BHART .

RHARI THE SCHOLAR*

by
HAJIME N A K A M U R A
Tokyo

I. BHARTRHARI~STHEORY CONCERNING THE SACRED BOOKS

Bhart.rhari declared himself to be a grammarian, and contemporary

scholars of India looked upon him as one. But the study of grammar
originated in the interpretation of the Vedas; orthodox Brahmanic
scholars had included grammar in the six aflgas which were supplementary
to the Vedas, and from ancient times it had held an important and
revered place.
Bhart.rhari was also held in high esteem as a Vedhnta philosopher and
since this philosophy was founded on various orthodox Brahmanic
sacred books, the Upani.sad in particular, it clearly follows that Bhar-
trhari, in addition to being a grammarian and a Vedanta philosopher,
was also a believer in those sacred books. The question arises as to
whether he really believed in the authority of those sacred books. The
historical fact that grammar originally developed out of the Vedfiflgas,
prejudiced his thinking, so that he was obliged to declare that the grammar
which he taught was based on the Vedas and that he himself was a follower
of the Vedic/ore.
Thus in his writings he referred frequently to the Vedas. He recognized
the authority of the four Vedas1 and the existence of various Vedic
schools based on the same ritualismfl he asserted too that though the
Vedas were of one entity, so to speak, they were taught by many saints

* This article is an English translation of a part of the writer's work in Japanese:

Kotoba no Keijijogaku ("Metaphysics of language") (Tokyo, 1956), pp. 141-181. This
book constitutes the fourth volume of his History o f Early Vedanta Philosophy.
x Atharva.nam A~girasa.rn samnam rgyajur ca [ yasminn uccavaca varna# p rthak
sthitaparigrahah.//(Vakyap. I, 21). But in some cases the term trayiis found: ibid.,
I, 134; III, 3, 70.
2 bhedanam (~akhdnam) bahumargatva.m karma.ny ekatra eangata / ~abdana.m
yata~aktitva.m tasya gakhasu dr@ate /] (Vakyap. I, 6). The words in brackets are
supplemented by the commentator.
 BHARTRHARI THE SCHOLAR 283

in various ways and this gave rise to the opinion that there were several
versions of the Vedas? This illustrates clearly the general attitude towards
the Vedas in Bhart.rhari's day.
The Vedas are the sacred scriptures of orthodox Brahmanism and are
known as the ~ruti. Brahmanic scholars hold that the Vedas are not
the work of man but revelations from time immemorial acquired by
various r.sis through mystic inspiration and were handed down by them
from generation to generation. In order to differentiate between the
Vedas and the compositions of the later sages, the latter were called
sm.rti and were supposed to be based on the ~ruti, i.e. the Vedas. Both
gruti and sm.rti were handed down, from father to son, in an unbroken
chain, through ages, and the Indians in general accorded to both authority
and veneration.
Bhart.rhari accepted this view of the orthodox Brahmins: "It is said
that the words of the gruti, though their author and their origin is unknown
to us, go on forever without interruption; so does the sm.rti though it
was composed by scholars4. ''5 And again: "The words of the gruti were
composed a long, long time ago. ''6
At the Mah~pralaya (the destruction of the whole world, especially at
the end of a kalpa) the world, dissolving into the Brahman, reverts to
nothing and is reborn as a new world again. This process of annihilation
and rebirth continues in an eternal cycle while the Vedas remain un-
changed; they are unaffected by the process of birth, duration and
annihilation of the world. Thus they are without beginning and without
end. (In this respect the thought of Bhart.rhari is precisely the same as
that contained in the Brahma-satras, 7 which was also shared by the
Mim~.msh school.) On the other hand, however, the sm.rti, though of
human conception and origin, was handed down from ancient times in
an unbroken sequence. And here Bhart.rhari makes a point of empha-
sizing the fact that the composition of the sm.rti writings are multifarious:
some are clear as to their aim and purpose (for instance the writings on

8 pr@tyupayo 'nukarag ca tasya ( = brahma.nah) redo mahar.sibhi.h ] eko 'py aneka-

vartmeva samamnata.h prthak prthak ]/(V~kyap. I, 5).
4 In some cases the words gruti and sm.rti are used in combination. (Vakyap. I, 135).
anadim apy avicchinn~.m grutim ahur akart.rkam / ~i~t.air nibadhyamana tuna vya-
vacchidyate sm.rtiO//(Vhkyap. I, 146). The text has avacchinnam and the present writer
changed it to the above reading according to the commentary of Pro3.yar~ja. According
to the information by Prof. de Jong, Charudeva Shastri's edition (Lahore, 1934)
gives the reading: avyavaehinnarp, which must be right.
e gdstram atidare vyavasttiitam, ibid., I/I, 14, 74, p. 487.
Refer to the author's work: "The Philosophy of the Brahrnas~tras" (in Japanese)
(Tokyo, 1951), pp. 412 ft.
 284 HAJIME NAKAMURA

medicine); some are vague and difficult to follow (as for example the
writings on what foods should and should not be eaten). But all the
sm.rti writings were propounded by the Vedic scholars (Vedavid) following
the special characteristics (lihga) of the Vedas. ''s
Bhart.rhari calls the' gruti as well as the sm.rti: ~astra 9 or agama. 1~
Frequently however the term gastra refers to the Vedas in a broad sense, 11
and the term agama stands for the sm.rti 12 and in particular the books
which give the basic rules on grammar, la The intrinsic meaning of the
term agama suggests something which has b e e n handed down from
ancient times ;14 therefore~ it can stand for books such as those of the
Vaige.sika school as well as the gastra. But in the Vakyapadiya the term
agama refers to the books of the pure orthodox Brahmanic schools and
can therefore include the ~ruti and the sm.rti. As we have already stated,
the former was of non-human creation and the latter compiled by human
effort; but the latter found its source and origins in the former. In the
concept of the transmigration of the world it is believed that the gruti
perishes only to grow like seeds (bija) out of the Vedas again. 16 "It is
our fixed belief that the agama was produced out of some source or other.
When all the agama have perished, the three Vedas will remain like seeds
to give new birth to the agama. ''17
As we can clearly see from the above quotation, Bhart.rhari regarded
the Vedas as the absolute source of all knowledge. He studied them
diligently and was well versed in them. He was also familiar with the
subtle differences which existed between the various Vedic schools, is His
work clearly reflects his veneration for the Vedas.
His views on the gruti and the sm.rti are much similar to those of the
s sm.rtayo bahur@a~ ca d.rs.t.adr.staprayo]anaO / tam evakritya lifzgebhyo vedavidbhiO
praka~itah./[ (Vfikyap.I, 7).
9 Pu.nyarfijarefers to the sm.rti as sm.rtigdstra (ad V~tkyap.I, 43).
1~ grutismrtilaks.a.nagama(Pun.yaraja ad I, 41).
u Vfikyap. I, 43; I, 137. But in a certain case he refers to the grammar of Pa.nini
as gastra (III, 13, 23, p. 441).
1~ sarvapravades, v ~gamav~ky~n~.m sm.rtiv~ky~n~.m pra.netrparigrahetta paurus, eyatvam
upagamyate - (Pun.yar~ja ad V~tkyap. I, 134).
13 Cf. V~kyap. II, 484 f.
1~ v.rddhebhya dgamalj, III, 7, 2 (p. 294); pftrvebhya agamab, III, 14, 20 (p. 456).
15 Vfikyap. III, 11, 9. See also the commentary of Hel~trSja (p. 399).
1~ tfmi (Vedavftkyani) parvagames.u vicchinne~u anyes.u pra.nett's.u agamantar(musa.m-
dhfme bijavad avatis.t.hante / (Ptm..yarfija ad V~kyap. I, 134).
1~ na j(ttv akart.rkar~ ka~cid ~gama .mpratipadyate / bljar~ sarvgtgamapaye trayy evftdau
vyavasthit~//(V~tkyap. I, 134).
~ In his commentary on the Mahfibhfi.sya he refers to and quotes from Taittiriy~t.h,
Vfijasaneyinah., A~valSyana- and Apastamba (-~rauta) -s5tra, Bahv.rca-(~rauta)-sfitra-
bh~.sya, Nirukta, Pr~tti~fikhya and ~ik.sa (Kielhorn in Indian Antiquary, 1883, p. 227).
 BHARTRHARI THE SCHOLAR 285

