they cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime. Three, for alibi to prosper, the
accused must prove not only that they were somewhere else when the crime was committed, but
also that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission. Fourth, alibi assumes significance or strength only when it is amply corroborated by
credible and disinterested witnesses. Fifth, alibi is an issue of fact that hinges on the credibility of
witnesses, and the assessment made by the trial court — unless patently and clearly inconsistent —
must be accepted.
People of the Phil. vs. Juanito Apattad, G.R. No. 193188, August 10, 2011, citing People vs. Estoya,
G.R. No. 153538, May 19, 2004
Alibi becomes more unworthy of merit where it is established mainly by the accused himself and
his or her relatives, friends, and comrades-in-arms and not by credible persons.
Victor Rondina vs. People of the Phil., G.R. No. 179059, June 13, 2012 citing People v. Alfredo, G.R.
No. 188560, December 15, 2010
In light of the positive identification of appellant by the prosecution witnesses and since no ill
motive on their part or on that of their families was shown that could have made either of them
institute the case against the appellant and falsely implicate him in a serious crime he did not
commit, appellant's defense of alibi must necessarily fail. It is settled in this jurisdiction that the
defense of alibi, being inherently weak, cannot prevail over the clear and positive identification of
the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.
People of the Phil. vs. Francisca Talaro, et al., G.R. No. 175781, March 20, 2012 citing People vs.
Molina, G.R. No. 184173, March 13, 2009
It is elementary that the defense of denial is outweighed by a positive identification that is

categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on
the matter. Denial, like alibi, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and
self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.
People of the Phil. vs. Antonio L. Baldomar, G.R. No. 197043, February 29, 2012
Rule 6, Sec. 6 - Counterclaim
Felipe Yulienco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131692, June 10, 1999
A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party. It
partakes of the nature of a complaint or cause of action against the plaintiff. It is an independent
action, separate and distinct from the original complaint.
Johnny K. Lima, et al. vs. Transway Sales Corp., et al, G.R. No. 106770, October 22, 1999
Rule 6, Sec. 7 - Compulsory counterclaim
A counterclaim is compulsory when its object "arises out of or is necessarily connected with the
transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not
require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction".
Premiere Development Bank vs. Alfredo C. Flores, et al., G.R. No. 175339, December 16, 2008
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 does not apply to compulsory counterclaims. The circular
applies to initiatory and similar pleadings. A compulsory counterclaim set up in the answer is not an
"initiatory" or similar pleading. The initiatory pleading is the plaintiff's complaint. A respondent has
no choice but to raise a compulsory counterclaim the moment the plaintiff files the complaint.
Otherwise, respondent waives the compulsory counterclaim. In short, the compulsory counterclaim
is a reaction or response, mandatory upon pain of waiver, to an initiatory pleading which is the
complaint.
Estherlita Cruz-Agana vs. Aurora Santiago-Lagman, et al., G.R. No. 139018, April 11, 2005
A compulsory counterclaim cannot be the subject of a separate action but it should instead be
asserted in the same suit involving the same transaction or occurrence, which gave rise to it. To
determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, we have devised the following tests: (1)
Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same? (2) Would
res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (3)
Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as the defendant's
counterclaim? and (4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?
Affirmative answers to the above queries indicate the existence of a compulsory counterclaim.
A compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary to the proceeding in the original suit and derives its
jurisdictional support therefrom. A counterclaim presupposes the existence of a claim against the
party filing the counterclaim. Hence, where there is no claim against the counterclaimant, the
counterclaim is improper and it must dismissed, more so where the complaint is dismissed at the
instance of the counterclaimant. In other words, if the dismissal of the main action results in the
dismissal of the counterclaim already filed, it stands to reason that the filing of a motion to dismiss
the complaint is an implied waiver of the compulsory counterclaim because the grant of the motion
ultimately results in the dismissal of the counterclaim.
Thus, the filing of a motion to dismiss and the setting up of a compulsory counterclaim are
incompatible remedies. In the event that a defending party has a ground for dismissal and a
compulsory counterclaim at the same time, he must choose only one remedy. If he decides to file a
motion to dismiss, he will lose his compulsory counterclaim. But if he opts to set up his compulsory
counterclaim, he may still plead his ground for dismissal as an affirmative defense in his answer.
Financial Building Corp. vs. Forbes Park Association, G.R. No. 133119, August 17, 2000
A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a defending party may
have against an opposing party. A counterclaim is compulsory if (a) it arises out of, or is necessarily
connected with, the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim; (b) it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim. In other words, a
compulsory counterclaim cannot be made the subject of a separate action but should be asserted in
the same suit involving the same transaction or occurrence giving rise to it. cdasia
Felipe Yulienco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131692, June 10, 1999
Rule 6, Sec. 8 - Cross-claim
The Rules of Court defines a cross-claim as any claim by one party against a co-party arising out
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a
counterclaim. It may include a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to
the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant. The
answer then to the cross-claim is meant to join the subsidiary issues between the co-parties in
relation to the opposing party's claim against the cross-claimant.
Needless to state, until the principal issue between the plaintiff and the defendant cross-claimant
shall have been heard and determined, it would be premature to decide the cross-claim .
Leticia P. Ligon vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127683, August 7, 1998
China Airlines vs. Daniel Chiok, G.R. No. 152122, July 30, 2003
Rule 6, Sec. 10 - Reply
Under Section 10, Rule 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any new matter alleged by way of
defense in the answer (or comment as in this case) is deemed controverted should a party fail to file
a reply thereto. Except in cases where the answer alleges the defense of usury in which case a reply
under oath is required otherwise the allegation of usury is deemed admitted, or is based on an
actionable document in which case a verified reply is necessary otherwise the genuineness and due
execution of said actionable document is generally deemed admitted, the filing of a reply is merely
optional as the new matters raised in the answer are deemed controverted even without a reply.
Ramon M. Veluz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139951, November 23, 2000
Rule 6, Sec. 11 - Third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint
A third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a
person not a party to the action, called the third-party defendant, for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim.
Seaoil Petroleum Corp. vs. Autocorp Group, et al., G.R. No. 164326, October 17, 2008
A third-party complaint is actually a complaint independent of, and separate and distinct from the
plaintiff's complaint. Were it not for Rule 6, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, such third-party
complaint would have to be filed independently and separately from the original complaint by the
defendant against the third-party defendant. The purpose is to avoid circuitry of action and
unnecessary proliferation of law suits and of disposing expeditiously in one litigation all the matters
arising from one particular set of facts. The trial court is vested with discretion whether or not to
allow the defendant to file a third-party complaint. As such, the defendant has no vested right to file
a third-party complaint.
Erasmo Tayao vs. Rosa D. Mendoza, et al., G.R. No. 162733, April 12, 2005
Accordingly, the requisites for a third-party action are, firstly, that the party to be impleaded must
not yet be a party to the action; secondly, that the claim against the third-party defendant must
belong to the original defendant; thirdly, the claim of the original defendant against the third-party
defendant must be based upon the plaintiff's claim against the original defendant; and, fourthly, the
defendant is attempting to transfer to the third-party defendant the liability asserted against him by
the original plaintiff.
As the foregoing indicates, the claim that the third-party complaint asserts against the third-party
defendant must be predicated on substantive law. Here, the substantive law on which the right of
Inland to seek such other relief through its third-party complaint rested were Article 2176 and
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. vs. Felix Paras, et al., G.R. No. 161909, April 25, 2012
Paras' cause of action against Inland (breach of contract of carriage) did not need to be the same
as the cause of action of Inland against Philtranco and its driver (tort or quasi-delict) in the
impleader. It is settled that a defendant in a contract action may join as third-party defendants those
who may be liable to him in tort for the plaintiff's claim against him, or even directly to the plaintiff.
Indeed, Prof. Wright, et al., commenting on the provision of the Federal Rules of Procedure of the
United States from which Section 12, supra, was derived, observed so, to wit:
The third-party claim need not be based on the same theory as the main claim. For
example, there are cases in which the third-party claim is based on an express indemnity
contract and the original complaint is framed in terms of negligence. Similarly, there need not
be any legal relationship between the third-party defendant and any of the other parties to the
action. Impleader also is proper even though the third party's liability is contingent, and
technically does not come into existence until the original defendant's liability has been
established. In addition, the words 'is or may be liable' in Rule 14(a) make it clear that
impleader is proper even though the third-party defendant's liability is not automatically
established once the third-party plaintiff's liability to the original plaintiff has been
determined.
Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. vs. Felix Paras, et al., G.R. No. 161909, April 25, 2012
Rule 7, Sec. 1 - Caption
Rule 7, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states that the names of the parties shall be indicated in
the title of the original complaint or petition.
Linton Commercial Co., Inc., et al. vs. Alex A. Hellera, et al., G.R. No. 163147, October 10, 2007
Rule 7, Sec. 3 - Signature and address
Antonio (Antonino) Samaniego, et al. vs. Vic Alvarez Aguila, et al., G.R. No. 125567, June 27, 2000
[I]n a derivative suit, it is the corporation that is the indispensable party, while the suing
stockholder is just a nominal party. Under Rule 7, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, an indispensable
party is a party-in-interest, without whom no final determination can be had of an action without
that party being impleaded. Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the controversy
that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the court cannot proceed without
their presence. "Interest," within the meaning of this rule, should be material, directly in issue, and
to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question
involved. On the other hand, a nominal or pro forma party is one who is joined as a plaintiff or
defendant, not because such party has any real interest in the subject matter or because any relief is
demanded, but merely because the technical rules of pleadings require the presence of such party on
the record.
Santiago Cua, Jr., et al. vs. Miguel Ocampo Tan, et al., G.R. Nos. 181455-56 & 182008, December 4,
2009
With the corporation as the real party-in-interest and the indispensable party, any ruling in one of
the derivative suits should already bind the corporation as res judicata in the other. Allowing two
different minority stockholders to institute separate derivative suits arising from the same factual
background, alleging the same causes of action, and praying for the same reliefs, is tantamount to
allowing the corporation, the real party-in-interest, to file the same suit twice, resulting in the
violation of the rules against a multiplicity of suits and even forum-shopping. It is also in disregard
of the separate-corporate-entity principle, because it is to look beyond the corporation and to give
recognition to the different identities of the stockholders instituting the derivative suits.
Santiago Cua, Jr., et al. vs. Miguel Ocampo Tan, et al., G.R. Nos. 181455-56 & 182008, December 4,
2009
It is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that are controlling. The inclusion
of the names of all the parties in the title of a complaint is a formal requirement under Section 3,
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. However, the rules of pleadings require courts to pierce the form and
go into the substance. The non-inclusion of one or some of the names of all the complainants in the
title of a complaint, is not fatal to the case, provided there is a statement in the body of the
complaint indicating that such complainant/s was/were made party to such action. This is specially
true before the HLURB where the proceedings are summary in nature without regard to legal
technicalities obtaining in the courts of law and where the pertinent concern is to promote public
interest and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action, application or other proceedings.
Sps. William and Rebecca Genato vs. Rita Viola, G.R. No. 169706, February 5, 2010
Rule 7, Sec. 4 - Verification
Loreta Torres vs. Specialized Packaging Dev't. Corp., G.R. No. 149634, July 6, 2004
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that an affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations
therein are true and correct as to his personal knowledge or based on authentic records. The party
does not need to sign the verification. A party's representative, lawyer, or any person who personally
knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification.
Hutama-RSEA/Supermax Phils., J.V. vs. KCD Builders Corp., G.R. No. 173181, March 3, 2010
A party's failure to sign the certification against forum shopping is different from the party's
failure to sign personally the verification. The certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by
the party, and not by counsel. The certification of counsel renders the petition defective.
On the other hand, the requirement on verification of a pleading is a formal and not a
jurisdictional requisite. It is intended simply to secure an assurance that what are alleged in the
pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and
that the pleading is filed in good faith. The party need not sign the verification. A party's
representative, lawyer or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the
pleading may sign the verification.
Vallacar Transit, Inc. vs. Jocelyn Catubig, G.R. No. 175512, May 30, 2011, citing Pajuyo v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 146364, June 3, 2004
As a general rule, a pleading need not be verified, unless there is a law or rule specifically
requiring the same. Examples of pleadings that require verification are: (1) all pleadings filed in
civil cases under the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure; (2) petition for review from the
Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court raising only questions of law under Rule 41, Section 2;
(3) petition for review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals under
Rule 42, Section 1; (4) petition for review from quasi-judicial bodies to the Court of Appeals under
Rule 43, Section 5; (5) petition for review before the Supreme Court under Rule 45, Section 1; (6)
petition for annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions under Rule 47, Section 4; (7)
complaint for injunction under Rule 58, Section 4; (8) application for preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order under Rule 58, Section 4; (9) application for appointment of a receiver
under Rule 59, Section 1; (10) application for support pendente lite under Rule 61, Section 1; (11)
petition for certiorari against the judgments, final orders or resolutions of constitutional
commissions under Rule 64, Section 2; (12) petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under
Rule 65, Sections 1 to 3; (13) petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 1; (14) complaint for
expropriation under Rule 67, Section 1; (15) petition for indirect contempt under Rule 71, Section 4,
all from the 1997 Rules of Court; (16) all complaints or petitions involving intra-corporate
controversies under the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies; (17)
complaint or petition for rehabilitation and suspension of payment under the Interim Rules on
Corporate Rehabilitation; and (18) petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and
annulment of voidable marriages as well as petition for summary proceedings under the Family
Code.
Vallacar Transit, Inc. vs. Jocelyn Catubig, G.R. No. 175512, May 30, 2011
For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential
pronouncements already reflected above respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, or
submission of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission

of defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of
defective certification against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render

the pleading fatally defective. The Court may order its submission or correction or act on the
pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to
swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and
when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein,

unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction
thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or
presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in
a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under
reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners
share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of
only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the
Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not
by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable
to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to
sign on his behalf.
Nellie Vda. de Formoso, et al. vs. PNB, et al., G.R. No. 154704, June 1, 2011, citing Oldarico S.
Traveno v. Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, G.R. No. 164205, September 3,
2009
As worded, the Rule dictates that a pleading may be verified under either of the two given modes
or under both.
Marcial Aparece vs. J. Marketing Corp., et al., G.R. No. 174224, October 17, 2008
The verification requirement is significant, as it is intended to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of
speculation.
Toyota Motor Phil. Corp. Workers Assn., et al., vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos.
158786, 158789 & 158798-99, October 19, 2007
Christine Chua vs. Jorge Torres, G.R. No. 151900, August 30, 2005
Loreta Torres vs. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation, G.R. No. 149634, July 6, 2004
Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146923, April 30, 2003
Under Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, a pleading is verified by an affidavit that the
affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal
knowledge or based on authentic records.
Fernando Go vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 163745, August 24, 2007
LDP Marketing, Inc. vs. Monter, G.R. No. 159653, January 25, 2006
Section 4 of Rule 7 indicates that a pleading may be verified under either of the two given modes
or under both. The veracity of the allegations in a pleading may be affirmed based on either one's
own personal knowledge or on authentic records, or both, as warranted. The use of the preposition
"or" connotes that either source qualifies as a sufficient basis for verification and, needless to state,
the concurrence of both sources is more than sufficient.
Hun Hyung Park vs. Eun Won Choi, G.R. No. 165496, February 12, 2007
Franklin P. Bautista vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 136082, May 12, 2000
The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such

requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleading, the non-compliance of which does
not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an
assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the
imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may
order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not
verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.
Sergio I. Carbonilla, et al. vs. Board of Airlines Representatives, G.R. Nos. 193247 & 194276,
September 14, 2011
Marilyn Valdecantos vs. People of the Phil., et al., G.R. No. 148852, September 27, 2006
The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations of the
petition have been made in good faith, or are true and correct, not merely speculative.
Non-compliance with such requirement does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective,
hence, the court may order its correction if verification is lacking, or act on the pleading although it
is not verified if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rules may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.
Erneliza Z. Mamaril vs. CSC, et al., G.R. No. 164929, April 10, 2006
Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true
and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading
is filed in good faith."
Jesus Dela Rosa, et al. vs. Santiago Carlos, et al., G.R. No. 147549, October 23, 2003
Verification is intended to assure that the allegations in the pleading have been prepared in
good faith or are true and correct, not mere speculations. Generally, lack of verification is merely a
formal defect that is neither jurisdictional nor fatal. The court may order the correction of the
pleading or act on the unverified pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict
compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order to serve the ends of justice.
Antonio I. Rodriguez vs. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), G.R. No. 153947, December 5,
2002
Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Sps. Willie and Julie L. Evangelista, et al., G.R. No. 146553,
November 27, 2002
City Warden of the Manila City Jail vs. Raymond S. Estrella, et al., G.R. No. 141211, August 31, 2001
Pfizer Inc. et al. vs. Edwin V. Galan, G.R. No. 143389, May 25, 2001
Verification based on the affiant's own knowledge and information is sufficient under the
circumstances. Verification is merely a formal and not a jurisdictional requisite which does not
affect the validity or efficacy of the pleading, or the jurisdiction of the court. Therefore, a defective
verification, as in the present case, does not render the pleading or the petition invalid and the Court
of Appeals did not err in giving due course to the petition.
Purto J. Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141307, March 28, 2001
Rule 7, Sec. 5 - Certification against forum shopping
Basis for the Requirement of Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
The requirement of the certification of non-forum shopping is rooted in the principle that a
party-litigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this practice
is detrimental to an orderly judicial procedure. However, the Court has relaxed, under justifiable
circumstances, the rule requiring the submission of such certification considering that, although it is
obligatory, it is not jurisdictional. Not being jurisdictional, it can be relaxed under the rule of
substantial compliance.
South Cotabato Communications Corp., et al. vs. Patricia A. Sto. Tomas, et al., G.R. No. 173326,
December 15, 2010
All complaints, petitions, applications, and other initiatory pleadings must be accompanied by a
certificate against forum shopping, first prescribed by Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which
took effect on April 1, 1994, then later on by Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
Vallacar Transit, Inc. vs. Jocelyn Catubig, G.R. No. 175512, May 30, 2011
What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the
vexation caused the courts and parties-litigant by a party who asks different courts and/or
administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the same or
substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being
rendered by the different fora upon the same issue.
Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. vs. Pfizer, Inc. et al., G.R. No. 167715, November 17, 2010
Public Interest Center, Inc., et al. vs. Vicente Q. Roxas, et al., G.R. No. 125509, January 31, 2007
Regarding the certification against forum shopping, the Rules of Court provides that the plaintiff
or the principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading the
requirements as mandated under Section 5, Rule 7.
Teresa Gabriel, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 149909, October 11, 2007
Failure to comply with the non-forum shopping requirements in Section 5, Rule 7 of the Revised
Rules of Court, does not automatically warrant the dismissal of the case with prejudice.
Composite Enterprises, Inc. vs. Emilio M. Caparoso, et al., G.R. No. 159919, August 8, 2007
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court requires that, should there be any pending action or claim
before any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, a complete statement of its status should be
given.
Rufa C. Suan vs. Ricardo D. Gonzalez, A.C. No. 6377, March 12, 2007
This circumstance — of being surprised by the discovery of another pending claim with another
court or quasi-judicial agency — is the very situation contemplated by letter (c) in the first
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
Nelson P. Collantes vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 169604, March 6, 2007
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides that the certification of non-forum shopping
should be executed by the plaintiff or the principal party. Failure to comply with the requirement
shall be cause for dismissal of the case. However, a liberal application of the rules is proper where
the higher interest of justice would be served. In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that while a
petition may have been flawed where the certificate of non-forum shopping was signed only by
counsel and not by the party, this procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial
justice. So it is in the present controversy where the merits of the case and the absence of an
intention to violate the rules with impunity should be considered as compelling reasons to temper
the strict application of the rules.
Michael C. Guy vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 163707, September 15, 2006
The requirement that the certification of non-forum shopping should be executed and signed by
the plaintiff or principal means that counsel cannot sign said certification unless clothed with
special authority to do so. The reason for this is that the plaintiff or principal knows better than
anyone else whether a petition has previously been filed involving the same case or substantially the
same issues. Hence, a certification signed by counsel alone is defective and constitutes a valid cause
for dismissal of the petition. In the case of natural persons, the Rule requires the parties themselves
to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping. However, in the case of the corporations, the physical
act of signing may be performed, on behalf of the corporate entity, only by specifically authorized
individuals for the simple reason that corporations, as artificial persons, cannot personally do the
task themselves. It cannot be gainsaid that obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is
needed if we are to expect fair results therefrom. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.
Phil. Public School Teachers Ass'n, et al vs. Heirs of Carolina P. Iligan, et al., G.R. No. 171562, July 27,
2006
Forum-shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.
Thus, it has been held that there is forum-shopping —
(1) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable
decision (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another, or
(2) if, after he has filed a petition before the Supreme Court, a party files another before the
Court of Appeals since in such case he deliberately splits appeals "in the hope that even as
one case in which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed, another case (offering a
similar remedy) would still be open," or
(3) where a party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after failing to
obtain the same from the original court.
Executive Secretary, et al. vs. Richard J. Gordon, et al., G.R. No. 134171, November 18, 1998
Forum shopping exists when two or more actions involve the same transactions, essential facts
and circumstances, and raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues. Still another test
of forum shopping is when the elements of litis pendencia are present or where a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicata in another — whether in the two or more pending cases, there
is an identity of (a) parties (or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions);
(b) rights or causes of action, and (c) reliefs sought.
Metrobank vs. International Exchange Bank, G.R. Nos. 176008 & 176131, August 10, 2011
The Rules of Civil Procedure generally do not apply to election cases. They apply only by
analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. Election contests are
subject to the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Rule 35 thereof governs election contests involving
elective municipal officials before the Regional Trial Courts. Rule 35 does not require that the
petition contesting the election of any municipal official be accompanied by a certification or any
statement against forum shopping.
Claudius G. Barroso vs. Francisco S. Ampig, et al., G.R. No. 138218, March 17, 2000
Apolinario vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123686, November 16, 1999
Section 5, Rule 7 expressly provides that it is the plaintiff or principal party who shall certify
under oath that he has not commenced any action involving the same issues in any court, etc.
The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge
by the party who executed the same. Petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to
personally sign the certification. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking
on the policy of liberal construction.
Efren O. Loquias, et al. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 139396, August 15, 2000
Allen Leroy Hamilton vs. David Levy, et al., G.R. No. 139283, November 15, 2000
MCIAA vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139495, November 27, 2000
Alexander T. Ty vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 112872 & 114672, April 19, 2001
Alfredo Canuto, Jr. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 110914, June 28, 2001
The requirement in Rule 7, § 5 that the certification should be executed by the plaintiff or the
principal means that counsel cannot sign the certificate against forum-shopping. The reason for this
is that the plaintiff or principal knows better than anyone else whether a petition has previously been
filed involving the same case or substantially the same issues. Hence, a certification signed by
counsel alone is defective and constitutes a valid cause for dismissal of the petition.
Santiago Eslaban vs. Clarita Vda. De Onorio, G.R. No. 146062, June 28, 2001
Forum shopping is an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one
forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or
the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition. The language of the Supreme Court circular (now the above-quoted Section 5, Rule 7,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) distinctly suggests that it is primarily intended to cover an initiatory
pleading or an incipient application of a party asserting a claim for relief. The most important factor
in determining the existence of forum shopping is the "vexation caused the courts and
parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes or grant
the same or substantially the same reliefs."
Since a party resorts to forum shopping in order to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable
decision or action, it has been held that a party cannot be said to have sought to improve his chances
of obtaining a favorable decision or action where no unfavorable decision has ever been rendered
against him in any of the cases he has brought before the courts. Forum shopping exists where the
elements of litis pendencia are present, and where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in the other.
Ma. Carminia C. Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139337, August 15, 2001
Request for Consolidation of Civil Case No. R-1692 RTC BR. 45, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro with
Civil Case No. 3640, RTC-BR. 49, Cabanatuan City, A.M. No. 00-7-299-RTC, August 31, 2001
Republic vs. Carmel Development, Inc., G.R. No. 142572, February 20, 2002
Spouses Elanio C. Ong vs. Court of Appeals and Emma A. Garamay Ong, G.R. No. 144581, July 5,
2002
Antonio I. Rodriguez vs. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), G.R. No. 153947, December 5,
2002
Tomas R. Leonidas vs. Francisco G. Supnet, AM MTJ-02-1433, February 21, 2003
Emilio S. Young vs. John Keng Seng, G.R. No. 143464, March 5, 2003
Agapito Cruz Fiel vs. Kris Security Systems, G.R. No. 155875, April 3, 2003
Prudencio Bantolino, et al. vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., G.R. No. 153660, June 10, 2003,
Top Rate Construction vs. Paxton Development Corp., G.R. No. 151081, September 11, 2003
Jimmy L. Barnes vs. Teresita C. Reyes, et al., G.R. No. 144533, September 23, 2003
Diana M. Barcelona vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130087, September 24, 2003
Sps. Manuel and Rosemarie Wee vs. Rosario D. Galvez, G.R. No. 147394, August 11, 2004
Origin of the Concept of Forum Shopping
The determination of whether there is identity of parties rests on the commonality of the parties'
interest, regardless of whether they are indispensable parties or not. The issue of whether the
additional parties are indispensable parties or not acquires real significance only when considering
the validity of the judgment that will be rendered in the earlier case. This is so, because if the
additional parties are indispensable parties, then no valid judgment can be rendered against them in
the earlier case in which they did not participate, and this will foreclose the application of res
judicata which requires the existence of a final judgment.
Sps. Sofronio and Natividad Santos, et al. vs. Heirs of Dominga Lustre, G.R. No. 151016, August 6,
2008
Forum shopping originated as a concept in private international law, where non-resident litigants
are given the option to choose the forum or place wherein to bring their suit for various reasons or
excuses, including to secure procedural advantages, to annoy and harass the defendant, to avoid
overcrowded dockets, or to select a more friendly venue. To combat these less than honorable
excuses, the principle of forum non conveniens was developed whereby a court, in conflicts of law
cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available
forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
In the Philippines, forum shopping has acquired a connotation encompassing not only a choice of
venues, as it was originally understood in conflicts of laws, but also to a choice of remedies. As to
the first (choice of venues), the Rules of Court, for example, allow a plaintiff to commence personal
actions "where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the
plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff" (Rule 4, Sec. 2[b]). As to
remedies, aggrieved parties, for example, are given a choice of pursuing civil liabilities
independently of the criminal, arising from the same set of facts. A passenger of a public utility
vehicle involved in a vehicular accident may sue on culpa contractual, culpa aquiliana or culpa
criminal — each remedy being available independently of the others — although he cannot recover
more than once.
"In either of these situations (choice of venue or choice of remedy), the litigant actually shops for
a forum of his action. This was the original concept of the term forum shopping. "Eventually,
however, instead of actually making a choice of the forum of their actions, litigants, through the
encouragement of their lawyers, file their actions in all available courts, or invoke all relevant
remedies simultaneously. This practice had not only resulted to (sic) conflicting adjudications
among different courts and consequent confusion enimical (sic) to an orderly administration of
justice. It had created extreme inconvenience to some of the parties to the action.
"Thus, 'forum-shopping' had acquired a different concept — which is unethical professional legal
practice. And this necessitated or had given rise to the formulation of rules and canons discouraging
or altogether prohibiting the practice." What therefore started both in conflicts of laws and in our
domestic law as a legitimate device for solving problems has been abused and misused to assure
scheming litigants of dubious reliefs.
Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.), Inc., et al. vs. Social Security Commission, G.R. No. 159323, July 31, 2008
First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115849, January 24, 1996
Forum Shopping Construed
Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who "repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions
and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either
pending in, or already resolved adversely by some other court . . . to increase his chances of
obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another."
Tokio Marine Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., et al. vs. Jorge Valdez, G.R. No. 150107, January 28, 2008
It is "the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment."
Mondragon Leisure and Resorts Corp. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 154187, April 14,
2004
T'Boli Agro-Industrial Development, Inc. vs. Nephtali Solilapsi, A.C. No. 4766, December 27, 2002
There is forum shopping when the following elements are present: "(a) identity of parties, or at
least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions[;] (b) identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts[;] and (c) the identity of the two
preceding particulars[,] such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration; said requisites
[are] also constitutive of the requisites for auter action pendant or lis pendens." The essence of
forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment,
through means other than by appeal or certiorari.
Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. Litis pendentia
is a Latin term, which literally means "a pending suit" and is variously referred to in some decisions
as lis pendens and auter action pendant. As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, it refers to
the situation where two actions are pending between the same parties for the same cause of action,
so that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It is based on the policy against
multiplicity of suits. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) identity
of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both actions; (2)
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3)
identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that
may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other case.
Rationale for Rule Against Forum Shopping
The rationale against forum shopping is that a party should not be allowed to pursue
simultaneous remedies in two different courts as it constitutes abuse of court processes, which tends
to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to
the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.
Sps. Manuel and Rosemarie Wee vs. Rosario D. Galvez, G.R. No. 147394, August 11, 2004
George S. Briones vs. Lilia J. Henson-Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 159130, August 22, 2008
Coca-Bottler (Phils.), Inc., et al. vs. Social Security Commission, et al., G.R. No. 159323, July 31, 2008
Tokio Marine Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., et al. vs. Jorge Valdez, G.R. Nos. 150107 & 150108, January
28, 2008
A certificate of non-forum shopping is required only in complaints or other initiatory pleadings,

