Professional Documents
Culture Documents
4, 2005
Abstract
This essay serves as a guide for scholars, especially those in education, who want to gain
a better understanding of Heidegger’s essay, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’. The paper
has three sections: an interpretive summary, a critical commentary, and some remarks on
Heidegger scholarship in education. Since Heidegger’s writing style is rather opaque, the
interpretive summary serves as a map with which to navigate the essay.The critical commentary
offers a careful analysis of some of the central concepts in the essay. These concepts, which
include bringing-forth, challenging-forth, and gestell, are intriguing but problematic.
The problems and possibilities of these ideas are analyzed, and an overall assessment of
Heidegger’s ideas on technology is offered. In the final section, the work of several scholars
in education is examined. Some of this work is excellent, but there is also a significant
amount of confused and confusing scholarship.
Introduction
Reading Heidegger is a lot like trying to navigate a ship through a dense fog. His
language is sprinkled with German neologisms, and his lines of thought tend not
to be laid out in a straightforward manner. However, despite these difficulties,
philosophers of education have recently exhibited a heightened level of interest in
Heidegger’s thought. They seem especially interested in a short piece by Heidegger
entitled ‘The Question Concerning Technology’; in Michael Peters’ (2002) new
collection, Heidegger, Education, and Modernity, eight of the eleven included essays
refer to ‘The Question Concerning Technology’. Academics working in technology
education have also expressed an interest in this particular essay.
Heidegger pioneered a new way of thinking about technology; ‘The Question
Concerning Technology’ contains exciting ideas that may have important implica-
tions in both technology education and environmental education. However, just as
one must set the table before sitting down to a meal, so too must one understand
Heidegger before trying to draw educational implications from his thought. Thus,
the primary role of this essay is to act as a field guide—to summarize, criticize and
interpret ‘The Question Concerning Technology’.
Some may think that is unnecessary to perform such a low-level task. Yet, there
are several reasons why a field guide is important:
under which the four causes are subsumed—rather, it is a unified process, ‘a single
leading-forth to which [each of the causes] is indebted’ (Lovitt, 1972, p. 46).
Heidegger writes that bringing-forth ‘comes to pass only insofar as something
concealed comes into unconcealment’ (1977, p. 11). Thus, instead of the craft-item
being created by the craftsman, as one would think, it was revealed or unconcealed.
In ‘The Thing’, Heidegger comments on the making of a jug,
The jug is not a vessel because it was made; rather, the jug had to be
made because it is this holding vessel. The making … lets the jug come
into its own. But that which in the jug’s nature is its own is never brought
about by its making. (1971, p. 168)
Clearly, revealing/unconcealing in the mode of bringing-forth contains strong hints
of Platonism.
Bringing-forth is the mode of revealing that corresponds to ancient craft. Modern
technology, however, has its own particular mode of revealing, which Heidegger
calls challenging-forth. Thinking in the mode of challenging-forth is very different
from thinking in the mode of bringing-forth: when challenging-forth, one sets upon
the elements of a situation both in the sense of ordering (i.e. setting a system upon)
and in a more rapacious sense (i.e. the wolves set upon the traveler and devoured
him). In bringing-forth, human beings were one important element among others
in the productive process; in challenging-forth, humans control the productive process.
Efficiency is an additional important element of thinking in the mode of challeng-
ing forth; the earth, for example, is set upon to yield the maximum amount of ore
with the minimum amount of effort. Essentially, challenging-forth changes the way
we see the world—as Michael Zimmerman pointedly remarks, ‘To be capable of
transforming a forest into packaging for cheeseburgers, man must see the forest not
as a display of the miracle of life, but as raw material, pure and simple’ (1977, p. 79).
Production in the mode of challenging-forth reveals objects that have the status
of standing-reserve. Objects that have been made standing-reserve have been
reduced to disposability in two different senses of the word: (1) They are disposable
in the technical sense; they are easily ordered and arranged. Trees that once stood
chaotically in the forest are now logs that can be easily counted, weighed, piled, and
shipped. (2) They are also disposable in the conventional sense; like diapers and
cheap razors, they are endlessly replaceable/ interchangeable and have little value.