Mima.rosa school. It is not possible to go deeply into this matter in this

article, but short reference must be made to it as it has given rise to many
questions. To modern scholars it may seem illogical that Bhart.rhari held
the Vedas in such profound veneration; but when we realize the circum-
stances which led to the establishment of grammar as a branch of studies
in ancient India, Bhart.rhari's attitude can be easily understood. In the
beginning grammar, like the study of phonetics (dik.s~7),prosody (chandas)
and etymology (nirukta), was only an auxiliary science or one of the
Vedaflgas. It was taken for granted that the scholars who applied them-
selves to these studies were convinced of the absolute sanctity of the Vedas.
Accordingly, up to a much later period, all grammarians adhered un-
conditionally to the Vedas. Since he grew up in such an atmosphere of
tradition, the sanctity of the Vedas was an accepted and undisputed fact
which he believed had been handed down through the ages. The im-
portant place accorded to their sanctity in his writings arises from the
fact that, as a grammarian, he was loyal to historical traditions and
beliefs.
Bhart.rhari does not make an effort to explain clearly and in detail why
the Vedas were regarded as holy. To him, a faithful Brahmin of the
orthodox school, their holiness was without question; in other words he
took it for granted. This does not mean, however, that he did not give
the matter his thought and consideration, for he was, after all, a phi-
losopher. Traces of his speculations, though they may be few, can be
found in his writings. To him the Vedas were "the convenient road
(expediency) leading to the Brahman", or "the imitation19 of the
Brahman". These phrases which were used in the Vedanta philosophy
express his veneration of the Vedas. But when we analyze them we see
that the only absolute principle which he accepted was the Brahman
existing behind the Vedas, although these were traditionally considered
to have a holiness of their own. His idea suggested, consequently, that
the authority of the Vedas is dependent on the Brahman. According to
Bhart.rhari the Brahman is high and the Vedas low. In other words,
although Bhart.rhari was an orthodox Brahmin scholar who professed
profound veneration for the Vedas, in actual fact he transcended this
generally accepted belief. In terms of his own doctrines, parts of the
Vedas, which deal with various rituals, lose their significance, ~~ and the
19 praptyupayo 'nukarag ca tasya (brahma.nah) veda.h . . . (V~kyap. I, 5). Cf. Tattva-
sa.mgrahapafijika ad v. 128. - var.napadakrame.navasthito Vedas tadadhigamopayas
tasya praticchandakanyayenfivasthita.h /
20 F o r further details o f his views on the Vedas see Vfikyap. I, 8-10; 24; II, 240;
392 f. etc.
286 HAJIME NAKAMURA

Vedanta (Upani.sad), which deals with the Brahman, is the only adequate
one. Therefore we can say that Bhartrhari's doctrines were based on
the Vedanta philosophy although on the surface he appears to be an
ordinary Brahmin scholar professing the same Vedic ideas as all other
scholars of his time.

II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BHARTRHARI'S SCHOLARSHIP AS A GRAMMARIAN

As there is a tendency in the Vedic ideas of Bhart.rhari to evaluate the

Vedas from a Ved~mta standpoint rather than from the usual Brahmin
one, his attitude as a grammarian must differ from that of the other
grammarians of his time. Before discussing this point, it may be well to
examine his conception of grammar.
This branch of study was, in ancient India, one of the six ahgas, called
vydkara~a; the ahgas were second in importance to the ~ruti. Therefore
grammar-books giving the rudiments of grammar were a part of the
sm.rti. It is said that the various grammar-books written by ancient
scholars were based o n the ~ruti and the sm.rti, a point acknowledged by
Bhartrhari: ~1 "Therefore the excellent scholars began to teach the
significance of words according to the Vedas which were not created by
man, and, according to the sm.rti, which laid down the rules (on the usage
of words). ''z2 We are inclined to believe that the grammarians of those
days, despite the interest they had in their subject and the pleasure they
derived from it, would not have devoted their energies to such a com-
plicated and elaborate study as grammar, if it were only one of the six
Ved~tflgas. But scholarship in the field of grammar was second in im-
portance only to the Vedas themselves as is dearly shown by some
Buddhist sfltras. 2a Bhartrhari emphasized its importance as a study in
its own right. According to him scholarship in grammar should be placed
higher than the others of the six Ved~figas (prathamam. chandasam
ahgam) 2~ and elsewhere he praises it as the highest among the studies of
the three Vedas which are made up of many branches of study. .5 He
21 Cf. Vfikyap. 1, 143.
22 tasmad akrtaka.m Sastra.m sm.rti~n v5 sanibandhanarn [ a$rityarabhyate M.st.aib
gabdanam anugasanam // (V~kyap. I, 43).
28 In the various traditional sciences of India "Vy~kara.na" is mentioned next to the
Vedas. 'Ch'eng-shih-lun' X, Miscellaneous Impurities, 136 (Taisho XXXII, p. 321 b);
"Mah~tparinirv~n.a-sfitra' XIX (Taisho XII, p. 730 ab).
24 V~kyap. I, 11 SDS. XIII, 1. 87 (p. 295). This idea was shared by Patafijali -
'pradhana.m ca s.at.sv ahges.u wakara~am [ pradhane ca k.rto yatnaO phalavan bhavati'
(Mahfibh~t.sya,p. I, 11. 19-20; cf. SDS., XIII, 1.84).
25 anekatfrthabheday~s trayya vaea.hpara.m padam (Vgtkyap. I, 144).
 BHARTRHARI THE SCHOLAR 287
also speaks of it as the foundation of all other studies. "As the species
of the meanings of all words are subject to their forms (ak.rti), the study
of grammar is the original source of all studies (vidya) in the world." 36
It is the foundation on which all other studies are based and can be
likened to a purifying fire. ~7 "Being a purifying fire to all study, it shines
brightly over all branches of learning. ''2s Sometimes it is likened to a
light in the darkness (tamasijyotis). Likewise Bhart.rhari considers the
study of grammar to be the most excellent of all the ascetic trainings
(tapasam uttamam, tapa.h)29 and therefore it deserves the highest praise.
The original aim of grammar was to study the structure of the sacred
language of Sanskrit and thereby codify the various rules applied in the
language, thus preserving its purity and preventing its corruption. As
Vedic literature was written in Sanskrit, the endeavour to preserve the
purity of the language meant the preservation of the Vedas themselves.
Patafijali's statement that grammar should be studied in order that the
Vedas be preserved 3~ (rak.sartham. Vedanam adhyeyam, vyakaran.am)
illustrates this point. Bhartrhari inherited this traditional attitude
towards grammar. As grammar aimed at checking the corruption and
confusion of the language of the sacred Vedas 81, Bhart.rhari called it
counteracting linguistic corruption 32 (va~maldndm. cikitsitam).
What is actually meant by the right usage of a language? The gram-
matical rules of Sanskrit had been established by the sQtras of Pan..ini,
the "V~trttika" of K~ty~yana and the "Mah~bha.sya" of Pata~jali. The
works of these three came to be regarded by the scholars who came later,
as representing the very highest authority. Bhart.rhari confirms this in
his work. zz
Thus the duty of the grammarians who came after those three pioneers
lay not in codifying new rules but in preserving and propagating the
rules which had already been fixed. This reflects the attitude of Indian
society at this period, 100 B.C. and onwards, which gradually took on a
tolerably stable character. What this society cherished was not the
novelty of things but the durability of tradition. Therefore things which
2~ yath~rthajataya~ sarvab ~abdakrtinibandhana.h / tathaiva loke vidy~narn eca vidya
paraya.nam//(V~tkyap. I, 15).
37 Vakyap. I, 14 ed.
3a pavitra.m sarvavidyanam adhividya.m ( = vidyasu) prakadate. (V~kyap. I, 14).
33 V~kyap. I, 11.
3o Mahhbh~.sya, I, p. 1 (ed. by Kielllorn).
3z bhavati ca gabdasa.mskaro vyakara.~astrasya prayojanam. (SDS. XIII, 1.59, of. 1l,
60.
~2 V~kyap. I, 14 (the aim of grammar is also said to be the perfection of words).
a3 V~kyap. I, 23.
288 HAJIMENAKAMURA
had been handed down from the immemorable past were treasured and
valued. The study of grammar claimed to be age-old and a part of the
historical traditions. The correct usage of words (sadhutva) meant
faithful conformation with the traditional rules of language. The usage
held to be the correct one was that given in the traditional rules of
grammar. Therefore it followed that "being right" meant "being old";
one was related to the other just like the back of something is related to
its front.
According to Bhart.rhari the sacred study of grammar aimed at con-
tinuity (nitya) and correctness of language,a4 "The aim of grammar is
the knowledge of correctness of words. The rules of this sacred study
have been handed down in an unbroken chain to the educated. ''a~
His attitude towards language as a social phenomenon is as thoroughly
conservative as that of any other orthodox Brahmin scholar.
What were his reasons for ranking the study of grammar so high,
calling it the foundation of all other studies? The answer, we think, lies
in the fact that all studies can be brought into existence only through the
medium of language, either the written or the spoken word. The semantic
relation can only be classified and expressed logically by means of words.
At present grammar is the only study wherein the sole object is the
analysis of words, a6 "Without grammar the understanding of the real
nature of various words cannot exist. ''aT Bhart.rhari illustrates this point
by means of the simile of the mirror which reflects the images of various
objectsY 8 Supposing that it is only by studying grammar that the nature
of words can be understood, then it is for grammarians to devote their
energies to this study. With this in view, Bhart.rhari enters into philo-
sophical speculations; he adopts a philosophical attitude to language
which is quite separate from mere defense of grammatical rules and their
propagation. He delved much deeper into linguistic problems than any
of his predecessors had done and came to the conclusion that words
were component parts of the Brahman and therefore on the same level
as it.
As this metaphysical attitude formed the nucleus of Bhart.rhari's
philosophical ideas, his grammatical ideas transcended those of the
grammarians before him. According to him, grammar leads the way to
34 V~kyap.I, 29.
8~ s~dhutvaj~navis.ay~ sai~ vy~kara.nasmrti.h [ avicchedena ~ist.dn~m ida.m sm.rtini-
bandhanam//(Vakyap. I, 143).
36 Cf. Vfikyap.I, 13 ab.
87 tattvdvabodha.h gabddna.m nasti vyakara.nad.rte ] (Vfikyap.I, 13 cd).
88 Vfikyap.I, 20.
 BHARTRHARI THE SCHOLAR 289

