Chapter 10 Connecting social identity theory and cognitive appraisal theory of emotions Patricia Garcia-Prieto and Klaus R. Scherer To account for intergroup phenomena, social identity theory has evoked the cognitive (i.e. social categorization) and motivational (i.e., self- enhancement) processes underlying social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). However, the way in which these processes may interact and translate into specific emotional responses in intergroup settings remains to be clearly explained. Little is still known about why, how, and when groups display emotion toward each other, and adding an affective component remains one of the key challenges for future development in social identity theory (Brown, 2000). Cognitive appraisal theories of emotion have much to offer in this regard. Cognitive appraisal theories of emotion suggest that emotions are deter- mined by the cognitive evaluation or appraisal of an event that is personally relevant. The results of our appraisal of the causes and the potential con- sequences of an event determine the emotion we feel (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991b; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Scherer, 2001a; C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). From this perspective, there are as many potential emo- tion responses to an event as there are ways of appraising it. This approach has significantly improved our understanding of emotion as a complex individual process consisting of multiple components, including cognition, physiological changes, motor expression, motivation, and subjective feel- ings (Frijda, 1986; Scherer, 2001a). However, despite explicit acknowledgements from appraisal theorists that social context can influence the emotional process (e.g., see Lazarus, 199la) and that emotions have important social functions (e.g., Frijda & Mesquita, 1994), few studies have directly examined social context effects (for exceptions see Jakobs, Fischer, & Manstead, 1997; Jakobs, Manstead, & Fischer, 1999; Kappas, 1996). Moreover, some authors maintain that current appraisal theories remain unsatisfactory in accounting for the effects of the social context and of ongoing interactions on the emotional process (see Manstead & Fischer, 2001; Parkinson, 2001; Parkinson & Manstead, 1993). For these authors, appraisal researchers have been pri- marily concerned with how appraisal of events relevant to us as individuals190 Garcia-Prieto and Scherer can determine emotions we feel as individuals, almost irrespective of the social context. Notwithstanding, the appraisal approach to emotions provides a parti- cularly useful framework for the study of social emotions because it conceptualizes emotion as a process in which subjective appraisal and personal meaning are fundamental, and allows for an unlimited range of emotional responses. In addition, several appraisal theories recognize the social context of appraisal and have suggested dimensions such as: (a) agency, which is used to evaluate the role of other(s) in causing an emotion- eliciting event; (b) coping potential, which is used to evaluate one’s sense of control or power over the consequences of the event; and (c) legitimacy, value relevance, and compatibility with external standards, which are used to evaluate the compatibility of an event with the perceived normative standards of a social group (for a review of these dimensions, see Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003). Empirical research has confirmed the sensitivity of these specific appraisal dimensions to the influence of national culture (Mesquita, 2003; Scherer, 1997). However, appraisal theorists have paid little attention to the identification of the psychological mechanisms through which the social and cultural aspects of the context — particularly the functions that reference groups have for the individual — may systematically influence these specific dimensions of appraisal and the resulting emotions. In this chapter we argue that social identity salience is one of the most promising potential mechanisms. There is abundant empirical evidence in the intergroup relations field suggesting that when social identity becomes salient it can influence cog- nitive focus, how information is perceived, as well as the affective and behavioral responses (for a review see Brown, 2000). More recently, researchers in the field of intergroup relations have become increasingly interested in the study of intergroup emotions and in applications of appraisal theories to intergroup settings (e.g., Dijker, 1987; Dijker, Koomen, van den Heuvel, & Frijda, 1996; Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Mackie & Smith, 2002; E. R. Smith, 1993, 1999; E. R. Smith & Ho, 2002; Vanman & Miller, 1993; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Gordijn, & Wigboldus, 2002; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003). In contrast to appraisal researchers, intergroup relations researchers are interested in emotions experienced by individuals as members of social groups in intergroup settings. However, up till now, research in the intergroup domain has con- centrated on testing whether the effect of social identity on intergroup behavior (as suggested by measures of action tendencies) is mediated by specific emotions (e.g., anger, fear, guilt). Only a few researchers have tested the links between specific appraisal dimensions and specific emotions in intergroup contexts (for exceptions, see Dumont et al., 2003; Mackie et al., 2000). Moreover, little is known about the ways in which social identityCognitive appraisal theory of emotions 191 salience might affect some of the standard appraisal dimensions proposed by the main appraisal theories. This chapter addresses precisely this last question. After briefly reviewing research on intergroup emotions, we will outline propositions about the influence of social identity salience on those specific appraisal dimensions (see Scherer’s appraisal theory, 1984, 2001a) that have been identified as being particularly sensitive to the effects of the socio-cultural context. Research on intergroup emotions In his 1993 work, E. R. Smith borrowed from several appraisal theories (including Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1988) to speculate about the types of appraisal-emotion-action tendency patterns that could be relevant to the study of emotion in intergroup relations. For E. R. Smith, the appraisal processes that generate social emotions are identical to the appraisal processes proposed by cognitive theories of emotion for individuals, with the difference that appraisal involves aspects of social identity instead of only aspects of personal identity. In 1999, E. R. Smith’s position breaks away from one of the basic constructs of social identity theory, which is that intergroup behavior such as prejudice is primarily motivated by the maintenance of self-esteem. For E. R. Smith, the evaluation of self-esteem targets the self (personal or collective) and ranges from positive to negative. In contrast, he sees preju- dice as a group-based emotional reaction to the appraisal of an outgroup that has some implication for the ingroup, and reactions may involve a whole range of emotions (e.g., fear, anger, resentment). To cite E. R. Smith (1999) “. . . appraisals refer to the position of the outgroup in relation to the ingroup, just as, in emotion theories, the appraisals that trigger emotion by definition refer to an object’s or situation’s implication for the self” (p. 187). The intergroup emotion theory afterwards proposed by E. R. Smith and his colleagues (Mackie et al., 2000; also see E. R. Smith & Mackie, Chapter 9, this volume) constitutes the first attempt to adapt appraisal theories to the area of intergroup relations. From this perspective, individuals may experience emotions toward the outgroup as a whole just as they can experience emotional reactions toward individual outgroup members. Based on intergroup emotion theory one could argue that, if the outgroup is appraised as threatening the ingroup’s interests or goals, and if the ingroup is appraised as more powerful than the outgroup, the resulting emotion may be anger accompanied by the ten- dency to move against the outgroup. In contrast, if the outgroup is appraised as more powerful than the ingroup, the response may be fear or anxiety accompanied by the tendency to move away from the outgroup. Research by Mackie et al. (2000) has confirmed that, in situations of intergroup conflict, appraisals of the ingroup as stronger (in terms of