1

Innovation Stifled: An Analysis of Institutional Isomorphism in the National Football

League

Jack Bradshaw / University of Asheville North Carolina

Adviser: Dr. Micheal Stratton, Professor of Management / AACSB Unit Head and Chair
Department of Management and Accountancy / University of North Carolina Asheville

Abstract

Creating and maintaining a competitive advantage is pivotal to long-term sustainability in

most industries. However, the National Football League (NFL) operates as a singular economic
entity, and is thus interested in handicapping competitive advantages amongst its 32 teams.
This, according to York & Miree (2015), leads to strategic isomorphism and increased
homogeneity amongst NFL teams. Through institutional pressures, innovation is constrained
and teams readily accept efficiency reductions in lieu of social legitimacy, which results in
consistent examples of non-maximized decisions. This includes the implementation of
metric-driven “analytics,” which have been embraced and fully incorporated in other major North
American sports such as Major League Baseball. There currently exists a schism in the NFL
regarding the utility of employing these concepts in team decision-making. The aim of this paper
is to create a theoretical model that identifies and assigns various institutional forces to explain
this phenomenon. We begin by establishing the importance of cognitive framing amongst NFL
league executives regarding analytics and how it acts as a powerful moderator. Following, we
establish mimetic and normative isomorphic mechanisms that reinforce established NFL beliefs.
With a model constructed, we offer several propositions. First, that an organization’s existing
reputation plays a strong role in its ability to effectively integrate an analytical way of thinking. In
recent years, there appears to be a shifting ideology in regard to metric-driven decision-making,
with a select few teams incorporating entire analytical departments. We offer some potential
explanations why certain teams have been able to integrate these concepts into their structure
and strategy. Finally, we address the role of institutional change theory and propose several
methods which may be causing a gradual diffusion of NFL analytics.
2

Introduction

Professional football sits upon an iconic mantle in the United States. Year after year,

Super Bowl viewership hovers around one third of the entire United States population, and in

2017, nearly 75% of the most watched U.S. broadcasts were NFL games (Crupi, 2018).

Compounded by high salaries, there undoubtedly exists a magnetism towards the sport that

attracts some of the youngest, brightest minds. Despite such marketable attraction to the

industry, there remains a dogmatic and stifling obsession with keeping ideas, concepts, and

strategy the same. In the highly competitive world of the National Football League, rational

assumption would suggest an aggressive pursuit of competitive advantages, yet the league

displays resistance towards structural and schematic changes. The league “proves over and

over it is almost prehistoric when it comes to intelligent evolution. Football is devout in its

commitment to remain in the past, clinging to the days of unenlightened information” (Joe

Banner qtd. Sharp, 2018). Never is this disparity more clear in the sport’s reticence to embrace

quantitative data-analytics. At a time when over 53% of American companies are searching for

ways to adopt and integrate big data, the NFL continues to display an aversion to metric-driven

analysis (Nottage, 2018). This stands in contrast to the demonstrable success found in other

North American sports, including Major League Baseball, Major League Soccer, and the

National Basketball Association. “The NFL may be the most popular and profitable major sport

in America, but until recently, it’s lagged behind other leagues in sophisticated use of data

analysis” (Lindsey, 2017). Baseball teams have been implementing these models for several

decades; the strategy deemed a legitimately acceptable strategy following the publication of

“Moneyball​” (​ Lewis, 2003) . The book details the ways in which the Oakland Athletics used

analytics to compete despite severe disadvantages. Through application of “sabermetrics,” the

3

innovative approach installed by team executives Billy Beane and Paul DePodesta statistically

quantified as many components of the game as they could. Even at a severe financial

disadvantage, increases in efficiency allowed Oakland to quickly morph into a consistent

competitor (Cassilo & Sanderson, 2015).

Despite a rather quick ascension in other major sports, adoption has not taken hold as

strongly in the NFL. “The advanced metrics that came to baseball in the 1970s with Bill James

and his acolytes have only really touched the NFL over the last decade” (Farrar, 2018). There

exist several potential explanations. First, the statistical nature of baseball lends itself more

easily to quantitative analysis. “The sport is individually oriented and, thus, it is easier to

measure the individual’s contribution” (Davenport, 2007) . Secondly, NFL teams operate by and

large as a single economic entity, pooling and sharing over two thirds of all revenue (Vrooman,

2012). “One of the reasons for analytics’ slow growth in the NFL is the sport’s financial set-up.

With both a salary cap and a revenue sharing system in place, the competing sides are placed

on far more even a playing field than in baseball or soccer” (Fraser, 2016).

To describe NFL analytics as non-existent, however, would be false. “The game itself is

rooted in tactics and strategy and details, and so the study of those has always been inherent in

the coaching of the sport and building of its teams" (Breer, 2017). Outside of game-specific

strategy, nearly every team in the league incorporates a certain degree of analytical modeling.

These specific applications include sports science, player tracking, injury assessment and

prevention, player asset management, and varying degrees of digitized opponent scouting

(Breer, 2017; Roseman, 2018). “It’s being driven by the information. Technology provides the

efficiency. And analytics provide more effectiveness in the decision-making" (Breer, 2017).

Despite the seeming prevalence and utility of such analysis, many coaches, owners, and

general managers are not embracing these methods. “Some view analytics as a dirty word.
4

Analytics are really nothing more than added information to increase the chances of good

decision making" (Banner qtd. Sharp, 2018). While there exist numerous potential explanations,

we contend that the strongest force limiting the development of NFL innovation, and analytics

specifically, is the presence of a strong institutional field that often works in direct contrast to

strategic evolution. “Institutional theory attends to the deeper and more resilient aspects of

social structure. It considers the processes by which structures, including schemas, rules,

norms, and routines, become established as authoritative guidelines for social behavior" (Scott,

2005). Isomorphism is central to the concept of institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983;

Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Through isomorphism, organizations display conformity to commonly

used and accepted strategies, structures, and practices, appearing rational and thus considered

acceptable (Fligstein, 1991; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). York & Miree (2015) identify the

presence of strategic isomorphism amongst NFL teams as a result of increased homogeneity,

and Washington and Patterson (2009) establish the predictive power of institutional theory

within a sports context.

Teams in National Football League resemble one another closely, both structurally and

in terms of their output on the field. When organizations within an institutional field are similar,

isomorphic tendencies are accelerated (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Conformity to these

practices often involve conscious, deliberate trade-offs in efficiency (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

Over the past few decades, sociological institutionalist scholars have begun placing greater

emphasis on “cultural-cognitive” analyses (Scott, 1995). Cassilo & Sanderson (2017) explore

this framework, including the moderating force of media framing, to help explain the myriad

opinions on the value of analytics in the NFL and ways in which institutional norms inhibit this

from becoming an acceptable ideology.

Building off the work of both York & Miree (2015) and Cassilo & Sanderson (2017) the
5

aim of this paper is to create a theoretical framework of NFL institutionalism. We begin by

addressing the homogeneous nature of the NFL, and how it has historically operated with a

singular “league-think” mentality. (Vrooman, 2012). From there, we address the symbolic

manner in which organizations build their structures around institutionalized myths. Those

structures, in turn, act as a critical component in the social construction of reality for their

inhabitants. We contend that this process has led to a reinforced, stigmatized view of analytics

amongst key NFL actors. DiMaggio & Powell (1983) identify three mechanisms for isomorphic

actions - normative, mimetic, and coercive. Scott (1995), adopting more of a sociological

perspective, describes these pillars as cultural-cognitive, normative and regulative (see

Appendix, Table 1). We adopt a hybridization of these concepts, addressing normative and

mimetic forces (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), understood through a cognitive lens (Scott, 1995).

Following the construction of this theoretical model, we assess the ways in which teams pursue

and acquire legitimacy. Invoking Deephouse & Carter (2005), we argue that in order to

successfully challenge existing institutional barriers, teams must meet minimum performance

measures, lest they expose themselves to legitimacy challenges. We conclude by offering some

propositions to explain how some forward-thinking teams have been able to overcome these

forces, and how they may continue to build upon these competitive advantages as a result of

decreasing regulative institutional pressures. Creation of this theoretical model provides us an

opportunity to understand and explain irrational NFL decision-making, and can be used as a

potential building block towards deeper analyses of the many vexing issues found in

professional football.

Literature Review
6

Despite the rational assumption that organizations pursue any and all competitive

advantages, actual strategy often runs contrary. Institutional theory, at its core, acts a means to

address organizational decision-making and why it is not always rational. DiMaggio & Powell’s

(1983) seminal work attempts to address this irrationality, explaining how it often leads to a lack

of organizational innovation. The principal mechanism for institutional action is isomorphism,

which is central to the concept of institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). While there are

passive ways in which these behaviors unfold, often the choices are intentional. Strategic

isomorphism is a conscious and strategic decision by firms to appropriately model themselves

as similar to other organizations within their field in pursuit of legitimacy and other social

resources (cf., Fernández-Alles and Valle- Cabrera, 2006). Legitimacy provides better access

to resources, social reputation, and is particularly advantageous in rivalrous situations (Dowling

and Pfeffer, 1975; Ruef and Scott, 1998; Sherer and Lee, 2002; Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002).