the Brahman (dsanna.m brahma.nas I, 11). He goes on to assert that

grammar is a direct road (dgjasa I, 12) and that finally the highest
Brahman can be reached through scholarship in g r a m m a r (I, 22 cd).
Since reaching the Brahman means arriving at spiritual liberation, the
study of grammar may be called the gate leading to spiritual liberation. 39
Therefore Bhart.rhari elevates grammar from a mere study in which rules
on grammar are discussed to a philosophy of the inner-self (adhydtma-
gastra). " I t is the first step towards perfection. It is the truly royal
road for those who deserve enlightenment ''~~ thus he praised the merits
of grammar. "The knowledge of the inner self cleans dirt from the body,
from speech, ~1from the mind and can be compared to a healing process. ''42
Bhart.rhari's theory which describes grammar as a study of the inner-self
(adhydtmaddstra) which brings about spiritual liberation was of epoch-
making importance in the history of grammar in India.
The various rituals described in the Vedas aim at prosperity in the
present world and heavenly rebirth in the next. The aim of g r a m m a r is
to understand the language of the Vedic scriptures and from it prosperity
in this and the other world can be attained. Kfityfiyana put into words
his belief that the use of the language of grammatical sfltras leads to
prosperity (ddstrapftrvake p r a y o g e 'bhyudaya.h);43 Patafijali endorsed this
view too and other later grammarians believed they would find re-birth
and happiness in heaven through their study of grammar. 44 But
Bhart.rhari's belief was based on philosophical ideas; he claimed the aim
behind the study of grammar to be much higher than re-birth in heaven;
for hkm it meant the acquirement of Brahmanic wisdom; for him the
study of grammar was a quest for spiritual liberation.
This theory brought on a new significance to the study of grammar and
one which differed from the theories of his predecessors. And of course,

39 dvdrarn apavargasya, I, 14. cf. ~abddnu~dsanagdstrasya ni.h~reyasasddhanatvat:n

siddham. SDS. )(HI, 11.275-6. tasmdd vyakaran, agastra.m paramapurus.drthasadhana-
tayddhyetavyam iti siddham. (SDS. XI/I, 1.284).
4o idam ddya.m padasthdna .m siddhisopdnaparva.ndm / iya .m sd moks.amd.ndnam ajihmd
rdjapaddhati.h // (V~kyap. I, 16). siddhi = kaivalya-prdpti (Pu.nyar~ja). He means
spiritual liberation.
41 = apabhra.mgand.m nivrtti (Pu.nyar~ja).
4~ kayavdgbuddhivi.sayd ye mald.h samavasthitfl.h / cikitsdlak.sa.nddhydtma~dstrais tes.a.m
viguddhaya.h//(Vakyap. I, 148).
43 Mahfibh~sya, 1, p. 10.
44 "Also others say thus: "If one word is known and used correctly, it will be a cow
in the heavenly realm that brings about things one desires." And again others say
thus: "They ride on the wagon that are made of words well combined and wellregulated
and go to the heavenly realm where desirous pleasures are. But those who talk such
wrong words as cikkamita go there troubled" (SDS. X-I/I, 11.92-96).
290 HAJIME NAKAMURA

it was his adoption of the Vedanta philosophy that brought about this
great change in the study of grammar.
In what way is the study of grammar a quest for spiritual liberation?
To find an answer to this question we must refer to his ideas on meta-
physics. With this in mind, a study of his metaphysics will be made in
another article and, as an introduction to this, his theory concerning
knowledge in general will be discussed first.

III. BHARTRHARI'S THEORY ON KNOWLEDGE

As Bhart.rhari's grammatical scholarship was based - albeit super-

ficially - on the preservation of traditional usage, his scope in the realm
of philosophy was consequently restricted. He was a staunch supporter
of traditions (agama) and was strongly opposed to scholars who aimed
at forming their philosophical ideas around a nucleus of logic (tarka).
Though he admitted the existence of perception (pratyak.sa) and
inference (anumana) applied by men in general, Bhart.rhari advocated the
existence of something which could not be proved by either of these.
"Various divine powers such as demons, pit.rs and vampires which exist
outside the realm of perception and inference (employed by the ordinary
man) are the result of certain processes such as asceticism. ''~5 What he
means is that, though we cannot ascertain the powers of demons, pitrs
and vampires etc. through perception or inference, nevertheless we
cannot deny their existence. How then do we know that they exist?
Through the agama, that is, through the source of the scriptures. "There
is no ordinary lihga to prove the existence of the universal and the form,
the essence and the species. Therefore some other source (i.e. that of the
sacred books) is used. ''4n
It hardly calls for mention that all philosophic schools belonging to the
orthodox Brahmanical religion recognized the various sources of
tradition, especially the Vedas, besides perception and inference; therefore
no special mention is called for. But Bhart.rhari stressed with emphasis
the importance of the dgama and as he held it in profound veneration
he was strongly opposed to schools which resorted to philosophical
thinking. Here again we get a glimpse of Bhart.rhari's particular attitude
4~ pratyaks, a m anumana .m ca vyatikramya vyavasthitd.h [ raks. a.hpit.rpi~acdna .m karmaja
eva siddhaya.h // (V~tkyap. I, 36). Instead of karmaja, the Benares edition reads
karmanta. I adopted the reading of the Lahore edition accordingto the information
by Prof. de Jong.
~ samanyam akrtir bhavo jatir ity atra laukikam [ li~ga .mna sa.mbhavaty eva tendnyat
parig.rhyate//(VSkyap. III, 14, 323. p. 605).
 BHARTRHARITHE SCHOLAR 29 1

