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Ms 09
Ms 09
1. Managerial Economics serves as a “link between traditional economics and decision making
sciences.” Discuss.
Answer. Economics is one social science among several and has fields bordering on other areas,
including economic geography, economic history, public choice, energy economics, cultural economics,
and institutional economics.
Close interrelationship between management and economics has led to the development of managerial
economics. Managerial economics lies on the border line of management and economics. Management
deals with principles which help in decision making under uncertainty and improve effectiveness of
organization. Economics on the other hand provides a set of propositions for optimum allocation of
scarce resources to achieve the desired objectives. Managerial economics serves as “a link between
traditional economics and the decision sciences’.
Answer.
Q TC MC AC
3 60 - 20
4 88 28 22
5 122 34 24.4
6 162 40 27
4. “Oligopoly is the most prevalent form of market structure in the manufacturing sector.”
Describe this statement with the help of an example.
Answer. An oligopoly is an intermediate market structure between the extremes of perfect competition
and monopoly. Oligopoly firms might compete (noncooperative oligopoly) or cooperate (cooperative
oligopoly) in the marketplace. Whereas firms in an oligopoly are price makers, their control over the
price is determined by the level of coordination among them.
Oligopoly is the most prevalent form of market organization in the manufacturing sector of
industrial nations, including the United States. Some oligopolistic industries in the United States are
automobiles, primary aluminum, steel, electrical equipment, glass, breakfast cereals soaps etc. Aluminum
and steel are homogenous while other products like automobiles and other products are differentiated.
While entry into an oligopolistic industry is possible but it is not easy. Oligopoly also occurs when
transportation costs limit the market area; for example, there are many cement producers in the United
States; competition is limited to a few producers in a particular area. The distinguishing characteristic of
an oligopoly is that there are a few mutually interdependent firms that produce either identical products
(homogeneous oligopoly) or heterogeneous products (differentiated oligopoly).
Mutual interdependence means that firms realize the effects of their actions on rivals and the reactions
such actions are likely to elicit. For instance, a mutually interdependent firm realizes that its price drops
are more likely to be matched by rivals than its price increases. This implies that an oligopolist,
especially in the case of a homogeneous oligopoly, will try to maintain current prices, since price changes
in either direction can be harmful, or at least nonbeneficial. Consequently, there is a kink in the demand
curve because there are asymmetric responses to a firm's price increases and to its price decreases; that is,
rivals match price falls but not price increases. This leads to "sticky prices," such that prices in an
oligopoly turn out to be more stable than those in monopoly or in competition; that is, they do not change
every time costs change. On the flip side, the sticky-price explanation (formally, the kinked demand
model of oligopoly) has the significant drawback of not doing a very good job of explaining how the
initial price, which eventually turns out to be sticky, is arrived at. Airline markets and automobile
markets are prime examples of oligopolies. We see that as the new auto model year gets under way in the
fall, one car manufacturer's reduced financing rates are quickly matched by the other firms because of
recognized mutual interdependence. Airlines also match rivals' fares on competing routes.
In oligopolies, entry of new firms is difficult because of entry barriers. These entry barriers may be
structural (natural), such as economies of scale, or artificial, such as limited licenses issued by
government. Firms in an oligopoly, known as oligopolists, choose prices and output to maximize profits.
However, firms could compete along other dimensions as well, such as advertising, location, research and
development (R&D) and so forth. For instance, a firm's research or advertising strategies are influenced
by what its rivals are doing. When one restaurant advertises that it will accept rivals' coupons, others are
compelled to follow suit. The rivals' responses in an oligopoly can be modeled in the form of reaction
functions. Sophisticated firms anticipating rivals' behavior might appear to act in concert (conscious
parallelism) without any explicit agreement to do so. Such instances pose problems for antitrust
regulators. Mutually interdependent firms have a tendency to form cartels, enabling them to coordinate
price and quantity actions to increase profits. Besides facing legal obstacles, cartels are difficult to sustain
because of free-rider problems. Shared monopolies are extreme cases of cartels that include all the firms
in the industry.
Given that mutual interdependence can exist along many dimensions, there is no single model of
oligopoly. Rather, there are numerous models based on different behavior, ranging from the naive
Cournot models to more sophisticated models of game theory. An equilibrium concept that incorporates
mutual interdependence was proposed by John Nash and is referred to as Nash equilibrium. In a Nash
equilibrium, firms' decisions (i.e., price-quantity choices) are their best responses, given what their rivals
are doing. For example, McDonald's charges $2.99 for a Value Meal based on what Burger King and
Wendy's are charging for a similar menu item. McDonald's would reconsider its pricing if its rivals were
to change their prices.
