RULE 62: INTERPLEADER

Section 1. When interpleader proper. — Whenever conflicting claims upon the same
subject matter are or may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in
the subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants,
he may bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and
litigate their several claims among themselves. (1a, R63)

Section 2. Order. — Upon the filing of the complaint, the court shall issue an order
requiring the conflicting claimants to interplead with one another. If the interests of justice
so require, the court may direct in such order that the subject matter be paid or delivered
to the court. (2a, R63)

Section 3. Summons. — Summons shall be served upon the conflicting claimants,

together with a copy of the complaint and order. (3, R63)

Section 4. Motion to dismiss. — Within the time for filing an answer, each claimant may
file a motion to dismiss on the ground of impropriety of the interpleader action or on other
appropriate grounds specified in Rule 16. The period to file the answer shall be tolled and
if the motion is denied, the movant may file his answer within the remaining period, but
which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial. (n)

Section 5. Answer and other pleadings. — Each claimant shall file his answer setting forth
his claim within fifteen (15) days from service of the summons upon him, serving a copy
thereof upon each of the other conflicting claimants who may file their reply thereto as
provided by these Rules. If any claimant fails to plead within the time herein fixed, the
court may, on motion, declare him in default and thereafter render judgment barring him
from any claim in respect to the subject matter.

The parties in an interpleader action may file counterclaims, cross-claims, third-party

complaints and responsive pleadings thereto, as provided by these Rules. (4a, R63)

Section 6. Determination. — After the pleadings of the conflicting claimants have been
filed, and pre-trial has been conducted in accordance with the Rules, the court shall
proceed to determine their respective rights and adjudicate their several claims. (5a, R63)

Section 7. Docket and other lawful fees, costs and litigation expenses as liens. — The
docket and other lawful fees paid by the party who filed a complaint under this Rule, as
well as the costs and litigation expenses, shall constitute a lien or change upon the subject
matter of the action, unless the court shall order otherwise. (6a, R63)

What is an Interpleader?

An Interpleader is a legal remedy whereby a person who

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 a. has in his possession personal or real property, or
b. has an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both,
or
c. claims an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting
claimants, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said property
or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation,
be required to litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally who is
entitled to one or the other thing.

It requires, as an indispensable requisite, that "conflicting claims upon the same

subject matter are or may be made against the plaintiff-in-interpleader who claims no
interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not
disputed by the claimants."1

The subject matter of an Interpleader is a property, whether personal or real, and an

obligation to be rendered wholly or partially. For an action in interpleader to prosper, the
following elements must be present2:

1. The plaintiff claims no interest in the subject matter or his claim thereto is not
disputed.
2. There must be at least two or more conflicting claimants.
3. The parties to be interpleaded must make effective claims.
4. The subject matter must be one and the same.
What is the essence of Interpleader?

An action of interpleader is a rule founded on justice and equity. There is, on the
part of the complainant-in-interpleader, a disavowal of his interest in the property in
litigation, such that he deposits the property or funds in controversy with the court.

What is the purpose of an Interpleader?

Through this action, the law spares the complainant-in-interpleader from taking
into his hands the matter of deciding who among the conflicting claimants is entitled to the
subject matter, it being beyond his capability.

The remedy is afforded him not merely to protect him against double liability, but
also to protect him against double vexation in respect of one liability. That is, there will be
no double payment or double satisfaction of the obligation with respect to which the
conflicting claimants assert a right.

When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, there arises
in reality a new action and the former are styled interpleaders, and in such a case the

1
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Metro Container Corporation, G.R. No. 127913, September 13,
2001
2
Oscar M. Herrera, III Remedial Law 225 (2006)

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pleading which initiates the action is called a complaint of interpleader and not a cross-
complaint.3

The result of the action will determine which claimant is entitled to the property or
to the satisfaction of the obligation.

Who can file an Interpleader?

It may be filed by the person in possession of personal or real property or has an

obligation to render, wholly or partially, without claiming any right thereto.

This civil action is peculiar in that the party who initiates the proceeding is not a
party interested in the subject matter of the action. In other words, he claims no
enforceable right or interest thereto. There exists, however, two or more persons who are
each claiming conflicting rights or interests on the same subject matter in his possession.

The plaintiff in interpleader is called a complainant-in-interpleader or a stakeholder.

When must an Interpleader be filed?

This remedy can only prosper when it is filed within a reasonable time before
becoming liable to either claimants by virtue of a judgment. In other words, the Interpleader
should be filed after the plaintiff becomes aware of the conflicting claims. Significantly, it
should be filed without awaiting to be sued by one of the contending parties. It does not
become available to a person who has become independently liable in a civil case to any
of the contending claimants by virtue of a judgment.

A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending claimants

to court. He need not await actual institution of independent suits against him before filing
a bill of interpleader. He should file an action of interpleader within a reasonable time after
a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending
claimants. Otherwise, he may be barred by laches or undue delay. But where he acts with
reasonable diligence in view of the environmental circumstances, the remedy is not
barred.4

Should there have already been a suit against the complainant-in-interpleader, he

becomes barred by laches by reason of undue delay. Where a judgment has already been
obtained by one claimant, the plaintiff in an action for interpleader becomes liable to the
former who has become a judgment creditor by virtue of such judgment.

In the case of Yarborough v. Thompson5, It has been held that a stakeholder's

action of interpleader is too late when filed after judgment has been rendered against him

3
Oscar M. Herrera, III Remedial Law 224 (2006) citing Alvarez, et al. v. Commonwealth, et al., 65 Phil. 302
(1938); Ocampo v. Tirona G.R. No. 147812, April 6, 2005.
4 Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. v. Won, G.R. No. L-23851, March 26, 1976
5
41 Am. Dec. 626

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in favor of one of the contending claimants, especially where he had notice of the
conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and neglected the opportunity to
implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment was entered. This must be so,
because once judgment is obtained against him by one claimant he becomes liable to the
latter.

In Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. v. Won6, the interpleader suit was not
allowed to c prosper because the Corporation had already been made independently liable
in civil case 26044 and, therefore, the application for interpleader would in effect be a
collateral attack upon the final judgment in the said civil case. The appellee Lee had
already established his rights to membership fee certificate 201 in the aforesaid civil case
and, therefore, the interpleader suit would compel him to establish his rights anew, and
thereby increase instead of diminish litigations, which is one of the purposes of an
interpleader suit, with the possibility that the benefits of the final judgment in the said civil
case might eventually be taken away from him. Finally, because the Corporation allowed
itself to be sued to final judgment in the said case, its action of interpleader was filed
inexcusably late, for which reason it is barred by laches or unreasonable delay.

Where should the action be filed?

The court which has jurisdiction over the action will depend on the value of the property
subject matter of the action. The rules with respect to the jurisdictional amounts of courts
shall apply, to wit:

(A) Municipal Trial Court

1. Real Property

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts

and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

xxx

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed
value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as amended by
R.A. No. 7691)7

6
G.R. No. L-23851, March 26, 1976
7
BP 129 - The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980

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 2. Personal Property
xxx

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate

proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional
remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal property, estate,
or amount of the demand does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal property, estate, or
amount of the demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) exclusive of interest damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which must be
specifically alleged: Provided, That where there are several claims or
causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the
same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims
in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action
arose out of the same or different transactions;

xxx

(B) Regional Trial Court

1. Real Property
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

xxx

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property
involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such the value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
(50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of
lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts8

xxx

2. Personal Property
xxx

8
BP 129 - The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980

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 (8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages
of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value
of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(100,000.00) or, in such other abovementioned items exceeds Two
hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00). (as amended by R.A. No. 7691*)

xxx

Court Order and Summons

Upon the filing of the complaint, the court shall issue an order requiring the
conflicting claimants to interplead with one another. If the interests of justice so require,
the court may direct in such order that the subject matter be paid or delivered to the court.9

It is necessary that there be an order issued by the court requiring the conflicting
claimants to interplead with one another before the defendants (conflicting claimants) may
litigate among themselves.

However, it was ruled in Mesina v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Order of the
trial court requiring the parties to file their answers is to all intents and purposes an order
to interplead, substantially and essentially and was therefore in compliance with the
provisions of Rule 62 of the Rules of Court.10

Subsequently, the following shall be served upon the conflicting claimants:

(1) Summons, together with

(2) a Copy of the Complaint; and
(3) Order.

What other actions may be undertaken by the claimant after being served with
summons and copies of the order?

1. Claimant may move to dismiss11 the action for interpleader.

Upon proper service of the summons upon the conflicting claimants, together with
a copy of the complaint and order, a claimant may file a motion to dismiss within the time
for the filing of an answer upon the following grounds:

I. Impropriety of the action for interpleader;

Non-compliance with the requirements under Section 1 of Rule 62 such as the

allegations do not show conflicting claims between or among the persons required to

9
Section 2, Rule 62, Rules of Court
10
G.R. No. 70145, November 13, 1986
11
Section 4 of Rule 62

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interplead, the complaint is subject to dismissal on the ground of impropriety of the
interpleader.

Rule 63, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court (formerly Rule 14) requires, as
an indispensable element, that "conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are
or may be made" against the plaintiff-in-interpleader "who claims no interest
whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not
disputed by the claimants."

While the two defendant corporations may have conflicting claims between
themselves with regard to the management, administration and ownership of Project 4,
such conflicting claims are not against the plaintiffs nor do they involve or affect the
plaintiffs. No allegation is made in their complaint that any corporation other than the
PHHC which was the only entity privy to their lease-purchase agreement, ever made on
them any claim or demand for payment of the rentals or amortization payments. The
questions of fact raised in their complaint concerning the enforceability, and recognition
or non-enforceability and non-recognition of the turnover agreement of December 27,
1961 between the two defendant corporations are irrelevant to their action of interpleader,
for these conflicting claims, loosely so-called, are between the two corporations and not
against plaintiffs. Both defendant corporations were in conformity and had no dispute, as
pointed out by the trial court that the monthly payments and amortizations should be made
directly to the PHHC alone.12

Also, where the occupants of two different parcels of land adjoining each other
belonging to two separate plaintiffs, but on which the occupants had constructed a building
encroaching upon both parcels of land, faced two ejectment suits from the plaintiffs, each
plaintiff claiming the right of possession and recovery over his respective portion of the
lands encroached upon, this Court held that the occupants could not properly file an
interpleader suit, against the plaintiffs, to litigate their alleged conflicting claims; for
evidently, the two plaintiff did not have any conflicting claims upon the same subject
matter against the occupants, but were enforcing separate and distinct claims on
their respective properties.13

Likewise, an interpleader action is said to be improper when not filed within a

reasonable time. A party may no longer file for an application for interpleader when it has
been formerly sued by one of the conflicting claimants and, instead of interpleading the
other claimant, proceeded with the litigation.14 Besides, a successful litigant cannot later
be impleaded by his defeated adversary in an interpleader suit and compelled to prove his
claim anew against other adverse claimants, as that would in effect be a collateral attack
upon the judgment.

12
Beltran v. People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation, G.R. No. L-25138 August 28, 1969
13
Vda de Camilo v. Arcamo, G.R. No. L-15653 September 29, 1961
14
Wack-Wack Golf and Country Club, G.R. No. L-23851 March 26, 1976

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 II. Other appropriate grounds specified in Rule 16 of the Rules of court.

The enumerations under Rule 16 are made to apply and may be invoked in the
motion to dismiss the complaint for interpleader.

For instance, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action when the complaint to interplead involving
chattels with a value of P300,000.00 was filed in the Regional Trial Court.15

A motion to dismiss may also be filed on the ground of litis pendencia, res judicata, or
prescription, and other grounds stated in Rule 16.

2. Claimant may file an answer16 thereto

Upon proper service of the summons upon the conflicting claimants, together with
a copy of the complaint and order, a claimant may file his respective answer, setting for
his claim within fifteen (15) days from the service of summons. He shall serve a copy of
his answer to other conflicting claimants who may file a reply thereto. The rule does not
consider the filing of a reply mandatory.

If the motion to dismiss is filed within the time for filing an answer, the period to
filed an answer shall be tolled.

If the motion to dismiss is denied, the movant may file his answer within the remaining
period, provide however, that such period should not be less than five (5) days to be
reckoned from the denial.

3. Claimant may fail to file an answer; corresponding effects

If any claimant fails to plead within the time fixed by the rules, the court may, on
motion, declare him in default. However, unlike ordinary default, which no longer requires
the plaintiff to prove the allegations in the complaint-in-interpleader, the court thereafter
shall render judgment barring him from any claim in respect to the subject matter.

In a complaint for interpleader, the court shall determine the rights and obligations
of the parties and adjudicate their respective claims. Such rights, obligations, and claims
could only be adjudicated if put forward by the aggrieved party in assertion of his rights.
That party in this case referred to respondent Diaz. The second paragraph of Section 5 of
Rule 62 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the parties in an interpleader
action may file counterclaims, cross-claims, third party complaints and responsive
pleadings thereto, "as provided by these Rules." The second paragraph of Section 5 of
Rule 62 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the parties in an interpleader
action may file counterclaims, cross-claims, third party complaints and responsive
pleadings thereto, "as provided by these Rules." The second paragraph was added to

15
Riano, Willard B. (2009). Civil Procedure: The Bar Lecture Series, Volume II, pg. 203
16
Section 5 of Rule Rule 62

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Section 5 to expressly authorize the additional pleadings and claims enumerated
therein, in the interest of a complete adjudication of the controversy and its incidents.17

Pursuant to said Rules, respondent should have filed his claims against petitioner
Arreza in the interpleader action. Having asserted his rights as a buyer in good faith in his
answer, and praying relief therefor, respondent Diaz should have crystallized his demand
into specific claims for reimbursement by petitioner Arreza.18

Section 6. Determination. — After the pleadings of the conflicting claimants have been
filed, and pre-trial has been conducted in accordance with the Rules, the court shall
proceed to determine their respective rights and adjudicate their several claims. (5a, R63)

When will the court determine the respective rights of the claimants and adjudicate
their several claims?

It is only after the pleadings of the conflicting claimants have been filed and a pre-
trial conference had been held, will the court determine the respective rights of the
claimants and adjudicate their claims.19 Accordingly, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court shall
apply.

RULE 18

Pre-Trial

Section 1. When conducted. — After the last pleading has been served and filed, if shall
be the duty of the plaintiff to promptly move ex parte that the case be set for pre-trial (5a,
R20)

Section 2. Nature and purpose. — The pre-trial is mandatory. The court shall consider:

(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative modes of

dispute resolution;

(b) The simplification of the issues;

(c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;

(d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to

avoid unnecessary proof;

(e) The limitation of the number of witnesses;

(f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner;

17
Arreza v. Diaz, Jr., G.R. No. 133113 August 30, 2001
18
Supra
19
Section 6, Rule 62

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(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of
dismissing the action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist;

(h) The advisability or necessity of suspending the proceedings; and

(i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action. (1a, R20)

Section 3. Notice of pre-trial. — The notice of pre-trial shall be served on counsel, or on

the party who has no counsel. The counsel served with such notice is charged with the
duty of notifying the party represented by him. (n)

Section 4. Appearance of parties. — It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel
to appear at the pre-trial. The non-appearance of a party may be excused only if a valid
cause is shown therefor or if a representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in
writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute
resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents. (n)

Section 5. Effect of failure to appear. — The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so
required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action.
The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless other-wise ordered by the court. A similar
failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his
evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof. (2a, R20)

Section 6. Pre-trial brief. — The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse
party, in such manner as shall ensure their receipt thereof at least three (3) days before
the date of the pre-trial, their respective pre-trial briefs which shall contain, among others:

(a) A statement of their willingness to enter into amicable settlement or alternative modes
of dispute resolution, indicating the desired terms thereof;

(b) A summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation of facts;

(c) The issues to be tried or resolved;

(d) The documents or exhibits to be presented stating the purpose thereof;

(e) A manifestation of their having availed or their intention to avail themselves of discovery
procedures or referral to commissioners; and

(f) The number and names of the witnesses, and the substance of their respective
testimonies.

Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-
trial. (n)

Section 7. Record of pre-trial. — The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be recorded. Upon
the termination thereof, the court shall issue an order which shall recite in detail the matters
taken up in the conference, the action taken thereon, the amendments allowed to the
pleadings, and the agreements or admissions made by the parties as to any of the matters
considered. Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall, explicitly define and limit

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the issues to be tried. The contents of the order shall control the subsequent course of the
action, unless modified before trial to prevent manifest injustice. (5a, R20)

In the case of EDGAR H. ARREZA vs. MONTANO M. DIAZ, JR. (G.R. No. 133113.
August 30, 20015), the Supreme Court ruled that the court in a complaint for interpleader
shall determine the rights and obligations of the parties and adjudicate their respective
claims. Such rights, obligations and claims could only be adjudicated if put forward by the
aggrieved party in assertion of his rights. The second paragraph of Section 5 of Rule 62
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the parties in an interpleader action
may file counterclaims, cross-claims, third party complaints and responsive pleadings
thereto, as provided by these Rules. The second paragraph was added to Section 5 to
expressly authorize the additional pleadings and claims enumerated therein, in the interest
of a complete adjudication of the controversy and its incidents.

Pursuant to said Rules, respondent Diaz should have filed his claims against
petitioner Arreza in the interpleader action. Having asserted his rights as a buyer in good
faith in his answer, and praying relief therefor, respondent Diaz should have crystallized
his demand into specific claims for reimbursement by petitioner Arreza. This he failed to
do.

Section 7. Docket and other lawful fees, costs and litigation expenses as liens. — The
docket and other lawful fees paid by the party who filed a complaint under this Rule, as
well as the costs and litigation expenses, shall constitute a lien or charge upon the subject
matter of the action, unless the court shall order otherwise. (6a, R63)

Who will be liable for the docket fees? How is the payment for the docket fees and
other lawful fees, costs and litigation expenses made?

The party who filed the action or complaint for interpleader will be the one to pay
for the docket and other lawful fees. Nevertheless, these docket and other lawful fees, as
well as the costs and litigation expenses shall constitute a lien or charge upon the subject
matter of the action, unless the court shall order otherwise. Whoever claims a right over
the property, which is the subject matter of the case, he is the one ultimately liable to pay
the docket fees.

What is the effect if there is failure to pay the docket fees?

This is answered in the case of BANK OF COMMERCE vs. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT

BANK and BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (G.R. Nos. 154470-71; September 24,
2012).

“When an action is filed in court, the complaint must be accompanied by the

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payment of the requisite docket and filing fees by the party seeking affirmative relief from
the court. It is the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, accompanied
by the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over
the claim or the nature of the action. However, the non-payment of the docket fee at the
time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, so long as the fee is
paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, especially when the
claimant demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment.

In the present case, considering the lack of a clear guideline on the payment of
docket fee by the claimants in an interpleader suit, compounded by the unusual manner
in which the interpleader suit was initiated and the circumstances surrounding it, we surely
cannot deduce from the BOC’s mere failure to specify in its prayer the total amount of the
CB bills it lays claim to (or the value of the subjects of the sales in the April 15 and April
19 transactions, in its alternative prayer) an intention to defraud the government that would
warrant the dismissal of its claim.

At any rate, regardless of the nature of the BOC’s "counterclaims," for purposes of
payment of filing fees, both the BOC and the PDB, properly as defendants-in-interpleader,
must be assessed the payment of the correct docket fee arising from their respective
claims.

The seminal case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Judge Asuncion provides us
guidance in the payment of docket fees, to wit:

1. x x x Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment

of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and

similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee
prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a
reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.

This must be the rule considering that Section 7, Rule 62 of which reads:

“SEC. 7. Docket and other lawful fees, costs and litigation expenses as liens. –
The docket and other lawful fees paid by the party who filed a complaint under this
Rule, as well as the costs and litigation expenses, shall constitute a lien or charge
upon the subject matter of the action, unless the court shall order otherwise.”

This only pertain to the docket and lawful fees to be paid by the one who initiated
the interpleader suit, and who, under the Rules, actually "claims no interest whatever in
the subject matter." By constituting a lien on the subject matter of the action, Section 7 in
effect only aims to actually compensate the complainant-in-interpleader, who happens to
be the stakeholder unfortunate enough to get caught in a legal crossfire between two or
more conflicting claimants, for the faultless trouble it found itself into. Since the
defendants-in-interpleader are actually the ones who make a claim - only that it was

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extraordinarily done through the procedural device of interpleader - then to them devolves
the duty to pay the docket fees prescribed under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as
amended.

The importance of paying the correct amount of docket fee cannot be

overemphasized:

The matter of payment of docket fees is not a mere triviality. These fees are
necessary to defray court expenses in the handling of cases. Consequently, in
order to avoid tremendous losses to the judiciary, and to the government as well,
the payment of docket fees cannot be made dependent on the outcome of the
case, except when the claimant is a pauper-litigant. “

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Procedure: (flow chart)

Complaint

Court

Order parties to interplead

Service of Summons

Motion to Dismiss Claimants Default

Answer (Counterclaim, Cross-claim, 3rd-party claim)

Pre-trial

Trial
(The court shall determine the parties respective rights and adjudicate their several
claims.)

Docket
(Whoever gets property, he/she will be subject to the payment of the fees as lien.)

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 RULE 70: FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER
Nature of Proceedings
Ejectment cases are summary proceedings intended to provide an expeditious
means of protecting actual possession or right of possession of property. Title is not
involved, that is why it is a special civil action with a special procedure. The only issue to
be resolved in ejectment cases is the question as to who is entitled to the physical or
material possession of the premises or possession de facto.19
When can there be Forcible Entry?
There can be forcible entry when:
1. One is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by means of force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.
2. The possession is illegal from the beginning.
3. The only issue is who has the prior possession de facto.
4. Prescription period is counted from the date of defendant's actual entry on the land.
When does one become an Unlawful Detainer?
A person unlawfully detains and property when:
1. One lawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his
right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied.
2. Possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or
termination of the right to possess.
3. The issue of rightful possession is the termination of the defendant's right to
continue in possession.
4. Prescription period is counted from the date of the last demand to vacate.
Philosophy Underlying the Remedy
In affording this remedy of restitution, the statute seeks to prevent breaches of the
peace and criminal disorder to compel the party out of possession to respect and resort
to the law alone to obtain what he claims is his.
The owners of a property have no authority to use force and violence to eject alleged
usurpers who were in prior physical possession of it. They must file the appropriate action
in court and should not take the law in their own hands.

19 Florentino Go, et.al. vs Court of Appeals and Aurora Perez, G.R. No. 142276, August 14, 2001.

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 Article 539 of the Civil Code provides that:
“Every possessor has the right to be respected in his possession; and should he be
disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by means
established by the laws and the Rules of Court.
xxx.”
Three Kinds of Possessory Rights
Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of actions available to
recover possession of real property, namely:
1. Accion Interdictal
Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry
(detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico). In forcible entry, one is deprived of
physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or
stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the expiration
or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The
two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the
defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de
facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal
but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.
The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper
municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. Both actions must be brought within one
year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date
of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer. The issue in said cases is the right to physical
possession.20
2. Accion Publiciana
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should
be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than
one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of
realty independently of title.
In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had
elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendants possession
had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer,
but an accion publiciana.21
3. Accion Reivindicatoria
It seeks the recovery of ownership and includes the jus possidendi. It is, thus, an action
whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full

20 Spouses Bonifacio Valdez vs. Court of Appeals and Spouses Gabriel Fabella, G.R. No.
132424, May 02, 2006.
21 Id.

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possession. It is different from accion interdictal or accion publiciana where plaintiff merely
alleges proof of a better right to possess without claim of title.22
Forcible Entry distinguished from Unlawful Detainer
In Muñoz vs. CA23, the summary actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry as
distinguished from each other, were reiterated by the Supreme Court as follows:
a. In forcible entry, the possession of the land by the defendant is unlawful from the
beginning as he acquires possession thereof by force, intimidation, threat, strategy
or stealth; while in unlawful detainer, the possession of the defendant is inceptively
lawful but it becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right to the
possession of the property under the contract with the plaintiff.
b. In forcible entry, the law does not require a previous demand for the defendant to
vacate the premises; but in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff must first make such
demand, which is jurisdictional in nature.
The fact that a demand to vacate is made does not change the nature of defendant’s
possession and convert the owner’s action into unlawful detainer.
c. In forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical possession
of the premises until he was deprived thereof by the defendant; in unlawful
detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession.
d. In forcible entry, the one-year period is generally counted from the date of actual
entry on the land; in unlawful detainer, from the date of last demand, or last letter
of demand.

Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. — Subject to the provisions of
the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or
building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee,
or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of
any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such
unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving
of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with damages and costs. (1a)

22 Serdoncillo vs. Benolirao, G.R. No. 118328, October 8, 1998.

23 G.R. No. 102693, September 23, 1992.

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What to file?
The complainant should ask for the restitution of possession, together with
damages and costs.
Who may file?
A. In Forcible Entry
A person deprived of the possession of any land or building by:
a. Force
b. Intimidation
c. Threat
d. Strategy
e. Stealth
B. In Unlawful Detainer
1. A lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of
any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination
of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied
2. The legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee,
or other person.
Where to file?
The action should be filed in the proper Municipal Trial Court.
Against whom should the restitution be filed?
1. Against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession; or
2. Any person or persons claiming under them.
What are the grounds?
1. For forcible entry- deprivation of any land or building by:
a. Force
b. Intimidation
c. Threat
d. Strategy or stealth
2. For unlawful detainer
That the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration
or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied

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What is meant by prior physical possession?
Possession in ejectment cases “means nothing more than actual physical
possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in Civil Law.” In forcible entry
cases, “prior physical possession is the primary consideration.” "A party who can prove
prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever
may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he
has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right
lawfully ejects him.” The party in peaceable, quiet possession shall not be thrown out by
a strong hand, violence, or terror.24
What is meant by force?
In the case of Arbizo vs. Spouses Santillan 25, the Court held that the acts of
unlawfully entering the disputed premises, erecting a structure thereon, and excluding
therefrom the prior possessor, would necessarily imply the use of force.
Further, in Spouses Baes vs. Lutheran Church 26, the Supreme Court ruled that
the mere presence of armed security guards even if there is yet no actual violence
employed constitute force for purposes of the Rules.
What if the entry was clandestine or made under stealth?
If it is alleged in the Complaint that the forcible entry includes stealth, strategy and
lack of knowledge of the complainant the one-year period should be counted from the time
of discovery of the complainant of the defendant’s possession of the property and not from
the occupation.
The Supreme Court held in the case of Philippine Overseas Telecommunications
Corporation vs. Gutierrez, et.al, G.R. No. 149764, November 22, 2006, that:
“Well-settled is the rule that where forcible entry was thus made clandestinely, the
one-year prescriptive period should be counted from the time the possessor demanded
that the defendant desist from such dispossession when the former learned thereof. The
owner or possessor of the land cannot be expected to enforce his right to its possession
against the illegal occupant and sue the latter before learning of the clandestine intrusion.
Where entry is allegedly obtained by stealth, as in this case, the intruder might manage to
conceal the trespass for more than one year, and it is but just that the one year period
should be counted from discovery and demand to vacate.”
What must be alleged in the Complaint?
A. Allegations in Forcible Entry
Two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction:
1. That the plaintiff had prior physical possession of the property; and

24 Evangeline Calingasan and E. Rical Enterprises vs. Wilfredo Rivera, G.R. No. 171555, April 17,
2013.
25 570 Phil. 200 (2008).
26 G.R. No. 142308, November 15, 2005.

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 2. That the defendant deprived him of such possession by means of force,
intimidation, threats, strategy, or stealth.
B. Allegations in Unlawful Detainer:
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the
following:
1. Initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff;
2. Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to
defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession;
3. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived
the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
4. Within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.27
Therefore, in an action for unlawful detainer, it is suffice to allege that the defendant is
unlawfully withholding possession of the property in question. Accordingly, a complaint for
unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding or possession or the refusal
to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law.
What is the effect if the Complaint fails to aver facts how entry was made?
To give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant on the land, it
is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to bring
the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, without
resort to parol testimony, as these proceedings are summary in nature.
In short, the jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When
the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where
it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the
remedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.28
Where the complaints failed to allege prior physical possession of the property and
all that is alleged is unlawful deprivation of their possession by private respondents, the
deficiency is fatal to petitioners’ actions before the Metropolitan Trial Court. Such bare
allegation is insufficient for the MeTC to acquire jurisdiction.
As a rule, the allegations determine the nature of the action. A complaint should
not be dismissed merely for its failure to state a cause of action for forcible entry, although
plaintiff has designated or denominated it in a caption as one for forcible entry, where the
allegations in the body thereof sufficiently establish a cause g action for unlawful detainer.

27 Corazon Sarmienta, et.al. vs. Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc., G.R. No. 182953,
October 11, 2010.
28 Carmencita Suarez vs. Mr. and Mrs. Felix Emboy and Marilou P. Emboy-Delantar, G.R. No.

187944, March 12, 2014.

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Well settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as well as the court,
which has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint.
It is not essential, however, that the complaint should expressly employ the
language of the law. It would be sufficient that facts are set up showing that dispossession
took place under said conditions.
When the complaint is neither forcible entry nor unlawful detainer
The Supreme Court held that when the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of
forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or
how and when dispossession started, the action should either be accion publiciana or
reinvindicatoria in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court).29
Possession
In Mangaser vs. Ugay, G.R. No. 204926, December 3, 2014, the Supreme Court
held that possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet
on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession. It is
sufficient that a person is able to subject the property to the action of his will.
Jurisdiction
Section 33(2) of BP 129 provides that Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over cases of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer, to wit:
“Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer:
Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue
of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession.”
Possession by Tolerance
A person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he
will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy. The status of the defendant is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose
terms has expired but whose occupancy continues by tolerance of the owner.30
In Villena vs. Chavez,31 it held that based on the admissions of respondents
themselves, they entered into an agreement with petitioners. Necessarily, the latter’s
occupancy of the lots in question was not based merely on the former’s tolerance or
permission. Thus, petitioners were not necessarily bound by an implied promise to vacate
upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment would have become proper.

29 Supra Note 5.
30 Spouses Barnachea vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150026, July 23, 2008.
31 G.R. No. 148126. November 10, 2003.

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 As a rule, where there had been more than one demand to vacate, the one-year
period for filing the complaint for unlawful detainer must be reckoned from the date of the
last demand.32 This is because the lessor has the option to waive his right of action based
on previous demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in the premises.
Can possession by tolerance convert Forcible Entry into Unlawful Detainer?
The Supreme Court, explained in Sarona v. Vilegas33 that where the possession
of the defendants was illegal at the inception as alleged in the compliant there can be no
tolerance.
In forcible entry, possession is illegal at the inception, while in unlawful detainer;
possession is legal until demand is made to recover such possession or until the
possessor does or fails to do an act which makes his continued possession of the
premises illegal.
The fact that a demand was made to vacate the premises cannot change the
nature of the possession of the property and convert the action from forcible entry to one
for unlawful detainer.
Also, such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to
be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer.34
How is jurisdiction determined?
Well-settled is the rule that the nature of an action as well as which court has
jurisdiction over it is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of
the relief sought.
Precisely, in the case of Ramirez vs. Chit 35, the Supreme Court ruled that where
the ejectment complaint sufficiently averred that the plaintiff owns the property and seeks
to recover possession from the overstaying lessee, the MTC had jurisdiction over the case.
The lessee’s assertion of ownership in the ejectment case does not oust the Municipal
Trial Court from its jurisdiction over the case, for its jurisdiction is determined by the
allegations of the complaint, not by the defenses in the answer.
Furthermore, where the main issue was the timeliness of the filing of the complaint
before the MTC, the Supreme Court held that, to determine whether the case was filed on
time, there is a necessity to ascertain whether the complaint was one for forcible entry or
unlawful detainer. Since in forcible entry cases, the prescriptive period is counted from the
date of defendant’s actual entry on the land, while in unlawful detainer, from the date of
the last demand to vacate.36
Jurisdictional Allegations

32 Eufemia Sarmiento vs Court of Appeals and Genrosa Cruz, G.R. No. 116192, November 16,
1995.
33 22 SCRA 1257 (1968).
34 Fiorello Jose vs. Roberto Alfuerto, et. al., G.R. No. 169380, November 26, 2012.
35 G.R. No. L-22022, December 26, 1967.
36 Supra Note 15.

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 A. Rule On Strictissimi Juris
It has been settled that jurisdiction of courts of limited jurisdiction – and Municipal
Courts are among them – is to be interpreted in Strictissimi Juris.
Since, jurisdiction hinges on the one year period "after such unlawful deprivation
or withholding of possession" and the period of such unlawful deprivation or withholding
of possession does not clearly appear on the face of the complaint, and, for the reason
that petitioners have admitted that private respondent was in the land for more than one
year prior to the time the complaint was lodged in court, this case should be dismissed.37
B. Rule on Liberal Interpretation
Under Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, liberal construction of
the rules is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice. Thus, litigations should, as
much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on technicalities.38
In forcible entry and detainer cases, which are summary in nature to minimize
disturbance of the social order, procedural technicalities should be carefully avoided and
should not be allowed to override substantial justice. The interest of substantial justice is
best served if both parties in a case are heard and their respective claims through their
respective pleadings and position papers. A liberal interpretation of technical rules, which
does not subvert the nature of the Rule on Summary Procedure nor defeat its objective of
expediting adjudication of suits is not disfavored by the court.39
Allegation vs. Proof
What prevents a trial court from acquiring jurisdiction in ejectment cases is the
failure to allege in the complaint that a demand was made, not the fact that plaintiff failed
to prove said allegation. In ejectment cases, the trial court does not assume jurisdiction if
the complaint fails to allege that a demand has been made. In case the plaintiff fails to
prove said demand despite allegations in the complaint to that effect, the case should be
dismissed not because of lack of jurisdiction but because the complaint did not meet the
evidentiary requirement to merit the judicial eviction of a defendant.40
Allegations of ownership by defendant in ejectment cases
It bears stressing that in unlawful detainer cases, the only issue for resolution,
independent of any claim of ownership by any party litigant, is: “Who is entitled to the
physical and material possession of the property involved?”
The mere fact that the defendant raises the defense of ownership of the property
in the pleadings does not deprive the MTC of its jurisdiction not take cognizance of and
decide the case. In cases where defendant raises the question of ownership in the
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue
of ownership, the court may proceed and resolve the issue of ownership but only for the
purpose of determining the issue of possession. However, the disposition of the issue of

37 Carmen Deveza, et.al. vs. Juan Montecillo, G.R. No. L-23942, March 28, 1969.
38 Sebastian vs. Hon. Morales, 445 Phil. 595, 605 (2003.)
39 Rural Bank of Sta. Ignacia vs. Dimatulac, G.R. No. 142015, 441 SCRA 742.
40 Wilfredo Silverio, et. al. vs. Court of Appeals, 407 SCRA 240, July 24, 2003.

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ownership is not final, as it may still be the subject of a separate proceeding specifically
brought to settle the issue.41 Hence, the bare fact that petitioners, in their answer to the
complaint, raised the issue of whether they owned the property did not divest the MTC of
its jurisdiction to tae cognizance of the case and decide the same on its merits.42
What is the effect of filing an action for ownership?
The filing of an action for reconveyance of title over the same property or for
annulment of the deed of sale over the land does not divest the Municipal Trial Court of
its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases before it. This is so,
because, while there may be identity of parties and subject matter in the forcible entry
case and the suit for annulment of title and/or reconveyance, the rights asserted and the
relief prayed for are not the same. The respondents in ejectment proceedings cannot
defeat the summary nature of the action against them by simply filing an action questioning
the ownership of the person who is trying to eject them from the premises.43
Cases which do not bar the filing of Unlawful Detainer or Forcible Entry
There are cases filed in the Regional Trial Court, which do not abate or prevent
the filing of an action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer. The case of Wilmon Auto
Supply Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97637, April 10, 1992, outlines certain
precedents:
(1) Injunction suits;
(2) Accion Publiciana;
(3) Writ of Possession case;
(4) Action for quieting of title;
(5) Specific Performance with damages;
(6) Action for reformation of instrument;
(7) Action for reconveyance of property;
(8) Annulment of sale, or title, or document.
The underlying reasons for the above rulings were that the actions in the Regional
Trial Court did not involve physical or de facto possession and, on not a few occasions,
that the case in the Regional Trial Court was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the
ejectment proceeding, or that the issues presented in the former could quite as easily be
set up as defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved.
When is ownership a valid defense?
Ownership is, however, a valid defense in unlawful detainer cases. While
possession is the main issue in ejectment, it is also one of the essential attributes of

41 Enrico Santos vs. National Statistics Office, G.R. No. 171129, April 6, 2011.
42 Dela Rosa vs. Roldan, G.R. No. 133882, September 5, 2006.
43 Jose Dante and Luzviminda Palomar vs. Maria P. Sison, et. al., G.R. No. 82761, June 29,

1989.

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ownership. It follows that an owner of real property is entitled to possession of the same.
Petitioner can, therefore, properly plead his right of possession to defeat that of
respondents. Indeed, an owner who cannot exercise the seven “juses” or attributes of
ownership – the right to possess, to use and enjoy, to abuse or consume, to accessories,
to dispose or alienate, to recover or vindicate and to the fruits – is a crippled owner.
Will the mere violation of right of first refusal raise the issue of ownership?
The defense of ownership contemplated by the said rule refers to a situation where
the defendants either claim ownership of the subject property or attributes said ownership
to another person other than the plaintiff. It does not apply where the defendants merely
question the validity of the title of the plaintiff. Thus, the petitioner spouses must anchor
the legality of their material possession of the property on a claim of title in order for the
court to be able to touch, at least provisionally and only for purposes of determining
possession, on the legality of the issue of ownership.
The alleged violation of their right of priority or fist option to buy the premises is not
the defense of ownership contemplated in Sec. 16 because said violation, even if true,
would only give a cause of action for damages on the ground of breach of contract but not
an action for recovery of title.44
Agricultural Tenants
Municipal courts have no jurisdiction over a forcible entry and detainer case
involving agricultural tenants. But there must be evidence of tenancy relationship. Mere
allegation is not enough.
Effect of allegation of tenancy
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the
complaint. Hence, the defenses in the answer do not determine jurisdiction.
If the defendant raises the issue of tenancy as a defense and alleges lack of
jurisdiction because a tenancy case falls within the jurisdiction of the Department of
Agrarian Reforms Adjudicatory Board (DARAB), it would be error for the court to dismiss
the complaint on that ground alone. The mere raising of the issue of tenancy does not
automatically divest the court of jurisdiction because, as earlier pointed out, the jurisdiction
of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint and is not dependent upon
the defenses set up by the defendant.45
Cases falling under the jurisdiction of HLURB
The Municipal Trial Court is, without jurisdiction where the ground for ejectment
would involve a consideration of the rights and obligations of the parties in a sale of real
estate under Presidential Decree No. 957 which falls under the jurisdiction of the HLURB
and consequently is also without jurisdiction to award counterclaim.

44 Spouses Dario Lacap vs. Jouvet Ong Lee, G.R. No. 142131, December 11, 2002.
45 Riano, Civil Procedure Vol. II.

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 Section 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand. — Unless otherwise
stipulated
such action by the lesser shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with
the conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee
or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises if
no person be found thereon
and the lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or
five (5) days in the case of buildings. (2a)

Condition Precedent to Filing a Case for Unlawful Detainer

An action by the lessor shall be commenced only after:
(1) Demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is
made upon the lessee; or
(2) By serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the
premises; or
(3) By posting such notice on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the
lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five
(5) days in the case of buildings.
When does Section 2 of Rule 70 apply?
An examination of Section 2, Rule 70, readily shows that the rule is applicable only
where there is a lessor-lessee relationship under a lease contract, which does not exist in
this case. Further, the rule applies only in instances where the grounds relied upon for
ejectment is non-payment of rentals or violation of the conditions of the lease, as the case
may be. In those cited situations, notice to vacate is crucial. A demand is a pre-requisite
to an action for unlawful detainer, when the action is based on "failure to pay rent due or
to comply with the conditions of his lease," but not where the action is to terminate the
lease because of the expiration of its term.46
Is Prior Possession a Condition Sine Qua Non for Unlawful Detainer Cases?
In Javellosa v Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124292, December 10, 1996, private
respondents alleged in their complaint that they are the registered owners of the subject
land and therefore, entitled to possession thereof; that petitioners were illegally occupying
the premises without their consent and thus unlawfully withholding possession from them;
and, despite receipt of their demand to vacate the premises, petitioner refused to leave
the property. On the face of the complaint, it also appears that private respondents were
seeking to recover merely the physical possession or posession de facto of the subject
land. Private respondents did not allege the incidents respecting the mortgage of the land
and the pending RTC case questioning the mortgage contract as the issue involved

46 Caezar Lanuza and Asteria Lanuza vs. Ma. Consuelo Munoz, G.R. No. 147372, May 27, 2004.

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therein is ownership which has no place in an ejectment case. In fine, the allegations in
the complaint make out a case for unlawful detainer.
It held that again, it is settled that prior physical possession is indispensable only
in actions for forcible entry but not in unlawful detainer. Since we have ruled that MTC
case filed against petitioner is one for unlawful detainer, petitioner’s prior possession of
the land is of no moment. Private respondents are entitled to its possession from the time
title was issued in their favor as registered owners. An action for unlawful detainer may
be filed when possession by a landlord, vendor, vendee or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination
of their right to hold possession, by virtue of a contract, express or implied.
Further, in the case of Peran vs. Presiding Judge, Br. II, CFI Sorsogon 47, in ruling
that a formal agreement or contract of lease is not necessary before an unlawful detainer
suit may be filed against a possessor by tolerance, neither is prior physical possession of
the property by petitioner an indispensable requisite.
When is demand to vacate a pre-requisite?
A demand to comply and to vacate in an unlawful detainer case is a jurisdictional
requirement.48
It is a settled rule that ‘where the complaint contains no allegation that a demand
had been made upon the defendant to vacate the premises but only an allegation that a
demand was made for the payment of the rentals agreed upon, it is held that such
allegation is insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon a justice of the peace court.49
In Bandoy vs. Court of Appeals,50 the demand to vacate was stressed by the
Supreme Court where it explained, “It is settled rule that ‘ where the complaint contains
no allegation that a demand had been made upon the defendant to vacate the premises
but only an allegation that a demand was made for the payment of the rentals agreed
upon, it is held that such allegation is insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon a justice of the
peace court.”
When is demand to vacate deemed sufficient?
In the case if Lesaca vs. Cuevas 51, “A lease contract "on a month-to-month basis"
provides for a definite period and may be terminated at the end of any month. In the case
at bar, when respondent Tan Chun refused to pay the increased rentals for the month of
May, 1975, the lease contract was deemed terminated as of said month, not only because
of the letters sent to him by the petitioner informing him that the lease was to be terminated
effective May, 1975, but more so by his refusal to pay the increased rate while remaining
in the premises.”
In the above case, the Court further ruled that “even assuming that there was a
need for such a demand in the instant case, we believe that the alternative demand to pay

47 125 SCRA 78.

48 San Andres v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 368, December 6, 1996.
49 Casilan v. Tomassi, et al, 10 SCRA 261.
50 175 SCRA 459 (1989).
51 G.R. No. L-48419, October 27, 1983.

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the increased rental or to vacate the premises is sufficient under the law to enable the
lessor to bring an ejectment case because as stated earlier, the lessee lost all his rights
to remain in the premises upon the expiration of the lease contract in May, 1975. There
is, therefore, no need for a more definite and unconditional demand to vacate as he had
no legal right to remain in the premises.”
However in the case of Vda. De Murga vs. Chan 52, the lease contract provided
that upon its expiration, the lessor had the option to purchase the improvements
introduced by the lessee on the leased premises; but in the event that the lessor did not
exercise such option, then the contract was automatically renewed. In this case, the court
ruled that a more definite demand was necessary to give the lessor the right to object the
lessee from the premises.
Exception to Rule on Demand to Vacate – Expiration of Term of Lease
Demand is a prerequisite to an action for unlawful detain detainer when it is for
failure to pay rent due or to comply with the conditions of the lease and not where the
action is to terminate the lease because of the expiration of its term.
However, this exception is applicable only where there is lessor-lessee relationship
and where the grounds relied upon for ejectment is non-payment of rentals or violation of
the conditions of the lease. Hence, there is no need to allege prior demand where the
cause of action is cessation of tolerance and not to pay rentals on the property.53
Hence, a notice to vacate is needed only when the action is due to the lessee's
failure to pay rent or to comply with the terms of the lease.54
Furthermore, this exception is especially applicable on lease contracts on a month
to month basis. A lease on a month to month basis is one where no definite period for the
lease was agreed upon by the parties but the rent is paid on a monthly basis, the contract
is on with a fix term, which terminates at the end of each month if notice to vacate is
properly given.55
In the case of Alfredo Arquelada vs. Philippine Veterans Bank56, the action for
unlawful detainer was based on the expiration of the contract of lease, a demand to vacate
was not necessary for judicial action after the expiration of the terms of the lease. There
being no need for any demand or notice, there was likewise no necessity to wait for five
(5) days upon notice or demand before an action for unlawful detainer may be filed.
Moreover, when the ground asserted is the expiration of the term of lease, any notice
given merely serves to negate any inference that the lessor has agreed to extend the
period of the lease.

52 25 SCRA 441.
53 Lanuza v. Munoz, 429 SCRA 562, May 27, 2004.
54 Labastida v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 663, 669 (1998).
55 Patermo v. Court of Appeals, 272 SCRA 771, 778 (1997) citing Chua v. CA, 242 SCRA 744

(1995)
56 329 SCRA 536, March 31, 2000.

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 Consequently, the period of five (5) days from the giving of the notice or demand
to vacate, necessarily, applies only if the alleged grounds in the complaint are the non-
payment of rents due or non-compliance with the conditions of the lease.57
Right of Lessor to Increase Rentals
In Inductivo vs Court of Appeals,58 when rentals are paid monthly, a lease is
deemed to be for a definite period expiring at the end of every monthly period. The lessor
is thus granted the right to eject the lessee, being an excepted case under the Rental
Control Law, after prior notice of such termination and demand to vacate the leased
premises.59
In such a case a demand to vacate is not necessary for judicial action after
expiration of one month. The lessor has the right to increase rentals after the expiration of
the lease and to evict the lessee who refuses to accept the new rate without necessity of
demand, provided that the same is not exorbitant.60
The court has no authority to fix rental of lease that has been extended but may
determine if increase is reasonable or to extend the lease with a fixed period.61

Section 3. Summary procedure. — Except in cases covered by the agricultural tenancy

laws or when the law otherwise expressly provides, all actions for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to
be recovered, shall be governed by the summary procedure hereunder provided. (n)

What rule shall govern Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer cases?
General Rule: All actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of the
amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered, shall be governed by the
summary procedure as provided by the Rules.
Exceptions:
(1) In cases covered by the agricultural tenancy laws; or
(2) When the law otherwise expressly provides.

Section 4. Pleadings allowed. — The only pleadings allowed to be filed are the
complaint, compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim pleaded in the answer, and the
answers thereto. All pleadings shall be verified. (3a, RSP)

57 Id.
58 229 SCRA 380.
59 Herrera, Oscar (2006) Remedial Law Volume III, Pg. 568
60 Id.
61 Id.

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What pleadings are allowed?
The only pleadings allowed are the following:
(1) complaint
(2) compulsory counterclaim
(3) cross-claim pleaded in the answer
(4) answer
Note: All pleadings must be verified.
What are the prohibited pleadings?
Prohibited pleadings are the same as that found under the Rule on Summary
Procedures, to wit:
(1) Motion to dismiss the complaint except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter, or failure to comply with section 12;
(2) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(3) Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;
(4) Petition for relief from judgment;
(5) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper;
(6) Memoranda;
(7) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order
issued by the court;
(8) Motion to declare the defendant in default;
(9) Dilatory motions for postponement;
(10) Reply;
(11) Third-party complaints; and
(12) Interventions.
Affidavits submitted to the court must be based on the personal knowledge of the
affiants or witnesses.

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 Section 5. Action on complaint. — The court may, from an examination of the
allegations in the complaint and such evidence as may be attached thereto, dismiss
the case outright on any of the grounds for the dismissal of a civil action which are
apparent therein. If no ground for dismissal is found, it shall forthwith issue summons.
(n)

After the court examines the allegations in the complaint and the evidences
attached thereto, the court may either:
(1) dismiss the case outright; or
(2) issue summons
The court, upon receiving the complaint and the evidences attached thereto, will
determine if there is a ground for its dismissal. However if the court finds that there is no
ground for the dismissal for the complaint, it shall then issue the summons which shall be
addressed to the defendant.
As a general rule, the court cannot dismiss a case outright without a motion. An
exception to this rule are forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases. This is because in
such cases, time is of the essence.

Section 6. Answers. — Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant
shall file his answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff.
Affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed waived, except
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims
not asserted in the answer shall be considered barred. The answer to counterclaims
or cross-claims shall be served and filed within ten (10) days from service of the answer
in which they are pleaded.

What is the period to answer a complaint?

It is within ten (10) days from service of summons. This is mandatory on the part
of the defendant, and the 10 day period is non-extendible. The intention of the law can be
clearly inferred from the use of the word ‘SHALL’ in the provision.
What should be included in answer to complaint?
It shall include:
(1) Affirmative and negative defenses
-Affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed waived,
except lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
(2) Cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims

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 -Cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims not asserted in the answer shall be
considered barred.
In the case of Cojuangco vs. Villegas62, “Villegas' claim to recover compensation
for improvements made on the land is essentially in the nature of a counterclaim since it
is inter-woven with the fact of possession. Said claim for compensation should have been
presented as a counterclaim in the ejectment suit. It is deemed barred if not raised on time
and the party in error is precluded from setting it up in a subsequent litigation. The rule on
compulsory counter-claim is designed to enable the disposition of the entire conflict at one
time and in one action. The philosophy of the rule is to discourage multiplicity of suits. “
What if the value recoverable in a counter-claim exceeds the jurisdictional amount
allowed in MTC?
In the case of Maceda vs. CA63, “The municipal trial court did not have original
jurisdiction over his counterclaim as it exceeds P20,000. Correspondingly, the regional
trial court did not have appellate jurisdiction over the claim. The decision of the Municipal
Trial Court of San Juan awarding him P158,000 on his counterclaim, and that of the
Regional Trial Court raising the award to P182,200, were invalid for lack of jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court in a civil action for sum of money (Maceda's
counterclaim for the value of his improvements is one such action) is limited to a demand
that "does not exceed twenty thousand pesos exclusive of interest and costs but inclusive
of damages of whatever kind." A counterclaim in the municipal or city court beyond that
jurisdictional limit may be pleaded only by way of defense to weaken the plaintiffs claim,
but not to obtain affirmative relief. “
What is the period to answer the counterclaims and cross-claim?
It shall also be served and filed within ten (10) days from service of the answer in
which they are pleaded.

Section 7. Effect of failure to answer. — Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint
within the period above provided, the court, motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall
render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to
what is prayed for therein. The court may in its discretion reduce the amount of damages
and attorney's fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable, without
prejudice to the applicability of section 3 (c), Rule 9 if there are two or more defendants.

What is the effect of failure to answer within the period provided by the Rules?
The court shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the
complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein.

62
G.R. No. 76838 April 17, 1990
63
G.R. No. 83545 August 11, 1989

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How shall it be done?
It shall be:
(1) By the court, motu proprio; or
(2) On motion of the plaintiff
In this case the correct motion to file is Motion for Immediate Decision.
Can the court award damages without trial?
Yes, as provided in section 7, the court may in its discretion reduce the amount of
damages and attorney's fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable.

