Maybe it is impossible for the UK to leave the EU?

Scope for action and involuntary path in the case of Brexit

2018/2019 Winter Term

Europe in Crises – Term Paper
Tamás Farbaky
Introduction

Brexit has always been a possibility because of Britain’s ambivalent relationship

with the continent ever since Britain has entered the EU in 1973.1 Since the success of the
2016 Referendum where the Leave campaign wont with a very small margin it has
become the reality (51.9 % versus 48.1).2 But is it possible at all?
By now there is extensive literature on the question. The existing scholarship has
already explored many topics. There has been many discussions about its actual causes,
Hopkin proposed that it was because of the inability of the ruling parties to tackle the
problems brought about by free market capitalism.3 Inglehart and Norris found in their
convincing paper, that the Brexit is rather understandable in the framework of the global
wave of a cultural backlash then through the economic insecurity caused by globalisation,
they proved it with statistics as well.4 Also, the polls gave interesting insight showing that
most of the Leave voters casted their votes to stop immigration.5 Furthermore, it was
examined how EU-British relations would work in a multipolar world.6 The faults of the
EU during the negotiations were also presented.7 Just like the views of different European
and non-European countries.8 Related to the possibility whether it is possible at all to
leave the EU, Moravcsik argued that Britain will “under no circumstance leave Europe.”9
However, it was written even before the referendum.
It seems that the question of the sheer possibility has not been elaborated in a
dedicated paper. This paper intends to do exactly this. But first, it should introduce some
caveats. Prophecy is not the matter of science thus the paper seeks to present a thought
experiment and is reluctant to forecast what will have happened by the end of October.
Also, the empirical part will only take into account events which happened until the end
of the Brexit emergency summit, on the 10th of April when the extension was granted.10
This philosophical thought experiment applies the theoretical framework of
Miklós Zeidler who used the terms of scope of action and involuntary path to make sense

1 “Kevin O’Rourke on Brexit: Britain Has Always Been Ambivalent about Europe,” accessed April 12, 2019,
https://www.penguin.co.uk/articles/2019/jan/kevin-o-rourke-on-brexit/.
2 “EU Referendum Results,” BBC News, accessed April 12, 2019,
https://www.bbc.com/news/politics/eu_referendum/results.
3 Jonathan Hopkin, “When Polanyi Met Farage: Market Fundamentalism, Economic Nationalism, and

Britain’s Exit from the European Union,” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 19, no. 3
(August 2017): 465–78, https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148117710894. 465.
4 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and

Cultural Backlash,” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2818659. 1-5.

5 C. S. I. Admin, “People’s Stated Reasons for Voting Leave or Remain,” CSI Nuffield (blog), April 25, 2018,

http://csi.nuff.ox.ac.uk/?p=1153.
6 Tim Oliver, “Europe’s British Question: The UK–EU Relationship in a Changing Europe and Multipolar

World,” Global Society 29, no. 3 (July 3, 2015): 409–26, https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2015.1044425.

7 Benjamin Martill and Tim Oliver, “Some Brexit Lessons for the EU,” n.d., 4.
8 Tim Oliver, “European and International Views of Brexit,” Journal of European Public Policy 23, no. 9

(October 20, 2016): 1321–28, https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2016.1174534.

9 Andrew Moravcsik, “The Great Brexit Kabuki — a Masterclass in Political Theatre,” n.d., 3.
10 “New Brexit Deadline Set for 31 October,” April 11, 2019, sec. UK Politics,
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-47889404.

2
of the unsuccessful Hungarian foreign policy between the world wars which led to
Hungary becoming the satellite state of Germany and losing all its territorial gains.11
There are important similarities resulting from structural or external constraints which
seriously limits or limited the scope for action of Hungary and that of the British
government in the implementation of Brexit.12 However, as the two cases are far away in
time, linking theories are necessary. As linking theories, globalisation and regionalisation
will be used. Thus, section 3 will build the theoretical structure to make sense of the
hardship faced by the cabinet of May by using scope for action and involuntary in section
3, the part of the analysis. It will start with a short overview of the Brexit negotiations up
until the EU emergency summit, which is necessary because the Brexit is a rather complex
political undertaking. With that necessary background information, the different
challenges of Brexit can be effectively explained with the help of the above-mentioned
theories. It is the case of the Irish backstop, as I will argue, where the framework of Zeidler
performs at its best. In general, current accounts form journalists rather focused on
empirical facts and explanations but connecting the empirical issues with these theories
might indeed contribute to the debate.

