WEEK 9 Skjærseth and Wettestad (2002)

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Understanding the Effectiveness of EU Environmental
Policy: How Can Regime Analysis Contribute?
J. B. Skjærseth; J. Wettestad
Online Publication Date: 23 January 2002

To cite this Article: Skjærseth, J. B. and Wettestad, J. (2002) 'Understanding the
Effectiveness of EU Environmental Policy: How Can Regime Analysis Contribute?',
Environmental Politics, 11:3, 99 - 120
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Understanding the Effectiveness of EU

Environmental Policy:
How Can Regime Analysis Contribute?
J O N B I R G E R S K J Æ R S E T H and J Ø R G E N
WE T T E STAD
The study of EU environmental policy consequences tends to focus on how EU

legislation output is formally implemented in the Member States and its impact in terms
of the state of the European environment. The crucial outcome dimension linking output
to impact has, however, received scant attention. Outcome points to changes in the
behaviour of relevant target groups causing the problems in the first place. Accordingly,
we know little about the causal relationships between EU environmental policy and the
state of the European environment. This article examines whether the study of regime-
effectiveness has something to contribute in order to bridge this gap. Since EU
legislation comes close to the notion of international regimes in the implementation
phase, this article argues that analysis and analyses of regime effectiveness can
contribute important insights about how to evaluate and explain the effectiveness of EU
environmental policy. In particular, the regime analysis perspective is important for
understanding how interaction between EU directives and international environmental
regimes affects the performance of EU environmental policy and vice versa. However,
the study of regime effectiveness has clear limitations in the domestic context. Moreover,
regime analysis has much to learn from EU studies particularly related to environmental
policy integration.
Introduction
In 1998, EU environmental policy celebrated its twentieth anniversary,
and the study of this policy development has also matured considerably
over time.1 Recent research indicates a gap in the EU between what is
delivered in terms of policies – or outputs – and what is achieved ‘on the
ground’ in terms of environmental improvement – or impact. On the one
hand, the impact assessments of the European Environmental Agency
Jon Birger Skjærseth and Jørgen Wettestad are Senior Researchers based at the Fridtjof Nansen
Institute in Norway. This article builds upon the FNI working paper ‘The Study of EU
Environmental Policy: Can Regime Theory Further Our Understanding’ [Skjærseth and
Wettestad, 2000]. Some sections have also benefited greatly from the Concerted Action agenda-
setting paper written by Clare Coffey, Andy Jordan and Jørgen Wettestad [Coffey, Jordan and
Wettestad, 2000]. In addition, the authors would like to thank Neil Carter, Jonas Tallberg, Olav
Schram Stokke and Steinar Andresen for very useful comments.
Environmental Politics, Vol.11, No.3, Autumn 2002, pp.99–120
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
100 E N V I R O N M E N TA L P O L I T I C S
(EEA) indicate that the quality of the European environment is

deteriorating [EEA, 1999, 2000, 2001]. On the other hand, the EU
institutional machinery has produced a comprehensive environmental
policy in depth and scope: about 300 environmental regulations, directives
and decisions have been adopted to date. What is then the causal
relationship between these apparently contradictory developments? This
question is extremely hard to answer conclusively since the crucial
outcome dimension linking outputs and impact has received scant
attention so far. Outcome points to change in behaviour among relevant
target groups causing the problems in the first place, such as industry,
agriculture and transport. Accordingly, we know little about the causal
relationships between EU environmental policy and the state of the
European environment.
If we are to improve the functioning of EU institutions in the field of the
environment, we will have to learn from previous experience and practice.
In particular, we need some idea of ‘well functioning’ in contrast to
‘malfunctioning’ that is, we need to know what constitutes effectiveness in
this field. As will be further elaborated later, one core element of
effectiveness is change in the behaviour of target groups at national and sub-
national levels caused by the institution in question. Hence, effectiveness is
a wider concept than implementation and compliance, which are confined
to the follow-up of a specific policy. For instance, as compliance with EU
climate policy targets can be achieved by energy switching or economic
fluctuations having absolutely nothing to do with EU climate policy, this
type of information may not tell us anything about the effectiveness of EU
climate policy. On the other hand, substantial knowledge about the
implementation of EU directives is an important building block in
effectiveness studies.
Although greater attention has been given to the consequences of EU
environmental policy over time, there are very few studies explicitly
focusing on how to evaluate the effectiveness of EU environmental policy.
Moreover, there are also few systematic empirical case studies of EU
environmental policy specifically aimed at explaining effectiveness or
related outcomes.2 Understanding more about the causes linking policy to
impact is a precondition for improving the policy itself. Against this
backdrop, the second section of this article provides a brief review of the
study of EU environmental policy in practice.
The extent to which analysis of regime effectiveness [for example,
Andresen and Wettestad, 1995; Young and Levy, 1999; Miles et al., 2001]
has something to contribute in the study of EU environmental policy
depends on whether it makes sense to compare EU environmental policy
with environmental regimes. Since opinions vary on this matter, the third
EF FECTIV ENESS OF EU ENVI RONM ENTA L P O L I C Y 101