as a scholar. He holds that "the meaning of things is indeed determined

by the sacred scriptures", 47 and again, at the end of the second book of
his V~kyapadiya where he discusscs in detail the tradition of the study
of grammar, 4s he adds that "only through the teachings of various
agamas can the mind reach clear understanding. How much can those
who follow their own reasonings discover?" 49 And further: "Those who
are full of illusions without the ~gamas and do not follow the teachings
of the ancients will never attain to lucid wisdomS~ ''51 In other words,
as far as Bhart.rhari was concerned, only the ~ruti and the smrti carried
real authority; he criticized philosophers who formulated their own
ideas, independent of tradition.
Although there is, in this verse, no reference to any school of thought
to which he was opposed, we are of the opinion that the materialists,
the Buddhists, Jains, the Ny~ya-Vai~e.sika school and the S~flkhya
school were among those which he combatted. Bhart.rhari, turning a
bold front, proved that even if the orthodox Brahmanic school is attacked
and challenged by liberal thinkers who flourish logic as a weapon, it can
suffer no harm because of its long traditional superiority. "Therefore as
the spirit (in the doctrine of subjectivity) (is not harmed by anything), so
will those who follow the ways of the agama handed down to us without
interruption meet with no refutation from the schools of logic (hetu-
v~da)." 52
His thinking was not confined to the field of metaphysics but extended
to his activities as a member of society. He held that the laws (dharma)
which regulated the lives of citizens in Indian society could neither be
established nor refuted by theory (tarka) as they were based on the
sacred agama. "The dharma is not founded on theory (alone) without
the sacred ~gama. Even the wisdom of various .r.sis was derived from
the sacred ~gama. ''53 " N o one can refute by (mere) theory the unin-
47 tayft (= ~ruty~) hy artho vidhiyate (= ni~e[yate), I, 130 d. Pu.nyar~ja'sinterpretation
was followed.
48 Cf. A. Weber, lndische Studien, V. S. 158 ft.; V~kyap. II, 484 ft.
49 praj~a vivekam (= vai~radya.m) labhate bhinnair agamadarganai~ / kiyad va
~akyam unnetum svatarkam anudhdvata // (V~tkyap. II, 492).
59 Commenting on this statement, Pu.nyar~ja calls academic knowledge bhagavatf
vidya, bhagavaff praj~a. There must be something in common with the Buddhist term
of bhagavatipraj~aparamita in so far as expression is concerned.
5~ tat tad utpreks.ama.nana.m (= vikalpayatftm) pura.nair agamair rind / anupasita-
v.rddh6n~.m vidya natiprasMati // (V~kyap. II, 493).
5~ caitanyam ira yaA cayam avicchedena vartate / agamas tam upasino hetuvadair na
bOAhyate//(Vakyap. I, 41).
58 na cagamad .rte dharmas tarke.na vyavati.slhate / .rs.f.nam api yaj j~ana.m tad apy
agamahetukam // (V~kyap. I, 30).
292 HAJIrcm NAKAMURA

terrupted ways 5a of dharma, as they are generally acknowledged. ''55

According to Bhart.rhari even something which is rejected by the public
or even considered to be contrary to all reason should nevertheless be
obeyed and carried out if it is so stated in the sacred agama. He holds,
too, that something which may be quite difficult to exist in actual life
must nevertheless be acknowledged if it is laid down in the sacred agama. 56
His veneration of the sacred scriptures may be regarded as conservative
in the extreme, even blindly enthusiastic.
Thus, as we have shown, Bhartrhari's characteristics as a scholar were his
veneration of the traditional agama and his refutation of logic. On what
grounds did he refute logic? The following lines sum up these reasons.
He stresses the fact that men may come to unexpected danger when
they reflect and act purely according to logic. "Even as a blind man
who hurries over a cliff by measuring his way step by step and releases
his hold fails off that cliff, so it can easily happen that a man falls into a
pit when he acts chiefly on inference (without the eyes of the agama)." 57
He likens the ~astras to the eyes as they enable us to have knowledge. 58
It is interesting to note that this argument was used by the V~ttsiputriya
school which was a branch of Hinayana Buddhism. In commenting on
the "Madhyamaka-karik~t", 9, 3, of N~tg~rjuna, Bhavya, a philosopher
o f the M~dhyamika school, makes the following statement in the
"Prajfi~t-pradipamfila-madhyamaka-v.rtti": "And yet some of the
V~ttsiputriyas believe the contrary. We cannot approve of the theory
which, according to the agama, holds that one who clings to existence
(upadat.r) expiates the karmas of what looks to be the former existence
and becomes one who dings to existence (upadat.r) of the (five) upada-
naskandha. However, that the upadat.r does not exist is an established
fact. Therefore we do not mean to assert by inference (anumana) that
the upadat.r does not exist. This can be likened to the following:
As a blind man hurries along a dangerous road by measuring his way
step by step, thus when one acts chiefly by inference one easily runs into
the danger of falling into a pit (Vfikyap. I, 42).
5~ With regard to the last part of the statement Pun.yarfija declares: agamdd dhi
lokaviruddha.m tarkaviruddham apy acara.na.rnpratlpadyante hist.5.h.
~s dharmasya c~vyavacchinn~.h panth~no ye vyavasthit~.h / na t~rnl lokaprasiddhatv~t
kahcit tarke.na badhate // (Vakyap. I, 31).
~6 See Vfikyap. I, 131.
~7 hastaspar~ad ivandhena vi.same (= girimarge, Comm.) pathi dhavata [ anumana-
pradhanena vinipato na durlabhab /[ (Vfikyap. I, 42). The Benares edition reads:
hastaspargadibadhena. But we adopt the reading of the Lahore edition, which coincides
with the reading of the Tibetan citation.
s8 See Vfikyap. III, 14, 81 (19.490).
 BHARTRHARI THE SCHOLAR 293

This argument is not sound, because the gods themselves, on account

of their various upadanaskandhas are designed as devas, and because the
inference is not correct, as 'to measure one's way step by step', is found
in negative instances (vipak.se sattva) and because those who chiefly make
use of false inference (anumanaprabhasa) fall into a pit. As doubts arise,
the sacred scriptures being open to followers of all beliefs, it is not right
to draw a conclusion (avadhdra.na) based on this fact alone (pratij~d). It
must be taken into account that the sacred scriptures have the same
significance as the method o f inference has (hetu). For that which is not
the direct object of perception (pratyak.sa) may be a cause of discriminative
knowledge (dr.st.Ctnta). For instance, the inference is by nature (svabhava)
a cause of discriminative knowledge." 59
Commenting on the above passage, Avalokitavrata remarks as
follows: "In order to make the meaning clear the acarya Bhandrihari
resorts to a simile of a blind man so as to point out the reasons why
inference should be refuted..."~~

59 (1- yah na gnas ma bu.hi sde pa dag las kha cig phyir zlog par byed de -1) / . . . . . . .
(2- lu has ~e bar len pa po ltar gyur pasha na gnas pa yod pa ltar hgyur ba.hi las yohs su zad
pas [ mi lasogs pa.hiphuhpo Ke bar blab bahi Ke bar len pa po Kid duhgyur bar grags pas
rjes ~u dpag pas ~e bar len pa po rned pa ~id du bstan pa kho bo cag mi .hdod de -2)
. . . . . . .

