1. PEO v.

TAN

Topic: Carbon sheets; All of the sheets so written on are regarded as the duplicate originals and either of
them may be introduced in evidence as such without accounting for the non-production of the others.

Parties:

P:

R: charged with the crime of falsification of public documents

Facts:

 P presented to a witness (salesman who issued triplicates) a booklet of receipts which were
triplicate copies
 Original invoices were sent to Manila office; duplicates to the customers
 In preparing receipts two carbons were inserted between sheets
 2nd witness: original practice of keeping the og no longer prevails as the og are given to the
customers
 LC: trip not admissible unless it is first proven that the ogs were lost and can not be produced
 P not be able to secure the prod of og on account of the loss; pet for certiorari

Issue: W/N triplicates were admissible? Y

Held:

 "When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so that the
writing of a contract upon the outside sheet, including the signature of the party to be charged
thereby, produces 2 facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such signature being thus reproduced
by the same stroke of the pen which made the surface or exposed impression, all of the sheets
so written on are regarded as duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced in
evidence as such without accounting for the nonproduction of the others." (Moran, 1952 ed., p.
444.)

2. ROBLES v. LIZARRAGA

Topic: The rule that a preliminary or contemporaneous agreement is not admissible to vary a written
contract appears to have more particular reference to the obligation expressed in the written
agreement, and the rule had never been interpreted as being applicable to matters of consideration or
inducement.

Parties:

P: co-owner & lessee of property

R: mercantile partnership

Facts:

 Hacienda belonged og to parents of P. Father died, Mother administratrix, leased to P for 6

years.
  P introduced improvements, some materials of wc were purchased from R. M died.
 R proposed to buy properties belonging to the estate including leased land, proposed to P to
surrender the lease over the property, agreeing to pay the value of the improvements.
 Agreement not reduced to writing, not included in instrument of conveyance of property to R.
 P filed action for recovery of compensation and damages
 P introduced ini evidence letter in which reference was made to an appraisal and liquidation wc
they claim evidence of the agreement, but vague, not be taken as sufficient proof by itself, but
believed by LC to otherwise proved by oral testimony

Issue: W/N oral testimony may be admitted? Y

Held:

 The rule that a preliminary or contemporaneous oral agreement is not admissible to vary a
written contract appears to have more particular reference to the obligation expressed in the
written agreement, and the rule had never been interpreted as being applicable to matters of
consideration or inducement.
 In the case before us the written contract is complete in itself; the oral agreement is also
complete in itself, and it is a collateral to the written contract, notwithstanding the fact that it
deals with related matters.

3. PNB v. SEETO

Topic: an extrinsic agreement between indorser and indorsee which cannot be embodied in the
instrument without impairing its credit is provable by parol

Parties:

P: indorsee, Surigao branch

R: indorser

Facts:

 The check was dated at Cebu – Mar 10, 1948

 R made a general and unqualified indorsement of the check, accepted by P, and pd R the
amount – Mar 13, 1948
 P presented to drawee bank, dishonored for insufficient fund – Apr 9, 1948
 P wrote R demanding immediate refund, refused by R, claiming that at the timie fo the
negotiation funds were sufficient had P not delayed in forwarding the check and the same
would have been pd
 P filed a complaint alleging that R gave assurance that the drawer had sufficient funds; R denied;
 LC: found for P; CA: reversed

Issue: W/N the verbal assurances is a collateral agreement admissible as an exception to PER – N

Held:
  And Wigmore states that "an extrinsic agreement between indorser and indorsee which cannot
be embodied in the instrument without impairing its credit is provable by parol." (9 Wigmore
148, section 2445 [3].)
 If, therefore, the supposed assurances that the drawer had funds and that the respondent
herein would refund the amount of the check if the drawer had no funds, were the
considerations or reasons that induced the branch agency of the petitioners to go out of its
ordinary practice of not cashing out of town checks and accept the check and to pay its face
value, the same would be provable by parol,
 provided, of course, that the assurances or inducements offered would not vary, alter, or
destroy the obligations attached by law to the indorsement.
 We find, however, that the supposed assurances of refund in case of dishonor of the check are
precisely the ordinary obligations of an indorser, and these obligations are, under the law,
considered discharged by an unreasonable delay in the presentation of the check for payment.

