Social Studies and Critical Thinking

E. Wayne Ross

Critical thinking has been a central focus of social studies education since it was
first conceived as a school subject in the early part of the twentieth century.
Critical thinking is generally considered an essential element of “civic
competence”—the ability of people to confront persistent and complex social
problems—which is the goal of social studies education that distinguishes it from
the disciplinary study of history and the social sciences.

Despite a rhetorical emphasis on critical thinking in social studies, researchers

have found very little teaching for critical thinking in classrooms. The dominant
pat-

tern of classroom social studies pedagogy is characterized by text-oriented, whole-

group, teacher-centered instruction, with an emphasis on memorization of factual
information. There have been widespread criticisms of traditional patterns of
social studies instruction and numerous alternatives presented, yet these decidedly
uncritical approaches to social studies teaching and learning persist (Stanley,
1991).

The gap between the rhetoric and reality of critical thinking in social studies can
be explained, in part, by a number of factors, including the powerful influences of
the organization, culture, and architec-

ture of schools; assumptions about the purposes of schools; and the increasing
emphasis on test scores as opposed to more authentic representations of student
learning. The most fundamental obstacle in efforts to promote critical thinking in
social studies, however, is the actual conception of what critical thinking means.
In what follows, I will briefly outline deficiencies in our current thinking about
critical thinking and offer a radical alternative.

THE PROBLEM:

"NONDIALECTICAL" THINKING

Most social studies educators turn to John Dewey for their definition of what
constitutes critical (or what he termed “reflective”) thinking. In How We Think
(1933), Dewey described what has since become the rhetorical holy grail of social
studies instruction:

Active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of

knowledge in the light of the grounds that support and the further conclusions to
which it tends . .. (p. 8).

There are two principle obstacles to achieving this kind of thinking in social
studies classrooms. First, Dewey’s holistic conception of thinking—which does not
separate knowing from doing—tends to be treated as a series of mechanical steps for
students to follow. Dewey lays out the elements of critical thinking as follows:

(1) suggestions, in which the mind leaps forward to a possible solution; (2) an
intellectu-alization of the difficulty or perplexity that has been felt (directly
experienced) into a problem to be solved, a question for which the answer must be
sought; (3) the use of one suggestion after another as a leading idea, or
hypothesis, to initiate and guide observation and other operations in collection of
factual material; (4) the mental elaboration of the idea or supposition as an idea
or supposition (reasoning,
in the sense in which reasoning is a part, not the whole, of inference); and (5)
testing the hypothesis by overt or imaginative action. (Dewey, 1933, p. 106,
emphasis in original)

Although Dewey never suggested that critical thinking occurs in mechanically

consecutive stages or is the consequence applying discrete cognitive skills to
solve a problem, social studies educators often interpret him in this way. Over the
years many teacher educators have encouraged teachers to take a skills-based
approach to teaching critical thinking is social studies. The basic tenet being
that teachers must use direct instruction to teach discrete critical thinking
skills, giving students many opportunities to practice application of thinking
skills and assisting students in transferring critical thinking skills from one
context to another.

As a result, exercising critical judgment in social studies is often reduced to

simplistic yardsticks for evaluating discrete bits of information. For example,
social studies teachers often employ schemes that identify cognitive skills or
aspects of critical thinking that are linked to the notion of logical argument:

• Grasping the meaning of a statement.

• Distinguishing between verifiable facts and value statements.

• Distinguishing relevant from irrelevant observations or reasons.

• Determining the factual accuracy of a statement.

• Determining the credibility of a source.

• Identifying ambiguous statements.

• Identifying unstated assumptions.

• Detecting bias.

• Recognizing logical inconsistencies in a line of reasoning.

• Judging whether there is ambiguity in a line of reasoning.

• Judging whether certain statements contradict each other.

• Judging whether a conclusion follows necessarily.

• Judging whether a statement is specific enough.

• Judging whether a statement is actually the application of a certain

principle.

• Judging whether an observation statement is reliable.

• Judging whether an inductive conclusion is warranted.

• Judging whether the problem has been identified.

• Judging whether something is an assumption.

• Judging whether a definition is adequate.