and a petition or motion for the issuance of the writ under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, is
not a complaint or an initiatory pleading.
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. vs. Sps. Elmor and Rosario J. Bance, G.R. No. 167280, April 30, 2008
The certification against forum shopping is required only in a complaint or other initiatory
pleading. The ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by the respondent is not
an initiatory pleading. Although the private respondent denominated its pleading as a petition, it is,
nonetheless, a motion. What distinguishes a motion from a petition or other pleading is not its form
or the title given by the party executing it, but rather its purpose. The office of a motion is not to
initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but incidental matter arising in the progress of the case
in which the motion is filed. A motion is not an independent right or remedy, but is confined to
incidental matters in the progress of a cause. It relates to some question that is collateral to the
main object of the action and is connected with and dependent upon the principal remedy. An
application for a writ of possession is a mere incident in the registration proceeding. Hence,
although it was denominated as a "petition," it was in substance merely a motion.
Metrobank vs. Salvador Abad Santos, et al., G.R. No. 157867, December 15, 2009
The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least, such as representing the
same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases, such that judgment in one,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
Roberto S. Benedicto, et al. vs. Manuel Lacson, et al., G.R. No. 141508, May 5, 2010
The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another
more than once regarding the same subject matter and for the same cause of action. This theory is
founded on the public policy that the same subject matter should not be the subject of controversy in
courts more than once, in order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided for the sake of
the stability of the rights and status of persons.
The test to determine identity of causes of action is to ascertain whether the same evidence
necessary to sustain the second cause of action is sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first, even
if the forms or the nature of the two (2) actions are different from each other. If the same facts or
evidence would sustain both, the two (2) actions are considered the same within the rule that the
judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action; otherwise, it is not. This method has been
considered the most accurate test as to whether a former judgment is a bar in subsequent
proceedings between the same parties. It has even been designated as infallible.
It is, thus, clear that the counsel is not the proper person to sign the certification against forum
shopping. If, for any reason, the principal party cannot sign the petition, the one signing on his
behalf must have been duly authorized.
Eagle Ridge Golf and Country Club vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 178989, March 18, 2010
[A] certification of non-forum shopping is a certification under oath by the plaintiff or principal
party in the complaint or other initiatory pleading, asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith, that (a) he has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending
therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed
or is pending, he shall report that fact within five days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid
complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Hutama-RSEA/Supermax Phils., J.V. vs. KCD Builders Corp., G.R. No. 173181, March 3, 2010
For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential
pronouncements already reflected above respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, or
submission of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission

of defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of
defective certification against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render

the pleading fatally defective. The Court may order its submission or correction or act on the
pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to
swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and
when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein,

unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction
thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or
presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in
a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under
reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners
share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of
only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the
Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not
by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable
to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to
sign on his behalf.
Nellie Vda. de Formoso, et al. vs. PNB, et al., G.R. No. 154704, June 1, 2011, citing Oldarico S.
Traveno v. Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, G.R. No. 164205, September 3,
2009
The lack of certification against forum shopping is not curable by mere amendment of a
complaint, but shall be a cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice. Indeed, the general
rule is that subsequent compliance with the requirements will not excuse a party's failure to comply
in the first instance.
Vivian T. Ramirez, et al. vs. Mar Fishing Co., Inc., et al., G.R. No. 168208, June 13, 2012 citing
Philippine Public School Teachers Association v. The Heirs of Carolina P. Iligan, 528 Phil. 1197 (2006)
Rule 8, Sec. 1 - In general
Timoteo Baluyot vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122947, July 22, 1999
The Rules of Court require every pleading to "contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain,
concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or
defense".
Edward T. Marcelo, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 156605, August 28, 2007
Rule 8, Sec. 4 - Capacity
Clearly, on the matter of capacity to sue, a foreign arbitral award should be respected not because
it is favored over domestic laws and procedures, but because Republic Act No. 9285 has certainly
erased any conflict of law question.
Tuna Processing, Inc. vs. Philippine Kingford, Inc., G.R. No. 185582, February 29, 2012
Rule 8, Sec. 5 - Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind
Sto. Tomas University Hospital vs. Cesar Antonio Y. Surla, G.R. No. 129718, August 17, 1998
Ernesto R. Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134090, July 2, 1999
Reynaldo T. Cometa vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124062, December 29, 1999
Claro Ponciano, et al. vs. Jose J. Parentela, et al., G.R. No. 133284, May 9, 2000
Felix Uy Chua vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121438, October 23, 2000
Sec. 5, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that in all averments of fraud, the
circumstances constituting fraud must be stated with particularity. This is to enable the opposing
party to controvert the particular facts allegedly constituting the same.
Jorge Gonzales, et al. vs. Climax Mining Ltd., et al., G.R. Nos. 161957 & 167994, January 22, 2007
Rule 8, Sec. 8 - How to contest such documents
Sps. Efren and Zosima Rigor vs. Consolidated Orix Leasing and Finance Corp., G.R. No. 136423,
August 20, 2002
Filipinas Textile Mills vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119800, November 12, 2003
Rule 8, Sec. 10 - Specific denial
Three (3) modes of specific denial are contemplated by the above provision, namely: 1) by
specifying each material allegation of the fact in the complaint, the truth of which the defendant
does not admit, and whenever practicable, setting forth the substance of the matters which he will
rely upon to support his denial; (2) by specifying so much of an averment in the complaint as is true
and material and denying only the remainder; (3) by stating that the defendant is without knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment in the complaint,
which has the effect of a denial.
Sps. Napoleon and Evelyn Gaza, et al. vs. Ramon J. Lim, et al., G.R. No. 126863, January 16, 2003
A negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at

least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an
admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or
modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied,
it has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.
A denial is not specific simply because it is so qualified by the defendant. A general denial does
not become specific by the use of the word "specifically." When the matters of whether the
defendant alleges having no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief, are plainly and
necessarily within the defendant's knowledge, his alleged ignorance or lack of information will not
be considered as a specific denial.
PNB vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126153, January 14, 2004
Rule 8, Sec. 11 - Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted
Sps. Napoleon and Evelyn Gaza, et al. vs. Ramon J. Lim, et al., G.R. No. 126863, January 16, 2003
A denial is not made specific simply because it is so qualified by the defendant. A general denial
does not become specific by the use of the word "specifically." When matters of whether the
defendant alleges having no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief are plainly and
necessarily within the defendant's knowledge, an alleged "ignorance or lack of information" will not
be considered as a specific denial. Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules also provides that material
averments in the complaint other than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages shall be
deemed admitted when not specifically denied. Thus, the answer should be so definite and certain in
its allegations that the pleader's adversary should not be left in doubt as to what is admitted, what is
denied, and what is covered by denials of knowledge as sufficient to form a belief.
Wilson Cham vs. Eva Paita-Moya, A.C. No. 7494, June 27, 2008
Agrifina Aquintey vs. Sps. Felicidad and Rico Tibong, G.R. No. 166704, December 20, 2006
Rule 9, Sec. 1 - Defenses and objections not pleaded
The second sentence of this provision does not only supply exceptions to the rule that defenses
not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, it also allows courts
to dismiss cases motu proprio on any of the enumerated grounds — (1) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter; (2) litis pendentia; (3) res judicata; and (4) prescription — provided that the ground
for dismissal is apparent from the pleadings or the evidence on record.
Heirs of Domingo Valientes vs. Reinerio (Abraham) B. Ramas, et al., G.R. No. 157852, December 15,
2010
Toshiba Information Equipment (Phils.), Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 157594,
March 9, 2010
Procopio Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143286, April 14, 2004
Spouses Elanio C. Ong vs. Court of Appeals and Emma A. Garamay Ong, G.R. No. 144581, July 5,
2002
Elidad C. Kho vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115758, March 19, 2002
Saturnino Salera, Jr., et al. vs. A-1 Investors, Inc., G.R. No. 141238, February 15, 2002
Maria L. Anido vs. Filomeno Negado and The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143990, October
17, 2001
Inocencia Yu Dino vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113564, June 20, 2001
Rudolf Lietz Holdings vs. Register of Deeds, G.R. No. 133240, November 15, 2000
Ramona T. Logronio vs. Roberto Taleseo, G.R. No. 134602, August 6, 1999
Citibank vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 61508, March 17, 1999
It is clear and categorical in Section 1, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court that failure to raise
defenses and objections in a motion to dismiss or in an answer is deemed a waiver thereof; and
basic is the rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation.
Librada M. Aquino vs. Ernest S. Aure, G.R. No. 153567, February 18, 2008
Failure to raise defenses and objections in a motion to dismiss or in an answer is deemed a

waiver thereof; and basic is the rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear and free
from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation.
In every action, indeed, the parties and their counsel are enjoined to present all available defenses
and objections in order that the matter in issue can finally be laid to rest in an appropriate contest
before the court. The rule is a wise and tested one, borne by necessity. Without the rule, there will
be no end to a litigation, because the dissatisfied litigant may simply raise "new" or additional issues
in order to prevent, defeat, or delay the implementation of an already final and executory judgment.
The endlessness of litigation can give rise to added costs for the parties, and can surely contribute to
the unwarranted clogging of court dockets. The prospect of a protracted litigation between the
parties annuls the very rationale of every litigation to attain justice. Verily, there must be an end to
litigation.
Catalina Balais-Mabanag vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, et al., G.R. No. 153142, March 29, 2010
We have ruled that trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of
prescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred . .
.; and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss, or an answer which sets up such ground as an
affirmative defense; or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for
reconsideration; or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is
found in the pleadings, or where a defendant has been declared in default. What is essential only, to
repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period, be otherwise sufficiently
and satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the averments of the plaintiffs complaint, or
otherwise established by the evidence.
PNB vs. Merelo B. Aznar, et al., G.R. Nos. 171805 & 172021, May 30, 2011, citing Feliciano v. Canoza,
G.R. No. 161746, September 1, 2010
Rule 9, Sec. 3 - Default, declaration of
United Overseas Bank of the Phils. vs. Rosemoor Mining and Development Corp., et al., G.R. No.
172651, October 2, 2007
Three requirements must be complied with before the court can declare the defending party in
default: (1) the claiming party must file a motion asking the court to declare the defending party in
default; (2) the defending party must be notified of the motion to declare him in default and (3) the
claiming party must prove that the defending party has failed to answer within the period provided
by the Rules of Court.
Sps. Guillerma and Pascual Lumanas vs. Esterlita S. Sabilas, et al., G.R. No. 144568, July 3, 2007
Well settled is the rule that the court should be liberal in setting aside orders of default for
judgment by default is frowned upon, and unless it clearly appears that the reopening of the case is
intended for delay, it is best that both parties be given every chance to fight their case fairly and in
the open, without resort to technicality.
Henry Tanchan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113150, March 29, 1999
Francisco Motors Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100812, June 25, 1999
Heirs of Fabela vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142546, August 9, 2001
Mariano Joaquin S. Macias vs. Margie Corpus Macias, G.R. No. 149617, September 3, 2003
Sps. Efren and Digna Mason, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 144662, October 13, 2003
Section 3 (b)
Phil. Banking Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127469, January 15, 2004
Section 3 (d)
Rule 9, Section 3 (d) of the Rules of Court defines the extent of the relief that may be awarded in
a judgment by default, i.e., only so much as has been alleged and proved.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Vicente A. Hidalgo, et al., G.R. No. 161657, October 4, 2007
Section 3 (e)
Marietta B. Ancheta vs. Rodolfo S. Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004
Failure to file an answer is a ground for a declaration that defendant is in default.