A key contributor in the evolution of institutional theory, Scott (2005) ascribes

isomorphism to three pillars - cultural-cognitive, normative, and regulative, that “together with

associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life… in sum,

institutional frameworks bound and define rational arguments and approaches.” (Scott, 2001 &

Scott, 1995). Social construction occurs within a given institution through collective cognitive

acceptance (Greenwood, Oliver, Suddaby, and Sahlin, 2008). Individuals infer meaning based

on their perceptions of social reality which are heavily influenced by institutionalized perceptions

(Scott, 1987). This leads to a self-reinforcing mechanism that makes any deviant behavior or

thought difficult. As a result, patterned behaviors are reinforced through inertia, and a

chronological cycle ensues (Oliver, 1992).

In place of rational advantages, individuals and firms pursue social resources such as a

legitimacy and reputation. “Legitimacy is not a commodity to be possessed or exchanged but a

7

condition reflecting cultural alignment, normative support, or consonance with relevant rules or

laws” (Scott, 1995). In their empirical study of isomorphic behaviors, Deephouse & Carter (2005)

call upon the work of Scott, drawing on this cognitive perspective in their definition of legitimacy.

“We view legitimacy as the social acceptance resulting from adherence to regulative, normative

or cognitive norms and expectations” (Deephouse & Carter, 2005). Legitimacy assessments can

be made on nearly any aspect of an organization, including “an act, a rule, a procedure, a

routine, a distribution, a position, a group or team, a groups status structure, teamwork”

(Johnson, 2004). It is important to stress that individuals and organizations pursue these social

resources even if when they do not lead to increased organizational efficiency (DiMaggio &

Powell, 1983).

Inherent to legitimacy is the subjective nature of those observing organizations and

making legitimacy assessments, made up of internal and external stakeholders. “The power of

external constituents in the institutional context is significant” (York & Miree, 2015). Due to the

fact that the pursuit of legitimacy is found more often in situations involving rivalry, the

institutional field of sports acts as fruitful opportunity to apply concepts of legitimacy. “Sport

organizations are embedded in organizational fields with a large number of stakeholders and

“license-holders” (Washington and Patterson, 2009). With such a large and diverse collection of

teams, fans, and media, these myriad opinions create a multilayered analysis of data-driven

decisions in the NFL. Key to the cognitive perception of legitimacy is “framing.” Framing plays a

key role in the social construction process both within organizations and without. The details of

the phrasing or structure of a decision problem can affect the choices a person makes (Tversky,

Kahneman, 1985). There exists a dynamic, two way relationship between society and the

media. Dominant views of society often alter the ways in which media present and frame
8

information, which leads the audience to a “connecting of specific aspects of an event that help

contribute to the public generating specific interpretations of that event (Stefanik-Sidener, 2013).

The National Football League is comprised of multiple competing fields and logics, which

can be viewed through a lens of institutional pluralism. This describes organizations that are

constituted by more than a single cultural logic and “participant in multiple discourses and or a

member of more than one institutional category,” (Kraatz and Block, 2008). For the sake of our

model, early establishment of this is vital; the concept and application of analytics is amorphous

and varied, both amongst organizations and within them. “However, if we accept the notion that

institutions are multi-dimensional entities that are composed of different institutional principles

and logics guiding action, then we should expect that there may be much inconsistency among

these dimensions and logics" (Campbell, 2007). This is compounded by the fact that no two

NFL organizations operate the same, as “hierarchies vary from team to team” (Breer, 2013).

Such diversity allows room for cognitive discourse within the broader homogeneous nature of

football organizations.

Further complicating any theoretical application is the concealed and esoteric nature of

NFL teams. “The outside world has no idea what’s going on in an NFL building a lot of the time”

(Kelly, 2017). The league is intentional in this discretion, and they set up their media apparatus

to keep those outside the league in the dark (Cosentino, 2018). This makes the acquisition of

concrete information difficult and any ensuing analysis hazy. In their applications of legitimacy,

(Deephouse & Carter, 2005; Cassilo & Sanderson, 2017) both turn to textual analysis to infer

meaning. “Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) wrote that norms are reflected in the communication and

writings of a society.” Thus, we turn to this method of textual analysis and media data to capture

public opinion on normatively shared beliefs amongst NFL league members.

9

Drawing on the work of Scott (1995) and DiMaggio & Powell (1983), we will apply

mimetic and normative mechanisms while largely ignoring coercive pressures. In their stead, we

adopt Scott’s cultural-cognitive perspective. Taken in totality, we use this model in attempt to

explain how isomorphic pressures curb ingenuity, and more specifically, the development of

analytical decision-making.

National Football League Homogeneity and Symbolic Creation of Structure

In their longitudinal study, York & Miree (2015) found a strong presence of structural

homogeneity amongst football teams in the NFL, which acts as a precursor to strategic

isomorphism. The NFL has historically operated with a “league-think” mentality (Vrooman,

2012), leading to “increased homogeneity among firms as a result of deliberate strategic choice”

(York & Miree, 2015). This includes the curbing of any competitive advantages, exemplified by

the establishment of rules that push teams towards a competitive equilibrium. These include the

presence of team salary caps, unbalanced schedules, and a reverse draft order, all in attempt to

create league parity (Zimbalist, 2002; Grier and Tollison,1994; Clark, 2017). “As joint members

of natural cartels, each sports team is only as strong as its weakest opponent” (Vrooman, 2012).

Traditional organizational strategy decisions dictate that firms improve efficiency as a response

to their environment to help ensure survival (Schmid, 2004). For teams in the NFL, this should

theoretically bring in more fans, TV viewers, and merchandise sales. “What we found however,

is that the NFL employs a different logic” (York & Miree, 2015). Rather, teams seem averse to

innovation of internal processes. For the past several decades, both team strategy and player

evaluation have remained static (Berri & Burke, 2011; Brown, 2016). Maintenance of these

traditional methods of conducting business is indicative of strategic isomorphism, which is

reinforced by homogenous league membership. “NFL owners, GMs, and coaches are a
10

relatively small group of individuals who know each other, have similar backgrounds, and have

lots of interaction” (Bursik, 2012). This lack of diversity amongst the organizational field further

reinforces isomorphic behavior. “The diversity of organizational forms is isomorphic to

environmental diversity” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).

Isomorphic behavior begins early in the structuralization within a given organizational

field, and tends to increase over time. Meyer & Rowan (1977) identify this relationship, claiming

that “formal structures reflect myths of the institutional environment.” This symbolic process

occurs as a transference of values, beliefs, and ceremony onto institutional structures,

practices, and strategies of an organization, and this process generates isomorphism (Scott,

1987; Zucker, 1987). We can identify a structural aversion to analytics by summarizing media

quotes following the decision of the 2016 Cleveland Browns to hire an analytically-based staff,

one that included co-innovator of the “Moneyball” concept, Paul DePodesta. With the potential

opportunity to bring an innovative process to a largely orthodox league, this hiring was

described as a philosophy “that was a radical departure from long-standing NFL models of

player evaluation and management,” one that was “unprecedented in the NFL,” and “different

from just about any other hierarchy in the NFL” (Cassilo & Sanderson; 2017; Sando, 2016; Orr,

2016). This aberrant structuring stood in direct opposition to the dogmatically acceptable ways

of NFL organizational structuring.

Isomorphic structuralization inexorably plays a role in the adoption of accepted

language. Individuals derive and create meaning around word choice as a result of commonly

used language within their organization. “The myths of job titles, occupations, and

organizational charts are "vocabularies of structure” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In time, these

myths become legitimized. Viewed through this lens, we are able to establish that the

development and widespread adoption of analytics faces significant structural barriers. “Part of
11

the problem with finding analytics’ place in football is the term itself. Often, the perceived

hesitancy to embrace quantitative analysis in the NFL is due to the fact that what is often

referred to as “analytics” (Breer, 2017). An overreliance on these traditional methods of

conducting business in the NFL has more deeply ingrained aversions to these disparate forms

of operation. Prescription to these organizational myths allows them to become deeply

embedded and subsequently leads to isomorphism (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2008). We thus

contend that this environmentally mythicized rejection of analytics has acted as a powerful

barrier towards any change in individual or organizational thought.

Mechanisms for Isomorphism & Application into NFL Context

Cultural-Cognitive

Perception of role and utility of data analysis in the NFL is an inherently cognitive issue.

We thus turn to Scott (2001), who establishes a focus on how actors’ perceptions of what is an

appropriate practice depend on the taken-for-granted scripts, schema, habits, and routines that

they possess and through which they interpret the world (Scott, 2001). Using this social

construction perspective, we can establish a traditional rejection of metric-driven analysis by

NFL coaches. “Coaches teach blocking, tackling and catching, draw up plays to beat coverages,

and largely ​ignore​ external analyses” (Brown, 2016). Anecdotal evidence abounds to this

institutionalized aversion to quantitative decision-making.

As powerful actors within their organizations, NFL coaches have the greatest potential

impact on the cognitive framing of analytics. “Organizational outcomes - both strategies and

effectiveness - are viewed as reflections of the values and cognitive bases of powerful actors in

the organization" (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). A spectrum exists of those embracing and those

rejecting these concepts. “Yet, there remains resistance, a battleground of thought, and a
12

general cloudiness on how far you can take numbers, and how far numbers can take you. And

that, of course, implies the truth about the NFL then, which is that few in football had even given

that concept a thought" (Breer, 2017).