section deals with the question of whether it is helpful to treat the EU as an
international regime or a set of interconnected regimes.3
In the fourth section, we ask to what extent and how we can define and
measure the effectiveness of EU environmental policy in the same way as
we define and measure the effectiveness of international regimes. Insights
from regime effectiveness analysis can inspire EU scholars to focus more
explicitly on the effectiveness of EU environmental policy.
Fifthly, to what extent and how can we explain the effectiveness of EU
policies using the same explanatory perspectives as applied to regime
studies? Due to the supranational qualities of the EU there has been an
understandable tendency in the study of EU environmental policy to focus
more upon institutional aspects than problem-types and related actor
interests and norms. However, a common challenge exists in combining the
study of international and domestic institutions since most transnational
environmental problems arise as consequences of domestic activities.
Moreover, in most areas of transnational environmental problems there
is a core environmental regime interacting with EU environmental policy.
In fact, the EU participates in 31 major international environmental
agreements spanning from the 1979 Convention of Migratory Species of
Wild Animals to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change [Vogler, 1999]. The performance of EU environmental
policy is difficult to understand without focusing on the interaction between
the EU and international regimes in issue areas where a core regime exists.
While the focus of this article mainly lies on how regime analysis and
analyses can further our understanding of EU environmental policy, the
study of EU environmental policy also has much to contribute to the study
of international regimes. Coming primarily from the field of regime theory,
we shall leave most of the lessons which can be drawn from the study of EU
environmental policy to others with more experience in this field.
Nevertheless, we shall indicate some possible lessons to be learned from EU
studies; particularly related to institutional capacity and environmental
policy integration.
Empirical examples are primarily drawn from the issue areas of marine
pollution, acid rain, ozone depletion and climate change. As this article
should be seen as a ‘think-piece’, rather than a paper based on extensive
empirical research on EU environmental policy, these cases primarily serve
illustrative purposes.
The Study of EU Environmental Policy in Practice

New volumes on EU environmental policy are published at a faster rate than
our ability to read, digest and review them.4 However, empirical case studies
aimed at evaluating and explaining effectiveness are still short in supply.

The study of compliance and implementation, however, has a longer history
within the EU than within regime studies, and central concepts have been
defined in response to the somewhat special EU decision-making context.
‘Compliance’ within the EU context refers to the incorporation/
transposition of EU legislation into national law and the subsequent
notification of the Commission of this act. Determining whether the ends
specified in the legislation/directive are achieved is referred to as
‘Application’.5 Initially, much more attention within the EU system was
given to compliance issues than to implementation/application issues, but
this balance has been changing.6 Over time, interesting overview articles on
these issues from the first part of the 1990s have been increasingly
supplemented by more specific compliance and application case studies and
information. For example, the Manuals of Environmental Policy produced
by the Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP) focus on
implementation of EU directives in Spain, France, UK and, in the near
future, the Netherlands.
Our impression is, however, that most studies so far tend to give most
attention to the more easily studied and measured compliance/transposition
stage, but address the degree and background of actual behavioural impact
in less detail. [e.g., Evans, 1979; Gormley, 1986; Dashwood and White,
1989; Burrows et al., 1993]. From a political science point of view, many of
the ‘implementation’ studies are descriptive rather than theoretically
informed and focus on single, non-cumulative case studies.
This general picture is strengthened if we turn to the role of the EU
institutions in implementing EU environmental policy. The Commission has
a central policy-initiating function, but it also plays a crucial role in the
execution and follow-up of environmental legislation. There are several
interesting contributions to knowledge on the role of the Commission in
environmental policy-making, offering bits and pieces to this issue [e.g.,
Edwards and Spence, 1997; Wurzel, 1999]. However, we seem to know far
more about the role of the Commission in policy-making than in the process
of implementation and ultimately policy effectiveness.
In the EU, complex decision-making procedures have evolved, under
which the European Parliament has been given more power and there is
greater use of majority-voting within the Council of Ministers. The 1997
Amsterdam Treaty broadened the application of the co-decision procedure
to cover Directives adopted on the basis of the ‘environmental’ paragraph
130s; hence increasing the decision-making role of the Parliament further.
The study of procedural development and the role of the European
Parliament in the environmental context seems mainly to consist of a
number of helpful, but quite general contributions, with case studies of the

practical impact (not least of the important Maastricht Treaty changes) in
relatively short supply [e.g., Weale, 1996; Jordan, 1998; Golub, 1999].
A large body of literature also exists focusing on general and specific
political principles underlying EU environmental policy, such as the
Environmental Action Programmes [e.g., Hildebrand, 1993; Johnson and
Corcelle, 1995; Collier, 1997]. Other work concentrates more on specific
principles, particularly related to subsidiarity [e.g., Wils, 1994; Golub,
1996; Collier, 1997]. The analysis of the core principles underlying EU
environmental policy is extremely valuable to anyone who wants to
understand the development of EU environmental policy, but we still know
little about their impact on target groups and the state of the environment.
Regimes versus the EU: Similar Implementation Challenges?

As pointed out in the introduction, opinions vary as to the extent to which the
EU can be treated as an international regime. Clarifying this question is
important to judge the relevance of core regime variables for the study of EU
policy and particularly for assessing the impact of international institutions
on member-states [Breckinridge, 1997]. In addition, complementary
approaches will enhance our ability to study interaction between the EU and
international regimes. Let us start by taking the standard definition of a
regime: ‘social institutions consisting of agreed-upon principles, norms,
rules, procedures and programs that govern the interaction of actors in
specific issue areas’ [Levy et al., 1995: 274].
The first difference to note is that the EU covers many issue areas while
international regimes are defined according to specific issue areas. In the
study of international environmental regimes, we talk about the ozone regime
and the climate regime defined in terms of norms, rules and principles that
consistently apply in a given issue area. By contrast, EU procedures, norms
and rules apply to a number of issue areas. Still, the EU is clearly a social
institution consisting of the same core elements as international regimes –
principles, norms, rules, procedures and programmes.
In spite of conceptual complementarity, the EU is clearly much more than
an international regime: EU members have actually transferred national
sovereignty to a supranational institution. Accordingly, when adopted, EU
laws are directly binding on the member states rather than requiring member
states to ratify joint commitments, as is the case within international regimes.
The EU is also a historically well-developed institution, with bodies that
enjoy significant autonomy. The Commission is a very different animal
compared to, for instance, the Ozone Secretariat, and the Council of
Ministers is something quite different from the annual co-operative meeting
of the parties within the framework of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change. In addition, there is nothing which is even