4. WOODHOUSE v. HALILII

Topic: His acts or statements prior to the agreement are essential and relevant to the determination of
the issue: to prove whether the representations or inducements, or fraud, with which or by which he
secured the other party’s consent; expressly excluded from PER

Parties:

P: represented himself as an owner/prospective of an exclusive bottling franchise

R: induced to be a party to an agreement to establish with P

Facts:

 P informed Mission Dry, manufacturer of bases and ingredients of beverages, that he had
interested R in the business who was willing to invest, and requested that such right to bottle
and distribute be granted him for a limited period under the condition that it would be
transferred to the “soon to be put up” corporation; granted
 Negotiations between P and R; entered into a written agreement: organize a part, R to decide
matters of general policy, P secure with MD, P to receive 30% of net profit
 Franchise agreement was entered into between MD and P & R, granted R exclusive right
 As operations had begun, P demanded that R execute the partnership papers, latter refused as
well giving further allowances
 P filed complaint for the execution of the papers, accounting of the profits, and the share 30%
and damages
 R alleges by defense, the he gave his consent upon the representation by P that he was the
owner/about to be of an excl which was false and not secured by P but by R himself
 LC: ruled in favor of P, except for the execution of the papers

Issue: W/N acts or statements prior to the agreement may be admitted to evidence – Y

Held:
  The issue of fact is: Did plaintiff represent to defendant that he had an exclusive franchise?
Certainly, his acts or statements prior to the agreement are essential and relevant to the
determination of said issue.
 The act or statement of the plaintiff was not sought to be introduced to change or alter the
terms of the agreement, but to prove how he induced the defendant to enter into it — to prove
the representations or inducements, or fraud, with which or by which he secured the other
party's consent thereto.
 These are expressly excluded from the parol evidence rule.
 Furthermore, the parol evidence rule expressly allows the evidence to be introduced when the
validity of an instrument is put in issue by the pleadings (section 22, par. (a), Rule 123, Rules of
Court),as in this case.

5. YU TEK and CO v. GONZALES

Topic: No clause in the written contract wc even remotely suggests such a condition; cannot be
considered to be added by PE; the rights of the parties must be determined by the writing itself.

Parties:

P: contracted with R

R: obligated itself to produce and deliver piculs of sugar

Facts:

 P & R executed a contract, containing the terms and conditions

 P filed a complaint, proved that no sugar had been delivered nor had it been able to recover the
amount paid; TC: rendered judgm for R to pay P
 On appeal, R alleges that TC erred in not allowing him too present PE to show that the parties
intended that the ssugar was tto be secured from the crop wc the defendant raised on his
platation and that he was unable to fulfill the contract by reason of the almost total failure of
his crop, such not included in the contract

Issue: W/N TC erred in refusing to allow R to present PE – N

Held:

 In the case at bar, it is sought to show that the sugar was to be obtained exclusively from the
crop raised by the defendant. There is no clause in the written contract which even remotely
suggests such a condition.
 Our conclusion is that the condition which the defendant seeks to add to the contract by parol
evidence cannot be considered. The rights of the parties must be determined by the writing
itself.

6. LECHUGAS v. CA

Topic: PER does not apply where at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to
the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right
originating in it the instrument or the relation established thereby.
Parties:

P: buyer of land

R: illiterate seller of land

Facts:

 P bought land in dispute from Lansague as evidenced by a DOAS and registered, paid taxes, and
leased
 P filed a complaint for forcible entry claiming that R unlawfully entered the lots in dispute
 Tenant corroborated P’s declaration; LC dismissed; appealed
 R maintain that the land purchased by P from Lansague was different from the land in dispute
 P was called to testify regarding the identity of the land, refused
 R claim that the property sold is situated south of the land in dispute
 Lansague testified for R, able to specifically point out the land wc she sold to P
 CA: affirmed the dismissal

Issue: W/N CA erred in considering PE over objection of P – N

Held:

 the parol evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by either party to the
litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of
a party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or
assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby.
 The petitioner's reliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. The rule is not applicable
where the controversy is between one of the parties to the document and third persons. The
deed of sale was executed by Leoncia Lasangue in favor of Victoria Lechugas. The dispute over
what was actually sold is between petitioner and the private respondents.
 From the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion but that Lasangue did not intend to sell as
she could not have sold, a piece of land already sold by her father to the predecessor-in-interest
of the respondents.

7. LASEDECO v. GARCIA

Topic: Although a document is usually to be interpreted in the precise terms in which it is couched,
Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may admit evidence of surrounding circumstances, in order
to arrive at the true intention of the parties

Parties:

P: seller of tractors

R: buyer of tractors; executed PN, assuming personal liability

Facts:

 P filed a case of specific performance of contract v. R for the recovery of a sum representing the
unpaid balance of tractors
  R admitted the execution of PN, argued that they entered into a subsequent agreement for an
extension contained in a letter sent by Manager from to May 31, 1957, argued that the claim
was premature
 P replied, admitted the due execution and genuineness of the letter but contended that the
same did not express the true and intent agreement
 On trial, when R was about to present Atty. To testify on the TIA, Judge ruled out the testi and
prevented the intro of evidence under PER, same went for P who would present Atty.
 LC: dismissed, premature; CA: certified to CA