For the most part, challenging things forth into standing-reserve is not a laudable
activity, and thus it makes sense to wonder what drives human beings to think in
this way. Heidegger’s answer to this motivational question is unconventional—
instead of suggesting that the origins of this motivation are indigenous to human
beings, he postulates the existence of a phenomenon that ‘sets upon man to order
the real as standing-reserve’ (1977, p. 19). Heidegger calls this mysterious
phenomenon enframing (Ge-stell in German). The word ‘Ge-stell’ gathers together
several meanings of the -stellen family of German verbs: in Ge-stell, humans are
ordered (bestellen), commanded (bestellen), and entrapped (nachstellen) (Harries 1994,
p. 229). Heidegger thinks that our default state is that of being trapped by Ge-stell;
this is what he means when he writes, ‘As the one who is challenged forth in this
way, man stands within the essential realm of [Ge-stell]. He can never take up a
relationship to it only subsequently’ (1977, p. 24; Sallis, 1971, p. 162).
According to Heidegger (1977, p. 25), there are different ‘ordainings of destining’
for human beings. Although the default destining is that of Ge-stell, it is possible
to choose an alternate road. Heidegger thinks that human beings have been granted
the special role of ‘Shepherds of Being’—we have been granted the power to reveal
the world in certain ways (Ballard, 1971, p. 60). Trapped in Ge-stell, we tend to
reveal things in the mode of challenging-forth, but we can also choose to reveal
things in the mode of bringing-forth. Heidegger comments, ‘Placed between these
possibilities, man is endangered from out of destining’ (1977, p. 26). However, by
carefully considering the ways of thinking that lie behind technology, we can grasp
the ‘saving power’. We can realize that we, the Shepherds of Being, have a choice:
we can bring-forth rather than challenge-forth. Thus, once we understand the
thinking behind technology, we become free to choose our fate—‘… we are already
sojourning in the open space of destining’ (Heidegger, 1977, p. 26).
2.0 Introduction
The following critical commentary will be organized in four sections; the first three
sections will analyze, in turn, the puzzles and weaknesses surrounding three pivotal
ideas in Heidegger’s essay: bringing-forth, challenging-forth-to-standing-reserve,
and Ge-stell. The final section of the analysis will synthesize the results of the first
three analyses to create an overall evaluation of Heidegger’s account.
2.1 Bringing-forth
If one were to draw conclusions about Plato and Aristotle solely from Heidegger’s
remarks in ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, one would think that crafts-
manship was a central issue for both of these ancient thinkers. Furthermore, from
the warm light in which Heidegger bathes the craftsman, one might also come to
believe that Plato and Aristotle have a certain reverence for craftsmen and the
process of craftsmanship. Plato and Aristotle’s attitudes toward craftsmanship,
however, can (at best) be described as ambivalent. In the Politics, Aristotle remarks,
‘… no man can practice excellence who is living the life of a mechanic or laborer’
(1995, 1278a20). Craftsmen and craftsmanship receive a more favorable treatment
in Plato, but Plato still makes the following unfriendly remark:
Heidegger also claims that his account of the four causes is true to the spirit of
Greek thought. Heidegger’s notion of the co-responsibility of the four causes has
some support in Aristotle, who comments: ‘… the [causes other than the efficient
cause] are causes in the sense of the end or the good of the rest …’ (1995, 195a23)
Heidegger’s insistence on the non-primacy of the efficient cause, however, finds
less support: in Topics, Aristotle remarks, ‘Again, the primary source of the change
or rest [is] … generally what makes of what is made …’ (1995, 194b30) Aristotle’s
remarks on causation do not entirely rule out Heidegger’s somewhat romantic
interpretation, but neither do they provide much supporting evidence.
