Unreliable and Non-Authoritative The Population Indicators Congress Used To Justify Their Creation. There Can Be No Surer Way

01 ALDABA VS COMELEC AUTHOR: PABRUA
G.R No. 188078 March 15, 2010 Notes:

PONENTE: CARPIO, J.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
 The passage of apportionment acts is not so exclusively within the political power of the legislature as to preclude a court from
inquiring into their constitutionality when the question is properly brought before it.
 District apportionment laws are subject to review by the courts
FACTS:
1. COMELEC filed an MR of the Decision dated 25 January 2010.
2. Congress reliance on the Certification of Alberto N. Miranda (Miranda), Region III Director, National Statistics Office (NSO),
projecting Malolos Citys population in 2010, is non-justiciable.
3. COMELEC also calls attention to the other sources of Malolos Citys population indicators as of 2007 (2007 Census of Population
PMS 3 Progress Enumeration Report) and as of 2008 (Certification of the City of MalolosWater District, dated 31 July 2008, and
Certification of the Liga ng Barangay, dated 22 August 2008) which Congress allegedly used in enacting Republic Act No. 9591
(RA 9591). The COMELEC extends its non-justiciability argument to these materials.
ISSUE(S): WON MR should be granted -NO
RATIO:
 It will not do for the COMELEC to insist that the reliability and authoritativeness of the population indicators Congress used in
enacting RA 9591 are non-justiciable. If laws creating legislative districts are unquestionably within the ambit of this Courts
judicial review power, then there is more reason to hold justiciable subsidiary questions impacting on their constitutionality,
such as their compliance with a specific constitutional limitation under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that
only cities with at least 250,000 constituents are entitled to representation in Congress. To fulfill this obligation, the Court, of
necessity, must inquire into the authoritativeness and reliability of the population indicators Congress used to comply with the
constitutional limitation.
 It is well settled that the passage of apportionment acts is not so exclusively within the political power of the legislature as to
preclude a court from inquiring into their constitutionality when the question is properly brought before it.
 It may be added in this connection, that the mere impact of the suit upon the political situation does not render it political
instead of judicial.
 The alleged circumstance that this statute improves the present set-up constitutes no excuse for approving a transgression of
constitutional limitations, because the end does not justify the means.
 To deny the Court the exercise of its judicial review power over RA 9591 is to contend that this Court has no power to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government, a duty mandated under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. Indeed, if we subscribe
to the COMELECs theory, this Court would be reduced to rubberstamping laws creating legislative districts no matter how
unreliable and non-authoritative the population indicators Congress used to justify their creation. There can be no surer way
to render meaningless the limitation in Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
 Moreover, the creation by RA 9591 of a legislative district for Malolos City, carving the city from the former First Legislative
District, leaves the town of Bulacan isolated from the rest of the geographic mass of that district. This contravenes the
requirement in Section 5(3), Article VI that each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact,
and adjacent territory.
02 SENATOR AQUINO & MAYOR ROBREDO V COMELEC AUTHOR: PAGCALIWAGAN

G.R. No. 189793 April 7, 2010 Notes: Humaba lang dahil sa table. 
TOPIC: Session 8
PONENTE: Perez, J.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
 Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a
representative, but not so for a province.
 Population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the composition of the additional district. Such
settlement is in accord with both the text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the
Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by this petition
EMERGENCY RECIT: Petitioners Senator Aquino III and Mayor Robredo as public officers, taxpayers and citizens seek the nullification
as unconstitutional of RA 9716 entitled “An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the 1st and 2nd Legislative Districts in the Province
of Camarines Sur and thereby Creating a New Legislative District from such Reapportionment”
Political Law Review: Session 8 [Other Provision] 1
G03 – Atty. Ricardo A. Sunga III
FACTS:
 Petitioners Senator Aquino III and Mayor Robredo as public officers, taxpayers and citizens seek the nullification as
unconstitutional of RA 9716 entitled “An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the 1 st and 2nd Legislative Districts in the
Province of Camarines Sur and thereby Creating a New Legislative District from such Reapportionment”
 Petitioners pray that respondent COMELEC be restrained from making any issuances and from taking any steps relative to
the implementation of RA 9716.
 Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821, distributed
among four (4) legislative districts in this wise:
District Municipalities/Cities Population
1st District Del Gallego Libmanan 417,304

Ragay Minalabac
Lupi Pamplona
Sipocot Pasacao
Cabusao San Fernando
2nd District Gainza Canaman 474,899

Milaor Camaligan
Naga Magarao
Pili Bombon
Ocampo Calabanga
3rd District Caramoan Sangay 372,548

Garchitorena San Jose
Goa Tigaon
Lagonoy Tinamba
Presentacion Siruma
4th District Iriga Buhi 429,070

Baao Bula
Balatan Nabua
Bato
 Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order
to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac,
Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a
new second legislative district. The following table3 illustrates the reapportionment made by Republic Act No. 9716:
District Municipalities/Cities Population
1st District Del Gallego 176,383

Ragay
Lupi
Sipocot
Cabusao
2nd District Libmanan San Fernando 276,777

Minalabac Gainza
Pamplona Milaor
Pasacao
3rd District (formerly 2nd District) Naga Camaligan 439,043

Pili Magarao
Ocampo Bombon
Canaman Calabanga

4th District (formerly 3rd District) Caramoan Sangay 372,548
Garchitorena San Jose
Goa Tigaon
Lagonoy Tinamba
Presentacion Siruma
5th District (formerly 4th District) Iriga Buhi 429,070

Baao Bula
Balatan Nabua
Bato
 Petitioner Aquino III was one of 2 senators who voted against the approval of the Bill by the Senate. Robredo is the Mayor of
Naga City which was part of the former 2nd district from which the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were taken for inclusion
in the new 2nd district.
 No other local executive joined the 2; neither did the representatives of the former 3rd and 4th districts of the province.
Petitioner’s Contentions: The reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional
standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. The
petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is
unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383. Petitioners
rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard.
ISSUE(S): WON RA 9716 is constitutional.
HELD: YES.
RATIO:
 We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of constitutionality. Before a law
may be declared unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear showing that a specific provision of the fundamental law
has been violated or transgressed. When there is neither a violation of a specific provision of the Constitution nor any proof
showing that there is such a violation, the presumption of constitutionality will prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt
is to sustain.
 There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative
district.
 The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative."
 The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement
of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned
about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
 The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population
is only required for a city, but not for a province.
 Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a
representative, but not so for a province.
 The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for cities only to its initial legislative
district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of
250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to
an additional district.
 There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional district within a city, should not be
applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created within a city is not required to
represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional district in a
province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless of
its population.
 Apropos for discussion is the provision of the LGC on the creation of a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled
to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the LGC states:
Requisites for Creation. – (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department
of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the
following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National
Statistics Office.
 Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the
indispensable income requirement.
 Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran through the deliberations on the words and
meaning of Section 5 of Article VI.
 The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at least two hundred fifty thousand" may be gleaned from
the records of the Constitutional Commission which, upon framing the provisions of Section 5 of Article VI, proceeded to form
an ordinance that would be appended to the final document. The Ordinance is captioned "APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES
AND CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA." Such records would show that the 250,000 population benchmark was
used for the 1986 nationwide apportionment of legislative districts among provinces, cities and Metropolitan Manila. Simply
put, the population figure was used to determine how many districts a province, city, or Metropolitan Manila should
have. Simply discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose, population had to be the determinant. Even then, the requirement
of 250,000 inhabitants was not taken as an absolute minimum for one legislative district. And, closer to the point herein at
issue, in the determination of the precise district within the province to which, through the use of the population benchmark,
so many districts have been apportioned, population as a factor was not the sole, though it was among, several determinants.
 Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district apportionment, we stated in Bagabuyo v. COMELEC that:
“x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The Constitution, however, does
not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of representation. x x x. To ensure
quality representation through commonality of interests and ease of access by the representative to the constituents,
all that the Constitution requires is that every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory.”
 This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the uncompromising stand of petitioner that an additional provincial
legislative district, which does not have at least a 250,000 population is not allowed by the Constitution.
 The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear lesson.
 Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution can, the petition find support. And the
formulation of the Ordinance in the implementation of the provision, nay, even the Ordinance itself, refutes the contention
that a population of 250,000 is a constitutional sine qua non for the formation of an additional legislative district in a province,
whose population growth has increased beyond the 1986 numbers.
 Translated in the terms of the present case:
1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of 1,693,821 in 2007 is ─ based on the formula and
constant number of 250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in nationally apportioning legislative districts among
provinces and cities ─ entitled to two (2) districts in addition to the four (4) that it was given in the 1986 apportionment.
Significantly, petitioner Aquino concedes this point.40 In other words, Section 5 of Article VI as clearly written allows and
does not prohibit an additional district for the Province of Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic Act No.
9786;
2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on the protests and complaints against strict conformity
with the population standard, and more importantly based on the final districting in the Ordinance on considerations other
than population, the reapportionment or the recomposition of the first and second legislative districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a new legislative district is valid even if the population of the new district is
176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted upon by the petitioners.
3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No. 4264, were:
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped municipalities;
(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the discussion from the reconfigured District One;
and
(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the redistricting of Districts One and Two.
 Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with the increased population of the erstwhile Districts
One and Two, point to the utter absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse of discretion, 42 that would warrant the
invalidation of Republic Act No. 9716.
 To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of the first and second legislative districts of
Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting additional district should not be considered. Our ruling is that
population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the composition of the additional district. Such

settlement is in accord with both the text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the
Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by this petition.
3. VALENTINO L. LEGASPI vs. CITY OF CEBU AUTHOR: Paras

G.R. No. 159110; December 10, 2013 NOTES: Consolidated cases.
Bersamin, J.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: *ratio bold part

Emergency Recit: The constitutionality and validity of an ordinance authorizing the immobilization of offending vehicles through
the clamping of tires is being questioned on the ground that it constituted a contravention of the guaranty of due process under
the Constitution. The RTC declared the ordinance unconstitutional, but CA reversed this. Hence, this petition. The SC ruled that the
ordinance is valid because the formal and substantive requirements for a valid ordinance are present.
FACTS:
1. On Jan. 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted Ordinance No. 1664 to authorize the traffic enforcers
of Cebu to immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking restrictions and prohibitions defined in Ordinance No. 801 (Traffic
Code of Cebu City).
2. A. On July 29, 1997, Atty. Bienvenido Jaban (Jaban,Sr.) and his son Atty. Bienvenido Douglas Luke Bradbury Jaban (Jaban,Jr.) filed
a case with RTC- Cebu against the City of Cebu, represented by Hon. Alvin Garcia, its City Mayor, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cebu City and its Presiding Officer, Hon. Renato V. Osmeña, and the chairman and operatives or officers of the City Traffic
Operations Management (CITOM), seeking the declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for being in violation of due
process and for being contrary to law, and damages. They alleged that on June 23, 1997, Jaban Sr. had properly parked his car in a
paying parking area on Manalili Street, Cebu City to get certain records and documents from his office; that upon his return after
less than 10 minutes, he had found his car being immobilized by a steel clamp, and a notice being posted on the car to the effect
that it would be a criminal offense to break the clamp; that he had been infuriated by the immobilization of his car because he had
been thereby rendered unable to meet an important client on that day; that his car was impounded for three days, and was
informed at the office of the CITOM that he had first to pay₱4,200.00 as a fine to the City Treasurer of Cebu City for the release of
his car; that the fine was imposed without any court hearing and without due process of law, for he was not even told why his car
had been immobilized; that he had undergone a similar incident of clamping of his car on the early morning of November 20, 1997
while his car was parked properly in a parking lot in front of the San Nicolas Pasil Market in Cebu City without violating any traffic
regulation or causing any obstruction; that he was compelled to pay ₱1,500.00(itemized as ₱500.00 for the clamping and₱1,000.00
for the violation) without any court hearing and final judgment; that on May 19, 1997, Jaban, Jr. parked his car in a very secluded
place where there was no sign prohibiting parking; that his car was immobilized by CITOM operative Lito Gilbuena; and that he was
compelled to pay the total sum of ₱1,400.00 for the release of his car without a court hearing and a final judgment.
B. On August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi (Legaspi) likewise sued in the RTC- Cebu, T.C. Sayson, Ricardo Hapitan and John Does. He
averred that on the morning of July 29, 1997, he left his car on the sidewalk and the street outside the gate of his house to make
way for the vehicle of the anay exterminator who had asked to be allowed to unload his materials and equipment from the front
of the residence inasmuch as his daughter’s car had been parked in the carport, with the assurance that the unloading would not
take too long; that while waiting for the anay exterminator to finish unloading, the phone in his office inside the house had rung,
impelling him to go into the house to answer the call; that after a short while, his son-in-law informed him that unknown persons
had clamped the front wheel of his car; that he rushed outside and found a traffic citation stating that his car had been clamped by
CITOM ; the car was towed even if it was not obstructing the flow of traffic.
3. In separate answers for the City of Cebu and its co-defendants, the City Attorney of Cebu reasoned that the traffic enforcers only
upheld the law; and that Ordinance No. 1664 enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality and validity.
4. The cases were consolidated before the RTC. After trial, it declared Ordinance No. 1664 as null and void because "In both
procedural and substantive due process, a hearing is always a pre-requisite, hence, the taking or deprivation of one’s life, liberty or
property must be done upon and with observance of the "due process" clause” Under Ordinance No. 1664, when a vehicle is parked
in a prohibited, restricted or regulated, the vehicle is immobilized by clamping any tire of said vehicle with the use of a denver boot
vehicle immobilizer or any other special gadget which immobilized the motor vehicle. The violating vehicle is immobilized, thus,
depriving its owner of the use thereof at the sole determination of any traffic enforcer or regular PNP personnel or Cebu City Traffic
Law Enforcement Personnel. The vehicle immobilizer cannot be removed or released without the owner or driver paying first to
the City Treasurer of Cebu through the Traffic Violations Bureau all the accumulated penalties of all unpaid or unsettled traffic law
violations, plus the administrative penalty of ₱500.00 and, further, the immobilized vehicle shall be released only upon presentation
of the receipt of said payments and upon release order by the Chairman, CITOM, or Chairman, Committee on Police, Fire and
Penology, or Asst. City Fiscal Felipe Belcina. It should be stressed that the owner of the immobilized vehicle shall have to undergo
all these ordeals at the mercy of the Traffic Law Enforcer who, as the Ordinance in question mandates, is the arresting officer,
prosecutor, Judge and collector. Otherwise stated, the owner of the immobilized motor vehicle is deprived of his right to the use
of his/her vehicle and penalized without a hearing by a person who is not legally or duly vested with such rights, power or authority.
The Ordinance in question is penal in nature.
5. The City of Cebu and its co-defendants appealed to the CA which overturned the RTC decision, declaring the ordinance valid.
Defendants-appellants contended that the passage of Ordinance 1664 is in accordance with the police powers exercised by the City
of Cebu through the Sangguniang Panlungsod and granted by RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code. Firstly, it
enumerates the subjects on which the Sangguniang Panlungsod may exercise these powers. Thus, with respect to the use of public
streets, Section 458 of the Code states:
Section 458 (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative branch of the city, x x x shall x x x
(5) (v) Regulate the use of streets, xxx
(vi) Regulate traffic on all streets and bridges; prohibit encroachments or obstacles thereon and, when necessary in the interest of
public welfare, xx The scope of the legislative authority of the local government is set out in Section 16, to wit: General Welfare. –
Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of
the general welfare.
ISSUE(S: Whether Ordinance No. 1664 complied with the requirements for validity and constitutionality, particularly the limitations
set by the Constitution and the relevant statutes.— YES
RATIO:
A. Tests for a valid ordinance: In Manila v. Laguio: For an ordinance to be valid, it (1) must not contravene the Constitution
or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive;(3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. As jurisprudence
indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of
the LGU, and whether it was passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and the substantive
(i.e.,involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the
statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy).
B. Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664 with the formal requirements: With no issues being hereby raised against the
formalities attendant to the enactment of Ordinance No. 1664, we presume its full compliance with the test in that regard.
Congress enacted the LGC as the implementing law for the delegation to the various LGUs of the State’s great powers,
namely: the police power, the power of eminent domain, and the power of taxation. In particular, police power is regarded
as "the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does ‘to all the great public needs.’" In
point is the exercise by the LGU of the City of Cebu of delegated police power. In MMDA v. Bel-Air Village the: The National
Legislature may delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of local
government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the
national lawmaking body. The CAs ruling was correct.
C. Compliance of Ordinance No. 1664 with the substantive requirements: The first substantive requirement for a valid
ordinance is the adherence to the constitutional guaranty of due process of law as embedded in Art III, Sec 1 of the
Constitution. The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of
the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically,
arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and
regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights,
it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of
public interest or public welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the
person to his life, liberty and property.
Considering that traffic congestions were already retarding the growth and progress in the population and economic centers of the
country, the plain objective of Ordinance No. 1664 was to serve the public interest and advance the general welfare in the City of
Cebu. Its adoption was, therefore, in order to fulfill the compelling government purpose of immediately addressing the burgeoning
traffic congestions caused by illegally parked vehicles obstructing the streets of the City of Cebu. Legaspi’s attack against the
provisions of Ordinance No. 1664 for being vague and ambiguous cannot stand scrutiny. There could be no confusion on the
meaning and coverage of the ordinance. The petitioners further assert that drivers or vehicle owners affected by Ordinance No.
1664 like themselves were not accorded the opportunity to protest the clamping, towing, and impounding of the vehicles, or even
to be heard and to explain their side prior to the immobilization of their vehicles; and that the ordinance was oppressive and
arbitrary for that reason.
The adverse assertions against Ordinance No. 1664 are unwarranted. Firstly, Ordinance No. 1664 was far from oppressive and
arbitrary. Any driver or vehicle owner whose vehicle was immobilized by clamping could protest such action of a traffic enforcer or
PNP personnel enforcing the ordinance. Section 3 of Ordinance No. 1664, supra, textually afforded an administrative escape in the
form of permitting the release of the immobilized vehicle upon a protest directly made to the Chairman of CITOM; or to the
Chairman of the Committee on Police, Fire and Penology of the City of Cebu; or to Asst. City Prosecutor Felipe Belciña–officials
named in the ordinance itself. The release could be ordered by any of such officials even without the payment of the stipulated
fine. That none of the petitioners, albeit lawyers all, resorted to such recourse did not diminish the fairness and reasonableness of
the escape clause written in the ordinance. Secondly, the immobilization of a vehicle by clamping pursuant to the ordinance was
not necessary if the driver or vehicle owner was around at the time of the apprehension for illegal parking or obstruction. In that
situation, the enforcer would simply either require the driver to move the vehicle or issue a traffic citation should the latter persist
in his violation. The clamping would happen only to prevent the transgress or from using the vehicle itself to escape the due
sanctions. And, lastly, the towing away of the immobilized vehicle was not equivalent to a summary impounding, but designed to
prevent the immobilized vehicle from obstructing traffic in the vicinity of the apprehension and thereby ensure the smooth flow of
traffic. The owner of the towed vehicle would not be deprived of his property. In fine, the circumstances set forth herein indicate
that Ordinance No. 1664 complied with the elements of fairness and reasonableness.
D. Being the same court in the three cases, the RTC should have anticipated that in the regular course of proceedings the
outcome of the appeal in these cases then pending before the CA would ultimately be elevated to and determined by no
less than the Court itself. Such anticipation should have made it refrain from declaring Ordinance No. 1664
unconstitutional, for a lower court like itself, appreciating its position in the "interrelation and operation of the integrated
judicial system of the nation," should have exercised a "becoming modesty" on the issue of the constitutionality of the
same ordinance that the Constitution required the majority vote of the Members of the Court sitting en bane to determine.
Such "becoming modesty" also forewarned that any declaration of unconstitutionality by an inferior court was binding
only on the parties, but that a declaration of unconstitutionality by the Court would be a precedent binding on all.
4. Municipality of Tiwi V. Betito AUTHOR: REYES

TOPIC: Local Chief Executive Notes:
PONENTE: Del Castillo
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
- The municipal mayor is required to secure the prior authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan before entering into a contract on behalf of the
municipality.
- Petitioners contention that the subject contract should first be ratified in order to become enforceable as against Tiwi must necessarily fail.
- As correctly held by the CA, the law speaks of prior authorization and not ratification with respect to the power of the local chief executive
to enter into a contract on behalf of the local government unit
Emergency Recit: This is complex case stemming from the execution of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of
NPC V. Province of Albay, in the case the sc had declared the liability of the NPC to Albay. Tiwi had decided to hire a lawyer to help
in the distribution of the NPC liabilities in the form of real estate tax shares since Albay had acquired properties belonging to NPC
by way of a public auction. However, an Office of the President Opinion later opined that NPC can directly pay to Tiwi, even though
it had remitted previously through Albay. Albay refused to remit payments made to it to Tiwi, hence the case reached the SC as to
whether the Contract for Legal services exceeded the authority given to Mayor Coral.
FACTS:
 On June 4, 1990, the Supreme Court issued a Decision in the case of National Power Corporation v. Province of Albay finding,
among others, the NPC liable for unpaid real estate taxes from June 11, 1984 to March 10, 1987 on its properties located in
Albay.
 These properties consisted of geothermal plants in the Municipality of Tiwi and substations in the Municipality of Daraga.
Previously, the said properties were sold at an auction sale conducted by Albay to satisfy NPC’s tax liabilities.
 As the sole bidder at the auction, Albay acquired ownership over said properties. On July 29, 1992, the NPC, through its then
President Pablo Malixi and Albay, represented by then Governor Romeo R. Salalima, entered into a MOA where the former
agreed to settle its tax liabilities estimated at P214,845,104.76.
 The MOA provided, among others, that: (1) the actual amount collectible from NPC will have to be recomputed/revalidated;
(2) NPC shall make an initial payment of P17,763,000.00 upon signing of the agreement; (3) the balance of the recomputed/

revalidated amount (less the aforesaid initial payment), shall be paid in 24 equal monthly installments to commence in
September 1992; and (4) ownership over the auctioned properties shall revert to NPC upon satisfaction of the tax liabilities.
 On August 3, 1992, then Mayor Naomi C. Corral of Tiwi formally requested Governor Salalima to remit the rightful tax shares
of Tiwi and its barangays where the NPC’s properties were located relative to the payments already made by NPC to Albay.
 On even date, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi passed Resolution No. 12-92 requesting the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay
to hold a joint session for the purpose of discussing the distribution of the NPC payments
 On August 10, 1992, Governor Salalima replied that the request cannot be granted as the initial payment amounting to
P17,763,000.00 was only an “Earnest money” and that the total amount to be collected from the NPC was Still being validated.
 Due to the brewing misunderstanding between Tiwi and the concerned barangays on the one hand, and Albay on the other,
and so as not to be caught in the middle of the controversy, NPC requested a clarification from the Office of the President as
to the scope and extent of the shares of the LGUs in the real estate tax collections.
 On August 30, 1992, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi passed Resolution No. 15-92 authorizing Mayor Corral to hire a lawyer to
represent Tiwi and its barangays in the recovery of their rightful share in the aforesaid realty taxes.
 Thereafter, Mayor Corral sought the services of respondent Atty. Betito (respondent) and Atty. Lawenko.
 As a result, on January 25, 1993, Mayor Corral, representing Tiwi, and respondent and Atty. Lawenko entered into a Contract
of Legal Services (subject contract).
 The subject contract provided, among others, that respondent and Atty. Lawenko would receive a 10% contingent fee on
whatever amount of realty taxes that would be recovered by Tiwi through their efforts.
 On December 3, 1992, the Office of the President, through then Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Antonio T. Carpio, opined that
the MOA entered into by NPC and Albay merely recognized and established NPC’s realty taxes.
 He further clarified that the sharing scheme and those entitled to the payments to be made by NPC under the MOA should be
that provided under the law, and since Tiwi is entitled to share in said realty taxes, NPC may remit such share directly to Tiwi.
Because of this opinion, NPC President Malixi, through a letter dated December 9, 1992, informed Mayor Corral and Governor
Salalima that starting with the January 1993 installment, NPC will directly pay Tiwi its share in the payments under the MOA.
As of December 9, 1992, payments made by NPC to Albay reached P40,724,471.74.
 On December 19, 1992, in an apparent reaction to NPC’s Decision to directly remit to Tiwi its share in the payments made and
still to be made pursuant to the MOA, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay passed Ordinance No. 09-92, which, among
others: (1) authorized the Provincial Treasurer upon the direction of the Provincial Governor to sell the real properties (acquired
by Albay at the auction sale) at a public auction, and to cause the immediate transfer thereof to the winning bidder; and (2)
declared as forfeited in favor of Albay, all the payments already made by NPC under the MOA.
 From Albays refusal to remit Tiwis share in the aforementioned P40,724,471.74 stemmed several administrative complaints and court cases
that respondent allegedly handled on behalf of Tiwi to recover the latters rightful share in the unpaid realty taxes, including the case of
Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. where, the Court held that the elective officials of Albay are administratively liable for abuse of authority due to
their unjustified refusal to remit the rightful share of Tiwi in the subject realty taxes.
 RTC rendered partial judgment on the pleadings ordering the defendant Municipality of Tiwi, Albay to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P14,657,966.18 plus interest at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint until payment is fully delivered to the plaintiff; and, for this
purpose, the defendant Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi, represented by the co-defendants officials, shall adopt and approve the necessary
appropriation ordinance.
 CA affirmed RTC judgment.
ISSUE(S):
 WON the amount of award of attys fees to respondent is unreasonable, unconscionable and without any proof of the extent, nature and
result of his legal service as required by the purported contract of legal services and pursuant to Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
 WON the application of the rule of judgment on the pleadings and/or summary judgment is baseless, improper and unwarranted in the case
at bar.
 WON the purported contract of legal services exceeded the authority of the late Mayor Corral and should have been ratified by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi in order to be enforceable
HELD: Yes, CA decision is reversed, case remanded to RTC for retrial.

RATIO:
First issue- Judgment on the Pleadings
Judgment on the pleadings is improper when the answer to the complaint tenders
several issues.
 A motion for judgment on the pleadings admits the truth of all the material and relevant allegations of the opposing party and the
judgment must rest on those allegations taken together with such other allegations as are admitted in the pleadings.
 It is proper when an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse partys pleading.

 However, when it appears that not all the material allegations of the complaint were admitted in the answer for some of them were
either denied or disputed, and the defendant has set up certain special defenses which, if proven, would have the effect of nullifying
plaintiffs main cause of action, judgment on the pleadings cannot be rendered In the instant case, a review of the records reveal that
respondent (as plaintiff) and petitioners (as defendants) set-up multiple levels of claims and defenses, respectively, with some failing to
tender an issue while others requiring the presentation of evidence for resolution.
 The generalized conclusion of both the trial and appellate courts that petitioners answer admits all the material averments of the
complaint is, thus, without basis.
 Preliminarily, it was erroneous for the trial court to rule that the genuineness and due execution of the Contract of Legal Services was
impliedly admitted by petitioners for failure to make a sworn specific denial thereof as required by Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of
Court.
 This rule is not applicable when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument. In the instant case, the subject
contract was executed between respondent and Atty. Lawenko, on the one hand, and Tiwi, represented by Mayor Corral, on the other.
 None of the petitioners, who are the incumbent elective and appointive officials of Tiwi as of the filing of the Complaint, were parties to
said contract. Nonetheless, in their subsequent pleadings, petitioners admitted the genuineness and due execution of the subject
contract. We shall, thus, proceed from the premise that the genuineness and due execution of the Contract of Legal Services has already
been established. Furthermore, both parties concede the contents and efficacy of Resolution 15-92.
 As a result of these admissions, the issue, at least as to the coverage of the subject contract, may be resolved based on the pleadings as
it merely requires the interpretation and application of the provisions of Resolution 15-92 vis--vis the stipulations in the subject contract.
Second Issue: Mayor Corral was authorized to enter into the Contract of Legal Services
 Petitioners argue that Resolution No. 15-92 did not authorize Mayor Corral to enter into the subject contract, hence, the contract must
first be ratified to become binding on Tiwi. The argument is unpersuasive. Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC provides:
SECTION 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. x x x
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal mayor shall: x x x
(1) Exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the
municipal government, and in this connection, shall: x x x
(vi) Upon authorization by the sangguniang bayan, represent the municipality in all its
business transactions and sign on its behalf all bonds, contracts, and obligations, and such other
documents made pursuant to law or ordinance; x x x
 Pursuant to this provision, the municipal mayor is required to secure the prior authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan before entering
into a contract on behalf of the municipality.
 In the instant case, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi unanimously passed Resolution No. 15-92 authorizing Mayor Corral to hire a lawyer
of her choice to represent the interest of Tiwi in the execution of this Court’s ruling in NAPOCOR v. Province of Albay
 Petitioners contention that the subject contract should first be ratified in order to become enforceable as against Tiwi must necessarily
fail.
 As correctly held by the CA, the law speaks of prior authorization and not ratification with respect to the power of the local chief
executive to enter into a contract on behalf of the LGU
 The wording of Resolution No. 15-92 is clear. Its title and whereas clauses, previously quoted above, indicate that the hiring of a lawyer
was for the sole purpose of executing the judgment in NAPOCOR v. Province of Albay, that is, to allow Tiwi to recover its rightful share
in the unpaid realty taxes of NPC. In his Complaint, respondent admits that he was furnished and read a copy of the said resolution
before he entered into the subject contract. He cannot now feign ignorance of the limitations of the authority of Mayor Corral to enter
into the subject contract and the purpose for which his services were employed.
 The allegations and admissions in the pleadings are sufficient to rule that Mayor Corral was duly authorized to enter into the Contract
of Legal Services. However, the legal services contemplated therein, which are properly compensable, are limited to such services, which
reasonably contributed to the recovery of Tiwis rightful share in the unpaid realty taxes of NPC. Paragraph 4 of the Contract of Legal
Services, insofar as it covers legal services outside of this purpose, is therefore unenforceable.
 It could not have been the intention of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi to authorize the hiring of a lawyer to perform general legal
services because this duty devolves upon the municipal legal officer. The council sought the services of a lawyer because the dispute
was between the municipality (Tiwi) and province (Albay) so much so that it f ell under the exception provided in Section
481(b)(3)(i)1[27] of the LGC which permits a LGU to employ the services of a special legal officer. Thus, the provisions of paragraph 4 of

the Contract of Legal Services to the contrary notwithstanding, the basis of respondents compensation should be limited to the services
he rendered which reasonably contributed to the recovery of Tiwis share in the subject realty taxes.
Third Issue: The issue of the reasonable legal fees due to respondent still needs to be resolved in a trial on the merits
 This aspect of the case is decisive because it goes into the central issue of whether the 10% contingent fee is unreasonable and
unconscionable. Consequently, it becomes necessary to weigh, based on the evidence that will be adduced during trial, the relative
importance of the aforesaid opinion vis--vis the cases allegedly handled by respondent on behalf of Tiwi insofar as they aided in the
eventual recovery of the unpaid realty taxes. And from here, the trial court may reasonably determine what weight or value to assign
the legal services which were rendered by respondent.
5. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO M. AUTHOR: STEPH

CACAYURAN NOTES:
G.R. No. 191667; April 17, 2013
TOPIC:
PONENTE:
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The distinction between ordinances and resolutions is well- perceived. While ordinances and laws possess
a general and permanent character, resolutions are merely temporary in nature as they merely express sentiments or opinion on a
specific matter or event.
Emergency Recit: Municipality of Agoo passed resolutions authorizing its mayor to enter into 2 loans with LBP in order to finance a
redevelopment plan of the Agoo Public Plaza. Construction of the commercial center at the Agoo Plaza was objected to by some
residents of the Municipality led by Cacayuran, claiming that the conversion of the Agoo Plaza into a commercial center, as funded
by the proceeds from the 2 loans were highly irregular, violative of the law, and detrimental to public interests, and will result to
wanton desecration of the said historical and public park. SC held that land bank cannot rely on the resolutions as basis to validate
the subject loans. Resolutions as opposed to ordinances, no rights can be conferred by and be inferred from a resolution.
FACTS:
1. The Municipality of Agoo’s Sangguniang Bayan (SB) passed resolutions to implement a Redevelopment Plan to redevelop the
Agoo Public Plaza where the Imelda Garden and Jose Rizal Monument were situated.
2. To finance the phase 1 of the said plan, SB initially passed a Resolution authorizing Mayor Eriguel to obtain a loan from Land
Bank and incidental thereto, mortgage a portion lot of the Agoo Plaza as collateral. To serve as additional security, it further
authorized the assignment of a portion of its internal revenue allotment (IRA) and the monthly income from the proposed
project in favor of Land Bank. The foregoing terms were confirmed, approved and ratified through Resolution.
3. Consequently, Land Bank extended a ₱4M loan in favor of the Municipality, the proceeds of which were used to construct 10
kiosks at the northern and southern portions of the Imelda Garden. After completion, these kiosks were rented out.
4. Later, a commercial center on the Plaza lot was built, with a loan from Land Bank, posting the same securities as the first loan.
Land Bank granted a second loan in favor of the Municipality in the principal amount of ₱28M (Second Loan).
5. Unlike phase 1 of the Redevelopment Plan, the construction of the commercial center at the Agoo Plaza was vehemently
objected to by some residents of the Municipality. Led by respondent Cacayuran, claimed that the conversion of the Agoo Plaza
into a commercial center, as funded by the proceeds from the First and Second Loans were "highly irregular, violative of the
law, and detrimental to public interests, and will result to wanton desecration of the said historical and public park." These
were embodied in a Manifesto, launched through a signature campaign conducted by the residents and Cacayuran.
6. Also, Cacayuran wrote a letter addressed to Mayor Eriguel, Vice Mayor Eslao, and the members of the SB expressing the
growing public clamor against the conversion of the Agoo Plaza into a commercial center.
7. Cacayuran, invoking his right as a taxpayer, filed a Complaint against the Implicated Officers and Land Bank, assailing, among
others, the validity of the Subject Loans on the ground that the Plaza Lot used as collateral thereof is property of public
dominion and therefore, beyond the commerce of man.
8. Upon denial of the MTD, the Implicated Officers and Land Bank filed their respective Answers.
9. Land Bank claimed that it is not privy to the Implicated Officers’ acts of destroying the Agoo Plaza; that Cacayuran did not have
a cause of action against it since he was not privy to any of the Subject Loans.
10. During the pendency of the proceedings, the construction of the commercial center was completed and the said structure later
became known as the Agoo’s People Center.
11. SB passed a Municipal Ordinance, declaring the area where the APC stood as patrimonial property of the Municipality.
12. RTC ruled in Cacayuran’s favor, declaring the nullity of the Subject Loans. It found that the resolutions approving the said
loans were passed in a highly irregular manner and thus, ultra vires; as such, the Municipality is not bound by the same.
Moreover, it found that the Plaza Lot is proscribed from collateralization given its nature as property for public use.

13. CA affirmed with modification RTC’s ruling, excluding Vice Mayor Eslao from any personal liability arising from the Subject
Loans. Cacayuran has locus standi as resident and taxpayer in the municipality and the issue involves public interest. The plaza
cannot be a valid collateral to a loans for it is of public dominion.
ISSUE(S):
1. whether Cacayuran has standing to sue - yes
2. whether the Subject Resolutions were validly passed – no
3. 3. whether the Subject Loans are ultra vires – yes, ultra vires act that is void
RULING:
1. for a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, 2 requisites must be met, 1) public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political
subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed; and (2) the petitioner is directly
affected by the alleged act.
 First, although the construction of the APC would be primarily sourced from the proceeds of the Subject Loans, which
Land Bank insists are not taxpayer’s money, there is no denying that public funds derived from taxation are bound to
be expended as the Municipality assigned a portion of its IRA as a security for the foregoing loans. Needless to state, the
Municipality’s IRA, which serves as the LGU’s just share in the national taxes, is in the nature of public funds derived
from taxation. The Court believes, however, that although these funds may be posted as a security, its collateralization
should only be deemed effective during the incumbency of the public officers who approved the same, else those who
succeed them be effectively deprived of its use.
 The proceeds from the Subject Loans had already been converted into public funds by the Municipality’s receipt thereof.
Funds coming from private sources become impressed with the characteristics of public funds when they are under
official custody. - Accordingly, the first requisite has been clearly met.
 Second, as a resident-taxpayer of the Municipality, Cacayuran is directly affected by the conversion of the Agoo Plaza
which was funded by the proceeds of the Subject Loans. It is well-settled that public plazas are properties for public use
and therefore, belongs to the public dominion. As such, it can be used by anybody and no one can exercise over it the
rights of a private owner. Cacayuran had a direct interest in ensuring that the Agoo Plaza would not be exploited for
commercial purposes through the APC’s construction.
 Cacayuran need not be privy to the Subject Loans in order to proffer his objections thereto. In Mamba v. Lara, it has
been held that a taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity; as long as taxes are involved,
people have a right to question contracts entered into by the government.
2. A careful perusal of Sec 444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC shows that while the authorization of the municipal mayor need not be in the
form of an ordinance, the obligation which the said local executive is authorized to enter into must be made pursuant to a law
or ordinance.
 Sec. 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. -
o (b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal mayor shall:
o (vi) Upon authorization by the sangguniang bayan, represent the municipality in all its business transactions and
sign on its behalf all bonds, contracts, and obligations, and such other documents made pursuant to law or
ordinance;
 while Mayor Eriguel’s authorization to contract the Subject Loans was not contained – as it need not be contained – in the
form of an ordinance, the said loans and even the Redevelopment Plan itself were not approved pursuant to any law or
ordinance but through mere resolutions.
 While ordinances are laws and possess a general and permanent character, resolutions are merely declarations of the
sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter and are temporary in nature. As opposed to ordinances,
"no rights can be conferred by and be inferred from a resolution." In this accord, it cannot be denied that the SB violated
Sec 444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC altogether.
 the passage of the Subject Resolutions was also tainted with other irregularities, (1) SB’s failure to submit the Subject
Resolutions to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of La Union for its review contrary to Sec 56 of the LGC; and (2) lack of
publication and posting in contravention of Sec 59 of the LGC.
 Hence, Land Bank cannot rely on the Subject Resolutions as basis to validate the Subject Loans.
3. Generally, an ultra vires act is one committed outside the object for which a corporation is created as defined by the law of its
organization and therefore beyond the powers conferred upon it by law. There are 2 types of ultra vires acts. As held in
Middletown Policemen's Benevolent Association v. Township of Middletown:
 There is a distinction between an act utterly beyond the jurisdiction of a municipal corporation and the irregular exercise
of a basic power under the legislative grant in matters not in themselves jurisdictional. The former are ultra vires in the
primary sense and void; the latter, ultra vires only in a secondary sense which does not preclude ratification or the
application of the doctrine of estoppel in the interest of equity and essential justice.

 In other words, an act which is outside of the municipality’s jurisdiction is considered as a void ultra vires act, while an
act attended only by an irregularity but remains within the municipality’s power is considered as an ultra vires act
subject to ratification and/or validation. To the former belongs municipal contracts which (a) are entered into beyond
the express, implied or inherent powers of the local government unit; and (b) do not comply with the substantive
requirements of law e.g., when expenditure of public funds is to be made, there must be an actual appropriation and
certificate of availability of funds; while to the latter belongs those which (a) are entered into by the improper
department, board, officer of agent; and (b)do not comply with the formal requirements of a written contract e.g., the
Statute of Frauds.
 Applying these principles to the case at bar, it is clear that the Subject Loans belong to the first class of ultra vires acts
deemed as void.
 Records disclose that the said loans were executed by the Municipality for the purpose of funding the conversion of the
Agoo Plaza into a commercial center pursuant to the Redevelopment Plan. However, the conversion of the said plaza is
beyond the Municipality’s jurisdiction considering the property’s nature as one for public use and thereby, forming part of
the public dominion. Accordingly, it cannot be the object of appropriation either by the State or by private persons. Nor
can it be the subject of lease or any other contractual undertaking.
 Nevertheless, while the Subject Loans cannot bind the Municipality for being ultra vires, the officers who authorized the
passage of the Subject Resolutions are personally liable. Case law states that public officials can be held personally
accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires.
06. The Learning Child et al. v. Ayala Alabang Village AUTHOR: S A Y O

Association, et al., Notes: Ang hirap 
TOPIC: Iba din lumalabas sa GR No and SCRA
PONENTE:
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: While it would be a violation of the principle of separation of powers for the courts to interfere with the
wordings of a statute, there would be no violation of said principle for the court to merely affirm the correction made by the same
entity which committed the error.
EMERGENCY RECIT: A parcel of land was sold to spouses Alfonso with an annotated Deed of Restrictions, which states that the
property shall be exclusively used for the establishment and maintenance thereon of apreparatory school. However, spouses
Alfonso opened on the same lot The Learning Child CenterPre-school (TLC) which was later expanded to include a grade school
program. AAVA filed with theRTC an action for injunction against TLC and the spouses Alfonso, alleging breach of contract.
RTCrendered its Decision in favor of AAVA.
TLC and the spouses Alfonso filed a Motion for Reconsideration and while pending, the Municipalityof Muntinlupa, through its
Sangguniang Bayan, passed Resolution No. 94-179 correcting an allegedtypographical error in the description of a parcel of land
under the heading "Institutional Zone" in Appendix B of Ordinance No. 91-
39, adjusting the description "Lot 25, Block 1, Phase V, Ayala Alabang" to "Lot 25, Block 3, Phase V, Ayala Alabang." According
to the HLURB, Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is not a case of a mere correction of anerror but an actual rezoning of the property
into an institutional area, and therefore remanded thesame to the Sanguniang Bayan of Muntinlupa for the conduct of the required
public hearings. TheMunicipality of Muntinlupa, TLC and the spouses Alfonso appealed the HLURB Resolution to theOffice of the
President which held that Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is a mere rectifyingissuance and need not comply with the mandatory
requirements of notice and hearing. CA affirmedwith modifications
FACTS:
 Subdivision developer Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI) sold a parcel of land to the spouses Jose and Cristina Yuson.
 Sps Yuson sold the same to the spouses Felipe and Mary Anne Alfonso. A Deed of Restrictions was annotated in the TCT issued
to the spouses Alfonso, as had been required by ALI.
 The Deed of Restrictions indicated that:
2.2 USE AND OCCUPANCY - The property shall be used exclusively for the establishment and maintenance
thereon of a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school, which may include such installations as an office
for school administration, playground and garage for school vehicles.

ALI turned over the right and power to enforce the restrictions on the properties in the Ayala Alabang Village to
the association of homeowners therein, the Ayala Alabang Village Association (AAVA).

Sps Alfonso opened on the same lot The Learning Child Center Pre-school (TLC), a preparatory school which
initially consisted of nursery and kindergarten classes.

The TLC was expanded to include a grade school program which provided additional grade levels as the pupils
who initially enrolled advanced.


Injunction Case: AAVA filed with the RTC of Makati City an action for injunction against TLC and the spouses
Alfonso alleging breach of contract, particularly, the restriction and violations of Metropolitan Manila
Commission Ordinance No. 81-01 (MMC No. 81-01), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance
for the National Capital Region and Barangay Ordinance No. 03, Series of 1991.

RTC agreed with the spouses Alfonso. with the reclassification by Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance No. 91-39 of the
subject property, the earlier residential classification can no longer be enforced. MR also denied
Zoning Ordinance Case

 While the MR of TLC and the spouses Alfonso was still pending in the RTC, the Municipality of Muntinlupa, through its
Sangguniang Bayan, passed Resolution No. 94-179 correcting an alleged typographical error in the description of a parcel of
land under the heading "Institutional Zone" in Appendix B of Ordinance No. 91-39, adjusting the description "Lot 25, Block 1,
Phase V, Ayala Alabang" to "Lot 25, Block 3, Phase V, Ayala Alabang."
 This is the same ordinance which was used as basis by the Makati RTC in Civil Case No. 92-2950, when it ruled for AAVA.
 Lot 25, Block 3, Phase V is the subject property wherein TLC is located.
 The Municipality of Muntinlupa wrote a letter to the Metropolitan Manila Zoning Administration Office, informing the latter of
the enactment of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179. On December 1, 1994, the Municipality of Muntinlupa filed a Petition for
the approval of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). AAVA and the
adjacent property owners filed an Opposition.
 On June 26, 1995, the HLURB issued its Resolution remanding the case to Sanguniang Bayan of Muntinlupa for the conduct of
the required public hearings as mandated by the "Uniform Guidelines for Rezoning of the Metro Manila Area.
 According to the HLURB, Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is not a case of a mere correction of an error but an actual rezoning
of the property into an institutional area, and therefore remanded the same to the Sanguniang Bayan of Muntinlupa for the
conduct of the required public hearings.
 The Municipality of Muntinlupa, TLC and the spouses Alfonso appealed the HLURB Resolution to the Office of the President.
 OP held: Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is a mere rectifying issuance to an alleged typographical error in Ordinance No. 91-
39, and therefore does not need for its validity compliance with the mandatory requirements of notice and hearing; Deed of
Restrictions need not be recognized.
 The Zoning case was appealed to the CA (agreed with the OP that being merely a rectifying issuance and not a rezoning
enactment, the questioned Resolution did not have to comply with the mandatory requirements of notice and hearing but OP
exceeded its authority when it ruled that the Deed of Restrictions had lost its force and effect in view of the passage of
Ordinance No. 91-39.
ISSUE(S): WON Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is valid (YES)
RATIO:
Validity of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179

 AAVA claims that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Decision of the Office of the President that Muntinlupa Resolution
No. 94-179 was merely a rectifying issuance and not a rezoning enactment, and therefore did not have to comply with the
requirements of notice and hearing which are required for zoning ordinances. Notice and hearing are required under the
Uniform Guidelines for the Rezoning of the Metropolitan Manila Area, contained in Resolution No. 12, series of 1991, of the
then Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC).
 In asserting that Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 is not a mere rectifying enactment, AAVA faults the Office of the President
and the Court of Appeals in allegedly accepting hook, line and sinker the assertion of the ENCRFO Regional Officer and the
Municipality (now City) of Muntinlupa itself that Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 was passed merely to correct a
typographical error in Appendix B of Ordinance No. 91-39.
 Even more telling that there was indeed a typographical error in Appendix B of Ordinance No. 91-39 is the fact that both the
Official Zoning Map of Muntinlupa and that of the Ayala Alabang Village show that the subject property, described as "Lot 25,
Block 3, Phase V of Ayala Alabang" is classified as "institutional." On the other hand, neither the Official Zoning Map of
Muntinlupa nor that of the Ayala Alabang Village classify "Lot 25, Block 1, Phase V of Ayala Alabang" as institutional. The official
zoning map is an indispensable and integral part of a zoning ordinance, without which said ordinance would be considered
void. Indeed, Section 3 of Ordinance No. 91-39 expressly provides that the Official Zoning Map of Muntinlupa shall be made an
integral part of said ordinance.
 It is therefore crystal clear that there was a typographical error in Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance No. 91-39. AAVA, however,
furthermore claims that even assuming arguendo that there was a typographical error in the said zoning ordinance, the proper
remedy is to legislate a new zoning ordinance, following all the formalities therefor, citing the leading case of Resins,
Incorporated v. Auditor General. Again, we disagree.
 Resins was decided on the principle of separation of powers, that the judiciary should not interfere with the workings of the
executive and legislative branches of government:
If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by
the Executive – on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining
one of the cornerstones of our democratic system – the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial
decree.
 In Resins, it was a taxpayer who alleged that there was an error in the printing of the statute, unlike in the case at bar where it
is the Municipality (now City) of Muntinlupa itself which seeks to correct its own error in the printing of the ordinance. While
it would be a violation of the principle of separation of powers for the courts to interfere with the wordings of a statute,
there would be no violation of said principle for the court to merely affirm the correction made by the same entity which
committed the error. In Resins, there is a presumption of regularity in favor of the enrolled bill, which the courts should not
speculate on. In the case at bar, it is the curative Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179 which is entitled to a presumption of
regularity.
 Finally, AAVA claims that the power to evaluate, approve or disapprove zoning ordinances lies with the HLURB under Article
IV, Section 5(b) of Executive Order No. 648. AAVA reminds us that the decisions of administrative agencies on matters
pertaining to their jurisdiction will generally not be disturbed by the courts.
 We should remind AAVA that the Court of Appeals, the court that was first to reexamine the case at bar, affirmed the Decision
of the Office of the President, which had set aside the HLURB ruling. The authority of the HLURB is certainly subordinate to that
of the Office of the President and the acts of the former may be set aside by the latter. Furthermore, while it is true that courts
will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation
of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies, it should be noted that the HLURB
and the then MMC were both tasked to regulate the rezoning of the Metropolitan Manila area. The then Municipality of
Muntinlupa submitted Resolution No. 94-179 to both the HLURB and the MMC for their appropriate action. The MMC approved
Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179, and this approval should be given more weight than the disapproval of the HLURB since it
was the MMC itself which issued the Uniform Guidelines for the Rezoning of the Metropolitan Manila Area (MMC Resolution
No. 12, Series of 1991), the issuance alleged by AAVA to have been violated by the Municipality of Muntinlupa.
 In sum, Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179, being a mere corrective issuance, is not invalidated by the lack of notice and hearing
as AAVA contends.
7. Greenhills East Association, Inc., represented by its AUTHOR: The Taliño

President, Josefina J. Castillo vs. E. Ganzon, Inc., represented NOTES: Dami dates lol.
by its President, Eulalio Ganzon GEA – Greenhills East Association, Inc.
[G.R. No. 169741; January 20, 2010] EGI – E. Ganzon, Inc.
TOPIC: Session 8 – Other Provisions MMZO – Metropolitan Manila Commission Ordinance
PONENTE: Abad, J. OP – Office of the President
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
 The Rules and Regulations Governing Appeals to the OP requires the appellant to file, not only a notice of appeal, but also a
memorandum on appeal that must, among other things, state the grounds relied on for the appeal, the issues involved, and
the reliefs sought. The appellant must, to perfect his appeal, comply with these requirements within 15 days from receipt of a
copy of the HLURB decision.
 No matter how hard it tries to learn the technical intricacies of certain highly regulated human activities, the SC will always be
inadequately equipped to identify the facts that matter when resolving issues involving such activities. Invariably, the Court
must respect the factual findings of administrative agencies which have expertise on matters that fall within their
jurisdiction. Here, since the HLURB has the expertise in applying zonal classifications on specific properties and since GEA fails
to make out a clear case that it has erred, the Court must rely on its finding that EGI’s land site does not, for the purpose of
applying height restrictions, adjoin an R-1 zone.
Emergency Recit: EGI sought to develop a 4,109 sqm lot into the SKYCITY Condominium at the corner of EDSA and Ortigas Ave. in
Brgy. Wack-Wack, Greenhills East, Mandaluyong City. EGI fenced its land site, demolished the structures on it, and began excavation
works without first getting a clearance from the Brgy. GEA wrote the HLURB, opposing EGI’s project. In a separate development,
EGI applied with the Brgy. for clearance covering its project. However, the Brgy. denied the application. The HLURB Arbiter
rendered a decision, dismissing GEA’s opposition to EGI’s project. Acting on GEA’s petition for review of the Arbiter’s decision, the
HLURB Board of Commissioners issued a resolution, denying the petition. GEA filed its Notice of Appeal with the OP. GEA received
a copy of the OP’s order dated Nov. 27, 2001, requiring GEA to file its memorandum on appeal within 15 days from notice. But
before the period was up, GEA filed a motion for extension of 15 days within which to submit its memorandum on appeal. GEA filed
another motion for extension, this time for 5 days or until Jan. 16, 2002, within which to file the required memorandum. GEA filed
the required Memorandum on Appeal with the OP but asked that office for an extension of 2 days within which to file the required
draft decision. GEA filed still another motion for extension, this time for one day, within which to file the required draft. GEA claims
that it intended to file the same on Jan. 21, 2002 but, due to a nationwide brownout on that day, it had to ask for 5 more days
within which to do so. Finally, GEA filed its draft decision with the OP. GEA received a copy of an order from the OP dated Jan. 28,
2003, denying its appeal on the ground of GEA’s failure to perfect it on time. GEA moved for a reconsideration of the Order, but
the OP denied the same. GEA filed with the CA a petition for review of the OP’s orders. CA: Rendered judgment, denying GEA’s
petition. SC affirmed the CA. (Refer above)
FACTS:
 GEA is the homeowners association of Greenhills East Subdivision, a residential subdivision in Brgy. Wack-Wack, Greenhills
East, Mandaluyong City.
 For a time now, EGI has sought to develop a 4,109 sqm. lot at the corner of EDSA and Ortigas Ave. in Brgy. Wack-Wack with its
owner, the San Buena Realty and Development Corp. EGI wanted to build on the property a 77-storey mixed-used building
with an 8-storey basement for a total of 85 storeys. The proposed SKYCITY Condominium, when built, will be the tallest building
in the country.
 GEA’s subdivision has been classified under Sec. 4, Art. IV of the MMZO 81-01 as an "R-1 low density residential zone." The
subdivision consists of about 380 lots.
 As it happened, the land site on which the project will rise is adjacent to Greenhills East Subdivision although MMZO 81-01
had classified that site as "C-2" or a Major Commercial Zone. It is bounded by EDSA on the east, Florida Street on the north, Lot
11, Block 4 of the Subdivision and a narrow creek on the west, and Ortigas Ave. on the south.
 April or May 1997 - EGI fenced its land site, demolished the structures on it, and began excavation works without first getting
a clearance from the Brgy.
 July 10, 1997 - The HLURB issued to EGI a Certificate of Locational Viability.
 Aug. 11, 1997 - The City of Mandaluyong issued to EGI an Excavation and Ground Preparation Permit.
 Sept. 15, 1997 - The HLURB further issued to EGI a Preliminary Approval and Locational Clearance for its project.
 Jan. 1998 - GEA wrote the HLURB NCR Regional Director, opposing EGI’s project. Not content with its HLURB opposition, GEA
filed a separate one addressed to the DPWH.
 June 4, 1998 - The DPWH advised the Building Official of Mandaluyong to require EGI to secure a Development Permit and a
valid Locational Clearance for its project from the HLURB. In a separate development, EGI applied with the Brgy. for clearance
covering its project. However, the Brgy. denied the application.
 Nov. 24, 1999 - The HLURB Arbiter rendered a decision, dismissing GEA’s opposition to EGI’s project.
 Mar. 20, 2001 - Acting on GEA’s petition for review of the Arbiter’s decision, the HLURB Board of Commissioners issued a
resolution, denying the petition. It also denied GEA’s MR.
 Nov. 20, 2001 - GEA filed its Notice of Appeal with the OP, simultaneously paying the required appeal and legal fees.
 Dec. 12, 2001 - GEA received a copy of the OP’s order dated Nov. 27, 2001, requiring GEA to file its memorandum on appeal
within 15 days from notice. But before the period was up or on Dec. 27, 2001, GEA filed a motion for extension of 15 days
within which to submit its memorandum on appeal. On Jan. 11, 2002, GEA filed another motion for extension, this time for 5
days or until Jan. 16, 2002, within which to file the required memorandum.
 Jan 16, 2002 - GEA filed the required Memorandum on Appeal with the OP but asked that office for an extension of 2 days
within which to file the required draft decision.
 Jan. 18, 2002 - GEA filed still another motion for extension, this time for one day, within which to file the required draft. GEA
claims that it intended to file the same on Jan. 21, 2002 but, due to a nationwide brownout on that day, it had to ask for 5 more
days within which to do so.
 Jan. 28, 2002 - Finally, GEA filed its draft decision with the OP.
 Feb. 10, 2003 - GEA received a copy of an order from the OP dated Jan. 28, 2003, denying its appeal on the ground of GEA’s
failure to perfect it on time. GEA moved for a reconsideration of the Order, but the OP denied the same.
 Aug. 13, 2003 - GEA filed with the CA a petition for review of the OP’s orders.
 CA: Rendered judgment, denying GEA’s petition.
ISSUE(S):
 WON the CA correctly upheld the ruling of the OP that GEA failed to perfect on time its appeal to that office from the decision
of the HLURB.
 WON the HLURB erred in finding no valid ground to restrict EGI’s use of the subject land site, which lies beside a residential
subdivision, for constructing a high-rise building.
HELD: Yip and Nope. CA is affirmed!