Despite the presence of homogeneity amongst NFL teams, there exists a diverse

spectrum of cognition in regard to analytics. Institutional logics addresses inconsistencies within

organizational fields, as they can differ fundamentally in their ordering principles, content, and

nature of central assumptions (Friedland and Alford, 1991). Thus, we begin by focusing on the

portion of NFL organizations outwardly rejecting the usefulness of metric-driven

decision-making. We extend our analysis by offering a connection between analytics and

technological innovation within institutions. "Prevailing institutional forces in organizations can

establish considerable inertia and inhibit the appropriate use of technological innovations"

(Purvis, Sambamurthy, and Zmud, 2001). We propose that NFL coaches have an overreliance

on heuristic decision-making, reinforced through normative beliefs. "It’s devilishly hard for

traditional, non-empirical evaluators to even consider the possibility that quantified predictions

might do a better job than they can do on their own home turf" (Cullen, Myer, & Latessa, 2009).

Reinforcement of these beliefs leads to an embedded stigmatization that constrains divergent

thought.

- Former Chargers head coach Mike McCoy: “No on piece of paper can tell me this is the

right or wrong thing to do” (Seifert, 2015).

- Dave Gettleman, general manager of the New York Giants: “It is a crock. At the end of

the day, a great player is a great player… I think a lot of that stuff is nonsense. I think it is
13

someone who had decided to get into the analytics of it and went through whatever"

(Gonzales, 2018).

- Ken Whisenhunt, former head coach of the Arizona Cardinals, following a big play -

“How do you put an analytic on that?” (Seifert, 2015)

- Dirk Koetter, head coach of the Tampa Bay Buccaneers - “I don’t need a freaking piece

of paper with a bunch of numbers on there” (Smith, 2018).

National Football League executives display cognitive reinforcement of these norms

through their public criticisms, establishing greater inertia against any potential change of

thought. This results in constrained ingenuity, a core characteristic of institutional theory.

Rejection of these precepts often unfold even in in the face of verifiably opposing information.

This is congruent with DiMaggio & Powell (1983), who find that “organizations adopt whatever

practices they believe their institutional environment deems appropriate or legitimate regardless

of whether these practices increase organizational efficiency.”

For fans of NFL teams, there is an implicit assumption that owners and coaches attempt

to maximize their team’s chances of winning. “These assumptions are not likely to be stated, as

they are widely accepted to be true with no need of being tested or verified” (Bursik, 2012).

However, empirical research has consistently shown that NFL teams do not maximize. Romer

(2005) found that teams significantly reduce their chances of victory as a result of their 4th down

choices. His research states that teams choose to punt far more than is optimal. This represents

“an amazing degree of conservatism and failure to maximize” (Bursik, 2012). Thaler and

Massey (2006) discovered that NFL teams display irrational cognitive biases in their behavior
14

and decision-making during the annual rookie draft. Kovash and Levitt (2009) found that teams

display a tendency to alternate runs and passes, especially when the previous play was

unsuccessful. Burke’s (2007) analysis provides several useful insights, including the debunking

of numerous traditional “football truths,” including the perceived necessity to run the ball and the

notion that “defense wins championships.” Instead, he found that passing efficiency has the

strongest correlation (.61) with win percentage, followed by defensive interceptions (.39).

Viewed in totality, it is clear teams do not embrace and employ strategies that lead to increases

in expected value, instead relying on “by the book” scripts. Due to their quantitative nature and

the fact that teams still exhibit behavior contrary to these findings today, there is empirical

support for the proposition that NFL teams, by and large, avoid analytical learning and

decision-making. Through application of mimetic and normative mechanisms, as well as

assessments of legitimacy, we seek to explain this phenomenon.

Mimetic

Under Scott’s cognitive framework, the primary mechanism for isomorphism is mimicry.

March and Olsen (1976) propose that organizations model or mimic other organizations “when

there is a new technology that is poorly understood, when goals are ambiguous, or when the

environment creates symbolic uncertainty.” The NFL has traditionally displayed an aversion to

analytics in large part due to such uncertainty. “A lot of times, when people on the outside are

looking in, I don't know if they truly understand what the data is and where it's coming from"

(Doug Marrone, qtd. Seifert, 2015). Within organizations, Weick (1990) found that individuals

initially display ambiguity regarding the value of new technologies. Former NFL quarterback

Charlie Batch is attempting to help teams integrate these metrics, yet there remains
15

considerable cloudiness: “We’ve got it (data, analytics), but we don’t understand it and know

what to do with it.' (Bell, 2018).

In response to uncertainty, organizations often turn to their outside environment,

modeling the behaviors of other organizations (March and Olsen, 1977). In the NFL, this

mimicking is so prevalent that it has earned the moniker of “copycat league.” “The old cliché that

the NFL is a copycat league is true because teams are afraid to try things that they haven’t seen

work elsewhere" (Clark, 2018b). This reinforces the notion that teams would rather appear

legitimate than successful and is consistent with the practice of modeling high performing

organizations as a means of acquiring legitimacy.

Sports organizations must attune to the needs of a large number of stakeholders, which

increases isomorphic pressure to appease these manifold groups (Washington and Patterson,

2009; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). NFL teams must display a requisite level of competency to

their fan bases, and thus adopt these practices “to enhance their legitimacy, to demonstrate that

they are at least trying to improve” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Outwardly to fans, this appears

as a desire to increase organizational effectiveness. However, the primary goal is an increase in

legitimacy; any measurable increase in efficiency is merely a positive externality. This is

consistent with what we see as a result of NFL mimicry, as “the imitations rarely work" (Clark,

2018b). When attempting to adopt successful strategy from other organizations, teams often fail

in their quest to efficiently replicate successful competitors (Farrar, 2018).

NFL teams obscure the extent of their use of analytics (Battista, 2012), making any

direct form of mimicry difficult. Instead, we propose that teams attempt to model what they view

as demonstrable, legitimized practice. As these quantifiable strategies have not yet crossed this

threshold, we propose that teams reject the utility of such information through a decoupling

strategy. “The sport field is a location at the intersection of the technical and institutional
16

environment, which increases the tendency of actions for legitimacy to be decoupled from

actions for performance" (Washington and Patterson, 2009). Resolution of this dissonance

allows teams and coaches to cognitively maintain their preexisting cognitive schema, effectively

discrediting any innovations and missing out on opportunities to improve organizational

effectiveness.

Normative

Perhaps stronger than any isomorphic element is the existence of normative football

beliefs. “Normative pressures come from dyadic relationships where companies share some

information, rules, and norms” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). It has been established that creation

of an analytical structure represent divergent strategic behavior. Teams must overcome

significant normative isomorphic pressure that restrict idea development. “If the actions and

behaviors of organizations are grounded in what is socially possible (Meyer, Boli, and Thomas,

1987), then a behavior must be treated like an institutional norm for it to become widespread”

(Cassilo & Sanderson, 2017).

We begin our analysis with a cross-field comparison of normative behaviors between the

MLB and NFL. “The NFL is not the only sports organization with a history of clinging to dominant

ideology" (Cassilo & Sanderson, 2017). Despite the perception of a natural marriage between

baseball and analytical modeling, Major League Baseball faced a number of structural and

cognitive norms in its evolution. We find evidence of similarly institutionalized, normative barriers

that worked to slow the introduction of new ideas. Specifically, baseball had to overcome beliefs

of the “traditional baseball paradigm” (Cullen, et al., 2009). There exists bountiful opportunity to

apply concepts of normative isomorphism to these developments experienced across both the

MLB and NFL.

17

1st tenet: In-person scouting of players by “baseball men” (Cullen, et al., 2009), a

practice mirrored in traditional football methods as well. “We suspect NFL decision-makers put

more weight on scouting evidence than is justified" (Thaler and Massey, 2006). In describing an

upcoming potential NFL player, an anonymous scout said, "I haven’t seen him in person yet -

and that’s a huge piece of the puzzle for me" NFL Scout” (Burglar, 2018). Les Snead, general

manager of the Los Angeles Rams, described this process in contrast to metric-driven analyses:

“Well, those may be the metrics of the situation. But for me, before you pick that speaker, I want

actually go hear him and feel him speak” (Seifert, 2015).

2nd tenet: In-game decisions should be made based on accumulated wisdom from

insider experiences, regardless of whether these practices hold up empirically (Cullen, et al.,

2009). Bursik (2012) speculates that this non-rational behavior runs rampant in the NFL. "Even

if teams want to maximize expected profits, they may be overly reliant on experience and

intuition as opposed to a more robust examination... it is more possible that various tidbits of

conventional wisdom can develop that are both incorrect and standard practice" (Bursik, 2012).

3rd tenet: Decision-making should be made by intuition, or a “gut feeling” (Cullen, et al.,

2009). A cursory scan of comments from NFL executives reveal the prevalent nature of this

behavior, often referring to this process with a degree of pride.

- Vikings general manager Rick Spielman: “We have all those charts and looked at

them. But when the game is going, you still have to go with what your gut instinct

is" (Seifert, 2015).

- Former Chargers head coach Mike McCoy: "I'm going to go with my gut decision

on those things… It's all about what you think is best, and what you think is best

for your team at that time" (Seifert, 2015).

18

- Former San Francisco 49ers head coach Bill Walsh: “Scripting is planning; it’s

contingency planning. You don’t want to live by your instincts” (Mays, 2017a).

Head coach Bill Walsh, architect of the 1980’s San Francisco 49ers dynasty, became a

pioneer of “scripting” the first 25-30 plays of each game (Mays, 2017a). Aware of the potential to

become emotionally biased in the heat of a game, he scripted his play calls to work against

these cognitive biases.