Philippine National Bank vs. Sps. Erlando and Norma Rodriguez, G.R. No. 170325, September 26, 2008
Clearly, there are three requirements which must be complied with by the claiming party before
the court may declare the defending party in default, to wit: (1) the claiming party must file a motion
asking the court to declare the defending party in default; (2) the defending party must be notified of
the motion to declare him in default; (3) the claiming party must prove that the defending party has
failed to answer within the period provided by the Rule.
Sps. Humberto and Carmencita DeLos Santos vs. Emmanuel C. Carpio, et al., G.R. No. 153696,
September 11, 2006
A petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment by default is also available if the trial
court improperly declared a party in default, or even if the trial court properly declared a party in
default, if grave abuse of discretion attended such declaration.
The filing of the present petition is clearly not the proper remedy to assail the default judgment
rendered by the trial court. Petitioner still has the available remedy of filing with the Regional Trial
Court a motion for new trial or an ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals from the trial court's
default judgment. Note that petitioner admits that she was "properly declared in default." Thus,
there is no question of any improvident or improper declaration of default by the trial court, and the
remedy of filing a special civil action for certiorari has been effectively foreclosed on petitioner.
Her only recourse then is to file an ordinary appeal with the Court of Appeals under Section 2(a),
Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Instead, she came directly to this Court via petition for review on certiorari, without setting forth
substantial reasons why the ordinary remedies under the law should be disregarded and the petition
entertained.
Crisologo vs. Globe Telecom, G.R. No. 167631, December 16, 2005
Rule 10, Sec. 1 - Amendments in general
Jovito Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131175, August 28, 2001
The Court has invariably held that amendments are not proper and should be denied when delay
would arise, or when amendments would result in a change of cause of action or theory of the case,
or would be inconsistent with the allegations in the original complaint.
Josephine B. Ng, et al. vs. Sps. Marcelo and Maria Fe Soco, G.R. No. 149132, May 9, 2002
Rule 10, Sec. 2 - Amendments as a matter of right
Under the Rules of Court, a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time
before a responsive pleading is served, or in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) days
after it is served.
NAMAWU vs. Adelina Calderon-Bargas, et al., G.R. No. 157232, December 10, 2007
Under Section 2 of Rule 10, a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any time
before a responsive pleading is served, and thereafter, only upon leave of court.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Andres L. Africa, et al., G.R. No. 172315, August 28, 2007
It is clear from Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 10 that once a case has already been set for hearing,
regardless of whether a responsive pleading has been served, substantial amendments . . . may only
be made upon leave of court.
Alicia C. Maranan vs. Manila Banking Corp., G.R. No. 164398, March 30, 2007
Section 2, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly states that a pleading may be
amended as a matter of right before a responsive pleading is served. This only means that prior to
the filing of an answer, the plaintiff has the absolute right to amend the complaint whether a new
cause of action or change in theory is introduced. The reason for this rule is implied in the
subsequent Section 3 of Rule 10. Under this provision, substantial amendment of the complaint is
not allowed without leave of court after an answer has been served, because any material change in
the allegations contained in the complaint could prejudice the rights of the defendant who has
already set up his defense in the answer.
Conversely, it cannot be said that the defendant's rights have been violated by changes made in
the complaint if he has yet to file an answer thereto. In such an event, the defendant has not
presented any defense that can be altered or affected by the amendment of the complaint in
accordance with Section 2 of Rule 10. The defendant still retains the unqualified opportunity to
address the allegations against him by properly setting up his defense in the answer. Considerable
leeway is thus given to the plaintiff to amend his complaint once, as a matter of right, prior to the
filing of an answer by the defendant.
The right granted to the plaintiff under procedural law to amend the complaint before an answer
has been served is not precluded by the filing of a motion to dismiss or any other proceeding
contesting its sufficiency. Were we to conclude otherwise, the right to amend a pleading under
Section 2, Rule 10 will be rendered nugatory and ineffectual, since all that a defendant has to do to
foreclose this remedial right is to challenge the adequacy of the complaint before he files an answer.
Moreover, amendment of pleadings is favored and should be liberally allowed in the furtherance
of justice in order to determine every case as far as possible on its merits without regard to
technicalities. This principle is generally recognized to speed up trial and save party litigants from
incurring unnecessary expense, so that a full hearing on the merits of every case may be had and
multiplicity of suits avoided.
Remington Industrial Sales Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133657, May 29, 2002
Rule 10, Sec. 3 - Amendments by leave of court
The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, "the
amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense." This should only be true,
however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the
amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent
delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a "just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."
Remington Industrial Sales Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133657, May 29, 2002
Amendment of pleadings may now substantially alter the cause of action or defense
Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former rule in
such manner that the phrase "or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered" was
stricken-off and not retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3,
Rule 10 is that under the new rules, "the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of
action or defense." This should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or
alteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the
higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective
of the rules which is to secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding."
Phil. Ports Authority vs. William Gothong & Aboitiz Inc., G.R. No. 158401, January 28, 2008
Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former rule in such manner
that the phrase "or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered" was stricken-off and
not retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that
under the new rules, "the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense."
This should only be true, however when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of
action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial
justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure
a "just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding".
Ligaya Biglang-Awa, et al. vs. Philippine Trust Co., G.R. No. 158998, March 28, 2008
Phil. Ports Authority vs. William Gothong & Aboitiz, Inc., G.R. No. 158401, January 28, 2008
Rule 10, Sec. 4 - Formal amendments
The error or defect is merely formal and not substantial and an amendment to cure such defect is
expressly authorized by Sec. 4, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 10, Sec. 5 - Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence
Materrco, Inc. vs. First Landlink Asia Development Corp., G.R. No. 175687, November 28, 2007
BPI Family Bank vs. Amado Franco, et al., G.R. No. 123498, November 23, 2007
Lolita R. Ayson vs. Marina Enriquez Vda. De Carpio, G.R. No. 152438, June 17, 2004
Phil. Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp. vs. Phil. Infrastructures, G.R. No. 120384, January 13,
2004
Maunlad Savings and Loan Assn. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114942, November 27, 2000
Bernardo Mercader vs. DBP, G.R. No. 130699, May 12, 2000
Bank of America vs. American Realty Corp., G.R. No. 133876, December 29, 1999
Nicholas Y. Cervantes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125138, March 2, 1999
Cindy & Lynsy Garment vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 108369, January 7, 1998
If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues raised by the
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the
presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby.
Asean Pacific Planners, et al. vs. City of Urdaneta, et al., G.R. No. 162525, September 23, 2008
Indeed, any objection to the admissibility of evidence should be made at the time such evidence
is offered or as soon thereafter as the objection to its admissibility becomes apparent, otherwise the
objection will be considered waived and such evidence will form part of the records of the case as
competent and admissible evidence. Rule 10, Section 5 of the Rules of Civil Procedure allows the
amendment of the pleadings in order to make them conform to the evidence in the record.
Jose L. Chua vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109840, January 21, 1999
It need not be underlined that jurisdiction over an issue in a case is determined and conferred by
the pleadings filed by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial order or stipulation or, at times
by their implied consent as by the failure of a party to object to evidence on an issue not covered by
the pleadings, as provided in Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.
Eugene L. Lim vs. BPI Agricultural Dev't. Bank, G.R. No. 179230, March 9, 2010
Rule 10, Sec. 6 - Supplemental pleadings
The rule is a useful device which enables the court to award complete relief in one action and to
avoid the cost of delay and waste of separate action. Thus, a supplemental pleading is meant to
supply deficiencies in aid of the original pleading and not to dispense with or substitute the latter.
Sps. Orlando and Carmelita C. Lambino vs. Presiding Judge, et al., G.R. No. 169551, January 24, 2007
Shoemart, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86956, October 1, 1990
Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 81024 February 3, 2000
The admission of supplemental pleadings, including supplemental complaints, does not arise as a
matter of right on the petitioner, but remains in the sound discretion of the court, which is well
within its right to deny the admission of the pleading. Section 6, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, governing supplemental pleadings, is clear that the court only "may" admit the
supplemental pleading, and is thus not obliged to do so.
Far East Bank and Trust Co. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, et al., G.R. No. 138919, May 2,
2006
As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or adds something to the
primary pleading. A supplement exists side by side with the original. It does not replace that which
it supplements. Moreover, a supplemental pleading assumes that the original pleading is to stand
and that the issues joined with the original pleading remained an issue to be tried in the action. It is
but a continuation of the complaint. Its usual office is to set up new facts which justify, enlarge or
change the kind of relief with respect to the same subject matter as the controversy referred to in the
original complaint.
The purpose of the supplemental pleading is to bring into the records new facts which will
enlarge or change the kind of relief to which the plaintiff is entitled; hence, any supplemental facts
which further develop the original right of action, or extend to vary the relief, are available by way
of supplemental complaint even though they themselves constitute a right of action.
The parties may file supplemental pleadings only to supply deficiencies in aid of an original
pleading, but not to introduce new and independent causes of action. In Leobrera v. Court of
Appeals, the Court ruled that when the cause of action stated in the supplemental complaint is
different from the causes of action mentioned in the original complaint, the court should not admit
the supplemental complaint. However, a broad definition of causes of action should be applied.
Planters Dev't Bank vs. LZK Holdings and Dev't Corp., G.R. No. 153777, April 15, 2005
Supplemental pleadings must be with reasonable notice, and it is discretionary upon the court or
tribunal to allow the same or not.
Secondly, a supplemental pleading must state transactions, occurrences or events which took
place since the time the pleading sought to be supplemented was filed.
Conrado L. De Rama vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001
Intramuros Administration vs. Yvette Contacto, et al., G.R. No. 152576, May 5, 2003
A supplemental pleading states the transactions, occurrences or events which took place since the
time the pleading sought to be supplemented was filed. A supplemental pleading is meant to supply
deficiencies in aid of the original pleading and not to dispense with or substitute the latter. It does
not supersede the original, but assumes that the original pleading is to stand.
Jose Feliciano Loy, Jr., et al. vs. SMCEU-PTGWO, et al., G.R. No. 164886, November 24, 2009
As a general rule, leave will be granted to a party who desires to file a supplemental pleading that
alleges any material fact which happened or came within the party's knowledge after the original
pleading was filed, such being the office of a supplemental pleading. The application of the rule
would ensure that the entire controversy might be settled in one action, avoid unnecessary repetition
of effort and unwarranted expense of litigants, broaden the scope of the issues in an action owing to
the light thrown on it by facts, events and occurrences which have accrued after the filing of the
original pleading, and bring into record the facts enlarging or charging the kind of relief to which
plaintiff is entitled. It is the policy of the law to grant relief as far as possible for wrongs complained
of, growing out of the same transaction and thus put an end to litigation.
Pentacapital Investment Corp. vs. Makilito B. Mahinay, G.R. Nos. 171736 & 181482, July 5, 2010
The supplemental pleading must be based on matters arising subsequent to the filing of the
original pleading related to the claim or defense presented therein, and founded on the same cause
of action. Supplemental pleadings must state transactions, occurrences or events which took place
since the time the pleading sought to be supplemented was filed.
Pentacapital Investment Corp. vs. Makilito B. Mahinay, G.R. Nos. 171736 & 181482, July 5, 2010
Rule 10, Sec. 8 - Effect of amended pleadings
Under Section 8, Rule 10, Rules of Court, an amended complaint supersedes an original one. The
original complaint is deemed withdrawn and no longer considered part of the record.
Natividad Figuracion, et al. vs. Sps. Cresenciano and Amelita Libi, G.R. No. 155688, November 28,
2007
The Philippine American Life & General Insurance Company vs. Breva, G.R. No. 147937, November 11,
2004
Vlason Enterprises Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 3G.R. Nos. 121662-64, July 6, 1999
Wilfredo P. Verzosa vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 119511-13, November 24, 1998
Section 8, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court clearly provides that an amended complaint supersedes
the complaint that it amends.
Negros Merchants Enterprises, Inc. vs. China Banking Corp., G.R. No. 150918, August 17, 2007
Rule 11, Sec. 8 - Existing counterclaim or cross-claim
Sps. Marcelo and Anita Arenas vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126640, November 23, 2000
Rule 11, Sec. 9 - Counterclaim or cross-claim arising after answer
Rule 11, Sec. 11 - Extension of time to plead
Sps. Ampelquio vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124243, June 15, 2000
Sps. Payongayong vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144576, May 28, 2004
The Rules of Court provides for discretion on the part of the trial court not only to extend the
time for filing an answer but also to allow an answer to be filed after the reglementary period.
Sps. Guillerma and Pascual Lumanas vs. Esterlita S. Sabilas, et al., G.R. No. 144568, July 3, 2007
Rule 12, Sec. 1 - When applied for; purpose
Jose Baritua, et al. vs. Nimfa Divina Mercader, et al., G.R. No. 136048, January 23, 2001
Rule 13, Sec. 2 - Filing and service, defined
Equitable PCI Bank vs. Rosita Ku, G.R. No. 142950, March 26, 2001
Ginete vs. Sunrise Manning Agency, G.R. No. 142023, June 21, 2001
Sps. Sarraga vs. Banco Filipino, G.R. No. 143783, December 9, 2002
PCI Bank vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114951, July 19, 2003
Phil. Ports Authority vs. Sargasso Construction & Dev't. Corp., G.R. No. 146478, July 30, 2004
Phil. Airlines, Inc. vs. Balubar, Jr., A.M. No. P-04-1767, August 12, 2004
If any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel unless
service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Notice or service made upon a party who is
represented by counsel is a nullity. Notice to the client and not to his counsel of record is not notice
in law. While this rule admits of exceptions, such as when the court or tribunal orders service upon
the party or when the technical defect is waived, none applies in this case.
Heirs of Benjamin Mendoza, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170247, September 17, 2008
Rule 13 Section 2 of the Rules of Court merely defines filing as "the act of presenting the
pleading or other paper to the clerk of court." Since the signing of verifications and certifications
against forum shopping is not integral to the act of filing, this may not be deemed as necessarily
included in an authorization merely to file cases.
Metropolitan Cebu Water District (MCWD) vs. Margarita A. Adala, G.R. No. 168914, July 4, 2007
It is a rule generally accepted that when the service is to be made by registered mail, the service
is deemed complete and effective upon actual receipt by the addressee as shown by the registry
return card. Thus, between the registry return card and said written note, the former commands more
weight. Not only is the former considered as the official record of the court, but also as such, it is
presumed to be accurate unless proven otherwise, unlike a written note or record of a party, which is
often self-serving and easily fabricated. Further, this error on the part of the secretary of the
petitioners' former counsel amounts to negligence or incompetence in record-keeping, which is not
an excuse for the delay of filing.
Sps. De la Cruz vs. Ramiscal, G.R. No. 137882, February 4, 2005
Rule 13, Sec. 3 - Manner of filing
The date of filing is determinable from two sources: from the post office stamp on the envelope
or from the registry receipt, either of which may suffice to prove the timeliness of the filing of the
pleadings. If the date stamped on one is earlier than the other, the former may be accepted as the
date of filing. This presupposes, however, that the envelope or registry receipt and the dates
appearing thereon are duly authenticated before the tribunal where they are presented.
GSIS vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 180045, November 17, 2010
Norma Santos vs. Joyce Trinidad A. Hernandez, et al., AM P-02-1556, February 22, 2002
Rule 13, Sec. 4 - Papers required to be filed and served
Teodora and Rodolfo Capacete vs. Venancia Baroro, et al., G.R. No. 154184, July 8, 2003
Marcelina Gacutana-Fraile vs. Angel T. Domingo, et al., G.R. No. 138518, December 15, 2000
Rule 13, Sec. 5 - Modes of service
Rule 13, Sec. 7 - Service by mail
Petition for Habeas Corpus of Benjamin Vergara, G.R. No. 154037, April 30, 2003
Rule 13, Sec. 8 - Substituted service
The requirements for substituted service are indispensable because substituted service is in
derogation of the usual method of service. It is an extraordinary method since it seeks to bind the
defendant to the consequences of a suit even though notice of such action is served not upon him
but upon another whom the law could only presume would notify him of the pending proceedings.
Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the statutory requirements of substituted service
renders such service ineffective.
Abubakar A. Afdal, et al. vs. Romeo Carlos, G.R. No. 173379, December 1, 2010
Luthgarda F. Fernandez vs. Fidel M. Cabrera II, A.C. No. 5623, December 11, 2003
Nancy L. Ty vs. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, et al., G.R. Nos. 149797-98, February 13,
2004
Rule 13, Sec. 9 - Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions
Fidel M. Bañares II, et al. vs. Elizabeth Balising, et al., G.R. No. 132624, March 13, 2000
Section 9 in relation to Section 10
The rule on service by registered mail contemplates two situations: (1) actual service, the
completeness of which is determined upon receipt by the addressee of the registered mail; and (2)
constructive service, which is deemed complete upon expiration of five (5) days from the date the
addressee received the first notice from the postmaster.
Philemploy Services and Resources, Inc. vs. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 152616, March 31, 2006
Umbra M. Tomawis vs. Nora M. Tabao-Caudang, G.R. No. 166547, September 12, 2007
Rule 13, Sec. 10 - Completeness of service
Sps. Jose and Evangeline Aguilar vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120972, July 19, 1999
Carmelita G. Abrajano vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120787, October 13, 2000
Equitable PCI Bank vs. Rosita Ku, G.R. No. 142950, March 26, 2001
Service by registered mail is deemed completed upon actual receipt by the addressee or after five
(5) days from the date the addressee received the first notice of the postmaster, whichever date is
earlier.
Jerryco C. Rivera vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 157040, February 12, 2008
The rule on service by registered mail contemplates two situations: (1) actual service the
completeness of which is determined upon receipt by the addressee of the registered mail; and (2)
constructive service the completeness of which is determined upon expiration of five days from the
date the addressee received the first notice of the postmaster.
Jose Mel Bernarte vs. PBA, et al., G.R. No. 192084, September 14, 2011
Insofar as constructive service is concerned, there must be conclusive proof that a first notice was
duly sent by the postmaster to the addressee. Not only is it required that notice of the registered mail
be issued but that it should also be delivered to and received by the addressee. Notably, the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed is not applicable in this situation. It is
incumbent upon a party who relies on constructive service to prove that the notice was sent to, and
received by, the addressee. The best evidence to prove that notice was sent would be a certification
from the postmaster, who should certify not only that the notice was issued or sent but also as to
how, when and to whom the delivery and receipt was made. The mailman may also testify that the
notice was actually delivered.
The Postmaster's Certification does not sufficiently prove that the three notices were delivered to
and received by respondents; it only indicates that the post office issued the three notices. Simply
put, the issuance of the notices by the post office is not equivalent to delivery to and receipt by the
addressee of the registered mail. Thus, there is no proof of completed constructive service of the
Labor Arbiter's decision on respondents.
Rule 13, Sec. 11 - Priorities in modes of service and filing
E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co. vs. Herminio I. Benito, et al., G.R. No. 136426, August 6, 1999
Castilex Industrial Corp. vs. Vicente Vasquez, G.R. No. 132266, December 21, 1999
Engrace Niñal vs. Norma Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000
Security Bank and Trust Company vs. Rodolfo M. Cuenca, G.R. No. 138544, October 3, 2000
Marcelina Gacutana-Fraile vs. Angel T. Domingo, et al., G.R. No. 138518, December 15, 2000
Perla S. Zulueta vs. Asia Brewery, G.R. No. 138137, March 8, 2001
Pfizer Inc. et al. vs. Edwin V. Galan, G.R. No. 143389, May 25, 2001
MC Engineering vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 142314, June 28, 2001
Deogracias Musa, et al. vs. Sylvia Amor, G.R. No. 141396, April 9, 2002
Aquilina Estrella, et al. vs. Nila Espiridion, G.R. No. 134460, November 27, 2003
Sps. Payongayong vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144576, May 28, 2004
The rule that a pleading must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing
was not done personally is mandatory.
Martin Penoso, et al. vs. Macrosman Dona, G.R. No. 154018, April 3, 2007
The requirement under Section 11 is mandatory. Any violation of this Rule may be cause for the
court to consider the paper as not filed.
However, such discretionary power of the court must be exercised properly and reasonably,
taking into account the following factors: (1) "the practicability of personal service;" (2) "the
importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein;" and (3) "the prima facie
merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11".
The affidavit of service is a substantial compliance with the requirement under Section 11. It
bears stressing that petitioners' procedural lapse in not appending such affidavit to their petition did
not in any way thwart the laudable objective of Section 11 as stated in Solar, i.e., to quell the
lawyers' unethical practice of deliberately resorting to delays in the filing and service of pleadings,
motions and other papers. Indeed, the evil sought to be prevented by the new rule is absent here.
Also, there is absolutely no indication from petitioners' omission that they demonstrated their
contempt for the Rules and our directive in Solar, as claimed by respondents.
Luciano Ello vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141255, June 21, 2005
Personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the
exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in light of the
circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when
personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be
accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to
begin with.
Charles N. Uy vs. Nelida S. Medina, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1247, October 10, 2000
Roberto Fulgencio, et al., vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 141600, September 12, 2003
Pursuant . . . to Section 11 of Rule 13, service and filing of pleadings and other papers must,
whenever practicable, be done personally; and if made through other modes, the party
concerned must provide a written explanation as to why the service or filing was not done
personally. . . .
Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should expedite action
or resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate,
delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail, considering the inefficiency of postal
service. Likewise, personal service will do away with the practice of some lawyers who, wanting to
appear clever, resort to the following less than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by
mail to catch opposing counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for
instance, responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice from the post office
that the registered parcel containing the pleading of or other paper from the adverse party may be
claimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby
causing undue delay in the disposition of such pleading or other papers.
If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules
requiring personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court the
discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing
were resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why personal service was not
done in the first place. The exercise of discretion must, necessarily, consider the practicability of
personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause "whenever practicable."
We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service
and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in
light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory.
Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had,
which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing
was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall
likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and
the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11. This Court
cannot rule otherwise, lest we allow circumvention of the innovation introduced by the 1997 Rules
in order to obviate delay in the administration of justice.
Marcelino Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 169122, February 2, 2010 citing Solar Team
Entertainment, Inc. v. Judge Ricafort, 355 Phil. 404 (1998)
City of Dumaguete vs. Phil. Ports Authority, G.R. No. 168973, August 24, 2011
Rule 13, Sec. 13 - Proof of service
Ace Navigation Co. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140364, August 15, 2000
MC Engineering vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 142314, June 28, 2001
Lutgarda Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123340, August 29, 2002
Betty T. Chua vs. Absolute Mngt. Corp., et al., G.R. No. 144881, October 16, 2003
Republic of the Phil. vs. Josefina B. Vda. De Neri, G.R. No. 139588, March 4, 2004
Rule 13, Sec. 14 - Notice of lis pendens
As provided in Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of lis pendens
may be cancelled on two grounds: (1) when the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title
of the adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who
caused it to be recorded.
Heirs of Jose Sy Bang, et al. vs. Rolando Sy, et al., G.R. Nos. 114217 & 150797, October 13, 2009
The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of the
litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment in order to prevent the
final judgment from being defeated by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide
or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate
subsequently.
Heirs of Jose Sy Bang, et al. vs. Rolando Sy, et al., G.R. Nos. 114217 & 150797, October 13, 2009
Rule 14, Sec. 1 - Clerk to issue summons
Producers Bank vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125468, October 9, 2000
Noel G. Wabe vs. Luisita P. Bionson, AM P-03-1760, December 30, 2003
Rule 14, Sec. 3 - By whom served
Giselle G. Talion vs. Esteban P. Ayupan, A.M. No. P-01-1529, January 23, 2002
Rule 14, Sec. 4 - Return
Harry Ang Ping vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126947, July 15, 1999
Joel R. Umandap vs. Jose L. Sabio, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 140244, August 29, 2000
Christopher V. Aguilar vs. Rolando C. How, et al., A.M. No. RTJ-03-1783, July 31, 2003
Rule 14, Sec. 5 - Issuance of alias summons
Sps. Madrigal vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129955, November 26, 1999
Christopher V. Aguilar vs. Rolando C. How, et al., A.M. No. RTJ-03-1783, July 31, 2003
Rule 14, Sec. 6 - Service in person on defendant
Sps. Madrigal vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129955, November 26, 1999
Maria Victoria Cano-Gutierrez vs. Herminio A. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 138584, October 2, 2000
Federico S. Sandoval II vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 149380, July 3, 2002
Regalado P. Samartino vs. Leonor B. Raon, G.R. No. 131482, July 3, 2002
Cipriano M. Lazaro vs. Rural Bank of Francisco Balagtas (Bulacan), Inc., et al., G.R. No. 139895,
August 15, 2003
Henry S. Oaminal vs. Pablito M. Castillo, et al., G.R. No. 152776, October 8, 2003
Sps. Patrick and Rafaela Jose vs. Sps. Helen and Romeo Boyon, G.R. No. 147369, October 23, 2003
A resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court, such as petitioner in this case,
must be personally served with summons as provided under Sec. 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
Ma. Theresa Chaves Biaco vs. Phil. Countryside Rural Bank, G.R. No. 161417, February 8, 2007
Section 6 in relation to Section 7
Personal service of summons is preferred over substituted service. Only if the former cannot be
made promptly may the process server resort to the latter. Moreover, the proof of service of
summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time; (b)
specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a
person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the
office or regular place of business, of the defendant. It is likewise required that the pertinent facts
proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officer's return. The failure to
comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of substituted service
renders the service of summons ineffective.
Air Materiel Wing Savings, et al. vs. Luvin S. Manay, et al., G.R. No. 175338, October 9, 2007
In an action in personam, personal service of summons or, if this is not possible and he cannot be
personally served, substituted service, as provided in Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, is
essential for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant who does not
voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court.
[P]ersonal service of summons should and always be the first option, and it is only when the said
summons cannot be served within a reasonable time can the process server resort to substituted
service.
Constantino A. Pascual vs. Lourdes S. Pascual, G.R. No. 171916, December 4, 2009
Rule 14, Sec. 7 - Substituted service
Maria Victoria Cano-Gutierrez vs. Herminio A. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 138584, October 2, 2000
United Coconut Planters Bank vs. Roberto V. Ongpin, G.R. No. 146593, October 26, 2001
Federico S. Sandoval II vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 149380, July 3, 2002
November 27, 2002
Cipriano M. Lazaro vs. Rural Bank of Francisco Balagtas (Bulacan), Inc., et al., G.R. No. 139895,
August 15, 2003
Henry S. Oaminal vs. Pablito M. Castillo, et al., G.R. No. 152776, October 8, 2003
Fortunato Gomez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127692, March 10, 2004
As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. It is only when summons
cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time that substituted service may be
resorted to.
Orion Security Corp. vs. Kalfam Enterprises, Inc., G.R. No. 163287, April 27, 2007
If a resident defendant cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time,
substituted service may be effected (1) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (2) by leaving the
copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof in accordance with Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
Ma. Theresa Chaves Biaco vs. Phil. Countryside Rural Bank, G.R. No. 161417, February 8, 2007
Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is therefore required that
statutory restrictions for effecting substituted service must be strictly, faithfully and fully observed.
Failure to comply with this rule renders absolutely void the substituted service along with the
proceedings taken thereafter. The underlying principle of this rigid requirement is that the person, to
whom the orders, notices or summons are addressed, is made to answer for the consequences of the
suit even though notice of such action is made, not upon the party concerned, but upon another
whom the law could only presume would notify such party of the pending proceedings.
FEU-NRMF, et al. vs. FEU-NRMFEA-AFW, G.R. No. 168362, October 16, 2006
The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served
promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service. Section 8, Rule 14 provides that the plaintiff or
the sheriff is given a "reasonable time" to serve the summons to the defendant in person, but no
specific time frame is mentioned. "Reasonable time" is defined as "so much time as is necessary
under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the
contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if
any[,] to the other party." Under the Rules, the service of summons has no set period. However,
when the court, clerk of court, or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return of the summons
and the latter submits the return of summons, then the validity of the summons lapses. The plaintiff
may then ask for an alias summons if the service of summons has failed. What then is a reasonable
time for the sheriff to effect a personal service in order to demonstrate impossibility of prompt
service? To the plaintiff, "reasonable time" means no more than seven (7) days since an expeditious
processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff, "reasonable time" means 15 to 30
days because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of court to require the
sheriff to submit a return of the summons assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriff's Return
provides data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to be
submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the succeeding
month. Thus, one month from the issuance of summons can be considered "reasonable time" with
regard to personal service on the defendant.
Ma. Imelda M. Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 130974, August 16, 2006
In a long line of cases, this Court held that the impossibility of personal service justifying
availment of substituted service should be explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted
towards personal service failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of
summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer's Return; otherwise, the substituted
service cannot be upheld. It bears stressing that since service of summons, especially for actions in
personam, is essential for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the resort
to a substituted service must be duly justified. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent
proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.
Administrative Circular No. 59 was precisely issued by this Court to stress the importance of
strict compliance with the requisites for a valid substituted service.
Madrigal vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129955, November 26, 1999
Sps. Patrick and Rafaela Jose vs. Sps. Helen and Romeo Boyon, G.R. No. 147369, October 23, 2003
[R]equirements to effect a valid substituted service:
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served
promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service. Section 8, Rule 14 provides that the plaintiff or
the sheriff is given a "reasonable time" to serve the summons to the defendant in person, but no
specific time range is mentioned. "Reasonable time" is defined as "so much time as is necessary
under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the
contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if
any, to the other party." Under the Rules, the service of summons has no set period. However, when
the court, clerk of court, or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return of the summons and the
latter submits the return of summons, then the validity of the summons lapses. The plaintiff may
then ask for an alias summons if the service of summons has failed. What then is a reasonable time
for the sheriff to effect a personal service in order to demonstrate impossibility of prompt service?
To the plaintiff, "reasonable time" means no more than seven (7) days since an expeditious
processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff, "reasonable time" means 15 to 30
days because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of court to require the
sheriff to submit a return of the summons assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriff's Return
provides data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to be
submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the succeeding
month. Thus, one month from the issuance of summons can be considered "reasonable time" with
regard to personal service on the defendant.
Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons with due care, utmost
diligence, and reasonable promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious dispensation
of justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try their best efforts to accomplish personal service on
defendant. On the other hand, since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade service of
summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on
the defendant. For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by
the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period [of one month] which
eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means at
least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why
such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or
accepted.
(2) Specific Details in the Return
The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the
attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the
failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of the attempts on personal
service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged
residence or house of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on
defendant must be specified in the Return to justify substituted service. The form on Sheriff's
Return of Summons on Substituted Service prescribed in the Handbook for Sheriffs published by
the Philippine Judicial Academy requires a narration of the efforts made to find the defendant
personally and the fact of failure. Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5 dated November 9,
1989 requires that "impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to
find the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts," which should be made in the proof of
service.
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion
If the substituted service will be effected at defendant's house or residence, it should be left with
a person of "suitable age and discretion then residing therein." A person of suitable age and
discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to
have enough discernment to understand the importance of a summons. "Discretion" is defined as
"the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible choice and for which an understanding
of what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed". Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such
person must know how to read and understand English to comprehend the import of the summons,
and fully realize the need to deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest
possible time for the person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the "relation of
confidence" to the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be notified of the
receipt of the summons. The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the alleged
dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient's relationship with the
defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons
and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt
of summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons.
(4) A Competent Person in Charge
If the substituted service will be done at defendant's office or regular place of business, then it
should be served on a competent person in charge of the place. Thus, the person on whom the
substituted service will be made must be the one managing the office or business of defendant, such
as the president or manager; and such individual must have sufficient knowledge to understand the
obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from
inaction on the summons. Again, these details must be contained in the Return.
Constantino A. Pascual vs. Lourdes S. Pascual, G.R. No. 171916, December 4, 2009
In Montalban v. Maximo (G.R. No. L-22997, March 15, 1968), we held that substituted service
of summons under the present Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court in a suit in personam against
residents of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom is the normal method of service of
summons that will confer jurisdiction on the court over such defendant.
Leah Palma vs. Danilo P. Galvez, et al., G.R. No. 165273, March 10, 2010
. . . A man temporarily absent from this country leaves a definite place of residence, a dwelling
where he lives, a local base, so to speak, to which any inquiry about him may be directed and where
he is bound to return. Where one temporarily absents himself, he leaves his affairs in the hands of
one who may be reasonably expected to act in his place and stead; to do all that is necessary to
protect his interests; and to communicate with him from time to time any incident of importance that
may affect him or his business or his affairs. It is usual for such a man to leave at his home or with
his business associates information as to where he may be contacted in the event a question that
affects him crops up. If he does not do what is expected of him, and a case comes up in court
against him, he cannot just raise his voice and say that he is not subject to the processes of our
courts. He cannot stop a suit from being filed against him upon a claim that he cannot be summoned
at his dwelling house or residence or his office or regular place of business.
Not that he cannot be reached within a reasonable time to enable him to contest a suit against
him. There are now advanced facilities of communication. Long distance telephone calls and
cablegrams make it easy for one he left behind to communicate with him.
Considering that private respondent was temporarily out of the country, the summons and
complaint may be validly served on her through substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court . . . .
Leah Palma vs. Danilo P. Galvez, et al., G.R. No. 165273, March 10, 2010 citing Montalban v. Maximo,
No. L-22997, March 15, 1968
Section 7 also designates the persons with whom copies of the process may be left. The rule
presupposes that such a relation of confidence exists between the person with whom the copy is left
and the defendant and, therefore, assumes that such person will deliver the process to defendant or
in some way give him notice thereof.
Rule 14, Sec. 11 - Service upon domestic private juridical entity
Orion Security Corp. vs. Kalfam Enterprises, Inc., G.R. No. 163287, April 27, 2007
Bank of the Phil. Islands vs. Sps. Ireneo and Liwanag Santiago, et al., G.R. No. 169116, March 28, 2007
November 27, 2002
Kanlaon Construction vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 126625, September 18, 1997
The Rules of Court provides that personal service of petitions and other pleadings is the general
rule, while a resort to other modes of service and filing is the exception.
Pedro Tagabi vs. Margarito Tanque, G.R. No. 144024, July 27, 2006
Teresa Gabriel, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 149909, October 11, 2007
When we crafted Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, we did not intend it to be just some
silly rule the parties can ignore when convenient, and the courts disregard when expedient. We
designed it to serve a very real purpose: to ensure that pleadings, motions and other papers reach the
courts directly and promptly, so that they may be acted upon expeditiously; and to forestall the
deplorable practice among some lawyers of serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch their
opposing counsel off-guard. Thus, these lawyers leave the opposing counsel with little or no time to
respond accordingly; or, upon receiving notice from the post office of the registered parcel
containing the pleading or other papers from the adverse party, the latter may unduly procrastinate
before claiming said parcel - or, worse, not claim it at all - and thereby cause undue delay in the
disposition of such pleading or other papers.
Under said rule, personal service and filing of pleadings and other papers is a mandatory mode,
especially when the peculiar circumstances of the case — such as the proximity of the office of a
party's counsel to the court or to the office of the opposing party's counsel — make such mode
practicable. If another mode is employed, there must be attached to the pleading or paper, a written
explanation of such recourse. Omission of a written explanation will give the court cause to
expunge the pleading or paper not personally served or filed. And ordinarily, such exercise of
discretion by the court will not be overruled on appeal, except when: a) on the face of the affidavit
of service, it is patent that personal service and filing is impractical, such as when the parties or
their counsels live in different provinces; b) there is prima facie merit in the pleading or paper
expunged; and c) the issue raised therein is of substantial importance. Under these exceptional
circumstances the lack of written explanation may be excused and the pleading or paper served or
filed, accepted.
Alex M. Cadornigara vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 158073, November 23,
2007
Sps. Julian, Sr. and Leonila Santiago, et al. vs. BPI, G.R. No. 163749, September 26, 2008
Service of summons on a domestic corporation is restricted, limited and exclusive to the persons
enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, following the rule in
statutory construction that expressio unios est exclusio alterius.
DOLE Phil., Inc. (Tropifresh Division) vs. Reinato G. Quilala, et al., G.R. No. 168723, July 9, 2008
Rule 14, Sec. 12 - Service upon foreign private juridical entity
Elucidating on the above provision of the Rules of Court, this Court declared in Pioneer
International, Ltd. v. Guadiz, Jr. (G.R. No. 156848, October 11, 2007) that when the defendant is a
foreign juridical entity, service of summons may be made upon:
1. Its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose;
2. The government official designated by law to receive summons if the corporation does not
have a resident agent; or,
3. Any of the corporation's officers or agents within the Philippines.

Atiko Trans, Inc., et al. vs. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., G.R. No. 167545, August 17,
2011
As amended [by A.M. No. 11-3-6-SC], said provision of the Rules of Court now reads:
SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. — When the defendant is a
foreign private juridical entity which has transacted business in the Philippines, service may
be made on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, if there
be no such agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect, or on any of its
officers or agents within the Philippines.
If the foreign private juridical entity is not registered in the Philippines or has no
resident agent, service may, with leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines through
any of the following means:
a) By personal service coursed through the appropriate court in the foreign country
with the assistance of the Department of Foreign Affairs;
b) By publication once in a newspaper of general circulation in the country where

the defendant may be found and by serving a copy of the summons and the court order
by-registered mail at the last known address of the defendant;
c) By facsimile or any recognized electronic means that could generate proof of

service; or
d) By such other means as the court may in its discretion direct.
Atiko Trans, Inc., et al. vs. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., G.R. No. 167545, August 17,
2011
Rule 14, Sec. 13 - Service upon public corporations
EDI-Staffbuilders International, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 145587, October 26, 2007
Rule 14, Sec. 14 - Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown
Rule 14, Sec. 15 - Extraterritorial service
Service of summons on a non-resident defendant must be in accordance with Section 15, Rule 14
of the Rules of Court. Such service, to be effective outside the Philippines, must be made either (1)
by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for
such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court
should be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; or (3) in any other
manner which the court may deem sufficient. The third mode, like the first two, must be made
outside the Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign country where
defendant resides.
Extrajudicial service of summons apply only where the action is in rem, that is, an action against
the thing itself instead of against the person, or in an action quasi in rem, where an individual is
named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the
obligation or loan burdening the property. The rationale for this is that in in rem and quasi in rem
actions, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on
the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.
Erlinda R. Velayo-Fong vs. Sps. Raymond and Maria Hedy Velayo, G.R. No. 155488, December 6, 2006
As a rule, when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, Philippine
courts cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his
person unless he voluntarily appears in court. But when the case is one of actions in rem or quasi in
rem enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction to
hear and decide the case. In such instances, Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the res, and
jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential.
Actions in personam and actions in rem or quasi in rem differ in that actions in personam are
directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments. On the other hand, actions in rem or
quasi in rem are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with
respect thereto as against the whole world.
Margarita Romualdez-Licaros vs. LAbelardo icaros, G.R. No. 150656, April 29, 2003
Octavio Alvarez vs. Augustus C. Diaz, et al., A.M. No. MTJ-00-1283, March 3, 2004
Rule 14, Sec. 16 - Residents temporarily out of the Philippines
In Montefalcon v. Vasquez (G.R. No. 165016, June 17, 2008), we said that because Section 16 of
Rule 14 uses the words "may" and "also," it is not mandatory. Other methods of service of summons
allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving officer on a defendant-resident who
is temporarily out of the Philippines. Thus, if a resident defendant is temporarily out of the country,
any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in section
7 (formerly Section 8), Rule 14; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3)
service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) in any other manner the court may deem
sufficient.
Rule 14, Sec. 18 - Proof of service
Rule 14, Sec. 20 - Voluntary appearance
Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd vs. Dakila Trading Corp., G.R. No. 172242, August 14, 2007
A defendant's voluntary appearance in the action is equivalent to service of summons.

DOLE Phil., Inc. (Tropifresh Division) vs. Reinato G. Quilala, et al., G.R. No. 168723, July 9, 2008
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, while jurisdiction
over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons upon them in
the manner required by law or through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to
its authority. A party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said
court based on the ground of invalid service of summons is not deemed to have submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court
[A] defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarily
before the court. What the rule on voluntary appearance — the first sentence of the above-quoted
rule — means is that the voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is without qualification, in
which case he is deemed to have waived his defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person due to
improper service of summons.
Edna Diago Lhuillier vs. British Airways, G.R. No. 171092, March 15, 2010, citing Garcia v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 170122, October 12, 2009
It is settled that if there is no valid service of summons, the court can still acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant by virtue of the latter's voluntary appearance.
Rapid City Realty and Development Corp. vs. Sps. Orlando and Lourdes Villa, G.R. No. 184197,
February 11, 2010
Rule 15, Sec. 4 - Hearing of motion
Clodualdo C. De jesus vs. Rodolfo D. Obnamia Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-00-1314, September 7, 2000
Antonio M. Bangayan vs. Jimmy R. Butacan, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1320, November 22, 2000
Dolores Fajardo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140356, March 20, 2001
Re: Release by Judge Muro, A.M. No. P-00-7-323-RTJ, October 17, 2001
Mahid M. Mutilan vs. Judge Santos B. Adiong, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1581, July 2, 2002
Winnie Bajet vs. Judge Vivencio S. Baclig, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1598, July 30, 2002
Republic of the Phil. vs. Marilyn A. Peralta, et al., G.R. No. 150327, June 18, 2003
Teodora and Rodolfo Capacete vs. Venancia Baroro, et al., G.R. No. 154184, July 8, 2003
A motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court is considered a worthless piece of paper, which the Clerk of Court has no right to receive and
the trial court has no authority to act upon.
Federico Pallada v. Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Br. 1, G.R. No. 129442, March 10, 1999
KKK Foundation, Inc. vs. Adelina Calderon-Bargas, et al., G.R. No. 163785, December 27, 2007
The requirements in Sections 4 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court on notice of hearing and
proof of service thereof to the adverse party, far from being merely technical and procedural, are
necessary elements of procedural due process.
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Augustine A. Vestil, A.M. Nos. RTJ-06-2030 & RTJ-07-2032,
October 5, 2007
As may be gleaned (from Section 14 of Rule 15) and as held time and again, the notice
requirement in a motion is mandatory. As a rule, a motion without a Notice of Hearing is considered
pro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite
pleading.
Gliceria Sarmiento vs. Emerita Zaratan, G.R. No. 167471, February 5, 2007
Annie Tan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130314, September 22, 1998
Rule 15, Sec. 5 - Notice of hearing
Serena T. Bacelonia vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 143440, February 11, 2003
Dolores Fajardo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140356, March 20, 2001
A motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court is considered a worthless piece of paper, which the Clerk of Court has no right to receive and
the trial court has no authority to act upon.
Federico Pallada v. Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Br. 1, G.R. No. 129442, March 10, 1999
KKK Foundation, Inc. vs. Adelina Calderon-Bargas, et al., G.R. No. 163785, December 27, 2007
Aneco Realty and Development Corp. vs. Landex Development Corp., G.R. No. 165952, July 28, 2008
Jurisprudence confirms that the requirements laid down in Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court that the notice of hearing shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall state
the time and place for the hearing of the motion, are mandatory. If not religiously complied with,
they render the motion pro forma. As such, the motion is a useless piece of paper that will not toll
the running of the prescriptive period.
Yet, again, there were previous cases with peculiar circumstances that had compelled us to
liberally apply the rules on notice of hearing and recognize substantial compliance with the same.
Once such case is Philippine National Bank v. Paneda, (G.R. No. 149236, February 14, 2007)
where we adjudged: Thus, even if the Motion may be defective for failure to address the notice of
hearing of said motion to the parties concerned, the defect was cured by the court's taking
cognizance thereof and the fact that the adverse party was otherwise notified of the existence of said
pleading. There is substantial compliance with the foregoing rules if a copy of the said motion for
reconsideration was furnished to the counsel of herein private respondents. In the present case,
records reveal that the notices in the Motion were addressed to the respective counsels of the private
respondents and they were duly furnished with copies of the same as shown by the receipts signed
by their staff or agents. Consequently, the Court finds that the petitioner substantially complied with
the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court and existing jurisprudence on the requirements of
motions and pleadings.
City of Dumaguete vs. Phil. Ports Authority, G.R. No. 168973, August 24, 2011
Rule 15, Sec. 6 - Proof of service necessary
Lutgarda Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123340, August 29, 2002
Mahid M. Mutilan vs. Santos B. Adiong, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1581, July 2, 2002
The requirements in Sections 4 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court on notice of hearing and
proof of service thereof to the adverse party, far from being merely technical and procedural, are
necessary elements of procedural due process.
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Augustine A. Vestil, A.M. Nos. RTJ-06-2030 & RTJ-07-2032,
October 5, 2007
Rule 15, Sec. 8 - Omnibus motion
Rationale for Rule