Theoretical framework

Miklós Zeidler’s study is a chapter of a more comprehensive book on the history

of the 20th century Hungary edited by Ignác Romsics who is one of the main authorities
of this era. He advances a convincing argument on the shrinking opportunities of the
Hungarian foreign policy after the Trianon Peace Treaty, up until the end of WW2. The
historical part of his approach albeit interesting will only be shortly presented as the
actual historical happenings are unrelated to the current situation regarding Brexit. On
the other hand, his argument, through generalisation and with the help of other linking
theories such as globalisation and regionalisation might indeed provide a helpful tool for
a more thorough understanding of the current stalemate in the UK. This part presents
first Zeidler’s argument, then generalises it and closes by linking up with the above-
mentioned theories.
Zeidler tries to understand Hungary’s foreign policy mostly focusing on revisionist
aims and their impacts on Hungary resulting of their pursuit.13 He uses two key terms
which he borrows from György Ránki: scope for action (“mozgástér”) and involuntary
path (“kényszerpálya”).14 These terms have become popular among Hungarian historians

11 Zeidler Miklós, “Mozgástér a kényszerpályán. A magyar külpolitika ‘választásai’ a két világháború

között.,” in Mítoszok, legendák, tévhitek a 20. századi magyar történelemről, ed. Ignác Romsics (Budapest:
Osiris, 2005), 162–205.
12 Alexander E. Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” International

Organization 41, no. 03 (June 1987): 335, https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081830002751X.

13 Zeidler, Mozgástér,” 168. 170.
14 Zeidler, Mozgástér,” 163, translation mine.

3
following Ránki’s paper. Later, they were also applied to other historical periods.15
Zeidler first proposes his own understanding of these terms by criticising Ránki but then
ends up using the definitions of the existing literature creating a bit of confusion.16 Thus
I will use them according to the latter. SO, both scope for action and involuntary path can
be understood from the point of view of identic or divergent interests of a given country
and its international environment.17 When a state can pursue its own interest, it has a
real scope for action however when it cannot then it is on involuntary path.18 In his
criticism, however, he adds, that the role of the external factor which determines the
involuntary path of that state. The latter can be both a great power or a small state.19
Later in the text, he applies these terms to show how Hungary lost its agency and
became the satellite state of the Nazi Germany. He localises the exact time when the scope
for action drastically diminished, meaning that from that point on, Hungary had to walk
this path through until the external factor forced it to do so without the possibility of
returning, redirecting or stopping.20 The strong decrease of scope for action started when
Hungary entered the Tripartite Pact in 1940, and was drastically diminished when
Hungary joined the Nazi Germany in attacking Yugoslavia.21 Entering the Tripartite Pact
was a result of the continuous favourable decisions by Hitler on Hungarian territorial
claims. And as Germany set the rules and the Hungarian government wanted to neutralize
Romanian and Slovakian counter-revisionist attempts, it had to be loyal to Hitler.22 Also,
the prevailing sentiment in the public of getting everything back of the former Hungarian
territory was an important cause for the tragical siding of Hungary.23 Important factor
are thus the emotional attitude of the public.
This theoretical framework can be related to the context of the structure-agency
debate in IR.24 Different schools answer differently this philosophical-historical problem
whether there is a real agency in our world (individualism), or things are determined by
the structure (structuralism), or there is some middle ground (structurationism).25
Individualist theories such as neorealism play down the importance of structure and
focus on the individual agents whereas theories such as world-systems theory emphasise
the importance of the structure.26 Wendt identifies the weaknesses of both of these
approaches and proposes structurationism which provides identic ontological weight for
both structure and agency.27

15 Zeidler, Mozgástér,” 163

16 Zeidler, Mozgástér,” 163-169.
17 Ibid, 163.
18 Ibid, 163.
19 Ibid, 166.
20 Ibid, 198.
21 Ibid, 200.
22 Ibid, 195-6.
23 Teleki emphasised the problems with the insistence on full territorial revision. Cited by Zeidler,

Mozgástér,” 193.
24 Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory.” 336-337.
25 Wendt. 337.
26 Wendt.
27 Wendt. 339.