The works of Romer (2005), Thaler (2006), Burke (2007), and Kovash (2009), provide

evidence that teams do not maximize. We are thus left with the conclusion that much of this

accumulated insider “wisdom” is demonstrably false. Coaches often consciously reject empirical

evidence (i.e. information gleaned from analytical evaluation), instead relying on heuristic

decision methods. In doing so, they reinforce normative pressure to keep processes the same,

a form of institutional maintenance. Washington and Patterson (2009), summarizing the work of

(Selznick, 1957; Washington, Boal, & Davis, 2008), describe this process as “the artful repetition

of stories from the past to represent the normative bases of the institution.” Internally,

organizations potentially resolve these incongruencies through buffering. Adherence to both

institutional norms and structural imperatives requires buffering strategies to reduce conflict

between these frictional forces

Central to normative isomorphism is increased professionalism, which can be

interpreted as the collective struggle amongst institutional actors to maintain autonomy of their

work processes. “While various kinds of professionals within an organization may differ from one

another, they exhibit much similarity to their professional counterparts in other organizations.”

(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Despite the sport’s evolution over the last several decades, there

remains a tendency to valorize “old school” values, authoritarian hierarchies, and a dismissal of
19

intellectualism as meek. Furthermore, there exists a pattern of hiring coaches who have “earned

their stripes” through following of institutional behaviors, and an exclusionary, demonizing

practice to those who have violated these cultural expectations (Cosentino, 2018). We identify

several cultural characteristics and their normative presence in football - commitment to

tradition, high degree of power distance, control over strategy, and exclusionary punishment as

a result of normative violations.

Football professionalism manifests as a tendency to favor the familiar, reinforced by the

notion that coaching and assessing player talent has “always been done this way” (Brown,

2016). “Much of the league subscribes to the belief that football organizations should be run in a

certain way” (Cassilo & Sanderson, 2017). We speculate that many of the normative values

exhibited by NFL coaches are present in lower levels of the sport. Coaches are trained and

developed with traditional, socially acceptable methods of teaching the game. Normative beliefs

are imbued during this early socialization process as a result of membership in these

professional training institutions. “The exchange of information among professionals helps

contribute to a commonly recognized hierarchy of status, of center and periphery, that becomes

a matrix for information flows and personnel movement across organizations” (DiMaggio &

Powell, 1983). This ultimately results in a homogenizing pressure that drives coaching practices

towards a narrow, undifferentiated medium. “Much homogeneity in organizational structures

stems from the fact that despite considerable search for diversity there is relatively little variation

to be selected from” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).

This socialization process creates prescribed “taken-for-granted” assumptions,

especially visible in the field of sports (Greenwood, et al., 2008). Organizational leaders have

been professionalized to share similar views on what constitutes appropriate organizational

practice (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Norms can be explicit or implicit, emergenging “over time
20

from interactions among participants in a social system” (Edelman, 1992). Following his arrival

into a new organization, former player and coach Pepper Johnson was instructed by his fellow

coaches to “stay in his lane” (Cosentino, 2018). Not questioning the status quo was an inherent

norm to his new organization, one that was implicitly reinforced. “It’s tough, every time when I

would ask someone about that statement, I couldn’t really get a clear answer" (Cosentino,

2018). Misaligned with the acceptable behaviors dictated by his new organization, colleagues

institutionally attempted to ring in this deviant behavior. Coercive pressures keep institutional

actions in line, but effectiveness is dependent upon calculated normative self-enforcement

(Greif, 1998).

Aside from deference to status quo, coaches often exhibit an obsession with doing

things their own way, allowing little room for post-professional adaptation. This invokes a key

tenet of normative institutionalism - the desire to maintain autonomy over work (DiMaggio &

Powell, 1983). “Especially in sports, they’re trying to protect their turf. They’re sitting there and

going ‘hey this is the way it’s always been, and why should anything change?’” (Roseman,

2018). Upon encountering a more institutionally moderated NFL team structure, Pepper

Johnson found little room for his input, despite years spent with the division-rival New England

Patriots. “Some people, if it’s not their ideals, then they don’t want to use them. Because they’re

not getting credit for that" (Cosentino, 2018). Head coach Andy Reid, largely considered one of

the more innovative minds in professional football (Clark, 2018a), encountered this early in his

career, when his coaching superiors told him, “Yeah, that looks like a good play—but you know

what? I don’t know that play. When you get your own offense, you go ahead and feel free to put

that in.’ (Vrentas, 2018).

NFL coaches face tangible risk in their job security, with a mean tenure of only three

years (Brian, 2013). Even in the presence of on-field success, they are less likely to remain in
21

their positions for long terms relative to their counterparts in the NBA or MLB (Malone, 2012).

Such tenuous status leads coaches towards risk aversion (Bursik, 2012). In the face of said

pressure, coaches look towards institutional norms, which provide legitimacy and help ensure

survival (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Paradoxically, this leads them to reject analytical

advantages that could help ensure their survival. Individuals apply these structures as cognitive

guides on how they should act with respect to new technology assimilation (Scott, 1995;

Orlikowski,1992). Head coach Dirk Koetter - “The percentages say you should go for it almost

every time… but if I don’t get it in this particular game, we might be losing, and I might be out of

here" (Smith, 2018). The prospect of getting fired “inclines coaches to do what everyone else

has done and failed because that is at least defensible in that circle. Doing it the way someone

else has not done it before and failing… well, that is going to get you cast out.” (Bloom and

Sharp, 2018). Teams deficient in player or coaching talent rationally should pursue every

competitive advantage possible. However, Warren Sharp finds that these teams display the

strongest aversion to analytical decision-making, instead doubling down on their institutionalized

beliefs. “The more structure is derived from institutional myths, the more elaborate displays of

confidence, satisfaction, and good faith, internally and externally” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

Institutional theory dictates adherence to normative guidelines provides stability, even at the

expense of efficiency. This holds true in the NFL, as empirical evidence has found that

individual coaching success is negatively related to internal advancement (Malone, 2012). Thus,

we can deduce that NFL coaches have a stronger incentive to accommodate their behavior and

choices to established norms rather than any potential innovation.

Normative Violations - “Rocking the Boat”

22

Internalization of normative NFL behaviors occurs through repetitive self-reinforcement.

Within organizations, there is a unwritten expectation amongst players and coaches to not “rock

the boat,” as the league is “generally considered a traditionalist league where few teams push

the boundaries” (Davis, 2016). “If executives don’t trust you, they won’t listen to you" (Roseman,

2018). Punishment for these normative transgressions range from verbal attacks to expulsion

from the league. Only a month after being hired as the Browns general manager, Paul

DePodesta found himself victim to such attacks, not only by the media, but his fellow peers as

well. “The 43-year-old executive overheard fellow NFL front office people bad mouthing him and

the Browns at the NFL Scouting Combine” (Mike Chiari, Bleacher Report).

These institutional reprimands can occur within teams as well To ensure that their

assimilation actions do not violate institutional rules, individuals turn to “structures of

domination” to ensure legitimacy and block issuance of any potential sanctions (Scott, 1995;

Orlikowski, 1992). Coach Pepper Johnson experienced these consequences less than two

years after joining the New York Jets. It is not difficult to equate the Patriots, his former

organization, with efficient and innovative success; a model organization that has seemingly

bucked many of these institutional rules. As previously mentioned, the normative value of

“staying in your lane” was communicated to Johnson by his professional peers. However, we

contend that he did not properly attune to these structures of domination. This resulted in a

ceremonial termination as a direct result of challenging established cognitive schema and

traditional ways of doing things, which represents normatively accepted behavior amongst the

Patriots. “The only thing I ever heard,” through the grapevine “was that I was over-opinionated"

(Cosentino, 2018). The NFL reinforces this discipline by demonizing and “blacklisting” cultural

violators. "To my understanding, once you’re out of the league it’s hard to get back in"

(Cosentino, 2018).
23

Strict institutional maintenance ensures the survival of these normative mechanisms. In

reaction, individuals and organizations rely on legitimized behaviors and thought patterns. As

we have established, analytics in the NFL has not yet reached this ceremonial ascension. Thus,

we contend that there remains a conscious, normative rejection of data-driven behavior and

decision-making. Challenges to these institutionalized beliefs incurs both individual and

organization risk. Instead, structures of legitimation are used to quell any non-conforming

behavior, which serves to increase normative isomorphism.

Challenges to institutions & the the moderating effect of legitimacy

Consistent through each isomorphic element is a emphasis on the pursuit and

acquisition of legitimacy, regardless of its impact on organizational efficiency (DiMaggio &

Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). As previously established, there remain untapped market

inefficiencies for teams to exploit through the harnessing of data-driven decision-making (Burke,

Romer, etc.). Although not diametrically opposed, legitimacy and efficiency often work in

opposition. The 2016 Cleveland Browns provide a potent opportunity for a contextual application

of legitimacy assessments.“The Browns’ decision to promote their general counsel to a position

with roster control and then hire a data-driven baseball executive over him was unprecedented

in the NFL” (Sando, 2016). We begin by analyzing ways in which the team violated structural

imperatives and normative beliefs. Lacking in both legitimacy and reputation, we propose that

the team did not have sufficient performance measures to challenge the strength of the

institutional NFL environment.

Team structuralization imbues commonly held beliefs and myths (Meyer & Rowan,

1977). The Cleveland Browns’ attempt to marry an analytical front office with a orthodox,

professionalized coaching staff did not align with organizational goals or their newfound
24

structural imperatives. Final decision authority over player personnel was never clearly

identified, and speculation of misaligned strategies proved true (McManamon, 2016b). The

personnel pairing with head coach Hue Jackson represented “possibly a ‘very bad fit’ in

Cleveland… and that executive also said Jackson’s coaching staff will not be on board with the

analytics department’s decision making.” (Wilson, 2016). Right off the bat, this created a

challenge to existing vocabularies of structure.