similar to the directly elected EU Parliament within international regimes. In
other words, the EU is clearly something more – in terms of institutional
competence and capacity – than an international regime.
In a broader perspective, the EU is not only something more than
environmental regimes, but also substantially different in nature. It started
out as an European Economic Community back in 1957, and the
environment was not added to the agenda until the 1970s. Moreover, as
indicated, the Community/Union has acquired several supra-national traits
along the way. However, the tension between what Hoffman [1966: 881]
refers to as the ‘logic of integration’ (Europeanism) and the ‘logic of
diversity’ (nationalism) is inscribed in the sharing of competence between
the ‘nationalism’ of member states in the Council and the ‘Europeanism’ of
the Commission, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Parliament.
Some member states are pushing for faster and closer integration while
others are fighting for their autonomy. Thus, the EU displays elements of
both inter-governmentalism and supranationalism, being neither a
federation nor an international organisation [Wallace, 1983]. This is also
reflected in the study of the dynamics of EU integration based on two
principal strands of International Relations theory: neofunctionalism and
intergovernmentalism.
The balance between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism differs
over time and according to specific issue-areas. The EU behaves more like
an international regime in energy and environmental policy than in
agricultural policy. In addition, the balance may vary between different
phases or stages of the policy cycle within individual sectors. While agenda
setting and particularly decision making differ, the implementation of EU
environmental policy still remains largely in the hands of the member states
even though EU laws are directly binding on the member states. In essence,
the similarities between international environmental regimes and EU
environmental policy are actually quite striking concerning policy
implementation, here understood as the process leading towards
behavioural change required at the domestic level (outcome). This is
because the EU has strong policymaking powers but comparatively weak
powers of implementation and enforcement. Thus EU environmental
legislation or clusters of legislation applying to specific issue-areas come
close to the notion of environmental regimes. For example, there is a high
degree of congruence between the regime for controlling marine pollution
in the North-East Atlantic with a particular focus on the North Sea and EU
Directives relevant for marine pollution [Skjærseth, 2000a].
The main formal difference between regime and EU implementation lies
in the fact that EU Directives, once adopted, impose legal obligations

directly upon the member states. Even if a member state fails to implement
the legislation properly, it is still binding on the member state and can be
relied upon in national courts. In certain cases, failure to comply with EU
law can even result in successful awards for damages to individuals who
have suffered a loss as a consequence. National courts are required to
interpret national laws in line with the EU obligations that the laws
implement (sympathetic interpretation). The existence and role of the ECJ
is also unique, although its regime counterpart is in the international court
in the Hague. Since 1993, the ECJ may impose fines on states who have
failed to observe previous rulings of the court. This provision is currently
being applied for the first time against Greece for its failure to observe a
court ruling concerning waste management in Crete. The Commission is
also able to exert pressure on the member states to observe provisions of EU
environmental law. Despite these formal differences the implementation of
environmental policy lies largely in the hands of member states in the EU
as well as in international regimes.
To conclude, the EU is clearly different from international regimes as to
its scope, depth, nature and competence. However, EU environmental
legislation in specific issue areas faces many of the same implementation
challenges as international environmental regimes. Implementation
represents the ‘sharp end’ of the EU policy process where supranational
institutions meet a decentralised policy delivery system in which the
member states play the dominant role [Jordan, 1999].
Evaluating Effectiveness : The Crucial and Challenging Phase of

Outcome
Since the EU can be approached as an environmental regime in the phase of
implementation, the next question is: to what extent and how can we apply
evaluation insights from the field of regime effectiveness to EU
environmental policies? First, against the backdrop of the neglect of
effectiveness in EU environmental policy studies, regime analysis can
contribute with a rich and diversified academic discussion as well as
empirical case studies of effectiveness extending over the past ten years
[e.g., Underdal, 1992; Young and von Moltke, 1994; Young, 1994; Levy et
al., 1995; Miles et al., 2001]. Secondly, scholars working within the fields
of the effectiveness of international environmental regimes have applied
and developed quite sophisticated approaches to the concept and substance
of effectiveness that may also be useful for EU scholars as well. Although
much research has focused on effectiveness, there are, of course, other
relevant standards that can be used such as fairness, legitimacy or
robustness.7
Studies of international regimes have evolved rapidly during the last

