\TAYLOR v. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT CO. that of adult.
that of adult. While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him
Negligence | March 22, 1910 | Cason, J.
Facts:
1. Defendant Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. is engaged in the operation of
a street railway and an electric light system in the City of Manila. It has a power
plant situated on a small island in the Pasig River called Isla del Provisor.
2. On the other hand, David Taylor is a 15 year old boy.
3. Taylor, with another boy, went to Isla del Provisor to visit an employee of
defendant company called Mr. Murphy who promised to make them a cylinder
for a miniature engine. When they realized that Murphy was not in his quarters,
the boys wandered the plant and eventually found several fulminating caps
intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite. They carried
these caps home and experimented on it on their way home. The boys opened
one of the caps and lighted with match the yellowish substance that they found
inside. An explosion ensued and the boys were injured. David suffered the worst
as his right eye needed to be removed by the surgeons.
4. One of the arguments of plaintiff is that because of plaintiff’s youth and
experience, his entry upon defendant company’s premises, and the intervention
of his action between the negligent acct of defendant in leaving the caps exposed
on its premises and the accident which results in his injury should not be held to
have contributed in any way to the accident, which should be deemed to be the
direct result of defendant’s negligence in leaving the caps exposed at a place
where they were found by the plaintiff.
5. Torpedo Cases: In a typical cases, the question involved has been whether a
railroad company is liable for an injury received by an infant of tender years,
who from mere idle curiosity, or for the purposes of amusement, enters upon the
railroad company's premises, at a place where the railroad company knew, or had
good reason to suppose, children would be likely to come, and there found
explosive signal torpedoes left unexposed by the railroad company's employees,
one of which when carried away by the visitor, exploded and injured him; or
Turntable Cases: Where such infant found upon the premises a dangerous
machine, such as a turntable, left in such condition as to make it probable that
children in playing with it would be exposed to accident or injury therefrom and
where the infant did in fact suffer injury in playing with such machine.
In these, and in great variety of similar cases, the great weight of authority
holds the owner of the premises liable.
Railroad v. Stout: the principles on which these cases turn are that "while a
railroad company is not bound to the same degree of care in regard to mere
strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to passengers
conveyed by it, it is not exempt from responsibility to such strangers for injuries
arising from its negligence or from its tortious acts;" and that "the conduct of an
infant of tender years is not to be judged by the same rule which governs
to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another
he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an
infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is according to
his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the
circumstances of the case."
6. These cases have been heavily criticized in different jurisdictions. However, a
lot of jurisdictions, including the Supreme Court of the US, have held that they
conform to the principles announced in Railroad v. Stout
Held:
 Children here are the same in the other jurisdiction where Railroad v. Stout was
upheld. These children are actuated by similar childish instincts and impulses.
 The owners of premises, therefore, whereon things attractive to children are
exposed, or upon which the public are expressly or impliedly permitted to enter
or upon which the owner knows or ought to know children are likely to roam
about for pastime and in play, " must calculate upon this, and take precautions
accordingly." In such cases the owner of the premises cannot be heard to say
that because the child has entered upon his premises without his express
permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner owes no duty or obligation
whatever. The owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent the child
from entering his premises at a place where he knows or ought to know that
children are accustomed to roam about of to which their childish instincts and
impulses are likely to attract them is at least equivalent to an implied license to
enter, and where the child does enter under such conditions the owner's
failure to take reasonable precautions to guard the child against injury from
unknown or unseen dangers, placed upon such premises by the owner, is
clearly a breach of duty, responsible, if the child is actually injured, without
other fault on its part than that it had entered on the premises of a stranger
without his express invitation or permission. To hold otherwise would be
expose all the children in the community to unknown perils and unnecessary
danger at the whim of the owners or occupants of land which they might naturally
and reasonable be expected to enter.
 This conclusion is found on reason, justice and necessity.
 Under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in
leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the
injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking,
"attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are
satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting
match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the
resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is
not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred.
 We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and
understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he
put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his
age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity
for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury
which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him
must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and
reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been
incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed
on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal
cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.
 We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated, the immediate cause
of the explosion, the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own
act in putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that having "contributed to
the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover."

Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result
would not have occurred otherwise. Determined form the facts of each case,
combining logic, common sense, policy and precedent
 VERGARA v. AZARCON and CA
Negligence | September 30, 1987 | Padilla, J.

Facts:
1. Martin Belmonte who was driving a cargo truck belonging petitioner Vergara
rammed “head-on” the store-residence of Azarcon, causing damages thereto
assessed at P53,024.
2. An action for damages based on quasi-delict was filed by Azarcon against
Petitioner.
3. Petitioner Vergara claims that his driver, Belmonte, operated said cargo truck in
a very diligent and careful manner, and that the steering wheel refused to respond
to his effort and as a result of blown-out tire and despite application of his brakes,
the said cargo truck hit the store-residence of plaintiff and the said accident was
an act of God for which he cannot be held liable.
4. Petitioner also filed a third-party complaint against Travellers Insurance and
Surety Corporation, the insurer of the cargo truck of petitioner, for the proceeds
of the insurance.
5. Trial Court ruled in favor of Azarcon. CA affirmed in toto.

Issue/Ratio

WON petitioner is guilty of negligence. - YES

 It was established by competent evidence that the requisites of a quasi-delict
are present in the case, namely: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by
act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose acts he must
respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such
negligence and the damages. Private respondent suffered damages as a result of
an act or omission of petitioner.
 The findings of the trial court show that the fact of occurrence of the vehicular
accident was sufficiently established by the police report and the testimony of
Patrolman Masiclat.
 The fact of negligence may be deduced form the surrounding circumstances
thereof. According to the police report, cargo truck was travelling on the right
side of the road going to Manila and then it crossed to the center line and went
to the left side of the highway where it bumped a tricycle and a bicycle before
ramming the store of the Azarcon.
 Court also held that a mishap caused by defective breaks cannot be considered
as fortuitous event since it is curable and preventable.
 No evidence to overcome presumption of negligence.
 ANDAMO and ANDAMO v. IAC and MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF
SALETTE, INC.
Negligence | November 6, 1990 | Fernan, C.J.
Facts:
1. Petitioner spouses Andamo are the owners of land situated in Silang Cavite,
adjacent to the land of respondent Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc.,
a religious corporation.
2. Within the land of respondent, waterpaths and contrivances were constructed
which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioner’s land, which
a. caused a young man to drown,
b. damaged petitioners’ crops and plants,
c. washed away costly fences,
d. endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and
stormy seasons, and
e. exposed plants and other improvements to destruction
3. Petitioners instituted a criminal action before RTC against the officers and
directors of respondent corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under
Art. 324 of the RPC.
4. Petitioners filed a civil case for damages with prayer for issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction
5. RTC suspended hearing in civil case until the criminal case is decided.
6. RTC dismissed Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction as the criminal case which was
instituted ahead of civil case was still unresolved. RTC decision is grounded
upon the provision of ROC which provides that “criminal and civil actions
arising from same offenses may be instituted separately, but after the criminal
action has been commenced, the civil action cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.
7. IAC affirmed. MR denied.
and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an
indemnity for loss and damages to the injured property.
 Use of one’s property is not without limitations. Art. 431 of NCC provides that
the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the
rights of a third person. Adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties
which require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not
to infringe upon the rights and interests of others.
 Article 2176 of the NCC imposes civil liability on a person for damage caused
by his act or omission constituting fault or negligence. Whenever it refers to
“fault or negligence”, covers not only acts “not punishable by law” but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
 Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two if ever.
 Distinction is shown in Art. 2177 which states that responsibility for fault of
negligence under 2176 is separate and distinct from civil liability arising
from negligence under the Penal Code. Former is a violation of criminal law,
latter distinct and independent negligence which is a quasi-delict which is
separate from criminal negligence. The court cited Castillo v. CA and Azucena
v. Potenciano to support this case.

