2. California Clothing, Inc. and Michelle S. Ybanez vs. Shirley G.

Quinones
G.R. No. 175822 October 23, 2013

Doctrine:
The elements of abuse of rights are as follows: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which
is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in
the exercise of legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acted
in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. Good faith refers to the state of mind which
is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain
from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. Malice or bad
faith, on the other hand, implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act
for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.
Facts:
On July 25, 2001, Shirley G. Quiñones (“Shirley”), a Reservation Ticketing Agent
of Cebu Pacific Air in Lapu Lapu City, went inside the Guess USA Boutique at the second
floor of Robinson's Department Store (Robinson's) in Cebu City. She fitted four items: two
jeans, a blouse and a shorts, then decided to purchase the black jeans worth P2,098.00.
Shirley allegedly paid to the cashier evidenced by a receipt issued by the store. While she
was walking through the skywalk connecting Robinson's and Mercury Drug Store
(Mercury) where she was heading next, a Guess employee approached and informed her
that she failed to pay the item she got. She, however, insisted that she paid and showed
the employee the receipt issued in her favor. She then suggested that they talk about it
at the Cebu Pacific Office located at the basement of the mall. She first went to Mercury
then met the Guess employees as agreed upon.
When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess employees allegedly
subjected her to humiliation in front of the clients of Cebu Pacific and repeatedly
demanded payment for the black jeans. They supposedly even searched her wallet to
check how much money she had, followed by another argument. Shirley, thereafter, went
home.
On the same day, the Guess employees allegedly gave a letter to the Director of
Cebu Pacific Air narrating the incident, but the latter refused to receive it as it did not
concern the office and the same took place while respondent was off duty. Another letter
was allegedly prepared and was supposed to be sent to the Cebu Pacific Office in
Robinson's, but the latter again refused to receive it. Shirley also claimed that the Human
Resource Department (HRD) of Robinson's was furnished said letter and the latter in fact
conducted an investigation for purposes of canceling respondent's Robinson's credit card.
Shirley further claimed that she was not given a copy of said damaging letter.
Guess claimed that there was a miscommunication between the cashier and the invoicer
leading to the erroneous issuance of the receipt to respondent. When they realized the
mistake, they made a cash count and discovered that the amount which is equivalent to
the price of the black jeans was missing. They, thus, concluded that it was Shirley who
failed to make such payment. It was, therefore, within their right to verify from Shirley
whether she indeed paid or not and collect from her if she did not. However, the question
now is whether such right was exercised in good faith or they went overboard giving
respondent a cause of action against them.
Issue:
Whether or not Guess abused their rights.
Ruling:
Yes. The elements of abuse of rights are as follows: (1) there is a legal right or
duty;(2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another. Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person
must, in the exercise of legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he
instead acted in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. Good faith refers to the state
of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the
intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of
another. Malice or bad faith, on the other hand, implies a conscious and intentional design
to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.
Initially, there was nothing wrong with petitioners asking Shirley whether she paid
or not. The Guess employees were able to talk to respondent at the Cebu Pacific Office.
The confrontation started well, but it eventually turned sour when voices were raised by
both parties. Considering, however, that Shirley was in possession of the item purchased
from the shop, together with the official receipt of payment issued by petitioners, the latter
cannot insist that no such payment was made on the basis of a mere speculation. Their
claim should have been proven by substantial evidence in the proper forum.
It is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went overboard
and tried to force Shirley to pay the amount they were demanding. In the guise of asking
for assistance, petitioners even sent a demand letter to Shirley's employer not only
informing it of the incident but obviously imputing bad acts on the part of respondent.
Petitioners claimed that after receiving the receipt of payment and the item purchased,
Shirley "was noted to hurriedly left (sic) the store." Petitioners accused Shirley that
not only did she fail to pay for the jeans she purchased but that she deliberately took the
same without paying for it and later hurriedly left the shop to evade payment. These
accusations were made despite the issuance of the receipt of payment and the release
of the item purchased. There was, likewise, no showing that Shirley had the intention to
evade payment. Contrary to petitioners' claim, Shirley was not in a rush in leaving the
shop or the mall. This is evidenced by the fact that the Guess employees did not have a
hard time looking for her when they realized the supposed non-payment.
It can be inferred from the foregoing that in sending the demand letter to Shirley's
employer, petitioners intended not only to ask for assistance in collecting the disputed
amount but to tarnish Shirley's reputation in the eyes of her employer. To malign Shirley
without substantial evidence and despite the latter's possession of enough evidence in
her favor, is clearly impermissible. A person should not use his right unjustly or contrary
to honesty and good faith, otherwise, he opens himself to liability. The exercise of a right
must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be
excessive or unduly harsh. In this case, petitioners obviously abused their
rights.Therefore, petitioner is held liable for damages.
22. Noel A. Lasanas vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 159031 June 23, 2014