Suppose, there are two defendants, one will file an answer and the other will not,
may the other defendant benefit from the answer filed by the other?
Yes, the Rules provide that judgment rendered by court is without prejudice to the
applicability of section 3 (c), Rule 9 if there are two or more defendants.
Hence, there can be no judgment by mere failure of one defendant to answer if the
other defendant filed his answer. The answer filed shall benefit those who did not file an
answer.

Section 8. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. — Not later than thirty (30)
days after the last answer is filed, a preliminary conference shall be held. The
provisions of Rule 18 on pre-trial shall be applicable to the preliminary conference
unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.
The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference shall be cause for the
dismissal of his complaint. The defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff
shall be entitled to judgment on his counterclaim in accordance with the next preceding
section. All cross-claims shall be dismissed. (7, RSP)
If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall likewise be entitled to judgment
in accordance with the next preceding section. This procedure shall not apply where
one of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of action defense shall
appear at the preliminary conference.
No postponement of the preliminary conference shall be granted except for highly
meritorious grounds and without prejudice to such sanctions as the court in the
exercise of sound discretion may impose on the movant. (n)

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Preliminary conference
 A preliminary conference shall be held not later than thirty (30) days after the last
answer is filed. The provisions of Rule 18 on pre-trial shall be applicable to the
preliminary conference unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.
Effects of failure to appear by plaintiff or defendant
(1) If the plaintiff failed to appear in the preliminary conference, the following shall be
the effect:
a) Complaint shall be dismissed.
b) The defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled
to judgment on his counterclaim in accordance with the next preceding
section.
c) All cross-claims shall be dismissed.
(2) If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall likewise be entitled to
judgment in accordance with the next preceding section. This procedure shall not
apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of action
defense shall appear at the preliminary conference.
Postponement of preliminary conference
General Rule: No postponement of the preliminary conference shall be granted.
Exception: For highly meritorious grounds and without prejudice to such sanctions as the
court in the exercise of sound discretion may impose on the movant.
 Former section 5 of Rule 70, allows a continuance of not more than five days
unless the defendant posts a bond. However the present rule totally prohibits
continuance of preliminary conference except for highly meritorious grounds and
without prejudice to such sanctions as the court in the exercise of sound discretion
may impose on the movant.

Section 9. Record of preliminary conference. — Within five (5) days after the
termination of the preliminary conference, the court shall issue an order stating the
matters taken up therein, including but not limited to:
1. Whether the parties have arrived at an amicable settlement, and if so, the terms
thereof;
2. The stipulations or admissions entered into by the parties;
3. Whether, on the basis of the pleadings and the stipulations and admission made by
the parties, judgment may be rendered without the need of further proceedings, in
which event the judgment shall be rendered within thirty (30) days from issuance of the
order;

Page 34 of 116
 4. A clear specification of material facts which remain converted; and
5. Such other matters intended to expedite the disposition of the case. (8, RSP)

Court’s order after the preliminary conference

 The court shall issue an order stating the matters taken up in the preliminary
conference within five (5) days after the termination of such. This order is actually
the counterpart of pre-trial order.
Contents of the court’s order
 It shall state the matters taken up in the preliminary conference, including but not
limited to:
1. Whether the parties have arrived at an amicable settlement, and if so, the
terms thereof;
2. The stipulations or admissions entered into by the parties;
3. Whether, on the basis of the pleadings and the stipulations and admission
made by the parties, judgment may be rendered without the need of further
proceedings, in which event the judgment shall be rendered within thirty
(30) days from issuance of the order;
4. A clear specification of material facts which remain converted; and
5. Such other matters intended to expedite the disposition of the case.

Section 10. Submission of affidavits and position papers. — Within ten (10) days from
receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding section, the parties shall submit
the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues defined in the
order, together with their position papers setting forth the law and the facts relied upon
by them. (9, RSP)

Affidavits
 The parties shall submit the affidavits of their witnesses together with their position
papers after the court issues an order stating the matters taken up in the
preliminary conference.
The 10-day reglementary period
 Section 10 states that the parties shall submit their position papers and affidavits
10 days after the court issues an order which is contemplated under Section 9.

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  The 10-day reglementary period should not be disregarded as held in the case of
Heirs of Ferraren vs. Court of Appeals64. The petitioners in this case did not dispute
the appellate court’s finding that they submitted their position paper and affidavits
more than three months after the deadline set by the law. In this regard, the
Supreme Court held that while the rules of procedure are liberally construed, the
provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are
to the prevention of needless delays and are necessary to the orderly and speedy
discharge of judicial business.
 Section 10 should be read in relation to Section 14 which requires that a party must
attach affidavits in his position paper. The affidavits will now take the place of the
testimony of the witnesses. The affidavits should be within the personal knowledge
of the affiant.
 However, the Supreme Court ruled in Dela Rosa v. Carlos65, that the verified
complaint of the Spouses Dela Rosa constitutes the affidavit of witnesses required
under Rule 70. For as long as the verified position paper states that all the
allegations therein are true and correct of their own personal knowledge.
Moreover, documentary evidence is attached to their position paper which
strengthens their claim of prior possession. Therefore, there is no need of separate
affidavits.

Section 11. Period for rendition of judgment. — Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the
affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court
shall render judgment.
However, should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, during the said
period, issue an order specifying the matters to be clarified, and require the parties to
submit affidavits or other evidence on the said matters within ten (10) days from receipt of
said order. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last
affidavit or the expiration of the period for filing the same.
The court shall not resort to the foregoing procedure just to gain time for the rendition of
the judgment. (n)

In the case of Palma Gil vs. Lopez Jr. (A.M. No. MTJ-02-1453, April 29,
2003),respondent judge was held guilty of gross inefficiency for his failure to resolve and
dispose of Civil Case No. 1110 within the period prescribed by the Rules which is to render
a decision within 30 days from receipt of the affidavits and position papers. The Court also
said that “A magistrate should dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods. Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and
confidence of the public in the institution of justice, lowers its standards and brings them
into disrepute. Every judge must cultivate a capacity for quick decision; he must not delay

64
G.R. No. 159328, October 5, 2011
65
G.R. No. 147549, October 23, 2003

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the judgment which a party justly deserves. The public trust reposed in a judge's office
imposes upon him the highest degree of responsibility to promptly administer justice.”
On the other hand, in the case of Petallar vs. Judge Pullos (A.M. No. MTJ-03-1484,
January 15, 2004), “Respondent indeed violated Rule 70, Section 11 of the Rules of Court
for undue delay in rendering judgment. The records show that the parties in Special Civil
Action Case No. 137 had filed their respective position papers as early as February 2,
2000. Thus, respondent had until March 4, 2000 to render judgment. Had there been
circumstances which prevented him from handing down his decision within the prescribed
period, respondent should have at least requested from this Court for an extension of time
within which to render judgment. As respondent himself admitted, Case No. 137 was
decided only on June 2, 2002 or two (2) years and some three (3) months beyond the
reglementary period. Moreover, he could not even come up with an explanation for the
delay.”

Section 12. Referral for conciliation. — Cases requiring referral for conciliation, where
there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without
prejudice, and may be revived only after that requirement shall have been complied with.
(18a, RSP)

This requirement is in relation to certain provisions of law which requires that

before an action may be formally decided or taken action by the Court, it must first undergo
conciliation. Conciliation is a mechanism designed by the Court to promote speedy
disposition of cases and prevent unnecessary clogging of court dockets.
One example of it is PD 1508 or the law which established a System of Amicably
Settling Disputes at the Barangay Level.It’s purpose is to help relieve the courts of docket
congestion and thereby enhance the quality of justice dispensed by the courts due
to indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts of justice which contributes heavily and
unjustifiably to the congestion of court dockets, thus causing a deterioration in the quality
of justice.
Nevertheless, in cases of forcible entry, the rule provides that the Court will merely
order for the compliance of the requiremen and the dismissal of the case is not prejudicial
thereto. The case may revive after compliance thereto.

Section 13. Prohibited pleadings and motions. — The following petitions, motions, or
pleadings shall not be allowed:
1. Motion to dismiss the complaint except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, or failure to comply with section 12;
2. Motion for a bill of particulars;
3. Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;

Page 37 of 116
4. Petition for relief from judgment;
5. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper;
6. Memoranda;
7. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued
by the court;
8. Motion to declare the defendant in default;
9. Dilatory motions for postponement;
10. Reply;
11. Third-party complaints;
12. Interventions. (19a, RSP)

The prohibition of these pleadings and motions stemmed from the summary nature
of this remedy. This means that the action must be immediately resolved.
In the case of Edillo vs Dulpina (G.R. No. 180542), the court ruled that the plaintiffs-
respondents filing of a motion for reconsideration of the MCTC judgment did not stop the
running of the period for appeal since a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited
pleading.It was applied to prevent undue delays in the disposition of cases; to achieve this
end, the filing of certain pleadings a motion for reconsideration, among others is
prohibited.

Section 14. Affidavits. — The affidavits required to be submitted under this Rule shall
state only facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiants which are admissible in
evidence, and shall show their competence to testify to the matters stated therein.
A violation of this requirement may subject the party or the counsel who submits the same
to disciplinary action, and shall be cause to expunge the inadmissible affidavit or portion
thereof from the record. (20, RSP)

WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF VIOLATION OF THE REQUIREMENT66 ?

(1) The party or counsel who submits the defective affidavit may be subjected to
disciplinary action.
(2) The defective affidavit or a portion thereof shall be expunged from record.

66
2nd par., Sec. 14, Rule 70 of Rules of Court.

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 As a rule, affidavits of witnesses and other evidence must be attached to the position
paper. However in the case of Dela Rosa v. Carlos67, the Supreme Court held that the
spouses Dela Rosa jointly verified their position paper by stating that all the allegations in
the position paper are true and correct of their “own personal knowledge.” The verification
itself is an affidavit.

A verified position paper without a separate affidavit is sufficient and valid. The
requirement to append the separate affidavits to the position paper is dispensed with, as
the matters to be treated and contained therein are already incorporated and made part
of the position paper which is duly verified by the defendant. Thus, there has been
substantial compliance with the requirements of the Rules under Section 10 and Section
14, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

SECTION 15. Preliminary injunction. — The court may grant preliminary injunction, in
accordance with the provisions of Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the defendant from
committing further acts of dispossession against the plaintiff.
A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible from the filing of the complaint,
present a motion in the action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. The court shall
decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof.

SOURCE OF THE RULE

Taken from section 3 of the former rule which reads:
SEC 3: preliminary injunction- the court may grant preliminary injunction, in
accordance with the provision of Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the defendant from
committing further acts if dispossession against the plaintiff.
A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry may within ten (10)
days from the filing of the complaint present a motion to secure from the competent court,
in the action for forcible entry, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in
his possession. The court shall decide the motion within thirty days from the filling thereof.
CHANGES IN THE RULE
Under the new rule, the period during which the petition may be filed was reduced
to five (5) days.
Before the remedy of preliminary mandatory injunction is only possible in forcible
entry cases. Article 539 of the Civil code provides such remedy limited only to Forcible
entry cases:

67
G.R. No. 147549, October 23, 2004.

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Article 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should
he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the
means established by the laws and the Rules of Court.
A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry may within ten days from
the filing of the complaint present a motion to secure from the competent court, in the
action for forcible entry, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his
possession. The court shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof.
(446a)

The applicability of Preliminary Mandatory injunction to unlawful detainer cases

was first laid down by the Supreme Court before 1997 in the case of Day vs RTC of
Zamboanga Branch 13, 191 SCRA 610. The Supreme Court ruled that the municipal trial
court can issue provisional remedies in all cases as authorized by Judiciary law BP Bilang
129.
Section 33 of B.P. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act) allows the plaintiff in an
unlawful detainer action to apply for a writ of preliminary injunction. With the advent of B.P.
129, Art. 539 of the New Civil Code, Sec. 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, and Sec. 3, Rule
70 of the Rules of Court have been substantially modified. B.P. 129 provides: "provided
the main action is within its jurisdiction, an inferior court can appoint a receiver and it has
jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction in either forcible entry or unlawful
detainer cases." (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Second Revised Edition, p. 33).
"Under the present law, an inferior court has jurisdiction to grant provisional remedies in
proper cases.
These proper cases would be:
(1) Preliminary attachment under Rule 57, provided the principal action is
within its jurisdiction such as an action for recovery of personal property
valued at not more than P20,000.00; an action for recovery of a sum of
money not exceeding P20,000.00; an action of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer.
(2) Preliminary injunction under Rule 58 in both forcible entry and unlawful
detainer also in cases mentioned in the preceding paragraph." (Dean Jose
Y. Feria, Phil. Legal Studies, Series No. 1, the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980, 1981 edition, pp. 43-44.)68
COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 58 OF ROC
The injunctive relief accorded to the plaintiff in relation to FEUD cases must comply
with the provisions of Rule 58 of Rules of Court.
In Palma Gil v. Lopez69, the Supreme Court held that the TRO issued by the MCTC
Judge in connection with the Forcible Entry case was improper as it violated Rule 58 of
the Rules of Court. Aside from the lack of verification of the motion, no affidavits of the
applicant and his witnesses were appended thereto. Furthermore, the assailed Order did

68
Day vs. Regional Trial Court of Zambonga, G.R. No. 79119, November 22, 1990.
69
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1453, April 29, 2003.

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not specify the duration of the temporary restraining order. The Rules explicitly mandate
that the application for injunction should be verified. While litigation is not a game of
technicalities, every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to insure an orderly administration of justice.
Also, in Columbres v. Judge Madronio70, the Supreme Court held that the
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he granted the application
for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in connection with a Forcible Entry case
without any notice of hearing in violation of Section 15, Rule 70 on Forcible Entry and
Unlawful Detainer, in conjunction with Section 5, Rule 58, on preliminary injunction of the
Rules of Court.

Section 16. Resolving defense of ownership. — When the defendant raises the defense
of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine
the issue of possession

SOURCE OF RULE
Taken from section 4 of the former rule which reads
Sec 4. Evidence of title when admissible,- Evidence to the land or building may be received
solely for the purpose of determining the character and extent of possession and damages
for detention.
CHANGES IN THE RULE
Under the Judiciary reorganization act, the issue of ownership shall be resolved
only to determine the issue of possession provided:
a. The defendant raises the issue of ownership in the pleadings; and
b. The question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership.
As a rule the issue to be resolved under Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases
is the issue of Physical Possession. The issue of ownership is immaterial. However,
Section 16 Rule 70 of the Rules of court provides for an instance wherein the defense of
ownership was raised in ejectment cases. This rule was taken from section 33 paragraph
2 of BP Bilang 129 Judiciary Law - Jurisdiction of MTC,RTC and MCTC in Civil Cases
Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of Forcible entry and unlawful detainer
provided that when in some cases the defendant raises the question of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue

70
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1461, March 31, 2005.

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of ownership. The issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession.
By virtue of the express mandate set forth in section 33 paragraph 2 of the judicial
law (BP129) which is also section 16 of rule 70, inferior courts or first level courts, MTC
have the power to resolve the question of ownership raised as an incident of an ejectment
case where the determination thereof is necessary for a proper complete adjudication on
the issue of possession. Any such pronouncement made affecting ownership is to be
regraded merely as provisional. Hence, it will not bar nor prejudice an action between
same parties involving title to the land. 71
WHAT HAPPENS IF THE MTC RULE ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP?
The decision of ownership is not final. An adjudication made therein regarding the
issue of ownership should be regarded as merely provisional and, therefore, would not
bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land. The
foregoing doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases where the only issue to be settled is the physical or material possession
over the real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure 72 . The
assertion by the defendant of ownership over the disputed property does not serve to
divest the inferior court of its jurisdiction. The defendant cannot deprive the court of
jurisdiction by merely claiming ownership of the property involved. 73 [Rural Bank of Sta.
Ignacia v. Dimatulac, G.R. No. 142015, April 29, 2003]
Such judgment would not bar an action between the same parties respecting title
to the land or building. The resolution of the MeTC on the ownership of the property is
merely provisional or interlocutory. Any question involving the issue of ownership should
be raised and resolved in a separate action brought specifically to settle the question with
finality74
It bears stressing that in unlawful detainer cases, the only issue for resolution,
independent of any claim of ownership by any party litigant, is: who is entitled to the
physical and material possession of the property involved? The mere fact that defendant
raises the defense of ownership of the property in the pleadings does not deprive the MTC
of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide the case. In cases where defendant
raises the question of ownership in the pleadings and the question of possession cannot
be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the court may proceed and resolve
the issue of ownership but only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession.
However, the disposition of the issue of ownership is not final, as it may be the subject of
separate proceeding specifically brought to settle the issue. Hence, the bare fact that
petitioners, in their answer to the complaint, raised the issue of whether they owned the
property as trustors of a constructive trust (with the spouses Dulay as the trustees), did

71
Refugia vs CA 258 SCRA 347 (1996)
72
Hilario v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121865, August 7, 1996
73
Rural Bank of Sta. Ignacia v. Dimatulac, G.R. No. 142015, April 29, 2003
74
Roberts vs. Papio, GR 166714, Feb. 9, 2007

Page 42 of 116
not divest the MTC of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case and decide the same
on its merits.75
Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass
upon the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The
adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action
between the same parties involving title to the property.76
Certain guidelines, however, must be observed in the implementation of this
legislative prescription, viz.:
(1) The primal rule is that the principal issue must be that of possession, and
that ownership is merely ancillary thereto, in which case the issue of
ownership may be resolved but only for the purpose of determining the
issue of possession. Thus, as earlier stated, the legal provision under
consideration applies only where the inferior court believes and the
preponderance of evidence shows that a resolution of the issue of
possession is dependent upon the resolution of the question of ownership.

(2) It must sufficiently appear from the allegations in the complaint that what
the plaintiff really and primarily seeks is the restoration of possession.
Consequently, where the allegations of the complaint as well as the reliefs
prayed for clearly establish a case for the recovery of ownership, and not
merely one for the recovery of possession de facto, or where the averments
plead the claim of material possession as a mere elemental attribute of
such claim for ownership, or where the issue of ownership is the principal
question to be resolved, the action is not one for forcible entry but one for
title to real property.

(3) The inferior court cannot adjudicate on the nature of ownership where the
relationship of lessor and lessee has been sufficiently established in the
ejectment case, unless it is sufficiently established that there has been a
subsequent change in or termination of that relationship between the
parties. This is because under Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,
the tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.

(4) The rule in forcible entry cases, but not in those for unlawful detainer, is
that a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession
even against the owner himself. Regardless of the actual condition of the
title to the property and whatever may be the character of his prior
possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that
entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person
having a better right through an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria. Corollary, if prior possession may be ascertained in some

75
Dela Rosa v. Roldan, G.R. No. 133882, September 5, 2006.
76
Esmaquel v. Coprada, G.R. No. 152423, December 15, 2010.

Page 43 of 116
 other way, then the inferior court cannot dwell upon or intrude into the issue
of ownership.

(5) Where the question of who has prior possession hinges on the question of
who the real owner of the disputed portion is, the inferior court may resolve
the issue of ownership and make a declaration as to who among the
contending parties is the real owner. In the same vein, where the resolution
of the issue of possession hinges on a determination of the validity and
interpretation of the document of title or any other contract on which the
claim of possession is premised, the inferior court may likewise pass upon
these issues. This is because, and it must be so understood, that any such
pronouncement made affecting ownership of the disputed portion is to be
regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not bar nor prejudice an
action between the same parties involving title to the land. Moreover,
Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the
judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall
be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind the title
or affect the ownership of the land or building.
Thus, even where the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings
and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve the issue of ownership
albeit only to determine the issue of possession.77

Section 17. Judgment. — If after trial court finds that the allegations of the complaint are
true, it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the
sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the premises, attorney's fees and costs. If a counterclaim is established, the
court shall render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either party and award costs
as justice requires. (6a)

A. What constitutes judgment

There will be hearings, and after these and the court finds that the allegations in the
complaint are true, judgment shall be rendered in favor of plaintiff which includes:
1. Restitution of premises;
2. The sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the premises;
3. Attorney’s fees; and

77
Refugia v. CA, supra.

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 4. Costs
If allegations in the complaint are not true, then the case will be dismissed and
judgment shall be rendered in favor of the defendant to recover the cost.
If a counterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment for the sum found in
arrears from either party and award costs as justice require.
B. Damages recoverable under FE/UD Cases
Damages recoverable in ejectment cases are limited to:
1. Attorney’s fees;
2. Costs;
3. Unpaid rentals; and
4. Reasonable compensation for the use of the property.
The recoverable damages in forcible entry and detainer cases thus refer to “rents” or
“the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises” or “fair rental
value of the property” and attorney’s fees and costs.78
All other damages and unrealized profits are not recoverable. To recover such, there
is a need to file another case.
C. Rationale for the limitation
The rationale for limiting the kind of damages recoverable in an unlawful detainer case
was explained in In Araos v. Court of Appeals79, wherein the Court held that:
The rule is settled that in forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases, the only damage
that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the leased property. The reason for this is that in such
cases, the only issue raised in ejectment cases is that of rightful possession; hence,
the damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have
sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation
of the property, and not the damages which he may have suffered but which have no
direct relation to his loss of material possession.
In Teraa v. Sagun80, the Supreme Court held that it had no jurisdiction to award the
reimbursement prayed for by both parties. Both parties seek damages other than rentals
or reasonable compensation for the use of the property, which are the only forms of
damages that may be recovered in an unlawful detainer case.
In Felisilda v Villanuva81, the Supreme Court stated that the only damages that can be
recovered in an ejectment suit are the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation

78
CGR Corporation v. Ernesto L. Treyes, JR., G.R. No.170916, April 27, 2007.
79
Araos vs. CA, G.R. No. 107057, June 2, 1994
80
Terana v. Sagur, G.R. 152131, April 29, 2009
81
Felisilda v. Villanueva, G.R. No. L-60372, October 29, 1985

Page 45 of 116
for the use and occupation of the real property. Other damages must be claimed in an
ordinary action.
In Car Cool Philippines, Inc. v. Ushio Realty and Development82, the Court held that
there is no unjust enrichment when the person who will benefit has a valid claim to such
benefit. Under Section 17 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the new owner has
the legal right to receive some amount as reasonable compensation for plaintiff’s
occupation of the property.

Section 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving
title or ownership. — The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall
be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or
affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between
the same parties respecting title to the land or building.
The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court
which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in
the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties
or required by the Regional Trial Court. (7a)

A. Judgment Conclusive Only on Possession

The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive
with respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the
ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same
parties respecting title to the land or building.83
The authority of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) to provisionally decide the issue of
ownership in an ejectment case is only to determine the question of possession. Such
decision does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building; neither shall
it bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building nor be
held conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a
different cause of action involving possession.84
The MTC has no power to rule on the issue of ownership or title.
The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court
which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in
the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties
or required by the Regional Trial Court.85

82
Car Cool Philippines, Inc. vs. Ushio Realty And Development Corporation, G.R. No. 138088, January 23,
2006.
83
Section 18, Rule 70
84
Barba vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126638, February 6, 2002, 376 SCRA 210
85
Section 18, Rule 70

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 Section 18 is related to Section 16. When there is an issue raised in the pleadings as
to the ownership, such will be resolved for the purpose of resolving the issue of
possession. But definitely, there should be another case filed as to the ownership.
B. Against whom is Judgment Binding
The judgment is binding against the parties and all persons claiming under them, viz.:
1. Trespassers, squatters, or agents of the defendant fraudulently occupying the
property to frustrate the judgment.
2. Guests or other occupant of the premises with the permission of the defendant.
3. Transferees Pendente lite.86
4. Sublessees.
5. Members of the family, relatives and other privies of the defendant.
In the foregoing situations a person who was not a party in the ejectment case is bound
by the judgment, even if they were not formally impleaded as parties to the case.
C. Not binding against non – parties
1. An alias of writ of execution cannot legally be issued against respondent –
lessees who are not parties to the case.
2. A writ of possession and order of demolition directed against persons who were
not parties are void. They should be heard first before they are ejected.
3. Ayog v. Cusi, Jr.87, a judgment in an ejectment case cannot be enforced
against persons who were not defendants.

Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. — If judgment is

rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion unless an
appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient
supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the
plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment
appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the
appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as
determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he
shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation
of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment
of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The
supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the papers, to
the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.

86
Planas vs Madrigal, 94 Phil 754 (1954)
87
Ayog vs. Cusi, G.R. No. L-46729, November 19, 1982

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All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited with said court or authorized
government depositary bank, and shall be held there until the final disposition of the
appeal, unless the court, by agreement of the interested parties, or in the absence of
reasonable grounds of opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for justifiable reasons, shall
decree otherwise. Should the defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed from
time to time during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the
plaintiff, and upon proof of such failure, shall order the execution of the judgment appealed
from with respect to the restoration of possession, but such execution shall not be a bar
to the appeal taking its course until the final disposition thereof on the merits.
After the case is decided by the Regional Trial Court, any money paid to the court by the
defendant for purposes of the stay of execution shall be disposed of in accordance with
the provisions of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. In any case wherein it appears
that the defendant has been deprived of the lawful possession of land or building pending
the appeal by virtue of the execution of the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court, damages
for such deprivation of possession and restoration of possession and restoration of
possession may be allowed the defendant in the judgment of the Regional Trial Court
disposing of the appeal. (8a)

Immediate Execution of judgment in the MTC

The Rules provide that execution shall issue immediately upon motion if the
judgment is rendered against the defendant.88 This Rule is however anchored upon a
judgment which is in favor of the plaintiff. However, if the judgment is rendered in favor of
the defendant and against the plaintiff, the judgment is not immediately executory.
Although the rule is clear with the judgment being immediately executory, there
must first be a motion to that effect and a hearing called for that purpose.89 The rule is
settled that in an ejectment case, the adverse party is entitled to notice before execution
can be ordered90. The defendant must be given reasonable time to vacate by Sheriff
enforcing the writ – normally three to five days91.
Does the plaintiff need to cite good reasons for immediate execution?
No, the plaintiff is not required to cite a good reason for immediate execution of the
judgment. The Rule is clear that when the plaintiff wins the case, it is the ministerial duty
of the MTC to order immediate execution. Winning the case is already a good reason to
order immediate execution.
Since the rule provides for its immediate execution in forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases, the execution of judgment in favor of the plaintiff is therefore a matter of
right and mandatory. The duty to order the immediate execution is ministerial and
imperative.

