EDWARD N. SENT TS Tae yNTe STRATEGY Op ital: BYZANTINE EMPIRETable of Contents PART ONE - The Invention of Byzantine Stratezv CHAPTER | - Atvils end the Crisis of Empire ‘The Composite Reflex Bow ‘The Operations! Level ‘The Level of Theater Stretezy Processes and Personality: Attila (CHAPTER 2 - The Emersence ofthe New Strateey ‘The Tactical Revolution Intelligence end Covert Action Fortress Constantinople Justinian 's Reversal Reversed: Victorw and Piaeve PART TWO - itine Diy : The Myth and the Methods (CHAPTER 3 -Envows CHAPTER 4 - Religion and Statecraft CHAPTER 5 - The Uses oflperial Prestige CHAPTER 6 - Dunsstic Mesiszes CHAPTER 7 - The Geozrephy of Power CHAPTER § - Bulzhers end Bulezrisns. ‘The Was of 811, Themats and Teemats A War of State Destruction: Basi! IL 1014-1018 53 “Di in Byron CHAPTER 9 - The Muslim Arsbs and Turks ‘The Muslin Conquest and Tax Reduction Christians, Jews, and the Muslim Conquest The Caliphate and Constantinoole ‘The Seljuk Turks and the Decline of the EmpirePART THREE - The Byzantine Art of War CHAPTER 10 - The Clzssicel Inheritance ‘Surisnos Magister on Naval Tactics, CHAPTER 11 - The Stretezitvon of Mauriiciog ‘The Byzantine Style of Wer CHAPTER 12 - Afior the Stratecitvon Leo Vion Fighting the Muslisns The Svliogs Tscticorum ‘Heron of Byzantium Dz Obsidions Tolerends: A Msnual on Resisting Siszes CHAPTER 13 -Leo Wand Navel Wertere Greek Fire ‘The Dromon ‘Naval Strength in Buzentine Strategy CHAPTER 14 - The Tenth-Century Military Renzissence Ds Velitetions (Skimuishing) ‘De Re Militari (Campaien Oreanization) The ‘Militaris of TPhoices ‘The Tektike off Nikephoros Ourenos ‘The Strstesibon ofKskaunenos CHAPTER 15 - Sustegic Maneuver: Hersileios Deftats Persiz Conclusion: Grand. and the ne Code” A Was Feasible in. Times? Constantine 7 10 Constantine 37 | : ‘ iThe Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire EDWARD N. LUTTWAK THE BELKNAP PRESS OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England 2009Copyright © 2009 bry the Presitect and Fetlons of Harvard Collage: Allght emerved rina! i ths Ueitnd Sites of America, Library of Congress Cataioging-in-Publication Data Letwak Etward. ‘The grand wamay of the Byractios Emgice ' Edward N. Lomwat pom, echodas tobSngrachice! eafeceaces a08 inten STE-O-STHOSSIS-S (cloth 2h papes) 1 Byzantine Emgire—Miteery patsy. 2 Seategy—Hisery—To 1500. 3. Mithary art and science —Bymaation Exnpire—Hisory. 4. Imparialaen—Hiatary—To 1500.5, Byzantine Eengire—Hintry, Mary. f. yzacine Emgire—Foseige celasen T Tite.Preface Once largely neglected, as ifthe entire Roman empire had seally ended in 476, the eastem halfthat we call Byzantine by modem habit now attracts 50 muuch attention that it is even the subject of popular histories. While many are interested in the culture of Byzantium, itis the epic struggle to dead the expire ie century aller century azzinst an unending sequence ofenemies that seams to resonate especially in our own times This book is devoled to onz dimension of Byzantine history: th application ofmethod and ingenuity in the use ofboth persuasion and force—that is to.say, strategy in all its aspects, fom higher statecralt down to military tactics. ‘When I first started to study Byzantine strategy in exmest, [had just completed a booitoa the strategy of the Roman empire up to the third century that continues to attract both inordinat= praise and strenuous criticism My original intention was simply to write 2 second volume to cover the subsequent centuries. What ensued instead was the discovery ofan altogether richer body of strategy then the ealier Romans had ever possessed, which called for 2 vastly erester Siri of research and composition. In the end, this lasted or more than two decades, albeit with, auny interruption:—some dus to my aot entirely unrelated work in applying military strategy in the field. There was one compensation for this prolonged delzy: several essential Byzantine texts, once available only 2s scarcely accessible manuscripts, or in antiquated aditions replete with, errors, have now been published in reliable foe. Also, a considerable mumber of important new works ofdirect relevance to Byzantine strtery have been published since Leterted oa my quest jong azo. For in recent years Byzantine studies have indeed flourished 2s never bees A grent wave of first-class scholarship has illuminated many 2 dark comer of Byzantine and world history—and it fas also inspired a climate of high-spirited generosity among the practitioners. Although I am swore student than scholar in this field, Ihave experienced this generosity in the fitlest measure. Soon after I started reading thr this boot cirea 1982, George Dennis, whore translation of the Strategitonis the most widely read ofByzantine military tents, gave me an advance typescript of hhis