n Finst quopiieET Question 15 Does our intellect know sensible things intuittvely in this life? fe cognition, is sufficient intellective vision is super- For the negative: Sentient vision, along wit for knowing sensible things. Theref fluous.® Tor the opposite: Whatever perfection the senses are capable of, the intellectis also capable of. Therefore, ete. REPLY TO THE QUESTION To this question T reply that the answer is yes. Fopthe intellect has an evident cognition of the first contingent proposition about sensible things!" There- fore, it has a noncomplex cognition that is sufficient to cause that complex ‘cognition evidently. But an abstractive cognition of sensible things is not suf- ficient for this. Therefore, et. REPLY TO SEVEN ARGUMENTS FOR THE OPPOSITE POSITION Reply to Argument true. For if it were true, then an angel would always be lacking some natural perfection, since it seems that an angel would also be able to possess such 8). This argument is reminiscent of Saint Thomas position, according t9 which the intellect cognizs singular things by referring general concepts back to the image (or phan tasm) delivered up bythe senses, ‘84. The frst contingent proposition about a sensible thing i propesiton tothe eect that such-and-such a sensibe thing actually exists. 85, These arguments are found in Chaton, Report 1, Prlogue, ques. 2, at 4 QuEsTION 45 B forms naturally. For corporeal things would be only the efficient causes of those forms.* Agent proposition, even though use an actin the sentient appetite. (The two cases are not the second case the same form would be the subject of both i the acto desiring.) ‘You might object that the intellective soul and the sentient soul tant from one another in posit ‘numerically the same thing th As for the argument about understanding in the head and in the foot, 1 gave my reply above.” Reply to Argument 2 Tothe next argument reply tafe ference between a sentient vision and aninjellcive vison isknown to us thuough experince: through experience, snc a young chil sees setenty through reason aswell, since a separated soul can have an intellective vision, but not a sentient: vision Reply o Argument 5 ‘To the next argument I reply that a separated intellect has fan intuitive intel= I therwise a separated soul would not be able to have ‘an angel can have this sort of cogni- ‘ separated soul can naturally see the secrets ‘of hearts as well as the complex and noncomplex [cognitions] inthe mind of an angel As for the passage from Scripture," Iclaim tha this passage is speaking de facto and about a natural power suspended from its act, 86, That is if sentient vison (sensation) were received in the ineletve soul, such sion would have a corporel thing as itsecen cause but not ats recipient (or nate ‘wase). But if his so then there sno reason why angels could no likewise have sentient Visions caused by corporeal things, soul isthe subject ofthe sensation, she 88. See Que 1.13, Reply to Problem 4. 89. The passages a Paralipomenon (2 Chronicles) 6:30. This passage aecords knowledge ‘ofthe secrets of human hears to God alone7” First quopiiseT stand naturally those things which he stand naturally. The second is are not revealed to another angel above concerning the specch of an angel? toone angel that separated soul, as was expl Reply to Argument 5 ‘To the next argument I reply that he cannot naturally acquire the vision of God and beatitude, since that vision cannot be caused except by God [acting] alone. /86/ ‘And, further, this does not follow: "He can see what is less visible; there- fore he can see what is more visble’—just as this does not follow: ‘My intel- lect can see a whiteness that is less visible; therefore, it can see an angel who is more visible’. And this is because the vision of an angel cannot be caused. ‘naturally in me. This is how its in the case under discussion her. Sao ea soca Tee ne aoc oe a Imlloctve vison, Butt i ot «paral enue ofan ac tn thee la editing intelecive” Vision, sins a complex cogaton prev mncomplex cognition in the same suet In the same way, the will own actunlesthereisa prcelig opin in telnet, As for the next argument, I grant that a sentient vision exists subjectively in the sentient appetite, since the senses and the sentient appetite are the therefore, whatever exists subjectively in the one also exists subjectively in the other. REPLY TO THE MAIN ARGUMENT ‘To the main argument I reply that a sentient vision is not sufficient; rather, an intellective vision is required. '87/ ‘90. See Qeaditet 1.6, Reply to Problem 2 and Reply to Problem 4 QuEsTION 16 25 Question 16 Can it be sufficiently proved that the will freely causes its own acts as an efficient cause? For the negative: The willis free, and yet itis not active. Therefore, itis not . The consequence is evident. The antecedent is proved by the the wills a passive power" reply to the question. FIRST ARTICLE ‘As forthe frst article, it should be noted that what Iam calling feedomis the power by which I can indifferently and contingently posit diverse things, in such a way that Iam both abe to cause and able not to cause the same effect when there is no diference anywhere else outside that power, SECOND ARTICLE ‘Tao Dificulties As for the second article, there are two difficulties: The fist is whether it can, be sulficiently proved that the wi we second /88) is whether, on the assumption that the will is free, it can be sufficiently proved that the will is active, any argument, since every argument meant to prove it will assume some- 54. This argument isa puting one, since on the surface i does not support the thesis thatthe wills an active power Pethaps the one proposing its assuming thatthe willis fee, in which case the argument would best be interpreted asa reacts ad absurd ofthe ‘aim thatthe wilis passive, As such, it would function asa proof ofthe thesis that the ll [san active cause ofits own acts. n any case, kam claims atthe end ofthe question