ten years, from focusing predominantly on regime formation to recent
concern with regime consequences and effectiveness. A somewhat similar
development appears to have taken place in the study of the EU, from
explaining the causes of integration to exploring the consequences of EU
governance. Studies of international regimes have also increasingly drifted
towards the study of international environmental regimes in various issue-
areas, such as climate change, ozone depletion, acid rain and marine pollution.
Regime effectiveness is defined and operationalised in different ways,
but all analysts have to deal with at least two fundamental questions: how
can we measure what has been achieved – and how can we relate actual
achievements to some standard, or criterion for what can be achieved?
Concerning the former question, international environmental regimes as
well as EU environmental policy produce a chain of consequences and
effectiveness can be measured at different points in this chain. Three core
dimensions can be discerned: output, outcome and impact.
Output is conceived as relevant policy, outcome connotes changes in the
behaviour of those subject to the provisions of regimes, while impact
represents the tangible consequences affecting the physical problem at
hand. These dimensions can in turn be further specified: Output can be
divided into the extent to which international obligations are incorporated in
national policy (output1) and whether adequate policy instruments and
measures have been adopted and implemented in accordance with relevant
policy (output2). Note that the scores produced by our evaluations depend
heavily on which phase in the causal chain we are focusing on. In the North
Sea/North-East Atlantic co-operation, for example, the Netherlands had
adopted a more ambitious policy (output1) than Norway, but achieved less
in terms of behavioural change [Skjærseth, 2000a].
In relation to this chain of consequences, two main perspectives in the
measuring of effectiveness have evolved, focusing upon ‘behavioural
change’ and ‘environmental problem solving’. In order to solve resource
and environmental problems, regimes must first produce outputs and induce
greener outcomes. Hence, behavioural change may be seen as a necessary,
but not sufficient, condition for achieving regime effectiveness. It is not
sufficient, as even considerable behavioural change may fall far short of
solving the problem at hand. Recording behavioural change caused by the
regime or institution in question is full of spurious fallacies since such
change can be caused by factors unrelated to the policy in question, like
economic fluctuations and technological innovation. However, interpreting
impacts upon the natural environment is even more complicated: natural
variability makes it difficult to identify human-induced changes over time,
and attributing causes to observed effects is an even more uncertain process.

Hence, political scientists and lawyers tend to focus upon some notion
of behavioural change. Note that any assessment of regime effectiveness
requires causal inference between output and outcome in order to avoid the
spurious fallacies pointed to above. This is extremely important in order to
understand whether it is the policy in question, or other unrelated factors
that have caused observed changes in behaviour. In turn, establishing such
causal links is a precondition for improving the effectiveness of
environmental policy. As pinpointed by Oran Young [2000: 54–5], carrying
out such an analysis is a logical consequence of a behavioural effectiveness
approach, but at the same time a daunting challenge. This is not least so due
to the simple fact that international regimes often contain a high number of
parties. For instance, the Montreal Protocol has over 130 parties.
Aggregating information and national assessments into overall scores and
overriding explanations is a very tall order. In order to cope with this
challenge, we often have to select countries which are representative for
groups of countries according to differences in dependent (effectiveness) or
independent (explanatory) variables. The aggregation problem appears less
serious in the EU than in many global environmental regimes. Still, the
logic of selecting typical or representative cases will clearly be relevant also
in the case of the EU.
Let us take one example from a study on the North Sea/North-East
Atlantic regime on marine pollution [Skjærseth, 2000a]. The joint
obligations considered are the targets of a 50 per cent reduction between
1985 and 1995 of nutrients (to sensitive areas) and 36 specified hazardous
substances. These obligations partly overlap with a number of relevant EU
Directives.8 The study’s main conclusions were that the international
obligations had significantly affected achievements in most North Sea states,
but some countries and sectors had achieved significantly more than others.
This study overcame the aggregation problem by selecting three countries –
Norway, the Netherlands and the UK – representative in terms of marine
pollution exchange of the importers, ‘balanced’ actors, and exporters. The
next step was to check the extent to which these obligations had been
included in national legislation or relevant policy in the selected member
countries (output1). The third step was to check whether domestic follow-up
programmes to achieve these goals had been adopted (output2). The fourth,
and more challenging step, was to analyse the extent to which relevant target
groups (industry, agriculture and municipal waste-water treatment) had
changed their behaviour (in this case measured in terms of emissions of
relevant substances) as a result of the identified change in policy. This was
achieved by a combination of process-tracing and analysis of rival
explanations. The rival explanations considered were: (a) economic
fluctuations affecting activity in the sectors concerned; (b) action taken
anyway due to purely domestic concerns; (c) unrelated (to the regime)
introduction of new technology; (d) alternative ways of disposal; (e) other
relevant international commitments. These factors could only to a limited
extent explain the achievements witnessed. Hence, most of the reductions
witnessed in this case could be traced back to deliberate control and
regulation at national level causally linked to the international commitments.
The most important analytical requirement in any evaluation of what can
be achieved is to make evaluation criteria explicit. As Underdal (1995)
reminds us, we have basically two main alternatives when approaching the
question of what can be achieved. These alternatives may provide us with
significantly different scores. The first alternative is related to the distance
between the actual regime/policy and some notion of the ‘ideal’ solution;
either in economic or, most commonly, environmental terms. Expert advice
is sometimes available concerning resource regimes like fishery regimes, but
many rely on the official purpose of the regime/policy. The second is related
to what would have happened in a hypothetical situation without the regime
or policy. Counterfactual questions are extremely hard to answer
conclusively, but they can be approached by careful analysis of the situation
before the regime or policy was established, or before significant changes in
the regime/policy. The point is that a country or sector can sometimes make
substantial progress without reaching its goals, or conversely; reach its goals
without much effort. For example, the UK has reduced its CO2 emissions
mainly due to the closure of coal mines and shift to natural gas for economic
reasons, while emissions continue to rise in the Netherlands in spite of a
relatively active climate policy throughout the 1990s [VROM, 1999].
As far as we can see, the distinction between output, outcome and
impact as well as the criteria and methodologies used in the study of regime
effectiveness are also applicable to the EU. Consider the case of EU ozone
(Næss, forthcoming). The EU has since 1978 adopted nine resolutions,
decisions and regulations aimed at phasing out ozone depleting substances
(ODS). The member states have included relevant obligations in national
policy (output1) and developed policies and measures to reach the targets
(output2). In turn, target groups have generally followed up and the EU
states are only 10 per cent away from phasing out all ODS within the Union
including production, consumption and trade across borders (outcome).
This will in the long run have positive consequences for the environment
and human health (impact).
Judged against the official purpose of EU ozone policy, achievements
appear highly effective. However, this high score is at least questionable
judged against a hypothetical situation without an EU ozone policy since
most developed countries are in compliance with the Montreal Protocol.
The Montreal Protocol has influenced achievements within the EU to the

