Professional Documents
Culture Documents
LECTURE 12
Financial Crises
• Widespread runs.
• Identifying crises.
• Secondary sources.
11.7
11.7
11.6
Logarithms
11.6
11.5
11.5
11.4
11.4
1985-I 1987-I 1989-I 1991-I 1993-I 1995-I
From: Reinhart and Rogoff, This Time Is Different.
Conclusion
III. JALIL, “A NEW HISTORY OF BANKING PANICS IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1825-1929: CONSTRUCTION AND
IMPLICATIONS”
Jalil – Overview
• Identifying crises.
From: Jalil, “A New History of Banking Panics in the United States, 1825–1929”
Jalil’s Definition of a Panic
• A financial panic occurs when fear prompts a
widespread run by private agents … to convert
deposits into currency (a banking panic).” (p. 7)
Falling asset values and corporate bankruptcies linked to the collapse in the commercial property market have
provoked an unprecedented increase in banks’ loan losses. These reached Skr 70 billion in 1992 (7.7 per cent of
outstanding loans), up from Skr 36 billion in 1991. Losses are widely expected to remain high in 1993. With the capital
bases of most major banks rapidly eroding, the Government has guaranteed that banks can meet their commitments.
Government rescue operations are officially estimated to burden the 1992/93 budget by Skr 22 billion (1½ per cent of
GDP), with off-budget loans and guarantees amounting to an additional Skr 46 billion (over 3 per cent of GDP). It is not
known what scale of rescue operations will be needed in the 1993/94 budget.
Finally, in discussing risks to the outlook, the OECD stated, “greater weakness of demand could be accentuated by rising
capital costs in the event of larger loan losses. This would … risk reducing credit supply” (p. 115).
This episode is similar to Norway in 1992:2 and Finland in 1993:1. The most obvious difference is that in this case, the OECD
devoted a sentence in its summary to the financial-market problems. But the financial system was starting from a slightly
better position than Finland’s was (as described above, we code Sweden in 1992:2 as a minor crisis–regular, whereas we
classify Finland in 1992:2 as a minor crisis–plus). And, in contrast to the discussion of Norway, there was no explicit
reference to firms facing difficulties in obtaining financing. We therefore also classify this episode as a moderate crisis–
regular.
Measure of Financial Distress (0 to 15)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1967:1
1968:2
1970:1
Japan
Finland
1971:2
1973:1
1974:2
1976:1
1977:2
France
Norway
1979:1
1980:2
1982:1
1983:2
1985:1
Sweden
1986:2
Germany
1988:1
Figure 1
1989:2
1991:1
1992:2
Turkey
Iceland
1994:1
1995:2
1997:1
1998:2
Italy
2000:1
New Measure of Financial Distress
2001:2
2003:1
United States
2004:2
2006:1
Comparison to Other Chronologies
10
12
14
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0
2
4
6
8
1986:1 1988:2
1987:1 1989:2
1988:1 1990:2
Reinhart
& Rogoff
Reinhart
1989:1 1991:2 & Rogoff
1990:1 1992:2
Romer
Romer
& Romer
1991:1
& Romer
1993:2
a. Finland
c. Norway
1992:1 1994:2
1993:1 1995:2
IMF
1994:1 1996:2
IMF
1995:1 1997:2
1996:1 1998:2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0
2
4
6
8
1981:1 1990:1
1982:1 1991:1
1992:1
1983:1
Reinhart
& Rogoff
1993:1
1984:1
1994:1
Reinhart
& Rogoff
1985:1 1995:1
1986:1 1996:1
1987:1 1997:1
IMF
b. Japan
1998:1
1988:1
1999:1
d. United States
1989:1
2000:1
Romer
1990:1
& Romer
2001:1
Romer
& Romer
1991:1 2002:1
IMF
1992:1 2003:1
Comparison of Crisis Chronologies for Key Episodes
1993:1 2004:1
2005:1
1994:1
2006:1
Estimating the Relationship between Output
and Financial Distress
• Panel Data
• GDP or IP for 24 countries, 1967-2007.
• Both distress and output are semiannual.
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-2
-4
-6
-8
Half-Years After the Impulse
Figure 3
Impulse Response Function, Output to Distress
b. GDP, Full Sample
1
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of Real GDP (Percent)
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5
-6
-7
-8
Half-Years After the Impulse
Measure of Financial Distress (0 to 15)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1967:1
1968:2
1970:1
Japan
Finland
1971:2
1973:1
1974:2
1976:1
1977:2
France
Norway
1979:1
1980:2
1982:1
1983:2
1985:1
Sweden
1986:2
Germany
1988:1
Figure 1
1989:2
1991:1
1992:2
Turkey
Iceland
1994:1
1995:2
1997:1
1998:2
Italy
2000:1
New Measure of Financial Distress
2001:2
2003:1
United States
2004:2
2006:1
Figure 4
Impulse Response Function, Output to Distress
b. GDP, No-Japan Sample
8
6
Response of Real GDP (Percent)
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-2
-4
-6
• Other concerns?
2
Response of Real GDP (Percent)
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-2
-4
-6
-8
Half-Years After the Impulse
Allowing for Nonlinearity
(3) 𝑦𝑗,𝑡+𝑖 = 𝛼𝑗𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽 𝑖 𝑓(𝐹𝑗,𝑡 ) + ∑4𝑘=1 𝜑𝑘𝑖 𝑓(𝐹𝑗,𝑡−𝑘 ) + ∑4𝑘=1 𝜃𝑘𝑖 𝑦𝑗,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝑒𝑗,𝑡
𝑖
1 1
0 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-1
-2 -2
-3 -3
-4 -4
-5 -5
-6 -6
-7 -7
Half-Years After the Impulse
Half-Years After the Impulse
Reinhart and Rogoff’s Evidence on
The Aftermath of Financial Crises
Note: variables are expressed as an index=0 two half-years before the crisis.
Explaining the Variation Across Episodes
Note: variables are expressed as an index=0 two half-year before the crisis.
Conclusions