The spirit that surrounds the foregoing statutory norm is to require the party filing a pleading or
motion to raise all available exceptions for relief during the single opportunity so that single or
multiple objections may be avoided.
True, the Omnibus Motion Rule requires the movant to raise all available exceptions in a single
opportunity to avoid multiple piecemeal objections. But to apply that statutory norm, the objections
must have been available to the party at the time the Motion was filed.
PH Credit Corporation vs. Court of Appeals and Carlos M. Farrales, G.R. No. 109648, November 22,
2001
The spirit that surrounds the foregoing statutory norm is to require the party filing a pleading or
motion to raise all available exceptions for relief during the single opportunity so that single or
multiple objections may be avoided.
Rule 16 - Motion to Dismiss
The Order of the trial court denying the motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory. An
interlocutory order does not terminate nor finally dispose of the case, but leaves something to be
done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. It is always under the control of
the court and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before final
judgment. This proceeds from the court's inherent power to control its processes and orders so as to
make them conformable to law and justice.
Bonifacio Construction Management vs. Bernabe, G.R. No. 148174, June 30, 2005
Rule 16, Sec. 1 - Grounds
In General
Forum non conveniens is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Section 1, Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court does not include it as a ground.
Kazuhiro Hasegawa, et al. vs. Minoru Kitamura, G.R. No. 149177, November 23, 2007
It is a well-settled rule that the order denying the motion to dismiss cannot be the subject of
petition for certiorari. Petitioners should have filed an answer to the complaint, proceed to trial and
await judgment before making an appeal.
Bank of America vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120135, March 31, 2003
A motion to dismiss shall be filed within the time for but before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim.
Elidad C. Kho vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115758, March 19, 2002
The period to file a motion to dismiss depends upon the circumstances of the case. Section 1 of
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court requires that, in general, a motion to dismiss should be filed within
the reglementary period for filing a responsive pleading. Thus, a motion to dismiss alleging
improper venue cannot be entertained unless made within that period.
However, even after an answer has been filed, the Court has allowed a defendant to file a motion
to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction, (2) litis pendentia, (3) lack of cause of
action, and (4) discovery during trial of evidence that would constitute a ground for dismissal.
Except for lack of cause of action or lack of jurisdiction, the grounds under Section 1 of Rule 16
may be waived. If a particular ground for dismissal is not raised or if no motion to dismiss is filed at
all within the reglementary period, it is generally considered waived under Section 1, Rule 9 of the
Rules.
Felizardo S. Obando, et al. vs. Eduardo F. Figueras, et al., G.R. No. 134854, January 18, 2000
Accordingly, Rule 16, Section 1 of the Rules of Court does not consider as grounds for a motion
to dismiss the allotment of the disputed land for another public purpose or the petition for a mere
easement of right-of-way in the complaint for expropriation. The grounds for dismissal are
exclusive to those specifically mentioned in Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, and an action
can be dismissed only on a ground authorized by this provision.
Robern Development Corp. vs. Jesus V. Quitain, G.R. No. 135042, September 23, 1999
The option of whether to set the case for preliminary hearing after the filing of an answer which
raises affirmative defenses, or to file a motion to dismiss raising any of the grounds set forth in
Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules are procedural options which are not mutually exclusive of each
other.
Associated Bank vs. Sps. Justiniano, Sr. and Ligaya Montano, et al., G.R. No. 166383, October 16,
2009
Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the trial court may dismiss a
complaint on the ground that the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's complaint has been
paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished. This ground essentially admits the obligation
set out in the complaint but points out that such obligation has been extinguished, in this case
apparently by abandonment after respondent received partial reimbursement from [the seller] as a
consequence of the cancellation of contract to sell between them.
Doña Rosana Realty and Dev't. Corp., et al. vs. Molave Dev't. Corp., G.R. No. 180523, March 26, 2010
(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause
Spouses Ma. Cristina D. Tirona and Oscar Tirona vs. Hon. Floro P. Alejo as Presiding Judge, G.R. No.
129313, October 10, 2001
For litis pendentia to lie as a ground for a motion to dismiss, the following requisites must be
present: (1) that the parties to the action are the same; (2) that there is substantial identity in the
causes of action and reliefs sought; and (3) that the result of the first action is determinative of the
second in any event and regardless of which party is successful.
Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. This situation is not present here.
DBP vs. Sps. Gatal, G.R. No. 138567, March 4, 2005
Litis pendentia is a Latin term, which literally means "a pending suit" and is variously referred to
in some decisions as lis pendens and auter action pendant. As a ground for the dismissal of a civil
action, it refers to the situation where two actions are pending between the same parties for the same
cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It is based on the policy
against multiplicity of suits.
To constitute litis pendentia, not only must the parties in the two actions be the same; there must
as well be substantial identity in the causes of action and in the reliefs sought. Further, the identity
should be such that any judgment that may be rendered in one case, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
Dotmatrix Trading vs. Rommel B. Legaspi, G.R. No. 155622, October 26, 2009
The rule on litis pendentia does not require that the case later in time should yield to the earlier
case; what is required merely is that there be another pending action, not a prior pending action.
Neither is it required that the party be served with summons before lis pendens can apply; it is the
filing of the action, not the receipt of summons, which determines priority in date.
The "more appropriate action test" considers the real issue raised by the pleadings and the
ultimate objective of the parties; the more appropriate action is the one where the real issues raised
can be fully and completely settled.
In the "anticipatory test", the bona fides or good faith of the parties is the critical element. If the
first suit is filed merely to preempt the later action or to anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its
dismissal, then the first suit should be dismissed.
Under this established jurisprudence on litis pendentia, the following considerations predominate
in the ascending order of importance in determining which action should prevail: (1) the date of
filing, with preference generally given to the first action filed to be retained; (2) whether the action
sought to be dismissed was filed merely to preempt the later action or to anticipate its filing and lay
the basis for its dismissal; and (3) whether the action is the appropriate vehicle for litigating the
issues between the parties.
(f), (h) and (i)
Under Section 5 of Rule 16, dismissals under paragraphs (f), (h), and (i) of Section 1 of Rule 16
of the Rules of Court constitute res judicata.
Sps. Isidro and Lea Cruz vs. Sps. Florencio and Amparo Caraos, et al., G.R. no. 138208, April 23, 2007
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action
There is a distinction between a motion to dismiss for failure of the complainant to state a cause
of action and a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action. The first is governed by Rule 16,
Section 1 (g), while the second by Rule 33 of the Rules of Court.
Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. vs. Dakila Trading Corp., G.R. No. 172242, August 14, 2007
Manila Banking Corp. vs. University of Baguio, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 159189, February 21, 2007
Republic of the Philippines vs. Juan C. Tuvera, et al., G.R. No. 148246, February 16, 2007
Melissa Domondon vs. Percival Mandap Lopez, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1696, June 20, 2002
A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action is filed by the defendant after the plaintiff
has presented his evidence on the ground that the latter has shown no right to the relief sought.
While a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 is based on preliminary objections which can be ventilated
before the beginning of the trial, a motion to dismiss under Rule 33 is in the nature of a demurrer to
evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is presented only after the plaintiff has
rested his case.
Melissa Domondon vs. Judge Percival Mandap Lopez, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1696, June 20, 2002
In a motion to dismiss due to failure to state a cause of action, the trial court can consider all the
pleadings filed, including annexes, motions and the evidence on record. However in so doing, the
trial court does not rule on the truth or falsity of such documents. It merely includes such documents
in the hypothetical admission. Any review of a finding of lack of cause of action based on these
documents would not involve a calibration of the probative value of such pieces of evidence but
would only limit itself to the inquiry of whether the law was properly applied given the facts and
these supporting documents. Therefore, what would inevitably arise from such a review are pure
questions of law, and not questions of fact.
China Road and Bridge Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 137898, December 15, 2000
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.
Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129242, January 16, 2001
It is a settled rule that an Order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and,
therefore, not appealable, nor can it be subject of a petition for review on certiorari. Such order may
only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. The
ordinary procedure to be followed in that event is to file an answer, go to trial, and if the decision is
adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment.
Rule 16, Sec. 2 - Hearing of motion
Francisca L. Marquez vs. Simeon Baldoz, G.R. No. 143779, April 4, 2003
Spouses Horacio and Felisa Benito vs. Agapita Saquitan-Ruiz, G.R. No. 149906, December 26, 2002
William Alain Miailhe vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108991, March 20, 2001
Heirs of Nepomucena Paez vs. Ramon Am. Torres, et al., G.R. No. 104314, February 2, 2000
Rule 16, Sec. 3 - Resolution of motion
United Overseas Bank Phils. vs. Rosemoor Mining & Development Corp., et al., G.R. Nos. 159669 &
163521, March 12, 2007
Douglas Lu Ym vs. Gertrudes Nabua, G.R. No. 161309, February 23, 2005
Wolfgang O. Roehr vs. Maria Carmen D. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003
Richard Teh vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147038, April 24, 2003
Francisca L. Marquez vs. Simeon Baldoz, G.R. No. 143779, April 4, 2003
William Alain Miailhe vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108991, March 20, 2001
California and Hawaiian Sugar vs. Pioneer Insurance, G.R. No. 139273, November 28, 2000
Erlinda C. Pefianco vs. Maria Luisa C. Moral, G.R. No. 132248, January 19, 2000
Rule 16, Sec. 5 - Effect of dismissal
246 Corp. vs. Reynaldo B. Daway, G.R. No. 157216, November 20, 2003
Rule 16, Sec. 6 - Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses
246 Corp. vs. Reynaldo B. Daway, G.R. No. 157216, November 20, 2003
Tourist Duty Free Shops vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 107395, January 26, 2000
True, Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules, specifically provides that a preliminary hearing on
the affirmative defenses may be allowed only when no motion to dismiss has been filed. Section 6,
however, must be viewed in the light of Section 3 of the same Rule, which requires courts to
resolve a motion to dismiss and prohibits them from deferring its resolution on the ground of
indubitability. Clearly then, Section 6 disallows a preliminary hearing of affirmative defenses once a
motion to dismiss has been filed because such defense should have already been resolved.
California and Hawaiian Sugar vs. Pioneer Insurance, G.R. No. 139273, November 28, 2000
The rule is based on practicality. Both the parties and the court can conveniently save time and
expenses necessarily involved in a case preparation and in a trial at large, when the issues involved
in a particular case can otherwise be disposed of in a preliminary hearing.
Associated Bank vs. Sps. Justiniano, Sr. and Ligaya Montano, et al., G.R. No. 166383, October 16,
2009
Rule 17 - Dismissal of Actions
There are two ways by which an action may be dismissed upon the instance of the plaintiff. First,
dismissal is a matter of right when a notice of dismissal is filed by the plaintiff before an answer or
a motion for summary judgment has been served on him by the defendant. Second, dismissal is
discretionary on the court when the motion for the dismissal of the action is filed by the plaintiff at
any stage of the proceedings other than before service of an answer or a motion for summary
judgment. While the dismissal in the first mode takes effect upon the mere notice of plaintiff
without need of a judicial order, the second mode requires the authority of the court before
dismissal of the case may be effected. This is so because in the dismissal of an action, the effect of
the dismissal upon the rights of the defendant should always be taken into consideration.
Limaco vs. Shonan Gakuen Children's House Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 158245, June 30, 2005
Rule 17, Sec. 1 - Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff
Susie Chan-Tan vs. Jesse C. Tan, G.R. No. 167139, February 25, 2010
Ma. Carminia C. Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139337, August 15, 2001
It is mandatory that the trial court issue an order confirming such dismissal (upon notice of
plaintiff) and, unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice and could be
accomplished by the plaintiff through mere notice of dismissal, and not through motion subject to
approval by the court. Dismissal is ipso facto upon notice, and without prejudice unless otherwise
stated in the notice.
Frederick Dael vs. Sps. Benedicto and Vilma Beltran, G.R. No. 156470, April 30, 2008
Rule 17, Sec. 2 - Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff
Susie Chan-Tan vs. Jesse C. Tan, G.R. No. 167139, February 25, 2010
Rule 17, Sec. 3 - Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff
Benedicta M. Samson, et al. vs. Geraldine C. Fiel-Macaraig, et al., G.R. No. 166356, February 2, 2010
Eduardo M. Martinez vs. Judge Orlando C. Paguio, A.M. No. MTJ 02-1419, December 27, 2002
Lilia J. Vicoy vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 138203, July 3, 2002
Emma Gallardo-Corro, et al. vs. Efren Don L. Gallardo, et al., G.R. No. 136228, January 30, 2001
Failure to make a substitution pursuant to Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court is a ground for
the dismissal of an action.
Rufus B. Rodriguez, et al. vs. Samuel A. Jardin, G.R. No. 141834, July 30, 2007
Under Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, the dismissal of a case for lack of interest to
prosecute had the effect of an adjudication on the merits.
Pablo C. Olivares, et al. vs. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr., A.C. No. 6323, April 13, 2007
The rules contemplate certain instances where the complaint may be dismissed due to the
plaintiff's fault: (1) if he fails to appear during a scheduled trial, especially on the date for the
presentation of his evidence in chief; (2) if he fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable
length of time; (3) if he fails to comply with the rules or any order of the court; or, (4) where the
plaintiff fails to appear when so required at the pre-trial.
BPI vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117385, February 11, 1999
Dismissals of actions for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute is authorized under Section 3, Rule
17 of the Rules of Court. A plain examination of the December 16, 2003 dismissal order shows that
it is an unqualified order and, as such, is deemed to be a dismissal with prejudice. "Dismissals of
actions (under Section 3) which do not expressly state whether they are with or without prejudice
are held to be with prejudice[.]"As a prejudicial dismissal, the December 16, 2003 dismissal order is
also deemed to be a judgment on the merits so that the petitioner's complaint in Civil Case No.
02-488 can no longer be refiled on the principle of res judicata. Procedurally, when a complaint is
dismissed for failure to prosecute and the dismissal is unqualified, the dismissal has the effect of an
adjudication on the merits. As an adjudication on the merits, it is imperative that the dismissal order
conform with Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court on the writing of valid judgments and final
orders.
Shimizu Phil. Contractors, Inc. vs. Leticia B. Magsalin, et al., G.R. No. 170026, June 20, 2012
The reliance on Joaquin [Joaquin vs. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 (1953)] is misplaced as it is based on
the conclusion the appellate court made in its April 8, 2005 resolution — i.e., that the pleading of
undisputed facts is equivalent to a prohibited appeal. The reliance is inattentive to both the
averments of the subject appeal and to the text of the cited case. The operative legal principle in
Joaquin is this: "[W]here a case is submitted upon an agreement of facts, or where all the facts are
stated in the judgment and the issue is the correctness of the conclusions drawn therefrom, the
question is one of law which [is properly subject to the review of this Court.]" In this case, as
already pointed out above, the facts supposedly supporting the trial court's conclusion of non
prosequitur were not stated in the judgment. This defeats the application of Joaquin.
The grounds specified by Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court for the motu proprio dismissal
of a case for failure to prosecute. . . are as follows:
(a) Failure of the plaintiff, without justifiable reasons, to appear on the date of the
presentation of his evidence in chief;
(b) Failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time;
(c) Failure of the plaintiff to comply with the Rules of Court; or
(d) Failure of the plaintiff to obey any order of the court.

The fundamental test for non prosequitur is whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff is
chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. There
must be unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to prosecute. While it is discretionary on the trial
court to dismiss cases, dismissals of actions should be made with care. The repressive or restraining
effect of the rule amounting to adjudication upon the merits may cut short a case even before it is
fully litigated; a ruling of dismissal may forever bar a litigant from pursuing judicial relief under the
same cause of action. Hence, sound discretion demands vigilance in duly recognizing the
circumstances surrounding the case to the end that technicality shall not prevail over substantial
justice.
Rule 18, Sec. 1 - When conducted
Benedicta M. Samson, et al. vs. Geraldine C. Fiel-Macaraig, et al., G.R. No. 166356, February 2, 2010
Rule 18, Sec. 2 - Nature and purpose
Toshiba Information Equipment (Phils.), Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 157594,
March 9, 2010
Rule 18, Sec. 3 - Notice of pre-trial
Under the pre-1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of pretrial must be served separately on
the counsel and the client. If served only on the counsel, the notice must expressly direct the counsel
to inform the client of the date, the time and the place of the pretrial conference. The absence of
such notice renders the proceedings void, and the judgment rendered therein cannot acquire finality
and may be attacked directly or collaterally.
Mariano de Guia vs. Ciriaco de Guia, G.R. No. 135384, April 4, 2001
Rule 18, Sec. 4 - Appearance of parties
Noteworthy is the fact that Section 4, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Court is a new provision; and
requires nothing less than that the representative should appear in a party’s behalf fully authorized
in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution,
and to enter into stipulations of facts and of documents.
United Coconut Planters Bank vs. Miguel "Mike" Magpayo, G.R. No. 149908, May 27, 2004
Under Rule 18, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it is obligatory upon both a party
and her counsel to appear at a pre-trial conference. The failure of a party to appear at pre-trial, given
its mandatory character, may cause her to be non-suited or considered as in default.
Nora E. Miwa vs. Rene O. Medina, A.C. No. 5854, September 30, 2003
The rules require that the party-litigant himself must appear for pre-trial but if he chooses to be
represented thereat, he should grant a special power of attorney to his counsel or representative.
Rule 18, Sec. 5 - Effect of failure to appear
Indeed the dismissal of a case whether for failure to appear during trial or prosecute an action for
an unreasonable length of time rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. But this discretion
must not be abused, nay gravely abused, and must be exercised soundly. Deferment of proceedings
may be tolerated so that cases may be adjudged only after a full and free presentation of all the
evidence by both parties. The propriety of dismissing a case must be determined by the
circumstances surrounding each particular case. There must be sufficient reason to justify the
dismissal of a complaint.
BPI vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117385, February 11, 1999
Prior to the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the phrase "as in default" was initially
included in Rule 20 of the old rules, and which read as follows:
Sec. 2. A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference may be non-suited

or considered as in default.
It was however amended in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Justice Regalado, in his
book REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, explained the rationale for the deletion of the phrase "as
in default" in the amended provision, to wit:
1. This is a substantial reproduction of Section 2 of the former Rule 20 with the

change that, instead of defendant being declared "as in default" by reason of his
non-appearance, this section now spells out that the procedure will be to allow the ex parte
presentation of plaintiff's evidence and the rendition of judgment on the basis thereof. While
actually the procedure remains the same, the purpose is one of semantical propriety or
terminological accuracy as there were criticisms on the use of the word "default" in the
former provision since that term is identified with the failure to file a required answer, not
appearance in court.
Still, in the same book, Justice Regalado clarified that while the order of default no longer
obtains, its effects were retained, thus:
Failure to file a responsive pleading within the reglementary period, and not failure to
appear at the hearing, is the sole ground for an order of default, except the failure to appear at
a pre-trial conference wherein the effects of a default on the part of the defendant are
followed, that is, the plaintiff shall be allowed to present evidence ex parte and a judgment
based thereon may be rendered against defendant.
As the rule now stands, if the defendant fails to appear for pre-trial, a default order is no longer
issued. Instead, the trial court may allow the plaintiff to proceed with his evidence ex parte and the
court can decide the case based on the evidence presented by plaintiff.
Philippine American Life & General Insurance Co. vs. Joseph Enario, G.R. No. 182075, September 15,
2010
Rule 18, Sec. 6 - Pre-trial brief
The pre-trial brief serves as a guide during the pre-trial conference so as to simplify, abbreviate
and expedite the trial if not to dispense with it. It is a devise essential to the speedy disposition of
disputes, and parties cannot brush it aside as a mere technicality. In addition, pre-trial rules are not
to be belittled or dismissed, because their non-observance may result in prejudice to a party's
substantive rights. Like all rules, they should be followed except only for the most persuasive of
reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the
degree of his thought[less]ness in not complying with the procedure.
Eufemia Balatico vda. de Agatep vs. Roberta L. Rodriguez, et al., G.R. No. 170540, October 28, 2009
Section 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court mandates that parties shall file with the court and serve
on the adverse party their pre-trial briefs at least three days before the scheduled pre-trial. The Rules
also provide that failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the
pre-trial.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Ildefonso T. Oleta, G.R. No. 156606, August 17, 2007
Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the failure of the defendant to file
a pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial, i.e., the plaintiff may
present his evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof. The remedy
of the defendant is to file a motion for reconsideration showing that his failure to file a pre-trial
brief was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect. The motion need not really stress the
fact that the defendant has a valid and meritorious defense because his answer which contains his
defenses is already on record.
Jacinto Saguid vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003
Rule 18, Sec. 7 - Record of pre-trial
LCK Industries Inc., et al. vs. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No. 170606, November 23, 2007
Hermogenes Datuin vs. Andres B. Soriano, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1640, October 15, 2002
Rule 19 - Intervention
Rule 19 of the Rules of Court allows a person to intervene in a civil case.

Manuel H. Nieto, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 166984, August 17, 2007
To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two requisites must concur: (1) the
movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; and (2) intervention must not unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor should the claim of the intervenor be
capable of being properly decided in a separate proceeding. The interest, which entitles one to
intervene, must involve the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the
intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.
Office of the Ombudsman vs. Maximo D. Sison, G.R. No. 185954, February 16, 2010
The purpose of intervention is to enable a stranger to an action to become a party in order for him
to protect his interest and for the court to settle all conflicting claims. Intervention is allowed to
avoid multiplicity of suits more than on due process considerations. To warrant intervention under
Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two requisites must concur: (1) the movant has a legal interest on the
matter in litigation; and (2) intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the parties, nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly decided in a
separate proceeding.
CSMC's intervention should be treated as one pro interesse suo which is a mode of intervention
in equity wherein a stranger desires to intervene for the purpose of asserting a property right in the
res, or thing, which is the subject matter of the litigation, without becoming a formal plaintiff or
defendant, and without acquiring control over the course of a litigation, which is conceded to the
main actors therein.
Rule 19, Sec. 1 - Who may intervene
The legal interest which entitles a person to intervene must be in the matter in litigation and of
such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct legal
operation and effect of judgment.
GSIS vs. Mariano A. Nocom, G.R. No. 175989, February 4, 2008
Elmar O. Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 162580, January 27, 2006
To warrant intervention under Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, two requisites must
concur: (a) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, and (b) intervention must not
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor should the claim of the
intervenor be capable of being properly decided in a separate proceeding.
Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Danilo L. Concepcion, G.R. No. 160727, June 26, 2007
Intervention is not mandatory, but only optional and permissive. Notably, Section 2, Rule 12 of
the then 1988 Revised Rules of Procedure uses the word 'may' in defining the right to intervene. The
present rules maintain the permissive nature of intervention in Section 1, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure.
California Bus Lines, Inc. vs. State Investment House, Inc., G.R. No. 147950, December 11, 2003
Intervention is not a matter of right but may be permitted by the courts only when the statutory
conditions for the right to intervene is shown. Thus, the allowance or disallowance of a motion to
intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. In determining the propriety of letting a
party intervene in a case, the tribunal should not limit itself to inquiring whether "a person (1) has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation; (2) or in the success of either of the parties; (3) or an interest
against both; (4) or when is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof."
Domingo R. Manalo vs. Court of Appeals and Paic Savings And Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 141297,
October 8, 2001
Intervention is not a matter of right but may be permitted by the Courts when the applicant shows
facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention. Under Section 1 Rule 19 of
the Revised Rules of Court, what qualifies a person to intervene is his possession of a legal interest
in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or
when he is situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in
the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. As regards the legal interest as qualifying factor,
this Court has ruled that such interest must be of direct and immediate character not merely
contingent or expectant so that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of
the judgment.
Firestone Ceramics vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 127022 & 127245, September 2, 1999
Fort Bonifacio Development Corp. vs. Yllas Lending Corp., et al., G.R. No. 158997, October 6, 2008
GSIS vs. Mariano A. Nocom, G.R. No. 175989, February 4, 2008
[A] motion for intervention shall be entertained when the following requisites are satisfied: (1)
the would-be intervenor shows that he has a substantial right or interest in the case; and (2) such
right or interest cannot be adequately pursued and protected in another proceeding.
Eleazar P. Quinto, et al. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010
Rule 19, Sec. 2 - Time to intervene
This section is derived from the former Section 2, Rule 12, which then provided that the motion
to intervene may be filed "before or during a trial." Said former phraseology gave rise to ambiguous
doctrines on the interpretation of the word "trial," with one decision holding that said Motion may
be filed up to the day the case is submitted for decision, while another stating that it may be filed at
any time before the rendition of the final judgment. This ambiguity was eliminated by the present
Section 2, Rule 19 by clearly stating that the same may be filed "at any time before rendition of the
judgment by the trial court," in line with the second doctrine above-stated. The clear import of the
amended provision is that intervention cannot be allowed when the trial court has already rendered
its Decision, and much less, when even the Court of Appeals had rendered its own Decision on
appeal.
Learning Child, Inc., et al. vs. Ayala Alabang Village Association, et al., G.R. Nos. 134269, 134440 &
144518, July 7, 2010
We have ruled however that allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the
sound discretion of the court after consideration of the appropriate circumstances. Rule 19 of the
Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and
completely available for justice. Its purpose is not to hinder or delay but to facilitate and promote
the administration of justice. Thus, interventions have been allowed even beyond the prescribed
period in the Rule in the higher interest of justice. Interventions have been granted to afford
indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has
been rendered by the trial court, when the petition for review of the judgment was already submitted
for decision before the Supreme Court, and even where the assailed order has already become final
and executory.
Office of the Ombudsman vs. Florita A. Masing, et al., G.R. No. 165416, January 22, 2008
As a rule, intervention is allowed "before rendition of judgment by the trial court," as Section 2,
Rule 19 expressly provides. However, the Court has recognized exceptions to this rule in the interest
of substantial justice . . . But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated,
is simply a rule of procedure, the whole purpose and object of which is to make the powers of the
Court fully and completely available for justice. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice.
Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It
was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It
does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is
designed as the means best adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end."
Edna Collado, et al. vs. Court of Appeals and Republic of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 107764,
October 4, 2002
It is not appropriate for petitioner to intervene at the execution stage of the decision. Such right to
intervene has lapsed.
Emilia T. Boncodin vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 130757, January 18, 2002
Intervention is merely collateral or accessory or ancillary to the principal action, and not an
independent proceeding; it is an interlocutory proceeding dependent on or subsidiary to the case
between the original parties. Where the main action ceases to exist, there is no pending proceeding
wherein the intervention may be based.
Domingo R. Manalo vs. Court of Appeals and Paic Savings And Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 141297,
October 8, 2001
Alberto Looyuko, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 102696, July 12, 2001
It was error for the trial court to entertain the motion for intervention when it was filed after the
case had not only been submitted for decision but was in fact partially executed. The intervention
unduly delayed and disrupted the smooth operation of the trial and prejudiced the adjudication of
the rights of the principal parties, especially so since the intervenor's rights could be fully protected
in a separate proceeding. More so, the motion for intervention should have been denied it appearing
clearly and succinctly that a Compromise Agreement had already been entered into.
Crisostomo Magat, et al. vs. Albert M. Delizo, et al., G.R. No. 135199, July 5, 2001
Thus, intervention may be granted only where its allowance will not unduly delay or prejudice
the rights of the original parties to a case. Generally, it will be allowed "before rendition of
judgment by the trial court", as Rule 19, §2 expressly provides. After trial and decision in a case,
intervention can no longer be permitted. Certainly it cannot be allowed on appeal without unduly
delaying the disposition of the case and prejudicing the interest of the parties.
Reggie Christi Limpo vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 124582, June 16, 2000
Intervention can no longer be allowed in a case already terminated by final judgment.