Issue: W/N judge erred in excluding PE tending to prove TIA of parties and the existence of a condition
precedent before the extension granted contained in the letter – Y

Held:

 When the operation of the contract is made to depend upon the occurrence of an event, which,
for that reason is a condition precedent, such may be established by parol evidence. This is not
varying the terms of the written contract by extrinsic agreement, for the simple reason that
there is no contract in existence; there is nothing to which to apply the excluding rule
 The rule excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a writing, does not extend so far as to
preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence, to show prior or contemporaneous collateral parol
agreements between the parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of whether or
not the written agreement contains reference to such collateral agreement
 and although a document is usually to be interpreted in the precise terms in which it is couched,
Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may admit evidence of surrounding circumstances, in
order to arrive at the true intention of the parties

8. MAULINI v. SERRANO

Topic: the purpose of the prohibition is to prevent alteration, change, modification, or contradiction of
the terms of a written agreement by the use of PE, except in cases specifically named in the section;
when the purpose was to show that no contract of indorsement ever existed, PE should be allowed.

Parties:

P: indorsee of PN

R: indorser of PN

Facts:

 P brought an axn upon the COI alleged to have been made in his favor by R
 LC received PE provisionally: R was a broker, done IMENT at the special request of P aand R to
take PN in his own name, that PN was always owned by P and not R
 LC rendered it inadmissible and refused to consider it; that R in making the IMENT was acting as
agent of P, immaterial w/n there was consid, that R was an accommodation IER; Appeal

Issue: W/N under NIL an IER of PN may, in an axn brought by his IEE show by PE that the IMENT was wo
consideration – Y
Held:

 In the case at bar this was done at the special request of the indorsee and simply as a favor to
him, the latter stating to the broker that he did not wish his name to appear on the books of the
borrowing company as a lender of money and that he desired that the broker take the note in
his own name, immediately transferring to him title thereto by indorsement. This was done, the
note being at once transferred to the lender.
 Nor was the defendant an accommodation indorser. Such a person is liable on the instrument to
a holder for value, notwithstanding such holder at the time of taking the instrument knew the
same to be only an accommodation party.
 The accommodation to which reference is made in the section quoted is not one to the person
who takes the note — that is, the payee or indorsee, but one to the maker or indorser of the
note. It is true that in the case at bar it was an accommodation to the plaintiff, in a popular
sense, to have the defendant indorse the note; but it was not the accommodation described in
the law, but, rather, a mere favor to him and one which in no way bound Serrano.
 The purpose of that prohibition is to prevent alternation, change, modification or contradiction
of the terms of a written instrument, admittedly existing, by the use of parol evidence, except in
the cases specifically named in the section. The case at bar is not one where the evidence
offered varies, alters, modifies or contradicts the terms of the contract of indorsement
admittedly existing. The evidence was not offered for that purpose. The purpose was to show
that no contract of indorsement ever existed; that the minds of the parties never met on the
terms of such contract; that they never mutually agreed to enter into such a contract; and that
there never existed a consideration upon which such an agreement could be founded.

9. CANUTO v. MARIANO

Topic: The rule forbidding the admission of parol or extrinsic evidence does not apply when PE does not
in any way deny that the original agreement was that wc the writing purports to express, but merely
goes to show that the parties have exercised their right to change or abrogate the same, or to make a
new and independent con

Parties:

P: seller of land

R: buyer of land

Facts:

 P executed a DOS in favor of R reserving the right to repurchase within one year, having elapsed
and P having failed, R set up absolute right over the land.
 P testified that prior to the expiration, she asked R for an extension upon the promise to make
such during the month, to wc the latter agreed, and that R failed to appear on the time and
place on such date and has refused since that time to execute a DORS
 Pascual who was present when the oral agreement corroborated P’s testimony
 LC: accepted testimony of P as true, ordered execution of DORS; appeal

Issue: W/N the judge erred in accepting the testi – N

Held:

 The contention that the plaintiff should not be permitted to alter, vary, or contradict the terms
of the written instrument by the introduction of oral evidence is manifestly untenable under the
circumstances of the case, as will readily appear from the following citation from 17 Cyc., p. 734,
and numerous cases cited in support of the doctrine:
 The rule forbidding the admission of parol or extrinsic evidence to alter, vary, or contradict a
written instrument does not apply so as to prohibit the establishment by parol of an agreement
between the parties to a writing, entered into subsequent to the time when the written
instrument was executed, notwithstanding such agreement may have the effect of adding to,
changing, modifying, or even altogether abrogating the contract of the parties as evidenced by
the writing; for the parol evidence does not in any way deny that the original agreement of the
parties was that which the writing purports to express, but merely goes to show that the parties
have exercised their right to change or abrogate the same, or to make a new and independent
contract.
 It makes no difference how soon after the execution of the written contract the parol one was
made. If it was in fact subsequent and is otherwise unobjectionable it may be proved and
enforced.
 settled rule in this jurisdiction is that a bona fide offer or tender of the price agreed upon for the
repurchase is sufficient to preserve the rights of the party making it, without the necessity of
making judicial deposit, if the offer or tender is refused;