88
Section 19, Rule 70, Rules of Court
89
Lu v Siapno, A.M. MTJ-99-1199. July 6, 2000
90
Kaw v. Judge Anunciacion, March 1, 1995
91
Rule 39, Section 10 (c) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

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Exceptions to the Immediate Execution of Judgment in Ejectment Cases
The rule however admits of exceptions, to wit:
(a) When the delay is due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence,92
or
(b) Where supervening events occurring subsequent to the judgment bring about
a material change in the situation of the parties which makes execution inequitable,
or where there is no compelling urgency for the execution because it is not justified
by the prevailing circumstances.93
The first exception also applies to the filing of the supersedeas bond.94
How to stay the Immediate Execution; Requisites95
1. The losing defendant must appeal the judgment to the Regional Trial Court.
This is to prevent the judgment becoming final;
2. The losing defendant must file a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the
Municipal Trial Court; and
3. During the pendency of the appeal in the Regional Trial Court, the losing
defendant must deposit with the RTC the rent due from time to time.
If however the defendant fails to comply with any of these conditions, it would then
be a ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect
being "ministerial and imperative." 96

Nature of Supersedeas Bond

The supersedeas bond should be approved by the Municipal Trial Court and must
be executed in favor of the plaintiff. This supersedeas bond is to pay for the rents,
damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from. The
supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers,
to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.97
Effect of failure to file supersedeas bond
If the defendant-appellant perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas
bond, the immediate execution of the judgment would automatically follow. Conversely,
the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the judgment if the appeal
is not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should be filed within the period
for the perfection of the appeal.98

92
3 Moran Comments on the Rules of Court (1963 ed.) 298-299; Acibo vs. Macaraeg, et al., L-19710, June
30, 1964, citing Sison vs. Bayona, et al., L-13440, Sept. 30, 1960. See also Acierto vs. Laperal, L-15966,
April 29, 1960, 58 O.G. 4853
93
Laurel v Abalos, 30 SCRA 281 [1969]
94
De Laureano v. Adil, supra
95
Section 19, Rule 70, Rules of Court
96
Acbang vs Luczon, G.R. No. 164246 January 15, 2014
97
Section 19, Rule 70, Rules of Court
98
Spouses Chua vs Court of Appeals and Spouses Moreno, G.R. No. 113886. February 24, 1998

Page 49 of 116
Effect of belatedly filing the supersedeas bond
While it is true therefore that defendant deposited the amount which approximates
the monetary judgment for unpaid rentals, since the same was filed late, it could not qualify
as a supersedeas bond. What is considered material for the purpose of the stay of
execution pending appeal under Rule 70 is not the fact of payment but more importantly
the timeliness of the filing of the supersedeas bond. Execution could not be legally stayed
by reason of admittedly belated filing of the aforequoted supersedeas bond.99
Immediate execution applies also if the plaintiff appeals judgment
The Supreme Court has ruled that Section 19, Rule 70 can also apply even if it is
the lessor is the appellant. In that case, a judgment ordering lessee to pay, but the lessor
appealed because he was not satisfied with the rental fixed by the Court.100 Such bond is
required to assure payment of damages to the winning party in case the appeal is found
frivolous, or the judgment appealed is affirmed.
Meaning of Damages in Supersedeas Bond
With regard to the damages to be awarded, the Supreme Court has already ruled
that since the only issue raised in forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases is that of rightful
physical possession, the "damages" recoverable in these cases are those which the
plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, i.e., those caused by the loss of the
use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may have suffered but
which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession. Municipal and city courts,
therefore, have no jurisdiction to award damages based on any other ground. Simply put,
"damages" in the context of Section 8 of Rule 70 (Section 19, Rule 70) is limited to "rent"
or "fair rental value" for the use and occupation of the property.101
Basis of the duty to deposit
In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the
reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or
period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day
of each succeeding month or period.102
Amounts paid placed with the court or authorized government bank
All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited with said court or
authorized government depositary bank, and shall be held there until the final disposition
of the appeal, unless the court, by agreement of the interested parties, or in the absence
of reasonable grounds of opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for justifiable reasons,
shall decree otherwise.103

99
Cordova vs Labayen, 240 SCRA 172. October 10, 1995
100
City of Manila v Court of Appeals and Jimenez, G.R. No. L-42364. April 9, 1987
101
Hualam Construction vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85466. October 16, 1992
102
Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
103
Id.

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What if defendant fails to make the payments?
The appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, and upon proof of such failure,
shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of
possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until final
disposition thereof on the merits. 104
Any money paid for the stay of immediate execution to be disposed of in
accordance with the Decision
After the case is decided by the Regional Trial Court, any money paid to the court
by the defendant for purposes of the stay of execution shall be disposed of in accordance
with the provisions of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court.105

Section 20. Preliminary mandatory injunction in case of appeal. — Upon motion of the
plaintiff, within ten (10) days from the perfection of the appeal to the Regional Trial
Court, the latter may issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore the
plaintiff in possession if the court is satisfied that the defendant's appeal is frivolous or
dilatory or that the appeal of the plaintiff is prima facie meritorious. (9a)

Preliminary Injunction when case is on appeal to the RTC

(1) If the judgment of the MTC is appealed, the Regional Trial Court may issue a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore the plaintiff in his possession,
upon his motion which shall be filed within ten (10) days from the perfection of
appeal.
(2) The grant of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is predicated upon a
finding that the (a) defendant’s appeal is frivolous or dilatory, or (b) plaintiff’s
appeal is prima facie meritorious.106

Case Example of a Plaintiff’s Appeal found prima facie meritorious

Dayao vs Shell Company of the Phils. Ltd
(G.R. No. L-32475, April 30, 1980)

Facts: The CFI of Rizal issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction allowing the turn-
over of possession of a sub-leased property back to Shell from Dayao as a result of an

104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Riano, Civil Procedure Vol. II, p. 465

Page 51 of 116
ejectment case filed by the former. It is undisputed that Dayao failed and refused to vacate
the property after proper notice. He also allegedly violated the terms and agreements of
the sub-lease agreement as mentioned by Shell in its amended complaint.

Issue: Whether the CFI was correct in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction.

Ruling: The original complaint showed that Shell's cause of action was predicated on
Dayao's failure to vacate the premises after the lapse of the ninety day notice of
termination. In the amended complaint, Shell added Dayao's failure to comply with the
terms and conditions of the Sublease and Dealer Agreement. The decision discloses that
even during the trial, Shell had introduced evidence substantiating Dayao’s alleged
violation of the terms of their agreement. Dayao objected to its presentation but
nonetheless introduced proof in contra.

Under the foregoing circumstances, it cannot be successfully argued that respondent

Judge gravely abused his discretion when he admitted the Amended Complaint during the
pendency of the appeal. Under Sec 20 Rule 70, the Court has authority to issue a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction where a lessor's appeal is prima facie meritorious.

Section 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. —

The judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately
executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. (10a)

Decision of the RTC on appeal is immediately executory

Once the RTC decides on appeal, such decision, if against the defendant, is also
immediately executory, without prejudice to an appeal.107 The appeal shall be filed before
the Court of Appeals through a Petition for Review under Rule 42.

The decision of the RTC on appeal is immediately executory and can no longer be
stayed. Hence, the remedy would now be to ask for the issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction before the Court of Appeals.

107
Id.

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 APPENDIX A:
SUMMARY OF CASES UNDER RULE 62: INTERPLEADER
JOSE A. BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION
G.R. No. L-25138, August 28, 1969
Facts:
An interpleader suit was filed on August 21, 1962, by plaintiffs Jose Beltran, et al. in their
own behalf and in behalf of all residents of Project 4 in Quezon City, praying that the
People's Homesite & Housing Corporation (PHHC) and GSIS be compelled to litigate and
interplead between themselves their alleged conflicting claims involving said Project 4.
PHHC leased out housing units to plaintiffs in 1953. The lessees, paying monthly rentals
therefor, were assured by competent authority that after 5 years of continuous occupancy,
they would be entitled to purchase these units. In 1961, the PHHC announced that the
management, administration and ownership of Project 4 would be transferred to GSIS in
payment of PHHS debts to GSIS. PHHC also asked the tenants to signify their conformity
to buy the housing units at the selling price indicated on the back thereof, agreeing to
credit the tenants, as down payment on the selling price, 30% of what had been paid by
them as rentals. The tenants accepted the PHHC offer, and on March 27, 1961, the PHHC
announced in another circular that all payments made by the tenants after March 31, 1961
would be considered as amortizations or installment payments.
By the end of 1960, administration and ownership of Project 4 was turned over to GSIS.
PHHC, however, through its new Chairman-General Manager, Esmeraldo Eco, refused to
recognize all agreements previously entered into with GSIS, while GSIS insisted on its
legal rights to enforce the said agreements and was upheld in its contention by both the
Government Corporate Counsel and the Secretary of Justice.
Plaintiffs thus claimed that these conflicting claims between PHHC and GSIS caused them
great inconvenience and incalculable moral and material damage, as they did not know to
whom they should pay the monthly amortizations or payments.
TC: Designated the People's First Savings Bank, QC "to receive in trust the payments
from the plaintiffs on their monthly amortizations on PHHC lots and to be released only
upon proper authority of the Court."
PHHC and GSIS filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint of Beltran, et al. for failure to state
a cause of action as well as to lift the Court's order designating the People's First Savings
Bank as trustee to receive the tenants' payments on the PHHC lots.
TC granted the Motion, ruling that the counsel for GSIS ratified the allegations in his motion
and made of record that GSIS has no objection that payments on the monthly
amortizations be made directly to PHHC. There was thus no dispute as to whom the
residents pay and therefore no cause of action for interpleading. Counsel for defendants
went further to say that whatever dispute, if any, may exist between the two corporations
over the lots and buildings in Project 4, payments made to the PHHC will not and cannot
in any way affect or prejudice the rights of the residents thereof as they will be credited by
either of the two defendants.

Page 53 of 116
On appeal, plaintiffs claim that the trial Court erred in dismissing their suit, contending the
allegations in their complaint "raise questions of fact that can be established only by
answer and trial on the merits and not by a motion to dismiss heard by mere oral
manifestations in open court," and that they "do not know who, as between the GSIS and
the PHHC, is the right and lawful party to receive their monthly amortizations as would
eventually entitle them to a clear title to their dwelling units."
Issue:
Whether the dismissal of the complaint for interpleader was proper? YES.
Ruling:
Plaintiffs entirely missed the vital element of an action of interpleader. Rule 62, section 1
of the Revised Rules of Court requires as an indispensable element that "conflicting claims
upon the same subject matter are or may be made" against the plaintiff-in-interpleader
"who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in
part is not disputed by the claimants." While PHHC and GSIS may have conflicting
claims between themselves with regard to the management, administration and
ownership of Project 4, such conflicting claims are not against the plaintiffs nor do they
involve or affect the plaintiffs. No allegation is made in their complaint that any corporation
other than the PHHC which was the only entity privy to their lease-purchase agreement,
ever made on them any claim or demand for payment of the rentals or amortization
payments. The questions of fact raised in their complaint concerning the enforceability,
and recognition or non-enforceability and non-recognition of the turnover agreement of
December 27, 1961 between the two defendant corporations are irrelevant to their action
of interpleader, for these conflicting claims, loosely so-called, are between the two
corporations and not against plaintiffs. Both defendant corporations were in conformity
and had no dispute, as pointed out by the trial court that the monthly payments and
amortizations should be made directly to the PHHC alone.

Vda. De Camilo v. Arcamo

Facts:
Petitioner Petra had been in peaceful, open and adverse possession of a parcel of public
foreshore land situated in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur. A commercial building was
erected on said property and respondent Ong Peng Kee was a lessee of one of the
apartments of said commercial building. Bannister filed an unlawful detainer case against
both De Camilo and Kee but for his failure to appear at the trial, he was declared in default.
Petitioners Franciscos had also been in possession, peaceful, open and adverse of a
parcel of public foreshore land, adjoining that land occupied by De Camilo. On this parcel,
a commercial building was erected by the Franciscos. The two commercial buildings were
burned down. Two weeks thereafter, respondents Kee and Ong, constructed a building of
their own which was so built that portions of the lands previously occupied by petitioners
were encroached upon.
De Camilo filed a case for Forcible Entry against the respondents with respect to portion
belonging to her wherein the building of Kee was erected. The Franciscos filed a similar
case. The respondents claimed that the land where they constructed their building was
leased to them by the Municipality of Malangas. Pending trial of the two cases, the

Page 54 of 116
respondents filed a complaint for Interpleader against De Camilo, Estrada, the Franciscos,
Bannister, the Mayor and Treasurer of Malangas, alleging that the filing of the cases of
forcible entry, indicated that the defendants in the Interpleader had conflicting interests,
since they all claimed to be entitled to the possession of the lot in question and they (Kee
and Ong) could not determine without hazard to themselves who of defendants was
entitled to the possession.
ISSUE:
W/N interpleader suit is proper? Does the Justice of the Peace Court have jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the Interpleader case?
HELD: NO to both.
Petitioners instituted the present proceedings for certiorari and mandamus, against Justice
of peace Arcamo and herein respondents. They allege that Arcamo gravely abused his
discretion in giving due course to the complaint for interpleader, and that he unlawfully
neglected the performance of an act which was specifically enjoined by law, and for which
there was no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The CFI
ruled that Arcamo had no jurisdiction to try the case of interpleader.
Section 1, Rule 14 provides that an Interpleader is proper whenever conflicting claims
upon the same subject matter are or may be made against a person, who claims no
interest whatever in the subject-matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not
disputed by the claimants, such person may bring an action against the conflicting
claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves.
The petitioners did not have conflicting claims against the respondents. Their respective
claim was separate and distinct from the other. De Camilo only wanted the respondents
to vacate that portion of her property which was encroached upon by them when they
erected their building.
The same is true with Estrada and the Franciscos. They claimed possession of two
different parcels of land of different areas, adjoining each other. Furthermore, it is not true
that respondents did not have any interest in the subject matter. Their interest was the
prolongation of their occupancy or possession of the portions encroached upon by them.
It is, therefore, evident that the requirements for a complaint of Interpleader do not exist.
The complaint asking the petitioners to interplead, practically took the case out of the
jurisdiction of the JP court, because the action would then necessarily "involve the title to
or possession of real property or any interest therein" over which the CFI has original
jurisdiction. Then also, the subject matter of the interpleader would come under the original
jurisdiction of the CFI, because it would not be capable of pecuniary estimation, there
having been no showing that rentals were asked by the petitioners from respondents.

Arreza v. Diaz
FACTS:
Bliss Development Corporation is the owner of a housing complex located in Balara
Quezon City. It instituted an interpleader case against Arreza and Diaz who were
conflicting claimants of the property. the RTC ruled in favor of Arreza. In view of said
decision, Bliss executed a contract to sell the property to Arreza and Diaz was compelled
to transfer possession together with all improvements to Arreza.

Page 55 of 116
Thereafter, Diaz instituted a claim against Arreza and Bliss for the reimbursement of the
cost of the improvements which amounted to approximately 1.7 M inclusive of 8% interest.
Arreza filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata and lack of cause of action.
RTC dismissed the Motion to Dismiss and the Motion for Reconsideration of Arreza. This
prompted Arreza to file a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA dismissed the petition
saying that res judicata does not apply because the interpleader case only settled the
issue on who had a better right. It did not determine the parties‘ respective rights and
obligations.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the claim for reimbursement is barred by res judicata – YES

HELD:
An examination of the answer filed by Diaz showed that he asserted his status as a buyer
in good faith and for value and he prayed that affirmative relief arising out of the rights of
a buyer in good faith and for value be granted. This only means that Diaz expected that
the court shall award him damages in the form of reimbursement in case judgment is
rendered in favor of Arreza.
Diaz contends that in the pre-trial of the interpleader case, reimbursement and damages
was never put in issue. Thus it could not have been the subject of the interpleader and
consequently, not barred by res judicata. Diaz says it was incumbent on Arreza to include
the damages as an issue. The Supreme Court said that (1) it is not the duty of the petitioner
to do the lawyering against the respondent and (2) in a complaint for interpleader shall
determine the rights and obligations of the parties and adjudicate their respective claims.
Such rights, obligations, and claims could only be adjudicated if put forward by the
aggrieved party in assertion of his rights. That party in this case referred to respondent
Diaz. The second paragraph of Section 5 of Rule 62 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that the parties in an interpleader action may file counterclaims, cross-claims,
third party complaints and responsive pleadings thereto, "as provided by these Rules."
The second paragraph was added to Section 5 to expressly authorize the additional
pleadings and claims enumerated therein, in the interest of a complete adjudication of the
controversy and its incidents
Having failed to set up his claim for reimbursement, said claim of respondent Diaz being
in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim is now barred.

EDGAR H. ARREZA vs. MONTANO M. DIAZ, JR.

(G.R. No. 133113. August 30, 20015),

FACTS: Bliss Development Corporation is the owner of a housing complex located in

Balara Quezon City. It instituted an interpleader case against Arreza and Diaz who were
conflicting claimants of the property. The RTC ruled in favor of Arreza. In view of said
decision, Bliss executed a contract to sell the property to Arreza and Diaz was compelled
to transfer possession together with all improvements to Arreza.

Page 56 of 116
Thereafter, Diaz instituted a claim against Arreza and Bliss for the reimbursement of the
cost of the improvements, which amounted to approximately 1.7 M inclusive of 8%
interest. Arreza filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata and lack of cause
of action. RTC dismissed the Motion to Dismiss and the Motion for Reconsideration of
Arreza. This prompted Arreza to file a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA dismissed the
petition saying that res judicata does not apply because the interpleader case only settled
the issue on who had a better right. It did not determine the parties‘ respective rights and
obligations.

ISSUE: Whether or not Diaz can claim reimbursement. – NO.

HELD: In its assailed decision, respondent Court of Appeals pointed out that the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure provide that in a case for interpleader, the court shall determine
the respective rights and obligations of the parties and adjudicate their respective claims.
The appellate court noted, however, that the defendants in that interpleader case, namely
Diaz and Arreza, did not pursue the issue of damages and reimbursement although the
answer of respondent Diaz did pray for affirmative relief arising out of the rights of a buyer
in good faith.

Following the same tack, respondent Diaz now alleges that the issues in the prior case,
Civil Case No. 94-2086, were delimited by the pre-trial order which did not include matters
of damages and reimbursement as an issue. He faults petitioner for not raising such issues
in the prior case, with the result that the trial court did not resolve the rights and obligations
of the parties. There being no such resolution, no similar cause of action exists between
the prior case and the present case, according to respondent Diaz.

Respondent in effect argues that it was incumbent upon petitioner as a party in Civil Case
No. 94-2086 to put in issue respondents demands for reimbursement. However, it was not
petitioner's duty to do the lawyering for respondent. As stated by the Court of Appeals,
the court in a complaint for interpleader shall determine the rights and obligations
of the parties and adjudicate their respective claims. Such rights, obligations and
claims could only be adjudicated if put forward by the aggrieved party in assertion
of his rights. That party in this case referred to respondent Diaz. The second paragraph
of Section 5 of Rule 62 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the parties in
an interpleader action may file counterclaims, cross-claims, third party complaints and
responsive pleadings thereto, as provided by these Rules. The second paragraph was
added to Section 5 to expressly authorize the additional pleadings and claims enumerated
therein, in the interest of a complete adjudication of the controversy and its incidents.

Pursuant to said Rules, respondent should have filed his claims against petitioner Arreza
in the interpleader action. Having asserted his rights as a buyer in good faith in his answer,
and praying relief therefor, respondent Diaz should have crystallized his demand into
specific claims for reimbursement by petitioner Arreza. This he failed to do.

Page 57 of 116
 BANK OF COMMERCE vs. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK and BANGKO
SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS
G.R. Nos. 154470-71 September 24, 2012

FACTS: The Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) was the registered owner of
seven Central Bank (CB) bills with a total face value of P 70 million, issued on January 2,
1994 and would mature on January 2, 1995.2 As evidenced by a "Detached Assignment"
dated April 8, 1994,3

The RCBC sold these CB bills to the BOC.4 As evidenced by another "Detached
Assignment"5 of even date, the BOC, in turn, sold these CB bills to the PDB.6

The BOC delivered the Detached Assignments to the PDB.7

On April 15, 1994 (April 15 transaction), the PDB, in turn, sold to the BOC Treasury Bills
worth P 70 million, with maturity date of June 29, 1994, as evidenced by a Trading
Order8 and a Confirmation of Sale.9

However, instead of delivering the Treasury Bills, the PDB delivered the seven CB
bills to the BOC, as evidenced by a PDB Security Delivery Receipt, bearing a
"note: ** substitution in lieu of 06-29-94" – referring to the Treasury Bills.10

Nevertheless, the PDB retained possession of the Detached Assignments. It is

basically the nature of this April 15 transaction that the PDB and the BOC cannot agree
on.

The PDB essentially claims that in both the April 15 transaction (involving the first set of
CB bills) and the April 19 transaction (involving the second set of CB bills), there was no
intent on its part to transfer title of the CB bills, as shown by its non-issuance of a detached
assignment in favor of the BOC and Bancap, respectively. The PDB particularly alleges
that it merely "warehoused"31 the first set of CB bills with the BOC, as security collateral.

NOW, Bank of commerce and All Asia ARE IMPLEADEAD for the value of the
treasury bill.

On December 28, 1994, the RTC temporarily enjoined Nuqui and the BSP from paying
the face value of the CB bills on maturity.32 On January 10, 1995, the PDB filed an
Amended Petition, additionally impleading the BOC and All Asia.33

The BOC filed its Answer, praying for the dismissal of the petition. It argued that the PDB
has no cause of action against it since the PDB is no longer the owner of the CB
bills. Contrary to the PDB’s "warehousing theory,"38 the BOC asserted that the (i) April 15
transaction and the (ii) April 19 transaction – covering both sets of CB bills - were valid

Page 58 of 116
contracts of sale, followed by a transfer of title (i) to the BOC (in the April 15 transaction)
upon the PDB’s delivery of the 1st set of CB bills in substitution of the Treasury Bills the
PDB originally intended to sell, and (ii) to Bancap (in the April 19 transaction) upon the
PDB’s delivery of the 2nd set of CB bills to Bancap, likewise by way of substitution.

The BOC adds that Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28 cannot apply to the PDB’s case
because (i) the PDB is not in possession of the CB bills and (ii) the BOC acquired these
bills from the PDB, as to the 1st set of CB bills, and from Bancap, as to the 2nd set of CB
bills, in good faith and for value. The BOC also asserted a compulsory counterclaim for
damages and attorney’s fees.

PDB agrees that the various claimants should now interplead and substantiate their
respective claims on the subject CB bills. However, the total face value of the subject CB
bills should be deposited in escrow with a private bank to be disposed of only upon order
of the RTC.42

In May 2001, the PDB filed an Omnibus Motion,61 questioning the RTC’s jurisdiction over
the BOC’s "additional counterclaims." The PDB argues that its petitions pray for the BSP
(not the RTC) to determine who among the conflicting claimants to the CB bills stands in
the position of the bona fide holder for value. The RTC cannot entertain the BOC’s
counterclaim, regardless of its nature, because it is the BSP which has jurisdiction
to determine who is entitled to receive the proceeds of the CB bills.

Lastly, since Nuqui’s office (Government Securities Department) had already been
abolished,69 it can no longer adjudicate the dispute under the second situation covered by
CB Circular No. 28. The abolition of Nuqui’s office is not only consistent with the BSP’s
Charter but, more importantly, with CB Circular No. 769-80, which removed the BSP’s
adjudicative authority over fraudulent assignments.

The PDB claims that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint/petition
and not by the defenses set up in the answer.70 In filing the petition with the RTC, the PDB
merely seeks to compel the BSP to determine, pursuant to CB Circular No. 28, the party
legally entitled to the proceeds of the subject CB bills, which, as the PDB alleged, have
been transferred through fraudulent representations – an allegation which properly
recognized the BSP’s jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims of ownership over the CB
bills.

ISSUE: Whether or not BOC’s failure to pay the appropriate docket fees prevents the RTC
from acquiring jurisdiction over the BOC’s "counterclaims." - NO

HELD: The PDB argues that, even assuming that the RTC has jurisdiction over the issue
of ownership of the CB bills, the BOC’s failure to pay the appropriate docket fees prevents
the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction over the BOC’s "counterclaims."

Page 59 of 116
We disagree with the PDB.

To reiterate and recall, the order granting the "PDB’s motion to interplead," already
resulted in the dismissal of the PDB’s petition. The same order required the BOC to amend
its answer and for the conflicting claimants to comment, presumably to conform to the
nature of an answer-in interpleader. Perhaps, by reason of the BOC’s denomination of its
claim as a "compulsory counterclaim" and the PDB’s failure to fully appreciate the RTC’s
order granting the "BSP’s motion for interpleader" (with the PDB’s conformity), the PDB
mistakenly treated the BOC’s claim as a "permissive counterclaim" which necessitates the
payment of docket fees.