extent that the difference between a status quo situation and the current
situation would probably not be dramatically different. The effectiveness
lessons to be drawn will only be of limited value to the extent reductions of
ODS are only weakly causally related to EU ozone policy. The importance
of acknowledging this crucial interaction between international regime
activity and EU policies will be further elaborated in the following section.
To conclude, insights from regime effectiveness analysis can inspire EU
scholars to focus more explicitly on the effectiveness of EU environmental
policy. Insights from such studies can also contribute in bridging the gap in
knowledge concerning causal relationships between EU environmental
policy and impact.
Explaining Effectiveness: Problem-Types, Problem-Solving Capacity

and Interaction Effects
How can we apply explanations of regime effectiveness to EU
environmental policies? First, the study of regime effectiveness may
complement the study of EU environmental policy by a more systematic
focus on differences in problem-types. In particular, the combination of
assumptions treating actors as both rational and consequence oriented and
norm-guided appears as an interesting avenue for explaining effectiveness.
Secondly, the interaction between EU policy and core environmental
regimes operating in the same issue areas appears important for explaining
effectiveness. However, the approaches to the study of EU and regime
institutional attributes share more similarities than differences.
In regime studies, important explanatory perspectives have been built
around the central concepts of interests, power, knowledge/learning and
institutional factors [e.g., Underdal, 1995; Young and Levy, 1999]. The
recently completed effectiveness project led by Ed Miles and Arild
Underdal has benefited from the formulation and application of two central
explanatory perspectives: characteristics of the problem versus problem-
solving capacity.
Problem-types
With regard to the first perspective, the general proposition is that some
problems are solved more effectively than others simply because they are
politically and/or intellectually easier to cope with. This variable highlights
the links between problem-structure, the interests and preferences of
relevant actors, knowledge and effectiveness. For example, it is hard to
understand the differences between the ‘effective’ ozone regime and the
‘ineffective’ climate regime without analysing differences in problem-
structure [Skjærseth, 1992; Wettestad, 1999]. Evolving knowledge about
ecological, technological and economic aspects of the ozone problem

revealed that actors faced a quite ‘benign’ political problem. The same
argument is valid for EU ozone and climate policy. As a minimum, analysts
tend to distinguish between ‘benign` co-ordination or cost-efficiency
problems, and more ‘malign’ collaboration problems caused by externalities
and competition [e.g., Underdal, 1987; Rittberger, 1993; Andresen and
Wettestad, 1995]. The essence of a `malign` problem is incentive distortion,
while cost-efficiency problems are related to imperfect information and
communication failure. The point is that the integrative potential is more
easily tapped when actors are faced with problems of cost efficiency.
Careful problem ‘diagnosis’ is important for explaining change and
variance in effectiveness, as well as for developing adequate collective
solutions and policy instruments. The EU Commission has, for example,
placed more emphasis on voluntary agreements as a new policy instrument in
climate policy in line with the fifth action programme. In 1998, an agreement
between the Commission and European, Japanese and Korean car makers on
curbing CO2 emissions from new passenger cars was adopted. According to
the Commission, the reduction will contribute about 15 per cent of the total
reductions required from the EU under the Kyoto Protocol. However, serious
doubts have recently been voiced as to the shape and content of the
agreement itself and whether intended results will be achieved.9
In addition to the qualities of voluntary agreements, the environmental
effectiveness of such agreements depends heavily on the type of problem to
be solved and they are most likely to work when the problem is
characterised by cost-efficiency [Skjærseth, 2000b]. If target groups such as
car manufacturers maximise expected profits, a company or branch will
enter into an agreement voluntarily only if the expected profit from
participation is greater than the expected profit from not participating. In the
car-makers agreement case, however, an incentive problem probably exists
since entering into and complying with the agreement will involve net costs
for target groups, at least in the short run. If participation is voluntary and
there are no sanctions or subsidies, we would either expect target groups to
refrain from participation or to violate agreements whenever it is in their
interest to do so. In short, such situations call for other types of policy
instruments (regulatory, or economic) which have the capacity to provide
sufficient incentive correction through the logic of ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’.
The problem-type dimension can be further specified according to the
extent to which costs and benefits are concentrated or distributed to society
at large. Since regulatory policy tends to impose costs upon target groups,
we may assume that when such costs are concentrated on specific subgroups
of society while the benefits are widely distributed, there is a high incentive
to oppose relevant policies. Commitments are most difficult to implement