In an attempt to challenge traditionally held football doctrine, the team also violated

several culturally institutionalized norms. “This a league of considerable groupthink, and this

hiring and structure will engender considerable disdain” (La Canfora, 2017). Instead of curiosity

or optimism, a large portion of the media focused on the “philosophical differences between the

traditional, scouting-based player evaluation culture in the NFL and the analytics-based

approach to football strategy and evaluation” with a negative stress placed on “how schools of

thought would compete with each other versus how they would coexist” (Cassilo & Sanderson,

2017). As the key architect of this transformation, Paul DePodesta’s status as a critical actor

represented potentially the largest determinant of the program's success. An anonymous

general manager described DePodesta’s misfit within the broader institutional environment. He

claimed that he was “focused on getting it right as opposed to getting credit -- which is why he

can't survive most front offices." (Fleming, 2016). This is consistent with our previous

propositions that NFL teams value individual reputation over the quality of their output.

Finally, the team did not sufficiently assess the roles of their largest constituents - their

fans. In stakeholder theory, organizations seeking legitimacy must understand and attend to the

expectations of those that consume sports entertainment if they wish to be perceived as

legitimate, thereby ensuring future cash flows in the form of revenue (York & Miree, 2015). In

such an environment, legitimacy challenges may come not just from formal coercive bodies, but
25

mobilized social actors as well (Stinchcombe, 1969; Weber, 1968). Together, fans and media

exerted significant coercive pressure on the Browns’ organization. Within an institutional

context, exertion of regulative power is not uncommon, as the fate of the coach is often put on

the agenda by the media and fans (Gammelsaeter, 2013).

Establishment of these institutional transgressions lays the groundwork for our

proposition: organizations must have an established pool of legitimacy to successfully overcome

institutionally isomorphic barriers. According to Deephouse & Carter (2005), organizations with

low reputation are constrained in their strategic choices. At risk of attacks and legitimacy

questions, these firms “have little choice but to redouble efforts through greater conformity…

conversely, if a firm chooses a strategy that is different from the industry trend, it will potentially

reduce the legitimacy of the firm as a result of the reduced trust of the constituents and

ultimately decrease the performance of the company" (Törnquist, 2013). Given the Browns’

pre-existing low reputation, media framing created an inexorable link between the team’s

ineptitude and an analytics-derived hierarchy. “Given the Browns’ past failures, the shift to

analytics was also portrayed as a last-ditch effort from a struggling franchise rather than an

innovative approach… In some instances, reporters put less emphasis on analytics and more

focus on the fact that it was the Browns franchise employing that strategy" (Cassilo &

Sanderson, 2017).

Institutional theory views legitimacy as a social resource. For the Browns, this deficit

threatened the viability of their organizational overhaul from the start. Speculation and doubt

was pervasive not just in the media, but amongst league executives as well. "If you love

analytics and want it to grow and succeed in the NFL, then you know Cleveland is a nightmare

scenario," shared a league executive with 20 years of experience in analytics. “Cleveland is a

crazy, terrible place for this to be tested in football” (Fleming, 2016).

26

When organizations do not meet sufficient standards of legitimacy, the external

environment exerts pressures on them to “initiate change that brings it in line with accepted

standards” (Hanson, 2001). This institutional correction occurred quickly; a 1-31 record over two

years resulted in the termination of the entire personnel staff, a symbolic abortion of analytics in

the NFL. However, it is important to stress that institutionally-derived forces rarely concern

themselves with actual efficiency or output. A sports “dismissal can be interpreted as the

outcome of a highly institutionalized and taken-for-granted script" (Nissen, 2015). In the ensuing

season, the Cleveland Browns, have already topped their combined win total from the previous

two seasons (NFL.com), a sign that the “Moneyball” approach may prove successful given

sufficient time. Under heavily scrutinized legitimacy, however, isomorphic pressures do not allow

for such patience.

Implicit in this failure to fully incorporate an analytical football hierarchy was the potential

cognitive blow it represented to analytics. “The process of concept formation is always

simultaneously the process of concept transformation" (Wright, 1985). Accordingly, we must

acknowledge the role of framing by powerful actors, both internal to the organization and

outside. Critics of the approach “correlated attempt to use analytics with years of ineptitude,

thereby discrediting quantified decision criteria as a serious organizational approach.” (Cassilo

& Sanderson, 2017). According to organizational embeddedness, there exists a dyadic,

two-way relationship between institutions and their environments. “Organizations are both

sources of institutionalism and recipients of it” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). So long as league

executives publicly criticize implementation of these non-conforming strategies, the media will

continue to reinforce those beliefs. In turn, individuals and organizations will cyclically internalize

those values, and display increasingly isomorphic behaviors. Such analysis comes only in the

form of a proposition from this paper. Normative, mimetic, and cognitive isomorphisms interplay
27

subtly and are not always directly traceable. However, we agree with Cassilo & Sanderson that

media framing represent the greatest institutional barrier towards embracing new cognitive

schema. “Once analytics becomes an accepted ideology, it then has the possibility of growing

stronger and becoming dominant. But none of this is possible unless it first becomes a frame of

reference, and that can occur by media framing analytics as a viable philosophy within football.”

(Cassilo & Sanderson, 2017).

Towards a Theory of Institutional Change

Focus of institutional theory has shifted in recent decades in an attempt to explain

institutional change, which at first glance can seem at odds with isomorphism (Scott, 2005). To

fully understand the evolution of NFL analytics would require its own focused pursuit. Thus, we

conclude our model with some potential explanations for why certain innovative organizations

have been able to overcome institutional isomorphic pressures, with many more questions than

answers to be answered in future research opportunities.

Analysis of the Browns’ failure to innovate given their institutional constraints allows for

direct comparison with those teams that have successfully overcome these barriers. The New

England Patriots and Philadelphia Eagles are considered pioneers of analytical modeling within

their organizations, having established in-house analytics departments as early as the 1990’s

(Seifert, 2015; Sharp, 2018). A cursory examination of their successes suggests a positive

connection between data-driven decision models and organizational effectiveness, as the two

teams have participated in multiple Super Bowls this millenia, with a combined six victories

(ESPN.com).

Patriots head coach Bill Belichick, with a background in economics, is the first known

example of a coach to read and apply Romer’s (2005) 4th down findings. Given Belichick’s five
28

Super Bowl victories, “it is not surprising that he would try to get every edge possible” (Malone,

2012). Eagles team president Howie Roseman, nominated 2017 NFL Executive of the Year, has

continued the legacy undertaken by his predecessor Joe Banner. Akin to Bill Walsh, Roseman

argues against orthodox reliance on in-game intuition. Rather, he asserts there must be a

balance and clear delineation between cognitive and emotional processing. “It’s hard to

separate the emotion. That’s why we have analytics… subjective and objective” (Roseman,

2018).

Both organizations are aspirationally viewed as innovative, successful, and legitimate.

Establishment of these social credits allows them to continue advancing their competitive

advantages. So why are these teams praised for the “innovative” uses of analytics while others

are questioned? The answer is not entirely clear, but we propose that they represent

organizations with sufficient legitimacy to challenge institutional forces. “An organization’s

isomorphic actions will be interpreted differently by constituents depending on the organization’s

reputation" (Deephouse & Carter, 2005). In the face of isomorphic pressures, organizations with

strong reputations are permitted to exhibit non-conforming behavior, due to the presence of

“idiosyncrasy credits” (Deephouse & Carter, 2005). The most surprising difference between high

and low status organizations is represented by the relationship between innovation and

reputation. “If innovation directly affects reputation, then it is more likely to diffuse rapidly, to be

retained by the organization" (Zucker, 1987). For the Cleveland Browns, a negative association

between this evolution and reputation significantly undermined a challenge of normative

structures and behaviors. Yet, for team’s like the Eagles and Patriots, these innovations have

received praise (Clark, 2018b). These differences in perception provide strong support of

legitimacy and reputation as moderating factors in isomorphism analyses.

29

Successful implementation of analytics by the Patriots and Eagles highlight the necessity

for organizational clarity, alignment of imperatives, and total commitment. Within institutions,

powerful actors either promulgate institutional maintenance, or adjust structures to create

conditions more adaptive to technology assimilation (Orlikowski, 1992). This begins with support

from ownership, as pervasive risk of dismissal drives coaches towards risk-aversion. “The

operational similarity among NFL franchises starts with ownership and trickles down to other

organizational areas, including game strategy and personnel decisions" (Cassilo & Sanderson,

2017). Eagles owner Jeffrey Lurie is outspoken in the team’s commitment to data-driven

decision-making through all levels of the organization, including applications by head Coach

Doug Pederson. “And it doesn’t matter if three, four, five times in a row, we do things that don’t

work out. He’s got support from myself and everybody else. There is no downside to taking

action that gives us a better chance to win" (Clark, 2018b).

Farrar (2018) claims that NFL teams only innovate when absolutely necessary - in the

face of potential termination. “It’s entirely rare for any football innovation to occur without an

owner, general manager, coach, group of players, or single player up against the wall and

looking for a way to succeed.” Professionalized coaching norms typically reserve this as a last

resort. We speculate this is due to homogenized parity that the league seeks to maintain. “NFL

coaches tend to be late adopters of schematic trends—in part because pro talent levels are so

even, unlike in college, where overmatched desperation spurs innovation” (Vrentas, 2018).