Heidegger’s strongest evidence in favor of bringing-forth consists of a quote from
Symposium [what follows is Heidegger’s translation]: ‘Every occasion for whatever
passes over and goes forward into presencing from that which is not presencing is
poiesis, is bringing-forth’ (1977, p. 10). Nehamas and Woodruff, in their translation
of the Symposium, offer a different rendition of the same passage:
After all, everything that is responsible for creating something out of
nothing is a kind of poetry, and so all the creations of every craft and
profession are themselves a kind of poetry, and everyone who practices a
craft is a poet. (1997, 205b)
Although this translation is significantly different from Heidegger’s, its content
(craftsmen as poets creating something out of nothing) and tone (romantic) offers
some historical support for the notion of bringing-forth. Yet, this is not enough to
authenticate the supposed historical status of bringing-forth. Although there is some
evidence linking bringing-forth to Greek thinking, a far more likely conclusion
is that the idea of bringing-forth had its primary origin in the mind of Martin
Heidegger.
A more serious problem with the notion of bringing-forth concerns the idea of
revealing/unconcealment. Recall Heidegger’s comment in ‘The Thing’:
The jug is not a vessel because it was made; rather, the jug had to be
made because it is this holding vessel. The making … lets the jug come
into its own. But that which in the jug’s nature is its own is never brought
about by its making. (1971, p. 168)
Clearly, there is some sort of Platonic pre-existence at work here—the jug, appar-
ently, pre-exists as concealed and is revealed through the co-responsible action of
the four causes. Perhaps one can see what Heidegger means here by recalling the
ubiquitous stories of wood carvers who somehow know, in advance, what shape a
particular piece of wood ‘wants to be’. However, no amount of idiosyncratic
accounts on the part of folk artists can reduce the implausibility of the idea of pre-
existence. The jug is a created object, and while it can be created through the loving
and careful process of bringing-forth, the jug’s created status cannot be eclipsed.
To sum up, the notion of bringing-forth is probably largely Heidegger’s arbitrary
creation, and the idea of revealing pre-existent objects is highly implausible. Does
this mean that these ideas should be thrown out? This essential question, which has
important implications for Heidegger’s philosophy, will be addressed in a later section.
consider the monstrousness that reigns here, let us ponder for a moment
the contrast that speaks out of the two titles, ‘The Rhine’ as dammed up
into the power works, and ‘The Rhine’ as uttered out of the art work, in
Hölderlin’s hymn by that name. (1977, p. 16)
Even the most rabid capitalists may become uneasy when forced to watch a tree
‘harvester’ in the process of liquidating a forest; intuitively, one can see that there
is a certain monstrousness about this kind of wholesale destruction. Yet, although the
same kind of destruction is not taking place in the context of the dam on the Rhine,
Heidegger still asks us to ‘consider the monstrousness that reigns here’. (1977,
p. 16) In order to solve this puzzle in Heidegger’s thinking, let us clarify the terms
of the problem with some assumptions: assume that the dam has improved the
standard of living for many Germans and that no significant environmental damage
has resulted from its construction and operation. If these assumptions are made,
how can Heidegger still deem the dam monstrous?
In his polemic against the dam, Heidegger comments, ‘What the river is now,
namely a water power supplier, derives from out of the essence of the power station’
(1977, p. 16). Heidegger does not hate the dam because it physically damages the
river; instead, he hates it because it reduces the river. Subsumed under both the
idea and the material fact of the hydroelectric dam, the river no longer stands on
its own. Implicitly, Heidegger is using the following syllogism:
Premise: The building of the Rhine dam has compromised the standing-on-its-own
of the Rhine River.
Premise: All actions in which we compromise the standing-on-its-own of something
are monstrous actions.
Conclusion: The building of the Rhine dam is a monstrous action.
It is still unclear, however, what it means for something to stand on its own.
Aristotle may enlighten us in this regard with his description of what it is for a
human being not to stand on their own: ‘Hence we see what is the nature and office
of a slave; he who is … not his own but another’s man, is by nature a slave …’ (1995,
1254a13) The person whose nature is subsumed under that of another has been
reduced—reduced to slavery. No standing or dignity remain for the slave; ‘he’ or ‘she’
has been reduced to an ‘it’. The slave, regarded as slave, is a mere piece of property
that is disposable in both the technical and conventional senses of disposability
described in the summary.
Laboring under the material and conceptual mastery of the dam, the river has also
been reduced to slavery. It no longer stands on its own; it is merely a piece of property
to be manipulated by the various gigantic states and corporations of the world. The
Rhine and the Columbia, the Nile and the Yangtze—they were once the greatest
and most holy of rivers, but are now merely the most useful of our slave-objects.
