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“Describe the main features of Diem’s regime and explain why it was unable to maintain power in

South Vietnam by 1963”

Ngo Dinh Diem (b. January 1901) was a devout Catholic, nationalist, intelligent, stubborn and an
elitist. The Americans hoped he could be the leader of a new democratic Vietnam. He appeared to
be a logical choice because of his background as a provincial governor under the French and as a
Minister for the Interior as well as his strong anti-communist record. Diem however, was not a
democrat, he tended to look back to the administrative traditions of Vietnam’s past. He spoke of
‘personalism’, a political theory that included: Using family and family and family ties to help
government, and specifying individual duties to the state. It blended Catholicism and Confucianism.
He argued that it could be a kind of ‘middle way’ between communism and American-style
democracy. Although his ideas never won wide support outside his ‘inner circle’.

Diem's road to political power began in July 1954, when he was appointed the Prime Minister of the
State of Vietnam by former Emperor Bao Dai, who was Head of State. Then to President of the
renamed Republic of Vietnam. The South Vietnamese Army was renamed the Army of the Republic
of Vietnam (ARVN).
The Diem regime had the support of the Americans in both the immediate and long term because
they wanted to create a nation, an anti-communist state and perhaps, in time, a democratic one.
Such a modern democratic nation carved out of the former French colony of Indochina would
therefore be, to some extent, in America’s own image. As South Vietnam had been largely an
American creation, over the next 20 years the US found it difficult to abandon the new Republic of
Vietnam.
To consolidate his power as leader Diem was dependent on force, repression, and with the support
of the US. His first challenge within South Vietnam came from the influence of three religious sects.
The most powerful of these was the Cao Dai. His most trusted official was his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu,
leader of the primary pro-Diem Can Lao political party. It followed a blend of Buddhism, Catholicism
and some local religions. The US had used their money on propaganda and sabotage in a bid to
strengthen the anti communist government and weaken Ho’s communist one. At the same time, the
leaders of the two Vietnams set about strengthening their power.

Diem callously used the resources, equipment, and training provided by the US to crack down on
rival political groups in the south (communist and non communist). Madame Nhu, the wife of his
brother Nhu, was South Vietnam's First Lady, and she led the way in Diệm's programs to reform
Saigon society in accordance with their Catholic values. Brothels and opium dens were closed;
divorce and abortion made illegal, and adultery laws were strengthened. He further dismantled the
private armies of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao religious sects, which controlled parts of the Mekong
Delta.
In 1954 one-tenth of the wealthiest landlords in the south controlled 65% of the land. In the past,
the peasants had seen the French as their main enemies. Now much of that traditional hostility was
directed at the officials of Diem’s government. Diem set about undoing some of the land reforms
that had been put in place by the Vietminh during their struggle with the French. Peasants who had
come to regard land as their own were now expected to buy the land or pay rent. He had little
understanding of the needs/problems of the Vietnamese peasants and was less compelling than Ho,
and lacked Ho’s reputation as a nationalist leader in Vietnam’s fight for independence. Ho’s ability to
compromise after the extremities of ‘purification’ and land reform whereas Diem was unable to
negotiate and was exploitive in his land reforms and in his strive to eliminate opposition whether it
was communist or not.
The new ARVN often acted as agents for collecting the reimposed rents. When landlords themselves
were afraid to venture into the country side, they used members of the ARVN as rent collectors.
Their service was provided by the army for a commission. The results were understandable: The
members of the ARVN were seen as enemies by many peasants, the entire process opened way for
corruption on all levels, and the ARVN commanders were unlikely to allow fighting a war to interrupt
good business.
The communist (and their supporters) plan was to fight a long war against Diem. Guerrilla tactics and
small engagements on favourable terms would gradually be used to tear down the ARVN before the
campaign changed to major battles. During 1959, almost 90 000 Vietminh fighters moved south and
regularly challenged ARVN forces.

In 1956, Diem did away with locally elected councils and replaced them with provincial governors.
Throughout the period, Diem blamed any political opposition on the Viet Cong (VC) , the term he
used for Vietnamese Communists.
The NLF was the National Front for the Liberation of Vietnam, established in December 1960. They
held a political and propaganda campaign. Advantages that the NLF had over Diem’s government in
its bid to win the support of the peasants was that as a result of Diem’s policies, many of the South
Vietnamese peasants saw the NLF as allies against Saigon. The two factors that sealed the fate of
Ngo Dinh Diem (his government was corrupt and lacked wide support) were; The poor performance
of the South Vietnamese army and the refusal of his commanders to fight. And the wave of public
protest staged by members of South Vietnam’s Buddhist majority against the treatment that they
had received from Diem’s minority ruling Catholic ruling elite. Diem’s brother, Ngo Dinh Thuc, for
example, was the Catholic Archbishop of Hue.
The Buddhist leadership called on Diem’s government to give them the same freedom as Catholics.
Buddhist pressure on the government intensified. The Buddhist clergy published a manifesto that
called for: The right to display the Buddhist flag, equal status with the Catholics, an end to the arrest
of Buddhists, the freedom for Buddhist bonzes (clerics) to preach their religion and the
compensation for the Hue massacre victims and punishment of those responsible. Once the US
government realized the truth about who was behind the raids, tortures and deaths of those who
followed Buddism, they reacted with disapproval towards the Diem regime.

By the summer of 1963, however, there were growing doubts about the ability of the Diem
government to prosecute the war. The behaviour of the Ngo family, always odd, had now become
bizarre. In May 1963 the Ngos became embroiled in a fatal quarrel with the Buddhist leadership.
Strikes and demonstrations by Buddhists in Saigon and Hue were met with violence by the army and
Nhu’s security forces and resulted in numerous arrests. The following month a Buddhist monk, Thich
Quang Duc, publicly drench himself with gasoline and set himself ablaze as a protest against Diem’s
repression.
In the end the US accepted the Ho-led government and trieD to ensure it wasn’t too closely linked to
communist China.
At the beginning of November, 1963, President Diem was overthrown by a military coup. After the
generals had promised Diem that he would be allowed to leave the country they changed their mind
and killed him. He was replaced by Nguyen Van Thieu, the chief of staff of the Armed Forces of South
Vietnam.

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