Francisco I. Chavez vs. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716, May 19, 1999
Henry C. Seveses vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 102675, October 13, 1999
[A]llowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of the
court after consideration of the appropriate circumstances. Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of
procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice.
Its purpose is not to hinder or delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Thus,
interventions have been allowed even beyond the prescribed period in the Rule in the higher interest
of justice. Interventions have been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not been
impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by the trial court, when the
petition for review of the judgment was already submitted for decision before the Supreme Court,
and even where the assailed order has already become final and executory. In Lim v. Pacquing (310
Phil. 722 (1995)], the motion for intervention filed by the Republic of the Philippines was allowed
by this Court to avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive issues
raised by the parties.
Strategic Alliance Development Corp. vs. Radstock Securities Limited, et al., G.R. Nos. 178158 &
180428, December 4, 2009
Interventions have been allowed even beyond the period prescribed in the Rule, when demanded
by the higher interest of justice. Interventions have also been granted to afford indispensable parties,
who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by the
trial court, when the petition for review of the judgment has already been submitted for decision
before the Supreme Court, and even where the assailed order has already become final and
executory.
Eleazar P. Quinto, et al. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010
Rule 20, Sec. 2 - Assignment of cases
The raffle of cases is vital to the administration of justice because it is intended to ensure
impartial adjudication of cases and obviates public suspicion regarding assignment of cases to
predetermined judges. We have set rules in raffling, precisely to provide a uniform method of
assignment of cases for more equitable distribution of cases. Thus, a raffle must be conducted so
that all branches of the court in that station or grouping shall receive more or less the same number
of civil, criminal and other kinds of cases. In the event that there are inequalities, which inevitably
occur due to vacancies or absences, "once the vacancy is filled or the absent judge has returned, the
sala shall be assigned such number of cases as will equalize its caseload equitably with the rest of
the other branches in the same station". Hence, the assignment to the branch with the least number
of cases will still have to be through a raffle and not on the basis of the preference of any judge.
Antonio J. Fineza vs. Bayani S. Rivera, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1545, August 6, 2003
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Ireneo Lee Gako, Jr., et al., A.M. No. RTJ-07-2074, October 24,
2008
Rule 21, Sec. 3 - Form and contents
Purita Alipio vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134100, September 29, 2000
Under the Rules of Court, the issuance of subpoenas, including a subpoena duces tecum, operates
under the requirements of reasonableness and relevance. For the production of documents to be
reasonable and for the documents themselves to be relevant, the matter under inquiry should, in the
first place, be one that the Ombudsman can legitimately entertain, investigate and rule upon.
Re: Subpoena Duces Tecum of Acting Director Aleu A. Amante, PIAB-C, Office of the Ombudsman,
A.M. No. 10-1-13-SC, March 2, 2010
Rule 21, Sec. 4 - Quashing a subpoena
Under the Rules of Court, the issuance of subpoenas, including a subpoena duces tecum, operates
under the requirements of reasonableness and relevance. For the production of documents to be
reasonable and for the documents themselves to be relevant, the matter under inquiry should, in the
first place, be one that the Ombudsman can legitimately entertain, investigate and rule upon.
Re: Subpoena Duces Tecum of Acting Director Aleu A. Amante, PIAB-C, Office of the Ombudsman,
A.M. No. 10-1-13-SC, March 2, 2010
Rule 21, Sec. 8 - Compelling attendance
A judge may issue a warrant of arrest against a witness simply upon proof that the subpoena had
been served upon him but he failed to attend the hearing. The purpose is to bring the witness before
the court where his attendance is required, not to punish him for contempt which requires a previous
hearing.
Samuel D. Pagdilao vs. Adoracion G. Angeles, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1467, August 5, 1999
Rule 22, Sec. 1 - How to compute time
Rodolfo Alarilla, Sr., et al. vs. Reynaldo C. Ocampo, G.R. No. 144697, December 10, 2003
Republic of the Phil. Thru the DPWH vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116463, June 10, 2003
Roberto R. Serrano vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139420, August 15, 2001
Ma. Vilma S. Labad vs. University of Southeastern Phils., G.R. No. 139665, August 9, 2001
Medina Investigation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144074, March 20, 2001
Unity Fishing Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145415, February 2, 2001
Rule 22, Sec. 2 - Effect of interruption
PDIC vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139998, October 29, 2002
Rule 23 - Depositions Pending Action
While the taking of depositions pending trial is not expressly provided [for] under the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, we find no reason for public respondent to disallow the taking of the same in
the manner provided for under Section 1 of Rule 23 under the circumstances of the case. To
disallow petitioner to avail of the specific remedies provided under the Rules would deny him the
opportunity to adequately defend himself against the criminal charge of rape with homicide now
pending before the public respondent and, further, [it] loses sight of the object of procedure which is
to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties.
People of the Phil. vs. Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, G.R. No. 132577, August 17, 1999
Rule 23, Sec. 1 - Depositions pending action, when may be taken
Producers Bank vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110495, January 29, 1998
Rule 24 - Depositions Before Action or Pending Appeal
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112710, May 30, 2001
Rule 24, Sec. 1 - Depositions before action petition
Producers Bank of the Phils vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110495, January 29, 1998
Rule 24, Sec. 7 - Depositions pending appeal
Rule 26, Sec. 1 - Request for admission
The purpose of the rule governing requests for admission of facts and genuineness of documents
is to expedite trial and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed on
trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry.
Allied Agri-Business Dev. Co. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118438, December 4, 1998
This particular Rule seeks to obtain admissions from the adverse party regarding the genuineness
of relevant documents or relevant matters of fact through requests for admissions to enable a party
to discover the evidence of the adverse side thereby facilitating an amicable settlement of the case
or expediting the trial of the same. However, if the request for admission only serves to delay the
proceeding by abetting redundancy in the pleadings, the intended purpose for the rule will certainly
be defeated.
Fortunata N. Duque vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125383, July 2, 2002
Rule 26, Sec. 2 - Implied admission
Fortunata N. Duque vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125383, July 2, 2002
Cristina Diman, et al. vs. Florentino M. Alumbres, et al., G.R. No. 131466, November 27, 1998
The application of the rules on modes of discovery rests upon the sound discretion of the court.
In the same vein, the determination of the sanction to be imposed upon a party who fails to comply
with the modes of discovery rests on the same sound judicial discretion. It is the duty of the courts
to examine thoroughly the circumstances of each case and to determine the applicability of the
modes of discovery, bearing always in mind the aim to attain an expeditious administration of
justice.
Rey Lañada vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 102390 & 102404, February 1, 2002
Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless within a
period designated in the request which shall not be less than fifteen (15) days after service thereof,
or within such further time as the court may allow on motion, the party to whom the request is
directed files and serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either denying
specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why
he cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters. Upon service of request for admission, the
party served may do any of the following acts: (a) he may admit each of the matters of which an
admission is requested, in which case, he need not file an answers; (b) he may admit the truth of the
matters of which admission is requested by serving upon the party requesting a written admission of
such matters within the period stated in the request, which must not be less than ten (10) day after
service, or within such further time as the court may allow on motion and notice; (c) he may file a
sworn statement denying specifically the matter of which an admission is requested; or, (d) he may
file a sworn statement setting forth in the detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or
deny the matters of which an admission is requested.
Allied Agri-Business Dev. Co. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118438, December 4, 1998
Rule 27 - Production or Inspection of Documents or Things
Rule 27 of the Revised Rules of Court permits "fishing" for evidence, the only limitation being
that the documents, papers, etc., sought to be produced are not privileged, that they are in the
possession of the party ordered to produce them and that they are material to any matter involved in
the action.
Solidbank Corp. vs. Gateway Electronics Corp., et al., G.R. No. 164805, April 30, 2008
Rule 27, Sec. 1 - Motion for production or inspection; order
Carmelita S. Santos, et al. vs. PNB, G.R. No. 148218, April 29, 2002
Security Bank Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 135874, January 25, 2000
Roberto S. Alberto vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 132242, July 27, 1999
A more than cursory glance at the above text would show that the production or inspection of
documents or things as a mode of discovery sanctioned by the Rules of Court may be availed of by
any party upon a showing of good cause therefor before the court in which an action is pending. The
court may order any party: a) to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing of
any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things,
which are not privileged; which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the
action; and which are in his possession, custody or control; or b) to permit entry upon designated
land or other property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring,
surveying, or photographing the property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon.
Air Phil. Corp. vs. Pennswell, Inc., G.R. No. 172835, December 13, 2007
Secretary of National Defense, et al. vs. Raymond Manalo, et al., G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008
Rule 30, Sec. 2 - Adjournments and postponements
Report on the Judicial Audit, A.M. No. 98-8-262-RTC, March 21, 2000
Leticia G. Matias vs. Sergio A. Plan, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1159, August 3, 1998
Rule 30, Sec. 5 - Order of trial
Under this rule, a party who has the burden of proof must introduce, at the first instance, all the
evidence he relies upon and such evidence cannot be given piecemeal. The obvious rationale of the
requirement is to avoid injurious surprises to the other party and the consequent delay in the
administration of justice.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 152375, December 16, 2011
Section 5(f)
The exercise of the court's discretion under the exception of Section 5 (f), Rule 30 of the Rules of
Court depends on the attendant facts — i.e., on whether the evidence would qualify as a "good
reason" and be in furtherance of "the interest of justice." For a reviewing court to properly interfere
with the lower court's exercise of discretion, the petitioner must show that the lower court's action
was attended by grave abuse of discretion. Settled jurisprudence has defined this term as the
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or, the exercise of
power in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, so patent or so
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, to a virtual refusal to perform the mandated
duty, or to act at all in contemplation of the law. Grave abuse of discretion goes beyond the bare and
unsupported imputation of caprice, whimsicality or arbitrariness, and beyond allegations that merely
constitute errors of judgment or mere abuse of discretion.
Rule 30, Sec. 9 - Judgment to receive evidence; delegation to clerk of court
Vernette Umali-Paco, et al. vs. Reinato G. Quilala, et al., A.M. No. RTJ-02-1699, October 15, 2003
Rule 31, Sec. 1 - Consolidation
It is well recognized that consolidation of cases avoids multiplicity of suits, guards against
oppression and abuse, prevents delay, clears congested court dockets, simplifies the work of the
courts and seeks to attain justice with the least expense and vexation to litigants. Generally,
consolidation applies only to cases pending before the same judge and not to cases pending in
different branches of the same court or in different courts. Yet in appropriate instances and in the
interest of justice, cases pending in different branches of the court or in different courts may be
consolidated, consistent with the rule in our jurisdiction that leans towards permitting consolidation
of cases whenever possible and irrespective of the diversity of the issues for resolution. Hence,
consolidation of cases is proper when the actions involve the same reliefs or the same parties and
basically the same issues, or when there is real need to forestall the possibility of conflicting
decisions being rendered in the cases, provided that the measure will not give one party an undue
advantage over the other, or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties.
Bank of Commerce vs. Estela Perlas-Bernabe, et al., G.R. No. 172393, October 20, 2010
The consolidation of cases is addressed to the sound discretion of judges.

People of the Phil. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 149495, August 21, 2003
The main object of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression or
abuse, prevent delay, clear congested dockets, simplify the work of the trial court and save
unnecessary costs and expense.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, et al., G.R. No. 130907, November 27, 2001
Rule 32, Sec. 2 - Reference ordered on motion
Under Section 2, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court, a court may, motu proprio, direct a reference to a
commissioner when a question of fact, other than upon the pleadings, arises upon motion or
otherwise, in any stage of a case, or for carrying a judgment or order into effect. The order of
reference can be limited exclusively to receive and report evidence only, and the commissioner may
likewise rule upon the admissibility of evidence. The commissioner is likewise mandated to submit
a report in writing to the court upon the matters submitted to him by the order of reference.
Manotok Realty, Inc., et al. vs. CLT Realty Development Corp., G.R. Nos. 123346 & 134385, December
14, 2007
Rule 32, Sec. 3 - Order of reference; powers of the commissioner
Aljem's Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122216, March 28, 2001
Rule 32, Sec. 5 - Proceedings before commissioner
Aljem's Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122216, March 28, 2001
Rule 33 - Demurrer to Evidence
There is a distinction between a motion to dismiss for failure of the complainant to state a cause
of action and a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action. The first is governed by Rule 16,
Section 1 (g), 54 while the second by Rule 33 of the Rules of Court.
Melissa Domondon vs. Percival Mandap Lopez, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1696, June 20, 2002
Manila Banking Corp. vs. University of Baguio, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 159189, February 21, 2007
Rule 33, Sec. 1 - Demurrer to evidence
The general rule is that upon the dismissal of the demurrer in the appellate court, the defendant
loses the right to present his evidence and the appellate court shall then proceed to render judgment
on the merits on the basis of plaintiff's evidence. . . . It thus becomes the Court's duty to rule on the
merits of the complaint, duly taking into account the evidence presented by the Republic, and
without need to consider whatever evidence the Tuveras have, they having waived their right to
present evidence in their behalf.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Juan C. Tuvera, et al., G.R. No. 148246, February 16, 2007
While a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 is based on preliminary objections which can be
ventilated before the beginning of the trial, a motion to dismiss under Rule 33 is in the nature of a
demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is presented only after the
plaintiff has rested his case.
Melissa Domondon vs. Judge Percival Mandap Lopez, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1696, June 20, 2002
It should be underscored that the nature of an election protest case differs from an ordinary civil
action. Because of this difference, the Rules of Civil Procedure on demurrer to evidence cannot
apply to election cases even "by analogy or in a suppletory character," especially because the
application of said Rules would not be " practicable and convenient."
Gelacio P. Gementiza vs. Comelec, et al., G.R. No. 140884, March 6, 2001
When a demurrer to evidence granted by a trial court is reversed on appeal, the reviewing court
cannot remand the case for further proceedings. Rather, it should render judgment on the basis of
the evidence proffered by the plaintiff.
Radiowealth Finance Co. vs. Sps. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 138739, July 6, 2000
Rule 34, Sec. 1 - Judgment on the pleadings
Laurentino D. Bascug vs. Judge Graciano H. Arinday, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-00-1591, April 11, 2002
Simply stated, what distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings from a summary judgment is the
presence of issues in the Answer to the Complaint. When the Answer fails to tender any issue, that
is, if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations of
the adverse party's pleadings by admitting the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them
at all, a judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. On the other hand, when the Answer specifically
denies the material averments of the complaint or asserts affirmative defenses, or in other words
raises an issue, a summary judgment is proper provided that the issue raised is not genuine. "A
'genuine issue' means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished
from an issue which is fictitious or contrived or which does not constitute a genuine issue for trial."
Eugenio Basbas, et al. vs. Beata Sayson, et al., G.R. No. 172660, August 24, 2011
. . . The answer would fail to tender an issue . . . if it does not comply with the requirements for a
specific denial set out in Section 10 (or Section 8) of Rule 8; and it would admit the material
allegations of the adverse party's pleadings not only where it expressly confesses the truthfulness
thereof but also if it omits to deal with them at all.
Now, if an answer does in fact specifically deny the material averments of the complaint in the
manner indicated by said Section 10 of Rule 8, and/or asserts affirmative defenses (allegations of
new matter which, while admitting the material allegations of the complaint expressly or impliedly,
would nevertheless bar recovery by the plaintiff) . . ., a judgment on the pleadings would naturally
not be proper.
Eugenia D. Polido vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 170632, July 10, 2007
Pesane Animas Mongao, et al. vs. Pryce Properties Corp., G.R. No. 156474, August 16, 2005
Under Section 1 of Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, a judgment on the pleadings is proper when an
answer fails to render an issue or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading. The essential question is whether there are issues generated by the pleadings. A judgment
on the pleadings may be sought only by a claimant, who is the party seeking to recover upon a
claim, counterclaim or cross-claim; or to obtain a declaratory relief.
Romeo C. Garcia vs. Dionisio V. Llamas, G.R. No. 154127, December 8, 2003
While this rule [our ruling in Viajar vs. Estenzo] is true in the summary proceedings under Rule
34 of the Revised Rules of Court, it does not apply to summary proceedings under Rule 35. A
different rationale operates in the latter for it arises out of facts already established or admitted
during the pre-trial held beforehand, unlike in the former where the judge merely relies on the
merits of the movant's allegations. Rule 34 pertains to a judgment on the pleadings while Rule 35
relates to a summary judgment which was the holding in this case.
Rodolfo P. Velasquez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124049, June 30, 1999
The trial court has the discretion to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by a party
if there is no controverted matter in the case after the answer is filed. A judgment on the pleadings
is a judgment on the facts as pleaded, and is based exclusively upon the allegations appearing in the
pleadings of the parties and the accompanying annexes.
Doris U. Sunbanun vs. Aurora B. Go, G.R. No. 163280, February 2, 2010
Rule 35 - Summary Judgments
A summary judgment under Rule 35 of the Rules of Court is a procedural technique that is proper
only when there is no genuine issue as to the existence of a material fact and the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. It is a method intended to expedite or promptly dispose of
cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions,
and affidavits on record. Upon a motion for summary judgment the court's sole function is to
determine whether there is an issue of fact to be tried, and all doubts as to the existence of an issue
of fact must be resolved against the moving party. In other words, a party who moves for summary
judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, and any
doubt as to the existence of such an issue is resolved against the movant. Thus, in ruling on a
motion for summary judgment, the court should take that view of the evidence most favorable to the
party against whom it is directed, giving that party the benefit of all favorable inferences.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Sandiganbayan (First Division), et al., G.R. Nos. 166859, 169203 & 180702,
April 12, 2011
A summary judgment is granted to settle expeditiously a case if, on motion of either party, there
appears from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no important issues of fact
are involved, except the amount of damages.
Manuel Ybiernas, et al. vs. Ester Tanco-Gabaldon, et al., G.R. No. 178925, June 1, 2011
Under the applicable provisions of Rule 35, the defending party or the claimant, as the case may
be, must invoke the rule on summary judgment by filing a motion. The adverse party must be
notified of the motion for summary judgment and furnished with supporting affidavits, depositions
or admissions before hearing is conducted. More importantly, a summary judgment is permitted
only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.
Florentino Pineda vs. Heirs of Eliseo Guevara, et al., G.R. No. 143188, February 14, 2007
Summary judgment is a procedure aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early
stage of the litigation. The proper inquiry in this regard would be whether the affirmative defenses
offered by petitioners constitute genuine issues of fact requiring a full-blown trial. In a summary
judgment, the crucial question is: are the issues raised by petitioners not genuine so as to justify a
summary judgment? A "genuine issue" means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of
evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived, an issue that does not
constitute a genuine issue for trial.
Wood Technology Corp. vs. Equitable Banking Corp., G.R. No. 153867, February 17, 2005
The term genuine issue has been defined as an issue of fact that calls for the presentation of
evidence as distinguished from an issue that is sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith, and
patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. The court can determine this
on the basis of the pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits, and counter-affidavits submitted by
the parties to the court. Where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested,
proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Sandiganbayan (First Division), et al., G.R. Nos. 166859, 169203 & 180702,
April 12, 2011
Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, except as to the amount of damages, when
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law, summary judgment may be allowed. Summary or accelerated judgment is a
procedural technique aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the
litigation thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.
The law itself determines when a summary judgment is proper. Under the rules, summary
judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact which call for the presentation of
evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issues, when the
affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary
judgment as prescribed by the rules must ensue as a matter of law. What is crucial for
determination, therefore, is the presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact.
Evadel Realty and Development Corp. vs. Antero and Virginia Soriano, G.R. No. 144291, April 20, 2001
Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended, which gives authority to trial courts to
grant relief by summary judgment is intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases where the
facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, admissions and affidavits. This rule does
not vest in the court summary jurisdiction to try the issues on pleadings and affidavits but gives the
court limited authority to enter summary judgment only if it clearly appears that there is no genuine
issue of material fact. On a motion for summary judgment, the court is not authorized to decide an
issue of fact but to determine whether the pleadings and records before the court create an issue of
fact to be tried. It is impossible to state a general rule for determining whether a genuine issue of
fact exists in a particular case. The determination will depend upon the particular circumstances of
each case. Nevertheless, the language used by courts in making a determination in particular cases
may serve to indicate the manner in which a court should approach the question to be determined. It
is repeated often enough that the court is not authorized to try the issue of fact but to determine
whether there is an issue to be tried. Where the motion is made by a claimant, the defending party
must show that he has a plausible ground of defense, something fairly arguable and of a substantial
character.
Ray U. Velasco, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 121517, March 31, 2000
Simply stated, what distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings from a summary judgment is the
presence of issues in the Answer to the Complaint. When the Answer fails to tender any issue, that
is, if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations of
the adverse party's pleadings by admitting the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them
at all, a judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. On the other hand, when the Answer specifically
denies the material averments of the complaint or asserts affirmative defenses, or in other words
raises an issue, a summary judgment is proper provided that the issue raised is not genuine. "A
'genuine issue' means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished
from an issue which is fictitious or contrived or which does not constitute a genuine issue for trial."
Eugenio Basbas, et al. vs. Beata Sayson, et al., G.R. No. 172660, August 24, 2011
Rule 35, Sec. 1 - Summary judgment for claimant
A summary judgment, or accelerated judgment, is a procedural technique to promptly dispose of

cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and
affidavits on record, or for weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation to
avoid the expense and loss of time involved in a trial. When the pleadings on file show that there are
no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of
summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case
summarily by applying the law to the material facts.
Phil. Business Bank vs. Felipe Chua, G.R. No. 178899, November 15, 2010
Eland Phil., Inc. vs. Azucena Garcia, et al., G.R. No. 173289, February 17, 2010
Cotabato Timberland Co., Inc. vs. C. Alcantara and Sons, Inc., G.R. No. 145469, May 28, 2004
Korea Exchange Bank vs. Filkor Business Integrated, G.R. No. 138292, April 10, 2002
Ley Construction vs. Union Bank, G.R. No. 133801, June 27, 2000
Under the afore-quoted procedural rules, for a summary judgment to be proper, the movant must
establish two requisites: (a) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the
amount of damages; and (b) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. Where, on the basis of the pleadings of a moving party, including
documents appended thereto, no genuine issue as to a material fact exists, the burden to produce a
genuine issue shifts to the opposing party. If the opposing party fails, the moving party is entitled to
a summary judgment.
National Power Corp. vs. Santa Loro Vda. De Capin, et al., G.R. No. 175176, October 17, 2008
Benjamin Bitanga vs. Pyramid Construction Engineering Corp., G.R. No. 173526, August 28, 2008
Summary judgment may be allowed where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
where the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In Yuchengco v. Sandiganbayan
(515 Phil. 1, 12 (2006)), the Court has previously discussed the importance of summary judgment in
weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation in order to avoid the expense
and loss of time involved in a trial, viz.:
Even if the pleadings appear, on their face, to raise issues, summary judgment may
still ensue as a matter of law if the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such
issues are not genuine. The presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact
determines, at bottom, the propriety of summary judgment. A "genuine issue", as
differentiated from a fictitious or contrived one, is an issue of fact that requires the
presentation of evidence. To the party who moves for summary judgment rests the onus of
demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the
complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.
Even if in the Answer itself there appears to be a tender of issues requiring trial, yet when the
relevant affidavits, depositions, or admissions demonstrate that those issues are not genuine but
sham or fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering summary
judgment for plaintiff.
Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. vs. Republic of the Phil., G.R. Nos. 189434 & 189505, April 25, 2012
Summary judgment, or accelerated judgment as it is sometimes known, may also call for a
hearing so that both the movant and the adverse party may justify their positions. However, the
hearing contemplated (with 10-day notice) is for the purpose of determining whether the issues are
genuine or not, not to receive evidence of the issues set up in the pleadings. In Carcon Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that a hearing is not de riguer. The matter may be
resolved, and usually is, on the basis of affidavits, depositions, and admissions. This does not mean
that the hearing is superfluous; only that the court is empowered to determine its necessity.
It is the law itself that determines when a summary judgment is proper. Under the rules, summary
judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact that call for the presentation of
evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issues, when the
affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary
judgment as prescribed by the rules must ensue as a matter of law. What is crucial to a
determination, therefore, is the presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. When
the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then summary judgment is called for.
Rule 35, Sec. 2 - Summary judgment for defending party
Rule 35, Sec. 3 - Motion and proceedings thereon
Eland Phil., Inc. vs. Azucena Garcia, et al., G.R. No. 173289, February 17, 2010
Romeo C. Garcia vs. Dionisio V. Llamas, G.R. No. 154127, December 8, 2003
Monterey Foods Corp., et al. vs. Victorino E. Eserjose, G.R. No. 153126, September 11, 2003
Ley Construction vs. Union Bank, G.R. No. 133801, June 27, 2000
Eustaquio Mallilin vs. Ma. Elvira Castillo, G.R. No. 136803, June 16, 2000
Under Section 3, Rule 35, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment may be
allowed where, save for the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Summary or accelerated judgment is a
procedural technique aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the
litigation, thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial. Even if the pleadings
appear, on their face, to raise issues, summary judgment may still ensue as a matter of law if the
affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine.The presence or
absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact determines, at bottom, the propriety of summary
judgment. A "genuine issue", as differentiated from a fictitious or contrived one, is an issue of fact
that requires the presentation of evidence. To the party who moves for summary judgment rests the
onus of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the
complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.
Alfonso T. Yuchengco, et al vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 149802, January 20, 2006
Edward T. Marcelo, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 156065, August 28, 2007
Under the afore-quoted procedural rules, for a summary judgment to be proper, the movant must
establish two requisites: (a) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the
amount of damages; and (b) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. Where, on the basis of the pleadings of a moving party, including
documents appended thereto, no genuine issue as to a material fact exists, the burden to produce a
genuine issue shifts to the opposing party. If the opposing party fails, the moving party is entitled to
a summary judgment.
National Power Corp. vs. Santa Loro Vda. De Capin, et al., G.R. No. 175176, October 17, 2008
A summary judgment is allowed only if, after hearing, the court finds that except as to the
amount of damages, the pleadings, affidavits, depositions and admissions show no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The purpose of
a summary judgment is to avoid drawn out litigations and useless delays because the facts appear
undisputed to the mind of the court. Such judgment is generally based on the facts proven
summarily by affidavits, depositions, pleadings, or admissions of the parties. For a full-blown trial
to be dispensed with, the party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating
clearly the absence of genuine issues of fact, or that the issue posed is patently insubstantial as to
constitute a genuine issue. "Genuine issue" means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of
evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived.
Mangontawar M. Gubat vs. NAPOCOR, G.R. No. 167415, February 26, 2010
A genuine issue of fact is that which requires the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from
a sham, fictitious, contrived or false issue. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or
undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue. Summary judgment is proper in such a case. . . .
Notably, however, both Piltel and Smartnet admit that they entered into a contract to sell covering
the Valgoson Property; that Smartnet agreed to pay Piltel P560 million for it, with a down payment
of P180 million; and that Smartnet failed to pay the balance of the purchase price on or about April
30, 1997. With these common admissions, it is clear that there are no genuine issues of fact as to the
existence and nature of the contract to sell as well as Smartnet's failure to pay the balance of the
purchase price within the agreed period. Thus, the RTC was correct in skipping trial and deciding
the case through a summary judgment based on the undisputed facts.
Pilipino Telephone Corp. vs. Radiomarine Network (Smartnet) Phil., Inc., G.R. No. 160322, August 24,
2011
Rule 35, Sec. 4 - Case not fully adjudicated on motion
This is what is referred to as a partial summary judgment. A careful reading of this section
reveals that a partial summary judgment was never intended to be considered a "final judgment," as
it does not "[put] an end to an action at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or has not
entitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for." The Rules provide for a partial summary
judgment as a means to simplify the trial process by allowing the court to focus the trial only on the
assailed facts, considering as established those facts which are not in dispute. After this sifting
process, the court is instructed to issue an order, the partial summary judgment, which specifies the
disputed facts that have to be settled in the course of trial. In this way, the partial summary judgment
is more akin to a record of pre-trial, an interlocutory order, rather than a final judgment. The partial
summary judgment envisioned by the Rules is an interlocutory order that was never meant to be
treated separately from the main case.
Phil. Business Bank vs. Felipe Chua, G.R. No. 178899, November 15, 2010
Rule 35 on summary judgments, admits of a situation in which a case is not fully adjudicated on
motion, and judgment is not rendered upon all of the reliefs sought. In Philippine Business Bank v.
Chua, (G.R. No. 178899, 15 November 2010) we had occasion to rule that a careful reading of its
Section 4 reveals that a partial summary judgment was never intended to be considered a "final
judgment," as it does not "[put] an end to an action at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or
has not entitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for." In this case, there was never any final or
complete adjudication of Civil Case No. 0141, as the Sandiganbayan's partial summary judgment in
the Swiss Deposits Decision made no mention of the Arelma account.
Section 4 of Rule 35 pertains to a situation in which separate judgments were necessary because
some facts existed without controversy, while others were controverted. However, there is nothing
in this provision or in the Rules that prohibits a subsequent separate judgment after a partial
summary judgment on an entirely different subject matter had earlier been rendered. There is no
legal basis for petitioners' contention that a judgment over the Swiss accounts bars a motion for
summary judgment over the Arelma account. Thus, the Swiss Deposits Decision has finally and
thoroughly disposed of the forfeiture case only as to the five Swiss accounts. Respondent's 2004
Motion is in the nature of a separate judgment, which is authorized under Section 5 of Rule 36.
Rule 36, Sec. 1 - Rendition of judgments and final orders
Ubaldino A. Lacurom vs. Juanita C. Tienzo, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2075, October 9, 2007
Mariano "Mike" Z. Velarde vs. Social Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357, April 28, 2004
Jaime C. Taran vs. Jose S. Jacinto, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1436, April 3, 2003
People of the Phil. vs. Freddie Lizada, G.R. Nos. 143468-71, January 24, 2003
Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court also requires that a judgment or final order determining
the merits of the case "shall be in writing, personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the
clerk of court." This requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge
did so through the processes of legal reasoning. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state
the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached.
Erlinda B. Dandoy vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150089, August 28, 2007
The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold purpose: (1) to
avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of
judicial business and (2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors,
which is precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and
obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. The doctrine
is not a mere technicality to be easily brushed aside, but a matter of public policy as well as a
time-honored principle of procedural law.
Apo Fruits Corp., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 164195, December 4, 2009
The doctrine of the law of the case means that whatever is irrevocably established as the
controlling legal rule between the same parties in the same case, whether correct on general
principles or not, continues to be the law of the case for as long as the facts on which the legal rule
was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. It applies in a situation where an
appellate court has made a ruling on a question on appeal and thereafter remands the case to the
lower court for further proceedings; the question then settled by the appellate court becomes the law
of the case binding the lower court and any subsequent appeal, and questions necessarily involved
and dealt with in a former appeal will be regarded as the law of the case in a subsequent appeal,
although the questions are not expressly treated in the opinion of the court, inasmuch as the
presumption is that all the facts in the case bearing on the point decided have received due
consideration whether all or none of them are mentioned in the opinion.
EPZA vs. Jose Pulido, et al., G.R. No. 188995, August 24, 2011
The fundamental distinction between a final judgment or order, on one hand, and an interlocutory
order, on the other hand, has been outlined in Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, (G.R. No.
L-60036, January 27, 1987) viz.:
The concept of 'final' judgment, as distinguished from one which has 'become final' (or
'executory' as of right [final and executory]), is definite and settled. A 'final' judgment or order is
one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto,
e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial declares
categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a
judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or
prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or
determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done
by the Court except to await the parties' next move (which among others, may consist of the filing
of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to
cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes 'final' or, to use the established and more
distinctive term, 'final and executory. . . . Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the
case, and does not end the Court's task of adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their
rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be
done by the Court, is 'interlocutory,' e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the
Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment
thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection of
documents or things, etc. Unlike a 'final' judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed
out, an 'interlocutory' order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that
may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.
17, 2011
The nullity of the dismissal order is patent on its face. It simply states its conclusion that the case
should be dismissed for non prosequitur, a legal conclusion, but does not state the facts on which
this conclusion is based. . . . A trial court should always specify the reasons for a complaint's
dismissal so that on appeal, the reviewing court can readily determine the prima facie justification
for the dismissal. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which
it is based leaves the parties in the dark and is especially prejudicial to the losing party who is
unable to point the assigned error in seeking a review by a higher tribunal.
Rule 36, Sec. 2 - Entry of judgments and final orders
A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact
or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
All the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest once a judgment becomes
final and executory; execution of the decision proceeds as a matter of right as vested rights are
acquired by the winning party. Just as a losing party has the right to appeal within the prescribed
period, the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision on the case.
After all, a denial of a petition for being time-barred is tantamount to a decision on the merits.
Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation, and this will set to naught the main role of courts of
justice to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by
settling justiciable controversies with finality.
Under Section 2, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, a judgment or final order becomes final and
executory if no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration was filed within the period
provided by the Rules.
Emerlito F. Aguila, et al. vs. Carmen R. Baldovizo, et al., G.R. No. 163186, February 23, 2007
The precipitate entry of judgment worked injustice against petitioner, and the People whom
petitioner represents. In effect, the entry of judgment, done in haste, foreclosed petitioner's right to
appeal the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals to this Court.
People of the Phil. vs. Nazar U. Chavez, G.R. No. 140690, June 19, 2001
A "final order" issued by a court has been defined as one which disposes of the subject matter in
its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to
enforce by execution what has been determined by the court. As distinguished therefrom, an
"interlocutory order" is one which does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more
to be adjudicated upon.
This Court has previously held that an order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final order if
no motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed.
Rule 36, Sec. 5 - Separate judgments
The Sandiganbayan rightly characterized their ruling on the 2004 Motion as a separate
judgment, which is allowed by the Rules of Court under Section 5 of Rule 36 . . . Rule 35 on
summary judgments, admits of a situation in which a case is not fully adjudicated on motion, and
judgment is not rendered upon all of the reliefs sought. In Philippine Business Bank v. Chua, (G.R.
No. 178899, 15 November 2010) we had occasion to rule that a careful reading of its Section 4
reveals that a partial summary judgment was never intended to be considered a "final judgment," as
it does not "[put] an end to an action at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or has not
entitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for." In this case, there was never any final or
complete adjudication of Civil Case No. 0141, as the Sandiganbayan's partial summary judgment in
the Swiss Deposits Decision made no mention of the Arelma account.
Section 4 of Rule 35 pertains to a situation in which separate judgments were necessary because
some facts existed without controversy, while others were controverted. However, there is nothing
in this provision or in the Rules that prohibits a subsequent separate judgment after a partial
summary judgment on an entirely different subject matter had earlier been rendered. There is no
legal basis for petitioners' contention that a judgment over the Swiss accounts bars a motion for
summary judgment over the Arelma account. Thus, the Swiss Deposits Decision has finally and
thoroughly disposed of the forfeiture case only as to the five Swiss accounts. Respondent's 2004
Motion is in the nature of a separate judgment, which is authorized under Section 5 of Rule 36.
Rule 37, Sec. 1 - Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsideration
Requisites for Newly Discovered Evidence
Under the Rules of Court, the requisites for "newly discovered evidence" are: 1) the evidence
was discovered after trial (in this case, after investigation); 2) such evidence could not have been
discovered and produced during the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and 3) it is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if
admitted, will probably change the judgment.
Michael Syiaco vs. Eugene Ong, G.R. Nos. 179282-83, December 1, 2010
When Evidence Is Deemed Newly Discovered
In order that a particular piece of evidence may be properly appreciated as newly discovered,
what is essential is not so much the time when the evidence first came into existence or the time
when it first came to the knowledge of the party now submitting it. What is essential is that the
offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in trying to locate such evidence before or during
trial (or investigation), but had nonetheless failed to secure it. The Rules does not contain an exact
definition of due diligence. It is often equated with "reasonable promptness to avoid prejudice to the
defendant." It has both a time component and a good faith component. It contemplates a situation
where the party acts reasonably and in good faith to obtain evidence, in light of the totality of the
circumstances and the facts known to him.
The question of whether the pieces of evidence are newly discovered has two aspects: a temporal
one, i.e., when the evidence was discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it have
been discovered.
The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a
petition for certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or
perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the
case. The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as (a) where the order is
a patent nullity, as where the court a quo had no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the
certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as
those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or
of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances,
a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and
there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is
urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in
the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte, or in
which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law
or where public interest is involved.
Beatriz Siok Ping Tang vs. Subic Bay Distribution, Inc., G.R. No. 162575, December 15, 2010
Republic of the Philippines vs. Vicente A. Hidalgo, et al., G.R. No. 161657, October 4, 2007
Sps. Shem G. Alfarero and Aurelia Tagalog vs. Sps. Petra and Sancho Sevilla, G.R. No. 142974,
September 22, 2003
Danilo Cansino vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125799, August 21, 2003
Dulos Realty vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128516, November 28, 2001
Anastacio Fabela vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142546, August 9, 2001
Under Section 1, Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "negligence" must be excusable and
generally imputable to the party because if it is imputable to the counsel, it is binding on the client.
To follow a contrary rule and allow a party to disown his counsel's conduct would render
proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to re-opening by the mere subterfuge of replacing the
counsel. What the aggrieved litigant should do is seek administrative sanctions against the erring
counsel and not ask for the reversal of the court's ruling.
Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. Nos.
141104 & 148763, June 8, 2007
Sps. Benigno and Erlinda Que vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150739, August 18, 2005
New trial is a remedy that seeks to "temper the severity of a judgment or prevent the failure of
justice." Thus, the Rules allows the courts to grant a new trial when there are errors of law or
irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused committed during the trial, or when
there exists newly discovered evidence. The grant or denial of a new trial is, generally speaking,
addressed to the sound discretion of the court which cannot be interfered with unless a clear abuse
thereof is shown.
Manuel Ybiernas, et al. vs. Ester Tanco-Gabaldon, et al., G.R. No. 178925, June 1, 2011
Rule 37, Sec. 2 - Contents of motion for new trial or reconsideration and notice thereof
People of the Phil. vs. Zeida Aurora B. Garfin, et al., G.R. No. 153176, March 29, 2004
National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124267, January 31, 2003
Marina Properties Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125447, August 14, 1998
Rule 37, Sec. 3 - Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration
Rule 37, Sec. 4 - Resolution of motion
It is settled that when a minute resolution denies or dismisses a petition for failure to comply with
formal and substantive requirements, the challenged decision, together with its findings of fact and
legal conclusions, are deemed sustained.
Sps. Jose and Margarita Chua vs. Pedro Gutierrez, et al., G.R. No. 172316, December 8, 2010
Jose B. Custodio vs. Jesus V. Quitain, A.M. No. RTJ 03-1761, April 30, 2003
The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is
whether the [proffered] evidence is in fact a "newly discovered evidence which could not have been
discovered by due diligence." The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two
aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when
should or could it have been discovered. It is to the latter that the requirement of due diligence has
relevance. We have held that in order that a particular piece of evidence may be properly regarded
as newly discovered to justify new trial, what is essential is not so much the time when the evidence
offered first sprang into existence nor the time when it first came to the knowledge of the party now
submitting it; what is essential is that the offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in
seeking to locate such evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it.
Manuel Ybiernas, et al. vs. Ester Tanco-Gabaldon, et al., G.R. No. 178925, June 1, 2011, citing
Custodio v. Sandiganbayan
The Rules do not give an exact definition of due diligence, and whether the movant has exercised
due diligence depends upon the particular circumstances of each case. Nonetheless, it has been
observed that the phrase is often equated with "reasonable promptness to avoid prejudice to the
defendant." In other words, the concept of due diligence has both a time component and a good faith
component. The movant for a new trial must not only act in a timely fashion in gathering evidence
in support of the motion; he must act reasonably and in good faith as well. Due diligence
contemplates that the defendant acts reasonably and in good faith to obtain the evidence in light of
the totality of the circumstances and the facts known to him.
Manuel Ybiernas, et al. vs. Ester Tanco-Gabaldon, et al., G.R. No. 178925, June 1, 2011, citing
Custodio v. Sandiganbayan
Rule 37, Sec. 5 - Second motion for new trial
Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court is explicit that a second motion for reconsideration shall
not be allowed.
Hermenegilda dela Cruz Loyola vs. Anastacio Mendoza, G.R. No. 163340, November 23, 2007
Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court clearly provides, the proscription against a second
motion for reconsideration is directed against "a judgment or final order." Although a second
motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order can be denied on the ground that it is a mere
"rehash" of the arguments already passed upon and resolved by the court, it cannot be rejected on
the ground that it is forbidden by the law or by the rules as a prohibited motion.
Rule 37, Sec. 6 - Effect of granting of motion for new trial
New trial is a remedy that seeks to temper the severity of a judgment or prevent the failure of
justice. The effect of an order granting a new trial is to wipe out the previous adjudication so that
the case may be tried de novo for the purpose of rendering a judgment in accordance with law,
taking into consideration the evidence to be presented during the second trial. Consequently, a
motion for new trial is proper only after the rendition or promulgation of a judgment or issuance of
a final order. A motion for new trial is only available when relief is sought against a judgment and
the judgment is not yet final. Verily, in the case at bench, the filing by Spouses Guevarra of a
motion for new trial was premature and uncalled for because a decision has yet to be rendered by
the trial court in Civil Case No. 2187-00. Let it be underscored that the December 22, 2003
Decision of Judge Español was effectively set aside by the December 15, 2004 Omnibus Order of
Judge Mangrobang. Hence, there is technically no judgment which can be the subject of a motion
for new trial.
Nemia Castro vs. Sps. Jamir and Rosalyn Guevarra, G.R. No. 192737, April 25, 2012
Rule 37, Sec. 7 - Partial new trial or reconsideration
Rule 37, Sec. 9 - Remedy against order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration
Bienvenido P. Jaban, et al vs. Alvin Garcia, et al., G.R. No. 138336-37, February 16, 2004
Republic of the Phil. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 129846, January 18, 2000
Section 9 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court indicates that the proper remedy against the denial of
the petitioners' motion for reconsideration was an appeal from the final order dismissing the action
upon the respondents' motion to dismiss.
The restriction against an appeal of a denial of a motion for reconsideration independently of a

judgment or final order is logical and reasonable. A motion for reconsideration is not putting
forward a new issue, or presenting new evidence, or changing the theory of the case, but is only
seeking a reconsideration of the judgment or final order based on the same issues, contentions, and
evidence either because: (a) the damages awarded are excessive; or (b) the evidence is insufficient
to justify the decision or final order; or (c) the decision or final order is contrary to law. By denying
a motion for reconsideration, or by granting it only partially, therefore, a trial court finds no reason
either to reverse or to modify its judgment or final order, and leaves the judgment or final order to
stand. The remedy from the denial is to assail the denial in the course of an appeal of the judgment
or final order itself.
17, 2011
Rule 38 - Relief from Judgments, Orders or Other Proceedings
Mario Basco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125290, August 9, 2000
Rufino Valencia vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 119118, February 19, 2001
Philadelphia Agan vs. Heirs of Sps. Andres and Diosdado Nueva, G.R. No. 155018, December 11, 2003
A petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is of equitable character, allowed only in
exceptional cases as when there is no other available or adequate remedy.
Tancredo Redena vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 146611, February 6, 2007
A judicial compromise may be rescinded or set aside on the ground of fraud in accordance with
Rule 38 of the Rules on Civil Procedure on petition for relief from judgment.
Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corp. vs. DOTC, et al., G.R. Nos. 169914 and 174166, April 18, 2008
The mistake contemplated by Rule 38 of the Rules of Court pertains generally to mistake of fact,
not of law, which relates to the case. The word "mistake" which grants relief from judgment, does
not apply and was never intended to apply to a judicial error which the court might have committed
in the trial. Such error may be corrected by means of an appeal.
Romeo Samonte vs. S.F. Naguiat, Inc., G.R. No. 165544, October 2, 2009
Rule 38, Sec. 1 - Petition for relief from judgment, order or other proceedings
Eleuterio Lopez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127827, March 5, 2003
The 60-day period is reckoned from the time the party acquired knowledge of the order,
judgment or proceedings and not from the date he actually read the same.
Corazon L. Escueta, et al. vs. Rufina Lim, G.R. No. 137162, January 24, 2007
Relief from judgment is an equitable remedy and is allowed only under exceptional
circumstances and only if fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence is present. Where the
defendant has other available or adequate remedy such as a motion for new trial or appeal from the
adverse decision, he cannot avail himself of this remedy.
Under the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition for relief must be filed within
sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other proceeding to be set
aside and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of
action or defense, as the case may be. Most importantly, it should be filed with the same court
which rendered the decision.
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional
cases when there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy
available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of
the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from
filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. In order for a
petition for relief to be entertained by the court, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that he has
faithfully and strictly complied with the provisions of Rule 38. It is also incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the said petition was filed within the reglementary period specified in
Section 3, Rule 38 (within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or
other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order
was entered, or such proceeding was taken). And the rule is that the reglementary period is reckoned
from the time the party's counsel receives notice of the decision for notice to counsel of the decision
is notice to the party for purposes of Section 3 of Rule 38.
Mercury Drug Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138571, July 13, 2000
The mistake contemplated by Rule 38 of the Rules of Court pertains generally to mistake of fact,
not of law, which relates to the case. The word "mistake" which grants relief from judgment, does
not apply and was never intended to apply to a judicial error which the court might have committed
in the trial. Such error may be corrected by means of an appeal.
Romeo Samonte vs. S.F. Naguiat, Inc., G.R. No. 165544, October 2, 2009
Rule 38, Sec. 2 - Petition for relief from denial or appeal
Insular Life Savings and Trust Co. vs. Sps. Runes, G.R. No. 152530, August 12, 2004
Fukuzumi vs. Sanritsu Great International Corp., G.R. No. 140630, August 12, 2004
Under Section 2 of Rule 38, of the Rules of Court, a party prevented from taking an appeal from
a judgment or final order of a court by reason of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence,
may file in the same court and in the same case a petition for relief praying that his appeal be given
due course. This presupposes, of course, that no appeal was taken precisely because of any of the
aforestated reasons which prevented him from appealing his case. Hence, a petition for relief under
Rule 38 cannot be availed of in the CA, the latter being a court of appellate jurisdiction. For sure,
under the present Rules, petitions for relief from a judgment, final order or other proceeding
rendered or taken should be filed in and resolved by the court in the same case from which the
petition arose. Thus, petition for relief from a judgment, final order or proceeding involved in a case
tried by a municipal trial court shall be filed in and decided by the same court in the same case, just
like the procedure followed in the present Regional Trial Court.
Tancredo Redena vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 146611, February 6, 2007
[T]he proper remedy for allegations of mistake or inexcusable negligence of counsel, which
prevented a party from taking an appeal, is a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.
The petition must be filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or
was entered. It must be filed within the reglementary period, which is reckoned from the time the
party's counsel receives notice of the decision for notice to counsel of the decision is notice to the
party.
Jaime T. Torres vs. China Banking Corp., G.R. No. 165408, January 15, 2010
Rule 38, Sec. 3 - Time for filing petition; contents and verification
Mercury Drug Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138571, July 13, 2000
Public Estates Authority vs. Jesus S. Yujuico, et al., G.R. No. 140486, February 6, 2001
DAP Mining Assn. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92328, June 6, 2001
Gold Line Transit vs. Luisa Ramos, G.R. No. 144813, August 15, 2001
Teresita Villareal Manipor, et al. vs. Sps. Pablo and Antonia Ricafort, G.R. No. 150159, July 25, 2003
Under Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, a verified petition for relief must be filed within
sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set
aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered or such
proceeding was taken.
Heirs of the Late Faustina Borres, et al. vs. Julius L. Abela, et al., G.R. Nos. 131023, 131505 and
131768, July 17, 2007
Clear it is from the above that a petition for relief from judgment must be filed within: (a) sixty
(60) days from knowledge of judgment, order or other proceedings to be set aside; and (b) six (6)
months from entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding. These two periods must concur.
Both periods are also not extendible and never interrupted. Strict compliance with these periods
stems from the equitable character and nature of the petition for relief. Indeed, relief is allowed only
in exceptional cases as when there is no other available or adequate remedy. As it were, a petition
for relief is actually the "last chance" given by law to litigants to question a final judgment or order.
And failure to avail of such "last chance" within the grace period fixed by the Rules is fatal.
Sps. Eugenio and Vicenta Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 150722, August 17, 2007
Quelnan vs. VHF Philippines, G.R. No. 138500, September 16, 2005
[T]he proper remedy for allegations of mistake or inexcusable negligence of counsel, which
prevented a party from taking an appeal, is a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.
The petition must be filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or
was entered. It must be filed within the reglementary period, which is reckoned from the time the
party's counsel receives notice of the decision for notice to counsel of the decision is notice to the
party.
Jaime T. Torres vs. China Banking Corp., G.R. No. 165408, January 15, 2010
Rule 39 - Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments
Execution under Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court is a remedy afforded by law for the
enforcement of a judgment, its object being to obtain satisfaction of the judgment on which the writ
is issued. It issues by order of the court a quo, on motion of the judgment obligee, upon finality of a
judgment or order sought to be enforced, and is directed to an officer authorizing and requiring him
to execute the judgment of the court.
Cagayan de Oro Coliseum vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129713, December 15, 1999
Rule 39, Sec. 1 - Execution upon judgments or final orders
Eliza Mina, et al. vs. Benjamin T. Vianzon, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1682, March 23, 2004
Socorro R. Hoehne vs. Judge Ruben R. Plata, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1458, October 10, 2002
Sps. Adriano and Hilda Monterola vs. Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-01-1620, March 18,
2002
Jaime Tan, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136368, January 16, 2002
Vda. De Cochingyan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116092, June 29, 2001
Sy Chin vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136233, November 23, 2000
Teresita Jason vs. Briccio C. Ygaña, et al., A.M. No. RTJ-00-1543, August 4, 2000
Vlason Enterprises vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121662-64, July 6, 1999
Arsenia T. Bergonia vs. Alicia B. Gonzalez-Decano, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1505, October 29, 1999
Federico Pallada, et al. vs. Rtc of Kalibo, et al., G.R. No. 129442, March 10, 1999
PNB vs. Marcelino L. Sayo, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 129918, July 9, 1998
The execution of a judgment or final order that has attained finality and another pending appeal
require different motions from the prevailing party. Put differently, a judgment or final order that
has become final and executory mandatorily requires a specific motion to execute the same.
Odel S. Janda, et al. vs. Eddie R. Rojas, et al., G.R. No. A.M. No. RTJ-07-2054, August 23, 2007
Under Sec. 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion,
upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period
to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
Nora Bueno Pasion vs. Simplicio R. Melegrito, G.R. No. 166558, March 28, 2007
It has been opined that Section 1 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court now requires that the motion
for execution "must be with notice to the adverse party, with a hearing when the circumstances so
require, to enable him to file any objection thereto or bring to the attention of said court matters
which may have transpired during the pendency of the appeal and which may have a bearing on the
execution sought to enforce the judgment."
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Amalik P. Espinosa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 162922,
January 31, 2007
Rule 39, Sec. 2 - Discretionary execution
Fernando U. Batul vs. Lucilo Bayron, et al., G.R. Nos. 157687 & 158959, February 26, 2004
Thelma C. Baldado vs. Arnulfo O. Bugtas, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1586, October 24, 2003
Arturo G. Mackay vs. Adoracion G. Angeles, et al., G.R. No. 144230, September 30, 2003
City of Iligan vs. Principal Management Group, G.R. No. 145260, July 31, 2003
State Investment Trust vs. Delta Motors, G.R. No. 144444, April 3, 2003
Mortimer F. Cordero vs. Alan G. Go, et al., G.R. No. 149754, September 17, 2002
Javier E. Zacate vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 144678, March 1, 2001
Marawi Marantao Gen. Hospital vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141008, January 16, 2001
Corona International vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127851, October 18, 2000
As a discretionary execution, execution pending appeal is permissible only when good reasons
exist for immediately executing the judgment before finality or pending appeal or even before the
expiration of the period to appeal. Good reasons, special, important, pressing reasons must exist to
justify execution pending appeal; otherwise, instead of an instrument of solicitude and justice, it
may well become a tool of oppression and inequality. Good reasons consist of exceptional
circumstances of such urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage that the losing party may suffer
should the appealed judgment be reversed later.
Stronghold Insurance Co. vs. Nemesio S. Felix, et al., G.R. No. 148090, November 28, 2006
The prevailing doctrine and principle then — which continues to be the same as provided in
Paragraph 2, Section 2 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — is that discretionary
execution is permissible only when good reasons exist for immediately executing the judgment
before finality or pending appeal or even before the expiration of the time to appeal.
Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances justifying the immediate execution lest
judgment becomes illusory, or the prevailing party may after the lapse of time become unable to
enjoy it, considering the tactics of the adverse party who may apparently have no case except to
delay.
Jose B. L. Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 135180-81, August 16, 2000
Shuhei Yasuda vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112569, April 12, 2000
PBCom vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126158, September 23, 1997
This rule is strictly construed against the movant, for "courts look with disfavor upon any attempt
to execute a judgment which has not acquired a final character." In the same vein, the Court has
held that such execution "is usually not favored because it affects the rights of the parties which are
yet to be ascertained on appeal."
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda vs. DBP, et al., G.R. No. 135128, August 26, 1999
So also, mere issuance of a bond to answer for damages is no longer considered a good reason
for execution pending appeal. To consider the mere posting of a bond as a "good reason" would
precisely make immediate execution of judgment pending appeal routinary, the rule rather than the
exception.
The rule on execution pending appeal must be strictly construed being an exception to the general
rule. Applying the rule on statutory construction, it should be interpreted only so far as the language
thereof fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general rule rather than the
exceptions.
Planters Products vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106052, October 22, 1999
The execution of a judgment before its finality must be founded upon good reasons. The
yardstick remains the presence or the absence of good reasons consisting of exceptional
circumstances of such urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage that the losing party may suffer,
should the appealed judgment be reversed later. Good reason imports a superior circumstance that
will outweigh injury or damage to the adverse party.
Phil. Nails & Wires Corp. vs. Malayan Insurance, G.R. No. 143933, February 14, 2003
Diesel Construction Co. vs. Jollibee Foods Corp., G.R. No. 136805, January 28, 2000
A valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal requires that it should be
based "upon good reasons to be stated in a special order."
Roque Fermo vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 140179, March 13, 2000
By its provisional nature, the remedy of execution pending appeal requires only a "final"
judgment or order (as distinguished from an "interlocutory" order) and not a "final and executory"
judgment or order.
Intramuros Tennis Club vs. PTA, G.R. No. 135630, September 26, 2000
Section 2 (a)
The execution of a judgment or final order that has attained finality and another pending appeal
require different motions from the prevailing party. Put differently, a judgment or final order that
has become final and executory mandatorily requires a specific motion to execute the same.
Odel S. Janda, et al. vs. Eddie R. Rojas, et al., G.R. No. A.M. No. RTJ-07-2054, August 23, 2007
Rule 39, Sec. 3 - Stay of discretionary execution
Planters Products vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106052, October 22, 1999
Diesel Construction Co. vs. Jollibee Foods Corp., G.R. No. 136805, January 28, 2000
A supersedeas bond secures the performance of the judgment or order appealed from in case of
its affirmation. Section 3 finds application in ordinary civil actions where the interest of the
prevailing party is capable of pecuniary estimation, and consequently, of protection, through the
filing of a supersedeas bond. Thus, the penultimate sentence of Section 3 states: "[T]he bond thus
given may be proceeded against on motion with notice to the surety." Consequently, it finds no
application in election protest cases where judgments invariably include orders which are not
capable of pecuniary estimation such as the right to hold office and perform its functions.
Charito Navarosa vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 157957, September 18, 2003
Rule 39, Sec. 4 - Judgments not stayed by appeal
Diamond Builders Conglomeration, et al. vs. Country Bankers Insurance Corp., G.R. No. 171820,
December 13, 2007
Augustus Caezar R. Gan vs. Hon. Antonio C. Reyes, G.R. No. 145527, May 28, 2002
Intramuros Tennis Club vs. PTA, G.R. No. 135630, September 26, 2000
Rule 39, Sec. 5 - Effect of reversal of executed judgment
Jimmy T. Go, et al. vs. Zeus C. Abrogar, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1759, February 27, 2003
Sps. Guillermo Agbada and Maxima Agbada vs. Inter-Urban Developers, et al., G.R. No. 144029,
September 19, 2002
BF Corp. vs. EDSA Shangri-La Hotel, G.R. No. 132655, August 11, 1998
Rule 39, Sec. 6 - Execution by motion or by independent action
Asuncion Macias, et al. vs. Mariano Lim, et al., G.R. No. 139284, June 4, 2004
Oliverio Laperal vs. Pablo V. Ocampo, G.R. No. 140652, September 3, 2003
Winnie Bajet vs. Vivencio S. Baclig, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1598, July 30, 2002
Sps. Leoncio & Enriqueta Barrera vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123935, December 14, 2001
Jon and Marissa De Ysasi vs. Arturo and Estela Arceo, G.R. No. 136586, November 22, 2001
Ma. Valentina Santana-Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120176, July 20, 2001
Sec. 6 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that an action to revive judgment only requires proof
of a final judgment which has not prescribed and has remained unexecuted after the lapse of five (5)
years but not more than ten (10) years from its finality. Nowhere does the rule require proof that the
judgment is still enforceable by and against the original parties who have died. While the action is
still subject to defenses and counterclaims which arose after the judgment became effective, proof
of the death of some of the parties is not required because the judgment call still be enforced by the
executor, administrator or successor-in-interest of the judgment creditor against the judgment
debtor.
Juan Enriquez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137391, December 14, 2001
A judgment may be executed on motion within five years from the date of its entry or from the
date it becomes final and executory. Thereafter, before barred by the statute of limitations, by
action. However, there are instances where this Court allowed execution by motion even after the
lapse of five years upon meritorious grounds.
Esteban Yau vs. Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr., G.R. Nos. 158848 & 171994, February 4, 2008
Rule 39, Sec. 7 - Execution in case of death of party
Heirs of Lorilla vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118655, April 12, 2000
Rule 39, Sec. 8 - Issuance, form and contents of a writ of execution
Paterno R. Plantilla vs. Rodrigo G. Baliwag, A.M. No. P-00-1446, June 6, 2001
Section 8 (e)
A writ of execution is required under paragraph (e), Section 8 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
(to) "specifically state the amount of the interest, costs, damages, rents, or profits due as of the date
of the issuance of the writ, aside from the principal obligation under the judgment."
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Amalik P. Espinosa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 162922,
January 31, 2007
Rule 39, Sec. 9 - Execution of judgments for money, how enforced
Phil. Airlines, Inc. vs. Balubar, Jr., A.M. No. P-04-1767, August 12, 2004
Luzita Alpeche vs. Expedito B. Bato, A.M. No. P-02-1592, October 16, 2003
Petition for Habeas Corpus of Benjamin Guevarra, G.R. No. 154037, April 30, 2003
Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation vs. Oriental Assurance Corporation, G.R. No. 140613, October
15, 2002
Judge Gregorio R. Balanag vs. Alonzo B. Osita, A.M. No. P-01-1454, September 12, 2002
Sps. Felipe and Roselyn Biglete vs. Bonifacio V. Maputi, Jr., A.M. No. P-00-1407, February 15, 2002
GSIS vs. Bengson Commercial Buildings, G.R. Nos. 137448 & 141454, January 31, 2002
DBP vs. Ruben S. Nequinto, A.M. No. P-00-1371, January 23, 2002
Gloria O. Benitez vs. Medel P. Acosta, A.M. No. P-01-1473, March 27, 2001
Under Rule 39, in executing a money judgment against the property of the judgment debtor, the
sheriff shall levy on all property belonging to the judgment debtor as is amply sufficient to satisfy
the judgment and costs, and sell the same paying to the judgment creditor so much of the proceeds
as will satisfy the amount of the judgment debt and costs. Any excess in the proceeds shall be
delivered to the judgment debtor unless otherwise directed by the judgment or order of the court.
Jacobus Bernhard Hulst vs. PR Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 156364, September 3, 2007
If the judgment is for money, the sheriff or other authorized officer must execute the same
pursuant to the provisions of Section 9, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Jacobus Bernhard Hulst vs. PR Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 156364, September 3, 2007
Garnishment is proper only when the judgment to be enforced is one for payment of a sum of
money.
National Electrification Administration, et al. vs. Danilo Morales, G.R. No. 154200, July 24, 2007
Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court lays down the procedure to be followed by the sheriff in
implementing money judgments.
When the judgment obligee is not present at the time the judgment obligor makes the payment,
the sheriff is authorized to receive it. However, the money received must be remitted to the clerk of
court within the same day or, if not practicable, deposited in a fiduciary account with the nearest
government depository bank. Evidently, sheriffs are not permitted to retain the money in their
possession beyond the day when the payment was made or to deliver the money collected directly to
the judgment obligee.
Domingo Peña, Jr. vs. Achilles Andrew V. Regalado II, A.M. No. P-10-2772, February 16, 2010
Section 9 (b)
Jimmy T. Go vs. Zeus Abrogar, et al., G.R. No. 152672, October 2, 2007
Rule 39, Sec. 10 - Execution of judgments for specific act
Baikong Akang Camsa vs. Judge Aurelio D. Rendon, et al., A.M. No. MTJ-02-1395, March 28, 2003
Leody Manuel vs. Jose and Daisy Escalante, G.R. No. 134141, August 13, 2002
Winnie Bajet vs. Pedro M. Areola, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1615, June 19, 2001
Jaime Morta, Sr. vs. Jose S. Sañez, et al., A.M. No. RTJ 00-1593, October 16, 2000
Equatorial Realty Devt. vs. Mayfair Theater, G.R. No. 136221, May 12, 2000
Section 10 (c) - Delivery or Restitution of Real Property
A writ of possession is defined as "a writ of execution employed to enforce a judgment to recover
the possession of land. It commands the sheriff to enter the land and give its possession to the
person entitled under the judgment."
There are three instances when a writ of possession may be issued: (a) in land registration
proceedings under Section 17 of Act No. 496; (b) in judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in
possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had
intervened; and (c) in extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act No.
3135, as amended by Act No. 4118.
Metrobank vs. Salvador Abad Santos, et al., G.R. No. 157867, December 15, 2009
Possession is an essential attribute of ownership. Where the ownership of a parcel of land was
decreed in the judgment, the delivery of the possession of the land should be considered included in
the decision, it appearing that the defeated party's claim to the possession thereof is based on his
claim of ownership. Furthermore, adjudication of ownership would include the delivery of
possession if the defeated party has not shown any right to possess the land independently of his
claim of ownership which was rejected.
Bernardo de Leon vs. Public Estates Authority, et al., G.R. Nos. 181970 & 182678, August 3, 2010
A judgment for the delivery or restitution of property is essentially an order to place the
prevailing party in possession of the property. If the defendant refuses to surrender possession of the
property to the prevailing party, the sheriff or other proper officer should oust him. No express order
to this effect needs to be stated in the decision; nor is a categorical statement needed in the decision
that in such event the sheriff or other proper officer shall have the authority to remove the
improvements on the property if the defendant fails to do so within a reasonable period of time. The
removal of the improvements on the land under these circumstances is deemed read into the
decision, subject only to the issuance of a special order by the court for the removal of the
improvements. It bears stressing that a judgment is not confined to what appears upon the face of
the decision, but also those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
Bernardo de Leon vs. Public Estates Authority, et al., G.R. Nos. 181970 & 182678, August 3, 2010
Section 10 (d) - Removal of Improvements on Property Subject of Execution