under such circumstances, owing to the risk of vertical disintegration in
environmental policies – meaning that the aggregate of ‘micro decisions’
among target groups may deviate more or less systematically, or
substantially, from higher-order policy goals [Underdal, 1979]. Conversely,
if benefits are concentrated and costs widely distributed, there will be strong
incentives to support relevant policies and implementation is assumed to be
relatively easy under such conditions. This situation may be rare, but it is
perfectly possible that an industrial sector can improve its competitive edge
or achieve profit from environmental regulation. For example, those
producing sewage treatment facilities may profit directly from a stringent
marine policy on nutrient emissions.
When costs and benefits are highly asymmetrically distributed and the
problem or activity in question stems from point sources that are easy to
identify and highly visible, conflict tends to increase. Such situations are
likely to trigger mobilisation of environmental non-governmental
organisations (ENGOs). Such groups tend to represent a counterbalancing
force to reluctant target groups. According to this perspective, we may say
that environmental policy is formed and implemented in the area of tension
between ENGO mobilisation and distribution of costs and benefits among
target groups. Accordingly, the key to explaining implementation and
effectiveness may lie in the relative support and strength among ENGOs
and target groups.
This explanatory perspective helps us to understand why European
industry has delivered significantly more behavioural change in order to
improve the environment than the agriculture sector [Conrad, 1993]. For
example, industry has performed significantly better than agriculture in
reducing marine pollution [Skjærseth, 2000a]. While both sectors
frequently have incentives to oppose stringent regulation, industry has been
exposed to significantly more pressure from ENGOs as compared to
agriculture [ibid.]. In addition, agriculture represents diffuse sources which
are more difficult to control than industrial point sources.
Even though much regime analysis has been based on the assumption
that actors are rational utility maximisers, various combinations of actor
assumptions have recently been explored in theory and applied in practice
[Levy et al., 1995; Young, 1998: 7; Skjærseth, 2000a]. If we assume that
actors have different behavioural mechanisms consisting of cost/benefit
rationality based on the logic of consequence and norms based on the logic
of appropriateness [March and Olsen, 1996] we open the way for a wider
range of explanations than relying on one behavioural mechanism alone.
The logic of appropriateness means that actors under certain conditions may
be more preoccupied with doing the ‘right thing’ than with calculating costs
and benefits. This behaviour mechanisms is, for example, important for
understanding why the UK has ceased dumping of industrial waste in the

North Sea [Skjærseth, 2000a].
In the late 1980s, the UK changed its policy on sea dumping partly due
to internal and external political pressure which increased the political costs
of dumping. However, the principle of dumping at sea as the ‘last option’
was actually included in British legislation in 1985 before internal and
external pressure intensified in the latter part of the 1980s. At the same time,
the UK government, supported by virtually all important domestic actors,
consistently and vehemently argued that dumping at sea had no negative
environmental consequences. The question then becomes: why should
dumping at sea be considered as the ‘last option’ when such activities were
commercially profitable for companies and economic beneficial for the
state, and at the same time were claimed not to harm the environment?
There are strong indications that the British government had internalised
new norms since signing the Oslo and London Conventions on dumping in
the early 1970s. Those responsible for licensing dumping within the
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food changed their attitude over
time, gradually evolving around the idea that using the sea as a trash can is
‘wrong’ in itself.
Problem-Solving Capacity
The other main proposition examined in the Miles et al. project is that
effectiveness may vary due to the problem-solving capacity invested in the
problem. The core of capacity within an institutional perspective are the
regime attributes, that is, agreed upon norms, rules, principles and
procedures such as decision-making rules, funding mechanisms, flexibility,
transparency, implementation review systems, non-compliance procedures
and so forth [Wettestad, 1999]. Regime analysis also puts emphasis on
informal features often referred to as social practices [Young, 1998: 20].
Levy et. al. [1995] have proposed various behavioural ‘models’ through
which international institutions may have an impact. For example, iterative
collective decision-making may lead to various norms of reciprocity.
According to the institutional problem-solving perspective, the ozone
regime may have achieved more than the climate regime owing to a higher
problem-solving capacity. Likewise, the effectiveness of EU climate policy
has been curtailed by limited problem solving capacity. For example, the
requirement of unanimity in the Council of Ministers concerning provisions
of a fiscal nature and energy sources has severely restricted EU efforts to
adopt a common carbon/energy tax.
As far as we can see, the analysis of regime institutional factors does not
add significantly to the study of EU environmental policy. For regime
theorists, EU institutional attributes in fact represent deviant cases in terms

of institutional competence. Accordingly, to some extent, the EU represents
a social laboratory for regime analysts interested in the consequences of
strengthening institutional competence and capacity at the expense of
national sovereignty. For example, the systematic application of qualified
majority voting, funding mechanisms and the peculiar enforcement system
of the European Court of Justice may provide important inputs to the study
of regime attributes. In consequence this may be an important area where
regime studies could benefit from EU-focused research.
Take the case of air pollution policy. When comparing the parallel
processes of developing an EU National Emission Ceilings Directive and
negotiating the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol within the context of the
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP), the
more broad-spanning and advanced EU institutional structure must be taken
into consideration in order to understand the somewhat greater policy
strength achieved within the EU context. In particular, issue-linking seems
to have been a much more prominent feature of the decision-making process
within the EU than within CLRTAP [Wettestad, 2002].
The same argument is valid for the study of the role of domestic political
and administrative institutions concerning implementation and effectiveness
of environmental policy. Some regime effectiveness studies have focused on
domestic variations over how political institutions channel social demands
for environmental protection as well as how administrative institutions differ
in terms of distribution of competence and policy instruments. Nevertheless,
students of regime effectiveness take international relations theory as a point
of departure and regime theory has been repeatedly criticised for being state-
centric [Levy et al., 1995; Newell, 2000].
In contrast, evaluation of EU legislation is frequently researched from
the perspective of domestic policy. There has traditionally been an academic
divide between those working within international relations and those who
study domestic policy and processes. Scholars of public policy evaluations
working within individual states have developed their own approaches to
evaluation focusing on ‘top down’, ‘bottom up’ and a balanced approach
[Sabatier, 1986]. In our view, however, linking the study of international
institutions to the study of domestic political and administrative institutions
represents a common challenge. Since most transnational environmental
problems arise as by-products of otherwise legitimate domestic activities,
like production of energy, food and goods, we have to focus on domestic
and international institutions in order to explain differences in
implementation and effectiveness. Hence, we have to transcend these two
traditional institutional strands of political science in order to integrate
international and domestic politics.
Regime analysis has recently developed towards the study of interplay

