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Decision Batas Pambansa 6
Decision Batas Pambansa 6
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Accused.
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RESOLUTION
For resolution is a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the facts charged in
the information do not constitute an offense.
Defense argues that the accused is charged with a crime which is penalized
under Batas Pambansa Bilang 6, an amendment mainly as to penalty of
Presidential Decree No. 9. It adds that the Supreme Court in People vs. Purisima
had set the elements of the crime under P. D. No. 9, which was affirmed in a more
recent case of People vs. Lasana, to wit:
First, the carrying outside one’s residence of any bladed weapon, blunt, or
pointed weapon, etc., not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and,
Second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to
abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence,
criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
This Court shares the view of the accused. While the prosecution is correct
in citing that B.P. Blg. 6, which was enacted one day after the case of People vs.
Purisima, does not embody or expressly provide the second element required in
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that case, it does not mean, however, that said case is already abandoned or no
longer effective.
In People vs. Lasanas, et al.,1 a more recent decision dated July 7, 1987, the
Supreme Court quoted and applied its ruling in the case of Purisima on the issue of
whether or not an information on violation of Paragraph 3 of P.D. No. 9 is
defective when it does not contain the second element mentioned in said case. The
relevant portion of the aforesaid case is as follows:
The undersigned City Fiscal accuses Rogelio Lasanas for violation of General
Orders Nos. 6 and 7 in relation to Presidential Decree No. 9, as implemented by Letter
of Instruction, DND No. 707, committed as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of July, 1974, in the City of Iloilo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court, said accused, with deliberate
intent and without any justifiable motive, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and criminally carry outside of his residence one (1) knife which is a deadly
weapon and which, at that time, was not being used by him as a necessary
implement for his livelihood or occupation or in connection therewith.
Contrary to law.
While the information failed to Identify the specific paragraph of P.D. No. 9
alleged to have been violated by accused Lasanas, even a cursory examination of P.D.
No. 9 will show that the information must have been intended to refer to paragraph 3 of
P.D. No. 9 which provided as follows:
In People vs. Purisima,9 Mme. Justice Munoz Palma speaking for the Court, in a
tour de force of statutory construction, addressed the question of: "What----are the
elements of the offense treated in [paragraph 3 of] the Presidential Decree [No. 9] in
question?":
We hold that the offense carries two elements: first the carrying outside one's
residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or
implement for a livelihood; and second that the act of carrying the weapon was either in
furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection,
lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon, if
concealed, outside of the scope of the statute or the city ordinance mentioned above. In
other words, a simple act of carrying any of the weapons described in the presidential
decree is not a criminal offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable
under the decree is the motivation behind it, Without that motivation, the act falls within
the purview of the city ordinance or some statute when the circumstances so warrant.10
Applying the doctrine of Purisima, it is plain that the information filed in Criminal
Case No. 5055 was fatally defective. That information failed to charge the commission of
acts constitutive of the second element of the offense sought to be charged-i.e., that the
carrying of the weapon was in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with
1
G.R. Nos. L-48879-82, July 7, 1987
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"subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violation, criminality, chaos or public
disorder." Thus, the information failed to charge an offense under P.D. No. 9, paragraph
3 with the result that accused Lasanas could not have been lawfully convicted of such
offense under the information as actually filed.
In the case at hand, it is undisputed that the Information dated October 12,
2015, lacks the allegation constituting the second element mentioned above.
While it may be argued that the aforesaid Lasanas case was prosecuted
under P. D. No. 9 and not under B. P. Blg. 6, the same does not matter because a
closer look at the two laws reveals that what really differs between the two is only
the penalty. This is very clear upon comparison of the two laws as shown below:
Section 1. Paragraph three of Presidential Decree Numbered Nine is hereby amended to read
as follows:
"3. It is unlawful to carry outside of one's residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such
as "knife", "spear", "pana", "dagger", "bolo", "barong", "kris", or "chako", except where such
articles are being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood or in pursuit of a
lawful activity. Any person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not
less than one month nor more than one year or a fine of not less than Two Hundred
Pesos nor more than Two Thousand Pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine as the
Court may direct." (emphasis supplied)
3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such as
"fanknife," "spear," "dagger," "bolo," "balisong," "barong," "kris," or club, except where such
articles are being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and while being
used in connection therewith; and any person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from five to ten years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission
may direct. (emphasis supplied)
As shown in the Purisima and Lasanas cases, the issue on what constitutes
the crime of violation of Paragraph 3 of P. D. 9 has already been settled. The
Supreme Court interpreted it as one that requires the presence of two elements.
And when that paragraph was copied to B. P. Blg. 6, except as to the penalty, it
stands to reason that the interpretation on the Purisima case as to the elements of
that paragraph in P. D. No. 9, remains the same.
SO ORDERED.
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Presiding Judge
2
Caltex, Inc. vs. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247.
3
People vs. Licera, 65 SCRA 270.
4
People vs. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607.
5
Secretary of Justice vs. Catolico 68 SCRA 62; Albert vs. CFI, 23 SCRA 948.
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