(3-
lob ba rkah pa.hi tshod dpags kyis /
Kam ha.hi lam du rgyug pa ltar /
rjes su dpag pa gtsor .hdsin pa /
rnam par ltuh ba mi dka.ho // -3)

shes bya ba lta bur .hgyur ro shes na / . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . de ni rigs pa ma yin te / . . . . . . . . .

lha yah lha.hi Ke bar blab ba dag Kid la brten has lha ~id du gdags par bya ba yin pa.hi phyir
daft / rkan paOi tshod dpags pa ni mi mthun pa.hi phyogs la yah yod pa.hi rjes su dpag pa
Kid duma grub pa.hi phyir daft / rjes su dpag pa ltar snah ba gtsor bdsin pa ni Itun bar
.hgyur ba.hiphyir ro / luh spyi yin pas the tshom skye bahi phyir yah de Kid lasnes par gzuh
bas rai rigs te] luft ni rjes su dpag pa las don tha dad pa ma yin par gzuh bar bya ste [
mhon sum ma yin pa.hi don rtogs pahi rgyu yin pa.hi phyir / dper n a / rjes su dpag pa.hi
rah gi bdag Kid bshin no / (125 a)
(I cited the passage by courtesy Prof. J. Nozawa; cf. The Tibetan Tripitaka. Peking
Edition, ed: by D. T. Suzuki, Tokyo-Kyoto 1957, vol. 95, p. 193, fol. 153a, 1.7 f).
so don de Kid bsal bar bya baOi phyir slob dpon bha hdri ha ris rjes su dpag pa sun
phyuti ha.hi khuhs bstan pabi phyir / (3 -3) shes bya ba smras te / dper na lob ba rkah
pa.hi tshod dpag gis lam bde ba spates te ~am ha.hi lam du rgyug pa dih la sogs pa dag gis
brdos pa la rdeg hchah gift rnam par ltuh ba rni dka.h ba de bshin du / yid ches pa.hi luh
spa~s pa rjes su dpag pa.hi tshod dpag gis rtog ge skam po.hi lain du rgyug pa dag kyah
tshe .hdi la yan .hkhrul pa.hi gnod par Ogyur la [ tshe phyi ma la yah bbras bu mi .hdodpar
rnarn par ltu~ bar .hgyur ro shes zer ro / [vol. 97, p. 92, fol. 225b, 1. 2 f.] (The author is
deeply grateful to Dr. Josho Nozawa, through whose kindness he was able to obtain
the extracts from the Tibetan text quoted above.)
294 HAJIME NAKAMURA

Bhavya's statement above 61 is exactly the same as Bhart.rhari's in the

V~kyapadiya. As the statement comes from a Buddhist work we can
take it that the idea was fairly popular in ancient India as typical of
Bhart.rhari.
Why is it then not safe to have recourse to inference as a guiding
principle7 He claims that there are roughly two arguments. In the first
place he declares that it is absolutely impossible to ascertain precisely
the vyapti which is an integral part of inference. In other words he
doubts the existence of a proper subsumptive relationship of ideas.
"Because of the fact that the nature of all things varies 62 according to
conditions, place and time, it is difficult to ascertain the nature of things
by inference. ''6s This statement is further commented on by Pu.nyar~ja:
"Even the one and the same thing may assume a different function or
character under different conditions or in different places. For instance,
water is cold in a snow-bound place but hot in a heated pot. The same
applies to difference in time; for example a fire feels very hot in the
summer, but not so in the winter. Consequently the svabh~va of water
cannot be known by inference; only by figama. Even that which is plain
in its function (like fire for instance) will be impeded in this when brought
into contact with another element." 6~
To illustrate this point Pun.yarfija writes: " F o r example the burning
of a fire is impeded in a cloud; it can also be prevented by incantations
and medicine." This idea of Bhart.rhari's was made use of by ~aflkara in
his writings: "Even certain ordinary things such as gems, spells, herbs,
and the like possess powers which, owing to difference of time, place,
occasion, and so on, produce various opposite effects, and nobody
unaided by instruction is able to find out by mere reflection (logic) the
number of these powers, their flavouring conditions, their objects, their
purposes, etc. ; how much more impossible is it to conceive without the
aid of Scripture the true nature of Brahman with its powers unfathomable
by thought !" 65
In this connection it is interesting to note that the doctrine "Just as
61 This verse is not found in the corresponding passage in the Chinese version of the
"Prajfi~-pradipa-mfila-madhyamaka-v~tti" translated by Prabhfikaramitra. Dr.
Nozawa informs the writer that it may have been omitted when translated into Chinese.
e~ This verse is incorporated in the Tattvasa.mgraha under the heading v. 1460.
~s avastha-de~a-kal~na.m bhedad bhinnasu ~akti.su / bhav~n~m anumanena prasiddhir
atidurlabha//(V~kyap. I, 32).
~4 nirjBatahakter dravyasya tam tam arthakriya~ prati / viMs.t.adravyasa.mbandhe sa
gaktibpratibadhyate//(VAkyap. I, 33). This verse is incorporated in the Tattvasa.mgraha
under the heading v. 1461. The first pfida reads as vijaata~akter apy asya.
65 ~afikaraad Brahmasfitra 1I, 1, 27.
 BHARTRHARI THE SCHOLAR 295
the subsumptive relationship of two ideas cannot be absolutely established,
inference in general cannot exist" was in circulation throughout India as
the theory propounded by the Lok~tyata school of materialists. 66 It is
ironical that Bhart.rhari, who advocated the sanctity of the orthodox
Brahmanic agama, should have something in common with a school of
materialists who were little better than heathens in his eyes.
And, in the second point, he asserts that in actual life no inference can
exist which will meet with the approval of everyone. "A fact verified
after much thought by those skilled in inference may be interpreted in
quite a different way by those who are even more skilled in inference." 67
Thus as far as logical reflections are concerned Bhart.rhari has reached
an attitude of relativism or scepticism. His arguments refuting logic
became famous in later years and various writings of the Vedanta school
refer to these arguments. 68
Having assumed this attitude of relativism, Bhart.rhari declares in-
ference to be incapable of persuading. According to him logic is powerless
to move a person who is firmly convinced of the truth of some fact, a
person who believes that fact to be as true as his senses tell him; therefore
logical argumentation is powerless when it comes to persuading someone
of something. "When a person does not doubt his knowledge even as
he does not doubt his senses, how can anyone persuade him?" 66
This theory of relativism or scepticism was not new in India; it had
been propounded by Safijaya as early as ]3uddha's time and the Jain
belief had had similar philosophical inclinations from its inception. But
the fact that an orthodox Brahmin should take up this attitude is remark-
able indeed.
It is interesting to note in passing that Saflkara adopted Bhart.rhari's
philosophy as it was. This can be seen from the tone in which he pro-
pounded his doctrine in the following extracts from his writings. "In
matters to be known from Scripture mere reasoning is not to be relied
on for the following reason also. As the thoughts of man are altogether
unfettered, reasoning which disregards the holy texts and rests on
individual opinion only has no proper foundation. We see how argu-