work that would be published ss Three Eyzomnine Military Treatises. Twenty-six years later, he sent me 2 typescript of part ofhis eagerly awaited edition of Leo's Tattita, which I urgently nesded to complete this boot; generosity is mere habit for George T. Dennis of the Society of lesus. Walter E. Kaegi Ik, whose works illuminate the field, also gave me valuable advice arly on. Others whom I had never even met, but simply importuned without prior introduction, nevertheless responded zs ifbound by old iendship and collegial obligations Peter B. Golden, theeminent Turcologist amply cited in these pages, answered many questions, ofred valuable suggestions, and lent me two otherwise unobtainable books: John Worley entrusted me with the unique copy of his own annolaied typescript of Scylitzes. Deter Brennan and Salvatore Cosentino oftred important advice, while Eric MeGest and Paul Stephenson and Denis F. Sullivan, whose work is here conscripted at length, read drais of this book, uncovering erors and ofring important advice Joha F.Heldon, whose writings constinte 2 librery of Byzantine studies in themselves, responded to strenger’s imposition with a detailed critique of an ezrly dri Because what Sollows is intended for non-specialists 2s well, I asked two such, Anthony Harley and Kent Karlock, to comment on the lengthy text; I'am gratefil toe their hard work, considered opinions, and corrections. A third reader was Hans Rausing, not a specialist but a profound and multilingual student ofhistory, and to him Lowe waluzble observations. Stephen P.Glick applied both his encyclopedic imowledge of military historiography and his meticulous aention to the text, leaving his mari on this book Nicolé Miscioscia was my able assistant ora season Christine Col and Joseph E. Luttwak researched and graphically prepared all the maps, no eiey tak amidst endless revisions. Michael Aronson, senior editor for social sciences at Harvard University Press, was the active proponent oftmy earties book on Roman grand strategy along tine ago. It was with unending patience over two decades thathe athed dor this book a= well, and his experienced enthusiasm is manifst in the physical quality of the publication, an fort in which he was ably assisted by Donna Bouvier and Hilary 5. Jncqmin of the Press. It war most fortunate that they commissioned Wendy Nelson to serve 2s manuscript editor. With infinite care and talented discernment she uncovered many 2 stealthy enor, and gently indicated inBticities in need oftemedy. Finally, it is a pleasure to thank Alice Mary Talbot, also here cited, Director of the Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, and the always helpisl Deb Brown Stewart, Byzantine studies librarian at Dumbarton Oaks I sight have dithered forever instead of finally composing the text had Inot met Pater James MacDonald Hall, who demanded the book and removed the excuse ofall other work.PART ONE The Invention of Byzantine Strategy ‘When the administration of the Roman empire was divided in the year 395 between the two sons. of Theodosius L with the westem portion going to Honotius and the eastern to his brother Arkadios, Bw could have foretold the drastically different fates of the two halves. Deénded by Germanic field commanders, then dominated by Gennanic warlords, incressingly penetrated by mostly Gemanic migrants with or without imperial consent, then fezmented by outright invasions, the westem half of the empire progressively lost tax revenues territorial comtrol, end its Roman political identity in 2 process so gradual that the removal of the last imperial figurehead, Romulus Augustus, on September 4, 476, was mere Siemality. There were local accommodations with the invaders in places, even some episodes of cultural integration, but the newly Bshionsble vision of an almost peaceful immigration and 2 gradual transformation into a benign late antiquity is contradicted by the detailed evidence of violence, destruction, and the catastrophic loss of material amenities and educational attainments that would not be recovered fhe a thousand veers, ifthe) Very diffrent was the fite of the eastem half of the Roman empire commanded fom Constantinople That is the empire we call Byzantine by modem habit though it was never anything but Roman to its rulers and their subjects, the romaiai, who could hardly identify with provincial Byzantion, the ancient Gresk city that Constantine had converted into his imperial capital and New Rome in the year 330 Hawing subdued its own Genmenic warlords and cutmanenvered Attiia's Huns in the supreme crisis of the ith century that extinguished ite westem counterpart, the Byzantine empire acquired the strategic method with which it resisted successive waves of invaders for more than eight hundred years by the shortest reckoning.