As the preceding discussions would show, however, the BOC’s "claim" - i.e., its assertion
of ownership over the CB bills – is in reality just that, a "claim" against the stakeholder and
not as a "counterclaim,"144 whether compulsory145 or permissive. It is only the BOC’s
alternative prayer (for the PDB to deliver to the BOC, as the buyer in the April 15
transaction and the ultimate successor-in-interest of the buyer in the April 19 transaction,
either the original subjects of the sales or the value thereof plus whatever income that may
have been earned pendente lite) and its prayer for damages that are obviously compulsory
counterclaims against the PDB and, therefore, does not require payment of docket fees.146

The PDB takes a contrary position through its insistence that a compulsory counterclaim
should be one where the presence of third parties, of whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction, is not required. It reasons out that since the RCBC and All Asia (the intervening
holders of the CB bills) have already been dropped from the case, then the BOC’s
counterclaim must only be permissive in nature and the BOC should have paid the correct
docket fees.

We see no reason to belabor this claim. Even if we gloss over the PDB’s own conformity
to the dropping of these entities as parties, the BOC correctly argues that a remedy is
provided under the Rules. Section 12, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court reads:
SEC. 12. Bringing new parties. – When the presence of parties other than those to the
original action is required for the granting of complete relief in the determination of a
counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order them to be brought in as defendants, if
jurisdiction over them can be obtained.

Even then, the strict characterization of the BOC’s counterclaim is no longer material in
disposing of the PDB’s argument based on non-payment of docket fees.

When an action is filed in court, the complaint must be accompanied by the payment of
the requisite docket and filing fees by the party seeking affirmative relief from the court. It
is the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, accompanied by the
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the claim
or the nature of the action.147 However, the non-payment of the docket fee at the time of
filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, so long as the fee is paid

Page 60 of 116
within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, especially when the claimant
demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment.148

In the present case, considering the lack of a clear guideline on the payment of docket fee
by the claimants in an interpleader suit, compounded by the unusual manner in which the
interpleader suit was initiated and the circumstances surrounding it, we surely cannot
deduce from the BOC’s mere failure to specify in its prayer the total amount of the CB bills
it lays claim to (or the value of the subjects of the sales in the April 15 and April 19
transactions, in its alternative prayer) an intention to defraud the government that would
warrant the dismissal of its claim.149

At any rate, regardless of the nature of the BOC’s "counterclaims," for purposes of
payment of filing fees, both the BOC and the PDB, properly as defendants-in-interpleader,
must be assessed the payment of the correct docket fee arising from their respective
claims. The seminal case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Judge Asuncion150 provides us
guidance in the payment of docket fees, to wit:
1. x x x Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time
but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
[underscoring ours]

This must be the rule considering that Section 7, Rule 62 of which reads:
SEC. 7. Docket and other lawful fees, costs and litigation expenses as liens. – The docket
and other lawful fees paid by the party who filed a complaint under this Rule, as well as
the costs and litigation expenses, shall constitute a lien or charge upon the subject matter
of the action, unless the court shall order otherwise.

only pertain to the docket and lawful fees to be paid by the one who initiated the
interpleader suit, and who, under the Rules, actually "claims no interest whatever in the
subject matter." By constituting a lien on the subject matter of the action, Section 7 in effect
only aims to actually compensate the complainant-in-interpleader, who happens to be the
stakeholder unfortunate enough to get caught in a legal crossfire between two or more
conflicting claimants, for the faultless trouble it found itself into. Since the defendants-in-
interpleader are actually the ones who make a claim - only that it was extraordinarily done
through the procedural device of interpleader - then to them devolves the duty to pay the
docket fees prescribed under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.151

The importance of paying the correct amount of docket fee cannot be overemphasized:
The matter of payment of docket fees is not a mere triviality. These fees are necessary to
defray court expenses in the handling of cases. Consequently, in order to avoid

Page 61 of 116
tremendous losses to the judiciary, and to the government as well, the payment of docket
fees cannot be made dependent on the outcome of the case, except when the claimant is
a pauper-litigant.152

Page 62 of 116
 APPENDIX B:
SUMMARY OF CASES UNDER RULE 70: FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL
DETAINER

Evangeline Calingasan and E. Rical Enterprises vs. Wilfredo Rivera, G.R. No.
171555, April 17, 2013
FACTS:

During their lifetime, respondent Wilfredo Rivera and his wife, Loreto Inciong,
acquired several parcels of land in Lipa City, Batangas, two of which were covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-22290 and T-30557. On July 29, 1982, Loreto
died, leaving Wilfredo and their two daughters, Evangeline and Brigida Liza, as her
surviving heirs.

About eleven (11) years later, or on March 29, 1993, Loreto’s heirs executed an
extrajudicial settlement of her one-half share of the conjugal estate, adjudicating all the
properties in favor of Evangeline and Brigida Liza; Wilfredo waived his rights to the
properties, with a reservation of his usufructuary rights during his lifetime. On September
23, 1993, the Register of Deeds of Lipa City, Batangas cancelled TCT Nos. T-22290 and
T-30557 and issued TCT Nos. T-87494 and T-87495 in the names of Evangeline and
Brigida Liza, with an annotation of Wilfredo’s usufructuary rights.

Wilfredo claimed that he lawfully possessed and occupied the two (2) parcels of
land located along C.M. Recto Avenue, Lipa City, Batangas, covered by TCT Nos. T-
87494 and T-87495, with a building used for his furniture business. Taking advantage of
his absence due to his hospital confinement in September 2002, the petitioners and Star
Honda, Inc. took possession and caused the renovation of the building on the property. In
December 2002, the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc., with the aid of armed men, barred
him from entering the property.

Both the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. countered that Wilfredo voluntarily
renounced his usufructuary rights in a petition for cancellation of usufructuary rights dated
March 4, 1996, and that another action between the same parties is pending with the RTC
of Lipa City, Branch 13

Page 63 of 116
ISSUE: What is meant by prior physical possession?

RULING:

Possession in ejectment cases “means nothing more than actual physical

possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in Civil Law.” In forcible entry
cases, “prior physical possession is the primary consideration.” "A party who can prove
prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever
may be the character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he
has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with a better right
lawfully ejects him.” The party in peaceable, quiet possession shall not be thrown out by
a strong hand, violence, or terror.

Spouses Baes vs. Lutheran Church, 570 Phil. 200 (2008)

FACTS:

On August 16, 1990, certain members of the Lutheran Church in the Philippines
(LCP) filed an action against its President, Thomas Batong, and six other members of the
Board of Directors, before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), for
accounting and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction and appointment of a
management committee. This resulted in the division of the LCP into two factions, namely:
the Batong/ Saguilayan group which includes herein petitioners and the Ladlad/Almazan
group which includes herein respondents Almazan, et al.
On October 16, 1992, the SEC issued a writ of preliminary injunction, which reads
as follows:
It is hereby ordered that you, the above-named respondents, your agents,
representative or any person acting for or under your instruction refrain from representing
yourselves or from acting as board of directors or officers of the Lutheran Church in the
Philippines, Inc. (LCP) and from holding any convention or general or special membership
meeting as well as election of the members of the LCP Board of Directors, until further
order from this Hearing Officer.

By virtue of said injunction, on August 13, 1993, herein respondents, with the aid
of certain members of the Department of Interior and Local Government, the Philippine

Page 64 of 116
National Police, and Sheriff Primo Alimurong of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Manila,
tried to dispossess petitioners, as previous clergymen and occupants of the residential
houses located at 4443 Old Sta. Mesa Street, Manila, owned by LCP and form part of the
compound where the principal office of LCP is located. Petitioners however refused to
leave the same. Thus, the main gate of the subject property was padlocked by
respondents, preventing the petitioners and their families from going in and out of said
place. Security guards were also stationed at the premises with an instruction not to allow
petitioners entry and exit.

ISSUE: What constitutes force?

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that the mere presence of armed security guards even
if there is yet no actual violence employed constitute force for purposes of the Rules.

The findings of Judge Habacon-Garayblas of MeTC Branch 7, Manila, that

respondents, together with several armed security guards, forcibly took possession of the
residential houses, occupied by petitioners, and evicted petitioners therefrom are also
entitled to great weight; the CA erred in allowing the respondents to belatedly raise the
defense that petitioners voluntarily vacated the subject premises because an appellant
can only include in his assignment of errors those questions of law or fact that have been
raised in the court below and which are within the issues framed by the parties; the CAs
findings that there was an absence of force and intimidation to dispossess petitioners
directly conflict with the findings of the RTC; the RTCs conclusions are consistent and find
basis in the original findings of Judge Habacon-Garayblas who actually heard and
received the evidence; the CA, in CA-G.R. SP No. 44333, held that petitioners offered no
resistance to their illegal eviction hence no force or intimidation was employed, but, there
is no necessity that the force offered or intended to be offered be resisted if the failure to
resist is due to intimidation or a well founded belief that resistance will be useless; the CA,
in CA-G.R. SP No. 44333, erred in ruling that petitioners are not entitled to attorneys fees
and reasonable compensation for the premises; the award of reasonable compensation
is warranted under Section 17, Rule 70 in forcible entry cases and irrespective of whether
the plaintiff is paying rents thereon or not; as ruled in Vazquez vs. Garcia which was cited

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in the RTC decision, the plaintiff steps into the shoes of the lessor and as such cannot
recover damages other than the reasonable value of the use and enjoyment of the
property.

Munoz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102693, September 23, 1992
FACTS:

This case has its origin from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by Nicolas P.
Garcia (herein respondent) on August 15, 1988 before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Masantol-Macabebe, Masantol, Pampanga. The complainant alleged that he is a co-
owner of an agricultural land identified as Lot No. 2790 of Subdivision Plan, Cad. 378-D,
Macabebe, Cadastre, situated in the Barrio of Caduang Tete (Saplad David) of the same
municipality; that he and his co-owners acquired the lot by succession from their deceased
father, Pedro B. Garcia who died on April 6, 1939; that the said lot is tenanted by Loreto
Garcia; that the defendants (herein petitioners) constructed their houses on a portion of
the lot without the knowledge and consent of the owners; that he sent letters of demand
on June 6, 1988 asking the defendants to remove their houses from the lot within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the letters and that despite the demands made by him, the
defendants refused to vacate their houses

In their answer, the defendants denied the allegations of Nicolas Garcia and
alleged that the tenant, Loreto Garcia is already deemed the owner of the land pursuant
to P.D. 27. The answering defendants also invoked the following alternative defenses,
among others: (1) lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Municipal Trial Court, the case
being an accion publiciana which is exclusively cognizable by the Regional Trial Court

ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint filed by the private respondent before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court was for the summary proceeding of forcible entry or unlawful detainer
or an accion publiciana.

HELD:

It is one for Accion Publiciana. The summary actions for unlawful detainer and
forcible entry may be distinguished from each other, as follows:

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 "a. In forcible entry, the possession of the land by the defendant is unlawful from
the beginning as he acquires possession thereof by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth: while in unlawful detainer, the possession of the defendant is inceptively lawful but
it becomes illegal by reason of the termination of his right to the possession of the property
under his contract with the plaintiff.
"b. In forcible entry, the law does not require a previous demand for the defendant
to vacate the premises; but in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff must first make such demand,
which is jurisdictional in nature.
"c. In forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior physical possession
of the premises until he was deprived thereof by the defendant; in unlawful detainer, the
plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession.
"d. In forcible entry, the one-year period is generally counted from the date of actual
entry on the land; in unlawful detainer, from the date of last demand.

The complaint subject of this case was captioned as "unlawful detainer." However,
the private respondent alleged therein that from the start, the possession of the petitioner
was unlawful as it was stated that the defendants have constructed their houses on the
questioned premises stealthily, that is, without the knowledge and consent of his co-
owners. This allegation clearly characterized the complaint as one for forcible entry and
not for unlawful detainer.

There was no mention in the complaint nor in the position paper of the private
respondent that he or his co-owners were in prior possession of the property. There was
an allegation that the property "is presently tenanted" but did not state when the tenant
started to possess the property. While it is true that possession of the tenant is possession
of the owner, the complaint failed to state that Loreta Garcia was in prior possession of
the property at the time of entry by the petitioners. And, while the complaint stated that the
petitioners obtained possession of the premises through stealth, it failed to aver when this
entry was accomplished or when the private respondent learned of such entry. The failure
of the private respondent to allege the time when unlawful deprivation took place is fatal
because this will determine the start of the counting of the one year period for the filing of
the summary action of forcible entry. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of
forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or

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how and when dispossession started, the action should either be accion publiciana or
reinvindicatoria in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)

Serdoncillo vs. Benolirao, G.R. No. 118328, October 8, 1998

FACTS:

The subject premises was formerly part of the estate of H. V. Ongsiako, comprising
of 1,806 square meters, more or less. The legal heirs of H.V. Ongsiako organized the
United Complex Realty and Trading Corporation (UCRTC) which subdivided the property
into fourteen (14) lots, Lots 555-A to 666-N. The subdivided lots were then offered for
sale with first priority to each of the tenants, including the private respondents and
petitioner.
Petitioner, who was occupying the western end and front portions of the aforesaid
lots declined the offer to purchase any of the lots offered for sale by UCRTC.[5]

Petitioner continued paying rentals to H.V. Ongsiako’s wife, Mrs. Rosario de

Jesus.

On May 5, 1989, UCRTC executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of private

respondents-spouses Benolirao for Lot 666-H.[7] This sale was annotated at the back of
UCRTC’s title on Lot 666-H .

On November 20, 1989, Serdoncillo instituted Civil Case No. 7749 for the Exercise
of Preferential Rights of First Refusal against UCRTC and private respondents-spouses
Fidel and Evelyn Benolirao praying for the annulment of sale of a portion of lot 666-H
sold to the Benolirao spouses on the ground that said transfer or conveyance is
illegal. She claimed that she has the preferred right to buy the said property and that the
same was not offered to her under the same terms and conditions, hence, it is null and
void.

On November 20, 1990, private respondents made their final demand on petitioner
reiterating their previous demands to vacate the property.[12] On December 13, 1990,
private respondents filed their complaint for recovery of possession of the subject
premises against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.

Page 68 of 116
 Petitioner argues that considering that based on the letter of demand dated
November 20, 1990, the action filed should have been unlawful detainer and not an action
for recovery of possession.

ISSUE: Is petitioner correct?

HELD:
NO. It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether or
not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. As
a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon
the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the
question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. [22] What
determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing
from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the
relief sought are the ones to be consulted.

In this regard, to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant
or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show such a
statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the
statutes provide a remedy, without resort to parol testimony, as these proceedings are
summary in nature.[25] In short, the jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the
complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria.
A reading of the averments of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7785 undisputably
show that plaintiffs (private respondents herein) clearly set up title to themselves as being
the absolute owner of the disputed premises by virtue of their transfer certificates of title
and pray that petitioner Serdoncillo be ejected therefrom. There is nothing in the
complaint in Civil Case No. 7785 alleging any of the means of dispossession that would
constitute forcible entry under Section (1) Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, nor is there any
assertion of defendant’s possession which was originally lawful but ceased to be so upon

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the expiration of the right to possess. It does not characterize petitioner’s alleged entry
into the land, that is, whether the same was legal or illegal nor the manner in which
petitioner was able to construct the house and the pig pens thereon. The complaint
merely avers that a portion of the lot owned by private respondents and its right of way
have been occupied by petitioner and that she should vacate. The action therefore is
neither one of forcible entry nor of unlawful detainer but essentially involves a dispute
relative to the ownership of 4.1 square meters of land allegedly encroached upon by
petitioner and its adjoining right of way.

Spouses Jose Dante and Luzviminda Palomar vs. Maria Sison, et. al., G.R. No.
82761, June 29, 1989

FACTS:

On January 23, 1987, the petitioners filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 35, a complaint for forcible entry against respondents Ophelia P.
Sison, Alejandro Sison, Amelita Sison, Carlos Davantes and Alan Pacadabin. They
alleged that they are residents of No. 21 J. Ponce St., Project 4, Quezon City, which the
respondents are also presently occupying; that they bought the subject premises on
January 7, 1987 from Josephine Pacadabin, the property's registered absolute owner; that
after the sale, when Josephine was moving her belongings from the subject premises, the
respondents forced their way inside the premises; that since then, the respondents,
despite demands, refused to vacate the said premises to the prejudice of the petitioners.

In June 1987, while the ejectment case was pending, the respondents filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, a complaint for annulment of sale and
damages against Josephine Pacadabin, the petitioners and John Doe "who might be the
new buyer of the premises after the filing of the complaint."

Upon motion of the respondents, however, the Regional Trial Court issued on
August 20, 1987 an order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction "enjoining the
defendants particularly the Honorable Judge Gregorio D. Dayrit from further conducting
proceedings in connection with the hearing of Civil Case No. 50730, entitled 'Sps. Jose
Dante and Luzviminda Palomar versus Ophelia P. Sison, et. al.', pending the

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determination and adjudication on the herein amended complaint, or until further orders
from this Court."

ISSUE: Whether or not the hearing of an ejectment case in the Municipal Trial Court may
be stayed by the pendency of an annulment of sale case, involving the same property,
subsequently filed with the Regional Trial Court.

HELD:

NO. In recent decisions of this Court, we have repeatedly held that the filing of an
action for reconveyance of title over the same property or for the annulment of the deed
of sale over the land does not divest the Municipal Trial Court of its jurisdiction to try the
forcible entry or unlawful detainer case before it. This is so because, while there may be
identity of parties and subject matter in the forcible entry case and the suit for annulment
of title and/or reconveyance, the rights asserted and the relief prayed for are not the same.

The respondents in ejectment proceedings cannot defeat the summary nature of

the action against them by simply filing an action questioning the ownership of the person
who is trying to eject them from the premises.

It is true that the respondents may suffer distressing consequences if ever they are
ejected only to be reinstated if they eventually win the annulment case. However, the same
would be true for the petitioners if the final outcome is in their favor. There is yet no final
decision in the annulment case and in the ejectment proceedings. Both parties, then, have
equal chances of winning the cases.

Wilmon Auto Supply Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 97637, April 10,
1992

FACTS:
Wilmon Auto Supply Corporation (or Ramon Que), Iloilo, Multi Parts Supply
Corporation (or Ramon Que), Virgilio Ang, Henry Tan, Southern Sales Corporation, and
Chang Liang, Jr. were lessees of a commercial building and bodegas standing on
registered land in Iloilo City owned in common by Lucy A. Solinap, Fr. Jerry R. Locsin,

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Lourdes C. Locsin, Manuel C. Locsin and Ester L. Jarantilla. 1 The leases were embodied
in uniformly worded deeds executed by the individual petitioners, as lessees.

On September 18, 1989, after the expiration of the period fixed in the lease
agreements, the lessors executed a public instrument entitled "Deed of Absolute Sale," 4 in
virtue of which they sold the leased property to Star Group Resources and Development
Inc. (hereafter, simply referred to as Star Group). The deed provided inter alia that the
"Vendee shall henceforth deal with the lessees and occupants of the properties herein
sold without any further warranty or obligation on the part of the Vendors."

On November 22, 1989, the buyer, Star Group, brought separate actions of
unlawful detainer in the Municipal Trial Court In Cities of Iloilo City against the lessees.

The lessees refused to concede, and indeed impugned, Star Group's right to eject
them. They argued that in so selling the properties and seeking their ejectment therefrom,
the lessors — and their buyer — had violated their leasehold rights because they (the
lessees) were not accorded the right of pre-emption. The same propositions were also set
out as causes of action in a complaint filed on December 1, 1989 by some of them —
Wilmon, Iloilo Multi Parts, Virgilio Ang et. al. in the RTC.

The lessees prayed for dismissal of the ejectment suits on the grounds of litis
pendentia (adverting no doubt to Civil Case No. 18931 instituted by them in the RTC) and
lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the actions.

ISSUE: Whether or not an action of unlawful detainer filed in the Municipal Trial Court
against a lessee — grounded on the expiration of the latter's lease — should be abated
or suspended by an action filed in the Regional Trial Court by the defendant lessee — on
the claim that he is entitled to a right of preemption (or prior purchase) of the premises in
question and wishes to have said right judicially enforced.

HELD:

NO. It is a question that is far from novel, one that has been passed upon and
resolved by this Court in numerous cases, and one to which a negative answer has
invariably been given. The relevant precedents are hereunder outlined.

Page 72 of 116
1. Injunction suits instituted in the RTC by defendants in ejectment actions in the
municipal trial courts or other courts of the first level.

2. An "accion publiciana" does not suspend an ejectment suit against the plaintiff in
the former.

3. A "writ of possession case" where ownership is concededly the principal issue

before the Regional Trial Court does not preclude nor bar the execution of the judgment
in an unlawful detainer suit where the only issue involved is the material possession or
possession de facto of the premises.

4. An action for quieting of title to property is not a bar to an ejectment suit involving
the same property.

5. Suits for specific performance with damages do not affect ejectment actions (e.g.,
to compel renewal of a lease contract).

6. An action for reformation of instrument (e.g., from deed of absolute sale to one of
sale with pacto de retro) does not suspend an ejectment suit between the same parties.

7. An action for reconveyance of property or "accion reivindicatoria" also has no

effect on ejectment suits regarding the same property.

8. Neither do suits for annulment of sale, or title, or document affecting property

operate to abate ejectment actions respecting the same property.

The underlying reasons for the above rulings were that the actions in the Regional
Trial Court did not involve physical or de facto possession and, on not a few occasions,
that the case in the Regional Trial Court was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the
ejectment proceeding, or that the issues presented in the former could quite as easily be
set up as defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved. This is especially true in
the cases at bar, where the petitioners-lessees' claims — that the lessors (and the buyer
of the leased premises) had violated their leasehold rights because (a) they (the lessees)
were not accorded the right of preemption, (b) the buyer was not required to respect their
leases, and (c) the lessees were denied the option to renew their leases upon the

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expiration thereof — constituted their causes of action in the suits commenced by them in
the Regional Court.
It may well be stressed in closing that as the law now stands, even when, in forcible
entry and lawful detainer cases, "the defendant raises the question of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding that issue
of ownership," the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial courts, and Municipal Trial
Courts nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve "the issue of ownership
. . . only to determine the issue of possession."

Spouses Dario Lacap vs. Jouvet Ong Lee, G.R. No. 142131, December 11, 2002

FACTS:

Before 1981, a certain Victor Facundo mortgaged two parcels of land and the
improvements thereon to Monte de Piedad Savings Bank (the bank, for brevity). In 1981,
herein petitioner spouses Dario and Matilde Lacap assumed to pay Facundo’s mortgage
obligation to the bank. Due to their failure to pay their obligation to the bank, however, the
latter foreclosed on the mortgage. During the auction sale, the bank emerged as the
highest bidder and title passed on to it.

The bank allowed the petitioner spouses to stay in the premises as lessees paying
a monthly rental of P800. The petitioner spouses introduced improvements thereon
allegedly amounting to some P500,000 after relying on the bank’s assurance that the
property would be sold back to them. On May 1, 1996[5], the petitioner spouses’
representative went to the bank to pay the monthly rental. However, the bank refused to
accept the rentals inasmuch as, according to the bank, the property had already been sold
to another person. On June 20, 1996, the petitioner spouses received a letter demanding
that they vacate the premises because it was already owned by herein respondent, Jouvet
Ong Lee.

The petitioner spouses instituted a civil case against the respondent for
cancellation of sale and damages with an application for preliminary injunction.

Meanwhile, on October 30, 1996, the respondent filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer against the petitioners. After trial, the Municipal Trial Court of Davao City which
rendered a decision in favour of respondent, Jouvet Ong Lee. RTC affirmed the MTC’s
decision.

Page 74 of 116
 Petitioner spouses argued that since they were questioning the title of the
respondent over the subject property, the case for unlawful detainer was no longer limited
to the question of possession but also involved the question of ownership. The petitioner
spouses are questioning the respondent’s ownership by raising as an issue the alleged
failure of the bank to first offer to them the subject property, thereby making respondent’s
title defective. This, according to the petitioner spouses, is a defense of ownership that
should have been resolved by the courts a quo.

ISSUE: WON the alleged violation of right of first refusal is a valid defense of ownership
which should be resolved by the MTC in the unlawful detainer case

HELD: NO. Section 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:

Sec. 16. Resolving defense of ownership.- When the defendant raises the defense
of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine
the issue of possession.

In the instant case, however, the petitioners admit that they do not own the subject
parcels of land. As third persons to the contract of sale between the bank and the
respondent, they are only questioning the validity of the transfer of title to respondent. The
same cannot qualify as a defense of ownership as they will not derive title as a
consequence but will, at best, only be given their disputed priority option to buy the subject
premises.

Another reason why the supposed issue of ownership cannot be ruled upon by the
courts a quo is due to the fact that the same issue is also the subject of a separate pending
case for cancellation of sale filed by the petitioners themselves against the respondent
before the Regional Trial Court Davao City. In effect, by questioning the ownership of
respondent, the petitioners are raising a defense that serves as the main cause of action
in the complaint for the cancellation of sale pending before another court. This legal
strategy is prohibited by the rule on the alleged litis pendencia. To ask the courts a quo to
rule on the alleged defense of ownership is to pre-empt the ruling of the RTC, Branch 13,
hearing the case for cancellation of sale. A party is prohibited from splitting his cause of
action for the reason that it will unnecessarily clog the court dockets, waste the time and

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money of the parties, and perpetrate an abuse of the legal system by filing cases of the
same nature in the hope of insuring a favorable judgment.

Thus, the ruling of the MTCC that petitioner spouses’ defense does not qualify as a
defense of ownership is correct.

Villena vs. Chavez, G.R. No. 148126, November 10, 2003

FACTS:

All the petitioners are members of the Bagong Silang Phase III-C Homeowners’
Association, Inc. The respondents allowed the petitioners and other members of the said
homeowners’ association to continue occupying the subject lots in Angeles City and
ultimately to acquire ownership of the lots occupied, in consideration of a certain amount
to be paid to the respondents as equity.

However, notwithstanding repeated demands made upon the petitioners, they

have refused and failed without any justifiable ground to pay their respective equity. In
view of such failure to pay, the petitioners have forfeited their right to continue occupying
the lots in question. Formal demand letters were already sent.