10. MADRIGAL v. CA

Topic: even when a doc appears on its face to be a sale, the owner of the property may prove that the
contract is really a loan w mortgage by raising as an issue the fact that the doc does not express the true
intent of the parties, in this case PE then becomes competent and admissible

Parties:

P: Eq MEE of land of father

R: Father of P, Eq MOR

Facts:

 R are owners of land. In need off money for W travel abroad, H thought of mortgaging the
property to a bank. P convinced R instead to assign to him the land for a consideration. P
assured R that he will not dispose of the prop and that the latter can redeem such any time.
 DOAS was executed, wc did not reflect the true identity of the prop
 Subsequently, P sold prop to a longtime neighbor
 R filed before LC for annulment, redemption and damages; LC: judgm for P; CA: affirmed

Issue: W/N the CS erred in construing the DOAS as an EQM – N

Held:

 We rule and so hold that both courts correctly construed the aforementioned Deed of Absolute
Sale as an equitable mortgage and not a sale, as it purports to be.
  Evidence clearly shows that there was indeed no intent to sell the subject property.
 signed a document, a Deed of Sale, although the agreement was only a mortgage. The
consideration appearing in the Deed of Sale is grossly inadequate considering the location of the
property, the area and the fact that it was a two-storey building or house. If the intention was
really to sell, why was there a need for [petitioner Virgilio Mallari] to seek the consent of
[respondent Jose Mallari] if the property will be sold to third person
 Then, too, there is the ruling of this Court in Lustan vs. CA6 to the effect that even if the
document appears to be a sale, parol evidence may be resorted to if the same does not express
the true intent of the parties. In the very words of Lustan:
 mortgage by raising as an issue the fact that the document does not express the true intent of
the parties. In this case, parol evidence then becomes competent and admissible to prove

11. ENRIQUEZ v. RAMOS

Topic: The rule (wc disallows PE) only holds true if there is allegation that the agreement does not
express the intent of the parties. If there is and this claim is put in issue in the pleadings, the same may
bee the subject of PE.

Parties:

P: seller of land

R: buyer of land for subdv

Facts:

 R purchased land from P. In the CON, it was stipulated that upon failure to pay, the whole
unpaid balance would become immediately demandable; secured by a mortg, recorded.
 P instituted an axn for the foreclosure of the mortg due to R’s breach;
 R set up the affirmative defense that the CON does not express the true agreement of the
parties because the condition wc included among others that P assume the construct of roads in
the lands was not included therein as per P’s counsel advise that such was mandated by QC ord
and deemed part
 LC: dismissed for being premature; appeal

Issue: W/N LC erred in finding that P assumed construction, and such was a condition precedent,
although it was not included in the CON – N

Held:

 After considering and evaluating the evidence submitted by both parties, the court a quo found
defendant's contention well-taken, thereby concluding that the action of plaintiffs was
premature.
 . . . The Court is of the opinion that the construction of the roads was a condition precedent to
the enforcement of the terms of Exhibit A, particularly the foreclosure of mortgage
 This requirement must have been uppermost in the mind of the parties in this case which led to
the execution of the so-called 'Explanation'
 We find no error in the conclusion reached by the court a quo for indeed that is the condition to
be expected by a person who desires to purchase a big parcel of land for purposes of subdivision
 A circumstance which lends cogency to defendant's claim that the commitment of plaintiffs to
construct roads was not inserted in the contract because of the insurance made by their counsel
that it would be a superfluity
 At any rate, the execute of the document Exhibit 3 clarifies whatever doubt may have existed
with regard to the true terms of the agreement on the matter.
 It is argued that the court a quo erred in allowing presentation of parole evidence to prove that
a conteporaneous oral agreement was also reached between parties relative to the construction
of the roads for same is in violation of our rule
 This rule, however, only holds true if there is allegation that the agreement does not express the
intent of the parties. If there is and this claim is in issue in the pleadings, the same may be the
subject parole evidence (Idem.). The fact that such failure has been put in issue in this case is
patent in the answer wherein defendant has specifically pleaded that the contract of sale in
question does not express the true intent of the parties with regard to the construction of the
roads.