RATIO:
First Issue:
 GEA contends that it had already perfected its appeal when it filed on Nov. 20, 2001 a notice of appeal with the OP from the
decision of the HLURB.
 The Rules and Regulations Governing Appeals to the OP requires the appellant to file, not only a notice of appeal, but also a
memorandum on appeal that must, among other things, state the grounds relied on for the appeal, the issues involved, and
the reliefs sought. The appellant must, to perfect his appeal, comply with these requirements within 15 days from receipt of a
copy of the HLURB decision. GEA, however, failed to submit an appeal memorandum.
 Still, the OP actually gave GEA a chance to comply with the omitted requirement by directing it in the Order of Nov. 27, 2001
to submit its appeal memorandum and draft decision within 15 days from notice; otherwise, it would dismiss the case. Since
GEA received the above order on Dec. 12, 2001, it had until Dec. 27, 2001 within which to comply with it.
 GEA points out that it filed 2 successive motions for extension of time within which to file the required memorandum appeal
and draft decision. Since GEA had already filed its memorandum appeal before the OP could deny those motions, it cannot be
said that GEA filed the memorandum appeal out of time.
 But GEA gambled when it did not file the memorandum appeal and draft decision within the extra 15 days that the OP gave it.
It asked first for an extension of 15 days and then an additional extension of 5 days. GEA had no right to assume, however, that
the OP would grant these extensions. The governing rules did not provide for them. Consequently, GEA has only itself to blame
when its appeal was dismissed.
 Notably, the OP also required GEA to file, along with its memorandum appeal, a draft decision. GEA did not. It instead filed 2
more motions for extension of time within which to do so. Sec. 5 of the Rules of that office provides that failure to comply
with its orders may warrant a dismissal of the appeal. Consequently, the OP acted within its authority in dismissing GEA’s
appeal for this additional reason.
Second Issue:
 With the above ruling, this decision should end here. But GEA asks the Court to dispense with the technicalities involved and
rule instead on the merits of the case, given that GEA and its members had gone through a lot of trouble to get the HLURB to
stop the project from rising on the contested land site. To avert the likelihood that this case would shift to another forum under
the guise of some other issue or issues, the Court deems it wise to resolve the substantial issue that GEA presents considering
that both sides have amply argued the same.
 GEA invokes Sec. 10, Art. V of MMZO 81-01. This section provides height restrictions on a C-2 property that adjoins an R-1
property without an intervening street or permanent open space that is over 6 meters wide and that the properties have
adjacent front yards, or even when there are none, the intervening street or permanent open space does not exceed 3 meters
in width.
 But MMZO 81-01 applies to a situation where an R-1 property adjoins a C-2 property. This has ceased to be the case between
the land site and the subdivision after the Mandaluyong City government enacted Ordinance 128 in 1993. That was before
the present case came up. Ordinance 128 converted certain R-1 zones to C-2 zones and these included those on the western
side of EGI’s land site, namely Lot 11, Block 4, and Lot 11, Block 20. Consequently, the subject land site ceased to be adjacent
to an R-1 zone and no longer suffered from height restrictions.
 GEA claims that the lots that Ordinance 128 converted into C-2 zones were only the lots between Ortigas Ave. and Notre Dame
Street that run parallel to EDSA but at some depth from it. They are on the Wack-Wack side of Ortigas Ave. Ordinance 128
describes the newly converted C-2 zones relevant to this case as "a lot deep along Ortigas Ave. from EDSA to Notre Dame
Street." Because of the mention of Notre Dame Street, which is found on only one side of Ortigas Ave., GEA concludes that the
new C-2 zones did not extend to the other side of Ortigas Ave. where Greenhills East Subdivision and EGI’s land site are located.
 But, as HLURB pointed out, if the purpose of the ordinance was to limit the land classification conversion only to the side of
Ortigas Ave. where the Wack-Wack Subdivision lay, it would have simply stated, using the technical language applied to the
other converted areas, "a lot deep along the Wack-Wack side of Ortigas Ave. from EDSA to Notre Dame Street," instead of
saying, "a lot deep along Ortigas Ave." It could only mean, therefore, that the ordinance intended to convert all the lots, on
both sides and margins of Ortigas Ave. up to the point where Notre Dame Street was.
 The Court finds either conclusion unclear, given the essentially vague way by which Ordinance 128 describes the affected areas.
What really clears up the issue for the Court is the HLURB’s recourse to the Revised Zoning Map of Mandaluyong City. The
color-coded map shows identical color and captions for the lots stretching at some depth from EDSA, but running parallel to it,
on both sides of Ortigas Ave., including Lot 11, Block 4, and Lot 11, Block 20 on the Greenhills East Subdivision side. The map
tags both sides of Ortigas Ave. with the same C-2 classification.
 In relying on the Mandaluyong zoning map, the HLURB took note of the standard procedure observed in fixing the boundaries
of lands, where the preparation and drafting of the illustrative maps precede the drafting of the text that describes those
boundaries. Although the text of the ordinance is controlling, any doubt or vagueness in the meaning of its provisions may be
cleared up by a reference to the official map. As a quasi-judicial body, which enjoys an expertise in land zoning classifications,
the HLURB can take judicial notice of such official maps as are generated and used in government zoning activities. The Court
has no reason to disturb its findings in this case.
 GEA argues, however, that even on the assumption that Ordinance 128 converted the lots on the Greenhills East Subdivision
side of Ortigas Ave. into a C-2 zone, such conversion affected only Lot 11, Block 20. It did not convert Lot 11, Block 4, which
was adjacent to the controversial land site, and which retained an R-1 classification.

 But, as the HLURB Board of Commissioners noted, using the sketch map submitted to it, although the land site indeed adjoins
Lot 11, Block 4, it does so not in the manner that would properly call for the application of the zoning ordinance. Based on the
HLURB’s observation, Lot 11 of Block 4 and the land site do not have common boundaries that join them. Rather, they touch
each other only at a certain point due to the irregular shape of the properties, following the direction of the meandering creek
that lies between them. For this reason, it cannot be said that Sec. 10, Art. V of MMZO 81-01, which sets height restrictions,
applies to the project.
 No matter how hard it tries to learn the technical intricacies of certain highly regulated human activities, the SC will always be
inadequately equipped to identify the facts that matter when resolving issues involving such activities. Invariably, the Court
must respect the factual findings of administrative agencies which have expertise on matters that fall within their
jurisdiction. Here, since the HLURB has the expertise in applying zonal classifications on specific properties and since GEA fails
to make out a clear case that it has erred, the Court must rely on its finding that EGI’s land site does not, for the purpose of
applying height restrictions, adjoin an R-1 zone.
 GEA nonetheless contends that the proposed 77-storey building would have mixed uses, part residential, part office, and part
commercial, which would not be accord with the patterns of land uses suitable to C-2 zones. The buildings in C-2 zones, it
suggests, should rise no higher than 40 or 50 storeys from the ground. GEA invokes Art. IV, Sec. 4, par. 5 of MMZO 81-01,
which states that establishments in a C-2 zone should be sufficient to provide the needs of the district level. GEA infers from
this that a C-2 establishment must be such that it will provide the needs of the district level only and that, beyond those needs,
the establishment should be in High Intensity or C-3 Zone.
 But such contention has no basis. MMZO 81-01 contains no provision that allows the construction of not more than 40 or 50-
storey buildings in a C-1 or C-2 zone and restricts higher buildings to a C-3 zone. There are just no height restrictions under the
law for buildings located in C-2 zones, save probably for height clearances prescribed by the Air Transportation Office.
 The Court cannot find fault in HLURB’s assertion that the real test of whether a land use serves the need of a district is not in
the size or height of the buildings but in the sufficiency or surplus of the business or human activities in a given district to which
they cater. Land use is affected by the intensity of such activities. Extraordinary population density or overcrowding, brought
about by competition for space in the scarce area of the district, is to be avoided. Using this test, the HLURB, which is the
clearing house for efficient land use, found no clear showing that EGI’s project if finished would cause havoc in the population
level of the land district where the project lies.
 What is more, the houses of GEA’s members are separated by fence and guarded gates from the adjacent areas outside their
subdivision. Their exclusiveness amply protects their yen for greater space than the rest of the people of the metropolis outside
their enclave can hope for. EGI’s project offers no threat to the subdivision’s privacy. It is on the other side of the fence, wholly
unconnected to the workings within the subdivision. The new building would be in the stream of human traffic that passes
EDSA and Ortigas Ave. Consequently, it would largely attract people whose primary activities connect to those wide avenues.
It would seem unreasonable for petitioner GEA to dictate on property owners outside their gates how they should use their
lands if such use is not in contravention of law.
 Finally, GEA contends that the lack of approval of the project by the homeowners’ association or the Brgy. precludes it from
proceeding. GEA invokes Sec. 14, Art. V of MMZO 81-01 which provides that, where a proposed land use will necessarily affect
the character of the residential zone, the proponent needs to get such approval. It is a prerequisite for the issuance of a
locational clearance and a building permit.
 But, although Sec. 152 (c) of the LGC requires a barangay clearance for any activity within its jurisdiction, such clearance cannot
be denied when the activity is in a permissible zone. The denial would otherwise be illegal. Here, as discussed above, the
applicable ordinance of Mandaluyong City does not preclude the construction of the project on the land site in question over
the unreasonable objection of a nearby association of subdivision dwellers. Indeed, the city or municipality to which
the barangay unit belongs may still issue the required license or building permit despite the withholding of
the barangay clearance as had happened in this case.
 The Court will not dwell on the other matters raised concerning environmental requirements respecting light, ventilation,
drainage, sewerage, waste disposal, and pollution relating to the project. These matters very well fall under the competence
of other government agencies. Surely, the HLURB decision does not and cannot in any way confer a blanket passport for
constructing a building that does not meet the requirements of other laws.
08 The Province of Negros Occidental v. COA AUTHOR: Tan

G.R. No. 182574, September 28, 2010 Notes:
TOPIC: Session 8
PONENTE: Carpio, J.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: The grant of additional compensation like hospitalization and health care insurance benefits does not need
the approval of the President to be valid because the President only exercises supervision over local government units.