The level of information that firms have has a major influence on their behavior in an oligopoly. For
instance, when mutually interdependent firms have asymmetric information and are unable to make
credible commitments regarding their behavior, a "prisoner's dilemma" type of situation arises where the
Nash equilibrium might include choices that are suboptimal. For instance, individual firms in a cartel
have an incentive to cheat on the previously agreed-upon priceoutput levels. Since cartel members have
nonbinding commitments on limiting production levels and maintaining prices, this results in widespread
cheating, which in turn leads to an eventual breakdown of the cartel. Therefore, while all firms in the
cartel could benefit by cooperating, lack of credible commitments results in cheating being a Nash
equilibrium strategy—a strategy that is suboptimal from the individual firm's standpoint.
Models of oligopoly could be static or dynamic depending upon whether firms take intertemporal
decisions into account. Significant models of oligopoly include Cournot, Bertrand, and Stackelberg.
Cournot oligopoly is the simplest model of oligopoly in that firms are assumed to be naive when they
think that their actions will not generate any reaction from the rivals. In other words, according to the
Cournot model, rival firms choose not to alter their production levels when one firm chooses a different
output level. Cournot thus focuses on quantity competition rather than price competition. While the naive
behavior suggested by Cournot might seem plausible in a static setting, it is hard to image real-world
firms not learning from their mistakes over time. The Bertrand model's significant difference from the
Cournot model is that it assumes that firms choose (set) prices rather than quantities. The Stackelberg
model deals with the scenario in which there is a leader firm in the market whose actions are imitated by
a number of follower firms.
The leader is sophisticated in terms of taking into account rivals' reactions, while the followers are naïve,
as in the Cournot model. The leader might emerge in a market because of a number of factors, such as
historical precedence, size, reputation, innovation, information, and so forth. Examples of Stackelberg
leadership include markets where one dominant firm dictates the terms, usually through price leadership.
Under price leadership, the leader firm's pricing decisions are consistently followed by rival firms.
Since oligopolies come in various forms, the performance of such markets also varies a great deal. In
general, the oligopoly price is below the monopoly price but above the competitive price. The oligopoly
output, in turn, is larger than that of a monopolist but falls short of what a competitive market would
supply. Some oligopoly markets are competitive, leading to few welfare distortions, while other
oligopolies are monopolistic, resulting in dead weight losses. Furthermore, some oligopolies are more
innovative than others. Whereas the price-quantity rankings of oligopoly vis-à-vis other markets are
relatively well established, how oligopoly fares with regard to R and D and advertising is less clear.
Oligopoly is the most prevalent form of market structure in the manufacturing sector because
-barriers to entry. The most common barriers to entry include
-patents,
-resource ownership,
-government franchises,
-start-up cost,
-brand name recognition, and
-decreasing average cost.
Each of these make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for potential firms to enter an industry.
Examples
In the United Kingdom, the four-firm concentration ratio of the supermarket industry is 74.4%; the
British brewing industry has a staggering 85% ratio. In the U.S.A., oligopolistic industries include the oil,
beer, tobacco, accounting and audit services, aircraft, military equipment, and motor vehicle industries.
Many media industries today are essentially oligopolies. Six movie studios receive 90 percent of
American film revenues, and four major music companies receive 80 percent of recording revenues.
There are just six major book publishers, and the television industry was an oligopoly of three networks –
ABC, CBS, and NBC –from the 1950s through the 1970s. Television has diversified since then,
especially because of cable, but today it is still mostly an oligopoly (due to concentration of media
ownership) of five companies: Disney/ABC, CBS Corporation, NBC, Universal, Time Warner, and News
Corporation.
In industrialized countries oligopolies are found in many sectors of the economy, such as cars, auditing,
consumer goods, and steel production. Unprecedented levels of competition, fueled by increasing
globalisation, have resulted in the emergence of oligopoly in many market sectors, such as the aerospace
industry. Market shares in oligopoly are typically determined on the basis of product development and
advertising. There are now only a small number of manufacturers of civil passenger aircraft, though
Brazil (Embraer) and Canada (Bombardier) have fielded entries into the smaller-market passenger
aircraft market sector. A further instance arises in a heavily regulated market such as wireless
communications. In some cases states have licensed only two or three providers of cellular phone
services.
OPEC is another example of an oligopoly, although on the level of national bodies instead of corporate
bodies. There are a few countries that try to control the production of oil.
A further example are the three leading food processing companies, Kraft Foods, PepsiCo and Nestle.
Together these three corporations account for a large percentage of overall global processed food sales.
These three companies are often used as an example of "The rule of 3", which states that markets and
industries often become dominated by three major oligopolistic firms.
Australia has two very good examples of oligoplies. One is its media outlets, mostly owned by either
News Corporation or Fairfax Media. Likewise, Australia's retailing industry is dominated by two
companies, Coles-Myer and Woolworths.