4
 Zeidler who is also standing in this middle-ground, assuming Hungary’s original
wider scope of action.28 His theoretical approach focuses on the agents and examines how
the agents are free or not free to choose a path, and how they are determined by external
factors which can be considered as equivalent of a structure.29 In the empirical part,
where the theory will be applied to the actual events related to Brexit it will be shown
what kind of factors constraining May’s government play the role of structure. But in
order to surmount the difficulties resulting from a world completely changed since the
WW2, some linking theories describing the current international environment might be
necessary. Thus, the theories of globalisation and regionalisation will be used.
Globalisation which is not only a theory but also a real and comprehensive global
process. Secondly, regional integration, a special form of globalisation or an answer to t
can also make sense of the background which influences the Brexit talks.30 According to
Meyer, interdependence and the awareness of it both on the level of the states and
individuals are very high. For him actually it is one of the two key aspects of globalisation:
the consciousness of this embeddedness and interdependence.31 According to Hettne and
Söderbaum, states “undergo a major restructuring (sic!)” due to the globalisation and
regionalisation as well.32 Without losing their nation-state character, thus preserving
their agency they have a different relation towards the bigger structure.33
Furthermore, the softer power of global norms but also the unequivocal laws of
the unavoidable interdependence which was clear also from the warning of the Bank of
England before the referendum,34 give a strong direction of what is good and what is not
good for a state thus limiting the scope for action of the incumbent. Global or regional
structures and interdependencies thus determine the scope for action of the states. It is a
truism in IR, so it needs to be unwrapped to see the actual significance regarding Brexit.
The hypothesis of this paper is that it is impossible for the UK to leave the EU. Whether
or not it will prove to be indeed impossible, it must be examined using these theoretical
tools and terms the paper presented thus far. So, the paper will turn now to the actual
facts and will apply the theoretical framework to make sense of them.

28 Zeidler, “Mozgástér a kényszerpályán. A magyar külpolitika ‘választásai’ a két világháború között.” 164.
29 Zeidler, Mozgástér,” 204-205.
30 Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum, “Theorising the Rise of Regionness,” New Political Economy 5, no.

3 (August 2000): 457–72, https://doi.org/10.1080/713687778. 457-458. 471. And John W. Meyer,

“Globalization: Theory and Trends,” International Journal of Comparative Sociology 48, no. 4 (August 2007):
261–73, https://doi.org/10.1177/0020715207079529. 262-263.
31 Meyer, “Globalization.” 263.
32 Hettne and Söderbaum, “Theorising the Rise of Regionness.” 465.
33 Hettne and Söderbaum. 465.
34 Katie Allen, “Brexit Could Lead to Recession, Says Bank of England,” The Guardian, May 12, 2016, sec.

Business, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/may/12/bank-of-england-keeps-interest-rates-
on-hold-as-brexit-fears-bite. And Meyer, “Globalization.”

5
Analysis

Overview

Britain is and island and has its distinctive identity which makes it problematic to
consider itself a full member of European Union.35 “An island is an opt-out to a continent”,
as Kielinger writes it.36 But there are other islands, such as Malta, Ireland or Cyprus which
do not collide on as many issues as UK did.37 With all the imperial past, the glorious British
Empire, the winner of WW2, UK prefers giving then receiving orders.38 However, the UK
entered the EEC in 1973 and the first Brexit referendum in 1975 was a clear decision to
stay (67 %).39 The relationship has not been easy, ever since, UK opted out many times,
such as the case of euro in 1992 or Schengen zone just to name a few.40
With all this “awkward membership”,41 Britain’s belonging to Europe was clearly
uttered by Thatcher in 1975: “We are inextricably part of Europe. [No one] will ever be
able to take us “out of Europe”, for Europe is where we are and where we have always
been.”42 Also, Adenauer argued already in 1946 that “the English can only maintain their
global position as leaders of an economically united and politically balanced Western
Europe.”43 A clear case of regional normative pressure.
On the other hand, the pro-Leave camp has been present since the entering of the
EEC in both Tory and Labour parties.44 By setting a second EU referendum, Cameron
wanted to end the division in the Tory party.45 His hopes proved wrong as on that day the
Leavers were in majority.46 The primary cause for voting for Brexit was the control of the
immigration.47 Migration itself is a major “symptom” of globalisation thus the paper is

35 Thomas Kielinger, “Why Britain Keeps Its Distance,” POLITICO, December 27, 2015,
https://www.politico.eu/article/britain-has-always-been-an-island-david-cameron-compatibility-
europe/.
36 Kielinger.
37 Sam Wilson, “Love ’em or Hate ’Em - Britain’s Rocky Relationship with the EU,” April 1, 2014, sec. UK

Politics, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-26515129.
38 Wilson.
39 Wilson.
40 Ian Morris, “A Brief History of Britain’s Relationship with Europe, Starting in 6000 BCE,” Harvard Business

Review, June 24, 2016, https://hbr.org/2016/06/a-brief-history-of-britains-relationship-with-europe-

starting-in-6000-bce.
41 “Goodbye Europe,” The Economist, December 8, 2012,
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2012/12/08/goodbye-europe.
42 Morris, “A Brief History of Britain’s Relationship with Europe, Starting in 6000 BCE.”
43 Cited by: Kielinger, “Why Britain Keeps Its Distance.”
44 Wilson, “Love ’em or Hate ’Em - Britain’s Rocky Relationship with the EU.” And Stefan Haagedoorn, “The

Historical Evolution of EU-UK Relations - Consilium,” June 2, 2017,

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/sv/documents-publications/library/library-blog/posts/the-
historical-evolution-of-eu-uk-relations/.
45 Haagedoorn, “The Historical Evolution of EU-UK Relations - Consilium.”
46 “EU Referendum Results.”
47 Admin, “People’s Stated Reasons for Voting Leave or Remain.”