EMERGENCY RECIT: Petitioner, through an approved Sangguniang Panlalawigan resolution, granted and released the disbursement
for the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits of the province’s officials and employees without any prior approval from
the President. The COA disallowed the premium payment for such benefits since petitioner allegedly disregarded AO 103 and RA
6758, which require prior Presidential approval to conform with the state policy on salary standardization for government workers.
SC held that the requirement of prior approval from the President under AO 103 is applicable only to government offices under the
President’s control. Being an LGU, petitioner is merely under the President’s general supervision. Thus, the grant of additional
compensation like hospitalization and health care insurance benefits does not need the approval of the President to be valid.
FACTS:
 Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental passed a Resolution allocating P4,000,000 of its retained earnings for the
hospitalization and health care insurance benefits of 1,949 officials and employees of the province. After a public bidding, the
Committee on Awards granted the insurance coverage to Philam Care.
 Petitioner Province of Negros Occidental, represented by its then Governor Coscolluela, and Philam Care entered into a Group
Health Care Agreement involving a total payment of P3,760,000 representing the insurance premiums of its officials and
employees.
 After a post-audit investigation, the Provincial Auditor issued a Notice of Suspension, suspending the premium payment
because of lack of approval from the Office of the President (OP) as provided under AO 103. The Provincial Auditor explained
that the premium payment for health care benefits violated RA 6758 or the Salary Standardization Law.
 Petitioner complied with the directive post-facto and sent a letter-request to the OP. Then President Joseph E. Estrada directed
the COA to lift the suspension but only in the amount of P100,000. The Provincial Auditor ignored the directive of the President
and instead issued a Notice of Disallowance stating similar grounds as mentioned in the Notice of Suspension.
 Petitioner appealed the disallowance to the COA, which affirmed the Provincial Auditor’s Notice of Disallowance. The COA
ruled that under AO 103, no government entity, including a local government unit, is exempt from securing prior approval from
the President granting additional benefits to its personnel. This is in conformity with the policy of standardization of
compensation laid down in RA 6758.
 Petitioner insists that the payment of the insurance premium for the health benefits of its officers and employees was not
unlawful and improper since it was paid from an allocation of its retained earnings pursuant to a valid appropriation ordinance.
Petitioner states that such enactment was a clear exercise of its express powers under the principle of local fiscal autonomy
which includes the power of Local Government Units (LGUs) to allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities.
Petitioner adds that while it is true that LGUs are only agents of the national government and local autonomy simply means
decentralization, it is equally true that an LGU has fiscal control over its own revenues derived solely from its own tax base.
ISSUE(S): Whether COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the disallowance of P3,760,000 for premium paid for the
hospitalization and health care insurance benefits granted by the Province of Negros Occidental to its 1,949 officials and employees.
HELD: YES
RATIO:
 Section 2 of AO 103 state:
SECTION 2. All heads of government offices/agencies, including government owned and/or controlled
corporations, as well as their respective governing boards are hereby enjoined and prohibited from
authorizing/granting Productivity Incentive Benefits or any and all forms of allowances/benefits without prior
approval and authorization via Administrative Order by the Office of the President. Henceforth, anyone found
violating any of the mandates in this Order, including all officials/agency found to have taken part thereof, shall be
accordingly and severely dealt with in accordance with the applicable provisions of existing administrative and penal
laws.
Consequently, all administrative authorizations to grant any form of allowances/benefits and all forms of additional
compensation usually paid outside of the prescribed basic salary under R.A. 6758, the Salary Standardization Law, that
are inconsistent with the legislated policy on the matter or are not covered by any legislative action are hereby
revoked.”
 From a close reading of the provisions of AO 103, petitioner did not violate the rule of prior approval from the President since
Section 2 states that the prohibition applies only to “government offices/agencies, including government-owned and/or
controlled corporations, as well as their respective governing boards.” Nowhere is it indicated in Section 2 that the prohibition
also applies to LGUs. The requirement then of prior approval from the President under AO 103 is applicable only to
departments, bureaus, offices and government-owned and controlled corporations under the Executive branch. In other
words, AO 103 must be observed by government offices under the President’s control as mandated by Section 17, Article VII
of the Constitution which states:
“Section 17. The President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed.”
 Being an LGU, petitioner is merely under the President’s general supervision pursuant to Section 4, Article X of the Constitution:
“Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with
respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays
shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.”
 Since LGUs are subject only to the power of general supervision of the President, the President’s authority is limited to seeing
to it that rules are followed and laws are faithfully executed. The President may only point out that rules have not been followed
but the President cannot lay down the rules, neither does he have the discretion to modify or replace the rules. Thus, the grant
of additional compensation like hospitalization and health care insurance benefits in the present case does not need the
approval of the President to be valid.
 Consistent with the state policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution, under Section 25, Article II and
Section 2, Article X, and the Local Government Code of 1991, we declare that the grant and release of the hospitalization and
health care insurance benefits given to petitioner’s officials and employees were validly enacted through an ordinance passed
by petitioner’s Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
9. Bayan Muna v. Romulo and Ople AUTHOR: Valera (Used Lacap’s Ratio- I can’t do any better)
GR No. 159618, February 1, 2011 Notes: This petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition
TOPIC: Treaties/Executive Agreements under Rule 65 assails and seeks to nullify the Non-Surrender
PONENTE: Velasco. Agreement concluded by and between the Republic of the
Philippines (RP) and the United States of America (USA).
ROMULO = EXEC SEC
OPLE = DFA SEC.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: I don’t know which topic we are focusing on so the ones in BOLD in the Ratio would be the doctrine.
Emergency Recit: The RP and The US had an agreement which in essence states that “ absent the consent of one party, persons of
in the territory of another shall not be transferred or surrendered to any international tribunal.” The Agreement was done through
the process of Exchange of Notes, wherein the US Ambassador through a note proposed the agreement and the DFA Secretary via
exchange of notes consented to the agreement. Bayan- Muna asserts that such was an invalid agreement as it did not have the
concurrence of the senate and that it contravenes the Rome Statute that the PH is a signatory of but have not yet fully ratified. The
SC held that the agreement was valid, as it was an executive agreement no need for senate concurrence and it does not contravene
the Rome Statute.
FACTS:
 On Dec 28, 2000, the RP signed the Rome Statute which but its terms is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the
signatory states. Philippines as of the time of this case has not completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process.
 The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court, with the power to the power to exercise its
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern x x x and shall be complementary to
the national criminal jurisdictions.
 On May 9, 2003, Ambassador Riccardone sent the US embassy Note No. 0470 to the DFA proposing the terms of the non-
surrender bilateral agreement(agreement) between the US and the RP.
 Via Exchange of Notes No. BFO -028-03( E/N BFO-028-03), the RP represented by DFA sec. Ople agreed with and accepted the
US proposals in the US embassy note and put in effect the Agreement with the US.
 The agreement aims to protect what it refers to and defines as persons of the RP and the US from frivolous and
harassment suits that might be brought against them in international tribunal.
 The Agreement contains:
i. Persons are defined as current or former government officials, employees, military personnel
ii. That absent the consent of one party, persons in the territory of another shall not be transferred or
surrendered to any international tribunal (unless such tribunal has been established by the Un Security
Council) or to any other entity or third county; or to be expelled to a third country
iii. When the US extradites a person of the Philippines to a third country, the US will not transfer or surrender
such person to any tribunal without the consent of the Philippines, (this rule vice versa with the
Philippines)
 When the Sol Gen Benipayo inquired on the status of the non-surrender agreement to Ambassador Ricciardone, the
Ambassador replied that the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a legally binding agreement under international law and
that under US law, the Agreement did not require the advice and consent of the US Senate.
 In this Petition, Bayan-Muna imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the Agreement. And
prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional or at least declared as w/o force and effect.
 On the other hand, Respondents, questions Bayan-Muna’s legal standing and that the Agreement, being in the nature of an
executive agreement does not require Senate concurrence for its efficacy.
ISSUE(S):
1. W/N the Agreement was contracted validly?
2. WON the Agreement is valid, binding and effective without the concurrence of the Senate?
HELD: Yup and Yes.

RATIO:
EMERGENCY HELD:
 ISSUE 1: Whether or not the agreement was contracted validly, which resolves itself into the question of whether or not
respondents gravely abused their discretion in concluding it. -- YES it is valid and there’s no grave abuse of discretion.
o The Constitution vests in the President the power to enter into international agreements, subject, in appropriate
cases, to the required concurrence votes of the Senate. But as earlier indicated, executive agreements may be validly
entered into without such concurrence.
o In thus agreeing to conclude the Agreement thru E/N BFO‐028‐03, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
represented by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, acted within the scope of the authority and discretion vested in her
by the Constitution. At the end of the day, the President––by ratifying, thru her deputies, the non‐surrender
agreement––did nothing more than discharge a constitutional duty and exercise a prerogative that pertains to her
office.
o The rationale behind this principle is the inviolable doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive
and judicial branches of the government.
 ISSUE 2: Whether or not x x x AGREEMENT IS VALID, BINDING AND EFFECTIVE WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE BY AT LEAST TWO‐
THIRDS (2/3) OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE x x x. YES.
o One type of executive agreement is a treaty or a treaty‐implementing executive agreement, which necessarily would
cover the same matters subject of the underlying treaty.
o
In the instant case, it bears stressing that  the Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome Statute and not a State‐
Party for lack of ratification by the Senate. Thus, it is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object
and purpose of the Rome Statute.
o But over and above the foregoing considerations is the fact that––save for the situation and matters contemplated in
]
Sec. 25, Art. XVIII of the Constitution ––when a treaty is required, the Constitution does not classify any subject, like
that involving political issues, to be in the form of, and ratified as, a treaty. What the Constitution merely prescribes
is that treaties need the concurrence of the Senate by a vote defined therein to complete the ratification process.
o The Court has, in Eastern Sea Trading, as reiterated in Bayan, given recognition to the obligatory effect of executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Senate: x x x
 [T]he right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent
Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history, we have
entered executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most favored‐
nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the
settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.
LONG/DETAILED HELD
FIRST ISSUE: Locus Standi – PETITIONERS HAVE LOCUS STANDI