In addition, the petitioners alleged that they are qualified beneficiaries under
Republic Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of
1992; hence, they cannot be summarily evicted and their dwelling houses demolished
unless and until they have been relocated. According to the petitioners, they are also
builders in good faith and should be indemnified for the improvements they constructed
on the properties in question.

ISSUE: Whether or not ejectment is proper in the case

HELD: YES.

Contradictory were the statements of the appellate court that, on the one hand,
there was no contract between the parties; and yet, on the other, that petitioners failed to
pay the agreed equity. The fact that the CA found that there was failure to pay the equity
was an indication of an agreement. To be sure, petitioners’ possession of the subject
premises was not by mere tolerance of respondents.

Page 76 of 116
 In the Complaint of respondents, filed before Branch II of the Municipal Trial Court
of AngelesCity, they themselves alleged the presence of an agreement between the
parties as follows:

“10. That in consideration of a certain amount to be paid to the [respondents] by each of

the [petitioners] as equity for their right to continue occupying and ultimately acquire
ownership of the lots that they occupy, the said homeowners’ association has made
arrangements with the [respondents] to allow the [petitioners] and other members of the
said homeowners’ association to continue occupying and ultimately acquire ownership of
the lots that they occupy [.]”

Based on the admissions of respondents themselves, they entered into an

agreement with petitioners. Necessarily, the latter’s occupancy of the lots in question was
not based merely on the former’s tolerance or permission. Thus, petitioners were not
necessarily bound by an implied promise to vacate upon demand, failing which, a
summary action for ejectment would have become proper

Eduardo Lesaca vs. Judge Serafin Cuevas, 125 SCRA 78

FACTS:

Petitioner Eduardo M. Lesaca is the owner of the properties, both leased to

respondent, Tan Chun, on a month-to-month basis, payable in advance within the first five
days of each month, at the rate of P770.00 and P562.00 rentals per month respectively.
On April 15, 1974, Lesaca, through letters, increased the rate by 25%.

On May 12, 1975, the petitioner's counsel sent two letters to respondent, both stating that:

xxx xxx xxx

Our client further informed us that as of May 5, 1975, the scheduled date of monthly
rental payment for May, you have not complied with the above adjusted monthly
rental.

In the event that the above increased rental is not with your approval, you should
vacate the above-mentioned premises within the lst 15 days of the month of June,
1975, for our client is hereby terminating your month-to- month lease

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 effective May, 1975. This letter will therefore, serve as the demand to pay the
increased rental and/or to vacate said premises.

On June 25, 1975, the respondent paid but both payments were based on the old rates.

Hence, petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment, by which the court rendered
judgment ordering the respondent to vacate the premises in question and to pay increased
rentals beginning May, 1975 until he actually vacates said premises.

On appeal, the respondent contended that "the inferior court erred in assuming
jurisdiction over this case and/or in not holding that the present action for ejectment is
premature."

ISSUE: Whether or not the demand to vacate in this case is sufficient.

HELD:

Yes, demand in this case was sufficient. A lease contract "on a month-to-month
basis" provides for a definite period and may be terminated at the end of any month. (See
Rantael v. Court of Appeals, 97 SCRA 453; Cruz v. Puno, Jr., 120 SCRA 497). In the case
at bar, when respondent Tan Chun refused to pay the increased rentals for the month of
May, 1975, the lease contract was deemed terminated as of said month, not only because
of the letters sent to him by the petitioner informing him that the lease was to be terminated
effective May, 1975, but more so by his refusal to pay the increased rate while remaining
in the premises. In the case of Vda. de Kraut v. Lontok, 7 SCRA 281, we ruled:

... Considering that appellee was occupying the premises in question on a

month to month basis, it can not be denied that appellant had the right to
terminate the lease at the end of any month. The contract between the
parties herein must therefore be deemed terminated upon appellee's
refusal to pay the P60.00 monthly rental remanded by appellant which does
not appear to be exorbitant.

Similarly, in Bulahan, et al., v. Tuason, et al., 109 Phil, 251, we ruled:

Page 78 of 116
 .... The rule is settled that the owner of the land leased has the right not
only to terminate the lease at the expiration of the term, but also to demand
a new rate of rent. The tenant or lessee has the option either to accept the
new rent or vacate the premises. (Iturralde v. Alfonso, 7 Phil., 576; Iturralde
v. Evangelista, 7 Phil., 588; Iturralde v. Magcauas 9 Phil., 599; Cortez v.
Ramos, 46 Phil., 189). As plaintiffs, after the termination of their lease,
refused either to pay the new rent or to vacate the lot after the termination
of their lease, they have evidently become deforciants and can be ousted
judicially without the need of a demand. (Citing Co Tiamco v. Diaz, 75 Phil.
672; Art. 1669, new Civil-Code; reiterated in Gindoy v. Court of Appeals,
97 SCRA 453).

We distinguish the facts of this petition from the Vda. de Murga case, 25 SCRA 441, where
the Court applied the ruling in Manotok v. Guinto, 101 Phil. 383, as follows:

... We, however, do not find such notice (the alternative either to pay the
increased rental or otherwise to vacate the land) to be the demand
contemplated by the Rules of Court in "unlawful detainer"ases. When after
the notice the appellant elected to stay, he thereby merely assumed the
obligation of paying the new rental and could not be ejected until he
defaulted in said obligation and necessary demand was first made.

Such was the ruling in Vda. de Murga because in said case, the lease contract provided
that upon its expiration, the lessor had the option to purchase the improvements
introduced by the lessee on the leased premises; but in the event that the lessor did not
exercise such option, then the contract was automatically renewed. Therefore, the court
correctly ruled that a more definite demand Locate was necessary to give the lessor the
right to object the lessee from the premises. However, in the present case, the petitioner
had the right to terminate the lease at the end of every month as he did so in May, 1975,
when the lessee refused to pay the increased rentals. The lessee, therefore, had the
alternative but to vacate the premises and his refusal made him a deforciant who could be
ousted judicially without the need of the rylore specific demand he insists upon,
Furthermore, even assuming that there was a need for such a demand in the instant
case, we believe that the alternative demand to pay the increased rental or to vacate
the premises is sufficient under the law to enable the lessor to bring an ejectment

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case because as stated earlier, the lessee lost all his rights to remain in the
premises upon the expiration of the lease contract in May, 1975. There is, therefore,
no need for a more definite and unconditional demand to vacate as he had no legal
right to remain in the premises.

Javellosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124292, December 10, 1996

FACTS:

Private respondents alleged in their complaint that they are the registered owners
of the subject land and therefore, entitled to possession thereof; that petitioners were
illegally occupying the premises without their consent and thus unlawfully withholding
possession from them; and, despite receipt of their demand to vacate the premises,
petitioner refused to leave the property. On the face of the complaint, it also appears that
private respondents were seeking to recover merely the physical possession or posession
de facto of the subject land. Private respondents did not allege the incidents respecting
the mortgage of the land and the pending RTC case questioning the mortgage contract
as the issue involved therein is ownership which has no place in an ejectment case. In
fine, the allegations in the complaint make out a case for unlawful detainer.

ISSUE: Whether the allegations in the complaint constitute an action for forcible entry or
one of unlawful detainer

HELD:

Again, it is settled that prior physical possession is indispensable only in actions

for forcible entry but not in unlawful detainer. Since we have ruled that MTC case filed
against petitioner is one for unlawful detainer, petitioner’s prior possession of the land is
of no moment. Private respondents are entitled to its possession from the time title was
issued in their favor as registered owners. An action for unlawful detainer may be filed
when possession by a landlord, vendor, vendee or other person against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination
of their right to hold possession, by virtue of a contract, express or implied.

The mortgagee (predecessor-in-interest of private respondents) was able to consolidate

his ownership over the foreclosed land, cause the cancellation of title in the name of
petitioner-mortgagor and the issuance of a new title in his own name. It was this title that
he passed on to his daughters, private respondents herein. As aforestated, a restraining
order was issued by the RTC where the case for annulment of foreclosure sale is pending
after the mortgagee had consolidated his ownership over the land, hence, private
respondents were left with no choice but to file a separate and independent action for
unlawful detainer to recover physical possession of the property.

Page 80 of 116
We find that private respondents have adequately proved that they are entitled to possess
the subject land as the registered owners thereof. The age-old rule is that the person who
has a torrens title over a land is entitled to possession thereof. Except for the bare claim
that the title of private respondents was obtained in bad faith, petitioner has pointed to no
right to justify his continued possession of the subject property.

Caezar Lanuza and Asteria Lanuza vs. Ma. Consuelo Munoz, G.R. No. 147372, May
27, 2004

FACTS:

This is a case of unlawful detainer filed by the respondent against petitioner. In her
Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against herein petitioner-spouses Caezar and Asteria
Lanuza before the MTC of Muntinlupa City, herein respondent Ma. Consuelo Muñoz
claimed that she was the owner of a parcel of land located in Alabang, Muntinlupa, as
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 207017, together with the nine-door
apartment built on said parcel. She said she acquired the lot in 1996 from petitioners by
virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale. Muñoz as plaintiff below likewise averred that:

1. At the time plaintiff acquired the said property on August 7, 1996, defendants [Caezar
and Asteria Lanuza] are occupying door no. 2 and in possession of door no. 3 thereof and
plaintiff tolerated the same until January 1997 when said tolerance was withdrawn with
plaintiff demanding that as a condition to their continued stay therein, they would have to
pay rentals starting February 1997 at the rate of P5,000.00 for door no. 2 andP6,000.00
for door no. 3;

2. Defendants had not paid a signle [sic] centavo of the amounts being demanded nor did
they vacate the premises despite demands;

3. The failure and refusal of the defendants to vacate despite the cessation of their right
to occupy the same and their failure to pay the rentals being demanded despite demands
compelled plaintiff to litigate and to engaged [sic] the services of undersigned
for P15,000.00 as attorney’s fee and will expose her to incur litigation expenses estimated
to be not less than P15,000.00.6

In their Answer, the Lanuzas alleged that they are the lawful owners of the property
in question. They denied selling it to Muñoz. They also claimed that it was Francisco

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Muñoz, Sr., the respondent’s father, who persuaded them to sign an Absolute Deed of
Sale on August 7, 1996, purportedly in order to expedite the sale of the property as
previously agreed upon between herein petitioners and Francisco Muñoz, Sr., on August
6, 1996. Under this agreement, the property would be sold once the apartment was
repaired and remodeled, with the profits divided into three portions, after deducting the
renovation and improvement expenses amounting to P3.5 million, which was shouldered
by Francisco Muñoz, Sr.

ISSUE: When is Section 2of Rule 70 applicable?

Exception to the Demand to Vacate rule.

RULING:

An examination of Section 2, Rule 70, readily shows that the rule is applicable only
where there is a lessor-lessee relationship under a lease contract, which does not exist in
this case. Further, the rule applies only in instances where the grounds relied upon for
ejectment is non-payment of rentals or violation of the conditions of the lease, as the case
may be. In those cited situations, notice to vacate is crucial. A demand is a pre-requisite
to an action for unlawful detainer, when the action is based on "failure to pay rent due or
to comply with the conditions of his lease," but not where the action is to terminate the
lease because of the expiration of its term.

Demand is a prerequisite to an action for unlawful detain detainer when it is for

failure to pay rent due or to comply with the conditions of the lease and not where the
action is to terminate the lease because of the expiration of its term.

However, this exception is applicable only where there is lessor-lessee relationship and
where the grounds relied upon for ejectment is non-payment of rentals or violation of the
conditions of the lease. Hence, there is no need to allege prior demand where the cause
of action is cessation of tolerance and not to pay rentals on the property.

Page 82 of 116
 La Campana Food Products vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS:

On February 15, 1982, petitioner La Campana Food Products, Inc. leased a

building and lot in Quezon City to private respondent Cascade Commercial Corporation
for a period of 4 years beginning March 1, 1982. 1

On January 22, 1986, cascade received a demand letter 2 from the lessor reading in part
as follows:

In this connection, demands are hereby repeated again made to you for the full
payment of your above rentals in arrears and unpaid water bill in the total sum of
P73,902.00 within a period of three (3) days from your receipt hereof, other wise
upon your failure, we may forward this matter to our legal counsel for proper action
thereof.

On February 19, 1986, La Campana filed against Cascade a complaint for ejectment with
preliminary attachment in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.

ISSUE: Whether or not the demand to vacate in this case is sufficient.

HELD:

No. Demand to vacate in this case was insufficient. The January 20, 1986 letter
of La Campana to Cascade, however, is rather ambiguous. It warned that upon failure of
Cascade to pay the rentals and unpaid water bill, "We may forward this matter to our legal
counsel for proper action thereof." We do not see in this statement an unequivocal or even
an implied demand on the defendant to vacate the leased premises. The doctrine covered
in the Golden Gate case is therefore not applicable.

Page 83 of 116
 Spouses Marciano Bandoy and Segundina Bandoy vs. Court of Appeals and
Domingo Empaynado

FACTS:

Spouses Marciano and Segundina Bandoy herein petitioners, were lessees of a

residential house and lot owned by the University of the Philippines. Sometime in April
1984, petitioners sublet certain spaces of the property to Eduardo Empaynado, herein
private respondent, for a monthly rental of P550.00. Empaynado failed to pay the rental
for the month of July, 1985. Upon demand by petitioners, Empaynado still failed and
refused to pay.

Petitioners brought the matter to the office of the barangay captain for settlement,
but to no avail. On November 26, 1985, petitioners filed a complaint for ejectment against
Empaynado and attached thereto the certification to file action issued by the barangay
captain.

ISSUE: Whether or not certification issued by the office of the barangay captain sufficient
to constitute demand to vacate.

HELD:

No, certification issued by the office of the barangay captain is not sufficient to
constitute demand to vacate.

It is not disputed that the complaint contains no allegation that there was a prior
demand to vacate made by the petitioners upon private respondent. It is a settled rule that
"where the complaint contains no allegation that a demand had been made upon the
defendant to vacate the premises but only an allegation that a demand was made for
payment of the rentals agreed upon, it is held that such allegation is insufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon a justice of the peace court" (Casilan vs. Tomassi, et al., 10 SCRA 261,
264; Santos vs. Vivas, 96 Phil. 538, 540). The certification issued by the office of the
barangay captain is not conclusive as to the jurisdiction of the court to which the case was
subsequently filed. What was certified by the barangay captain was that no settlement
was reached by the parties in the barangay level. It did not certify that all the requisites for
the filing of an unlawful detainer case had been complied with.

Page 84 of 116
 In the case of Co Tiamco vs. Diaz, L-7, January 22, 1946 (75 Phil. 672), relied
upon by petitioners, there was no allegation in the complaint that a notice to quit or vacate
was made upon the defendants. However, during the presentation of evidence, plaintiffs
offered Exhibit "A" as evidence, which is a notice to quit alleged to have been served upon
defendants prior to the filing of the action. This was objected to by the defendants and the
objection was sustained by the trial court. The defendants filed with the Court of First
Instance a petition for mandamus to compel the municipal court judge to admit Exhibit "A".
By virtue of a writ of mandamus issued by the Court of First Instance, the evidence was
admitted. In that case, it was held that:

Even supposing without conceding, that the complaint is deficient (in not alleging
the notice to quit) the deficiency was cured by the evidence. (P. 679, supra)

But, the above case of Co Tiamco cannot be applied in this case. In the Co
Tiamco case, it was proven that there was indeed a notice to quit or demand to vacate
served upon the defendants. The notice to vacate was offered and admitted in evidence.
In the case at bar, the complaint was defective because of its failure to allege that there
was a prior demand to vacate. The defect was not cured because no evidence of a prior
demand to vacate was presented in the trial court. The affidavit of Empaynado relied upon
by the trial judge to the effect that: "na ako ang tinutukoy ni Marciano Tamis Bandoy dahil
di umano'y sa di magandang asal namin na gusto niyang paalisin sa kanyang extension",
does not prove that the spouses demanded that he vacate the premises. What
Empaynado admitted in the said affidavit was that the spouses intended to expel him out
of the premises ("gusto niyang paalisin') but has not actually or definitely demanded that
he vacate the premises. An intention to oust is different from an actually or definitely
demanded to vacate. It is the latter which confers jurisdiction upon the municipal court.

JESUS DELA ROSA and LUCILA DELA ROSA, petitioners, vs. SANTIAGO
CARLOS and TEOFILA PACHECO, respondents.
G.R. No. 147549. October 23, 2003

FACTS: A complaint for forcible entry filed by Spouses Dela Rosa against Santiago and
Teofila with the Municipal Trial Court of Paombong, Bulacan.
In their complaint, the Spouses Dela Rosa alleged that they are the owners of a
house and lot. The Spouses Dela Rosa claimed that Leonardo Carlos transferred to them

Page 85 of 116
the ownership of the Property under the Deed of Sale executed on 1 September 1966.
The Spouses Dela Rosa registered the Deed of Sale with the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan. The Spouses Dela Rosa asserted that they renovated the house, furnished and
occupied the same from 1966 to the present. Since the Spouses Dela Rosa work and
their children study in Manila, they reside in the Property only during weekends and
holidays. However, they padlock the house on the Property while they are away and
instruct relatives who live nearby to watch over the Property.
The Spouses Dela Rosa also asserted that in October 1997, they discovered that,
through stealth and without their knowledge and consent, Santiago had built a house of
strong materials on a vacant lot of the Property. Teofila had also been transferring furniture
to the house and sleeping there. The Spouses Dela Rosa, through their counsel,
demanded that Santiago and Teofila demolish the house, remove their furniture and
vacate the premises. However, Santiago and Teofila did not heed the Spouses Dela
Rosa’s demand.
In their answer, Santiago and Teofila alleged that they are the surviving heirs of
the Spouses Carlos. They contended that the Spouses Dela Rosa obtained the Deed of
Sale through fraud and undue influence and that their mother did not consent to the sale
of the Property which they claimed as conjugal.
After submission of the parties’ position papers, the MTC rendered a decision in
favor of Spouses dela Rosa. RTC affirmed the decision of MTC. The CA reversed and set
aside the decision of the lower court.
The CA noted that Spouses Dela Rosa’s position paper did not attach the affidavits
of witnesses required under Section 10 of Rule 70. It further ruled that the Spouses Dela
Rosa failed to prove prior possession of the Property. The appellate court pointed out that
instead of proving prior possession, the Spouses Dela Rosa admitted the contrary. The
Court of Appeals also held that the Spouses Dela Rosa did not verify their complaint in
violation of Section 4 of Rule 70.

ISSUE: W/N the verified position paper constitutes the affidavit of witnesses required
under Rule 70, Section 10.

RULING: The Spouses Dela Rosa jointly verified their position paper by stating that all the
allegations in the position paper are true and correct of their “own personal knowledge.
The verification itself is an affidavit. Section 4 of Rule 7 states that a “pleading is verified

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by an affidavit.” Thus, the verified position paper constitutes the affidavit of witnesses
required under Rule 70. Certainly, the Spouses Dela Rosa qualify as witnesses to their
own complaint. While there are no affidavits of other witnesses that support the complaint,
the Spouses Dela Rosa attached to their position paper documentary evidence that bolster
their claim of prior possession.
Santiago and Teofila never raised as an issue the alleged non-attachment to the complaint
of affidavits of witnesses, either in the MTC or in the RTC. In their petition for review
before the Court of Appeals, Santiago and Teofila did not also raise this issue. The MTC
and RTC apparently understood correctly that the verified complaint of the Spouses Dela
Rosa constitutes the affidavit of witnesses required under Rule 70. We rule that the Court
of Appeals erred in holding that the Spouses Dela Rosa failed to attach to their complaint
the affidavits required in Sections 10 and 14 of Rule 70.

DAY v. RTC OF ZAMBOANGA CITY BR. XIII

G.R. No. 79119
November 22, 1990

FACTS: Go Chu is the owner of a building constructed on a parcel of land owned by

Victorino Day. Day asked Chu to peacefully vacate and remove that portion of the latter’s
building standing on the latter’s lot. But due to Chu’s adamant and continued refusal to
vacate the disputed lot, Day filed on March 25, 1985 an action for unlawful detainer with
application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner Day. On April 23, 1986,
Chu filed an original action for certiorari with respondent court, against Judge Cabato and
Day. Pending hearing of the application for preliminary injunction, respondent court issued
a temporary restraining order in the case.
On May 27, 1986, respondent court issued an order resolving all the matters and
issues in the petition in favor of herein petitioner Day. The application for preliminary
injunction was likewise denied and the hearing of the main petition was set on June 24,
1986. On July 8, 1986, however, respondent court issued another order granting the
petition for certiorari and setting aside the decision of Judge Cabato of the Municipal Trial
Court.

Page 87 of 116
ISSUE: Whether or not B.P. 129 allows the plaintiff in an unlawful detainer case to apply
for a writ of preliminary injunction.

HELD: Yes. Section 33 of B.P. 129 allows the plaintiff in an unlawful detainer action to
apply for a writ of preliminary injunction. With the advent of B.P. 129, Art. 539 of the New
Civil Code, Sec. 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, and Sec. 3, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
have been substantially modified. B.P. 129 provides: "provided the main action is within
its jurisdiction, an inferior court can appoint a receiver and it has jurisdiction to issue a writ
of preliminary injunction in either forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases." (Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, Second Revised Edition, p. 33). "Under the present law, an
inferior court has jurisdiction to grant provisional remedies in proper cases. These proper
cases would be:

1) Preliminary attachment under Rule 57, provided the principal action is within its
jurisdiction such as an action for recovery of personal property valued at not more than
P20,000.00; an action for recovery of a sum of money not exceeding P20,000.00; an
action of forcible entry and unlawful detainer.

2) Preliminary injunction under Rule 58 in both forcible entry and unlawful detainer also in
cases mentioned in the preceding paragraph." (Dean Jose Y. Feria, Phil. Legal Studies,
Series No. 1, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, 1981 edition, pp. 43-44.)

PALMA GIL vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO H. LOPEZ, JR.

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1453
April 29, 2003

FACTS: This administrative complaint originated from a Civil Case for Forcible Entry and
Damages with Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction filed by Carlos Palen, Sr.
against Editha Palma Gil. In the said case, plaintiff filed a motion for temporary restraining
order which respondent Judge Francisco H. Lopez, Jr. of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of Lupon, Davao Oriental granted on the same day. Editha assails the Order of the Judge
for violating Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure due to lack of verification, bond,
and service of summons.

Page 88 of 116
ISSUE: WON the issuance of TRO was proper.

HELD: NO. Respondent judge likewise erred in issuing the temporary restraining order.
The records reveal that the motion for temporary restraining order was not
verified. Respondent judge issued the Order on the same date when the motion was filed
without prior notice to the complainant and without a hearing. The issuance of the assailed
Order cannot be justified under Rule 58, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Aside from the lack of verification of the motion, no affidavits of the applicant and
his witnesses were appended thereto. Furthermore, the assailed Order did not specify
the duration of the temporary restraining order.
Respondent argues that considering that the complaint in Civil Case No. 1110 was
verified and prayed for the issuance of a preliminary and prohibitory injunction, the
verification of the motion for issuance of temporary restraining order may be dispensed
with. We do not agree.

The Rules explicitly mandate that the application for injunction should be
verified. While litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly administration of justice.

MA. TERESA D. COLUMBRES vs. JUDGE ANICETO L. MADRONIO

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1461
March 31, 2005

FACTS: Lucille S. Columbres filed a complaint for forcible entry with damages (Civil Case
No. 1014 (SJ-99) before the MCTC of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan then presided
by Judge Madronio, against her stepdaughter, Ma. Teresa, who by means of force,
strategy and stealth unlawfully entered the former’s premises and carted away personal
belongings and goods found in her store.
Ma. Teresa refused to vacate the premises despite demands. This prompted
Lucille to file a Motion For Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction so that she may be
restored to the possession of the premises in question.
On December 16, 1999, Judge Madronio issued a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction against Ma. Teresa.

Page 89 of 116
 Ma. Teresa contends that the motion of Lucille was filed out of time under Section
15, Rule 70 and that the same was not verified, contrary to the requirement of Section 4,
Rule 58, of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: WON there was violation of Section 15, Rule 70 and Section 4, Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court.

HELD: YES.

Section 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibits the grant of

preliminary injunction without hearing and prior notice to the party or person
sought to be enjoined. But courts are authorized to issue ex-parte a temporary
restraining order (TRO) if it should appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified
petition that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter could
be heard on notice. The TRO, however, shall be effective only for a period of twenty (20)
days from notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. During the 20-day period,
the judge must conduct a hearing to consider the propriety of issuing a preliminary
injunction. At the end of such period, the TRO automatically terminates without need of
any judicial declaration to that effect, leaving the court no discretion to extend the same.
In Civil Case No. 1014 (SJ-99), the plaintiff filed her motion for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction twelve (12) days after the complaint for forcible
entry was filed. Opposed by defendant Ma. Teresa, the plaintiff again filed an ex-parte
and urgent motion for the issuance of the writ. Without conducting a hearing within the
time prescribed by law, respondent judge granted the motion based merely on the
allegations in the application therefor and the opposition thereto. Thus, no opportunity
was given both parties to be heard and to introduce evidence on the propriety for the
issuance of the injunctive writ.
We also take note of the fact that the motion for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction was belatedly filed, in contravention of Rule 70, Section 15 of the Rules
of Court which explicitly mandates that the application for injunction must be filed
within 5 days from the filing of the complaint. While litigation is not a game of
technicalities, every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to insure an orderly administration of justice.