When the property subject of the execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the
judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements
except upon special order of the court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due
hearing and after the former has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the
court.
Katipunan ng Tinig sa Adhikain, Inc. vs. Luis Zenon O. Maceren, et al., A.M. No. MTJ-07-1680, August
17, 2007
Rule 39, Sec. 11 - Execution of special judgments
Petition for Habeas Corpus of Benjamin Guevarra, G.R. No. 154037, April 30, 2003
Knecht vs. United Cigarette Corp., G.R. No. 139370, July 4, 2002
Julian B. San Juan, Sr. vs. Ariel S. Sangalang, A.M. No. P-00-1437, February 6, 2001
The implementation of a judgment for the performance of an act other than the payment of
money is governed by Section 11, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
National Electrification Administration, et al. vs. Danilo Morales, G.R. No. 154200, July 24, 2007
Rule 39, Sec. 12 - Effect of levy on execution as to third persons
Clearly, the levy does not make the judgment creditor the owner of the property levied upon. He
merely obtains a lien. Such levy on execution is subject and subordinate to all valid claims and liens
existing against the property at the time the execution lien attached, such as real estate mortgages.
Flor Martinez vs. Ernesto G. Garcia, et al., G.R. No. 166536, February 4, 2010
Rule 39, Sec. 13 - Property exempt from execution
Batong Bahay Gold Mines vs. Dela Serna, G.R. No. 86963, August 6, 1999
Rule 39, Sec. 14 - Return of writ of execution
Serafin A. Añonuevo vs. Jose Noel R. Rubio, et al., A.M. No. P-04-1782, July 30, 2004
Luzita Alpeche vs. Expedito B. Bato, A.M. No. P-02-1592, October 16, 2003
Salvador L. Bernabe vs. Winston T. Eguia, A.M. No. P-03-1742, September 18, 2003
Edna Fe F. Aquino vs. Jose R. Martin, A.M. No. P-03-1703, September 18, 2003
Vedasto Tolarba vs. Angel C. Conejero, A.M. No. P-02-1576, July 17, 2003
Dominador Arevalo, et al. vs. Edgardo S. Loria, et al., A.M. No. P-02-1600, April 30, 2003
Fernando Fajardo vs. Rodolfo V. Quitalig, A.M. No. P-02-1535, March 28, 2003
Renato Miguel D. Garcia vs. Pershing T. Yared, A.M. No. P-01-1492, March 20, 2003
Winnie Bajet vs. Judge Vivencio S. Baclig, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1598, July 30, 2002
Concerned Citizen vs. Viven M. Torio, A.M. No. P-01-1490, July 11, 2002
Sps. Felipe and Roselyn Biglete vs. Bonifacio V. Maputi, Jr., A.M. No. P-00-1407, February 15, 2002
DBP vs. Ruben S. Nequinto, A.M. No. P-00-1371, January 23, 2002
Giselle G. Talion vs. Esteban P. Ayupan, A.M. No. P-01-1529, January 23, 2002
Esmeraldo D. Visitacion vs. Gredam P. Ediza, A.M. No. P-01-1495, August 9, 2001
Gloria O. Benitez vs. Medel P. Acosta, A.M. No. P-01-1473, March 27, 2001
Accordingly, the sheriff is mandated to make periodic reports on partially satisfied or unsatisfied
writs every 30 days, until the judgment is satisfied or its effectivity expires. The reason for this
requirement is to update the court on the status of the execution and to explain to it why the
judgment has not been satisfied. It also enables the court to determine how efficiently court
processes are carried out after the promulgation of judgment. The over-all purpose of the
requirement is to ensure the speedy execution of decisions.
Rogelio V. Urbanozo vs. Crisanto T. Flora, A.M. No. P-06-2169, March 28, 2008
Filomena Meneses vs. Albert S. Zaragoza, A.M. No. P-04-1768, February 11, 2004
Salvador L. Bernabe vs. Winston T. Eguia, A.M. No. P-03-1742, September 18, 2003
Sheriffs are obliged to make a return of the writ of execution to the clerk or judge issuing it. If
the judgment cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after their receipt of the writ, the
officers shall report to the court and state the reason or reasons therefor. The officers are likewise
tasked to make a report to the court every thirty (30) days on the proceedings taken thereon until
judgment is satisfied in full or its effectivity expires.
Leticia T. Malsi vs. Silvino R. Malana, Jr., A.M. No. P-07-2290, May 25, 2007
Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that the writ of execution shall be returnable
to the court issuing it immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the
judgment cannot be satisfied in full within thirty days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall
report to the court and state the reason therefor. The officer shall make a report to the court every
thirty days on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity
expires.
Cebu International Finance Corp. vs. Arthur R. Cabigon, A.M. No. P-06-2107, February 14, 2007
The writ of execution shall be returnable to the court immediately after the judgment had been
satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in full within 30 days after his receipt
of the writ, the officer shall report to the court and state the reason therefor. He is likewise required
to make a report to the court every 30 days until judgment is satisfied in full or its effectivity
expires.
Leopoldo C. Lacambra, Jr. vs. Christopher T. Perez, A.M. No. P-08-2430, July 14, 2008
The Rules clearly provide that it is mandatory for sheriffs to execute and make a return on the
writ of execution within 30 days from receipt of the writ and every 30 days thereafter until it is
satisfied in full or its effectivity expires. Even if the writs are unsatisfied or only partially satisfied,
sheriffs must still file the reports so that the court, as well as the litigants, may be informed of the
proceedings undertaken to implement the writ. Periodic reporting also provides the court insights on
the efficiency of court processes after promulgation of judgment. Over-all, the purpose of periodic
reporting is to ensure the speedy execution of decisions.
Proserpina V. Anico vs. Emerson B. Pilipiña, A.M. No. P-11-2896, August 2, 2011
We will reiterate that a sheriff's duty in the execution of a writ is purely ministerial; he is to
execute the order of the court strictly to the letter. He has no discretion whether to execute the
judgment or not. He is mandated to uphold the majesty of the law as embodied in the decision.
When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the
contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it according to its mandate.
Accordingly, a sheriff must comply with his mandated ministerial duty as speedily as possible.
There is even no need for the litigants to "follow up" a writ's implementation.
Proserpina V. Anico vs. Emerson B. Pilipiña, A.M. No. P-11-2896, August 2, 2011
Rule 39, Sec. 15 - Notice of sale of property on execution
Aurora Guiang vs. Eva T. Co, G.R. No. 146996, July 30, 2004
Saad Anjum vs. Cesar L. Abacahin, et al., A.M. No. P-02-1640, October 13, 2003
Ofelia J. Villavicencio vs. Alejandro A. Mojares, et al., G.R. No. 142648, February 27, 2003
David de Guzman vs. Paulo M. Gatlabayan, A.M. No. P-99-1323, February 20, 2001
Section 15 (d)
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court unequivocally provides the time in which the auction sale is to be
conducted as well as the procedure to be followed in the redemption of the properties.
Roela D. Co vs. Allan D. Sillador, A.M. No. P-07-2342, August 31, 2007
Rule 39, Sec. 16 - Proceedings where property claimed by third person
Ildefonso P. Jacinto vs. Bernabe M. Castro, A.M. No. P-04-1907, July 3, 2007
Jimmy T. Go, et al. vs. Zeus C. Abrogar, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1759, February 27, 2003
Sps. Ching vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118830, February 24, 2003
Arthur R. Camarote vs. Pablo R. Glorioso, AM P-02-1611, July 31, 2002
MR Holdings, Ltd. vs. Sheriff Carlos P. Bajar, G.R. No. 138104, April 11, 2002
Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, explicitly mandates that the indemnity bond shall be in
a sum not less than the value of the property levied on.
Under the above Rule, a third-party claimant or a stranger to the foreclosure suit, like respondents
herein, can opt to file a remedy known as terceria against the sheriff or officer effecting the writ by
serving on him an affidavit of his title and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor. By the
terceria, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property and could be answerable for damages. A
third-party claimant may also resort to an independent "separate action," the object of which is the
recovery of ownership or possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages arising
from wrongful seizure and detention of the property despite the third-party claim. If a "separate
action" is the recourse, the third-party claimant must institute in a forum of competent jurisdiction
an action, distinct and separate from the action in which the judgment is being enforced, even
before or without need of filing a claim in the court that issued the writ. Both remedies are
cumulative and may be availed of independently of or separately from the other. Availment of the
terceria is not a condition sine qua non to the institution of a "separate action."
China Banking Corp. vs. Sps. Ordinario, G.R. No. 121943, March 24, 2003
Jurisprudence is likewise replete with rulings that since the third-party claimant is not one of the
parties to the action, he could not, strictly speaking, appeal from the order denying his claim, but
should file a separate reinvindicatory action against the execution creditor or the purchaser of the
property after the sale of public auction, or a complaint for damages against the bond filed by the
judgment creditor in favor of the sheriff.
Yupangco Cotton Mills vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126322, January 16, 2002
Annie Fermin, et al. vs. Antonio M. Esteves, et al., G.R. No. 147977, March 26, 2008
Ma. Fe Bacos vs. Domingo Arcega, G.R. No. 152343, January 18, 2008
Rule 39, Sec. 19 - How property sold on execution; who may direct manner and order of
sale
David de Guzman vs. Paulo M. Gatlabayan, A.M. No. P-99-1323, February 20, 2001
Drawing from Section 19, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which states that "all sales of property
under execution must be made at public auction, to the highest bidder," it naturally follows that the
highest bid submitted is the amount that should be credited to the account of the judgment debtor.
Rule 39, Sec. 21 - Judgment obligee as purchaser
LCK Industries Inc., et al. vs. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No. 170606, November 23, 2007
Aurora Guiang vs. Eva T. Co, G.R. No. 146996, July 30, 2004
Ofelia J. Villavicencio vs. Alejandro A. Mojares, et al., G.R. No. 142648, February 27, 2003
Conspicuously emphasized under Section 21 of Rule 39 is that if the amount of the loan is equal
to the amount of the bid, there is no need to pay the amount in cash. Same provision mandates that
in the absence of a third-party claim, the purchaser in an execution sale need not pay his bid if it
does not exceed the amount of the judgment; otherwise, he shall pay only the excess.
Sps. Esmeraldo and Elizabeth Suico vs. Philippine National Bank, et al., G.R. No. 170215, August 28,
2007
Rule 39, Sec. 27 - Who may redeem real property so sold
Restituto L. Castro vs. Carlos Bague, A.M. No. P-99-1346, June 20, 2001
Erlinda M. Villanueva, et al. vs. Angel S. Malaya et al., G.R. No. 94617, April 12, 2000
Rule 39, Sec. 28 - Time and manner of, and amounts payable on, successive redemptions;
notice to be given and filed
Hi-Yield Realty vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138978, September 12, 2002
Vicente P. Lim vs. Judge Jacinta B. Tambago, et al., A.M. No. RTJ 99-1498, September 17, 2001
Sps. Estanislao vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143687, July 31, 2001
Enrique M. Belo vs. Phil. National Bank, G.R. No. 134330, March 1, 2001
Paragraph 2
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court unequivocally provides the time in which the auction sale is to be
conducted as well as the procedure to be followed in the redemption of the properties.
Desiring to avoid any confusion arising from the conflict between the texts of the Rules of Court
(1940 and 1964) and Act No. 3135, on one hand, and the jurisprudence clarifying the reckoning of
the redemption period in judicial sales of real property, on the other hand, the Court has
incorporated in Section 28 of Rule 39 of the current Rules of Court (effective on July 1, 1997) the .
. . judicial construction of reckoning the redemption period from the date of the registration of the
certificate of sale, . . .
Eligio P. Mallari vs. GSIS, et al., G.R. No. 157659, January 25, 2010
Rule 39, Sec. 29 - Effect of redemption by judgment obligor, and a certificate to be