and interaction between environmental regimes and between such regimes
and other types of regimes, like those governing international trade. Regime
interplay can be understood as a situation where one regime influences the
effectiveness of another regime [Young, 1996]. This line of thought may
also be applied to the interaction between EU policy and international
regimes [Oberthür and Gehring, 2001]. As noted in the introduction, in
most areas of transnational environmental problems there is a core
environmental regime interacting with EU environmental policy.
In the study of EU water policy, for example, the interaction between the
North Sea/North East-Atlantic regime (NEA-regime) on marine pollution
and relevant EU directives has been largely ignored [e.g., Richardson,
1994; Grant et al.. 2000]. However, since the 1987 International North Sea
Conference (INSC), the NEA regime has actually triggered the adoption of
and partly shaped the content of important EU directives regulating nutrient
emissions as well as discharges of hazardous substances.10 For example, the
NEA regime has directly caused the EU obligation to phase out sewage
sludge dumping in the North Sea included in the Urban Waste Water
Directive. Recently, Para. 17 of the ‘soft law’ Esbjerg Declaration on the
phasing out of hazardous substances within one generation emanating from
the 1995 INSC has served as model for relevant sections in the Water
Framework Directive (2000/60/EC). Conversely, the EU directives on
nutrients and hazardous substances have subsequently strengthened the
implementation of the NEA regime commitments since they carry more
political weight owing to their authoritative force. This synergetic
interaction has been caused by a combination of a high degree of overlap in
membership and institutional differences owing to different functions
fulfilled by ‘soft law’, international law and EU law [Skjærseth, 2001]. Soft
law commitments can, for example, take instant effect, but are vulnerable to
changes in political leadership when they are to be implemented.
Conversely, developing EU law is time-consuming, but such law imposes
direct legal obligations on the member states once adopted.
Another example is the interaction between knowledge-building and
policymaking within the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution (CLRTAP) and EU air pollution policy-making. In order to
understand the recent years process of developing an EU Acidification
Strategy and a National Emission Ceilings Directive, it is essential to
acknowledge the influence of concepts and policy-making approaches that
were developed within the CLRTAP context. Specific examples are the
concept of ‘critical loads’ and the ‘multi-pollutants and multi-effects’
approach [Wettestad, 2002].

The interaction perspective applied to the cross-sectoral nature of the EU
itself is also crucial for understanding the current gap in the EU between
what is delivered and what is achieved, as pinpointed by the EEA. One
important reason for this mismatch between policy and achievements
appears to be that the EU is producing environmental ‘problems’ caused by
other sectors faster than it is finding environmental ‘solutions’. In theory,
one solution is sector-integration, meaning that environmental
considerations are ‘baked into’ the decision-making process in the
‘problem-creating’ sectors themselves, such as transport, energy, industry,
agriculture and so on. As a response to this challenge, a major debate has
commenced along with increasing research into environmental policy
integration (EPI) within the EU [Baldock et al., 1992; Wilkinson, 1997;
Haigh, 1999; Jordan and Lenschow, 2000].
However, the extent to which more ‘integrated’ policies also mean better
implemented policies is contestable. Perhaps it makes most sense to see the
issues of policy integration and implementation as separate challenges
calling for separate ‘cures’. In principle, the cross-sectoral and
comprehensive nature of the EU should put it in a far stronger institutional
position than traditional international environmental regimes; with the
potential for sectoral integration and the agreement of integrative package
deals across issue areas. However, evidence from climate politics so far
indicate that the EU has been unable to take full advantage of such potential
institutional strengths [Wettestad, 2000].
Concluding Comments
The impact assessments conducted by the EEA indicate a need to improve
the effectiveness of EU environmental policy. Research on EU
environmental policy has, however, paid scant attention to the evaluation
and explanation of effectiveness. We think that the study of regime
effectiveness has something to offer as a means of bridging this gap. Even
though the EU is clearly something different in nature and degree from an
international regime, EU environmental legislation or clusters of legislation
come close to the notion of environmental regimes in the implementation
phase. This is because the EU has strong policy-making powers but
comparatively weak powers of implementation. Still, transferring
approaches and methodologies from international regime analysis to the EU
requires particular sensitivity to their respective institutional, political and
historical characteristics.
Approaches to the study of the effectiveness of international
environmental regimes cannot offer one coherent approach that can be
applied automatically to the study of EU environmental policy. Regime
theory has clear limitations in the domestic context and such theory and EU
studies face common challenges in developing analytical frameworks
combining the importance of domestic and international institutions.
However, regime approaches can perhaps contribute with: (a) an explicit
focus on effectiveness that extends the existing more narrow focus on
implementation and compliance; (b) a more systematic approach to the
combined influence of problem-types and related actor interests and norms,
and institutional problem solving capacity for explaining effectiveness; and
(c) a growing awareness of the importance of interaction between
international regimes and EU environmental policy.
Ten years of regime effectiveness studies can also contribute to a
refinement of existing approaches to the EU by offering a framework for
analysis that emphasises issues of theory, methodology, research design and
case study testing – a framework that includes the importance of discussing
and classifying ‘success’ and ‘failure’. Current research on EU
environmental policy tends to be marked by an output, and to some extent,
an impact focus, while we know less about the causal links between these
dimensions and outcome in terms of behavioural change. If this dimension
is systematically included in the study of EU environmental implementation
it will by itself necessitate a more systematic focus on the role of relevant
actors in implementing policy, such as industry and green groups;
frequently operating as counterbalancing forces to target groups.
Our main focus has been on what the study of EU environmental policy
can learn from the study of environmental regimes. It is nevertheless clear
that regime analysis has much to learn from EU studies. First, the most
common prescription for improving the effectiveness of international
environmental regimes is in one way or another to make them more ‘state-
like’ by consolidating centralised compliance and verification capacities,
improving the collection and dissemination of information, and introducing
mechanisms to strengthen enforcement. Although even institutionally ‘solid’
international actors such as the European Union are plagued by serious
implementation problems, at least interesting monitoring and reporting
systems are in place which are being further developed to support the
evaluation of EU (and international) policy effectiveness on a country-by-
country level. Secondly, as signalled by the recent EPI initiative, increasing
the horizontal coordination between different policy areas is extremely
difficult. The EU has greater experience here, and has a sobering tale to tell
of the obstacles that need to be overcome in the effort to achieve better
coordination and linkages within and between international institutions.