Major League Baseball presents similar institutional forces that would more naturally compel

innovation than the NFL, as there exist less balanced schedules and no hard salary cap

(Zimbalist, 2002; Grier and Tollison,1994). Furthermore, NFL teams pool and share over two

thirds of total revenue (Vrooman, 2012), and thus face less financial incentive to innovate. A

shift in the past two decades has seen unshared, team-specific NFL revenue climb from 10% to
30

22%. “A major threat to league-thinking solidarity has emerged from an individualist

counterrevolution in unshared venue revenue” (Vrooman, 2012). Thus, we contend that there is

a weakening of regulative isomorphism amongst NFL teams that may be allowing greater

challenges to the institutional environment. This potentially explains why certain teams have

been able to wedge new ideas amidst strong isomorphic pressures.

If NFL teams truly do mimic legitimized practices seen in other organizations, then why

are there still so many teams not embracing analytics? Bursik (2012) invokes behavioral

economics to explain irrational decisions by various parties with diverse interests within an NFL

organization. Such agency bias often results in non-optimal outcomes. “So what is good for the

top leadership, and even for the organization as a whole, leads to behavior that seems

nonrational when analyzed in its own terms" (Freeman, 1999). As evidence by decades of

non-optimal team decision-making, empirical validity of data will not suffice to change the

current paradigm. Rather, this can only occur following the passing of a critical threshold in

which the analytics becomes positively associated with legitimacy. The more numerous the

adopters of a practice, the more widespread its acceptance and the greater its legitimacy

(Strang and Soule, 1998; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983).

Before organizations begin to mimic the analytical success prevalent in other

organizations, these practices must become legitimized. Only through clear and repetitive

failures of old customs do individuals search for new, more efficient ways of operating. When

this does occur, institutions display an expediency in the adaptation of internal processes

(Kasper and Streit, 1999). According to NFL analyst KC Joyner, the analytics trend “is not going

to take off in football until someone wins with metrics like the Red Sox did in baseball… Until

that happens and everyone catches up, analytics are going to give teams that are already using

the methods, like the Patriots, a competitive edge” (qtd. Sauser, 2008).
31

Potential applications of institutional theory are numerous. Technological innovation

states that “while technologies affect institutions, institutions surely affect the adoption of

technology and accompanying organizational changes” (Schmid, 2004). Institutional forces

exhibit inertia and often inhibit the appropriate use of technological innovations (Purvis,

Sambamurthy, and Zmud, 2001). Institutional work, in an effort to address deterministic,

top-down criticisms of institutional theory, introduces actor agency within institutions (Miceclotta

2013; Washington and Patterson, 2009). The theory identifies a fundamental misalignment

between the roles and needs of social actors within those institutional arrangements (Seo and

Creed, 2002). We have traced institutional logic through each component of our model as a

means of the cognitive perception of analytics. We would thus be remiss to neglect any

theoretical assessment of logic shifts. “Maybe the contending logic was always ‘lurking in the

shadows’ in the organizational field and eventually gained enough support to challenge the

dominant logic?” (Washington and Patterson, 2009).

Through the lens of our theoretical framework, Scott (2005) acknowledges that the three

pillars of institutions may not always be in alignment, and that they may undermine one another.

We have established the immense power of NFL normative isomorphism. The league remains a

complex institutional field, comprised of multiple competing logics, viewpoints, and objectives.

To create a true ideological shift, it is incumbent upon powerful actors such as coaches and

owners to change these current negative frames. Those with power must consciously

deconstruct prevailing institutional structures, introduce new models to facilitate technology use,

and reinforce norms that value the use of the technology (Kwon and Zmud, 1987).

Discussion and Conclusion

32

The purpose of this paper is to establish a theoretical framework in which to understand

institutional pressures and their constraining effects on idea evolution, specifically the usage of

analytics amongst teams in the National Football League. Teams imbue mythicized, socially

constructed beliefs in their formation of structure. In the NFL, these create the first institutional

barrier that discourage the adoption of unique or innovative processes. As a response to an

unclear relationship between inputs and outputs, teams turn to their external environment

through mimicry. Normative behaviors acts as guidelines for acceptable practices. Violations of

these institutional elements can lead to sanctions from the environment. Thus, actors and

organizations are increasingly led back to narrow, homogenized practices, further limiting the

potential for any innovation amongst NFL teams. Applying Deephouse & Carter (2005), we

propose that measures of legitimacy and reputation have a trickle down effect to decisions

made by football teams. In cases of low reputation, teams run the risk of questioned legitimacy,

exacerbated when they exhibit non-conforming behavior. Finally, we view the shifting cognitive

perception of analytics using several potential explanations for institutional change. Construction

of this model, while based largely on textual analysis and non-empirical evidence, present

numerous opportunities for further exploration and application of institutional theory.

The National Football League appears to be standing on a precipice, teetering on the

edge of embracing data-driven analysis as a valid and legitimate practice. Now more than ever,

there are teams embracing their potential utility. “Analytics in the NFL have moved well beyond

the point where a team hiring a consulting firm to run numbers constitutes outside-the-box

thinking" (Breer, 2017). Several teams have fully-staffed analytics departments which work

closely in tandem with their coaching staffs to scout opponents, create gameplans, and execute

personnel decisions (Breer, 2017). This type of data literacy provides a potentially seismic

advantage for teams “that have studied and figured out how to apply” these concepts
33

(Roseman, 2018). The past few years have seen teams slowly start to follow the prescriptions

laid out in Romer (2005), Burke (2007), and Kovash and Levitt (2009), “an indication that the

league may finally be realizing that passing is more efficient than running" (Kelly, 2018).

We end with one final hypothetical suggestion: Innovative organizations leverage their

institutional environment, strategically and purposefully reinforcing stigmatic beliefs of NFL

analytics. "Lots of teams are criticizing it in public and using it in private" (Fraser, 2016). When

the Baltimore Ravens announced the installment of a full-time analytics department, an

anonymous NFL general manager expressed bewilderment at their candor (Battista, 2012).

Such duplicitous manipulation potentially creates the opportunity to further extend and ensure

the sustainability of competitive advantages. If Deephouse & Carter are correct in their

assessment that high-reputation organizations are freer to display non-conforming and

innovative behavior, then might there be a multiplying effect where these teams continue to

push further ahead, a case of the “rich getting richer?” And in turn, could this cause an even

stronger coercive response from the league, which does everything in its power to preserve

parity (Clark, 2017)? This question remains one of many potential future research opportunities.

Further Research Opportunities

Application of institutional theory into an NFL context remains ripe with investigative

opportunities, both in terms of better understanding NFL behavior as well as an empirical testing

ground for contemporary theory. The discovery of NFL homogeneity and strategic isomorphic

(York & Miree, 2015) and identification of the role of media and fans in analytical framing

(Cassilo & Sanderson, 2017) are critical building blocks for any application of institutional theory

into the NFL. The models and propositions in this paper aim to help add detail and context to

those theoretical applications, and open up many potential applications.

34

First, the NFL and football culture would benefit from closer scholarly examination.

Similar to Deephouse & Carter (2005) and Cassilo & Sanderson (2017), we relied on textual

inference to examine isomorphic forces in the NFL. This inherently entails a selection bias, one

that could be mitigated through established, reproducible research on football norms, beliefs,

and values. Greater depths of documentation could open up many opportunities.

The conceptual nature of this type of analysis allowed us a good deal of speculative

freedom. The next step forward for this research would involve empirical modeling and testing.

Are analytically-inclined teams more successful than their counterparts? Do they display a

greater consistency year-over-year? A lack of information poses a serious threat to any

quantitative analyses, as NFL teams closely guard as much information as possible. However,

acquisition would allow the chance to test for the validity of some of the applications espoused

in this paper.

In our analysis, we largely ignore the role of coercive and regulative isomorphic

pressures. Central to seminal works by DiMaggio & Powell (1983) and Scott (1995; 2001;

2005), this analysis focuses on the formal and informal relationships between organizations and

legitimacy granting institutions, as well as the moderating impact of resource concentration.

There remains the possibility that aforementioned league-wide revenue changes represents a

weakening of NFL institutional pressure. Shifting and increasingly diverse fan membership,

through the booming popularity of fantasy football, may also potentially have a role in

decentralization of NFL resources. More thorough analysis of these forces could yield potential

insights.

We suggest NFL normative guidelines as the strongest enforcer of collectively held and

shared institutional beliefs. Within this repertoire of self-enforcement is exclusionary

“blacklisting.” There exists numerous papers on the NFL’s “kneeling” and social justice
35

controversy. However, specific application of institutional theory could provide the framework to

explain the demonization of Colin Kaepernick (normative) and the potential of league collusion

(coercive) barring his re-entry.

Although lightly touched upon, institutional change remains at the forefront of

neoinstitutional theory (Scott, 2005). Selection of a single method could yield insights into the

development of analytics in football. NFL organizations are largely homogeneous, yet

cognitively they are comprised of a large diversity of thoughts and opinions. Application of

institutional change could provide rich insights, particularly in cross-organizational examinations.

An examination of power dynamics between owners, coaches, and personnel could help shed

light on organizational inefficiencies beyond nonoptimal play calling.

A return to the 2016-2017 Cleveland Browns is but one of many opportunities to look at

the role of coaching political clout. Prior to his termination less than halfway through the 2018

season, there was an emerging narrative of head coach Hue Jackson as the worst coach in the

NFL. Yet, despite being at the helm of Cleveland's 1-31 stretch over this two year period, the

analytics personnel department were ceremonially fired, while Jackson was able to convince

ownership that the team’s failures did not fall on his shoulders. “In faltering corporations

selection may occur on political rather than economic grounds” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). A

potential pairing with our legitimacy analysis could add further context to the potency of

organizational dysfunction in a highly institutionalized environment.

Bursik (2012) provides strong evidence of non-maximizing team behavior in the NFL,

research that we have used to exemplify cognitive aversion to empirical self-scouting and

evaluation. In his findings, Bursik suggests several cognitive biases to explain how individuals

resolve this dissonance, including agency bias, prospect theory, familiarity bias, and Ellsberg
36

Paradox. Contributions from the field of behavioral economics could help shed more light on

these ideas, including both theoretical models and empirical testing.

Finally, there exists an opportunity to expand upon the findings of Cassilo & Sanderson

(2017). Over the past few decades, we believe that the NFL has lost exclusive control over its

agenda-setting platform. With the rise of third party coverage, the league no longer can hide its

inefficiencies as easily. There have been numerous scholarly explorations of this phenomenon,

although they have been analogous to the mishandlings of disastrous public relations events.

However, we postulate that there is a growing aggregate of football intelligence, both among

fans and media. Through online discourse, traditional football beliefs are being challenged

empirically, through works such as Romer (2005) and Burke (2007), leading to discarding of

these unsupported traditions. As stakeholders, fans are more well-equipped to challenge

inefficient team performance, which hypothetically could reduce the intensity of organizational

legitimacy-seeking. Hanson (2001) proposes environmental shock as an explanation for

institutional change, in which the external environment gets seriously ahead of any incremental

adaptations. This can be brought about by shifts in technology, law, or public awareness. Thus,

there is present an opportunity to explore the role of increasing public awareness (fan

intelligence in this example) on institutional maintenance.

An exposure to NFL media member discussions of these irrational tendencies inspired

this research undertaking. Evan Silva, 2017’s most cited fantasy football analyst on Twitter,

describes the NFL’s institutional tendency to reject innovation as the “cocoon” (Silva, 2018).

Sigmund Bloom’s “assumption of rational coaching” represents a fundamental question that we

have tried to answer through our model construction. Warren Sharp, publisher of the ​2018

Football Preview​, provides perhaps the most robust statistical evaluation of NFL play calling,

evoking the level of analysis found in baseball’s sabermetrics. Matt Waldman has published
37

numerous articles exploring the role of institutional forces in the NFL. This includes the biased

tendency for teams to give a disproportionate ratio of playing time to early NFL draft picks over

higher performing players picked later (Waldman, 2018), an exemplification of the institutional

tendency to decouple legitimacy pursuits from organizational efficiency, in this case the attempt

to cognitively legitimize previous decision-making.

In conclusion, we suggest that NFL teams will eventually be forced to stop ignoring the

validity and legitimacy of analytical decision-making. “Despite the efforts of institutional leaders

to maintain norms, institutions can become disrupted and changed" (Nite, 2018). The ability of

external stakeholders to hold institutions accountable remains a pivotal method in the

dissolution of institutional NFL pressures. “To the extent that behavioral anomalies are driven by

irrational factors, shining a light on the irrationality should eliminate the anomalous behavior

over time as long as the objective really is to maximize expected profit” (Bursik, 2012). “Just as

it did with baseball in the early 2000’s, evidence in favor will mount over the years, as the fossil

finds have for evolution - to the point where only those in the traditional faith will deny its

importance” (Cullen, et al., 2009).

Appendix

Table 1 (Scott, 2001)

38

References

Battista, J. (2012, November 24). More N.F.L. Teams Hire Statisticians But Their Use
Remains Mostly Guarded. Retrieved from
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/sports/football/more-nfl-teams-hire-statisticians-but
-their-use-remains-mostly-guarded.html

Bell, J. (2018, March 07). Analytics are here to stay in NFL, but interpreting flood of
information remains challenge. Retrieved from
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/columnist/bell/2018/03/07/analytics-nfl-interpr
eting-information-remains-challenge-demario-richard-jon-gruden-charlie-batch/40532200
2/

Berri, D. J., & Burke, B. (2011). Measuring Productivity of NFL Players. ​The Economics of
the National Football League,​137-158. doi:10.1007/978-1-4419-6290-4_8

Boxenbaum, E., & Jonsson, S. (n.d.). Isomorphism, Diffusion and Decoupling. ​The SAGE
Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism,7​ 8-98. doi:10.4135/9781849200387.n3

Breer, A. (2013, June 19). Who's really in charge? Power structures for all 32 NFL teams.
Retrieved from
39

http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap1000000210536/article/whos-ireallyi-in-charge-power-
structures-for-all-32-nfl-teams

Breer, A. (2017) How Analytics Are Used in the NFL. Retrieved from
https://www.si.com/mmqb/2017/06/27/nfl-analytics-what-nfl-teams-use-pff-stats-llc-tende
ncies-player-tracking-injuries-chip-kelly

Brian, G. (2013). Contributions of Managerial Levels: Comparing MLB and NFL.

Managerial and Decision Economics,34​(6), 428-436. doi:10.1002/mde.2604

Brown, C. B. (2017, June 03). Football Strategy's Radical, Tech-Fueled Revolution Has
Begun. Retrieved from
https://www.wired.com/2016/01/the-coming-revolution-in-football-strategy/

Brugler, D. (2018, November 28). Should He Stay Or Should He Go: NFL scout weighs in
on... Retrieved from
https://theathletic.com/679482/2018/11/28/nfl-draft-2019-underclassmen-qb-decisions/

Burke, B. (2007). What Makes Teams Win? 1. Retrieved from

http://archive.advancedfootballanalytics.com/2007/07/what-makes-teams-win-part-1.html?
m=1

Bursik, P. B. (2011). Behavioral Economics in the NFL. ​The Economics of the National
Football League,​259-276. doi:10.1007/978-1-4419-6290-4_15

Campbell, J. L. (2007). Why would corporations behave in socially responsible ways? an

institutional theory of corporate social responsibility. ​Academy of Management
Review,32​(3), 946-967. doi:10.5465/amr.2007.25275684

Canfora, J. L. (2017, April 06). Browns embrace grand experiment with hire of Paul
DePodesta. Retrieved from
https://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/browns-embrace-grand-experiment-with-hire-of-paul
-depodesta/

Cassilo, D., & Sanderson, J. (2017). “They Hired a Baseball Guy”: Media Framing and Its
Influence on the Isomorphic Tendencies of Organizational Management in Professional
Football. ​International Journal of Sport Communication,10​(3), 290-306.
doi:10.1123/ijsc.2017-0034

Chiari, M. (2017, September 19). Paul DePodesta Says Officials from Other NFL Teams
'Talking Trash' on Browns. Retrieved from
https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2624892-paul-depodesta-says-officials-from-other-nfl-t
eams-talking-trash-on-browns
40

Clark, K. (2017, October 17). NFL Parity Has Always Been a Myth-Until Now. Retrieved
from
https://www.theringer.com/nfl/2017/10/17/16488320/parity-myth-dynasty-roger-goodell-c
ollective-bargaining-agreement

Clark, K. (2018a, January 05). How a 59-Year-Old Football Lifer Became the NFL's Most
Influential Innovator. Retrieved from
https://www.theringer.com/nfl/2018/1/5/16853446/afc-playoffs-influential-offense-andy-r
eid-kansas-city-chiefs-college-spread

Clark, K. (2018b, September 06). How the Philadelphia Eagles Mastered the Modern NFL.
Retrieved from
https://www.theringer.com/nfl/2018/9/6/17826514/philadelphia-eagles-blueprint-doug-ped
erson-jeffrey-lurie-howie-roseman-carson-wentz

Cosentino, D. (2018, September 15). Q&A: Pepper Johnson On Drinking With Bill Belichick,
Spygate, And Why The Jets Can't Get It Together. Retrieved from
https://deadspin.com/q-a-pepper-johnson-on-drinking-with-bill-belichick-sp-1828726414

Crupi., A., & Crupi, A. (2018, January 02). Despite Another Ratings Slump, the NFL
Remains TV's Top Dog. Retrieved from
https://adage.com/article/media/ratings-slum/311777/

Cullen, F. T., Myer, A. J., & Latessa, E. J. (2009). Eight Lessons from Moneyball : The High
Cost of Ignoring Evidence-Based Corrections. ​Victims & Offenders,4(​ 2), 197-213.
doi:10.1080/15564880802612631

Davenport, T. H., & Harris, J. G. (2017). ​Competing on analytics the new science of winning.​
Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press.

Deephouse, D. L., & Carter, S. M. (2005). An Examination of Differences Between

Organizational Legitimacy and Organizational Reputation*. ​Journal of Management
Studies,42(​ 2), 329-360. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.2005.00499.x

Dimaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism
and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. ​American Sociological Review,48(​ 2),
147. doi:10.2307/2095101

Dowling, J., & Pfeffer, J. (1975). Organizational Legitimacy: Social Values and
Organizational Behavior. ​The Pacific Sociological Review,18​(1), 122-136.
doi:10.2307/1388226
41

Edelmann, R. J. (1992). The Wiley series in clinical psychology. Anxiety: Theory, research
and intervention in clinical and health psychology. Oxford, England: John Wiley & Sons.

Farrar, D. (2018). ​The genius of desperation: The schematic innovations that made the
modern NFL.​ Chicago, IL: Triumph Books LLC.