Doctrine:
Any person who contracts a second marriage without first having a judicial declaration of
the nullity of his or her first marriage, albeit its face void and inexistent for lack of a
marriage license, is guilty of bigamy.

Facts:
Noel Lasanas and Socorro Patingo was married on February 16, 1968 without the
benefit of a marriage license. It was solemnized by Judge Salazar. The record shows that
Lasanas and Patingo had not executed any affidavit of cohabitation to excuse the lack of
the marriage license. On August 27, 1980, they reaffirmed their marriage vows in a
religious ceremony. They submitted no marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation for
that purpose. Unfortunately, in 1982, Lasanas and Patingo separated de facto because
of irreconcilable differences.
Accused Lasanas then contracted marriage with Josefa Eslaban on December 27,
1993. Their marriage certificate reflected the civil status of the accused as single. On July
26, 1996, accused filed a complaint for annulment of marriage and damages against
Patingo. However, on November 24, 1998, it was dismissed and declared that the
marriage between Lasanas and Patingo is valid and legal. And in October 1998, Patingo
charged the accused with bigamy.
The accused contended that because he had not been legally married to Patingo,
the first element of bigamy was not established; that his good faith and the absence of
criminal intent were absolutory in his favor; and he had been of the honest belief that
there was no need for a juridical declaration of the nullity of the first marriage before he
could contract a subsequent marriage.
Issue: Whether or not a juridical Declaration of nullity of marriage is necessary before
contracting a subsequent marriage.
Held:
Yes. The requirement of securing a juridical declaration of nullity of marriage is
found in art.40 of the Family Code. The reason for the said provision was also discussed
in the case of Teves vs. People. It was stated that the requirement for a declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his
or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of nullity of
his or her marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy. Also,
if it will allow to contract a subsequent marriage before securing a juridical declaration of
nullity of marriage, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by
immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage and hope that a
favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him.
The law penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during
the subsistence of a valid marriage.
In this case, the crime of bigamy was consummated from the moment he
contracted the second marriage without his marriage to Patingo being first judicially
declared null and void, because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, his
marriage to Patingo was still deemed valid and subsisting due to such marriage not being
yet declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction. Therefore, the contention
of Lasanas is incorrect. It is necessary to secure a juridical declaration of nullity of
marriage before contracting a subsequent marriage. Without such juridical declaration, a
person maybe held guilty of bigamy.
41. Dino vs. Dino
G.R. No. 178044 January 19, 2011

Doctrine:
Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void
ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without
waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties
Facts:
Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño(respondent) started living
together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, they live together again
and got married on 14 January 1998.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag) submitted a psychological report establishing that
respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was incurable and
deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years. The trial court granted the
petition on the ground that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage and declared
their marriage void ab initio. It ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall
only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Trial court, upon motion for partial reconsideration of petitioner, modified
its decision holding that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code.
Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rules and Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages does not apply to article
147 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after
liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code.
Held:
No. Decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the
trial court’s decision without waiting for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the
parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. In the case of Valdes v. RTC, it
was stated that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148
of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the
Court.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article
147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and
respondent.
The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall
be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule
does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies
only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment
under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does
not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family
Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties
of the parties.
In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by
absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties agree
to a complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the
marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community
of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and
distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the
case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage
is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article
36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation
of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-
ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void
marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148
of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses
should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under
Article 496 of the Civil Code, “partition may be made by agreement between the parties
or by judicial proceedings. . .” It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses
in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage. Therefore, Decree of
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial court’s decision
without waiting for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under
Article 147 of the Family Code.