delivered and recorded upon; to whom payments on redemption made
Restituto L. Castro vs. Carlos Bague, A.M. No. P-99-1346, June 20, 2001
Rule 39, Sec. 33 - Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by
whom executed or given
Isaac Villegas vs. Victor Lingan, et. al., G.R. No. 153839, June 29, 2007
Candelaria Q. Dayot vs. Shell Chemical Co., (Phils.), Inc., G.R. No. 156542, June 26, 2007
China Banking Corp. vs. Sps. Ordinario, G.R. No. 121943, March 24, 2003
PNB vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135219, January 17, 2002
Rule 39, Sec. 36 - Examination of judgment obligor when judgment unsatisfied
Ramon D. Montenegro vs. Ma. Teresa L. Montenegro, et al., G.R. No. 156829, June 8, 2004
Rule 39, Sec. 37 - Examination of obligor of judgment obligor
PNB Mgt. & Devt. Corp. vs. R&R Metal Casting, G.R. No. 132245, January 2, 2002
Rule 39, Sec. 38 - Enforcement of attendance and conduct of examination
Ramon D. Montenegro vs. Ma. Teresa L. Montenegro, et al., G.R. No. 156829, June 8, 2004
Rule 39, Sec. 47 - Effect of judgments or final orders
Leonardo Chua vs. Mutya B. Victorio, G.R. No. 157568, May 18, 2004
Rural Bank of Sta. Ignacia vs. Pelagia Dimatulac, G.R. No. 142015, April 29, 2003
State Investment Trust vs. Delta Motors, G.R. No. 144444, April 3, 2003
Jose Clavano vs. HLURB, G.R. No. 143781, February 27, 2002
Alma G.De Leon vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127182, December 5, 2001
The Malayan Bank vs. Agustin Lagrama, G.R. No. 144884, April 27, 2001
Bryan U. Villanueva vs. Tirso D.C. Velasco, G.R. No. 130845, November 27, 2000
Maria Mercedes Nery, et al. vs. Gabriel Leyson, et al., G.R. No. 139306, August 29, 2000
Rodolfo Barretto vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110259, February 3, 2000
Cagayan De Oro Coliseum vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129713, Dec. 15, 1999
Pribhdas J. Mirpuri vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114508, November 19, 1999
Maria G. Baluyut, et al. vs. Rodolfo Guiao, et al., G.R. No. 136294, September 28, 1999
Ricardo T. Gloria vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131012, April 21, 1999
Ayala Corp. vs. Ray Burton Devt. Corp., G.R. No. 126699, August 7, 1998
The above-quoted provision lays down two main rules. Section 49 (b) enunciates the first rule of
res judicata known as "bar by prior judgment" or "estoppel by judgment," which states that the
judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and their
privies to the litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of
action either before the same or any other tribunal… The second rule of res judicata embodied in
Section 47 (c), Rule 39 is "conclusiveness of judgment." This rule provides that any right, fact, or
matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before
a competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by
the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or
not the claim or demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two suits is the same. It refers to a
situation where the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to the matters
actually determined or which were necessarily included therein.
Ernesto C. Del Rosario, et al. vs. Far East Bank and Trust Company, et al., G.R. No. 150134, October
31, 2007
Bar by prior judgment exists when, between the first case where the judgment was rendered, and
the second case where such judgment is invoked, there is identity of parties, subject matter and
cause of action. When the three (3) identities are present, the judgment on the merits rendered in the
first constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action. It is final as to the claim or demand in
controversy, including the parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which
was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible
matter which might have been offered for that purpose. But where between the first case wherein
judgment is rendered and the second case wherein such judgment is invoked, there is no identity of
cause of action, the judgment is conclusive in the second case, only as to those matters actually and
directly controverted and determined, and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is what is
termed conclusiveness of judgment.
Veronica Padillo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119707, November 29, 2001
The doctrine of res judicata actually embraces two (2) concepts: the first is "bar by prior
judgment" under paragraph (b) of Rule 39, Section 47, and the second is "conclusiveness of
judgment" under paragraph (c) thereof. In the present case, the second concept — conclusiveness of
judgment — applies.
Ramon D. Ocho vs. Bernardino Calos, G.R. No. 137908, November 22, 2000
Codidi Mata vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103476, November 18, 1999
It is clear that a judgment is not confined to what appears on the face of the decision, but also to
those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
Natividad P.Nazareno vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131641, February 23, 2000
Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, which is also known as "preclusion of issues"
or "collateral estoppel," issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised
in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action. In other words,
petitioner is barred from challenging the pronouncement of the trial court that his alleged lot is
within the property of respondents.
Domingo Celendro vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131099, July 20, 1999
There is "Conclusiveness of judgment", when, between the first case where judgment was
rendered and the second case where such judgment is invoked, there is identity of parties, not of
causes of action. The judgment is conclusive in the second case, only as to those matters actually
and directly controverted and determined, and not as to matters merely involved therein.
Augusto A. Camara vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100789, July 20, 1999
The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought
not be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once, that when the right or fact has been
judicially determined, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.
Marciana Serdoncillo vs. Fidel Benolirao, et al., G.R. No. 118328, October 8, 1998
The doctrine of res judicata is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of
jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law,
namely: (1) public policy and necessity which makes it to the interest of the State that there should
be an end to litigation — republicae ut sit litium, and (2) the hardship on the individual that he
should be vexed twice for the same cause — nemo debet bis vexari et eadem causa. A contrary
doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer
gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public
tranquility and happiness.
The requisites of res judicata are: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court
rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment
or order on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject
matter and causes of action.
The doctrine of res judicata has two aspects, to wit: (1) the effect of a judgment as a bar to the
prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action; and (2) preclude
relitigation of a particular fact or issue in another action between the same parties on a different
claim or cause of action.
Jose A. Linzag vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122181, June 26, 1998
Sps. Nicanor and Rosario Tumbokon vs. Apolonia G. Legaspi, et al., G.R. No. 153736, August 4, 2010
It is settled that when a final judgment is executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The
judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the
modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land.
The doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in time. The only recognized
exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries in
which case there is no prejudice to any party, and where the judgment is void.
GSIS vs. RTC-Branch 71 of Pasig City, et al., G.R. Nos. 175393 & 177731, December 18, 2009
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of
whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of
the land. Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the
winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case. The
doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and
sound practice, and that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments or orders of courts must
become final at some definite time fixed by law; otherwise, there would be no end to litigations,
thus setting to naught the main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the
rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by setting justiciable controversies with finality.
GSIS vs. RTC-Branch 71 of Pasig City, et al., G.R. Nos. 175393 & 177731, December 18, 2009
The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold purpose: (1) to
avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of
judicial business and (2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors,
which is precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and
obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. The doctrine
is not a mere technicality to be easily brushed aside, but a matter of public policy as well as a
time-honored principle of procedural law.
Apo Fruits Corp., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 164195, December 4, 2009
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable. The enforcement of such judgment should not be hampered or evaded,
for the immediate enforcement of the parties' rights, confirmed by final judgment, is a major
component of the ideal administration of justice. This is the reason why we abhor any delay in the
full execution of final and executory decisions. Thus, a remedy intended to frustrate, suspend, or
enjoin the enforcement of a final judgment must be granted with caution and upon a strict
observance of the requirements under existing laws and jurisprudence. Any such remedy allowed in
violation of established rules and guidelines connotes but a capricious exercise of discretion that
must be struck down in order that the prevailing party is not deprived of the fruits of victory.
Angelina Pahila-Garrido vs. Eliza M. Tortogo, et al., G.R. No. 156358, August 17, 2011
Rule 39, Sec. 47 (b) and (c)
The res judicata rule bars the re-litigation of facts or issues that have once been settled by a court
of law upon a final judgment on the merits. Section 47 (b) and (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
establishes two rules: (a) a judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction bars the
parties and their privies from bringing a new action or suit involving the same cause of action
before either the same or any other tribunal; and (b) any right, fact or matter directly adjudged or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court that renders
judgment on the merits is conclusively settled and cannot be litigated again between the parties and
their privies, regardless of whether the claims, purposes or subject matters of the two suits are the
same.
The first is commonly referred to as "bar by former judgment"; the second as "conclusiveness of
judgment." It is the second that is relevant to this case.
Conclusiveness of judgment or auter action pendent ordains that issues actually and directly
resolved in a former suit cannot be raised anew in any future case involving the same parties
although for a different cause of action. Where the rule applies, there must be identity of issues but
not necessarily identity in causes of action.
Pacifico R. Cruz vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. 174599-609, February 12, 2010
Rule 39, Sec. 47 (d)
It is fundamental that the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged
or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or
special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity.
Rule 39, Sec. 48 - Effect of foreign judgments
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in
our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must
still be determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign
judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the
parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed
under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure).
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for
the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of
Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem,
a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party
and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.
Under Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a judgment in an action in
personam rendered by a foreign tribunal clothed with jurisdiction is presumptive evidence of a right
as between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title.
Gil Miguel T. Puyat vs. Ron Zabarte, G.R. No. 141536, February 26, 2001
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar as
the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is convincingly
shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent
jurisdiction; that trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or
voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an
impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court
and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment. A foreign
judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary
showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in
the foreign forum.
Phil. Aluminum Wheels vs. Fasgi Ent., G.R. No. 137378, October 12, 2000
Rule 40, Sec. 1 - Where to appeal
Under the Rules of Court, final orders or resolutions of an MTC should be appealed to the RTC
exercising territorial jurisdiction over the former.
Go Ke Chong, Jr. vs. Mariano M. Chan, G.R. No. 153791, August 24, 2007
Rule 40, Sec. 2 - When to appeal
Ma. Imelda Argel vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128805, October 12, 1999
Rule 40, Sec. 5 - Appellate court docket and other lawful fees
The non-payment of the prescribed filing fees at the time of the filing of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading fails to vest jurisdiction over the case in the trial court. Yet, where the plaintiff
has paid the amount of filing fees assessed by the clerk of court, and the amount paid turns out to be
deficient, the trial court still acquires jurisdiction over the case, subject to the payment by the
plaintiff of the deficiency assessment.
Fedman Development Corp. vs. Federico Agcaoili, G.R. No. 165025, August 31, 2011
The filing of the complaint or other initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket
fee are the acts that vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the claim. In an action where the reliefs
sought are purely for sums of money and damages, the docket fees are assessed on the basis of the
aggregate amount being claimed. Ideally, therefore, the complaint or similar pleading must specify
the sums of money to be recovered and the damages being sought in order that the clerk of court
may be put in a position to compute the correct amount of docket fees.
If the amount of docket fees paid is insufficient in relation to the amounts being sought, the clerk
of court or his duly authorized deputy has the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment, and
the plaintiff will be required to pay the deficiency. The non-specification of the amounts of damages
does not immediately divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case, provided there is no bad
faith or intent to defraud the Government on the part of the plaintiff.
The prevailing rule is that if the correct amount of docket fees are not paid at the time of filing,
the trial court still acquires jurisdiction upon full payment of the fees within a reasonable time as the
court may grant, barring prescription. The "prescriptive period" that bars the payment of the docket
fees refers to the period in which a specific action must be filed, so that in every case the docket
fees must be paid before the lapse of the prescriptive period, as provided in the applicable laws,
particularly Chapter 3, Title V, Book III, of the Civil Code, the principal law on prescription of
actions.
Rule 40, Sec. 7 - Procedure in the Regional Trial Court
The appellant is duty-bound to submit his memorandum on appeal. Such submission is not a
matter of discretion on his part. His failure to comply with this mandate or to perform said duty will
compel the RTC to dismiss his appeal.
Melba Moncal Enriquez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140473, January 28, 2003
Section 7 (b), Filing of Memorandum Mandatory
Rule 40, Section 7 (b) provides that, "it shall be the duty of the appellant to submit a
memorandum" and failure to do so "shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal". The use of the
word "shall" in a statute or rule expresses what is mandatory and compulsory. Further, the Rule
imposes upon an appellant the "duty" to submit his memorandum. A duty is a "legal or moral
obligation, mandatory act, responsibility, charge, requirement, trust, chore, function, commission,
debt, liability, assignment, role, pledge, dictate, office, (and) engagement". Thus, under the express
mandate of said Rule, the appellant is duty-bound to submit his memorandum on appeal. Such
submission is not a matter of discretion on his part. His failure to comply with this mandate or to
perform said duty will compel the RTC to dismiss his appeal. In rules of procedure, an act which is
jurisdictional, or of the essence of the proceedings, or is prescribed for the protection or benefit of
the party affected is mandatory. As private respondent points out, in appeals from inferior courts to
the RTC, the appellant's brief is mandatory for the assignment of errors is vital to the decision of the
appeal on the merits. This is because on appeal only errors specifically assigned and properly argued
in the brief or memorandum will be considered, except those affecting jurisdiction over the subject
matter as well as plain and clerical errors. Otherwise stated, an appellate court has no power to
resolve an unassigned error, which does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter,
save for a plain or clerical error. It is true that the Rules should be interpreted so as to give litigants
ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and that a possible denial of substantial justice
due to legal technicalities should be avoided. But it is equally true that an appeal being a purely
statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of
Court. In other words, he who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must play by the rules. This the
petitioner failed to do when she did not submit her memorandum of appeal in Civil Case No. 12044
as required by Rule 40, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. That she lost her case is not
the trial court's fault but her own.
Lorna Villa vs. Heirs of Enrique Altavas, G.R. No. 162028, July 14, 2008
Melba Moncal Enriquez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140473, January 28, 2003
Rule 41 - Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts
Rosario Yambao vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140894, November 27, 2000
Under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by the Revised
Rules of Court to be appealable.
Francisco Magestrado vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 148072, July 10, 2007
The remedy to question a final order is appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
San Fernando Rural Bank, Inc. vs. Pampanga Omnibus Development Corp., et al., G.R. No. 168088,
April 4, 2007
There are two modes of appeal from a final order of the trial court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction — (1) by writ of error under Section 2 (a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court if questions of
fact or questions of fact and law are raised or involved; or (2) appeal by certiorari under Section 2
(c), Rule 41, in relation to Rule 45, where only questions of law are raised or involved.
First Bancorp, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 151132, June 22, 2006
Herminia Cando vs. Spouses Aurora and Claudio Olazo, G.R. No. 160741, March 22, 2007
Failure to interpose an appeal within the reglementary period renders an order or decision final
and executory unless a party files a motion for reconsideration within the 15-day reglementary
period. The law grants an aggrieved party a period of fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the court's
decision or order disposing of the action or proceeding to appeal or move to reconsider the same.
After the lapse of the fifteen-day period, an order becomes final and executory and is beyond the
power or jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further amend or revoke. The court loses
jurisdiction over the case and not even an appellate court would have the power to review a
judgment that has acquired finality. Otherwise, there would be no end to litigation and would set to
naught the main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and
the maintenance of peace and order by setting justiciable controversies with finality.
Heirs of Tungpala vs. CA, G.R. No. 136207, June 21, 2005
It is doctrinally entrenched that appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere statutory privilege.
Hence, parties who seek to avail themselves of it must comply with the statutes or rules allowing it.
The Rules of Civil Procedure provide, among others, that the appeal should be taken within fifteen
(15) days from the notice of judgment or from the denial of the motion for reconsideration, and that,
upon motion and payment of the docket fees before the expiration of the reglementary period, the
CA may grant an extension to file the petition for review. Moreover, there must be a proof of
service of a copy of the petition on the adverse party and the court a quo, and a written explanation
why service was not done personally, in case the service is made through registered mail or other
modes of service. Undisputedly, the petitioner failed to meet these requirements.
Time and again, it has been held that the rules of procedure are mere tools intended to facilitate
the attainment of justice, rather than frustrate it. A strict and rigid application of the rules must
always be eschewed when it would subvert the primary objective of the rules, that is, to enhance fair
trials and expedite justice. Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the
other party. Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.
Rosario Dalton-Reyes vs. CA, G.R. No. 149580, March 16, 2005
Starting March 20, 2003, the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC, sitting as a
special agrarian court, in a petition for determination of just compensation is a petition for review
under Rule 43, not a notice of appeal under Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Land Bank of the Phil. vs. Hermin Arceo, et al., G.R. No. 158270, July 21, 2008
Although appeal is an essential part of our judicial process, it has been held, time and again, that
the right thereto is not a natural right or a part of due process but is merely a statutory privilege.
Thus, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure of a party to conform to the rules regarding appeal will
render the judgment final and executory. Once a decision attains finality, it becomes the law of the
case irrespective of whether the decision is erroneous or not and no court — not even the Supreme
Court — has the power to revise, review, change or alter the same. The basic rule of finality of
judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the
risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must
become final at some definite date fixed by law.
Land Bank of the Phil. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 190660, April 11, 2011, citing Zamboanga
Forest Managers Corp. v. New Pacific Timber and Supply Co., et al., G.R. No. 143275
To recapitulate, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must strictly comply with the
requirements of the rules, and failure to do so leads to the loss of the right to appeal. The rules
require that from the date of receipt of the assailed RTC order denying one's motion for
reconsideration, an appellant may take an appeal to the CA by filing a notice of appeal with the
RTC and paying the required docket and other lawful fees with the RTC Branch Clerk of Court,
within the 15-day reglementary period for the perfection of an appeal. Otherwise, the appellant's
appeal is not perfected, and the CA may dismiss the appeal on the ground of non-payment of docket
and other lawful fees. As a consequence, the assailed RTC decision shall become final and
executory and, therefore, the prevailing parties can move for the issuance of a writ of execution.
Augustus Gonzales, et al. vs. Quirico Pe, G.R. No. 167398, August 8, 2011
Rule 41, Sec. 1 - Subject of appeal
Bienvenido P. Jaban, et al vs. Alvin Garcia, et al., G.R. No. 138336-37, February 16, 2004
Basilio Rivera vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141863, June 26, 2003
GSIS vs. Bengson Commercial Buildings, G.R. No. 137448, January 31, 2002
MMDA vs. Jancom Environmental Corp., G.R. No. 147465, January 30, 2002
Anastacio Fabela vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142546, August 9, 2001
Ramon Oro vs. Gerardo D. Diaz, G.R. No. 140974, July 11, 2001
Shuhei Yasuda vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112569, April 12, 2000
Maria G. Baluyut, et al. vs. Rodolfo Guiao, et al., G.R. No. 136294, September 28, 1999
According to Section 1, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court, governing appeals from the
Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) to the Court of Appeals, an appeal may be taken only from a
judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case or of a matter therein when declared by
the Rules to be appealable. Said provision, thus, explicitly states that no appeal may be taken from
an interlocutory order.
Judy Anne L. Santos vs. People of the Phil., et al., G.R. No. 173176, August 26, 2008
The first mode of appeal, governed by Rule 41, is taken to the Court of Appeals on questions of
fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal, covered by Rule 42, is brought
to the Court of Appeals on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third
mode of appeal, provided for by Rule 45, is elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law.
Emelinda V. Abedes vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 174373, October 15, 2007
It is explicit from (Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court) that no appeal may be taken from
an order of execution; instead, such order may be challenged by the aggrieved party via a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
A & C Minimart Corp. vs. Patricia S. Villareal, et al., G.R. No. 172268, October 10, 2007
Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that no appeal may be taken from an order
disallowing or dismissing an appeal.
Heirs of Teofilo Gaudiano vs. Constancio Benemerito, et al., G.R. No. 174247, February 21, 2007
Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the aggrieved party can no longer appeal from the
order denying the petition since this is proscribed under Section 1 of Rule 41. The remedy of the
party is to file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 from the order rejecting the petition
for relief from judgment.
Domingo Realty, Inc., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 126236, January 26, 2007
While this provision prohibits an appeal from an interlocutory order, the aggrieved party is
afforded the chance to question an interlocutory order through a special civil action of certiorari
under Rule 65; the petition must be filed within sixty days from notice of the assailed judgment,
order, resolution, or denial of a motion for reconsideration.
Section 1 (c)
Under Section 1 (c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an interlocutory order is not appealable. An
order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable.
Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc. vs. Felicidad Navarro, G.R. No. 152575, June 29, 2007
Douglas Lu Ym vs. Gertrudes Nabua, G.R. No. 161309, February 23, 2005
The fundamental distinction between a final judgment or order, on one hand, and an interlocutory
order, on the other hand, has been outlined in Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, (G.R. No.
L-60036, January 27, 1987) viz.:
The concept of 'final' judgment, as distinguished from one which has 'become final' (or
'executory' as of right [final and executory]), is definite and settled. A 'final' judgment or order is
one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto,
e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial declares
categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a
judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or
prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or
determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done
by the Court except to await the parties' next move (which among others, may consist of the filing
of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to
cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes 'final' or, to use the established and more
distinctive term, 'final and executory. . . . Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of the
case, and does not end the Court's task of adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining their
rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be
done by the Court, is 'interlocutory,' e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the
Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment
thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection of
documents or things, etc. Unlike a 'final' judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed
out, an 'interlocutory' order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that
may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.
17, 2011
The December 20, 2007 amendment to the Rules of Civil Procedure has deleted Section 1 (a) of
Rule 41 which contains the express provision that no appeal may be taken from an order denying a
motion for new trial or reconsideration.
Gertrudes Nabua, et al. vs. Douglas Lu Ym, G.R. No. 176141, December 16, 2008
The appropriate remedy to be taken from an interlocutory order is a special civil action under
Rule 65.
Valente Raymundo vs. Teofista Isagon vda. De Suarez, et al., G.R. No. 149017, November 28, 2008
Section 1 (h)
A dismissal without prejudice does not operate as a judgment on the merits, for there is no
unequivocal determination of the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the cause of
action and subject matter thereof.
Rizalina P. Positos vs. Jacob M. Chua, G.R. No. 179328, December 23, 2009
Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that an appeal may be taken only
from a final order that completely disposes of the case; that no appeal may be taken from (a) an
order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration; (b) an order denying a petition for relief or
any similar motion seeking relief from judgment; (c) an interlocutory order; (d) an order disallowing
or dismissing an appeal; (e) an order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent,
confession or compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating
consent; (f) an order of execution; (g) a judgment or final order for or against one or more of
several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints,
while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; or (h) an order
dismissing an action without prejudice. In all the above instances where the judgment or final order
is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65.
Certiorari is an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order (1) when the tribunal issued
such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and (2) when the
assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous, and the remedy of appeal would not afford
adequate and expeditious relief. Recourse to a petition for certiorari to assail an interlocutory order
is now expressly recognized in the ultimate paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of
Court on the subject of appeal.
Republic of the Phil. vs. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), et al., G.R. No. 159275, August 25, 2010
The enumeration of the orders that were not appealable made in the 1997 version of Section 1,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court — the version in force at the time when the CA rendered its assailed
decision on May 15, 2002 — included an order denying a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration . . . It is true that Administrative Matter No. 07-7-12-SC, effective December 27,
2007, has since amended Section 1, Rule 41, supra, by deleting an order denying a motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration from the enumeration of non-appealable orders, and that such a
revision of a procedural rule may be retroactively applied. However, to reverse the CA on that basis
would not be right and proper, simply because the CA correctly applied the rule of procedure in
force at the time when it issued its assailed final order.
17, 2011
The settled rule precluding certiorari as a remedy against the final order when appeal is available
notwithstanding, the Court rules that the CA should have given due course to and granted the
petition for certiorari for two exceptional reasons, namely: (a) the broader interest of justice
demanded that certiorari be given due course to avoid the undeserved grossly unjust result that
would befall the petitioners otherwise; and (b) the order of the RTC granting the motion to dismiss
on ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter evidently constituted grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
On occasion, the Court has considered certiorari as the proper remedy despite the availability of
appeal, or other remedy in the ordinary course of law. In Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, (G.R. Nos. 117622-23, October 23, 2006) the Court has declared that the requirement that
there must be no appeal, or any plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
admits of exceptions, such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a
party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where there
may be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and
insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public interest is involved;
and (g) in case of urgency.
Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal as a remedy does not constitute
sufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party from making use of certiorari if appeal is not an
adequate remedy, or an equally beneficial, or speedy remedy. It is inadequacy, not the mere absence
of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually
determine the propriety of certiorari. A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly
relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower
court or agency. It is understood, then, that a litigant need not mark time by resorting to the less
speedy remedy of appeal in order to have an order annulled and set aside for being patently void for
failure of the trial court to comply with the Rules of Court.
Nor should the petitioner be denied the recourse despite certiorari not being available as a proper
remedy against an assailed order, because it is better on balance to look beyond procedural
requirements and to overcome the ordinary disinclination to exercise supervisory powers in order
that a void order of a lower court may be controlled to make it conformable to law and justice.
Verily, the instances in which certiorari will issue cannot be defined, because to do so is to destroy
the comprehensiveness and usefulness of the extraordinary writ. The wide breadth and range of the
discretion of the court are such that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more
discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus, and that in the exercise of superintending control
over inferior courts, a superior court is to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case
"as the ends of justice may require." Thus, the writ will be granted whenever necessary to prevent a
substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.
17, 2011
Rule 41, Sec. 2 - Modes of appeal
Madrigal Transport, Inc. vs. Lapanday Holdings Corp., G.R. No. 156067, August 11, 2004
La Salette College, et al. vs. Victor C. Pilotin, G.R. No. 149227, December 11, 2003
Land Bank of the Phil. vs. Arlene and Bernardo de Leon, G.R. No. 143275, September 10, 2002
Napocor vs. Vine Development Corp., G.R. No. 137785, September 4, 2000
Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 121171, December 29, 1998
Macawiwili Gold Mining vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115104, October 12, 1998
While admittedly a complaint for expropriation is not a special proceeding, the above-quoted rule
requires the filing of a record on appeal in "other cases of multiple or separate appeal."
Jurisprudential law, no doubt, recognizes the existence of multiple appeals in a complaint for
expropriation.
NPC vs. Aguirre-Paderanga, G.R. No. 155065, July 27, 2005
Under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by the Revised
Rules of Court to be appealable.
Francisco Magestrado vs. People of the Phil., et al, G.R. No. 148072, July 10, 2007
Section 2 (a)
RTC judgments, final orders or resolutions meanwhile are appealable to the CA either through an
ordinary appeal, if the case was originally decided by the RTC, or a petition for review under Rule
42 if the case was decided under the RTC's appellate jurisdiction.
Go Ke Chong, Jr. vs. Mariano M. Chan, G.R. No. 153791, August 24, 2007
Section 2 (b)
The Rule is clear. In cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, appeal
to the Court of Appeals is taken by filing a notice of appeal. On the other hand, in cases decided by
the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, appeal to the Court of Appeals is by a petition
for review under Rule 42.
BF Citiland Corp. vs. Marilyn B. Otake, G.R. No. 173351, July 29, 2010
Section 2 (c)
Section 2 (c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that in all cases where questions of law are
raised or involved, the appeal shall be to this Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45.
Ericsson Telecommunications, Inc. vs. City of Pasig, G.R. No. 176667, November 22, 2007
Under Section 2 (c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, it is provided that in all cases where only
questions of law are raised, the appeal from a decision or order of the RTC shall be to the Supreme
Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45, Section 1.
Gerardo Mendoza, et al. vs. Soledad Salinas, G.R. No. 152827, February 6, 2007
Republic of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Juan Faber, G.R. No. 159589, December 23, 2008
This Court has invariably ruled that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
laid down by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. The failure to perfect an appeal as
required by the rules has the effect of defeating the right to appeal of a party and precluding the
appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. The right to appeal is not a natural right
nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must
comply with the requirement of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost. The reason for
rules of this nature is because the dispatch of business by courts would be impossible, and
intolerable delays would result, without rules governing practice. Public policy and sound practice
demand that judgments of courts should become final and irrevocable at some definite date fixed by
law. Such rules are a necessary incident to the proper, efficient and orderly discharge of judicial
functions. Thus, we have held that the failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed
reglementary period is not a mere technicality, but jurisdictional. Just as a losing party has the
privilege to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so does the winner also have the correlative
right to enjoy the finality of the decision. Failure to meet the requirements of an appeal deprives the
appellate court of jurisdiction to entertain any appeal. There are exceptions to this rule,
unfortunately respondents did not present any circumstances that would justify the relaxation of said
rule.
In Re: Heirship of the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez, et al., G.R. No. 182645, December 4, 2009
Multiple appeals are allowed in special proceedings, in actions for partition of property with
accounting, in the special civil actions of eminent domain and foreclosure of mortgage. The
rationale behind allowing more than one appeal in the same case is to enable the rest of the case to
proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be final. In
such a case, the filing of a record on appeal becomes indispensable since only a particular incident
of the case is brought to the appellate court for resolution with the rest of the proceedings remaining
within the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Voltaire I. Rovira vs. Heirs of Jose c. Deleste, et al., G.R. No. 160825, March 26, 2010
Rule 41, Sec. 3 - Period of ordinary appeal; appeal in habeas corpus cases
Manila Memorial Park vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137122, November 15, 2000
Tung Chin Hui vs. Rufus B. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 137571, September 21, 2000
Ma. Imelda Argel vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128805, October 12, 1999
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to
file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Sps. Ricardo and Leonila delos Santos vs. Ma. Socorro V. Vda. De Mangubat, et al., G.R. No. 149508,
October 10, 2007
The fifteen (15)-day period (mentioned in Section 3 of Rule 41) begins to run upon receipt of
notice of the decision or final order appealed from. Such period has been considered to begin upon
receipt of notice by the counsel of record, which is considered notice to the parties.
Vicente delos Santos, et al. vs. Fred Elizalde, et al., G.R. No. 141810 & 141812, February 2, 2007
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or
final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which,
considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations
of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.
Domingo Neypes vs. CA, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005
Makati Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Wilfredo D. Reyes, et al., G.R. No. 167403, August 6, 2008
Rule 41, Sec. 4 - Appellate court docket and other lawful fees
Noli Alfonso, et al. vs. Sps. Henry and Liwanag Andres, G.R. No. 139611, October 4, 2002
Teodora Buenaflor, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 142021, November 29, 2000
Ayala Land vs. Sps. Morris and Socorro Carpo, G.R. No. 140162, November 22, 2000
Oriental Assurance Corp. vs. Solidbank, G.R. No. 139882, August 16, 2000
Gabriel Lazaro vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137761, April 6, 2000
Mactan Cebu International Airport vs. Cuizon Mangubat, G.R. No. 136121, August 16, 1999
The payment of docket fees is a requirement in filing an ordinary appeal from the decision or
final order of the RTC.
Tereso Tan, et al. vs. Manuel “Guy” Link, et al., G.R. No. 172849, December 10, 2008
In cases of ordinary appeal, Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that the appeal to
the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by
filing a notice of appeal with the RTC (the court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from) and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. Section 3 thereof states that the
appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed
from. Concomitant with the filing of a notice of appeal is the payment of the required appeal fees
within the 15-day reglementary period set forth in Section 4 of the said Rule.
It bears stressing that payment of docket and other fees within this period is mandatory for the
perfection of the appeal. Otherwise, the right to appeal is lost. This is so because a court acquires
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action only upon the payment of the correct amount of
docket fees regardless of the actual date of filing of the case in court. The payment of appellate
docket fees is not a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement, without
which the decision or final order appealed from becomes final and executory as if no appeal was
filed.
D.M. Wenceslao and Associates, Inc. vs. City of Parañaque, et al., G.R. No. 170728, August 31, 2011
The right to appeal is not a natural right. It is also not part of due process. It is merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules.
Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal.
D.M. Wenceslao and Associates, Inc. vs. City of Parañaque, et al., G.R. No. 170728, August 31, 2011
Rule 41, Sec. 5 - Notice of appeal
Aquilina Estrella, et al. vs. Nila Espiridion, G.R. No. 134460, November 27, 2003
Rule 41, Sec. 9 - Perfection of appeal; effect thereof
Eusebio Osorio vs. Agustin S. Dizon, et al., A.M. No. RTJ-04-1838, March 18, 2004
Atlantic Erectors vs. Herbal Cove Realty Corp., G.R. No. 148568, March 20, 2003
Accordingly, in order to perfect an appeal from a decision rendered by the RTC in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction, the following requirements must be complied with. First, within 15 days, a
notice of appeal must be filed with the court that rendered the judgment or final order sought to be
appealed; second, such notice must be served on the adverse party; and third, within the same
15-day period, the full amount of appellate court docket and other legal fees must be paid to the
clerk of the court that rendered the judgment or final order.
It should be noted that full payment of the appellate docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory, even jurisdictional, for the perfection of the appeal. Otherwise, the appellate court
would not be able to act on the subject matter of the action, and the decision or final order sought to
be appealed from would become final and executory.
Procedural rules setting the period for perfecting an appeal or filing a petition for review are
generally inviolable. It is doctrinally entrenched that appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere
statutory privilege. Hence, parties who seek to avail themselves of it must comply with the statutes
or rules allowing it. The requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period
specified in law must, as a rule, be strictly followed. Such requirements are considered
indispensable interdictions against needless delays and are necessary for the orderly discharge of the
judicial business. Furthermore, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
permitted by law is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. Failure to perfect the appeal renders
the judgment of the court final and executory. Just as a losing party has the privilege to file an
appeal within the prescribed period, so does the winner also have the correlative right to enjoy the
finality of the decision.
Elpidio Calipay vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 166411, August 3, 2010
Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules explains that the court of origin loses jurisdiction over the case
only upon the perfection of the appeal filed in due time by the appellant and the expiration of the
time to appeal of the other parties. Withal, prior to the transmittal of the original records of the case
to the CA, the RTC may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the
prevailing party, as in this case, the issuance of the writ of execution because the respondent's
appeal was not perfected.
While every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination
of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities, the failure to perfect an appeal within the
reglementary period is not a mere technicality. It raises jurisdictional problem, as it deprives the
appellate court of its jurisdiction over the appeal. After a decision is declared final and executory,
vested rights are acquired by the winning party. Just as a losing party has the right to appeal within
the prescribed period, the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision
on the case.
Rule 41, Sec. 10 - Duty of clerk of court of the lower court upon perfection of appeal
Saturnino Obañana, Jr. vs. Armando R. Ricafort, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1545, May 27, 2004
Eusebio Osorio vs. Agustin S. Dizon, et al., A.M. No. RTJ-04-1838, March 18, 2004
Section 10, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that if the records are found to be
incomplete, measures should be taken to complete the records. In his comment, however, Clerk of
Court made no mention of any steps taken to complete the records. At any rate, the failure to
complete the records does not justify its non-transmittal. Under the Rules, when the records cannot
be completed, respondent should "indicate in his letter of transmittal the exhibits or transcripts not
included in the records being transmitted to the appellate court, the reasons for their non-transmittal,
and the steps taken or that could be taken to have them available".
Luminza Delos Reyes vs. Danilo S. Cruz, et al., A.M. No. RTJ-08-2152, January 18, 2010
Rule 42, Sec. 1 - How appeal taken; time for filing
Heirs of Sps. Dela Cruz vs. Heirs of Quintos, G.R. No. 149692, July 30, 2002
This Court has explained that the purpose in limiting the period of appeal is to forestall or avoid
an unreasonable delay in the administration of justice and to put an end to controversies. Where no
element of intent to delay the administration of justice could be attributed to petitioners, a one-day
delay does not justify their petition's dismissal.
In Department of Justice Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez v. Pennisi (G.R. No. 169958, March 5,
2010), this Court elucidated on the rules on reglementary periods, to wit: The general rule is that the
perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is, not only
mandatory, but jurisdictional, and failure to conform to the rules will render the judgment sought to
be reviewed final and unappealable. By way of exception, unintended lapses are disregarded so as to
give due course to appeals filed beyond the reglementary period on the basis of strong and
compelling reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof.
The purpose behind the limitation of the period of appeal is to avoid an unreasonable delay in the
administration of justice and to put an end to controversies.
In Samala v. Court of Appeals (416 Phil. 1 (2001), we said: The rules of procedure are mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application especially on
technical matters, which tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be avoided.
Even the Revised Rules of Court envision this liberality. Technicality, when it deserts its proper
office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant
consideration from the courts.
Heirs of Rodolfo Crisostomo vs. Rudex International Development Corp., G.R. No. 176129, August 24,
2011
Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides that a party who desires to appeal from a
decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall file a
verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals.
Sps. Maximo and Engracia C. Abadilla, et al. vs. Virginia Hofilena-Europa, et al., G.R. No. 146769,
August 17, 2007
The reason why it is permissible to adopt a petition for review when appealing cases decided by
the Special Agrarian Courts in eminent domain cases is the need for absolute dispatch in the
determination of just compensation. Just compensation means not only paying the correct amount
but also paying for the land within a reasonable time from its acquisition. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the consequences
of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before
actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Such objective is more in keeping
with the nature of a petition for review.
Unlike an ordinary appeal, a petition for review dispenses with the filing of a notice of appeal or
completion of records as requisites before any pleading is submitted. A petition for review hastens
the award of fair recompense to deprived landowners for the government-acquired property, an end
not foreseeable in an ordinary appeal. . . .
LBP vs. Luz L. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 148892, May 6, 2010
Rule 42, Sec. 2 - Form and contents
Francisco Dee vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133542, January 29, 2004
Santiago Alcantara vs. Court of Appeals and The Peninsula Manila, G.R. No. 143397, August 6, 2002
Sps. Anton and Eileen Lim vs. Uni-Tan Marketing Corp., G.R. No. 147328, February 20, 2002
Santiago Eslaban vs. Clarita Vda. De Onorio, G.R. No. 146062, June 28, 2001
Nelia Atillo vs. Buenaventura Bombay, G.R. No. 136096, February 7, 2001
Cornelia P. Cusi-Hernandez vs. Eduardo Diaz, et al., G.R. No. 140436, July 18, 2000
Far Eastern Shipping vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130068, October 1, 1998
The requirement to file a certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory, and failure to comply
therewith cannot be excused. The certification is a peculiar and personal responsibility of the party,
an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases involving
basically the same parties, issues and causes of action. Hence, the certification must be
accomplished by the party himself because he has actual knowledge of whether or not he has
initiated similar actions or proceedings in different courts or tribunals.
Rural Bankers Association of the Phil. vs. Ma. Rosario Tanghal-Salvana, G.R. No. 175020, October 4,
2007
Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152392, May 26, 2005
The requirements as to form and content of a petition for review of a decision of the RTC are laid
down in Section 2 of Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Virginia Real vs. Sisenando H. Belo, G.R. No. 146224, January 26, 2007
Non-compliance with these requirements is sufficient ground for the dismissal of the Petition,
pursuant to Section 3 of the same Rule, . . . .
Sps. Heber and Charlita Edillo vs. Sps. Norberto and Desideria Dulpina, G.R. No. 188360, January 21,
2010
Rule 42, Sec. 2 (d)
While Rule 42, Section 2 (d) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that,
inter alia, the petition shall "be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate original or true copies of
the judgments or final orders of both lower courts," the cited deficiency in petitioner's petition does
not make it insufficient in form and substance since it is the decision of the RTC, not that of the
MTCC, which is the subject of her appeal.
Evelyn Barredo vs. People of the Phil., et al., G.R. No. 183467, March 29, 2010
Rule 42, Sec. 3 - Effect of failure to comply with requirements
Nelia Atillo vs. Buenaventura Bombay, G.R. No. 136096, February 7, 2001
Cornelia P. Cusi-Hernandez vs. Eduardo Diaz, et al., G.R. No. 140436, July 18, 2000

Dokumen - Tips - Civil Procedures Case Digest PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Dokumen - Tips - Civil Procedures Case Digest PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

I.

General Provisions — Jurisdiction of Courts

Corollary to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is the principle of exhaustion of administrative

Rule 1, Sec. 2 - In what courts applicable

Rule 1, Sec. 3 - Cases governed

Rule 1, Sec. 4 - In what cases not applicable; suppletory character

Rule 1, Sec. 6 - Construction

Poverty cannot be used as an excuse to justify petitioners' complacency in allowing months to

Rule 2, Sec. 1 - Ordinary civil actions, basis of

(a) The legal right of the plaintiff;

(b) The correlative obligation of the defendant; and

Rule 2, Sec. 2 - Cause of action, defined

Rule 2, Sec. 4 - Splitting a single cause of action; effect of

Rule 2, Sec. 5 - Joinder of causes of action

Rule 3, Sec. 1 - Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant

Rule 3, Sec. 2 - Parties in interest

1) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or

Rule 3, Sec. 3 - Representatives as parties

Rule 3, Sec. 6 - Permissive joinder of parties

Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, defines indispensable parties as parties-in-interest

Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, defines indispensable parties as parties-in-interest

Rule 3, Sec. 8 - Necessary party

Rule 3, Sec. 9 - Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded

Rule 3, Sec. 10 - Unwilling co-plaintiff

Rule 3, Sec. 11 - Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties

Misjoinder of parties does not warrant the dismissal of the action.

Rule 3, Sec. 12 - Class suit

Rule 3, Sec. 16 - Death of party; duty of counsel

Rule 3, Sec. 20 - Action on contractual money claims

Rule 3, Sec. 21 - Indigent party

Rule 3, Sec. 22 - Notice to the Solicitor General

Rule 4 - Venue of Actions

Rule 4, Sec. 1 - Venue of real actions

Rule 4, Sec. 2 - Venue of personal actions

Rule 4, Sec. 4 - When Rule not applicable

Rule 5 - Uniform Procedure in Trial Courts

Rule 5, Sec. 1 - Uniform procedure

Rule 6, Sec. 5 - Defenses

2. The physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime.

It is elementary that the defense of denial is outweighed by a positive identification that is

Rule 6, Sec. 6 - Counterclaim

Rule 6, Sec. 7 - Compulsory counterclaim

Rule 6, Sec. 8 - Cross-claim

Rule 6, Sec. 10 - Reply

Rule 6, Sec. 11 - Third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint

Rule 7, Sec. 1 - Caption

Rule 7, Sec. 3 - Signature and address

Rule 7, Sec. 4 - Verification

1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission

2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render

4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein,

The verification requirement is significant, as it is intended to secure an assurance that the

The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such

Rule 7, Sec. 5 - Certification against forum shopping

Basis for the Requirement of Certification of Non-Forum Shopping

Tomas R. Leonidas vs. Francisco G. Supnet, AM MTJ-02-1433, February 21, 2003

Origin of the Concept of Forum Shopping

Forum Shopping Construed

Rationale for Rule Against Forum Shopping

A certificate of non-forum shopping is required only in complaints or other initiatory pleadings,

1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission

2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render

4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein,