The Politics,Power,and Pathologies

ofInternationalOrganizations
MichaelN. Barnett
andMarthaFinnemore

Do internationalorganizations reallydo whattheircreators intendthemtodo? In the

pastcentury thenumber ofinternationalorganizations(1Os) has increasedexponen-
tially,and we have a varietyof vigoroustheoriesto explainwhytheyhave been
created.Most of thesetheoriesexplainIO creationas a responseto problemsof
incomplete information, transactioncosts,andotherbarriers toParetoefficiencyand
welfareimprovement fortheirmembers. Researchflowing fromthesetheories,how-
ever,haspaidlittleattentiontohowIOs actuallybehaveaftertheyarecreated.Closer
scrutiny would reveal thatmanyIOs strayfromtheefficiency goals thesetheories
imputeand thatmanyIOs exercisepowerautonomously in waysunintended and
unanticipated by statesat theircreation.Understanding how thisis so requiresa
reconsiderationofIOs andwhattheydo.
In thisarticlewe developa constructivist approachrootedin sociologicalinstitu-
tionalismto explainboththepowerof IOs and theirpropensity fordysfunctional,
evenpathological, behavior.Drawingon long-standing Weberianarguments about
bureaucracy and sociologicalinstitutionalist
approachesto organizationalbehavior,
we arguethattherational-legal authoritythatIOs embodygivesthempowerindepen-
dentofthestatesthatcreatedthemandchannelsthatpowerin particular directions.
Bureaucracies, by definition, make rules,but in so doingtheyalso createsocial
knowledge. Theydefinesharedinternational tasks(like "development"), createand
definenewcategories ofactors(like "refugee"),createnewinterests foractors(like
"promoting humanrights"),andtransfer modelsofpoliticalorganization aroundthe
world(like marketsand democracy.)However,the same normative valuationon
impersonal, generalizedrulesthatdefines bureaucraciesandmakesthempowerful in

We aregrateful toJohnBoli,RaymondDuvall,ErnstHaas,PeterHaas,RobertKeohane,KeithKrause,
JeffreyLegro,JohnMalley,CraigMurphy, M. J.Peterson,MarkPollack,AndrewMoravcsik,Thomas
Risse,DuncanSnidal,SteveWeber,ThomasWeiss,andtwoanonymous referees
fortheircomments.We
are especiallygrateful
forthecarefulattention of theeditorsofInternational Earlierver-
Organization.
sionsofthisarticlewerepresented atthe1997APSA meeting, the1997ISA meeting,andatvariousfora.
We also acknowledge financialassistancefromtheSmithRichardson Foundation and theUnitedStates
ofPeace.
Institute

International 53, 4, Autumn1999,pp. 699-732

Organization
? 1999byThe 10 Foundation
andtheMassachusetts ofTechnology
Institute
700 International
Organization

modernlifecan also makethemunresponsive to theirenvironments, obsessedwith

theirownrulesattheexpenseofprimary missions,andultimately lead toinefficient,
self-defeatingbehavior.We are notthefirstto suggestthatIOs are morethanthe
reflectionof statepreferences andthattheycan be autonomous andpowerful actors
in globalpolitics.1Norarewe thefirst tonotethat1Os,likeall organizations, can be
dysfunctional andinefficient.2 However,ouremphasisonthewaythatcharacteristics
ofbureaucracy as a genericcultural formshapeIO behaviorprovidesa different and
verybroadbasisforthinking abouthowIOs influence worldpolitics.3
Developingan alternative approachto thinking aboutIOs is onlyworthwhile ifit
producessignificant insightsandnewopportunities forresearchon majordebatesin
thefield.Ourapproachallowsus to weighin withnewperspectives on at leastthree
suchdebates.First,itoffers viewofthepowerofIOs andwhether
a differ'ent orhow
theymatterin worldpolitics.This issue has been at the core of the neoliberal-
institutionalists'
debatewithneorealists foryears.4We showin thisarticlehowneo-
liberal-institutionalists
actuallydisadvantage themselves intheirargument withreal-
istsbylookingatonlyonefacetofIO power.Globalorganizations do morethanjust
facilitate
cooperation byhelpingstatestoovercomemarket failures,collectiveaction
dilemmas,and problemsassociatedwithinterdependent social choice.They also
createactors,specify responsibilitiesandauthorityamongthem,anddefinethework
theseactorsshoulddo,givingitmeaningandnormative value.Evenwhentheylack
materialresources,IOs exercisepoweras theyconstitute and construct thesocial
world.5
Secondandrelated,ourperspective providesa theoretical basisfortreating IOs as
autonomous actorsinworldpoliticsandthuspresents a challengetothestatist ontol-
ogyprevailing in international relationstheories.
Despiteall theirattention to inter-
nationalinstitutions,oneresultofthetheoretical orientation ofneoliberalinstitution-
alistsandregimestheorists is thattheytreatIOs thewaypluralists treatthestate.IOs
are mechanisms through which others(usuallystates)act; theyare notpurposive
actors.The regimesliterature is particularly
clearon thispoint.Regimesare "prin-
ciples,norms, rules,anddecision-making procedures;" theyarenotactors.6 Weber's
insightsaboutthenormative poweroftherational-legal authority thatbureaucracies
embodyand itsimplications forthewaysbureaucracies produceand controlsocial
knowledgeprovidea basisforchallenging thisviewandtreating IOs as agents,not
justas structure.

1. ForGramscian approaches, see Cox 1980,1992,and 1996;andMurphy1995.ForSocietyofStates

approaches,see HurrellandWoods1995.Fortheepistemic communities see Haas 1992.ForIO
literature,
decision-making see Cox etal. 1974;Cox andJacobson1977;Cox 1996;andNess andBrechin
literature,
1988.Fora rationalchoiceperspective, see Snidal1996.
2. Haas 1990.
3. Because theneorealistand neoliberalarguments we engagehave focusedon intergovernmental
organizationsrather thannongovernmental ones,andbecauseWeberianarguments fromwhichwe draw
dealprimarilywithpublicbureaucracy, we toofocusonintergovernmental inthisarticleand
organizations
use theterminternationalorganizations inthatway.
4. Baldwin1993.
5. See Finnemore 1993and 1996b;andMcNeely1995.
6. Krasner1983b.
 Organizations701
PathologiesofInternational

Third,ourperspective offersa different vantagepointfromwhichto assess the

desirabilityof 1Os.Whilerealistsand somepolicymakers have takenup thisissue,
surprisingly fewotherstudentsof IOs have been criticalof theirperformance or
desirability.7
Partofthisoptimism stemsfromcentraltenetsof classicalliberalism,
whichhas longviewedIOs as a peacefulwaytomanagerapidtechnological change
andglobalization, farpreferable to theobviousalternative-war.8 Also contributing
to thisuncriticalstanceis thenormative judgmentaboutIOs thatis builtintothe
theoreticalassumptions of mostneoliberaland regimesscholarsand theeconomic
organization theorieson whichtheydraw.IOs exist,in thisview,onlybecausethey
areParetoimproving andsolveproblems forstates.Consequently, ifan IO exists,it
mustbe becauseitis moreusefulthanotheralternatives since,bytheoreticalaxiom,
stateswillpull theplugon any10 thatdoes notperform. We findthisassumption
unsatisfying.IOs oftenproduceundesirable andevenself-defeating outcomesrepeat-
edly,withoutpunishment muchless dismantlement, and we, as theorists,wantto
understand why.International relationsscholarsare familiarwithprincipal-agent
problems andthewaysinwhichbureaucratic politicscancompromise organizational
effectiveness,buttheseapproacheshave rarelybeen appliedto 1Os. Further, these
approaches by no means exhaust sources of dysfunction. We examine one suchsource
thatflowsfromthesame rational-legal characteristicsthatmakeIOs authoritative
andpowerful. Drawing from research in sociology and anthropology, we showhow
theveryfeatures thatmakebureaucracies powerful can also be theirweakness.
The claimswe makein thisarticleflowfroman analysisofthe"social stuff"of
whichbureaucracy is made.We are askinga standard constructivistquestionabout
whatmakestheworldhangtogether or,as AlexanderWendtputsit,"howarethings
intheworldputtogether so thattheyhavetheproperties theydo."9In thissense,our
explanation ofIO behavioris constitutive anddiffers frommostotherinternational
relationsapproaches.This approachdoes notmakeourexplanation"meredescrip-
tion,"sinceunderstanding theconstitution ofthingsdoes essentialworkin explain-
inghowthosethingsbehaveand whatcausesoutcomes.Justas understanding how
thedouble-helix DNA moleculeis constituted materially makespossiblecausalargu-
mentsaboutgenetics, disease,andotherbiologicalprocesses,so understanding how
bureaucracies areconstituted sociallyallowsus tohypothesize aboutthebehaviorof
IOs andtheeffects thissocialformmighthavein worldpolitics.Thistypeofconsti-
tutiveexplanation does notallowus to offerlaw-likestatements suchas "ifX hap-
pens,thenY mustfollow."Rather, by providing a morecompleteunderstanding of
whatbureaucracy is, we can provideexplanations of how certainkindsof bureau-
craticbehaviorarepossible,orevenprobable,andwhy.10
We beginbyexamining theassumptions underlying differentbranchesoforgani-
zationtheoryand exploringtheirimplications forthestudyof 1Os. We arguethat
assumptions drawnfromeconomicsthatundergird neoliberaland neorealisttreat-

7. See Mearsheimer1994;andHelms1996.
8. See Commissionon GlobalGovernance1995;Jacobson1979,1; andDoyle 1997.
9. See Ruggie1998;andWendt1998.
10. Wendt1998.
702 International
Organization

mentsof IOs do notalwaysreflect theempiricalsituation of mostIOs commonly

studiedbypoliticalscientists.Further,theyprovideresearchhypotheses aboutonly
someaspectsofIOs (likewhytheyarecreated)andnotothers(likewhattheydo).
We thenintroduce sociologicalarguments thathelpremedy theseproblems.
In thesecondsectionwe developa constructivist approachfromthesesociological
arguments to examinethepowerwieldedbyIOs andthesourcesoftheirinfluence.
Liberalandrealisttheories onlymakepredictions about,andconsequently onlylook
for,a verylimitedrangeofwelfare-improving effectscausedby1Os.Sociological theories,
however, expectandexplaina muchbroader rangeofimpacts organizations
canhaveand
specificallyhighlighttheirrolein constructing actors,interests,and socialpurpose.
We provideillustrations fromtheUN systemto showhowIOs do,infact,havesuch
powerful incontemporary
effects worldpolitics.Inthethird section
weexplore thedysfunc-
tionalbehavior of1Os,whichwe define as behavior thatundermines thestatedgoals of
theorganization. International
relationstheorists are familiarwithseveraltypesof
theoriesthatmightexplainsuchbehavior.Some locatethesourceof dysfunction in
material factors,othersfocuson cultural factors. Some theorieslocatethesourceof
dysfunction outsidetheorganization, otherslocateitinside.We construct a typology,
mappingthesetheoriesaccordingto thesourceof dysfunction theyemphasize,and
showthatthesameinternally generatedcultural forcesthatgiveIOs theirpowerand
autonomy canalsobe a sourceofdysfunctional behavior. Weusetheterm pathologiesto
describesuchinstances whenIO dysfunction canbe tracedto bureaucratic culture.We
conclude bydiscussing howourperspective helpstowidentheresearch agendafor1Os.

TheoreticalApproachesto Organizations

Withinsocialsciencetherearetwobroadstrands oftheorizingaboutorganizations.
One is economistic and rootedin assumptions of instrumental and effi-
rationality
ciencyconcerns;theotheris sociologicaland focusedon issuesof legitimacy and
power.11Thedifferent assumptions embeddedwithin eachtypeoftheory focusatten-
tionon differentkindsofquestionsaboutorganizations andprovideinsights on dif-
ferent
kindsofproblems.
The economistic approachcomes,notsurprisingly, outofeconomicsdepartments
andbusinessschoolsforwhomthefundamental theoreticalproblem, laidoutfirstby
RonaldCoase and morerecently by OliverWilliamson,is whywe have business
firms.Withinstandardmicroeconomic logic,it shouldbe muchmoreefficient to
conductall transactionsthrough marketsrather than"hierarchies" or organizations.
Consequently, thefactthateconomiclifeis dominated byhugeorganizations (busi-
nessfirms)is an anomaly. Thebodyoftheory developedtoexplaintheexistenceand
powerof firmsfocuseson organizations as efficientsolutionsto contracting prob-
lems,incomplete information,andothermarket imperfections.12

11. See PowellandDiMaggio1991,chap.1; andGrandori1993.

12. See Williamson1975and 1985;andCoase 1937.
 PathologiesofInternational
Organizations703

This bodyof organization theoryinforms neoliberaland neorealistdebatesover

internationalinstitutions.FollowingKennethWaltz,neoliberalsandneorealists un-
derstandworldpoliticsto be analogousto a marketfilledwithutility-maximizing
competitors.13Thus,liketheeconomists, theysee organizations as welfare-improv-
ing solutionsto problemsof incomplete information and hightransaction costs.14
Neoliberalsandrealistsdisagreeaboutthedegreetowhichconstraints ofanarchy,an
interestin relativeversusabsolutegains,and fearsof cheatingwill scuttleinterna-
tionalinstitutional
arrangements orhobbletheireffectiveness, butbothagree,implic-
itlyorexplicitly,thatIOs helpstatesfurther theirinterests wheretheyareallowedto
work.15 Statepowermaybe exercisedin politicalbattlesinsideIOs overwhere,on
theParetofrontier, politicalbargainsfall,butthenotionthatIOs are instruments
createdto servestateinterests is notmuchquestionedby neorealistor neoliberal
scholars.16Afterall,whyelse wouldstatessetup theseorganizations andcontinueto
support themiftheydidnotservestateinterests?
Approachesfromsociologyprovideone set of answersto thisquestion.They
providereasonswhy,infact,organizations thatarenotefficient oreffectiveservants
ofmember interestsmightexist.In so doing,theylead us to lookforkindsofpower
and sourcesof autonomy in organizations
thateconomistsoverlook.Different ap-
proacheswithinsociologytreatorganizations in different ways,butas a groupthey
standin sharpcontrast to theeconomists'approaches in at leasttwoimportant respects:
theyoffera different conception oftherelationshipbetweenorganizations andtheir
environments, andtheyprovidea basisforunderstanding organizationalautonomy.

IOs and theirenvironment.The environment assumedbyeconomicapproaches

is sociallyverythinanddevoidof socialrules,culturalcontent,
to organizations or
even otheractorsbeyondthoseconstructing the organization. Competition, ex-
change,andconsequent pressuresforefficiency
arethedominant environmentalchar-
acteristics
driving theformation andbehavioroforganizations. bycon-
Sociologists,
trast,
studyorganizationsina widerworldofnonmarket situations,
and,consequently,
theybeginwithno suchassumptions. Organizations aretreatedas "social facts"to
be investigated;
whether theydo whattheyclaimor do itefficiently is an empirical
question,nota theoretical assumptionof theseapproaches.Organizations respond
notonlyto otheractorspursuingmaterialinterests in theenvironment butalso to
normativeandcultural forcesthatshapehoworganizations see theworldandconcep-
tualizetheirown missions.Environments can "select" or favororganizations for
reasonsotherthanefficient orresponsivebehavior.For example,organizations may
be createdand supported forreasonsof legitimacy and normative fitratherthan
output;theymaybe creatednotforwhattheydo butforwhattheyare-for
efficient
whattheyrepresent symbolicallyandthevaluestheyembody. 17

13. Waltz1979.
14. See Vaubel1991,27; andDillon,Ilgen,andWillett1991.
15. Baldwin1993.
16. Krasner1991.
17. See DiMaggioand Powell 1983; Scott1992; Meyerand Scott1992, 1-5; Powell andDiMaggio
1991;Weber1994;andFinnemore 1996a.
704 International
Organization

Empirically,organizationalenvironments can takemanyforms.Some organiza-

tionsexistin competitive environmentsthatcreatestrongpressuresforefficientor
responsivebehavior,butmanydo not.Someorganizations operatewithclearcriteria
for"success" (like firmsthathave balancesheets),whereasothers(like political
sciencedepartments) operatewithmuchvaguermissions,withfewclearcriteria for
successorfailureandno seriousthreat ofelimination.Ourpointis simplythatwhen
we choosea theoretical framework, we shouldchooseone whoseassumptions ap-
proximate theempiricalconditionsoftheIO we areanalyzing, andthatwe shouldbe
awareof thebiases createdby thoseassumptions. Economisticapproachesmake
certainassumptions abouttheenvironment in whichIOs are embeddedthatdrive
researcherswhouse themtolookforcertain kindsofeffects
andnotothers.Specify-
ingdifferentormorevariedenviro'nments forIOs wouldlead us to lookfordifferent
andmorevariedeffects in worldpolitics.18

IO autonomy. Followingeconomistic logic,regimetheory andthebroadrangeof

scholarsworking withinitgenerally treatIOs as creationsof statesdesignedto fur-
therstateinterests.19 Analysisof subsequentIO behaviorfocuseson processesof
aggregating memberstatepreferences through strategicinteractionwithinthestruc-
tureoftheJO.1Os,then,are simplyepiphenomena of stateinteraction;theyare,to
quoteWaltz'sdefinition ofreductionism, "understoodbyknowingtheattributes and
theinteractions of [their]
parts."20
Thesetheories thustreatIOs as emptyshellsorimpersonal policymachinery tobe
manipulated by otheractors.Politicalbargainsshapethemachinery at itscreation,
statesmaypolitickhardwithin themachinery inpursuit oftheirpolicygoals,andthe
machinery's normsand rulesmayconstrain whatstatescan do, butthemachinery
itselfis passive.IOs arenotpurposive politicalactorsin theirownrightandhaveno
ontologicalindependence. To theextentthatIOs do, in fact,takeon a lifeof their
own,theybreachthe"limitsofrealism"as wellas ofneoliberalism byviolating the
ontologicalstructures ofthesetheories.21
The regimesconceptspawneda hugeliterature on interstatecooperation thatis
remarkably consistentinitstreatment ofIOs as structure thanagents.Muchof
rather
theneoliberalinstitutionalistliteraturehas been devotedto exploringthewaysin
whichregimes(and1Os) can actas intervening variables,mediating betweenstates'
pursuit andpoliticaloutcomesbychanging
ofself-interest thestructureofopportuni-
tiesand constraints facingstatesthrough theircontroloverinformation, in particu-
lar.22Althoughthisline of scholarship accordsIOs some causal status(sincethey
demonstrably changeoutcomes),itdoesnotgrantthemautonomy andpurposeinde-

18. Researchersapplyingtheseeconomisticapproacheshavebecomeincreasingly awareof themis-

matchbetweentheassumptions oftheirmodelsandtheempiricsof1Os.See Snidal1996.
thisis notthecase; mostIOs now are createdby other1Os. See Shanks,
19. Note thatempirically
Jacobson,andKaplan1996.
20. Waltz1979,18.
21. Krasner1983a,355-68; butsee Finnemore 1996b;andRittberger
1993.
22. See Keohane1984;andBaldwin1993.
 PathologiesofInternational
Organizations705

pendentof thestatesthatcomprisethem.Another branchof liberalism has recently

divorceditselffromthestatistontologyand focusesinsteadon thepreferences of
social groupsas thecausal engineof worldpolitics,but,again,thisview simply
arguesforattention toa different groupofagentsinvolvedintheconstruction ofIOs
andcompeting foraccesstoIO mechanisms. Itdoesnotoffer a fundamentally differ-
entconception ofIOs.23
Therelevant questionto ask aboutthisconceptualization is whether itis a reason-
able approximation oftheempiricalcondition of most1Os. Ourreadingof detailed
empirical case studiesofIO activitysuggestsnot.Yes,IOs areconstrained bystates,
butthenotionthattheyarepassivemechanisms withno independent agendasoftheir
ownis notborneoutby anydetailedempiricalstudyof an JOthatwe have found.
Field studiesof the EuropeanUnion provideevidenceof independent roles for
"eurocrats."24 Studiesof theWorldBankconsistently identify an independent cul-
tureandagendasforaction.25 StudiesofrecentUN peacekeeping andreconstruction
effortssimilarly document a UN agendathatfrequently leadsto conflict withmem-
berstates.26AccountsoftheUN HighCommission on Refugees(UNHCR) routinely
notehow its autonomy and authorityhas grownovertheyears.Not onlyare IOs
independent actorswiththeirownagendas,buttheymayembodymultipleagendas
andcontainmultiple sourcesofagency-a problemwe takeup later.
Principal-agent analysis,whichhas been increasingly employedby students of
internationalrelationstoexamineorganizational dynamics, couldpotentially provide
a sophisticated approachto understanding JOautonomy.27 Buildingon theoriesof
rationalchoiceand of representation, theseanalystsunderstand IOs as "agents"of
states("principals").The analysisis concerned withwhether agentsareresponsible
delegatesoftheirprincipals, whether agentssmuggleinandpursuetheirownprefer-
ences,and how principalscan construct variousmechanisms to keep theiragents
honest.28 This framework providesa meansof treating IOs as actorsin theirown
rightwithindependent interestsandcapabilities.
Autonomous actionbyIOs is tobe
expectedin thisperspective. It wouldalso explaina numberof thenonresponsive
andpathologicalbehaviorsthatconcernus becausewe knowthatmonitoring and
shirking problemsarepervasivein theseprincipal-agent relationships andthatthese
relationshipscan oftengetstuckat suboptimal equilibria.
The problemwithapplyingprincipal-agent analysisto thestudyof IOs is thatit
requiresa prioritheoreticalspecification
ofwhatIOs want.Principal-agent dynamics
arefueledbythedisjuncture betweenwhatagentswantandwhatprincipals want.To
produceanyinsights, thosetwosetsof interests cannotbe identical.In economics
thistypeof analysisis usuallyappliedto preexisting agentsand principals(clients