NOTES
1. See, for instance, Jordan [1998] for a brief overview of the development of EU
environmental policy-making.
2. For one exception, see Grant et al. [2000]. However, their effectiveness concept spans no less
than eight indicators, and several of them are quite loosely defined.
3. Hildebrand [1993] argues that the EU has developed like an international environmental
regime, while Weale et al. [2000] argue that is difficult to understand EU environmental
policy from a regime perspective. See also Breckinridge [1997] who is arguing for the
appropriateness of using regime analysis when studying the EU.
4. For some recent contributions, see, for instance, Golub [(ed.), 1998a; 1998b]; Jordan [1998];
Weale et al. [2000].
5. Nigel Haigh, in the ‘Manual of Environmental Policy’, uses the terms ‘formal’ and
‘practical’ compliance [Haigh, 1999].
6. See Collins and Earnshaw [1993: 222]. In terms of infringement proceedings in the 1980s,
75 per cent of the cases had to do with various forms of non-compliance [ibid.: 216].
7. For a critical perspective, see, for example, Hovden [1999].
8. Some of the most relevant EU Directives are: Directive 76/769/EEC on dangerous
substances discharged into the aquatic environment; Directive 91/271/EEC concerning urban
waste water treatment and Directive 91/676/EEC on the protection of waters against
pollution caused by nitrates from agriculture.
9. Interview with Marianne Wenning, Deputy Head of Climate Change Unit, EU Commission
DG Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection, 30 Nov. 2000. See also a study of the
European Environment Bureau (EEB): http://ens.lycos.com/ens/jan2001/2001L-01-12-11.
html, 4 July 2001.
10. The Urban Waste-Water Directive, the Nitrates Directive, as well as the Dangerous
Substance Directive.
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Understanding the Effectiveness of EU

The study of EU environmental policy consequences tends to focus on how EU

(EEA) indicate that the quality of the European environment is

EF FECTIV ENESS OF EU ENVI RONM ENTA L P O L I C Y 101

The Study of EU Environmental Policy in Practice

aimed at evaluating and explaining effectiveness are still short in supply.

EF FECTIV ENESS OF EU ENVI RONM ENTA L P O L I C Y 103

Regimes versus the EU: Similar Implementation Challenges?

Convention on Climate Change. In addition, there is nothing which is even

EF FECTIV ENESS OF EU ENVI RONM ENTA L P O L I C Y 105

Evaluating Effectiveness : The Crucial and Challenging Phase of

Studies of international regimes have evolved rapidly during the last

EF FECTIV ENESS OF EU ENVI RONM ENTA L P O L I C Y 107

EF FECTIV ENESS OF EU ENVI RONM ENTA L P O L I C Y 109

Explaining Effectiveness: Problem-Types, Problem-Solving Capacity

ecological, technological and economic aspects of the ozone problem

EF FECTIV ENESS OF EU ENVI RONM ENTA L P O L I C Y 111

understanding why the UK has ceased dumping of industrial waste in the

EF FECTIV ENESS OF EU ENVI RONM ENTA L P O L I C Y 113

Regime analysis has recently developed towards the study of interplay

EF FECTIV ENESS OF EU ENVI RONM ENTA L P O L I C Y 115

EF FECTIV ENESS OF EU ENVI RONM ENTA L P O L I C Y 117

Andresen, S. and J. Wettestad (1995), ‘International Problem-Solving Effectiveness: The Oslo

Community Environment Legislation’, in Judge, [1993: 213–50].

EF FECTIV ENESS OF EU ENVI RONM ENTA L P O L I C Y 119

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