6
arriving now to the main part where it shows if impossible why it is impossible for the
UK to leave.
First, it must be clarified what leaving here means. There are many approaches
what Brexit actually could mean. There are two main proposals on the both extremes of
the scale, and of course many in-between. The extreme farthest from the EU is the hard
Brexit. Its supporters such as Jacob Rees-Mogg, one of the main Tory figures backing
Brexit want to cut as many ties as possible with EU, especially CJEU jurisdiction (1), the
area of free movement and single market, (2) and customs union (3), through which the
UK would be able to enter into trade deals with other states individually (3), could gain
back full control of immigration (2), and could have a legal sovereignty (1), getting rid of
the obligation to follow the rules of Brussels (1).48 It would be indeed a “genuine break.”49
Many Brexiters among the Tories would favour an independent trade policy meaning the
end of customs union.50
On the other hand, there is the soft Brexit which wants UK to stay as close to the
EU as possible. Its proponents favour minimal disruption and would like to retain the
single market (like Norway) and customs union (like Turkey) meaning no tariffs and the
same regulation regarding trade.51 This would also mean continuing competition,
freedom of movement and impossibility to strike individual trade deals.52 However, this
proposal backed my some Remainers, would be considered by many people as a betrayal
of the referendum, a half-move only.53 Jeremy Corbyn, lukewarm supporter of the Remain
side in the 2016 referendum wold prefer a customs union mostly to protect workers and
jobs.54
Thirdly, there is the deal already completed but not ratified with the EU, May’s
deal, a bipartite treaty consisting of the Withdrawal Agreement on the exit of Britain and
the short non-binding Political Declaration regulating the future relationship between the
EU and the UK.55 It is the result of two years of negotiations ending in November 2018
with 585-page-long Withdrawal Agreement plus the Declaration. During the negotiations
May had to please both sides. Thus, the deal is closer to the hard Brexit in envisaging
quitting the customs union and the single market and retains characteristics of soft Brexit
when it prescribes a transition period until 1st of January 2020 when all the EU rules
would apply, and which could be extended by up to two more years.56 It would also mean

48 “(19) Brexit Explained: What Happens When the UK Leaves the EU? - YouTube,” accessed April 10, 2019,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7eoDwvl0QGk. And “How a Soft Brexit Differs from a Hard One,” The
Economist, June 25, 2018, https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/06/25/how-a-soft-
brexit-differs-from-a-hard-one.
49 “(19) Brexit Explained: What Happens When the UK Leaves the EU? - YouTube.”
50 Alasdair Sandford, “What Is UK Labour Leader Jeremy Corbyn’s Policy on Brexit?,” euronews, April 3,

2019, https://www.euronews.com/2019/04/03/what-is-uk-labour-leader-jeremy-corbyn-s-policy-on-
brexit.
51 “How a Soft Brexit Differs from a Hard One.”
52 “(19) Brexit Explained: What Happens When the UK Leaves the EU? - YouTube.”
53 “(19) Brexit Explained: What Happens When the UK Leaves the EU? - YouTube.”
54 Sandford, “What Is UK Labour Leader Jeremy Corbyn’s Policy on Brexit?”
55 Alasdair Sandford, “What’s in Theresa May’s Brexit Deal and Why Is It so Unpopular?,” euronews,

December 7, 2018, https://www.euronews.com/2018/12/07/what-is-in-theresa-may-s-brexit-deal-and-

why-is-it-so-unpopular.
56 Sandford.

7
that UK should contribute to the EU budget until the end of the transition period.57 The
three main parts settle the citizens’ (of both UK and EU) rights (1), the issue of the border
of Ireland and Northern Ireland, the so-called backstop (2), and the divorce bill, the
contribution to EU on behalf of the UK (3).58 It was approved by all EU member states
except the UK where it was rejected three times on January 15th, March 12th and 29th, by
the so-called “meaningful votes”.
The situation is now that the current deal which is already approved by the EU
was rejected with great majority. The EU does not want to renegotiate the deal, as Tusk
said in January after the first meaningful vote that “the Withdrawal Agreement is not open
to renegotiation.”59 On the other hand, there is no majority for any other option as it was
proven during the indicative votes both on the 27th of March and on the 1st of April.60
Because of this deadlock, there was a chance that UK would just crash out of the EU on
the 29th of March (no-deal), the original Brexit day, however as no ratification was in
sight, May asked for extension until the 12th of April but as again there was no majority,
it will be asked for further extension (as it happened on 11th of April on the emergency
EU summit).61 The no-deal scenario which would enter into force immediately and would
mean going back to the WTO terms in trade with the EU, could cause a huge chaos, thus
this option seems to worry the MPs as it got the second-highest “against” votes (400-160)
among the MPs on the indicative voting session on the 26th of March.62 Also, a part of the
population is worried for example because of a possible shortage of medicines.63 On the
9th of April, extending Brexit became law after getting royal assent.64
There is a huge constitutional crisis in the UK right now, a stalemate where no
solution is in the near future. 65 No-deal is ruled out, May’s deal rejected three times, the
first (432 against, 202 for) was “the largest defeat for a sitting government in history.”66
The EU’s policy is to avoid further cherry-picking on behalf of UK: “out means out, as