Fernández-Alles, M. D., & Valle-Cabrera, R. (2006). Reconciling institutional theory with

organizational theories. ​Journal of Organizational Change Management,19(​ 4), 503-517.
doi:10.1108/09534810610676699

Fleming, D. (2016, April 11). 'I thought he was a genius until he agreed to work for the
Browns'. Retrieved from
http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/15159159/why-paul-depodesta-bringing-moneyball-br
owns

Fligstein, N. (1991). Managing in the Corporate Interest.Vicki Smith. ​American Journal of

Sociology,97(​ 2), 547-549. doi:10.1086/229795

Fraser, A. (2016, September 01). Why Is The NFL Slow To Adopt Analytics For Draft? |
Articles | Analytics. Retrieved from
https://channels.theinnovationenterprise.com/articles/why-is-the-nfl-slow-to-adopt-analyti
cs-for-draft

Gonzales, M. (2018, April 28). Giants GM Destroys The NFL Analytic Nerds After Selecting
Saquon Barkley. Retrieved from
https://clutchpoints.com/giants-news-david-gettleman-claims-analytics-supporting-rb-deva
luation-are-nonsense-a-crock/

Grier, K. B., & Tollison, R. D. (1994). The rookie draft and competitive balance: The case of
professional football. ​Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,25(​ 2), 293-298.
doi:10.1016/0167-2681(94)90016-7

Hambrick, D. C., & Mason, P. A. (1984). Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection
of Its Top Managers. ​Academy of Management Review,9(​ 2), 193-206.
doi:10.5465/amr.1984.4277628

Hanson, M (2001). Institutional Theory and Educational Change. (n.d.). Retrieved from
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/00131610121969451

Johnson, C., Dowd, T., & Ridgeway, C. (2006). Legitimacy as a Social Process. Annual
Review of Sociology, 32, 53-78. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/29737731
42

Kasper, W., & Streit, M. E. (2012). ​Institutional economics: Social order and public policy​.
Cheltenham: Elgar.

Kelly, D. (2017, August 24). How the NFL's Anonymous Pro Scouts Keep Your Favorite
Team Humming. Retrieved from
https://www.theringer.com/nfl/2017/8/24/16195480/life-of-pro-scouts

Kovash, K., & Levitt, S. (2009). Professionals Do Not Play Minimax: Evidence from Major
League Baseball and the National Football League. doi:10.3386/w15347

Kraatz, M. S., & Block, E. S. (n.d.). Institutional Pluralism Revisited. ​The SAGE Handbook of
Organizational Institutionalism,5​ 32-557. doi:10.4135/9781446280669.n21

Lewis, M. (2003). Moneyball: The art of winning an unfair game. China: Law Press.

Lindsey, J. (2017, June 03). The NFL Is Finally Tapping Into the Power of Data. Retrieved
from https://www.wired.com/2016/01/the-nfls-impending-data-revolution/

Malone, K. D., Couch, J. F., & Barrett, J. D. (2011). The Market for NFL Coaches and
Managers. ​The Economics of the National Football League,​189-206.
doi:10.1007/978-1-4419-6290-4_11

Massey, C., & Thaler, R. (2005). Overconfidence vs. Market Efficiency in the National
Football League. doi:10.3386/w11270

Mays, R. (2017, August 24). The Misunderstood Art of Play-Calling. Retrieved from
https://www.theringer.com/nfl/2017/8/24/16193394/play-calling-strategy-bruce-arians-sea
n-mcvay

McManamon, P. (2016, March 16). Paul DePodesta: Criticism of Browns' new ways 'part of
the fun'. Retrieved from http://www.espn.com/blog/cleveland-browns/post/_/id/18271/
paul-depodesta-criticism-of-browns-new-ways-part-of-the-fun

Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth
and Ceremony. ​American Journal of Sociology,83​(2), 340-363. doi:10.1086/226550

Nett, R., & Stinchcombe, A. L. (1969). Constructing Social Theories. ​Social Forces,48(​ 1),
116. doi:10.2307/2575477

Oliver, C. (1992). The Antecedents of Deinstitutionalization. ​Organization Studies,13​(4),

563-588. doi:10.1177/017084069201300403
43

Orlikowski, W. J. (1992). The Duality of Technology: Rethinking the Concept of Technology

in Organizations. ​Organization Science,3​(3), 398-427. doi:10.1287/orsc.3.3.398

Purvis, R. L., Sambamurthy, V., & Zmud, R. W. (2001). The Assimilation of Knowledge
Platforms in Organizations: An Empirical Investigation. ​Organization Science,12(​ 2),
117-135. doi:10.1287/orsc.12.2.117.10115

Roger Friedland and Robert R. Alford, Bringing society back in: Symbols, practices, and
institutional contradictions, (1991). 1

Romer, D. (2006). Do Firms Maximize? Evidence from Professional Football. ​Journal of

Political Economy,114​(2), 340-365. doi:10.1086/501171

Royston Greenwood, Christine Oliver, Roy Suddaby, and Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson, The
sage handbook of organizational institutionalism, 04 2008. 1

Ruef, M., & Scott, W. (1998). A Multidimensional Model of Organizational Legitimacy:

Hospital Survival in Changing Institutional Environments. Administrative Science
Quarterly,43(4), 877-904. doi:10.2307/2393619

Sando, M. (2018, October 08). Inside the NFL's offensive explosion: Every team's pace so far
-- and can it continue? Retrieved from
http://www.espn.com/nfl/insider/story/_/id/24927099/nfl-offensive-explosion-2018-explai
ned-look-every-team-production-continue

Schmid, A. A. (2004). ​Conflict and cooperation: Institutional and behavioral economics.​

Malden, MA: Blackwell.

SCOTT, D. (2005), Critical Realism and Empirical Research Methods in Education. Journal
of Philosophy of Education, 39: 633-646. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9752.2005.00460.x

Scott, W.R. (1987). The Adolescence of Institutional Theory. Administrative Science

Quarterly, 32(4), 493-511. doi:10.2307/2392880

Scott, W. R (1995). Institutions and organizations, Foundations for Organizational Science,

SAGE Publications.

Scott, W. R. (2001) Institutions and organizations, Foundations for Organizational Science,

SAGE Publications.

Roseman, H. (2018, May 09). Massey, Cade. Retrieved December 14, 2018, from
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jhjm_wGW5no
44

Sharp, W. (n.d.). ​2018 Football Preview.​ Sharp Football Analysis.

Sherer, P., & Lee, K. (2002). Institutional Change in Large Law Firms: A Resource
Dependency and Institutional Perspective. The Academy of Management Journal, 45(1),
102-119. doi:10.2307/3069287

Smith, M. D. (2018, September 15). Dirk Koetter: Percentages say go for it on fourth down,
but if I fail I'm out of here. Retrieved from
https://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2018/09/15/dirk-koetter-percentages-say-go-for-it-on
-fourth-down-but-if-i-fail-im-out-of-here/

Sutton, F. X., & Selznick, P. (1958). Leadership in Administration: A Sociological

Interpretation. ​American Sociological Review,23​(1), 98. doi:10.2307/2088633

Seifert, K. (2015)The Great Analytics Rankings. (n.d.). Retrieved from

http://www.espn.com/espn/feature/story/_/id/12331388/the-great-analytics-rankings

Tolbert, P. S., & Zucker, L. G. (1983). Institutional Sources of Change in the Formal
Structure of Organizations: The Diffusion of Civil Service Reform, 1880-1935.
Administrative Science Quarterly,28(​ 1), 22. doi:10.2307/2392383

Törnquist, O. (2013). Assessing the dynamics of democratization: Transformative politics,

new institutions, and the case of Indonesia.​ New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1985). The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of
Choice. ​Behavioral Decision Making,2​ 5-41. doi:10.1007/978-1-4613-2391-4_2

Vrentas, J. (n.d.). The Future of Football Looks a Lot Like Andy Reid and Patrick Mahomes.
Retrieved from
https://www.si.com/nfl/2018/11/12/future-football-offense-andy-reid-patrick-mahomes-ka
nsas-city-chiefs

Vrooman, J. (2011). The Economic Structure of the NFL. ​The Economics of the National
Football League,​7-31. doi:10.1007/978-1-4419-6290-4_2

Washington, M., & Patterson, K. D. (2011). Hostile takeover or joint venture: Connections
between institutional theory and sport management research. ​Sport Management
Review,14​(1), 1-12. doi:10.1016/j.smr.2010.06.003

Weick, K. E. (1990). The Vulnerable System: An Analysis of the Tenerife Air Disaster.
Journal of Management,16​(3), 571-593. doi:10.1177/014920639001600304

Wilson, R. (2016, April 11). Report: Hue Jackson could be 'very bad fit' for analytics-heavy
Browns. Retrieved from
45

https://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/report-hue-jackson-could-be-very-bad-fit-for-analytic
s-heavy-browns/

York, K., & Miree, C. (2015). A Longitudinal Exploration of Strategic Isomorphism: The
Case of the National Football League. ​American Journal of Business and
Management,4(​ 2). doi:10.11634/216796061504610

Zimbalist, A. S. (2002). Competitive Balance in Sports Leagues. ​Journal of Sports

Economics,3​(2), 111-121. doi:10.1177/152700250200300201

Zimmerman, A. Monica, & Zeitz, J. Gerald. (2002). Beyond Survival: Achieving New
Venture Growth by Building Legitimacy. The Academy of Management Review, 27(3),
414-431. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4134387

Zucker, L. (1987). Institutional Theories Of Organization. ​Annual Review of Sociology,13​(1),

443-464. doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.13.1.443