Most of the countries of the world have signed agreements that grant that human
beings possess a certain inviolable dignity; humans cannot be reduced to slavery
and they must be treated with a measure of respect. Human beings, however, are
not the only entities in the world that seem to possess dignity. For example, a
Sequoia in the forest stands on its own, and, as such, it seems to have some kind
of dignity. Once that tree has been cut down and reduced to a technically and
conventionally disposable log, whatever dignity it may once have had is lost.
Suppose it is true that all human beings possess a kind of inviolable dignity.
Animals differ from human beings only in the fact that they are not rational. Does
their lack of reason make animals unworthy of dignity? Surely not: when humans
lose their minds to Alzheimer’s disease, we all agree that their dignity remains
inviolable. We would not even consider consigning a witless Alzheimer’s patient to
a cage in a research laboratory.
One can expand the scope of this argument from animals to other living and
non-living entities. In each case one can ask, ‘Does their lack of property Z make
entity X less worthy of dignity than entity Y?’ Admittedly, as one traces the course
of this argument through the hierarchy of being—from animals all the way down
to manufactured objects—dignity becomes increasingly attenuated. Yet, I would
argue that dignity persists all the way down the hierarchy of being; even the plastic
soft-drink bottle possesses an extremely small amount of dignity. Heidegger would
probably concur with this view; he was fascinated by the work of Cezanne, who
thought that even inanimate objects had dignity:
People think that a sugar bowl has no physiognomy, no soul. But that also
changes from day to day. One has to know how to take them, flatter them,
these gentlemen. These glasses, these plates, they speak to each other, they
are always exchanging confidences. ( Jamme, 1994, p. 140)
In his essay, ‘The Thing’, Heidegger expresses views that are similar to those of
Cezanne. (1971, p. 182)
At one point, while discussing the reduction of objects to standing-reserve,
Heidegger remarks, ‘Whatever stands by in the sense of standing-reserve no longer
stands over against us as object’ (1977, p. 17). The notion of the dignity and
standing of objects can help us understand Heidegger’s cryptic remark. Objects like
the river lose their dignity by being subsumed under the material and conceptual
command of objects like the dam, which, for their part, are under the complete
control of human subjects. Therefore, in a sense, whatever is reduced to standing-
reserve is no longer an object because it has been completely subsumed under the
material and conceptual reign of the subject. A kind of objectlessness results—the only
significance these objects have is that they are the property of the subject. In light
of this view, another of Heidegger’s puzzling remarks begins to make sense:
Meanwhile man … exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth. In
this way the impression comes to prevail that everything man encounters
exists only insofar as it is his construct. This illusion gives rise in turn to
one final delusion: It seems as though man everywhere and always encounters
only himself [italics mine]. (1977, p. 27)
Heidegger feels that we should not underestimate the importance of the dignity
of objects; once the objectlessness of standing-reserve prevails, the next target for
2.3 Ge-stell
The phenomenon of Ge-stell is problematic for three reasons:
by most commentators: the way of thinking that lies behind the creation and use of
technology. If more commentators on technology were able to wade through ‘The
Question Concerning Technology’, as well as some of Heidegger’s other writings,
they might discover some exciting new pathways for their thinking.
Heidegger’s account also has noteworthy implications for environmental ethics.
If all living things and inanimate objects have a measure of dignity, the various
entities that make up the world must be accorded more respect. If human beings
are gradually destroying the world (both in the conventional sense and in the
Heideggerian sense of reduction to standing-reserve) through their entrapment in
challenging-forth, systematic efforts must be made to free individuals from their
ideological prison. Redesigning certain aspects of the education system might serve
to further this goal.