23. Moravcsik1997.
24. See Pollack1997;Ross 1995;andZabusky1995;butsee Moravcsik1999.
25. See Ascher1983; Ayres1983; Ferguson1990; Escobar 1995; Wade 1996; Nelson 1995; and
Finnemore 1996a.
26. JointEvaluationofEmergency AssistancetoRwanda1996.
27. See Pollack1997;Lake 1996;Vaubel1991;andDillon,Ilgen,andWillett1991.
28. See PrattandZeckhauser1985;andKiewitandMcCubbins1991.
706 International
Organization

hiring
lawyers, patients
visitingdoctors)whoseongoingindependent existencemakes
of independent
specification interests
relativelystraightforward.
The lawyeror the
doctorwouldprobably be inbusinessevenifyouandI didnottakeourproblemsto
them.1Os,on theotherhand,are oftencreatedby theprincipals(states)and given
missionstatements writtenbytheprincipals.How,then,can we imputeindependent
preferencesa priori?
ScholarsofAmericanpoliticshavemadesomeprogress in producingsubstantive
theoretical
propositionsaboutwhatU.S. bureaucratic agencieswant.Beginning with
thepioneering workofWilliamNiskanen,scholarstheorized thatbureaucracieshad
interests
defined bytheabsoluteorrelativesize oftheirbudgetandtheexpansionor
protectionof theirturf.
At first
theseinterests
wereimputed, andlatertheybecame
morecloselyinvestigated, andinsomecases modified
substantiated, orrejectedalto-
gether.29
Realismandliberalism,however, provideno basisforassertingindependent util-
ityfunctions
for1Os.Ontologically, thesearetheoriesaboutstates.Theyprovideno
basis forimputing
intereststo IOs beyondthegoals states(thatis, principals)give
them.Simplyadopting theratherbatteredNiskanenhypothesisseemslessthanprom-
isinggiventheglaringanomalies-forexample,theopposition ofmanyNATO and
OSCE (Organization forSecurityand Cooperation in Europe)bureaucratsto those
recentexpansionand institutionalization.
organizations' Thereare good reasonsto
assumethatorganizations care abouttheirresourcebase and turf,butthereis no
reasontopresumethatsuchmatters exhaustorevendominate theirinterests.
Indeed,
studiesofIOs describea worldinwhichorganizational
ethnographic goalsarestrongly
shapedbynormsoftheprofession thatdominatethebureaucracy andinwhichinter-
eststhemselvesare varied,oftenin flux,debated,and workedoutthrough interac-
tionsbetweenthestaffof thebureaucracy andtheworldin whichtheyare embed-
ded.30
Variousstrands ofsociologicaltheory
canhelpus investigate thegoalsandbehav-
ior of IOs by offeringa verydifferentanalyticalorientationthantheone used by
economists. BeginningwithWeber,sociologists haveexploredthenotionthatbureau-
cracyis a peculiarlymodernculturalformthatembodiescertainvaluesandcanhave
itsown distinct agendaand behavioraldispositions. Ratherthantreating organiza-
tionsas merearenasor mechanisms through whichotheractorspursueinterests,
manysociologicalapproachesexplorethesocial contentof theorganization-its
culture,its legitimacyconcerns,dominantnormsthatgovernbehaviorand shape
interests,and therelationshipof theseto a largernormative and culturalenviron-
ment.Ratherthanassumingbehaviorthatcorresponds to efficiency
criteriaalone,
theseapproachesrecognizethatorganizations also are boundup withpowerand
socialcontrolinwaysthatcan eclipseefficiency concerns.

29. See Niskanen1971; MillerandMoe 1983;WeingastandMoran1983; Moe 1984; and Sigelman

1986.
30. See Ascher1983;Zabusky1995;Barnett1997b;andWade 1996.
 PathologiesofInternational
Organizations707

The Power of IOs

IOs can becomeautonomous sitesof authority,independent fromthestate"princi-

pals"whomayhavecreatedthem, becauseofpowerflowing fromatleasttwosources:
(1) thelegitimacy of therational-legalauthority theyembody,and (2) controlover
technicalexpertise andinformation. The firstoftheseis almostentirely neglectedby
thepoliticalscienceliterature, andthesecond,we argue,has beenconceivedofvery
narrowly, leadingscholarsto overlooksome of themostbasic and consequential
formsofIO influence. Takentogether, thesetwofeatures providea theoretical
basis
fortreating IOs as autonomous actorsin contemporary worldpoliticsbyidentifying
sourcesof support forthem,independent of states,in thelargersocialenvironment.
Sincerational-legal authority andcontroloverexpertise arepartofwhatdefinesand
constitutesanybureaucracy (a bureaucracy wouldnotbe a bureaucracy withoutthem),
theautonomy thatflowsfromthemis bestunderstood as a constitutive
effect,an
effectof thewaybureaucracy is constituted,which,in turn,makespossible(and in
thatsensecauses)otherprocessesandeffects inglobalpolitics.

SourcesofIO Autonomy
andAuthority
To understand howIOs can becomeautonomous sitesofauthority we turntoWeber
and his classicstudyof bureaucratization.Weberwas deeplyambivalent aboutthe
increasinglybureaucratic worldin whichhe livedandwas well-attuned to thevices
as wellas thevirtues ofthisnewsocialformofauthority.3" Bureaucracies arerightly
considereda grandachievement, he thought. Theyprovidea framework forsocial
interactionthatcanrespondtotheincreasingly technicaldemandsofmodernlifeina
stable,predictable,and nonviolent way;theyexemplify rationalityand are techni-
callysuperior topreviousformsofrulebecausetheybringprecision, knowledge, and
continuity to increasingly complexsocial tasks.32But suchtechnicaland rational
achievements, according toWeber,comeata steepprice.Bureaucracies arepolitical
creatures thatcan be autonomous fromtheircreatorsandcan cometo dominatethe
societiestheywerecreatedtoserve,becauseofboththenormative appealofrational-
legalauthority in modernlifeandthebureaucracy's controlovertechnicalexpertise
andinformation. We considereachinturn.
Bureaucracies embodya formofauthority, rational-legal
authority,thatmodernity
viewsas particularly legitimateand good. In contrastto earlierformsof authority
thatwereinvestedin a leader,legitimate modernauthority is investedin legalities,
procedures, andrulesand thusrendered impersonal. Thisauthority is "rational"in
thatitdeployssociallyrecognized relevantknowledgetocreaterulesthatdetermine
howgoalswillbe pursued.The veryfactthattheyembodyrationality is whatmakes
bureaucracies powerful andmakespeoplewillingto submittothiskindofauthority.

31. See Weber1978,196-97;Weber1947;Mouzelis1967;andBeetham1985and 1996.

32. See Schaar1984,120;Weber1978,973; andBeetham1985,69.
708 International
Organization

According
toWeber,
in legalauthority,
submissiondoes notrestuponthebeliefanddevotionto
charismaticallygiftedpersons... oruponpietytowarda personallordand
masterwhois defined byan orderedtradition....Rathersubmission underlegal
authorityis baseduponan impersonal bondto thegenerallydefinedand
functional"dutyofoffice."The officialduty-likethecorresponding rightto
exerciseauthority:the"jurisdictional
competency"-isfixedbyrationally
established norms,byenactments, decrees,andregulations
in sucha mannerthat
thelegitimacy oftheauthoritybecomesthelegalityofthegeneralrule,whichis
purposely thought out,enacted,andannounced withformalcorrectness.33
Whenbureaucrats do something contrary to yourinterests or thatyou do notlike,
theydefendthemselves by saying'"Sorry,thoseare therules"or "just doingmy
job." "Therules"and "thejob" arethesourceofgreatpowerinmodemsociety.Itis
becausebureaucrats inIOs areperforming "dutiesofoffice"andimplementing "ra-
tionallyestablished norms"thattheyarepowerful.
A secondbasis of autonomyand authority, intimately connectedto thefirst, is
bureaucraticcontroloverinformation andexpertise. A bureaucracy's autonomy de-
rivesfromspecializedtechnicalknowledge, training,andexperience thatis notim-
mediately availableto otheractors.Whilesuchknowledgemighthelpthebureau-
cracycarryoutthedirectives of politiciansmoreefficiently, Weberstressedthatit
also givesbureaucracies poweroverpoliticians(and otheractors).It invitesand at
timesrequiresbureaucracies to shapepolicy,notjustimplement it.34
The ironyin bothof thesefeatures of authorityis thattheymakebureaucracies
powerful precisely bycreating theappearanceofdepoliticization. Thepowerof1Os,
andbureaucracies generally,is thattheypresentthemselves as impersonal, techno-
cratic,andneutral-asnotexercising powerbutinsteadas serving others;thepresen-
tationand acceptanceof theseclaimsis criticalto theirlegitimacy and authority.35
Weber,however, saw through theseclaims.According tohim,thedepoliticized char-
acterof bureaucracy thatlegitimates it could be a myth:"Behindthefunctional
purposes[ofbureaucracy], ofcourse,'ideas ofculture-values' usuallystand."36 Bu-
reaucraciesalwaysservesomesocialpurposeorsetofcultural values.Thatpurpose
maybe normatively "good,"as WeberbelievedthePrussiannationalism aroundhim
was,buttherewas no a priorireasontoassumethis.
In additionto embodying culturalvaluesfromthelargerenvironment thatmight
be desirableor not,bureaucracies also carrywiththembehavioraldispositions and
valuesflowing fromtherationality thatlegitimates themas a cultural form.Some of
these,likethecelebration ofknowledgeandexpertise, Weberadmired.Otherscon-
cernedhimgreatly, andhisdescriptions ofbureaucracy as an "ironcage" andbureau-
cratsas "specialistswithoutspirit"are hardlyan endorsement of thebureaucratic

33. GerthandMills 1978,299 (italicsinoriginal).

34. See GerthandMills 1978,233; Beetham1985,74-75; andSchaar1984,120.
35. WethankJohnBoli forthisinsight. 1997;
Also see Fisher1997;Ferguson1990;ShoreandWright
andBurleyandMattli1993.
36. GerthandMills 1978,199.
 Organizations709
PathologiesofInternational

form.37Bureaucracy can undermine personalfreedomin important ways.The very

impersonal, rule-bound character thatempowersbureaucracy also dehumanizes it.
Bureaucracies oftenexercisetheirpowerin repressive ways,in thenameofgeneral
rulesbecauserulesaretheirraisond'etre.Thistendency is exacerbated bytheway
bureaucracies selectandrewardnarrowed professionalsseekingsecurecareersinter-
nally-people who are "lackingin heroism,humanspontaneity, and inventive-
ness."738FollowingWeber,we investigate ratherthanassumethe "goodness"of
bureaucracy.
Weber'sinsights providea powerful critiqueof thewaysin whichinternational
relationsscholarshave treated1Os. The legitimacy of rational-legal authoritysug-
geststhatIOs mayhave an authority independent of thepoliciesand interests of
statesthatcreatethem,a possibility obscuredby thetechnicaland apoliticaltreat-
mentofIOs bybothrealistsandneoliberals. Norhaverealistsandneoliberals consid-
eredhowcontroloverinformation handsIOs a basisofautonomy. SusanStrange, at
theforefront amongrealistsin claimingthatinformation is power,has emphatically
statedthatIOs aresimplytheagentsofstates.Neoliberalshavetendedtotreatinfor-
mationina highlytechnocratic anddepoliticized way,failingtosee howinformation
is power.39As IOs createtransparencies and levelinformation asymmetries among
states(a commonpolicyprescription of neoliberals)theycreatenew information
asymmetries betweenIOs andstates.Giventheneoliberalassumption thatIOs have
no goals independent of states,suchasymmetries are unimportant; butif IOs have
autonomous valuesand behavioralpredispositions, thensuchasymmetries maybe
highlyconsequential.
Examplesof thewaysin whichIOs have becomeautonomous becauseof their
embodiment oftechnical rationalityandcontrol overinformation arenothardtofind.
The UN's peacekeepersderivepartof theirauthority fromtheclaimthattheyare
independent, objective,neutralactorswhosimplyimplement Security Councilreso-
lutions.UN officialsroutinelyusethislanguagetodescribetheirroleandareexplicit
thattheyunderstand thisto be thebasis of theirinfluence. As a consequence,UN
officials
spendconsiderable timeandenergyattempting to maintain theimagethat
theyarenottheinstrument ofanygreatpowerandmustbe seenas representatives of
"theinternationalcommunity" as embodiedintherulesandresolutions oftheUN.40
The WorldBank is widelyrecognizedto have exercisedpoweroverdevelopment
policiesfargreater thanitsbudget,as a percentage ofNorth/South aid flows,would
suggestbecauseof theexpertiseit houses.Whilecompetingsitesof expertisein
development have proliferated in recentyears,fordecades afterits founding the
WorldBank was a magnetforthe "bestand brightest" among"development ex-
Itsstaff
perts.?" hadandcontinues tohaveimpressive credentials fromthemostpres-

37. See Weber[1930] 1978,181-83;andClegg 1994a,152-55.

38. GerthandMills 1978,216,50, 299. Fortheextreme ofthisbureaucratic
manifestation character-
istic,seeArendt1977.
39. See Strange1997;andKeohane1984.
thatSaw No Evil,"TheNewRepublic,12February
40. See David Rieff,"The Institution 1996,19-24;
andBarnett 1997b.
710 International
Organization

tigiousuniversitiesand theelaboratemodels,reports, and researchgroupsit has

sponsoredovertheyearswerewidelyinfluential amongthe"development experts"
inthefield.Thisexpertise,coupledwithitsclaimto "neutrality" andits"apolitical"
technocraticdecision-makingstyle,havegiventheWorldBankan authoritative voice
withwhichit has successfully dictatedthecontent, direction,and scope of global
development overthepastfiftyyears.41 officialstanding
Similarly, and longexperi-
encewithreliefeffortshaveendowedtheUNHCR with"expert"statusandconse-
quentauthorityinrefugee matters.
Thisexpertise,coupledwithitsroleinimplement-
inginternationalrefugeeconventions andlaw ("the rules"regarding refugees),has
allowedtheUNHCR tomakelifeanddeathdecisionsaboutrefugees without consult-
ingtherefugees, themselves, and to compromise theauthority of statesin various
waysin settingup refugeecamps.42Note that,as theseexamplesshow,technical
knowledgeandexpertise neednotbe "scientific"in natureto createautonomy and
powerfor1Os.

ThePowerofIOs
IfIOs haveautonomy intheworld,whatdo theydo withit?A growing
andauthority
bodyof researchin sociologyand anthropology has examinedwaysin whichIOs
exercisepowerbyvirtueoftheirculturallyconstructedstatusas sitesofauthority;
we
distillfromthisresearchthreebroadtypesof IO power.We examinehow IOs (1)
classifytheworld,creatingcategoriesof actorsand action;(2) fixmeaningsin the
anddiffuse
socialworld;and(3) articulate newnorms, principles,andactorsaround
theglobe.All of thesesourcesof powerflowfromtheabilityof IOs to structure
knowledge.43

Classification. An elementary featureof bureaucraciesis thattheyclassifyand

organizeinformation and knowledge.This classification
processis boundup with
power."Bureaucracies,"writesDon Handelman,"are waysof making,ordering,
andknowingsocialworlds."Theydo thisby "movingpersonsamongsocialcatego-
riesorbyinventing andapplyingsuchcategories."44The abilityto classifyobjects,
andidentity,
to shifttheirverydefinition is one ofbureaucracy'sgreatest sourcesof
power.Thispoweris frequently bytheobjectsofthatpoweras accomplished
treated
through capriceand withoutregardto theircircumstances but is legitimatedand
withreference
justifiedby bureaucrats to therulesand regulations of thebureau-
cracy.Consequencesofthisbureaucratic exerciseofpowermaybe identity defining,
orevenlifethreatening.
Considertheevolvingdefinitionof "refugee."Thecategory "refugee"is notatall
straightforwardandmustbe distinguished fromothercategoriesofindividuals who

41. See Wade 1996;Ayres1983;Ascher1983;Finnemore 1996b;andNelson1995.

42. See Malkki1996;Hartigan1992;andHarrell-Bond 1989.
43. See Foucault1977,27; and Clegg 1994b,156-59. International disre-
relationstheorytypically
gardsthenegativesideoftheknowledgeandpowerequation.Foran example,see Haas 1992.
44. Handelman1995,280. See also Starr1992;andWright 1994,22.
 PathologiesofInternational
Organizations711

are "temporarily" and "involuntarily" livingoutsidetheircountryof origin-

displacedpersons,exiles,economicmigrants, guestworkers,diasporacommunities,
and thoseseekingpoliticalasylum.The debateoverthemeaningof "refugee"has
beenwagedin andaroundtheUNHCR. The UNHCR's legalandoperational defini-
tionofthecategory strongly influencesdecisionsaboutwhois a refugeeandshapes
UNHCR staff decisionsin thefield-decisionsthathavea tremendous effecton the
lifecircumstance of thousandsof people.45These categoriesare notonlypolitical
andlegalbutalso discursive, shapinga viewamongUNHCR officials thatrefugees
must,bydefinition, be powerless,andthatas powerlessactorstheydo nothavetobe
consultedindecisionssuchas asylumandrepatriation thatwilldirectlyanddramati-
callyaffectthem.46GuyGransimilarly describeshowtheWorldBanksetsupcriteria
to definesomeoneas a peasantin orderto distinguish themfroma farmer, day
laborer,andothercategories. The classification
matters
becauseonlycertainclasses
of people are recognizedby theWorldBank's development machinery as having
knowledgethatis relevantin solvingdevelopment problems.47Categorizationand
area ubiquitous
classification featureofbureaucratization
thathaspotentially
impor-
tantimplications forthosebeingclassified.To classifyis to engagein an act of
power.

The fixingofmeanings. IOs exercisepowerbyvirtueoftheirabilityto fixmean-

ings,whichis relatedtoclassification.48
Namingorlabelingthesocialcontext estab-
lishestheparameters, theveryboundaries, of acceptableaction.Because actorsare
orientedtowardobjectsandobjectiveson thebasisofthemeaningthattheyhavefor
them,beingable to investsituationswitha particular
meaningconstitutes an impor-
tantsourceof power.49 IOs do notact alonein thisregard,buttheirorganizational
resourcescontributemightilytothisend.
Thereis strongevidenceofthispowerfromdevelopment studies.Arturo Escobar
exploreshow theinstitutionalizationof theconceptof "development" afterWorld
WarII spawneda hugeinternational apparatusandhowthisapparatus hasnowspread
itstentaclesin domesticandinternationalpoliticsthroughthediscourseofdevelop-
ment.The discourseof development, createdand arbitrated in largepartby 1Os,
determines notonlywhatconstitutes theactivity(whatdevelopment is) butalso who
(orwhat)is considered powerful andprivileged,thatis, whogetsto do thedevelop-
ing(usuallythestateor1Os) andwhois theobjectofdevelopment (local groups).50
theendoftheColdWarencouraged
Similarly, a reexamination ofthedefinition of
IOs havebeenattheforefront
security.51 ofthisdebate,arguing thatsecurity pertains
notonlyto statesbutalso to individualsand thatthethreatsto securitymay be

45. See WeissandPasic 1997;Goodwin-Gill1996;andAnonymous 1997.

46. See Harrell-Bond1989;Walkup1997;andMalkki1996.
47. Gran1986.
48. See Williams1996;Clegg 1994b;Bourdieu1994;Carr[1939] 1964;andKeeley1990.
49. Blumer1969.
50. See Gupta1998;Escobar1995;CooperandPackard1998;Gran1986;Ferguson
1990;andWade1996.
51. See Matthews1989;andKrauseandWilliams1996.
712 International
Organization

economic,environmental, and politicalas well as military.52 In forwarding these

alternativedefinitions ofsecurity,
officials fromvariousIOs areempowering a differ-
entsetof actorsand legitimating an alternativesetof practices.Specifically, when
securitymeantsafetyfrominvadingnationalarmies,itprivileged stateofficialsand
investedpowerin military establishments. These alternativedefinitions of security
shiftattentionawayfromstatesandtowardtheindividuals whoarefrequently threat-
enedby theirowngovernment, awayfrommilitary practicesand towardotherfea-
turesof social lifethatmightrepresent a moreimmediate and dailydangerto the
livesofindividuals.
One consequenceoftheseredefined meaningsofdevelopment andsecurity is that
theylegitimate, andevenrequire, increasedlevelsofIO intervention inthedomestic
affairsof states-particularly ThirdWorldstates.Thisis fairlyobviousin therealm
ofdevelopment. TheWorldBank,theInternational Monetary Fund(IMF), andother
development institutions have establisheda web of interventions thataffectnearly
everyphaseoftheeconomyandpolityin manyThirdWorldstates.As "ruraldevel-
opment,""basic humanneeds,"and "structural adjustment" becameincorporated
intothemeaningof development, IOs werepermitted, even required,to become
intimately involvedin thedomesticworkings of developingpolitiesby postingin-
house"advisors"to runmonetary policy,reorganizing thepoliticaleconomyofen-
tireruralregions,regulating familyand reproductive practices,and mediating be-
tweengovernments andtheircitizensin a variety ofways.53
The consequencesofredefining security maybe similar.Democratization, human
rights,and theenvironment have all now becometiedto international peace and
security,andIOs justifytheirinterventions in memberstateson thesegrounds, par-
indeveloping
ticularly states.Forexample,during theanti-apartheid inSouth
struggle
Africa,humanrightsabuses came to be classifiedas securitythreatsby theUN
SecurityCouncilandprovidedgroundsforUN involvement there.Now,thatlinkage
betweenhumanrightsand security has becomea stapleofthepost-ColdWarenvi-
ronment. Widespread humanrights abusesanywhere arenowcauseforUN interven-
tion,and,conversely, theUN cannotcarryoutpeacekeeping missionswithout pro-
motinghumanrights.54 Similarly,environmental disastersinEasternEuropeandthe
newlyindependent statesoftheformer SovietUnionandwaterrightsallocationsin
theMiddleEast havealso cometobe discussedundertherubricof "environmental
security" andarethusgrounds forIO intervention. TheUnitedNationsDevelopment
Programarguesthatthereis an important linkbetweenhumansecurity and sustain-
able development andimplicitly arguesforgreater intervention in themanagement
ofenvironment as a meanstopromote humansecurity.55

Diffusionof norms. Havingestablishedrulesandnorms,IOs areeagerto spread

thebenefits
oftheirexpertise beltsforthetransmission
andoftenactas conveyor of

52. See UN Development Program1994;andBoutros-Ghali1995.

53. See Escobar1995;Ferguson1990;andFeldstein1998.
54. WorldConference on HumanRights1993.
55. UN Development Program1994.
 PathologiesofInternational
Organizations713

normsand modelsof "good" politicalbehavior.56 Thereis nothingaccidentalor

unintended aboutthisrole.Officials in IOs ofteninsistthatpartoftheirmissionis to
spread,inculcate, andenforceglobalvaluesandnorms.Theyarethe"missionaries"
ofourtime.Armedwitha notionofprogress, an idea ofhowtocreatethebetter life,
and some understanding of theconversionprocess,manyIO eliteshave as their
statedpurposea desireto shape statepracticesby establishing, articulating,and
transmitting normsthatdefinewhatconstitutes acceptableandlegitimate statebehav-
ior.To be sure,theirsuccessdependson morethantheirpersuasivecapacities,for
theirrhetoric mustbe supported bypower,sometimes (butnotalways)statepower.
Buttooverlookhowstatepowerandorganizational missionaries workintandemand
theways in whichIO officialschanneland shape states'exerciseof poweris to
disregard a fundamental feature ofvaluediffusion.57
Considerdecolonization as an example.The UN Charter announcedan intentto
universalize sovereigntyas a constitutive principleof thesocietyof statesat a time
whenoverhalftheglobewas undersomekindofcolonialrule;italso established an
institutionalapparatustoachievethatend(mostprominently theTrusteeshipCouncil
and the Special Committeeon Colonialism).These actionshad severalconse-
quences.One was to eliminatecertaincategoriesof acceptableactionforpowerful
states.Those statesthatattempted to retaintheircolonialprivilegeswereincreas-
inglyviewedas illegitimate by otherstates.Anotherconsequencewas to empower
international bureaucrats(at theTrusteeship Council)to setnormsandstandards for
"stateness."Finally,theUN helpedto ensurethatthroughout decolonization the
sovereignty of thesenew stateswas coupledwithterritorial Colonial
inviolability.
boundaries oftendividedethnicandtribalgroups,andtheUN was quiteconcerned
thatin theprocessof "self-determination," thesegovernments containing"mul-
tiple"or "partial"selvesmightattempt tocreatea wholepersonality through territo-
rialadjustment-afearsharedbymanyof thesenewlydecolonizedstates.The UN
encouraged theacceptanceofthenormofsovereignty-as-territorial-integrity through
resolutions, monitoring devices,commissions, and one famouspeacekeepingepi-
sodeinCongoin the1960s.58
Notethat,as withotherJOpowers,normdiffusion, too,has an expansionary dy-
namic.Developingstatescontinueto be populartargets fornormdiffusion by 1Os,
evenaftertheyareindependent. The UN andtheEuropeanUnionarenow actively
involvedinpolicetraining innon-Western statesbecausetheybelieveWestern polic-
ingpracticeswillbe moreconducivetodemocratization processesandtheestablish-
mentof civil society.But havinga professional police establishmentassumesthat
thereis a professionaljudiciaryandpenalsystemwherecriminals can be triedand
jailed; and a professionaljudiciary, in turn,presupposes thatthereare lawyersthat
can comebeforethecourt.Trainedlawyerspresupposea code oflaw.The resultis a
packageofreforms sponsoredby IOs aimedat transforming non-Western societies

1996;Finnemore
56. See Katzenstein 1996b;andLegro1997.
57. See Alger1963,425; andClaude 1966,373.
58. See McNeely1995;andJackson1993.
714 International
Organization

intoWestern societies.59
Again,whileWestern statesareinvolvedin theseactivities
andtherefore theirvaluesandinterests arepartofthereasonsforthisprocess,inter-
nationalbureaucrats involvedin theseactivitiesmaynotsee themselves as doingthe
biddingforthesestatesbutrather as expressingtheinterests andvaluesofthebureau-
cracy.
Otherexamplesof thiskindof normdiffusion arenothardto find.The IMF and
theWorldBankareexplicitabouttheirroleas transmitters ofnormsandprinciples
fromadvancedmarket economiestoless-developed economies.60 TheIMF's Articles
ofAgreement assignitthistaskofincorporating
specifically less-developed econo-
miesintotheworldeconomy, whichturnsoutto meanteachingthemhow to "be"
marketeconomies.The WorldBank,similarly, has a majorrole in arbitrating the
meaningofdevelopment andnorm's ofbehaviorappropriate tothetaskofdeveloping
oneself,as was discussedearlier.The end of theCold Warhas openedup a whole
new set of statesto thiskindof normdiffusion taskfor1Os.Accordingto former
Secretary of DefenseWilliamPerry, one of thefunctions ofNATO expansionis to
inculcate"modern"valuesandnormsintotheEasternEuropeancountries andtheir
militaries.61TheEuropeanBankforReconstruction andDevelopment has,as partof
its mandate,thejob of spreadingdemocracyand privateenterprise. The OSCE is
striving to createa community based on sharedvalues,amongtheserespectfor
democracy andhumanrights. Thislinkageis also strong attheUN as evidentin The
AgendaforDemocratization andTheAgendaforPeace.62Oncedemocratization and
humanrightsare tiedto international peace and security, thedistinctionsbetween
international and domesticgovernance becomeeffectively erasedand IOs have li-
censetointervene almostanywhere in an authoritative
andlegitimate manner.63
Realistsandneoliberals maywelllookat theseeffects andarguethattheclassifi-
catoryschemes,meanings,and normsassociatedwithIOs are mostlyfavoredby
strongstates.Consequently, theywouldargue,thepowerwe attribute to IOs is sim-
plyepiphenomenal ofstatepower.Thisargument is certainlyonetheoreticalpossibil-
ity,butit is nottheonlyone and mustbe testedagainstothers.Ourconcernis that
becausethesetheoriesprovideno ontologicalindependence for1Os,theyhave no
waytotestforautonomy norhavetheyanytheoretical causeorinclination totestfor
it since,by theoreticalaxiom,autonomy cannotexist.The one empiricaldomainin
whichthestatistview has been explicitlychallengedis theEuropeanUnion,and
empiricalstudiestherehavehardlyproducedobviousvictory forthe"intergovern-
mentalist" approach.64Recentempiricalstudiesin theareasofhumanrights, weap-
ons taboos,and environmental practicesalso castdoubton thestatistapproachby
providing evidenceaboutthewaysin whichnongovernmental andintergovernmen-

59. Call andBamettforthcoming.

60. Wade 1996.
61. See Perry1996;andRuggie1996.
62. Boutros-Ghali1995and 1996a,b.
63. Keen andHendrie,however,suggestthatnongovernmental andIOs can be thelong-
organizations
termbeneficiaries See Keen 1994;andHendrie1997.
ofintervention.
64. See BurleyandMattli1993;Pollack1997;andSandholtz1993.
 Organizations715
PathologiesofInternational

tal organizations
successfullypromotepoliciesthatare not(or notinitially)sup-
portedbystrong states.65
Certainly thereareoccasionswhenstrong statesdo driveIO
behavior,buttherearealso timeswhenotherforcesareatworkthateclipseorsignifi-
cantlydampentheeffects ofstateson 1Os.Whichcausalmechanisms producewhich
effectsunderwhichconditions thatcanbe understood
is a setofrelationships onlyby
intensiveempiricalstudyof how theseorganizations actuallydo theirbusiness-
researchthatwouldtracetheoriginsand evolutionof IO policies,theprocessesby
whichtheyareimplemented, discrepancies betweenimplementation andpolicy,and
overalleffects
ofthesepolicies.

The PathologiesofIOs

Bureaucracies arecreated, propagated, andvaluedinmodemsocietybecauseoftheir

supposedrationality andeffectiveness in carrying outsocialtasks.Thesesamecon-
siderationspresumably also applyto 1Os.Ironically, though, thefolkwisdomabout
bureaucracies is thattheyare inefficient and unresponsive. Bureaucracies are infa-
mousforcreatingand implementing policiesthatdefyrationallogic,foractingin
ways thatare at odds withtheirstatedmission,and forrefusing requestsof and
turning theirbackson thoseto whomtheyare officially responsible.66Scholarsof
U.S. bureaucracy haverecognizedthisproblemandhave devotedconsiderable en-
to
ergy understanding a wide range of undesirable and inefficient
bureaucraticbehav-
iorscausedbybureaucratic captureandslackandto exploring theconditions under
which"suboptimal equilibria"mayariseinorganizational structures.
Similarly,schol-
arsresearching foreign policydecisionmakingand,morerecently, thoseinterested
in learningin foreign policy have investigated organizationaldynamics thatproduce
self-defeating and behavior
inefficient in thosecontexts.67
1Os,too,arepronetodysfunctional behaviors, butinternationalrelationsscholars
have rarelyinvestigated in we
this, part, suspect, because thetheoretical apparatus
theyuse providesfewgroundsforexpectingundesirable JObehavior.68 The state-
centricutility-maximizing frameworks mostinternational scholarshavebor-
relations
rowedfromeconomicssimplyassumethatIOs are reasonablyresponsiveto state
interests(or,atleast,moreresponsive thanalternatives),otherwisestateswouldwith-
drawfromthem.Thisassumption, however, is a necessarytheoreticalaxiomofthese
frameworks; it is rarelytreatedas a hypothesis subjectto empiricalinvestigation.69
Withlittletheoretical reasonto expectsuboptimal behaviorin 1Os,
or self-defeating
thesescholarsdo notlook forit and have had littleto say aboutit. Policymakers,
however, havebeenquickerto perceiveandaddresstheseproblemsandareputting

65. See KeckandSikkink1998;Wapner1996;Price1997;andThomasforthcoming.

66. MarchandOlsen 1989,chap.5.
67. See Nye 1987;Haas 1990;Haas andHaas 1995;andSagan 1993.
68. Twoexceptions areGallaroti1991;andSnidal1996.
69. Snidal1996.
 Organization
716 International

Internal External

Bureaucratic Realism/
Material politics neoliberal
institutionalism

Cultural Bureaucratic Worldpolity

culture model

FIGURE 1. organization
Theoriesofinternational dysfunction

themon thepoliticalagenda.It is timeforscholars,too,to beginto explorethese

issuesmorefully.
In thissectionwe presentseveralbodiesoftheorizing thatmightexplaindysfunc-
tionalIO behavior,whichwe defineas behaviorthatundermines theJO's stated
objectives.Thusourvantagepointforjudgingdysfunction (and laterpathology)is
thepubliclyproclaimed missionof theorganization. Theremaybe occasionswhen
overallorganizational dysfunction is, in fact,functional
forcertainmembers oroth-
ersinvolvedin the1O's work,butgivenouranalysisofthewayclaimsofefficiency
and effectiveness act to legitimaterational-legal authorityin our culture,whether
organizationsactuallydo whattheyclaimandaccomplishtheirmissionsis a particu-
larlyimportant issue to examine.Severalbodiesof theoryprovidesomebasis for
understanding dysfunctional behaviorby1Os,each ofwhichemphasizesa different
locusofcausalityforsuchbehavior. Analyzing thesecauses,we construct a typology
oftheseexplanations thatlocatesthemin relationto one another. Then,drawingon
theworkofJamesMarchandJohanOlsen,Paul DiMaggioandWalterPowell,and
othersociologicalinstitutionalists,we elaboratehow thesame sourcesof bureau-
craticpower,sketched earlier,cancausedysfunctional behavior.Wetermthisparticu-
lar typeof dysfunction pathology.70 We identify fivefeaturesof bureaucracy that
mightproducepathology, andusingexamplesfromtheUN systemwe illustrate the
waythesemightworkin 1Os.
Extanttheories aboutdysfunction canbe categorized intwodimensions: (1) whether
theylocatethecause of JOdysfunction insideor outsidetheorganization, and (2)
whether theytracethecauses to materialor culturalforces.Mappingtheorieson
thesedimensions createsthetypology showninFigure1.
Withineach cell we have identified a representativebodyof theoryfamiliarto
mostinternational relations scholars.Explanations ofJOdysfunction thatemphasize
thepursuit ofmaterialinterests withinan organization typicallyexaminehowcom-
petitionamongsubunits overmaterial resourcesleadstheorganization tomakedeci-

ina waysimilartoourusage.We thankHaywardAlker

70. KarlDeutschusedtheconceptofpathology
forthispoint.Deutsch1963,170.
 Organizations717
PathologiesofInternational

sionsand engagein behaviorsthatare inefficient or undesirable as judgedagainst

someidealpolicythatwouldbetterallowthe10 to achieveitsstatedgoals.Bureau-
craticpoliticsis thebest-known theory here,andthoughcurrent scholarsofinterna-
tionalpoliticshavenotwidelyadoptedthisperspective to explain10 behavior, itis
relativelywelldevelopedin theolderIO literature.71 GrahamAllison'scentralargu-
mentis thatthe"nameofthegameis politics:bargaining alongregularized circuits
amongplayerspositioned hierarchically withinthegovernment. Government behav-
iorcan thusbe understood as .. . resultsofthesebargaining games."72In thisview,
decisionsarenotmadeaftera rational decisionprocessbutrather through a competi-
tivebargaining processoverturf,budgets,and staffthatmaybenefitpartsof the
organization attheexpenseofoverallgoals.
Another bodyofliterature traces10 dysfunctional behaviorto thematerial forces
locatedoutsidetheorganization. Realistandneoliberal theories might positthatstate
preferences andconstraints areresponsible forunderstanding 10 dysfunctional behav-
ior.In thisviewIOs arenottoblameforbadoutcomes, statesare.IOs do nothavethe
luxuryof choosingtheoptimalpolicybutrather are frequently forcedto chosebe-
tweenthebad andtheawfulbecausemoredesirablepoliciesaredeniedto themby
stateswhodo notagreeamongthemselves and/ordo notwishto see the10 fulfill its
mandatein someparticular instance. As RobertKeohaneobserved, IOs oftenengage
inpoliciesnotbecausetheyarestrong andhaveautonomy butbecausetheyareweak
andhavenone.73 The important pointofthesetheories is thattheytrace10 dysfunc-
tionalbehaviorbackto theenvironmental conditions established by,or theexplicit
preferences of,states.
Culturaltheoriesalso have internaland externalvariants.We shouldnotethat
manyadvocatesof culturaltheorieswouldrejecttheclaimthatan organization can
be understood apartfromitsenvironment orthatcultureis separablefromthemate-
rialworld.Insteadtheywouldstresshowtheorganization is permeated bythatenvi-
ronment, defined inbothmaterial andculturalterms, in whichitis embedded.Many
are also quitesensitiveto thewaysin whichresourceconstraints and thematerial
powerof important actorswill shapeorganizational culture.Thatsaid,theseargu-
mentsclearlydiffer fromtheprevioustwotypesin theiremphasison ideationaland
culturalfactors andclearlydiffer amongthemselves inthemotors ofbehaviorempha-
sized.Foranalytical claritywe dividecultural theories according towhether theysee
theprimary causesofthe10's dysfunctional behavioras deriving fromtheculture of
theorganization (internal)oroftheenvironment (external).
Theworldpolitymodelexemplifies theoriesthatlooktoexternal culture tounder-
standan 10's dysfunctional behavior. Therearetworeasonsto expectdysfunctional
behaviorhere.First,because10 practicesreflect a searchforsymboliclegitimacy
rather thanefficiency, 10 behaviormightbe onlyremotely connected to theefficient
implementation ofitsgoalsandmorecloselycoupledtolegitimacy criteria thatcome

71. See Allison1971;Haas 1990;Cox etal. 1974;andCox andJacobson1977.

72. See Allison1971,144; andBendorandHammond1992.
73. Personalcommunication totheauthors.
718 International
Organization

fromtheculturalenvironment.74 For instance,manyarms-export controlregimes

nowhavea multilateral character notbecauseofanyevidencethatthisarchitecture is
themostefficient waytomonitor andprevent armsexportsbutrather becausemulti-
lateralism hasattained a degreeoflegitimacy thatis notempirically connected toany
efficiency criteria.75
Second,theworldpolityis fullofcontradictions; forinstance, a
liberalworldpolityhas severaldefining principles,including market economicsand
humanequality, thatmightconflict atanyonemoment. Thus,environments areoften
ambiguousaboutmissionsand containvaried,oftenconflicting, functional, norma-
tive,andlegitimacy imperatives.76 Becausetheyareembeddedin thatcultural envi-
ronment, IOs canmirror andreproduce thosecontradictions, which,inturn, canlead
tocontradictory andultimately dysfunctional behavior.
Finally,organizations frequently developdistinctive internalcultures thatcanpro-
motedysfunctional behavior, behaviorthatwe call "pathological."The basic logic
of thisargument flowsdirectly fromourpreviousobservations aboutthenatureof
bureaucracy as a socialform.Bureaucracies areestablished as rationalized meansto
accomplish collectivegoalsandtospreadparticular values.To do this,bureaucracies
createsocialknowledgeanddevelopexpertise as theyactupontheworld(and thus
exercisepower).Butthewaybureaucracies areconstituted to accomplishtheseends
can,ironically, createa culturaldisposition towardundesirable andultimately self-
defeating behavior.77 Two features ofthemodernbureaucratic formareparticularly
important in thisregard.The first is thesimplefactthatbureaucracies areorganized
aroundrules,routines, andstandard operating procedures designedtotrigger a stan-
dardandpredictable responsetoenvironmental stimuli.Theserulescanbe formalor
informal, butineithercase theytellactorswhichactionis appropriate inresponseto
a specificstimuli,request, ordemand.Thiskindofroutinization is,afterall,precisely
whatbureaucracies are supposedto exhibit-itis whatmakesthemeffective and
competent in performing complexsocialtasks.However,thepresenceof suchrules
also compromises theextentto whichmeans-ends rationalitydrivesorganizational
behavior. Rulesandroutines maycometoobscureoverallmissionsandlargersocial
goals. Theymaycreate"ritualizedbehavior"in bureaucrats and construct a very
parochialnormative environment withintheorganization whoseconnection to the
largersocialenvironment is tenuousatbest.78
Second,bureaucracies specializeandcompartmentalize. Theycreatea divisionof
laboron thelogicthatbecauseindividuals haveonlyso muchtime,knowledge, and
expertise, specialization will allow theorganization to emulatea rationaldecision-
makingprocess.79 Again,thisis oneofthevirtues ofbureaucracy inthatitprovidesa
wayofovercoming thelimitations ofindividual rationalityandknowledge byembed-
dingthoseindividuals in a structure thattakesadvantageoftheircompetencies with-

74. 1996a.
See MeyerandRowan1977;MeyerandZucker1989;Weber1994;andFinnemore
75. Lipson1999.
76. McNeely1995.
77. See Vaughan1996;andLipartito1995.
78. See MarchandOlsen 1989,21-27; andMeyerandRowan1977.
79. See MarchandOlsen 1989,26-27; andMarch1997.
 Organizations719
PathologiesofInternational

outhavingto relyon theirweaknesses.However,it,too,has somenegativeconse-

quences.Justas rulescaneclipsegoals,concentrated expertiseandspecialization can
(and perhapsmust)limitbureaucrats' fieldof visionand createsubcultures within
bureaucracy thataredistinctfromthoseofthelargerenvironment. Professional train-
ingplaysa particularly strongroleheresincethisis onewidespread waywe dissemi-
natespecializedknowledgeandcredential "experts."Such training oftengivesex-
perts,indeedis designedto give them,a distinctive worldviewand normative
commitments, which,whenconcentrated in a subunitof an organization,can have
pronounced effectson behavior.80
Once in place,an organization's culture, understood as therules,rituals,andbe-
liefsthatare embeddedin theorganization (and itssubunits),has important conse-
quencesfortheway individualswho inhabitthatorganization makesense of the
world.It providesinterpretive framesthatindividualsuse to generatemeaning.81
Thisis morethanjustboundedrationality; in thisview,actors'rationality
itself,the
verymeansand ends thattheyvalue,are shapedby theorganizational culture.82
Divisionsand subunitswithintheorganization may developtheirown cognitive
frameworks thatare consistentwithbutstilldistinct fromthelargerorganization,
further complicating thisprocess.
All organizations have theirown culture(or cultures)thatshapetheirbehavior.
The effects ofbureaucratic culture,however, neednotbe dysfunctional. Indeed,spe-
cificorganizational culturesmaybe valuedand activelypromotedas a sourceof
"good" behavior,as students of businesscultureknowverywell. Organizational
culture is tiedto "good" and "bad" behavior, alike,andtheeffects oforganizational
cultureon behaviorarean empirical questiontobe researched.
To further suchresearch, we drawfromstudiesin sociologyandanthropology to
explorefivemechanisms bywhichbureaucratic culture
canbreedpathologies in1Os:
theirrationality ofrationalization,
universalism, normalizationofdeviance,organiza-
tionalinsulation, and culturalcontestation. The firstthreeof thesemechanisms all
flowfromdefining featuresofbureaucracy itself.Consequently,we expectthemto
be presentin anybureaucracy to a limiteddegree.Theirseverity maybe increased,
however, by specificempiricalconditions oftheorganization. Vaguemission,weak
feedbackfromtheenvironment, andstrong professionalismall havethepotential to
exacerbate thesemechanisms and to createtwo others,
organizationalinsulation and
culturalcontestation, through processeswe describelater.Our claim,therefore, is
thattheverynatureofbureaucracy-the"social stuff" ofwhichitis made-creates
behavioralpredispositions thatmakebureaucracy proneto thesekindsof behav-
iors.83But theconnection betweenthesemechanisms and pathological behavioris
probabilistic, not deterministic,and is consistentwithour constitutive analysis.
Whether, in fact,mission-defeating behavioroccursdependson empiricalcondi-

80. See DiMaggioandPowell1983;andSchien1996.

81. See Starr1992,160;Douglas 1986;andBergerandLuckman1966,chap.1.
82. See Campbell1998,378; Alvesson1996;BurrellandMorgan1979;Dobbin 1994; andImmergut
1998,14-19.
83. Wendt1998.
720 International
Organization

tions.We identify important

threesuch conditionsthatare particularly (mission,
feedback,andprofessionals)anddiscusshowtheyintensifytheseinherent
predispo-
sitionsandactivateorcreateadditional
ones.

Irrationality ofrationalization. Weberrecognized thatthe"rationalization" pro-

cesses at whichbureaucracies excelledcould be takento extremesand ultimately
becomeirrational iftherulesandprocedures thatenabledbureaucracies to do their
jobs becameends in themselves. Ratherthandesigningthemostappropriate and
efficientrulesandprocedures toaccomplish theirmissions, bureaucraciesoftentailor
theirmissionsto fittheexisting,well-known, and comfortable rulebook.84 Thus,
means(rulesand procedures)maybecomeso embeddedand powerfulthatthey
determine endsandthewaytheorganization definesitsgoals.One observerof the
WorldBanknotedhow,at an operational level,thebankdidnotdecideon develop-
mentgoals and collectdata necessaryto pursuethem.Rather,it continuedto use
existing data-collection
procedures andformulated goalsanddevelopment plansfrom
thosedata alone.85UN-mandated electionsmaybe anotherinstancewheremeans
becomeendsin themselves. The "end" pursuedin themanytroubledstateswhere
theUN has been involvedin reconstruction is presumably somekindof peaceful,
stable,justgovernment. Towardthatend,theUN hasdevelopeda repertoire ofinstru-
mentsandresponsesthatarelargelyintended topromote something akinto a demo-
craticgovernment. Amongthosevariousrepertoires, electionshave becomeprivi-
legedas a measureof "success"anda signalofan operation's successfulconclusion.
Consequently, UN (andother10) officials haveconducted electionsevenwhenevi-
dencesuggeststhatsuchelectionsareeitherpremature orperhapsevencounterpro-
ductive(frequently acknowledged as muchbystateandUN officials).86 In placeslike
Bosniaelectionshaveratified preciselytheoutcometheUN andoutsidepowershad
intervened toprevent-ethnic cleansing-andinplaceslikeAfricaelectionsarecriti-
cizedas exacerbating theveryethnictensions theywereostensibly designedtoquell.
UN peacekeeping mightalso provideexamples.As theUN begantoinvolveitself
in various"second-generation operations" thatentailedthemanagement andrecon-
ciliationofdomesticconflicts itturned totheonlyinstrument thatwas readilyavail-
ablein sufficient
numbers-peacekeeping units.Peacekeepers, however, aremilitary
troops, trained conflict
tohandleinterstate andtobe interposed betweentwocontend-
ingnationalarmies,operating withtheirconsent.SomeUN staff, stateofficials,
and
peacekeeping scholarsworriedthatpeacekeepers mightbe inappropriate forthede-
mandsofhandlingdomesticsecurity. Theyfearedthatpeacekeepers wouldtransfer
thathadbeenhonedforone environment
theskillsand attitudes to another without
fullyconsideringtheadjustments required.According tosomeobservers, peacekeep-
ersdidjustthat:theycarriedtheirinterstateconflictequipment andmindset intonew
situationsand so createda moreaggressiveand offensively mindedposturethan

84. Beetham1985,76.
85. See Ferguson1990;andNelson1995.
86. Paris1997.
 PathologiesofInternational
Organizations721

wouldotherwise havebeenthecase. The resultwas operations

thatundermined
the
objectivesofthemandate.87

Bureaucraticuniversalism. A secondsourceofpathology inIOs derivesfromthe

factthatbureaucracies "orchestratenumerous local contexts
atonce."88Bureaucrats
necessarily flattendiversitybecausetheyare supposedto generateuniversalrules
and categoriesthatare,by design,inattentive to contextualandparticularisticcon-
cerns.Partofthejustification forthis,ofcourse,is thebureaucratic viewthattechni-
cal knowledge is transferable
acrosscircumstances. Sometimes thisis a goodassump-
tion,but not always; whenparticularcircumstances are not appropriate to the
generalized knowledge beingapplied,theresultscanbe disastrous.89
ManycriticsoftheIMF's ha'ndling oftheAsianfinancial criseshavearguedthat
theIMF inappropriately applieda standardized formulaof budgetcutsplus high
interestratesto combatrapidcurrency depreciation withoutappreciating theunique
andlocal causesofthisdepreciation. Thesegovernments werenotprofligate spend-
ers,and austerity policiesdid littleto reassureinvestors, yettheIMF prescribed
roughly thesameremedythatithadinLatinAmerica.The result, bytheIMF's later
admission, was tomakematters worse.90
Similarly, manyof thosewho workedin peacekeepingoperations in Cambodia
weretransferred topeacekeeping operations inBosniaorSomaliaon theassumption
thattheknowledgegainedin one locationwouldbe applicableto others.Although
sometechnicalskillscanbe transferred acrosscontexts, notall knowledgeandorga-
nizationallessonsderivedfromonecontext areappropriate elsewhere. The UN has a
longstanding commitment to neutrality,whichoperationally translates intotheview
thattheUN shouldavoid theuse of forceand theappearanceof partiality. This
knowledgewas employedwithsomesuccessbyUN envoyYasushiAkashiin Cam-
bodia. Afterhis stintin Cambodia,he becametheUN Special Representative in
Yugoslavia.As manycriticsof Akashihave argued,however,his commitment to
theserules,combinedwithhis failureto recognizethatBosnia was substantially
differentfromCambodia,led himtofailtouse forcetodefendthesafehavenswhen
itwas appropriate andlikelytobe effective.91

Normalizationof deviance. We derivea thirdtypeof pathologyfromDiane

Vaughan'sstudyofthespaceshuttle Challengerdisasterin whichshechronicles the
wayexceptionstorules(deviance)overtimebecomeroutinized andnormalpartsof
Bureaucracies
procedures.92 establishrulestoprovidea predictable
responsetoenvi-
ronmentalstimuliin waysthatsafeguard againstdecisionsthatmightlead to acci-
dentsandfaultydecisions.Attimes,however, bureaucraciesmakesmall,calculated

87. See Featherston1995;Chopra,Eknes,andNordbo1995;andHirschandOakley1995,chap.6.

88. Heyman1995,262.
89. Haas 1990,chap.3.
90. See Feldstein1998;RadeletandSachs 1999;andKapur1998.
91. Rieff1996.
92. Vaughan1996.
722 International
Organization

deviationsfromestablished rulesbecauseofnewenvironmental or institutional

de-
velopments, explicitlycalculatingthatbendingtherulesin thisinstancedoes not
createexcessiveriskofpolicyfailure.Overtime,theseexceptionscan becomethe
rule-theybecomenormal,notexceptionsat all: theycan becomeinstitutionalized
tothepointwheredevianceis "normalized." Theresultofthisprocessis thatwhatat
timet1mightbe weighedseriously anddebatedas a potentially unacceptable riskor
dangerousprocedurecomesto be treatedas normalat timetn.Indeed,becauseof
staffturnover,thosemakingdecisionsat a laterpointin timemightbe unawarethat
thenow-routine behaviorwas everviewedas riskyordangerous.
We areunawareofanystudiesthathaveexaminedthisnormalization ofdeviance
in IO decisionmaking,thoughone exampleof deviancenormalization comes to
mind.Before1980 theUNHCR viewedrepatriation as onlyone of threedurable
solutionsto refugeecrises(theothersbeingthird-country asylumandhost-country
In itsview,repatriation
integration). hadtobe bothsafeandvoluntary becauseforced
violatestheinternational
repatriation legalprincipleofnonrefoulement, whichis the
cornerstone refugeelaw and codifiedin theUNHCR's convention.
of international
Priorto 1980,UNHCR's discussionsof repatriation emphasizedthattheprinciples
of safetyand voluntariness mustbe safeguarded at all costs.Accordingto many
commentators, however,theUNHCR has steadilyloweredthebarriers to repatria-
tionovertheyears.Evidenceforthiscanbe foundin international protection manu-
als,theUNHCRExecutive Committee anddiscourse
resolutions, thatnowweighs repatria-
tionandtheprinciple ofnonrefoulement othergoalssucha peacebuilding.This
against
was a steadyandincremental development as initialdeviationsfromorganizational
normsaccumulated overtimeandled to a normalization ofdeviance.The resultwas
a loweringofthebarriers torepatriationandan increaseinthefrequency ofinvolun-
taryrepatriation.93

Insulation. Organizations varygreatlyin thedegreeto whichtheyreceiveand

processfeedbackfromtheirenvironment aboutperformance. Those insulatedfrom
suchfeedbackoftendevelopinternal culturesand worldviews thatdo notpromote
thegoalsandexpectations ofthoseoutsidetheorganizationwhocreateditandwhom
it serves.These distinctive worldviewscan createtheconditionsforpathological
behaviorwhenparochialclassification and categorization schemescome to define
reality-howbureaucrats understandtheworld-suchthattheyroutinely ignorein-
formation thatis essentialtotheaccomplishment oftheirgoals.94
Two causes of insulation seemparticularlyapplicableto 1Os.The first
is profes-
sionalism.Professional trainingdoes morethanimparttechnicalknowledge.It ac-
tivelyseeks to shapethenormative orientationand worldviewsof thosewho are
trained.Doctorsaretrainedto valuelifeaboveall else,soldiersaretrainedto sacri-

93. See Chimni1993,447; Amnesty 1997a,b;HumanRightsWatch1997; Zieck 1997,

International
"The ShieldforExilesIs Lowered,"TheNew YorkTimes,22
433, 434, 438-39; andBarbaraCrossette,
December1996,4-1.
94. See BergerandLuckman1967,chap. 1; Douglas 1986;Biuner1990;MarchandOlsen 1989;and
Starr1992.
 Organizations723
PathologiesofInternational

ficelifeforcertainstrategic objectives,and economistsare trainedto value effi-

ciency.Bureaucracies, by theirnature,concentrate professionals insideorganiza-
tions,andconcentrations ofpeoplewiththesameexpertise or professionaltraining
can createan organizational worldviewdistinct fromthelargerenvironment. Sec-
ond,organizations forwhom"successfulperformance" is difficulttomeasure-that
is, theyarevaluedforwhattheyrepresent ratherthanforwhattheydo anddo not
"compete"withotherorganizations onthebasisofoutput-areprotected fromselec-
tionandperformance pressures thateconomistic modelssimplyassumewilloperate.
Theabsenceofa competitive environment thatselectsoutinefficient practicescoupled
withalreadyexistingtendencies towardinstitutionalization ofrulesandprocedures
insulatestheorganization fromfeedbackandincreasesthelikelihoodofpathologies.
IOs varygreatly inthedegreetowhichtheprofessionals theyrecruit havedistinc-
tiveworldviewsand thedegreeto whichtheyface competitive pressures,butit is
clearlythecase thatthesefactors insulatesomeIOs to somedegreeandin so doing
createa tendency towardpathology. The WorldBank,forexample,has beendomi-
natedformuchofitshistory byeconomists, which,atleastinpart,hascontributed to
manycritiques ofthebank'spolicies.In one suchcritiqueJamesFergusonopenshis
studyoftheWorldBank'sactivity in Lesothobycomparing thebank'sintroductory
description ofLesothoin itsreporton thatcountry to factson theground;he shows
howthebank"creates"a worldthathas littleresemblance towhathistorians, geog-
raphers,ordemographers see on thegroundin Lesothobutis uniquelysuitedto the
bank'sorganizational abilitiesand presents preciselytheproblemsthebankknows
how to solve.This is notsimply"staggeringly bad scholarship," Fergusonargues,
buta wayofmakingtheworldintelligible andmeaningful froma particular perspec-
tive-the WorldBank's.95The problem,however,is thatthisdifferent worldview
translatesintoa recordofdevelopment whichFergusonexploresindetail.
failures,
Insulationcontributestoandis causedbyanother well-known featureoforganiza-
tions-theabsenceofeffective feedbackloopsthatallowtheorganization to evalu-
ateitseffortsanduse newinformation tocorrectestablished routines.Thisis surelya
"rational"procedure in anysocialtaskbutis onethatmanyorganizations, including
1Os,failtoperform.96 Manyscholarsandjournalists, andeventhecurrent headofthe
WorldBank,havenoticedthatthebankhas accumulated a rather distinctive
record
of "failures"butcontinues tooperatewiththesamecriteria andhas showna marked
lackofinterest in evaluatingtheeffectiveness ofitsownprojects.97 The sameis true
of other1Os. JaratChopraobservesthatthelessons-learned conferences thatwere
establishedafterSomalia werestructurally arrangedso thatno information could
comeoutthatwouldblemishtheUN's record.Suchattempts atfacesaving,Chopra
cautions,makeit morelikelythatthesemaladieswill go uncorrected.98 Sometimes

95. Ferguson1990,25-73.
96. MarchandOlsen 1989,chap.5; Haas 1990.
97. See Wade 1996,14-17; Nelson1995,chaps.6, 7; andRichardStevenson,"The ChiefBankerfor
theNationsattheBottomoftheHeap,"New YorkTimes,14 September 1997,sec. 3, 1, 12-14.
98. Chopra1996.
724 International
Organization

newevaluativecriteria
arehoistedin orderto demonstrate
thatthefailureswerenot
reallyfailures
butsuccesses.