Page 90 of 116
 REFUGIA v. CA
G.R. No. 118284
July 5, 1996

FACTS: private respondent-spouses Arturo Refugia and Aurora Timbang-Refugia are the
registered owners of a parcel of land and a duplex apartment building constructed thereon.
The petitioners occupied one door while respondents stayed in the other unit.
In February 1993, petitioners were told by private respondents to vacate the unit
occupied by them. Petitioners refused to leave. Because of this, the matter was brought
before the barangay court of conciliation. No amicable settlement having been reached
between the parties, private respondents instituted an action for ejectment on October 20,
1993 in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 81.
On March 4, 1994, the MTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint for
ejectment based on its finding that herein petitioners are the lawful occupants of the
premises.
On appeal, the RTC of Valenzuela, Branch 172 affirmed with modification the judgment of
the lower court by declaring herein petitioners and private respondents co-owners of the
lot and the two-door apartment.
However, on December 9, 1994, the CA reversed and set aside the decisions of
the MTC and RTC declaring that the RTC, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over
an ejectment case, had no authority to resolve the issue of ownership and to declare
herein petitioners as co-owners because its power is limited only to a determination of the
issue of possession, among others.
ISSUE: WON the Metropolitan Trial Court, as well as the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, have jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership in
an action for unlawful detainer where the issue of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the question of ownership

HELD: YES.
As the law on forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases now stands, even where
the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts nevertheless have

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the undoubted competence to resolve the issue of ownership albeit only to determine the
issue of possession.[16]
At the outset, it must here be stressed that the resolution of this particular issue
concerns and applies only to forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases where the issue
of possession is intimately intertwined with the issue of ownership. It finds no proper
application where it is otherwise, that is, where ownership is not in issue, or where the
principal and main issue raised in the allegations of the complaint as well as the relief
prayed for make out not a case for ejectment but one for recovery of ownership.
After due deliberation, we find and so hold that by virtue of the express mandate
set forth in Section 33(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, inferior courts have jurisdiction to
resolve the question of ownership raised as an incident in an ejectment case where a
determination thereof is necessary for a proper and complete adjudication of the issue of
possession.

Hilario vs. CA
G.R. No. 121865
August 7, 1996

FACTS: Sps. Cesar and Antonia Hilario purchased a house and lot in from the spouses
Rosauro Palileo and Josefina Anastacio by virtue of a deed of sale with right to repurchase
the property within one year from said date.
The Hilarios further allowed private respondents to remain in possession of the
premises on the verbal understanding that the latter would vacate the same after two years
from the date of the sale. Said period passed without private respondents complying
therewith, even after several demands by the Hilarios, hence a complaint for unlawful
detainer was instituted by herein petitioners on August 12, 1993.
Private respondents alleged that the purported deed of sale between them and the
Hilarios was in fact a deed of mortgage and that their corresponding obligation had been
extinguished by payment of the sum of P165,000.00 therefor. They likewise impugned
the jurisdiction of the inferior court over the controversy.
ISSUE: WON the MTC can take cognizance of the ejectment case.
HELD: YES.
Thus, an adjudication made therein regarding the issue of ownership should be
regarded as merely provisional and, therefore, would not bar or prejudice an action

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between the same parties involving title to the land.[6] The foregoing doctrine is a
necessary consequence of the nature of forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases where
the only issue to be settled is the physical or material possession over the real property,
that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure.[7]
It is underscored, however, that the allegations in the complaint for ejectment
should sufficiently make out a case for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as the case may
be; otherwise, jurisdiction would not vest in the inferior court.[9] Jurisdiction over the subject
matter is, after all, determined by the nature of the action as alleged or pleaded in the
complaint. Thus, even where the defendant alleges ownership or title to the property in
his or her answer, the inferior court will not be divested of its jurisdiction.[10] A contrary rule
would pave the way for the defendant to trifle with the ejectment suit, which is summary in
nature, as he could easily defeat the same through the simple expedient of asserting
ownership.
In the case at bar, the submission of private respondents could not prosper, both
under the rule that the inferior courts have the undoubted competence to resolve the issue
of ownership provisionally, and on the well-grounded principle that jurisdiction is
determined by the allegations in the complaint. Indeed, while private respondents did
raise the question of ownership when they asserted that the contract of sale was in fact
one of mortgage, the municipal trial court could not be divested of its jurisdiction over the
case since, to repeat, it could very well resolve that particular issue albeit provisionally, as
what happened in this case.

DELA ROSA v. ROLDAN

G.R. No. 133882
September 5, 2006

FACTS: Spouses Rivera sold their two parcels of land to spouses Arsenio Dulay and
Asuncion dela Rosa. Thereafter, the spouses Dulay took possession of the lots, except a
500-square-meter portion which was then occupied by Gideon dela Rosa and his wife
Angela and the portion where the house of Corazon Medina stood. Sometime in 1982, the
spouses Dulay made demands on Gideon, Angela and Corazon to vacate the premises.
Angela and Corazon refused to do so, prompting the spouses to file a complaint for
recovery of possession (accion publiciana) against them with the then CFI of Tarlac. The

Page 93 of 116
spouses Dulay prayed that defendants be evicted from the property and be required to
pay reasonable compensation for their use of the premises.

The CFI rendered judgment in favor of the spouses Dulay and ordered the spouses
Dela Rosa and Corazon Medina to vacate the property and turn over possession to
plaintiff. On appeal, the CA rendered judgment granting the appeal and reversed the trial
court's ruling.
On January 29, 1996, Arsenio and his children, as plaintiffs, filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer against Corazon and Angela, as defendants, in the MTC of Tarlac,
Tarlac. Plaintiffs alleged the following:
On September 25, 1996, the MTC rendered judgment in favor of Corazon and
Angela and ordered the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.20 The court held that the issue between the parties was one of ownership and
not merely possession de facto. Thus, the possession of the property by defendants was
not by mere tolerance, but by virtue of a claim of ownership; in fact, defendants never
recognized the plaintiffs' claim of ownership over the property. In ruling against Arsenio
and his children, the trial court relied on their pleadings. It declared that, although the CA
reversed the decision of the CFI in Tarlac, the facts show that the dispute between the
parties constitutes possession de jure; the action of the spouses Dulay in Civil Case No.
6261 which was an accion publiciana cannot be converted into one for unlawful detainer
in Civil Case No. 6089.
On June 25, 1997, RTC reversed the decision of the MTC and ordered the eviction
of defendants, holding that the issue was the entitlement to the physical possession de
facto of the property, an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC; 22 in contrast,
the issue between the parties in Civil Case No. 6261 was possession de jure and not
possession de facto. CA affirmed RTC Decision.

ISSUE: WON the MTC had jurisdiction over the complaint for unlawful detainer.

HELD
It is settled jurisprudence that what determines the nature of an action as well as
which court or body has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought, whether or not plaintiff is entitled to any and all of the reliefs
prayed for.27 The jurisdiction of the court or tribunal over the nature of the action cannot

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be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss, for
otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on defendant. Once
jurisdiction is vested, the same is retained up to the end of the litigation.28
It is true that during the pre-trial, the MTC issued an order defining the issue to be
litigated by the parties – whether or not unlawful detainer is proper in the premises
considering defendants' claim of ownership from 1982; otherwise stated, whether
petitioners' occupation of the land in dispute was by mere tolerance of respondents. As
framed by the MTC, the issue before it was basically one of physical or material
possession of the property, although petitioners raised ownership as an issue. Thus, the
MTC erred when it declared that, since defendants claimed ownership over the property,
it was divested of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide the case on its merits.
It bears stressing that in unlawful detainer cases, the only issue for resolution,
independent of any claim of ownership by any party litigant, is: who is entitled to the
physical and material possession of the property involved? The mere fact that defendant
raises the defense of ownership of the property in the pleadings does not deprive the MTC
of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide the case. In cases where defendant
raises the question of ownership in the pleadings and the question of possession cannot
be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the court may proceed and resolve
the issue of ownership but only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession.
However, the disposition of the issue of ownership is not final, as it may be the subject of
separate proceeding specifically brought to settle the issue. Hence, the bare fact that
petitioners, in their answer to the complaint, raised the issue of whether they owned the
property as trustors of a constructive trust (with the spouses Dulay as the trustees), did
not divest the MTC of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case and decide the same
on its merits.

ESMAQUEL v. COPRADA
G.R. No. 152423
December 15, 2010

FACTS: spouses Marcos Esmaquel and Victoria Sordevilla (Victoria) filed an ejectment
case against respondent Maria V. Coprada before the MCTC of Magdalena, Liliw and
Majayjay Laguna claiming ownership over a parcel of land used and occupied by the latter.

Page 95 of 116
 On September 11, 1997, the MCTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint.
It held that laches had already set in which prevented petitioners from questioning the
validity of the purported sale between Victoria and Maria. On appeal, the RTC reversed
the MCTC’s judgment holding respondent's occupation of the subject property was by
virtue of petitioners' tolerance and permission.
Dissatisfied with the Decision, respondent filed with the CA a petition for review
with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. On April 6, 2001,
the CA granted respondent's petition, reversed the Decision of the RTC and affirmed in
toto the Decision of the MCTC.
Respondent claimed that the house was already sold to her by petitioner Victoria.
Thus, by virtue of the sale, she and her family have the right to possess the said property.
She further alleged that she is not guilty of laches; rather, it is the registered owners' right
to recover possession of their property which is barred by laches.

ISSUE: WON not petitioners have a valid ground to evict respondent from the subject
property.

HELD: YES.
The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the
parties. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass
upon the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The
adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action
between the same parties involving title to the property.[11]Since the issue of ownership
was raised in the unlawful detainer case, its resolution boils down to which of the parties'
respective evidence deserves more weight.
In the present case, respondent failed to present evidence to substantiate her
allegation that a portion of the land was sold to her in 1962. In fact, when petitioners sent
a letter [12] to the respondent, demanding her to vacate the subject property, the
respondent, in reply [13] to the said letter, never mentioned that she purchased the subject
land in 1962. If the sale really took place, the respondent should have immediately and
categorically claimed that in her letter response. Clearly therefore, respondent's
submission that there was an oral sale is a mere afterthought.

Page 96 of 116
 Araos vs. CA
G.R. No. 107057, June 2, 1994

FACTS: The petitioners are lessees of a ten-door apartment building located at No. 2222
Pedro Gil Street, Sta. Ana, Manila, which they have been occupying for some 25 years.
The building was originally owned by one Vivien B. Bernardino with whom the petitioners
had a written contract of lease which expired on 31 January 1988. Nevertheless, after this
period, the petitioners peacefully occupied their respective units and the lessor continued
to collect monthly rentals from the petitioners despite the absence of a written contract.

On 11 July 1991, the apartment was sold to private respondent Jovan Land, Inc. Three
days after, or on 15 July 1991, demands to vacate the units the petitioners and other
lessees were occupying were made simultaneously by Bernardino and the private
respondent. When the demands went unheeded, ten separate cases for unlawful detainer
were filed against the petitioners and other lessees by the private respondent before the
MeTC of Manila.

After the parties submitted their respective position papers, the MeTC rendered a joint
Judgment holding that the contracts between the lessor and the lessees provided for a
lease on a month-to-month basis and that the lease period had expired. The abovenamed
lessees appealed the decision to the RTC of Manila.

The RTC reversed the decision of the MeTC. Dissatisfied with the RTC decision, the
private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. In its decision
promulgated on 8 September 1992, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC
and affirmed the decision of the MeTC.

ISSUE: The core issue for our resolution is the propriety and validity of the increase in the
monthly rates of rentals as decreed by the MeTC and sustained by the Court of Appeals.

RULING: There is no basis for the increase in the rentals. The issue must then be resolved
in favor of the petitioners. The rule is settled that in forcible entry or unlawful detainer
cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property. The reason for this is
that in such cases, the only issue raised in ejectment cases is that of rightful possession;
hence, the damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have
sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of
the property, and not the damages which he may have suffered but which have no direct
relation to his loss of material possession.

It should be borne in mind that although the rent control laws allow unilateral increases in
rentals by the lessor within the period and the maximum rates provided therein, still the
demand for such increase must be made upon the lessee himself. The courts have no

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authority to fix the same for the parties where no valid demand for an increased rent has
been made by the lessor.

In the present case, the demand letters to vacate sent to the petitioners only mentioned
the purchase of the apartment units by the private respondent. Nothing in the record
shows that there were prior disputes on the rentals or that there was a demand for
increased rentals made by the private respondent or its predecessor on the petitioners.
Hence, the MeTC did not have the authority to decree the increase in rental rates.

Ayog vs. Cusi

G.R. No. L-46729 November 19, 1982

FACTS: On January 21, 1953, the Director of Lands, after a bidding, awarded to Biñan
Development Co., Inc. on the basis of its 1951 Sales Application No. V-6834 Cadastral Lot
No. 281 located at Barrio Tamugan, Guianga (Baguio District), Davao City with an area of
about two hundred fifty hectares. Some occupants of the lot protested against the sale. The
Director of Lands in his decision of August 30, 1957 dismissed the protests and ordered the
occupants to vacate the lot and remove their improvements. No appeal was made from that
decision.

Because the alleged occupants refused to vacate the land, the corporation filed against them
on February 27, 1961 in the Court of First Instance of Davao, Civil Case No. 3711, an
ejectment suit (accion publiciana). That ejectment suit delayed the issuance of the patent. The
trial court found that the protests of twenty of the abovenamed defendants were among those
that were dismissed by the Director of Lands in his 1957 decision already mentioned.

On July 18, 1961 the purchase price of ten thousand pesos was fully paid by Binan
Development Co., Inc. OnNovember 10, 1961, an official of the Bureau of Lands submitted a
final investigation report wherein it was stated that the corporation had complied with the
cultivation and other requirements under the Public Land Law and had paid the purchase price
of the land.

ISSUE: Whether the 1973 Constitution is an obstacle to the implementation of the trial court's
1964 final and executory judgment ejecting the petitioners.

RULING: We hold that the said constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application to the
sales application of Biñan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested
right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.

That vested right has to be respected. lt could not be abrogated by the new Constitution.
Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public
agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioners'
prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.

Page 98 of 116
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the
right of the corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and established
and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.

Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had
the effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain
a patent for that land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without due process.
On that issue, we have no choice but to sustain its enforceability.

We hold that judgment cannot be enforced against the said petitioners who were not
defendants in that litigation or who were not summoned and heard in that case.

To enforce the judgment against those who were not parties to the case and who occupy
portions of the disputed land distinct and separate from the portions occupied by the
defendants in the ejectment suit, would be violative of due process of law, the law which,
according to Daniel Webster in his argument in the Dartmouth College case, is the law of the
land, a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial.

Barba vs. CA
G.R. No. 126638, February 6, 2002

FACTS: On September 27, 1993, herein petitioner Rosanna Barba filed before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Mexico, Pampanga, a complaint for ejectment against
private respondents Teodora Garcia, Tess Garcia, Sevilla Garcia, Rodrigo Salazar, and
Abraham Velasquez over a parcel of land and the five-door apartment building standing
thereon, situated in Lagundi, Mexico, Pampanga and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 353973-R.

On April 5, 1994, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court rendered a decision in petitioner’s favor.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court reversed the decision of the MCTC and declared the
same as null and void for utter lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed
decision, affirmed the dismissal by the RTC of the ejectment case. The Court of Appeals
held that since there exists a genuine issue of ownership which is inextricably linked to
the issue of possession, the case should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not that in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, jurisdiction is
determined by the nature of the action as pleaded in the complaint.

RULING: While it is true that in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, jurisdiction is
determined by the nature of the action as pleaded in the complaint, a simple allegation
that defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is sufficient. In an
unlawful detainer case, the defendant’s possession was originally lawful but ceased to be
so by the expiration of his right to possess. Hence, the phrase "unlawful withholding" has

Page 99 of 116
been held to imply possession on the part of defendant, which was legal in the beginning,
having no other source than a contract, express or implied, and which later expired as a
right and is being withheld by defendant.

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that municipal trial courts, metropolitan trial courts
and municipal circuit trial courts now retain jurisdiction over ejectment cases even if the
question of possession cannot be resolved without passing upon the issue of
ownership. In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the
question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved
without deciding the issue of ownership, inferior courts, nonetheless, have the undoubted
competence to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of
determining the issue of possession. Such decision, however, does not bind the title or
affect the ownership of the land or building, neither shall it bar an action between the same
parties respecting title to the land or building nor be held conclusive of the facts therein
found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving
possession.

In an unlawful detainer case, the only issue for resolution is physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the
party litigants. Consequently, the filing of an action for reconveyance of title over the same
property or for the annulment of the deed of sale over the land does not divest the
municipal trial court of its jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case
before it and the same may not be successfully pleaded in abatement of an action for
unlawful detainer or forcible entry. This is because an ejectment suit is summary in nature
and the same cannot be circumvented by the simple expedient of asserting ownership
over the property.The fact, therefore, that an action for annulment of deeds and
reconveyance was pending before another branch of the regional trial court cannot be
pleaded by herein private respondents in abatement of the ejectment case before the
municipal circuit trial court.

Car Cool Philippines, Inc. vs. Ushio Realty And Development Corporation
G.R. No. 138088, January 23, 2006

FACTS: On 19 December 1995, Ushio Realty and Development Corporation (USHIO

Realty) filed an ejectment case against Car Cool Philippines, Inc. (CAR COOL) to recover
possession of a parcel of land (property) located at No. 72 (137) Quezon Avenue, corner
Victory Avenue, Quezon City.

USHIO Realty alleges that the former owners of the property, Spouses Hector and Gloria
Hizon Lopez (Spouses Lopez), leased the property to CAR COOL since 1972. In 1990,
the Spouses Lopez and CAR COOL executed a written lease agreement over the property
for two years. On 16 August 1992, on the expiration of the written lease agreement, the
Spouses Lopez allowed CAR COOL to continue occupying the property upon payment of
monthly rentals. Later, a verbal month-to-month lease agreement continued until 31

Page 100 of 116

August 1995. On 15 June 1995, Hector Lopez wrote CAR COOL to inform it of his intention
to sell the property. Hector Lopez gave CAR COOL the option to buy the property before
offering the same to other prospective buyers. CAR COOL failed to respond to the offer.
On 28 June 1995, Hector Lopez terminated the verbal lease agreement and gave CAR
COOL until 31 August 1995 to vacate the property. In his subsequent letters dated 22 July,
1 August and 12 August 1995, Hector Lopez reiterated his demand for CAR COOL to
vacate the property. CAR COOL allegedly ignored the demands to vacate the property
and continued to occupy the same.

On 21 November 1995, CAR COOL filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The complaint sought to compel
Hector Lopez to execute a written lease contract for the period from 1 January 1995 until
31 December 1996 and for USHIO Realty to be bound by the contract.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages by way of rentals and
attorneys fees in favor of USHIO.

RULING: Award of damages in the form of rentals. We have held that [t]here is unjust
enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a
person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice,
equity and good conscience. Article 22 of the Civil Code provides that [e]very person who
through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall
return the same to him. The principle of unjust enrichment under Article 22 requires two
conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that
such benefit is derived at anothers expense or damage.

There is no unjust enrichment when the person who will benefit has a valid claim to such
benefit. Under Section 17 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, USHIO Realty has
the legal right to receive some amount as reasonable compensation for CAR COOLs
occupation of the property.

Attorneys Fees. We cannot sustain the award of attorneys fees. The Court of Appeals
failed to state explicitly in its decision the basis for the award of attorneys fees. The award
of attorneys fees is the exception rather than the rule and the court must state explicitly
the legal reason for the award of attorneys fees.

CGR Corporation v. Ernesto L. Treyes, JR.

G.R. No.170916, April 27, 2007

FACTS: CGR Corporation claimed to have occupied 37.3033 hectares of public land
in Barangay Bulanon, Sagay City, Negros Occidental even before the notarized separate
Fishpond Lease Agreements in their respective favor were approved in October 2000 by

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the Secretary of Agriculture for a period of twenty-five (25) years or until December 31,
2024.

On November 18, 2000, Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr. allegedly forcibly and unlawfully entered
the leased properties and once inside barricaded the entrance to the fishponds, set up a
barbed wire fence along the road going to petitioners fishponds, and harvested several
tons of milkfish, fry and fingerlings owned by petitioners.

On November 22, 2000, petitioners promptly filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
in Sagay City separate complaints for Forcible Entry With Temporary Restraining Order
And/Or Preliminary Injunction And Damages, against Ernesto M. Treyes, Sr. and
respondent. In a separate move, petitioners filed in March 2004 with the Bacolod RTC
a complaint for damages against respondent. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss
petitioners complaint for damages on three
grounds litis pendentia, res judicata and forum shopping.

ISSUE: Whether a complainant in a forcible entry case can file an independent action for
damages arising after the act of dispossession had occurred.

RULING: The recoverable damages in forcible entry and detainer cases thus refer to rents
or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises or fair rental
value of the property and attorneys fees and costs. Other damages must thus be claimed
in an ordinary action.

It bears noting that petitioners’ claim for damages have no direct relation to their loss of
possession of the premises. It had to do with respondents alleged harvesting and carting
away several tons of milkfish and other marine products in their fishponds, ransacking and
destroying of a chapel built by petitioner CGR Corporation, and stealing religious
icons and even decapitating the heads of some of them, after the act of dispossession
had occurred.

Surely, one of the elements of litis pendentia - that the identity between the pending
actions, with respect to the parties, rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, is such that any
judgment rendered on one action will, regardless of which is successful, amount
to res judicata in the action under consideration - is not present, hence, it may not be
invoked to dismiss petitioners complaint for damages.

Res judicata may not apply because the court in a forcible entry case has no jurisdiction
over claims for damages other than the use and occupation of the premises and attorneys
fees.

Neither may forum-shopping justify a dismissal of the complaint for damages, the
elements of litis pendentia not being present, or where a final judgment in the forcible entry
case will not amount to res judicata in the former.

Page 102 of 116

Petitioners filing of an independent action for damages other than those sustained as a
result of their dispossession or those caused by the loss of their use and occupation of
their properties could not thus be considered as splitting of a cause of action.

Felisilda vs. Villanueva

G.R. No. L-60372 October 29, 1985

FACTS: The City Court of Butuan City in its decision of February 17, 1979 ordered the
Felisilda spouses to vacate Lot No. 662-C covered by OCT No. P-1877 in the name of Dr.
Vicente C. Galeon, to pay him P300 a month as compensation for the use of the land from
January, 1971 until the said land is vacated, P7,000 as moral and exemplary
damages and P3,000 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses (Civil Case No. 846).

That judgment became final and executory. To satisfy it, the sheriff levied upon two lots
with areas of 149 and 126 square meters covered by TCT No. T-1762 and OCT No. P2016
in the name of the Felisilda spouses. He sold the same to Galeon at a public auction.
There was no redemption within the one-year period. The sheriff issued to Galeon a final
deed of sale dated August 4, 1981. The sale was registered and new titles were issued to
Galeon on August 12, 1981.

Notwithstanding that fact and as an indication of over-zealousness, the city court in its
orders of December 17 and 29, 1981 ordered the register of deeds to issue new titles to
Galeon and to require the Felisilda spouses to surrender the owner's duplicate of their
titles for the two lots.

The city court in its order of December 17, 1981 (over the opposition of the Republic of
the Philippines) also directed the sheriff to place Galeon in possession of the said lots and
directed the Felisilda spouses to demolish their building on the disputed lot. The city court
denied the motion for the reconsideration of said orders in its order of April 17, 1982.

The said orders were assailed in the instant petition for certiorari filed on May 3, 1982 on
the grounds that the auction sale was void because it was a violation of Republic Act No.
730 and that the notice of sale was published in the newspaper for fourteen days only and
not for at least twenty days.*

ISSUE: Whether the execution sale of two small residential lots is valid when there is lack
of sufficient publication and for being allegedly in violation of Republic Act No. 730.

RULING: There is no merit in petitioners' contention that the sale was void because the
notice of sale was not published for at least twenty days in the Mindanao Journal as
required in section 18, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

Page 103 of 116

The notice of sale was published in the issues of June 22 and 29 and July 6, 1980. The
sale took place on July 15, 1980 or 23 days after the first publication. We hold that there
was compliance with section 18.

The prohibition found in Republic Act No. 730 is similar to that found in section 118 of the
Public Land Law. It was held under section 118 that the alienation prohibited therein may
be made by the sheriff under an execution sale. Hence, the sale of Lot 114 to Galeon is
void. Without ruling on the legality of the transfer of Lot 115 by Olaguer to Felisilda, it is
unquestionable that Lot 115 was invalidly sold by the sheriff to Galeon in 1980 because it
was made within 10 years from the issuance of the patent.

The only damages that can be recovered in an ejectment suit are the fair rental value or
the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the real property Other
damages must be claimed in an ordinary action.

Planas vs. Madrigal

G.R. No. L-6570, April 12, 1954

FACTS: This petition stems from a case of forcible entry and detainer instituted by
Madrigal & Co., Inc., against Concepcion L. Planas and Iluminado L. Planas in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No. 954), which culminated in a judgment in favor of
plaintiff and against the defendants, whereby the latter were ordered to vacate the property
in litigation and to pay to the former the corresponding rentals for their occupancy of the
property until it is vacated. This judgment was affirmed by the court of appeals and became
final and executory.

On November 28, 1952, upon petition of plaintiff, a writ of execution was issued by the
court and was given course by the clerk of court by virtue of which the defendants were
given 15 days within which to vacate the land. Defendants having failed to do so, plaintiff
filed a motion for the issuance of a special order of demolition of the buildings constructed
thereon. On December 16, 1952, Juan Planas filed an action in the same court claiming
to be the owner of two of the buildings, plus two other adjacent buildings marked as
annexes, contemplated to be demolished and praying for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. The writ prayed for was denied. Instead, the court granted the
motion of plaintiff for the demolition of the buildings belonging to the defendants.

On February 10, 1953, Juan Planas received a copy of an order of the court issued of
February 2, 1953 which directs that certain individuals, including Juan Planas, vacate the
land of the plaintiff pursuant to the judgment of the court. On February 17, 1953, these

Page 104 of 116

individuals, including Juan Planas, filed a joint petition for the reconsideration of the order
of February 2, 1953 but this joint petition was denied.