57 Sandford.
58 Jon Henley European affairs correspondent, “Theresa May’s Brexit Deal: Everything You Need to Know,”
The Guardian, November 15, 2018, sec. Politics,
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/nov/14/theresa-mays-brexit-deal-everything-you-need-
to-know.
59 Cited by: “EU’s Tusk Says Brexit ‘backstop’ Not Renegotiable,” Reuters, January 29, 2019,

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-tusk-idUSKCN1PN2TZ.
60 “How Did My MP Vote on Brexit Options?,” April 1, 2019, sec. UK Politics,
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-47779783; “How Did My MP Vote on Brexit Options?,” March 27,
2019, sec. UK Politics, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-47726787.
61 Holly Ellyatt, “Brexit Delay to Be Decided at EU Summit,” April 10, 2019,
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/10/brexit-delay-to-be-decided-at-eu-summit.html.
62 “How Did My MP Vote on Brexit Options?,” March 27, 2019.
63 Jane Merrick, “Brexit Is an Impossible Mess Verging on a Constitutional Crisis,” CNN, accessed April 11,

2019, https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/12/opinions/brexit-mess-cannot-make-anyone-happy-opinion-
intl/index.html. And “How Did My MP Vote on Brexit Options?,” March 27, 2019.
64 Andrew Sparrow, Kevin Rawlinson, and Daniel Boffey, “Brexit: Parliament Votes through Bill to Prevent

No-Deal - as It Happened,” The Guardian, April 8, 2019, sec. Politics,

https://www.theguardian.com/politics/live/2019/apr/08/brexit-latest-news-live-theresa-may-union-
most-likely-outcome-if-labour-and-government-can-compromise-says-minister-live-
news?page=with%3Ablock-5cabc08d8f0852bbb93b44aa.
65 Merrick, “Brexit Is an Impossible Mess Verging on a Constitutional Crisis.”
66 “PM’s Brexit Deal Rejected by Huge Margin,” January 15, 2019, sec. UK Politics,
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-46885828.

8
Wolfgang Schäuble put it very clearly already before the referendum.67 Still, up until now,
UK has been trying to find other options although the EU was clear on rejecting the
renegotiation of the current deal.68 Maybe, UK cannot leave the EU in our time. There are
still so many obstacles to solve to which we will turn now.

External and domestic factors limiting the scope for action for Britain

After presenting the facts, which was necessary because of the considerable
complexity of the Brexit debate in the UK, some major problems, constraints will be
connected with the theories already introduced. The following factors will be considered:
the issue of the Irish backstop (1) as an external factor seriously diminishing the scope
for action together with the current composition of Parliament and the role of the DUP
(2), the cherry-picking on behalf of the government of UK (3) as an unsuccessful attempt
to widen the scope for action limited by the structural constraints of EU’s terms, the
diminishing support for leaving (4).
Arguably the toughest issue of the Brexit is the Irish backstop.69 This is the key
part of the draft of Withdrawal Agreement which stipulates that even in the case of no-
deal scenario, there would be no hard border reinstated between Republic of Ireland and
Northern Ireland.70 Why is open border so important? In 1998, the Good Friday
Agreement successfully ended The Troubles, a long era of conflict which started with
discrimination of Catholics but then it escalated into intense fights and lasted for decades
between the 1960s and 1990s resulting in thousands of deaths due to the sectarian fights
between the Protestant Unionists (supporting the union with the Protestant UK) and the
Catholic Republicans (supporting the union with the Catholic Republic of Ireland). 71 The
British army set up fortified checkpoints along the border which were often targeted by
Republican armed groups. The deal in 1998 put an end to all this by introducing the
Northern Ireland Assembly and a wide cross-border cooperation between Ireland and

67 “EU Countries Urged to Unite Against Brexit Cherry-Picking,” September 6, 2018,