Culturalcontestation. Organizational coherence is an accomplishment ratherthan

a given.Organizational controlwithina putativehierarchy is alwaysincomplete,
creating pocketsof autonomy andpoliticalbattleswithinthebureaucracy.99 Thisis
partlya productofthefactthatbureaucracies areorganizedaroundtheprincipleof
division-of-labor,and different divisionstendto be staffed by individualswho are
"experts"in theirassignedtasks.Thesedifferent divisionsmaybattleoverbudgets
or materialresourcesand so followthebureaucratic politicsmodel,buttheymay
also clashbecauseofdistinct internalculturesthatgrowup insidedifferent partsof
theorganization. Different segments oftheorganization maydevelopdifferent ways
of makingsenseof theworld,experiencedifferent local environments, andreceive
different stimulifromoutside;theymay also be populatedby different mixesof
professions orshapedbydifferent historicalexperiences. All ofthesewouldcontrib-
uteto thedevelopment ofdifferentlocal cultureswithintheorganization anddiffer-
entwaysofperceiving theenvironment andtheorganization's overallmission.Orga-
nizationsmaytrytominimize complications fromthesedivisionsbyarranging these
demandshierarchically, buttotheextentthathierarchy resolvesconflict bysquelch-
inginputfromsomesubunits infavorofothers, theorganization losesthebenefits of
a divisionof laborthatit was supposedto provide.More commonly, though,at-
tempts toreconcilecompeting worldviews hierarchicallyaresimplyincomplete. Most
organizations developoverlapping andcontradictory setsofpreferences amongsub-
groups.100 Consequently, different constituenciesrepresenting differentnormative
viewswillsuggestdifferent tasksandgoalsfortheorganization, resultingina clash
ofcompeting perspectivesthatgenerates pathologicaltendencies.
The existenceof culturalcontestation mightbe particularly trueof high-profile
andexpansiveIOs liketheUN thathavevaguemissions,broadandpoliticizedcon-
stituencies,andlotsofdivisionsthataredevelopedovertimeandinresponsetonew
environmental demands.Arguablya numberof themorespectaculardebaclesin
recentUN peacekeepingoperationsmightbe interpreted as theproductof these
contradictions.
Considertheconflict betweentheUN's humanitarian missionsand thevalue it
places on impartiality and neutrality.Withintheorganization thereare manywho
viewimpartiality as a coreconstitutive principleofUN action.On theone hand,the
UN's moralstanding, itsauthority,anditsabilitytopersuadeall restonthisprinciple.
On theotherhand,theprinciples of humanitarianism requiretheUN to giveaid to
thosein need-values thatare particularly strongin a numberof UN reliefand
humanitarian agencies.Thesetwonormsof neutrality andhumanitarian assistance,
andthepartsof thebureaucracy mostdevotedto them,comeintodirectconflict in
thosesituationswhereprovidinghumanitarian reliefmightjeopardizethe UN's

99. See Clegg 1994a,30; Vaughan1996,64; andMartin1992.

100. Haas 1990,188.
 PathologiesofInternational
Organizations725

vauntedprinciple ofneutrality.
Bosniais theclassiccase in point.On theone hand,
the "all necessarymeans"provisionof SecurityCouncilresolutions gave theUN
authority to deliverhumanitarian aid andprotectciviliansin thesafehavens.On the
otherhand,theUN abstainedfrom"takingsides" because of thefearthatsuch
actionswouldcompromise itsneutralityandfuture effectiveness. The resultofthese
conflictswas a stringof contradictory policiesthatfailedto provideadequatelyfor
theUN's expandinghumanitarian charges.101
Accordingto ShashiTharoor,a UN
official
intimately involvedin thesedecisions,"It is extremely difficulttomakewar
andpeacewiththesamepeopleon thesameterritory atthesametime."102
UNHCR providesanother possibleexampleofculturalcontestation. Historically,
theUNHCR's Protection Divisionhas articulated a legalisticapproachtowardrefu-
gee matters andthustendstoviewtheUNHCR anditselfas therefugee'slawyerand
as theprotector of refugeerightsunderinternational law. Those thatinhabitthe
UNHCR's regionalbureaus,however, havebeencharacterized as takinga less "nar-
row"viewof theorganization's mission,stressing thattheUNHCR musttakeinto
accountthecausesofrefugeeflowsandstatepressures. Thesecultural conflictshave
beenparticularly evident,accordingto manyobservers, whentheUNHCR contem-
platesa repatriation exercisein areasofpoliticalinstabilityand conflict: protection
officersdemandthattherefugees'rights, includingtherightofnonrefoulement, be
safeguarded, whereastheregionalbureausare morewillingto undertake a risky
repatriationexerciseifitmightservebroaderorganizational goals,suchas satisfying
theinterests ofmemberstates,andregionalgoals,suchas facilitating a peace agree-
ment.103

Althoughbureaucratic cultureis nottheonlysourceof 10 dysfunction, it is a

potentiallypowerful one thatcreatesbroadpatterns ofbehaviorthatshouldinterest
internationalrelationsscholars.Noneofthesourcesofpathologiessketched hereis
likelyto appearin isolationin anyempiricaldomain.Theseprocessesinteract and
feedon each otherin waysthatwillrequirefurther theorizingandresearch.More-
over,whilewe havehighlighted theorganization's internal we must
characteristics,
alwaysbearinmindthattheexternal environment pressesuponandshapestheinter-
oftheorganization
nal characteristics in a hostofways.Culturalcontestationwithin
an organization frequentlyoriginatesfromandremainslinkedto normative contra-
dictionsin thelargerenvironment. Demandsfromstatescanbe extremely important
determinants of 10 behaviorand mayoverrideinternal culturaldynamics,butthey
canalso settheminplaceifconflicting statedemandsresultinthecreationoforgani-
zationalstructuresor missionsthatareproneto pathology. As we beginto explore
dysfunctional andpathologicalbehavior, we mustbearinmindthecomplexrelation-
shipbetweendifferent causalpathways, remaining closelyattentive
toboththeinter-
nal organizationaldynamics andthe10's environment.

101. See Barnett1997a;David Rieff,"We HateYou," New Yorker,4 September1995,41-48; David

Rieff,"The Institution
ThatSaw No Evil," TheNewRepublic,12 February1996,19-24; andRieff1996.
102. QuotedinWeiss1996,85; also see Rieff1996,166,170,193.
103. See Kennedy1986;andLawyersCommittee forHumanRights1991.
726 International
Organization

Conclusion

Forall theattentioninternational relations scholarshavepaidtointernational institu-

tionsoverthepastseveraldecades,we knowverylittleabouttheinternal workings
ofIOs or abouttheeffects theyhavein theworld.Ourignorance, we suspect,is in
largeparta productof thetheoretical lens we have applied.Froman economistic
perspective,thetheoretically interesting questionto ask aboutIOs is whytheyare
createdin thefirstplace. Economistswantto knowwhywe have firms;political
scientistswanttoknowwhywe have1Os.In bothcases,thequestionflowsnaturally
fromfirst theoreticalprinciples. If you thinkthattheworldlookslike a microeco-
nomicmarket-anarchy, firms(or states)competing to maximizetheirutilities-
whatis anomalousand therefore theoreticallyinterestingis cooperation.Conse-
quently, ourresearchtendsto focuson thebargainsstatesstriketo makeorreshape
1Os. Scholarspayverylittleattention to whatgoes on subsequently in theirday-to-
dayoperations oreventhelargereffects thattheymighthaveon theworld.
ViewingIOs through a constructivist or sociologicallens,as we suggesthere,
reveals features 10
of behaviorthatshouldconcerninternational relationsscholars
becausetheybearon debatescentralto ourfield-debatesaboutwhether and how
international
institutionsmatter anddebatesabouttheadequacyofa statist ontology
in an eraofglobalization andpoliticalchange.Threeimplications ofthisalternative
approachareparticularly important. First,thisapproachprovidesa basisfortreating
IOs as purposiveactors.Mainstreamapproachesin politicalsciencethatare in-
formed byeconomictheories havetendedtolocateagencyinthestatesthatcomprise
10 membership andtreatIOs as merearenasinwhichstatespursuetheirpolicies.By
exploringthenormative supportforbureaucratic in thebroaderinterna-
authority
tionalcultureand theway IOs use thatauthority to constructthesocial world,we
providereasonswhyIOs mayhave autonomy fromstatemembersandwhyit may
makesenseanalytically to treatthemas ontologically independent. Second,bypro-
vidinga basisforthatautonomy we also openup thepossibility thatIOs arepowerful
actorswho can have independent effects on theworld.We have suggestedvarious
ways to thinkabouthow IOs are powerfulactorsin globalpolitics,all of which
encouragegreaterconsideration of how IOs affectnotonlydiscreteoutcomesbut
also theconstitutivebasisofglobalpolitics.
Third,thisapproachalso drawsattention to normative evaluationsof IOs and
questionswhatappearsto us to be ratheruncritical optimismabout10 behavior.
Contemporary international relations scholarshavebeenquicktorecognizetheposi-
tivecontributionsthatIOs can make,andwe,too,aresimilarly impressed. Butforall
theirdesirablequalities,bureaucracies can also be inefficient,
ineffective,repressive,
andunaccountable. International relations scholars, however,haveshownlittleinter-
estininvestigatingtheseless savoryandmoredistressing The liberalWilso-
effects.
niantraditiontendsto see IOs as promoters ofpeace,enginesofprogress, andagents
foremancipation. Neoliberalshavefocusedontheimpressive wayinwhichIOs help
statestoovercomecollectiveactionproblems andachievedurablecooperation. Real-
istshavefocusedon theirroleas stabilizing forcesin worldpolitics.Constructivists,
 Organizations727
PathologiesofInternational

too,havetendedto focuson themorehumaneand other-regarding featuresof 1Os,

butthereis nothing
aboutsocialconstruction
thatnecessitates
"good" outcomes.We
do notmeanto implythatIOs are "bad"; we meanonlyto pointout theoretical
reasonswhyundesirable behaviormayoccurandsuggestthatnormative evaluation
of10 behaviorshouldbe an empirical notan analyticassumption.
andethicalmatter,

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