ISSUE: The question to be determined is whether the respondent Judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion when he ordered the quashing and discarding of the first and second
third-party claims interposed by petitioners, and in ordering petitioner Juan Planas to
vacate the land of the plaintiff not being a party to the case of forcible entry and detainer
instituted by Madrigal & Co. Inc.

RULING: We hold that the action taken by the respondent Judge on this matter is justified.
Anent the order of respondent Judge dated February 2, 1953 which directs that Jose Isla,
Carlos Neri, Jose T. Josue, Juan Planas and the San Miguel Brewery, Inc. vacate the land
of plaintiff pursuant to the judgments of the court in the ejectment case, which order is now
attacked as illegal because they were not parties to that case, the record shows that,
before issuing said order, the court conducted a summary hearing to determine the nature
of the possession of the property claimed by Juan Planas and other occupants, and that
at that hearing respondent Judge summoned all of them to appear to show cause why
they should not be ejected from the premises. And after the hearing was over, respondent
Judge found that Juan Planas and the other occupants were mere transferees or
possessors pendente lite of the property in question. Respondent Judge found that if they
had any right at all to occupy the property, that right is merely subsidiary to that of
defendant Concepcion L. Planas. As such, they are bound by the judgment rendered
against the latter in consonance with the doctrine laid down in the cases of Brodett vs. De
la Rosa, 44 Off. Gaz., No. 3, pp. 874-875, and Gozon vs. De la Rosa, 44 Off. Gaz., pp.
1227-1228. Of course, these are questions of fact, as to which there may be controversy,
but the proper place where this should be threshed out is not in this proceedings, but in
an ordinary action. For the present, we are satisfied that the respondent Judge has acted
on the matter in the exercise of his sound discretion.

Teraa vs. Sagun

G.R. No. 152131, April 29, 2009

FACTS: The respondent Antonio Simuangco (respondent) owned a house and lot at 138
J.P. Laurel St., Nasugbu, Batangas, which he leased to the petitioner.[4] Sometime in
1996, the petitioner demolished the leased house and erected a new one in its
place.[5] The respondent alleged that this was done without his consent.[6]

The petitioner allegedly also gave the materials from the demolished house to her sister,
who built a house adjacent to the respondents property.[8] When the respondent
discovered what the petitioner did, he immediately confronted her and advised her to
vacate the premises.[9] She refused. On February 3, 1997, the respondent sent a letter
demanding the petitioner to vacate the leased property.[10] Despite this letter of demand,
which the petitioner received on February 10,[11] she still refused to vacate the said
property.

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The respondent thus filed a complaint for unlawful detainer[12] against the petitioner
on April 16, 1997 on the ground of the petitioners violation of the terms of the Contract of
Lease.[13]The respondent prayed for the petitioners ejectment of the leased property, and
for the award of P70,000.00, representing the cost of the materials from the demolished
house, attorneys fees, and costs.[14]

ISSUE: Whether the complaint for unlawful detainer should be dismissed.

RULING: Damages recoverable in an unlawful detainer action are limited to rentals

or reasonable compensation for the use of the property.

This Court has no jurisdiction to award the reimbursement prayed for by both parties. Both
parties seek damages other than rentals or reasonable compensation for the use of the
property, which are the only forms of damages that may be recovered in an unlawful
detainer case.[52] Rule 70, Section 17 of the Rules of Court authorizes the trial court to
order the award of an amount representing arrears of rent or reasonable compensation
for the use and occupation of the premises if it finds that the allegations of the complaint
are true.[53]

The rationale for limiting the kind of damages recoverable in an unlawful detainer case
was explained in Araos v. Court of Appeals,[54]

An action for reimbursement or for recovery of damages may not be properly joined with
the action for ejectment. The former is an ordinary civil action requiring a full-blown trial,
while an action for unlawful detainer is a special civil action which requires a summary
procedure. The joinder of the two actions is specifically enjoined by Section 5 of Rule 2 of
the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of the Court

of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-48534 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The petitioner
FLORAIDA TERANA and all persons claiming right under her are ordered to vacate and
surrender possession of the subject property to the respondent ANTONIO
SIMUANGCO. No costs.

SPOUSES CHUA VS CA AND SPOUSES MORENO

G.R. No. 113886. February 24, 1998
FACTS:

On March 5, 1993, the Municipal Trial Court of Batangas City rendered a judgment in favor
of Spouses Moreno with respect to four lots in Galiciano St., Batangas City, ordering the
ejectment of Spouses Chua and ordering them to pay monthly rentals of P50,000.00
starting April 7, 1992 until they shall have vacated the lots and surrendered their
possession to Spouses Moreno and the sum of P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

Page 106 of 116

Spouses Chua then filed a notice of appeal. However, Spouses Moreno moved for the
execution of the decision in their favor, alleging that although Spouses Chua had filed a
notice of appeal, the latter had not filed a supersedeas bond nor make a deposit every
month of the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the properties as required by
Rule 70.

The RTC, in its first disputed order, denied Spouses Moreno’s motion for execution on the
ground that the transmission by the MTC of the records of the ejectment case to the RTC,
without waiting for the expiration of the period of appeal, prevented Spouses Chua from
filing a supersedeas bond on time. Subsequently, the RTC issued another order giving
petitioners an extension of five days within which to file a supersedeas bond.

In the Court of Appeals however, it ruled that the RTC erred in extending the period for
filing a supersedeas bond. The Court of Appeals held that the said provision was
mandatory and gave the said trial court no discretion with regard to its application. In
dismissing petitioner's claim that they did not know where to file the supersedeas bond,
the Court of Appeals noted that said argument was made for the first time on appeal before
it, petitioners' opposition to the motion for execution before the RTC being based only on
their alleged co-ownership of the said property.

ISSUES:

1. What is the effect of the failure of filing the supersedeas bond?

2. How shall the amount of supersedeas bond be determined?
3. Where should the supersedeas bond be filed?
4. Whether or not a supervening event occurred which would make execution
inequitable
HELD:

A WRIT OF EXECUTION SHOULD BE ISSUED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT IN CASE NO

SUPERSEDEAS BOND HAS BEEN FILED

As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately

executory, in order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of possession
of the property in question. To stay the immediate execution of the said judgment while
the appeal is pending, the foregoing provision requires that the following requisites must
concur: (1) the defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas bond; and (3) he
periodically deposits the rentals which become due during the pendency of the appeal.
The failure of the defendant to comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the
outright execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect being "ministerial
and imperative." Hence, if the defendant-appellant perfected the appeal but failed to file a
supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of the judgment would automatically follow.
Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the judgment if
the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas bond should be filed within
the period for the perfection of the appeal.

Page 107 of 116

In the present case, petitioners filed their notice of appeal on March 11, 1993, a day after
their receipt of the MTC's decision. On March 16, 1993, or five days later, the MTC
transmitted the records of the case to the RTC. On March 29, 1993, the private
respondents filed a motion for the immediate execution of the decision. As noted earlier,
petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that they were co-owners of the property.
On June 10, 1993, the RTC denied the motion for execution and directed petitioners to file
a supersedeas bond. On the authority of the RTC order, petitioners filed a cash bond,
which was later substituted with a surety bond.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the bond was filed out of time. The motion for
execution was filed eighteen days from the date the petitioners received a copy of the
MTC's decision, after the appeal had already been perfected. Because no supersedeas
bond had been filed within the period for appeal, a writ of execution should have been
issued as a matter of right. Petitioners manifestly failed to adduce a compelling reason to
justify a departure from the aforecited rule.

DETERMINATION OF THE AMOUNT OF BOND

Petitioners need not require the MTC to fix the amount of the supersedeas bond. They
could have computed this themselves. As early as 1947, we have held in Aylon vs. Jugo
and De Pablo that the supersedeas bond is equivalent to the amount of rentals, damages
and costs stated in the judgment.

Under Section 8 of Rule 70, the supersedeas bond shall be equivalent to the unpaid
rentals, damages and costs which accrued before the decision was rendered, as
determined by the MTC in the said decision. The bond does not answer for amounts
accruing during the pendency of the appeal, which are, in turn, the subject of the periodic
deposits to be made by the defendant.

In the present case, the MTC clearly stated in its March 5, 1993 decision that petitioners
should pay rentals of P50,000 a month from April 7, 1992 until they shall have vacated the
lots. The amount comprising the supersedeas bond and the periodic deposits, therefore,
is evident and computable from the MTC's decision.

WHERE SHOULD THE SUPERSEDEAS BOND BE FILED

Their claim that they did not know where to file the supersedeas bond is being made only
now. Indeed, in opposing petitioners' motion for execution they based their opposition not
on this ground but on the claim that since they were claiming to be co-owners of the lots
in question, their claim would be rendered moot and academic if execution were ordered
pending appeal. It is, therefore, not true that they were prevented from filing a supersedeas
bond because the MTC transmitted the records of the case to the RTC before the
expiration of private respondents' period of appeal.

Coming back to the original question, the bond should be filed before the MTC or, where
the records have been forwarded to the RTC, before the latter court. In either case, it
should be done during the period of appeal.

Page 108 of 116

NO SUPERVENING EVENT WHICH WOULD RENDER EXECUTION INEQUITABLE

Petitioners also argue that Laurel vs. Abalos should be applied here. In that case, this
Court held that "[w]here supervening events occurring subsequent to the judgment bring
about a material change in the situation of the parties, which makes the execution
inequitable, or where there is no compelling urgency for the execution because it is not
justified by the prevailing circumstances, the court may stay immediate execution of the
judgment." They also allege that the "immediate execution of judgment of the inferior
court, will cause irreparable injury to the petitioners herein who stand to lose their home,
business and source of livelihood . . . ."

The allegation of Petitioner Marciano Chua that he, as a co-owner of the subject property,
has filed an action for partition does not constitute a compelling reason to further delay
the execution of the judgment. An ejectment suit is conclusive only on the issue of material
possession or possession de facto of the property under litigation, not on the issue of
ownership.

The pendency of the action for partition, where ownership is one of the principal issues,
does not preclude the execution of the judgment in the ejectment suit. Such action for
partition is entirely independent of the ejectment suit. On the other hand, the issue of
ownership is considered in an ejectment suit only for the limited purpose of determining
who between the contending parties has the better right to possession. Moreover, it
should be stressed that we are not being called upon here to decide which of the parties
has a better right of possession, let alone, a better title to the property. The only issue in
this case is whether or not a writ of execution should be issued pending appeal of the
ejectment suit.

In any event, it is erroneous to characterize the partition suit as a compelling reason to

stay the execution of the judgment pending appeal.

ACBANG VS LUCZON
G.R. No. 164246, JANUARY 15, 2014
FACTS:

Spouses Lopez commenced an ejectment suit against Herminia Acbang, her son
Benjamin Acbang, Jr. and his wife Jean (Acbangs) in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Alcala, Cagayan. Spouses Lopez did not file their answer. Thus, the MTC rendered its
decision in favor of the Spouses Lopez.

Herminia subsequently appealed to the RTC. In the meantime, the Spouses Lopez moved
for the execution of the decision pending appeal in the RTC, alleging that the defendants
had not filed a supersedeas bond to stay the execution. The Acbangs opposed the motion
for execution pending appeal, insisting that the failure of the Spouses Lopez to move for
the execution in the MTC constituted a waiver of their right to the immediate execution;
and that, therefore, there was nothing to stay, rendering the filing of the supersedeas bond
unnecessary.

Page 109 of 116

Judge Luczon subsequently granted the motion for immediate execution. Herminia
however moved for reconsideration stressing that the filing of the supersedeas bond was
for the purpose of staying the execution; and that she as a defendant would not be placed
in a position to stay the execution by filing a supersedeas bond unless she was first notified
of the filing of the motion for immediate execution. This was however denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for execution pending appeal should be filed before the
losing defendant files a supersedeas bond. NO

HELD:

In the present case, there was no indication of the date when the petitioner filed her notice
of appeal. Her petition stated simply that she had filed a "timely notice of appeal which
was given due course without the respondents filing a motion for execution in the
Municipal Trial Court of Alcala, the court a quo." On the other hand, the Spouses Lopez
filed in the RTC their motion for execution pending appeal on February 19, 2004.

It has been settled that a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is
immediately executory, but the defendant, to stay its immediate execution, must: (1)
perfect an appeal; (2) file a supersede s bond; and (3) periodically deposit the rentals
becoming due during the pendency of the appeal. Although the petitioner correctly states
that the Spouses Lopez should file a motion for execution pending appeal before the court
may issue an order for the immediate execution of the judgment, the spouses Lopez are
equally correct in pointing out that they were entitled to the immediate execution of the
judgment in view of the Acbangs failure to comply with all of the three abovementioned
requisites for staying the immediate execution. The filing of the notice of appeal alone
perfected the appeal but did not suffice to stay the immediate execution without the filing
of the sufficient supersede s bond and the deposit of the accruing rentals.

CITY OF MANILA VS CA
G.R. No. L-42364, April 9, 1987
FACTS:

It appears that after the expiration of its contract of lease involving two market stalls
(owned by the City of Manila) in the Lacson Underpass in Quiapo, Manila, the lessor-City
wanted to increase the lease rentals. Despite the refusal of the lessee, Augusto Santos to
agree to the increased rates, it refused to vacate the premises, prompting the City to file
ejectment proceedings against it. The City Court subsequently ruled in favor of the City of
Manila fixing new rental rates and allowed the eventual ejectment of the lessee in case of
non-compliance.

The City of Manila, as lessor of the stalls appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI)
because it was not satisfied with the increased rentals granted by the City Court. In the
meantime, in view of the lessee's adamant refusal to pay the increased rates, the City
(without filing any supersedeas bond), asked for immediate execution of the City Court's
judgment pending appeal. The lessee opposed this execution on the theory that the

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judgment was a "conditional" one; that, there must first be a hearing or a new action for
ejectment to determine whether or not the lessee's refusal to pay was justified; and that
there can be no execution pending appeal because the City had not filed any supersedeas
bond. The CFI granted the writ of execution prayed for.

The Court of Appeals however reversed the ruling of the CFI. It explained that Sec. 8, Rule
70 of the Rules of Court (execution pending appeal in ejectment cases) does not apply for
said provision operates only when it is the lessee (not the lessor) who appeals, for in such
a case, it is the lessee who is supposed to file a supersedeas bond and to deposit the
monthly rentals in court, as said rentals fall due.

ISSUE: Whether or not the rule on appeal under Rule 70 also applies if the lessor is the
one who appealed the case. YES

HELD:

Sec. 8 of Rule 70 can apply even if it is the lessor who appeals in the sense that in such
a case, if the lessee desires to prevent execution pending appeal, he (the lessee) must
still file the supersedeas bond and deposit in court the accruing rentals. Our doctrine in
CRUZ, ET AL. vs. FERNANDO JUGO, ET AL, (supra) is reversed insofar as it conflicts
with the present case. The rationale for Our ruling is simple: why should the lessee
continue occupying the premises without filing the supersedeas bond and making the
necessary deposit for ensuing rentals (particularly when, by his failure to appeal, the
lessee does not question said accrued and incoming rents)?

And even if We were to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the very circumstances
referred to in the preceding paragraph (continued stay on the premises, and acquiescence
to the new rates) would constitute "special reasons" for authorizing an execution pending
appeal.

SPOUSES CORDOVA VS LABAYEN

A.M. No. RTJ-93-1033, OCTOBER 10, 1995
FACTS:

An action for ejectment was filed against Luz Cordova and Rudy Kubchan. A judgment
was rendered by the MTC ordering the Cordova and Kubchan to vacate the premises and
to pay Spouses Laguardia.

A Motion for Writ of Execution Pending Appeal was filed by Spouses Laguardia to which
the defendants opposed. The Regional Trial Court granted the motion on September 28,
1992 and the writ of execution was issued on September 30, 1992. However, in the
afternoon of September 29, 1992, plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order
of September 28, 1992 granting the motion for execution, on the ground that they could
not file the supersedeas bond because the court allegedly failed to apprise them of the
amount thereof and, at the same time, attaching to said motion a bond in the amount of
P18,000.00.

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The administrative complaint now filed before us by herein complainants, as heirs and
successors in interest of the late Luz Cordova, revolves around the validity of the writ of
execution issued by Judge Moscardon and the alias writ of execution issued by Judge
Labayen. The complainants herein argue that they have already filed the necessary
supersedeas bond, thus the execution was effectively stayed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the execution was effectively stayed by filing of the superedeas
bond. NO.

HELD:

The purpose of the supersedeas bond is to answer for the rents, damages and costs
accruing down to the judgment of the inferior court appealed from, the amount of which is
to be determined from the judgment of said court. The postulation of complainants and
their counsel that the execution sought was effectively stayed by the filing of a
supersedeas bond was sufficiently refuted and justifiably rejected when we consider the
circumstances then obtaining.

First. The amount of the supersedeas bond to be posted is easily discernible from the
dispositive portion of the judgment of the municipal trial court. Hence, it was erroneous, if
not altogether a deliberate falsity, for Atty. Sabio to claim that they could not file a
supersedeas bond because that court failed to determine the same.

Second. The bond should have been filed forthwith after the municipal trial court had
rendered judgment against complainants, which judgment was immediately executory,
without prejudice to the right of appeal. As the records readily reveal, the purported bond
was belatedly filed on September 29, 1992, more than five months later, and only after
the aforementioned Regional Trial Court had already issued an order granting the motion
for execution pending appeal. We cannot, therefore, elude the impression thus created
that the filing thereof came only as a dilatory afterthought on the part of defendants and
their counsel. In a vain attempt to remedy the situation, Atty. Sabio filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order granting execution, but the same necessarily had to fail for
being frivolous.

Third. It will be observed that no supersedeas bond was filed after the rendition of the
decision either in the court of origin or in the appellate court. The requirement for the filing
of a supersedeas bond is mandatory. Defendants in the ejectment case appealed to the
latter court without filing a supersedeas bond. Such failure is a ground for outright
execution of the judgment of the municipal trial court, the duty of the appellate court to
order the execution of the appealed decision being thereby ministerial and imperative.

Fourth. The Court of Appeals stated that the amount of P18,000.00 deposited by
defendants therein represented rental payments for the period from May, 1991 to April,
1992, and that a writ of execution had by then already been issued by the Regional Trial
Court. Evidently, therefore, the amount thus deposited could not qualify as or subserve
the purpose of a supersedeas bond.

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While it is true, therefore, that defendants deposited an amount which approximates the
monetary judgment for unpaid rentals, since the same was filed late, it could not qualify
as a supersedeas bond. What is considered material for purposes of staying execution
pending appeal under Rule 70 is not only the fact of payment but, more importantly, the
timeliness of the filing of the supersedeas bond. Hence, the amount of P18,000.00 was
correctly applied as mere rental payments from May, 1991 to April, 1992. On this ground
alone, Judge Moscardon was perfectly justified in issuing the writ of execution and
respondent sheriffs in implementing the same. Of these legal considerations, Atty. Sabio
could not have been unaware.

HUALAM CONSTRUCTION VS CA
G.R. No. 85466, OCTOBER 16, 1992
FACTS:

State Investment House is the owner of the State Centre Building located in Binondo
Manila. The building is divided into several office condominium units offered for sale or
lease to the general public. Pursuant to a Contract to Sell executed on 22 September 1983
between State Investment as Vendor, and Hualam Construction and Development
Corporation as Vendee, the latter occupied unit No. 1505 of said State Centre Building.

Hualam however failed and refused to pay he accumulated downpayment, installments,

utility charges and other assessments mentioned in the Contract to Sell. This prompted
State Investment to file am ejectment case against Hualam. The MTC ruled in favor of
State Investment ordering Hualam to vacate the premises and to pay plaintiff the sum of
P161,478.61 representing unpaid down payment, installments and other charges and
such other amount as may become due from defendants by reason of their continued
possession of the premises, which amount will be paid jointly and severally by defendants.

The controversy in the present case involves the question on the determination of whether
the amount adjudged by the MTC represents rents, damages and costs accruing down to
the time the decision was rendered.

It is the thesis of the petitioners that the amount of P161,478.61 does not represent back
rentals or the reasonable value for the use of the subject unit, but constitutes the totality
of the unpaid downpayment and installments of the purchase price of the condominium
unit, as well as parking fees, cost of electric consumption, real estate taxes, telephone
charges, association fees and the cost for the use of the building's airconditioning units.
Hence, no supersedeas bond is necessary to stay the execution of said judgment. The
filing of the notice of appeal was sufficient. In fine, petitioners allege that since "unpaid
downpayment", "installments" and "other charges" are not the same as "rent", "damages"
and "cost", they do not fall within the purview of Section 8, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules
Court

ISSUES:

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 1. Whether the amount adjudged by the MTC represents rents, damages and costs
accruing down to the time the decision was rendered.
HELD:

As to damages, We have no several occasions ruled that since the only issue raised in
forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases is that of rightful physical possession, the
"damages" recoverable in these case are those which the plaintiff could have sustained
as a mere possessor, i.e., those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the
property, and not the damages which he may have suffered but which have no direct
relation to his loss of material possession. 11 Municipal and city courts, therefore, have no
jurisdiction to award damages based on any other ground. Simply put, "damages" in the
context of Section 8 of Rule 70 is limited to "rent" or "fair rental value" for the use and
occupation of the property.

LAUREL VS ABALOS
G.R. No. L-26098, OCTOBER 31, 1969
FACTS:

Julita Laput bought the subject house from Pilar Saile for the sum of P400. This was
however only evidenced by a mere certification or notice to third persons that Pilar Saile
had sold the house to her. Laput had been living there as tenant even before the "sale" to
her, or since 1962, paying to Pilar Saile five pesos monthly rental for the use of the land.

Subsequently, Pilar Saile sold the lot to Spouses Parangan. Pilar and the Spouses then
verbally advised Laput of the sale and asked her to vacate the premises. Failing to do so
after having been given sufficient time to look for another place, Laput was required by
letter, received by her on November 12, 1964, to vacate the house and lot within twenty
days from notice. Laput refused, so the petitioners on December 14, 1964 filed the present
action for illegal detainer against her.

Before the municipal court could decide the illegal detainer case, Pilar Saile on February
11, 1965 instituted an action for reformation of instrument against the petitioners. She
alleged in her complaint that the deed of sale in favor of the petitioners failed to express
the real intention of the parties, their true agreement being a sale of only her 1/2 share of
the conjugal property. While this action was pending, the Dipolog municipal court decided
the illegal detainer case, and ordered Laput to vacate the premises and to pay the
petitioners P15.00 monthly rental until she shall have so vacated.

Laput now argues that the action on the motion for execution be held in abeyance pending
the final outcome of the action for reformation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to immediate execution of the decision
in the illegal detainer case, in the light of the prevailing facts and of the supervening events
narrated above.

HELD:

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In proceedings for unlawful detainer the only issue is who between the litigants has a
better right to the physical possession of the property. The question of title or ownership
is not involved. Unlike an ordinary civil case, an action for unlawful detainer is a special
civil action which is intended to be summary in character. It is distinct from an ordinary
civil case in the sense that while in the latter case a perfected appeal operates to vacate
the judgment of the inferior court, in an unlawful detainer action, notwithstanding the
perfection of an appeal, the judgment of the inferior court remains in force and may be
executed at anytime prior to rendition of judgment by the court of first instance.

Upon the foregoing tenets, the petitioners would have been entitled as a matter of right to
the possession of the property in controversy, and as a matter of law to the execution of
the decision of the inferior court in the illegal detainer case, upon the failure of Laput to
pay or deposit the monthly rentals as they fell due. Consequently, if it is true that Laput
failed to pay the rentals from August, 1964, the petitioners would no doubt be entitled to
immediate execution of the judgment of the inferior court, without prejudice to the appeal
taking its course. It would thus appear at first blush that the respondent Judge committed
a grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's motion for immediate execution.

But inescapable material facts and circumstances supervened. As already stated, an

action for reformation of the deed of sale was filed by Pilar Saile against the petitioners
while the appeal in the illegal detainer case was pending before the respondent Judge.
This must have given pause to the respondent Judge, with the result that he refrained
from issuing the writ of execution sought by petitioners, as he doubted the propriety, if not
the validity, of the decision of the municipal Court.7Nonetheless, in his order of December
11, 1965, the respondent Judge, at the same time that he denied the motion on immediate
execution, required Laput to post a supersedeas bond of P500 to answer for the rentals
that would become due, while the appeal pends, which the latter obviously complied with.

In the case at bar, the CFI of Zamboanga del Norte, in its decision, declared the deed of
sale, the basic prop of the petitioners' asserted right to possession of the property in
question, null and void. Thereafter, the same court, on proper motion, allowed Pilar Saile,
the owner-vendor of the property, to intervene in the illegal detainer case pending appeal
in the same court. By the intervention of the owner who is also the petitioners' vendor, the
illegal detainer case was virtually converted into a contest between the petitioners and
Pilar Saile, thereby relegating Laput into the background. This was undoubtedly the
reason the respondent Judge, having knowledge of all the facts involved in the present
controversy, denied the motion for immediate execution and, instead, required Laput to
post a supersedeas bond in the amount of P500. As to who between the petitioners and
the intervenor Pilar Saile is entitled to the rentals, is a question that has to await final
decision on the appeal in the illegal detainer case, which in turn will depend on the final
decision that will be rendered in the action for reformation of instrument.

Until the Court of Appeals shall have finally adjudged for the petitioners in the action for
reformation of instrument, their right to the immediate possession of the property in
question cannot be said to be clear or conclusive. The inconclusiveness of the petitioners'
so-called "right" is further accentuated when we recall that Juan Bulleras (husband of the

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vendor Pilar Saile) had absolutely no participation in the sale to the petitioners, and he
therefore retains, and may at any time appear to assert, his ownership and his right to the
possession of his 1/2 share in the said real property.

Where supervening events (occurring subsequent to the judgment) bring about a material
change in the situation of the parties which makes the execution inequitable, or where
there is no compelling urgency for the execution because it is not justified by the prevailing
circumstances, the court may stay immediate execution of the judgment.

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