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-06/eu-countries-urged-to-unite-against-brexit-
cherry-picking. And “Out Means out, Germany Warns Brexit Camp,” May 13, 2016,
https://www.thelocal.de/20160513/out-means-out-germany-warns-brexit-camp.
68 “EU’s Tusk Says Brexit ‘backstop’ Not Renegotiable.”
69 Stephen Castle, “Why Can’t U.K. Solve the Irish Border Problem in Brexit?,” The New York Times, March 1,

2018, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/28/world/europe/uk-northern-ireland-

brexit.html.
70 Daniel Boffey and Jennifer Rankin, “Brexit Deal Explained: Backstops, Trade and Citizens’ Rights,” The

Guardian, November 25, 2018, sec. Politics, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/nov/25/may-

brexit-deal-explained-eu-withdrawal-agreement-trade-backstop-citizens-rights.
71 “What Was the Good Friday Agreement? - CBBC Newsround,” accessed April 11, 2019,

https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/14118775. And Simon Rogers, “Deaths in the Northern Ireland

Conflict since 1969,” The Guardian, June 10, 2010, sec. News,
https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2010/jun/10/deaths-in-northern-ireland-conflict-data.

9
Northern Ireland, among others.72 The fortified barracks on the border were removed as
a bad memory of the conflict.73 Interestingly, open borders are not explicitly in the
agreement, but, even more interestingly, people living there consider the lack of hard
borders the symbol of peace and cooperation.74 It is thus understood as coming from the
“spirit” of the Agreement.75 Plus, recently (in 2017) the deal between the parties of
Northern Ireland collapsed, nevertheless, peace still prevails and violence did not
return.76 Indeed, reignition of the conflict would be the likely consequence of the Brexit,
as it would entail hard borders and re-establish checkpoints, which would fuel through
their symbolical role the conflict, also confirmed by an UNESCO report.77 This is also why
Tusk emphasised after the first meaningful vote in January that Backstop is not
renegotiable.78
Backstop thus aims to keep the borders open even after an eventual no-deal
scenario. But why is this so problematic? On the one hand, if UK leaves the EU, the border
between Northern Ireland and Ireland will become an external EU border which would
entails customs and entry check. But this is against the “spirit” of the Good Friday
Agreement. So, EU proposed at the end of February to move the customs union border to
the Irish Sea separating Northern Ireland from the rest of UK, with which it enraged the
UK and May rejected immediately the proposition (annexation of Northern Ireland by EU
in David Jones’s view).79 Also, the Northern Irish DUP party (U stands for Unionist) would
see this as the worst possible scenario.80 Therefore, the EU proposed at the end of
February that backstop would entail the whole UK meaning that it would stay in its
entirety in the customs union.81 This, however, would mean that UK is leaving the EU
without actually leaving the EU in the eyes of the supporters of the hard Brexit.82 The
backstop would really enrage them as they fear that the UK would indefinitely be trapped
in the customs union and in the related regulations.83 To make things worse, it is legally
impossible to unilaterally withdraw from backstop without EU approval, as it was
confirmed by Attorney General Geoffrey Cox in his legal opinion.84
The UK proposed a third solution, a technical one where they would use
technology and screening near the borders as it is already used at some of the Norway-

72 “Good Friday Agreement | British-Irish History,” Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed April 11, 2019,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Good-Friday-Agreement.
73 Castle, “Why Can’t U.K. Solve the Irish Border Problem in Brexit?”
74 John Campbell, “Does the Good Friday Agreement Rule out a Hard Border?,” January 30, 2019, sec.

Northern Ireland, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-46988529.

75 Campbell.
76 “What Was the Good Friday Agreement?”
77 Lisa O’Carroll, “Hard Border in Ireland Would Trigger Return to Violence, Says Report,” The Guardian,

February 18, 2019, sec. UK news, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/feb/18/hard-border-in-

ireland-would-trigger-return-to-violence-says-report.
78 “EU’s Tusk Says Brexit ‘backstop’ Not Renegotiable.”
79 Castle, “Why Can’t U.K. Solve the Irish Border Problem in Brexit?”
80 Campbell, “Does the Good Friday Agreement Rule out a Hard Border?”
81 Castle, “Why Can’t U.K. Solve the Irish Border Problem in Brexit?”
82 “How a Soft Brexit Differs from a Hard One.”
83 Sandford, “What’s in Theresa May’s Brexit Deal and Why Is It so Unpopular?”
84 Cited by Sandford.