• Judging whether a statement made by an alleged authority is acceptable.1

The problem with critical thinking schemes that focus on the development of
transferable generic skills is that the key element in the development of students’
critical thinking is left out—knowledge. In a review of research on critical
thinking in social studies, Stanley (1991) concludes that “attempts to teaching
generic thinking skills or models without adequate attention to content are
unlikely to have any impact on student performance in subject areas” (p. 255).
Recent studies indicate students most skilled in using critical thinking to solve
problems had both a detailed knowledge of the relevant subject matter and a good
understanding of problem-solving strategies.

The fundamental problem with traditional approaches to critical thinking in so-

cial studies is its “nondialectical” nature, that is, the separation of what cannot
be separated with distortion. Students should be presented with opportunities to
make connections between prior knowledge and various elements of new knowledge,
rather than learning skills in isolation or examining only oddments of information.
As Bertell Oilman has pointed out, most people see the parts well enough, but not
the connections and the overall patterns of human existence.

CRITICAL THINKING AS DIALECTICAL THINKING

Inadequacy of nondialectical thinking—unconnected thinking—is particularly evident

in social studies education where students are expected to confront persistent and
complex social problems. If we define civic competence as the ability to understand
the world and act on it, then it is crucial that we understand the differences
among getting the facts right, explaining the facts, and constructing prescriptive
actions.

For example, many people of various political persuasions have pointed out the
paradox of the growing wealth of the few and the increasing poverty of the many, as
well as connections between the interests of corporations and the actions of
governments and of being powerless and poor. As Oilman (1993) points out, despite
awareness of these relations, most people do not take such observations seriously.
Lacking a theory to make sense of what they are seeing, people don’t know what
importance to give it; forget what they have just seen, or exorcise the
contradictions by labeling them a paradox. The problem is that the socialization we
undergo (in and out of school) encourages us to focus on the particulars of our
circumstances and to ignore

interconnections. Thus, we miss the patterns that emerge from relations. Social
studies education plays an important role in reinforcing this tendency. The social
sciences break up the human knowledge into various disciplines (history,
anthropology, sociology, geography, etc.) each with its own distinctive language
and ways of knowing, which encourages concentrating on bits and pieces of human
experience. What existed before is usually taken as given and unchanging. As a
result, political and economic upheavals (such as the revolutions of 1789, 1848,
1917, and 1989) are treated as anomalous events that need explanation.

Dialectical thinking, on the other hand, is an effort to understand the world in

terms of interconnections—the ties among things as they are right now, their own
preconditions, and future possibilities. The dialectical method takes change as the
given and treats apparent stability as that which needs to be explained (and
provides specialized concepts and frameworks to explain it). Dialectical thinking
is an approach to understanding the world that requires not only a lot of facts
that are usually hidden from view, but a more interconnected grasp of the facts we
already know.

The problem is that reality is more than appearances and focusing exclusively on
appearances—on the evidence that strikes us immediately and directly—can be
misleading. Basing an understanding of ourselves and our world on what we see,
hear, or touch in our immediate surroundings can lead us to conclusions that are
distorted or false.

Understanding anything in our everyday experience requires that we know something

about how it arose and developed and how it fits into the larger context or system
of which it is a part. Just recognizing this, however, is

not enough . . . After all, few would deny that everything in the world is changing
and interacting at some pace and in one way or another, that history and systemic
connections belong to the real world. The difficulty has always been how to think
adequately about them, how not to distort them and how to give them the attention
and weight that they deserve. (Oilman, 1993, p. 11)

Dialectics, Oilman explains, is an attempt to resolve this difficulty by expanding

the notion of “anything” to include (as aspects of what is) both the process by
which it has become that thing and the broader interactive context in which it is
found. Dialectics restructures thinking about reality by replacing the common-sense
notion of “thing,” as something that has a history and has external connections to
other things, with notions of “process” (which contains its history and possible
futures) and “relation” (which contains as part of what it is its ties with other
relations).

Unlike nondialectical thinking, where one starts with some small part and through
establishing connections tries to reconstruct the larger whole, dialectical
thinking begins with the whole (or as much as one understands of it) and then
examines the part to see where it fits and how it functions—eventually leading to a
fuller understanding of the whole. The quintessential example of this kind of
thinking is the work of Karl Marx; for Marx, capitalism was the beginning point for
an examination of anything that takes place within it. (Although it should be noted
that most of Marx’s dialectic was taken from Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, who
systematized a way of thinking that goes back to the ancient Greeks. Additionally,
non-Marxist thinkers like Alfred North Whitehead and F. H. Bradely developed their
own versions of dialectics.)