66 SDS. I, 11. 70-102.

67 yatnenanumito 'py artha.h ku~alair anumat.rbhi.h ] abhiyuktatarair anyair anyathaivo-
papadyate/] (Vakyap. I, 34).
~8 Bhamati ad Brahmasfitra II, 1, 11; SDS. XVI, U. 820-821. This statement is
also quoted in the Anum~na-parik.s~ of the Tattvasa.mgraha as a doctrine of Bhart.rhari
(p. 426, v. 1462).
~9 yo yasya svam iva j~anam dar~ana.m nabhi~ankate ] sthita.m pratyak.sapak.se ta.m
katham anyo (tarkagaranab) nivartayet // (V~kyap. I, 39).
296 HAJIMENAKAMURA
ments, which some clever men had excogitated with great pains, are
shown, by people still more ingenious, to be fallacious, and how the
arguments of the latter again are refuted in their turn by other men; so
that, on account of the diversity of men's opinions, it is impossible to
accept mere reasoning as having a sure foundation." "But that cognitions
founded on reasoning do conflict is generally known; for we continually
observe that what one logician endeavours to establish as perfect know-
ledge is demolished by another, who, in his turn, is treated alike by a
third." 7o
Here again ~aflkara is in agreement with Bhart.rhari's views. Bhar-
t.rhari's doctrine brought much influence to bear on the later school of
Advaitins. The great scholar of the school, M~tdhava accepted his views
unreservedly. 71 (We may point out that a similarity exists between the
views of Bhart.rhari and ~aflkara and those of the French philosopher
Blaise Pascal as expressed in his Pens~es where he holds that the philo-
sophical reflections of men are always one-sided and contradictory; that
the Christian truth should be reverted to.)
The next step is to discuss Bhart.rhari's arguments in refutation of
inference. His two chief ones have been discussed earlier on; the first,
objective and based on pure theory, the second based on the social and
individual point of view. As the second one does not refute the essentials
of inference they may be considered irrelevant. But "to rely on inference"
is decidedly a social phenemenon and since he is opposed to it his argu-
ments have points in them which merit attention. But do his statements
prove inference to be false? Was Bhart.rhari truly opposed to it? To
answer these questions we have to discuss his statements and his argu-
ments.
As his first point Bhart.rhari holds that in some cases A can be B, in
others A cannot be B and that therefore no subsumptive relationship can
exist between the two. But Bhartrhari admits that in cases where A can
be B and the conditions (upadhi) which make this possible are represented
by C, then there must be a subsumptive relationship between A and C and
B. Then of course it can be imagined that in combining A with C
conditions represented by D may be necessary to bring about the sub-
sumptive relationship between A and C and B; and this ad infinitum.
The very fact that he considered such problems proved that Bhartrhari
himself presupposed the existence of subsumptive relationship. Indeed

7o Safikaraad Brahmas~tra II, 1, 11 (~nSS., I, pp. 449; 452).

71 SDS. XVI, 1. 818 L
 BHARTRHARI THE SCHOLAR 297
his argument to refute it r2 is based on inference. Therefore Bhart.rhari
failed in his effort to refute inference for the simple reason that he could
not unfold his own opinion without it. Consequently we may add that
his arguments to refute inference are weak and faulty.
As for his second statement, his assertions that the conclusions drawn
by different philosophers conflict with one another is quite correct as a
factual statement, but his conclusion "Therefore one should not rely on
inference" is evidently derived from inference. For the proposition "One
should not rely upon that which is not accepted by all" is presupposed
as the major premise to the above statement. Here we come face to face
with the interesting case of a philosopher who negates inference, taking
recourse to it himself. Therefore the relativist and dubitative attitude of
Bhart.rhari was contradictory in itself. Since scepticism or the theory of
doubt is full of difficult points, as is noticed in the history of philosophy
Eastern and Western, he had to acknowledge the difficulty of being
absolutely sceptical. 73 However Bhart.rhari's real aim in refuting the
power of inference was to minimize its importance and exalt the sanctity
of the orthodox Brahmin agama. Thus all his statements quoted above
point to the one conclusion, that "all inferences include falsehood" and
he really believed this. "When one wishes to convey to others that what
one said was untrue, when one declares that one's sayings were nothing
but ties, one does not mean the actual stating of that statement. For if
the saying itself be false, the words fail to convey the meaning they were
meant to convey." 74
The above statement can be taken to mean that he refutes the argument
that "an assertion that all is falsehood is self-contradictory and therefore
cannot exist". In other words an assertion "all is false" can be either
true or false. If it is true, he cannot possibly declare that "all is false"
as the very assertion is true. On the other hand, however, if the assertion
itself is false, it cannot exist.
We know that a similar problem was discussed by European philoso-
phers but in so far as it concerns Indian philosophy it was propounded
by the opponents to the M~dhyamika philosophy. In the "Vigrahavy~t-
vartani" of N~g~trjuna we find the following argument: " I f (as the M~-
dhyamika asserts) the essence (nature) of things escapes us and cannot

72 V~kyap. I, 32.
78 See Paul Deussen, Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophic, II, 1, S. 212.
~4 [svavaky~nam asatyarthatapratipadanaya] sarvam mithyd bravfmfti [ukte] naitad
vakya.m vivak$yate (= warthata na prasagjanfya) / tasya (= satyavakyagya) mithyabhi-
dhane hi prakranto 'rtho na gamyate // (V~kyap. HI, 3, 25, p. 108).
298 HATIME NAKAMURA

be found anywhere, then the very words that thou utterest lack their own
essence and all things cannot be deprived of their nature". " I f thou
assertest that only this sentence of thine has its essence (i.e. it is not false)
then the very previous assertion will mean nothing when it is heard." 75
These arguments were brought forward in order to refute the doctrine
of the Mfidhyamika that all things are void. Similar arguments were also
found in the Ny~tya-sQtra (II, 1, 13-14). 78
Bhartrhari was against adding the statement " . . . . . is false" to an
assertion. In other words, though he maintained that all things were
false, he tried to find truth in that assertion at least. This can be traced
in his statement that "inference is wrong and therefore the dgama is not
wrong" thus totally refuting inference.
As in his refutation of inference, Bhart.rhari had finally to betray the
fact that he virtuaUy resorted to reasoning, although he ardently expressed
his absolutely orthodox attitude in his arguments for the sacred scriptures.
He held them in profound veneration maintaining that disobedience of
their laws to be evil without questioning whether this was really right or
wrong. But the sacred books, which Bhart.rhari believed in so absolutely,
were collections of the wise words of philosophers who had lived hundreds,
even a thousand, years before his time so that there were many phrases
which were meaningless and their obvious or superficial meanings were
found to be doubtful on philosophical and theological grounds. Some-
times scholars interpreted them in such a way that the original meaning
was lost. Bhart.rhari himself admitted that this had happened. "Though
all men are able through the agama to understand things the fruit of
which is yet to be experienced, what is stated in the agama can be in-
terpreted in the contrary meaning." 77
The above extract makes it clear that Bhart.rhari himself acknowledged
the fact that various interpretations differed occasionally from and con-
tradicted what was stated in the sacred books. Therefore when confronted
with cases of this kind, it was logical reasoning on the part of scholars
engaged in the elucidation of the text and not the sacred scriptures
themselves which led to a final decision. This opinion was confirmed by

75 The Vigrahavyavartanf of Nagdrjuna with the author's commentary ed. by E. H.

Johnston and Arnold Ktmst (Bruges, 1951),vv. 1-2. Also see part III of "Hui-cheng-
hm" ("Rtsod-pa bzlog-pah.i tshig-leh.ur-byas-pa shes-bya-ba". "Vigrahavy~vartani-
k~rik~").
76 This argument is in some ways similar to "nityasam~ j~ti.h" recognized by the
Ny~ya school (Ny~tya-sfitraIV, 1, 25-26); cf. no. 74.
77 sarvo 'd.rs.t.aphalan arth~n agamat pratipadyate / viparita.m ca sarvatra ~akyate
vaktum agame // (V~kyap. I, 142).
 BHART HARI THE SCHOLAR 299
Pu.nyarhja. 7s In addition Bhart.rhari had the following to say on this
point: "There is a possibility that in interpreting the phrases of the
sacred books the opinions of the monogenists and the dualists m a y differ
as each derives his opinions from his own judgement." 79
It is indeed true that m a n y of the interpretations of words and phrases
in the sacred books contradict each another. Even those who profoundly
venerate the sacred books have to admit this. When confronted with
such problems, we have to resort to human logic to decide which inter-
pretation to use. The following words written by Bhart.rhari illustrate
this clearly. "Logical argument (tarka) which does not contradict the
sacred Vedas is as an eye to those who have not yet seen the truth. F o r
the meaning of the sentences cannot be construed from the colour (that
is the tangible, material contents of the sacred books) alone, s~
Even as colour which is a material thing can be perceived by the eyes,
so can the contents of the sacred books only be comprehended by logical
reflection. Therefore, though he appears to be a profound venerator of
the sacred books, Bhart.rhari had to resort to logical reflection in the end.
Pu.nyar~ja makes this point quite clear in the following lines: "Logic
which does not conflict with the a g a m a is indeed a proper foundation on
which to build knowledge. And contrarily agama which is not tempered
with logic is meaningless." sl
After all Bhart.rhari was virtually a philosopher and a free thinker
who delved into metaphysical reflections while on the surface keeping
agama as the basis of his philosophy, s~ (Saflkara also admits that logic
is necessary for the interpretation of the sacred books.) s3