10
Sweden border crossings.85 But still, even such a “smart border” could not rule out checks,
and clearances usually take 3-9 minutes.86 This proposal suggested by the European
Research Group (founded by MPs from the Brexiter side) was dubbed “Narnia solution”
and was unanimously rejected by Ireland, Northern Ireland and Michel Barnier, the chief
negotiator as well.87 The technology is not developed sufficiently as of now, according to
the EU, and according to the police office of Northern Ireland the checkpoints would
become targets irrespective of whether they are on the border or not.88
The whole issue puts really high constraints on the cabinet of May, especially that
after the 2017 snap elections, the 10 DUP MPs have become kingmakers as they provide
the necessary majority in the Parliament for the Conservatives, and any deal which would
not represent their interests in terms of Northern Ireland would not get the necessary
majority although voting lines run across both parties.89
Thus, as for now, there is no solution for avoiding staying in the customs union.
The scope for action is so narrow, May cannot really move anywhere, backstop really
looks like an involuntary path which is partly the result of historical events such
Reformation of the 16th century leading to the currently existing denominations and their
country preferences. And staying in the customs union is actually not what Brexit is
meant for, at least not for the supporters of the hard Brexit, leaving the EU would also
mean leaving its institutions as many hardliner Brexiters want.90
However, support for the Brexit has diminished since the referendum, the
difficulties related to decreased public support for leaving the EU is the third point in the
analysis. Indeed, since the summer of 2017, the remain had always had a slight majority
up until the last poll, the 8th of April. This finding is identical throughout a number of
different polls.91 Also, the request of for a second vote pushed by a petition got huge
support (just beyond 6 million signatures).92 Still, May rejected their demand.93

85 Alice Tidey, “Irish Border: Can Technology Remove the Need for a Backstop?,” euronews, February 5,
2019, https://www.euronews.com/2019/02/05/irish-border-can-technology-remove-the-need-for-a-
backstop.
86 Tidey.
87 Castle, “Why Can’t U.K. Solve the Irish Border Problem in Brexit?” And Tidey, “Irish Border.”
88 Cited by Tidey, “Irish Border.”
89 Ed O’Loughlin, “Britain’s Election: What the D.U.P. Is, and What It Wants,” The New York Times, December

22, 2017, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/10/world/europe/britain-election-dup-

northern-ireland.html.
90 “(19) Brexit Explained: What Happens When the UK Leaves the EU? - YouTube.” And Craig Berry,

“Theresa May’s Brexit Deal Is Almost Exactly What the UK Voted for | Craig Berry,” The Guardian, November
19, 2018, sec. Opinion, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/19/theresa-may-brexit-
deal-political-reality.
91 “If There Was Another Referendum on Britain’s Membership of the EU, How Would You Vote?,” What UK

Thinks: EU, accessed April 12, 2019, https://whatukthinks.org/eu/questions/if-a-second-eu-referendum-

were-held-today-how-would-you-vote/.
92 “Petition: Revoke Article 50 and Remain in the EU.,” Petitions - UK Government and Parliament, accessed

April 12, 2019, https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/241584.

93 Alex Hern, “May Rejects Revoke Article 50 Petition despite 2m Signatures,” The Guardian, March 22, 2019,

sec. Politics, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/mar/21/petitions-site-crashes-after-

thousands-back-call-to-revoke-article-50.

11
 Last but not least, there are other external factors and constraints as well related
to the structure of the current integrations (EFTA, customs union) in Europe and to
Europe’s stance. The “best of both world” approach which is also behind the cherry-
picking of the UK in wanting easy access to the EEA but saying no the freedom of labour
(one of the four freedoms of the Single Market which also applies to EFTA countries such
as Norway), this pickiness was never welcomed by the EU as it was pointed out above.94
Here again, May’s cabinet is facing external constraints imposed by the structure of the
integration of the EU. So, again, scope for action is rather limited. Although during the
indicative vote sections many alternatives were considered just to find a possible
direction out of the impasse after the continuous failure in the meaningful vote sessions.95
The Norway Plus, or Common Market 2.0 scored well during the second turn, but it again
would mean the acceptance of the four freedoms including freedom of labour although
some MPs think that it would be possible to restrict it, however, the legal ground is
insufficient for that.96 But with this option, at least, there would be a possibility to strike
trade deals independently, as it does not entail customs union membership.97 On the
other hand, it would mean a considerable contribution to the EU budget ( between two
thirds and 88 % of the current yearly amount) which again would be problematic in the
light of one of the Vote Leave campaign’s key arguments that the money should go to the
NHS instead of funding the EU.98 Plus, this option would take away the possibility to have
a meaningful say on the four freedoms in Brussels.99 But, as immigration was the main
reason for voting to Leave, it is hardly a possible solution.100
Xavier Bettel, Luxembourg’s PM said that the UK was “in with loads of opt-outs,
now they are out and want a loud of opt-ins.”101 This covers such co-operations as
Erasmus, scientific research, security and terrorism, medicines, aviation, financial
services just to name a few.102 This again might invoke the theories of regionalisation
mentioned above especially in terms of the content of the interdependence. After so many
years of membership, it is understandable that the UK does not want to renounce all these
benefits but then it looks like it is “still part of the club”.103 Maybe it is then just not
possible to really leave in this regional setup? Maybe the aim to reach sovereignty has
just too many costs and trade-offs. UK might not really have a choice but to try to opt in
for these vital issues. This is where, as Söderbaum and Hettne put, states “undergo a

94 Reality Check team, “What Is Common Market 2.0?,” March 25, 2019, sec. UK Politics,
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-47639946.
95 “How Did My MP Vote on Brexit Options?,” April 1, 2019. And “How Did My MP Vote on Brexit

Options?,” March 27, 2019.