Dialectical investigations proceed from whole to part (from the system inward) and
are primarily aimed at examining four kinds of relations. The first relation is
identity/difference—how things are either the same/identical or different, not
both. For example, there are differences among profit, rent, and interest; however,
dialectical analysis brings out the identity of each as forms of surplu's-value,
that is, wealth created by workers that is not returned to them in the form of
wages.

The second relation is interpretation of opposites, which is based on the

recognition that, to a large degree, how anything appears and functions is due to
its surrounding conditions. For example, a capitalist sees a machine as a
commodity, bought on the market and that is something that will bring her a profit.
While, a worker looks at the same machine and sees an instrument that will
determine her movements in the production process.

The third relation is quantity/quality. Quantity becomes quality and qualities

become quantities. The motive force of change is the addition of specific
quantities that cause change. For example, reducing the temperature of water
creates a new quality—ice. Adding years to life creates a new quality. Adding salt
to food, nearness to friendship, velocity to a bullet, instruments to a band, all
make something new. Incremental change, then, is accompanied by qualitative—
revolutionary
change—an apparently sudden leap.

Lastly, and most important, is contradiction. Contradiction is the incompatible

development of different elements within the same relation (the unity and struggle
of opposites). All things are composed of contradictions. Simple examples of
unified polarity include:

• Anatomy: the thumb and forefinger

• Mathematics: addition/subtraction; mul-tiply/divide

• Education: nature and nurture

• Music: major/minor keys; sound/silence

• Literature: the best of times, the worst of times

• Mechanics: every action has a reaction

Oilman explains that “nondialectical thinkers in every sphere of scholarship are

involved in nonstop search for the ‘outside-agitator,’ for something or someone
that comes form outside the problem under examination that is the cause for
whatever occurs, dialectical thinkers attribute the main responsibility for all
change to the inner contradictions of the system or systems in which it occurs”
(1993,

p. 16).

Without a conception of things as relations, it is difficult to focus on the

different sides of a contradiction at the same time. As a result, even if all the
sides of a contradiction are examined, they do not receive the same level of
attention and their mutual interaction is often mistaken for causality. For
nondialectical thinkers, real contradictions—such as the fact that during the
“economic boom” of the 1980s and 1990s, when the Gross Domestic Product of the
United States increased 25%, the poverty rate among workers increased 7.4% or that
while the rich have gotten substantially richer, four out of five households in the
United States take home a thinner slice of the economic pie since 1977—can only be
understood as differences, paradox, opposition, imbalance, while the underlying
forces responsible for these appearances remain invisible and unrecognized.

Dialectical thinking is no simple matter and like nondialectical thinking there are
distortions associated with this way of

388 CRITICAL THINKING AND LEARNING

thinking. If nondialectical thinkers miss the forest for trees, dialectical

thinkers often do the opposite, de-emphasizing details in favor of generalizations.

Dialectical thinking, however, is a way to understand the full range of changes and
interactions that occur in the world. If we want our students to be able to
understand and act on the world, dialectics helps us to pose questions that make
effective action possible: What kind of changes are already occurring? What kinds
of changes are possible? The only thing that cannot be chosen is what we already
have. Dialectics is both critical and radical. It helps us to understand the
present as a moment through which we are passing. Dialectics forces us to examine
where we have come from and where we are heading as part of learning what our world
is about. It enables us to understand that everyone and everything are connected,
and that we have the power to change our world.
Note

1. The single best source on traditional conceptions of critical thinking in social

studies

education is the work of Barry K. Beyer: see, for example. Developing thinking
skills programs (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1988). See also the work of Benjamin
Bloom, Robert Ennis, and Shirley Engle.

References

Dewey, J. (1933). How we think. Lexington, MA: Heath.

Oilman, B. (1993). Dialectical investigations. New York: Routledge.

Oilman, B. (2001). How to take an exam and remake the world. Montreal: Black Rose.

Stanley, W. B. (1991). Teacher competence in social studies. In J. R Shaver (Ed.),

Handbook of social studies teaching and learning (pp. 249-262). New York:
Macmillan.

Further Reading

Hursh, D. W„ & Ross, E. W. (Eds.). (2000). Democratic social education: Social

studies for social change. New York: Falmer Press.

Ross, E. W. (Ed.). (2001). The social studies curriculum: Purposes, problems, and
possibilities (Rev. ed.). Albany: State University of New York Press.