78 tasmad agama.m prama.nik.rtya kacid yuktir ucyarndna upodbalakatva.m labhate. -

(Pur)yaraja ad Vhkyap. I, 142).
7~ tasyarthavadar~pa.ni nigcitya svavikalpajab / ekatvina~n dvaitind.rn ca pravada
bahudha mat&h // (V?akyap. I, 8).
so Veda~dstravirodhf ca tarka~ caks.ur apagyatdrn / r~pamatrad dhi vakyarthalt kevalan
navatis.thate [/(Vhkyap. I, 137).
81 agamdvirodh[ tarka eva pram&nam atarka~ cagamo viphala iti (ad V~kyap. I, 137);
cf. ibid., I, 138.
82 The argument which Bhart.rhari employed to advocate the sacred Vedas was used
by the materialists to refute them (SDS. I, 11.46f.).
83 "Just as in the case of several conflicting scriptural passages we explain all of them
in such a manner as to make them accord with one, so ~ruti, if in conflict with other
means of right knowledge, has to be bent so as to accord with the latter. Moreover,
reasoning, which enables us to infer something not actually perceived in consequence
of its having a certain equality of attributes with what is actually perceived, stands
nearer to perception than ~ruti which conveys its sense by tradition merely" (Safikara
ad BS. II, 1, 4). This problem is discussed more boldly in the Yogavasi#t.ha. The
author says that a gastra, though it is derived from men, deserves to be accepted, if it
is reasonable. One must follow reason. A speech, if reasonable, must be accepted
 300 HAJIME NAKAMURA

Scholars who came after him were fully aware of Bhartrhari's am-
biguous attitude. His veneration of the sacred books was disregarded
as being common to other schools of thought and the metaphysical side
of his studies which he had built up so carefully was examined with great
interest; a~ this led to his being called a logician (naiy~yika) by the great
scholar V~caspatimi~ra. T h e i r o n y ofthisis of course obvious; Bhart.rhari
had always opposed the logicians of other schools of thought.
And now we come to a discussion of his doctrine as a true believer in
the sacred scriptures. Arguments which refute logic do not necessarily
support the sacred books. And scriptures or sacred writings are not
confined to the Brahmin belief alone; they are found in the Buddhist and
Jain beliefs as well. Therefore Bhart.rhari must have had some good
reason for insisting that only the sacred writings of the orthodox Brahmin
belief should be honoured and revered. As we have discussed earlier, he
acknowledged two classes of sacred books: those collected by the ancient
rs.is (Vedas) and those compiled by scholars who came later (smrti).
Bhart.rhari insisted that the minds of the .r.sis and the scholars in question
were perfect and flawless, transcending the past and the future and it
was not for shallow human understanding to refute what they had said
and written. "The knowledge of the wise, lucid and unscathed in their
minds, with knowledge concerning the past and the future, is as sound
and reliable as that which we acquire through our senses. ''Ss "The
truths told by those who see with the sacred eye, things which are un-

even from a child, but that which is not reasonable should be rejected like a piece of
straw though it might be uttered even by Brahman, the creator. That man is certainly
not wise who rejecting the beautiful water of the Ganges flowing before him drinks
from a well thinking only that it belongs to his father:
api paurusam adeya.m ~dstram ced yuktibodhakam /
anyat tv (trsarn api tydjya.rn bhavya.m nydyaikasevina [[
yuktiyuktam upadeya.m vacana.m balakad api [
anyat t.r.nam iva tyajyam apy ukta.m padmayoninft [/
yo 'srnattdtasya kftpo 'yam iti kaupa.m pibaty apab [
tyaktvft gfthga.m purastha~n ta~n ko na ~asty atigarhitam [[
(Yogav~sist.ha II, 18, 2--4; Vidhushekhara Bhattacharyya, The .Zlgamagastra of
Gauqlapada, University of Calcutta, 1943, p. 303).
84 V~easpatimigra comments on the Brahmas~tra-bh~t.syaby ~aflkara as follows in
I, 3, 28 where Saflkara refutes the spho.ta theory: "ditirnfttrarn atra sftcitarn, vistaras tu
Tattvabinddv avagantavya iti / ala~n va naiyayikair vivddena.' (p. 260). Here Tattvabindu
is the name of a book written by V~caspatimi~ra in accordance with the theory of
the Bh~tt.t.as. See also Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, II, p. 403.
s~ avirbh~taprak(tddnftm anupadrutacetasam / atitandgataj~na.m pratyaks, an na vi~is.-
yate [/(Vakyap. I, 37),
 BHARTRHARITHE SCHOLAR 301
perceivable because they are beyond perception, cannot be denied by
inference."se
Of course he did not admit the sensory perceptions to be correct in
themselves. To prove this Bhart.rhari gave the following answers to the
question as to whether things are really what our senses tell us they are. 87
"The empty sky appears to have a surface, just like fire-flies seem to be
made of fire. When seen from a different aspect the empty sky has no
surface and the fire-fly no fire." 88 "Therefore the wise observe correctly
with the mind even those things which can be directly perceived by the
senses. As intuition should be true knowledge, we should not represent
the things which we perceive." 89
Bhart.rhari was very critical of perceptive recognition but respected
intuition which the .r.sis esteemed so highly. And as the sacred writings
were full of intuitive knowledge Bhart.rhari insisted that they be observed.
He held that a certain knowledge exists in our daily life which cannot
reach us through inference but only through our own perceptive ex-
perience. "Knowledge regarding jewels and gold which belongs to those
who have made a study of these things cannot be fully conveyed to those
who have made no study of them, except through learning and training;
it cannot be derived from inference. ''9~ He then adds that the contents
of the sacred scriptures are understood by the rs.is who practised Yoga.91
What was the object of the intuition of the .r.sis? According to his
philosophy it was without doubt "the Brahman consisting of words".
This point will be dealt with later. According to Bhart.rhari's philosophy
too, the Vedas possess the highest authority because they are the reflection
or image of the Brahman. Therefore his profound belief in the Vedas
can be attributed to the fact that the .r.sis in ancient times held the intuition
of the Brahman in profound veneration. Bhart.rhari accorded a place of
primary importance to the training and discipline through which the
intuition of the Brahman could be attained. But even in his philosophy,
the Brahman is a state which transcends words; the .r.sis attained their