The great breakthrough of ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ is that it shifts
the focus away from specific technologies and toward the modes of thinking that
lie behind these technologies. However, within this breakthrough lies a danger: it
is possible to focus on the thinking behind the technology to such an extent that
meaningful distinctions in the world are obscured. In a remark that was originally
a part of ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, but was later excised (Harries,
1994, p. 233), this danger manifests itself:
Agriculture is now a motorized food industry—in essence the same as the
manufacture of corpses in the gas chambers and extermination campus,
the same as the blockading and starvation of nations, the same as the
manufacture of hydrogen bombs. (Ferry & Renaut, 1990, p. 71) (Schirmacher,
1983, p. 25)
In this remark, Heidegger is trying to point out that challenging-forth into standing-
reserve is at work in both modern agriculture and the concentration camps. Clearly,
however, to say that modern agriculture and the death camps are ‘in essence the
same’ obviates meaningful empirical distinctions and trivializes the significance of
the extermination camps. Rorty notes, ‘Heidegger needed to see everything in our
century other than its technologism as mere transitory appearance’ (1994, p. 36).
Another significant failing of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology is that the
benefits of technology are not acknowledged. The hydroelectric dam across
the Rhine does improve people’s lives, and, as Rorty (1977, p. 302) points out, the
spread of modern technology across the planet has prevented many people from
dying of starvation. Yet, despite the fact that Heidegger never acknowledges the
benefits of technology, he does not urge giving it up:
We can say ‘yes’ to the unavoidable use of technological objects, and we
can at the same time say ‘no,’ insofar as we do not permit them to claim
us exclusively and thus to warp, confuse, and finally lay waste to our
essence. (1966, p. 54)
This smacks of having one’s cake and eating it too. Under Heidegger’s conception,
we conveniently say ‘yes’ to the modern technologies that make our lives so
comfortable, while somehow apparently saying ‘no’ to them as well.
There are two significant problems with this paragraph. First, in a Heideggerian
context, it doesn’t make sense to talk about approaching technology ‘without pre-
suppositions’ or ‘before any decision is made as to what it is’. The problem is not
one of how to make the decision about technology; Heidegger would say that the
decision has always already been made. We are already stuck in a particular under-
standing of technology; the challenge is to become aware of that understanding and
to extricate ourselves from it somehow. Second, it is not clear to me how a ‘mutual
opening up’ is possible. Although it is possible to understand Ge-stell as having
some kind of agency, I fail to see how the essence of technology can really ‘open
itself up’. Further to this point, Marshall says that this ‘mutual opening up’ is ‘not
a temporal response’. What would it mean for a response to be ‘non-temporal’? I do
not consider myself a positivist or a person with an ‘overt antipathy to metaphysics’—
in fact, I am deeply sympathetic to much of Heidegger’s account. Yet, I still find it
‘difficult to understand’ what Marshall is saying in this particular paragraph.
There are several problems with this remark. First, Gur-Ze’ev introduces the word
‘enframing’ without any comment. Thus, any readers of Gur-Ze’ev, who have not
already read Heidegger, will be confused by this use of the word. Gur-Ze’ev com-
pounds this problem by misunderstanding enframing: obviously, enframing (Ge-stell)
is not a road to human freedom. Furthermore, since challenging-forth also involves
a kind of unconcealment, unconcealment is also not necessarily a ‘road to realizing
human freedom’.
Some of Gur-Ze’ev’s other remarks suffer from similar difficulties:
Unfortunately, Bonnett, Lambeir, and Standish have not presented us with ‘further
exploration’ and ‘critical evaluation’ of this kind. They are in no way blameworthy
for this; they simply chose to focus on examining the educational implications of
Heidegger’s philosophy rather than examining its faults.
I have chosen the opposite path: I have not commented very much about the
educational implications of Heidegger’s philosophy, choosing instead to focus on
solving puzzles in his philosophy and pointing out its shortcomings. However, as
Bonnett’s comment points out, this is a task that needs to be done. Hopefully, this
field guide will also serve as a tool with which scholars in education, who may have
been scared off by Heidegger’s difficult prose, can now pry open the treasure box
of interesting ideas that is ‘The Question Concerning Technology’. Indeed, in the
introduction, I suggested that this field guide would ‘set the table’ for further
scholarship on Heidegger within the philosophy of education. Now that I have ‘set
the table’, readers of this field guide should make ready ‘the meal’ by conducting
further investigations of the educational implications of Heidegger’s philosophy of
technology.
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