96 team, “What Is Common Market 2.0?” “How Did My MP Vote on Brexit Options?,” April 1, 2019.
97 team, “What Is Common Market 2.0?”
98 Adam Payne UK Business Insider, “Boris Johnson Says His £350 Million a Week Brexit Claim Was an

‘Underestimate,’” Business Insider, accessed April 12, 2019, https://www.businessinsider.com/boris-

johnson-says-his-350-million-a-week-brexit-claim-was-an-underestimate-2018-1. And team, “What Is
Common Market 2.0?”
99 “Norwegian PM to UK: Why Would You Want Our EU Deal?,” POLITICO, June 5, 2018,

https://www.politico.eu/article/norwegian-pm-uk-cannot-cherry-pick-eu-membership/.
100 Admin, “People’s Stated Reasons for Voting Leave or Remain.”
101 “12 Brexit Cherries the UK Wants to Pick,” POLITICO, June 11, 2018,
https://www.politico.eu/article/12-brexit-cherries-the-uk-wants-to-pick/.
102 “12 Brexit Cherries the UK Wants to Pick.”
103 “EU Countries Urged to Unite Against Brexit Cherry-Picking.”

12
major restructuration,” which entails a new relationship with the international
environment.104 Even more telling is the metaphor which can probably express the
absurdity of the Britain’s approach towards the Brexit with the analogy of the cake and
egg. It is impossible to remove the eggs from the cake once it is ready, just like to go back
in history.105 What is likely that a hard Brexit which aims to cut all major ties with the EU
has much more to do with emotions then with the actual reality, in other words, it is not
possible.

Conclusion

The paper followed through the philosophical thought experiment that maybe it
is not possible for the UK to leave the EU. More generally, maybe it is not possible for a
member state to leave the EU. After presenting the arguments, maybe it is more than just
a thought experiment and might have some reality basis. The conclusion summarises the
most important arguments again. The assumption which was unwrapped by Zeidler
regarding Hungary using the two key term of scope for action and involuntary path
seemed to be applicable here as well, as May’s cabinet has to tackle serious limiting
factors which result from the current high level of both global and regional
interdependence and common historical heritage of UK and Ireland: Northern Ireland
and the Good Friday Agreement. If Brexit is impossible, it is impossible because of the
issue of Northern Ireland, the actual stalemate to find majority for any option while no-
deal is equally ruled and while public support is diminishing. However, May’s cabinet
continues to be determined to deliver the Brexit.106
What seems to be impossible after this analysis? The hard Brexit for sure. No-deal
has been ruled out as well by the MPs with big majority, hard Brexit with cutting the ties
and leaving all EU institutions such as Single Market, Customs Union and ECJ jurisdiction
cannot be completely realized. Soft Brexit is still an option though.
It is yet to be proven that UK government is able to “take back control,” as of now
it seems, it is not. The stakes are high, a badly managed Brexit would severely damage
both the Tories and the country. The question is open, and the future will decide whether
it is really impossible to leave the EU for Britain. There might be a case that it is.
However, this paper does not want jump into prophecies and prefers keeping
these findings as the outcome of a thought experiment worth the intellectual effort.
Nevertheless, it has tried to show an interesting aspect of this complex issue. It was

104 Hettne and Söderbaum, “Theorising the Rise of Regionness.” 465.

105 “R/Ukpolitics - Brexit, Explained via Cake Analogy,” reddit, accessed April 12, 2019,
https://www.reddit.com/r/ukpolitics/comments/9n9bhm/brexit_explained_via_cake_analogy/.
106 Source: Twitter, “Theresa May Warns That Parliament Must Agree a Deal to Deliver Brexit – Video,” The

Guardian, April 7, 2019, sec. Politics,

https://www.theguardian.com/politics/video/2019/apr/07/theresa-may-warns-that-parliament-must-
agree-a-deal-to-deliver-brexit-video.

13
presented how the scope for action can seriously decrease opportunities for
decisionmakers often leading to the necessity to accept involuntary paths. It can even
include big powers, such as the UK. Further research could explore how the scope for
action, in case of other big powers, especially in the EU, got limited. It seems it is not only
the hardship of the small states. What if it is not possible for a member state to leave the
EU at this historical era?

14
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