86 atindriyan asa.mvedyan pagyanty ar.se.na caksu.sa / ye bhavan vacana.m te.sa.m nanu-

manena badhyate // (Vfikyap. I. 38).
sr vayarn yathavad artho d.r.st.a.h tathaiva ca vyavahari.syamaO / Puo.yar~ja's inter-
pretation was followed.
88 talavad d rgyate vyoma khadyoto havyavdd, iti / na cen nasti tala .mvyomni na khadyote
huta~ana.h//(Vftkyap. II, 142, p. 140).
a9 tasm~t pratyaks, am apy artha.m vidv~n [k.seta yuktita.h [ na dar~anasya prdm~.ny~t
d.rgyam artha.m prakalpayet (= vyavahara.rn nirvahayet) // (V~kyap. II, 143, p. 140).
9o paresam asamakhyeyam abhyasad eva jayate / ma~.drftpyadivijganar.n tadvida~n
nanumanikam//(VS.kyap. I, 35).
91 tathd r sf.ndm api yogajapratyaksagamyam eva. (Punyarftjaad I, 35).
302 HAJIME NAKAMURA

intuition through Yoga, a word-less and thought-less realm; and this is

the reason why the Brahman cannot be explained in words. The teaching
of the Brahman is simply the expediency of the imparting of truth to
men. "Because the descriptions of things in the sacred writings are made
in order to explain things by means of words, the avidydt itself is set forth
by means of certain descriptions." 92
According to Pun.yarfija the contents of the sacred books are explained
for the benefit of the stupid and to explain truth itself is an impossibility. 93
His statement that the explanations of the sacred scriptures is based on
the avidya is a bold one for a Brahmanic scholar; Safikara shares his
opinion in this. Bhart.rhari's view on this point will be discussed in full
later. 94
Therefore as a scholar of traditional lore Bhart.rhari has a deep vener-
ation for the sacred scriptures but as a philosopher he accords them
little real value. In fact 95 from the point of view of philosophy the sacred
scriptures were only of secondary importance.
In conclusion we can sum up the following facts about Bhart.rhari: He
professed to restore orthodox Brahmanic studies, especially the study of
grammar; he attacked the general tendency in the schools of philosophy
in his day to depend on logic alone at the same time advocating the
sanctity of the sacred books. But in order to do this (refute logic and
advocate the sanctity of the sacred books) he had to propound certain
arguments and in so doing was obliged h i m s e l f - albeit unconsciously -
to resort to logical reflections. His fragmentary views regarding know-
ledge reveal that he recognized three ways in which knowledge could be
obtained:
1) Perception through the senses (pratyak.sa);
2) Thinking by inference (anumana);
3) Intuition of the Brahman (aptavacana).

92 vyavaharaya manyante ~astrarthaprakriya yata.h / gastres,u prakriyabhedair avidyai-

vopavarnyate//(V~kyap. II, 234). The latter half of this statement is again recorded
in I/I, 14, 78. (p. 489).
93 gastrarthaprakriyah, kevalam abudhanam vyutp~danaya ato na kgtstrg~.ni tattva.m
vaktu.m parayanti. Punyar~tja ad V~kyap. II, 234.
94 V~kyap. I, 74; II, 240; II, 322 f.
95 According to a fragment ascribed to him and cited in a Tibetan text, Bhart.rhari
thought even the sacred books were based on the parikalpa. The author's article:
"Tibetan citations of Bhart.rhari's verses and the problem of his date", (Yamaguchi
Commemoration Volume (Kyoto, 1955),p. 125). By courtesy of Rev. Jain Muni Jambu-
vijay the author came to know that the following verse is cited in Bhart.rhari's own
commentary on v. I, 1 (Lahore ed.): sarvaparikalpanam abhdse 'py anavasthitaO /
tarkagamanumanena buddhya parikalpita.h [/
 BHARTRHARI THE SCHOLAR 303

The first and second methods are those applied by ordinary men and
according to one view-point of his, perception is stable and inference
subsists on it. 96 While emphasizing however the fact that inference is
unstable, he resorts to it in his own writings.
The third method is to be found only in the ancient .r.sis and the Yogins
who through a system of abstract meditation and rigid asceticism aim to
become united with the Brahman. While the first two methods are earth
bound, the last is not of this world. The sacred books are based upon
the third method which is described and known as ~ptavaeana in India.
The term pratyak.sa is sometimes used for the third as well as the first
method since both methods base their experience on clear evidence. 97
Needless to say however the first and third methods differ from each
other fundamentally. Though Bhartrhari revered the aptavaeana above
all, in point of fact he made use of the three methods. The three methods,
according to Bhart.rhari, are nothing but the self-manifestation of the
absolute Brahman. This will be discussed in another article.

ADDENDA : WESTERN PARALLELS

Some of Bhart.rhari's dogmatical statements illustrate the mediaeval

trends of thought which can be traced in other countries. In the following
appendices the writer would point out certain parallels in the mediaeval
West.

To page 292
A1-Mansur a Muslim Caliph published an edict in which he declared
that God had decreed hell fire for those who believed that truth could be
found by means of unaided reason. All books on logic and metaphysics
were burnt.
Algazel a Muslim philosopher wrote a book called "The Destruction
of the Philosophers" pointing out that, since all the truth necessary to
life is to be found in the Koran, speculation independent of revelation
is pointless.
Abelard in his famous book "Sic et Non", ("Yes and N o " ) states that

96 "If the words were founded upon the dar~ana (= pratyak.sa) there would be no
need for inference. Indeed when the dar~ana is established why should be need for
inference?" (na calam anumanaya kabdo darAanaparvaka.h / siddhe hi dar~ane ki.m syad
anumanaprayojanam/[ (V~kyap. III, 13, 12, p. 436).
~7 In the Brahrnasfitras the Vedas are called pratyak.sa, cf. BS. I, 3, 28; III, 2, 24;
IV, 4, 2O.
304 HAJIME NAKAMURA

nothing outside the scriptures is infallible; even Apostles and Fathers

may err.

To page 297
Eubalides said as follows: "Wenn ich sage: ich liJge, liige ich dann oder
sage ich die Wahrheit? Wenn ich dabei die Wahrheit sage, so ltige ich;
wenn ich abet lfige, so sage ich eben die Wahrheit. Die L~sung liegt
darin, dass in diesem Falle die Form des Urteils, welche den Anspruch
involviert, etwas als seiend als wahr auszusagen, zuf~illigerweise mit dem
Inhalt des Urteils in Widerspruch steht. Als Curiosurn mag in Erinnerung
gebracht werden, dass es . . . von den Kretern heisst: " . . . Die Kreter
sind immer LiJgner." (P. Deussen Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie,
II, 1, Leipzig, 1911, S. 212.)

To page 298
According to the Muslim mystics, every text of the Koran had seven
or seven hundred layers of interpretation, the literal meaning being only
for the ignorant and the vulgar. It would seem to follow that a philoso-
pher's teaching could not possibly conflict with the Koran; for among
seven hundred interpretations there would surely be at least one that
would fit what the philosopher had to say. (B. Russell, A History of
Western Philosophy, New York, 1945, p. 426.)

To page 302
The three kinds of knowledge, as were set forth by Bhart.rhari, were
mentioned in nearly the same way by Thomas Aquinas; according to
him there are three ways of knowing God: by reason, by revelation and
by intuition of things previously known only by revelation, although he
says almost nothing about the third way. (B. Russell, op. cit., p. 460.)

ABBREVIATIONS

~afikara ad BS. ~afikara: Brahmasfttra-bha.sya (AnSS. No. 21). Poona, 1900. The
English translation of the passages of this work cited in this article
is by Georg Thibaut, SBE., XXXIV (Oxford, 1890), and cited here
with slight modifications.
SDS. The Sarvadar$ana-sam.graha of Sfiya.na-Madhava,ed. by Vasudev
Shastri Abhyankar. Government Oriental Series, No. 1 (Poona,
1924).
Taisho The Taish6 Tripit.aka, ed. by J. Takakusu and K. Watanabe.
Tattvasam.graha The Tattvasa.mgraha of ~fintarak.sita with the Commentary of
Kamalaw ed. by Embar Krishnamacharya. Gaekwad's Oriental
Series, No. 30 (Baroda, 1926).
 BHARTRHARI THE SCHOLAR 305

Va~ap. Vakyapad[ya, ed. with the commentary of Pun yar~tja and of HelSrSja.
Benares Sanskrit Series (Benares, 1887-1907, 1928-1937).

P.S. In preparing the English translation Prof. Jun Orui of Toyo University, Tokyo,
helped the author greatly. The translation was revised by Mrs. Koch. The rewritten
MS. was looked over by Dr. Minoru Kiyota who has come from America to study
with the author at the University of Tokyo. Here the author wants to express his
sincere gratitude to these scholars, without whose kind help this article could not
have been brought to its present state of completion.