 Going by the petition, petitioner’s representatives pursue the instant suit primarily as concerned citizens raising issues of
transcendental importance, both for the Republic and the citizenry as a whole.
 In the case at bar, petitioner’s representatives have complied with the qualifying conditions or specific requirements exacted
under the locus standi rule.
 As citizens, their interest in the subject matter of the petition is direct and personal.
 At the very least, their assertions questioning the Agreement are made of a public right, i.e., to ascertain that the Agreement
did not go against established national policies, practices, and obligations bearing on the State’s obligation to the community
of nations.
 Where an action of any branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution or is done with grave
abuse of discretion, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle it. As in this petition, issues are
precisely raised putting to the fore the propriety of the Agreement pending the ratification of the Rome Statute.
SECOND ISSUE: Whether exchange not notes is a valid mode of concluding an international written contract among nations –
YES
 Petitioner’s initial challenge against the Agreement relates to form, its threshold posture being that the exchange of notes
cannot be a valid medium for concluding the Agreement.
 Petitioner’s argument is untenable.
 The doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, wherein the Philippines adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law and international jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres
to the policy of peace, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
 An exchange of notes falls “into the category of inter-governmental agreements,” which is an internationally accepted form
of international agreement.
 The terms “exchange of notes” and “executive agreements” have been used interchangeably, exchange of notes being
considered a form of executive agreement that becomes binding through executive action.
 On the other hand, executive agreements concluded by the President “sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at
other times that of more formal documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols.’
 It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that the exchange of notes (E/N BFO-028-03) ––be it viewed as the Non-
Surrender Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance thereof or as consent to be bound––is a recognized
mode of concluding a legally binding international written contract among nations.
THIRD: Whether Senate Concurrence is required – NO

 Petitioner submits that the subject of the Agreement does not fall under any of the subject-categories that are enumerated in
the Eastern Sea Trading case, and that may be covered by an executive agreement, such as commercial/consular relations,
most-favored nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and
settlement of claims.
 SC does not agree. There are no hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering, on a given subject, into a treaty or an
executive agreement as an instrument of international relations
 Save for the situation and matters contemplated in Sec. 25, Art. XVIII of the Constitution––when a treaty is required, the
Constitution does not classify any subject, like that involving political issues, to be in the form of, and ratified as, a treaty. What
the Constitution merely prescribes is that treaties need the concurrence of the Senate by a vote defined therein to complete
the ratification process.
 International agreements may be in the form of (1) treaties that require legislative concurrence after executive ratification;
or (2) executive agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they do not require legislative concurrence and are
usually less formal and deal with a narrower range of subject matters than treaties
 Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding effects
on the contracting states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers.
 The Court has, in Eastern Sea Trading, as reiterated in Bayan, given recognition to the obligatory effect of executive agreements
without the concurrence of the Senate:
o The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional
approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history, we have entered executive
agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most favored-nation rights, patent rights,
trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity
of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.”
FOURTH ISSUE: Whether the agreement is in contravention with the Rome Statute – NO
 Petitioner posits that the Agreement was constituted solely for the purpose of providing individuals or groups of individuals
with immunity from the jurisdiction of the ICC; and such grant of immunity through non-surrender agreements allegedly does
not legitimately fall within the scope of Art. 98 of the Rome Statute.
 Contrary to petitioner’s pretense, the Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from, the Rome
Statute. Far from going against each other, one complements the other.
o As a matter of fact, the principle of complementarity underpins the creation of the ICC.
o As aptly pointed out by respondents and admitted by petitioners, the jurisdiction of the ICC is to “be complementary
to national criminal jurisdictions [of the signatory states].”
o Significantly, the sixth preambular paragraph of the Rome Statute declares that “it is the duty of every State to
exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.”
 This provision indicates that primary jurisdiction over the so-called international crimes rests, at the first
instance, with the state where the crime was committed; secondarily, with the ICC in appropriate
situations contemplated under Art. 17, par. 1 of the Rome Statute
 Of particular note is the application of the principle of ne bis in idem under par. 3 of Art. 20, Rome Statute, which again
underscores the primacy of the jurisdiction of a state vis-a-vis that of the ICC.
 The Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states, like the RP, over serious crimes committed within
their respective borders, the complementary jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when the signatory states are
unwilling or unable to prosecute.
 The Rome Statute also contains a proviso that enjoins the ICC from seeking the surrender of an erring person, should the
process require the requested state to perform an act that would violate some international agreement it has entered into.
FIFTH ISSUE: Whether Sovereignty is limited by International Agreements – Yes.

 Petitioner next argues that the RP has, through the Agreement, abdicated its sovereignty by bargaining away the jurisdiction
of the ICC to prosecute US nationals, government officials/employees or military personnel who commit serious crimes of
international concerns in the Philippines
 We are not persuaded. As it were, the Agreement is but a form of affirmance and confirmance of the Philippines’ national
criminal jurisdiction
 The Philippines may decide to try “persons” of the US, as the term is understood in the Agreement, under our national criminal
justice system. Or it may opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or over US “persons” committing
high crimes in the country and defer to the secondary criminal jurisdiction of the ICC over them.
 As to “persons” of the US whom the Philippines refuses to prosecute, the country would, in effect, accord discretion to the US
to exercise either its national criminal jurisdiction over the “person” concerned or to give its consent to the referral of the
matter to the ICC for trial. In the same breath, the US must extend the same privilege to the Philippines with respect to
“persons” of the RP committing high crimes within US territorial jurisdiction.
 By their nature, treaties and international agreements actually have a limiting effect on the otherwise encompassing and
absolute nature of sovereignty.
o By their voluntary act, nations may decide to surrender or waive some aspects of their state power or agree to limit
the exercise of their otherwise exclusive and absolute jurisdiction.
o The usual underlying consideration in this partial surrender may be the greater benefits derived from a pact or a
reciprocal undertaking of one contracting party to grant the same privileges or immunities to the other.
SIXTH ISSUE: Whether the Agreement is Immoral and at Variance with Principles of International Law – NO
 Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down as void ab initio for imposing immoral obligations and/or being at variance
with allegedly universally recognized principles of international law.
o The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, “leaves criminals immune
from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity
 The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender agreement, as aptly described by the
Solicitor General, “is an assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. The agreement
is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the country’s judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws and
dispense justice fairly and judiciously.”
 Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement would allow Filipinos and Americans
committing high crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect.
o Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the
Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the
formalities necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statute have been met.
 There is nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal
jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the
Rome Statute.
SEVENTH ISSUE: Whether the agreement needs to be in the form of a treaty – NO

 On December 2009, then President Arroyo signed into law RA 9851, otherwise known as the “Philippine Act on Crimes Against
International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity.”
o Jurisdiction: xxx the authorities may surrender or extradite suspected or accused persons in the Philippines to the
appropriate international court, if any, or to another State pursuant to the applicable extradition laws and treaties
 The petitioner’s view is that the Agreement prevents the Philippines—without the consent of the US—from surrendering to
any international tribunal US nationals accused of crimes covered by RA 9851, and, thus, in effect amends Sec. 17 of RA 9851.
 We find that the Agreement does not amend or is repugnant to RA 9851. For another, the view does not clearly state what
precise principles of law, if any, the Agreement alters. And for a third, it does not demonstrate in the concrete how
the Agreement seeks to frustrate the objectives of the principles of law subsumed in the Rome Statute.
 RA 9851 clearly: (1) defines and establishes the crimes against international humanitarian law, genocide and other crimes
against humanity; (2) provides penal sanctions and criminal liability for their commission; and (3) establishes special courts for
the prosecution of these crimes and for the State to exercise primary criminal jurisdiction. Nowhere in RA 9851 is there a
proviso that goes against the tenor of the Agreement.
 The Agreement can already be considered a treaty following this Court’s decision in Nicolas v. Romulo which cited Weinberger
v. Rossi. In Nicolas, We held that “an executive agreement is a ‘treaty’ within the meaning of that word in international law and
constitutes enforceable domestic law vis-à-vis the United States.”
 Likewise, the Philippines and the US already have an existing extradition treaty, i.e., RP-US Extradition Treaty. Thus,
the Agreement, in conjunction with the RP-US Extradition Treaty, would neither violate nor run counter to Sec. 17 of RA 9851.
o The argument that the Extradition treaty is inapplicable because the US does not have a legislation like RA 9851, must
fail.
o US has already enacted legislation punishing the high crimes
o Nonetheless, despite the lack of actual domestic legislation, the US notably follows the doctrine of incorporation.
o This rule finds an even stronger hold in the case of crimes against humanity. It has been held that genocide, war crimes
and crimes against humanity have attained the status of customary international law. Some even go so far as to state
that these crimes have attained the status of jus cogens
 These jus cogens crimes relate to the principle of universal jurisdiction, i.e., “any state may exercise
jurisdiction over an individual who commits certain heinous and widely condemned offenses, even when no
other recognized basis for jurisdiction exists.”
o Therefore, even with the current lack of domestic legislation on the part of the US, it still has both the doctrine of
incorporation and universal jurisdiction to try these crimes.
CONCLUSION:
 An act of the executive branch with a foreign government must be afforded great respect. The power to enter into executive
agreements has long been recognized to be lodged with the President.
 As We held in Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, “[t]he power to enter into an
executive agreement is in essence an executive power.
 This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally
been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.”
 The rationale behind this principle is the inviolable doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative.
DISPOSITIVE: The petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition was DISMISSED for lack of merit.


Unreliable and Non-Authoritative The Population Indicators Congress Used To Justify Their Creation. There Can Be No Surer Way

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01 ALDABA VS COMELEC AUTHOR: PABRUA

G.R No. 188078 March 15, 2010 Notes:

02 SENATOR AQUINO & MAYOR ROBREDO V COMELEC AUTHOR: PAGCALIWAGAN

District Municipalities/Cities Population

1st District Del Gallego Libmanan 417,304

2nd District Gainza Canaman 474,899

3rd District Caramoan Sangay 372,548

4th District Iriga Buhi 429,070

District Municipalities/Cities Population

1st District Del Gallego 176,383

2nd District Libmanan San Fernando 276,777

3rd District (formerly 2nd District) Naga Camaligan 439,043

Political Law Review: Session 8 [Other Provision] 2

5th District (formerly 4th District) Iriga Buhi 429,070

Political Law Review: Session 8 [Other Provision] 3

Political Law Review: Session 8 [Other Provision] 4

3. VALENTINO L. LEGASPI vs. CITY OF CEBU AUTHOR: Paras

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: *ratio bold part

4. Municipality of Tiwi V. Betito AUTHOR: REYES

Political Law Review: Session 8 [Other Provision] 7

HELD: Yes, CA decision is reversed, case remanded to RTC for retrial.

Political Law Review: Session 8 [Other Provision] 8

Political Law Review: Session 8 [Other Provision] 9

5. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO M. AUTHOR: STEPH

Political Law Review: Session 8 [Other Provision] 10

Political Law Review: Session 8 [Other Provision] 11

06. The Learning Child et al. v. Ayala Alabang Village AUTHOR: S A Y O

Political Law Review: Session 8 [Other Provision] 12

Zoning Ordinance Case

Validity of Muntinlupa Resolution No. 94-179

7. Greenhills East Association, Inc., represented by its AUTHOR: The Taliño

HELD: Yip and Nope. CA is affirmed!

Political Law Review: Session 8 [Other Provision] 16

08 The Province of Negros Occidental v. COA AUTHOR: Tan

Political Law Review: Session 8 [Other Provision] 17

HELD: Yup and Yes.

FIRST ISSUE: Locus Standi – PETITIONERS HAVE LOCUS STANDI

THIRD: Whether Senate Concurrence is required – NO

FIFTH ISSUE: Whether Sovereignty is limited by International Agreements – Yes.

SEVENTH ISSUE: Whether the agreement needs to be in the form of a treaty – NO

Political Law Review: Session 8 [Other Provision] 23

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