Issue/Ratio

WON respondent liable - YES

 Civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 on quasi-delicts. All the
elements of quasi-delict are present: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b)
fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose acts e must
respond, and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff
 Causal Connection between the Act of Building Water Path and the
Damage: From the petitioner’s complaint, the water paths and contrivances built
by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners.
 Samson v. Dionisio: Court applied Art. 2176 and held that “any person who
without due authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or
communication between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing loss and
damages to third party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use
 CALTEX v. SULPICIO LINES, ET. AL
Negligence | September 30, 1999 | Pardo, J.
Facts:
1. MT Vector, a vessel owned by Vector Shipping Corporation, was carrying 8,800
barrels of petroleum products of petitioner Caltex when it collided with MV
Doña Paz, a passenger and cargo vessel owned and operated by Sulpicio Lines,
killing almost all the passengers and crew members of both ships. Only 2
survived from MT Vector, while 24/4000 survived from MV Dona Paz.
2. The Bord of Marine Inquiry found that MT Vector, its registered operator, and
its actual operator and owner, were at fault and responsible for the collision.
3. Teresita and Solera Canezal, wife and mother of one of those who perished, filed
a complaint for damages arising from breach of contract of carriage against
Sulpicio Lines. Sulpicio filed a third-party complaint against Vector Shipping
Corporation as well as Caltex, alleging that Caltex chartered MT Vector with
gross and evident bad faith knowing fully well that MT Vector was improperly
manned, ill-equipped, unseaworthy and a hazard to safe navigation
4. RTC dismissed third party complaint against Caltex but upheld the liability of
Sulpicio Lines. On Appeal, CA included Caltex as one of those liable for
damages.
Issue/Ratio
WON charter has no liability for damages under Philippine Maritime Laws –
NO
 Respective rights and duties of a shipper and the carrier depends not on whether
the carrier is public or private, but on whether the contract of carriage is a bill of
lading or equivalent shipping documents on the one hand, or a charter party of a
similar contract on the other.
 Caltex and Vector entered into a contract of affreightment or a voyage charter.
 A contract of affreightment is one by which the owner of a ship lets the whole or
part of her to a merchant for the conveyance of goods, on a particular voyage, in
consideration of the payment of freight. Charter-party provides for the hire of the
vessel only. The ship owner supply the ship’s store, pay for the wages of the
master of the crew, and defray the expenses for the maintenance of the ship. This
is as opposed to a demise or bareboat charter.
 If charter is a contract of affreightment, the rights and the responsibilities of
ownership rest on the owner. Charterer is free from liability third persons in
respect of the ship.
WON MT Vector is a common carrier – YES
 Threshold question is WON the charter party agreement turned the common
carrier into a private one. In this case, the charter party agreement did not convert
the common carrier in to private one. The parties entered into a voyage charter
which retains the character of the vessel as a common carrier.
 A common carrier is a person or corporation whose regular business is to carry
passengers or property for all persons who may choose to employ and to
remunerate him. MT Vector fits the definition of a common carrier under Art.
1732 of the Civil Code.
 Thus, the carriers are deemed to warrant impliedly the seaworthiness of the
ship. For a vessel to be seaworthy, it must be adequately shipped for the voyage
and manned with a sufficient number of competent officers and crew. Failure of
a common carrier to maintain in seaworthy condition the vessel involved in its
contract of carriage is a clear breach of its duty prescribed in Art. 1755 of the
Civil Code.
 Shipper of goods under no obligation to conduct an inspection of the ship and its
crew, the carrier being obliged by law to impliedly warrant its seaworthiness.
WON Caltex liable for damages under the Civil Code – NO
 Sulpicio argues that Caltex negligently shipped its highly combustible fuel
aboard an unseaworthy vessel.
 CA relied on Articles 20 and 2176 to determine liability of Caltex in its ruling.
 Negligence is defined by Art. 1173 as consisting in the omission of that diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.
 Southeastern College v. CA: Negligence is conduct which naturally or
reasonably creates undue risk or harm to others. It may be failure to observe that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance, which the circumstances justly demand,
or the omission to do something which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do.
 Charterer of a vessel has no obligation before transporting its cargo to ensure that
the vessel it chartered complied with all legal requirements. Duty rests upon the
common carrier simply for being engaged in public service.
 Relationship between parties in the case is governed by special laws. Because of
implied warranty of seaworthiness, shippers of goods are not expected to inquire
into vessels seaworthiness. To demand from the shippers and hold them liable
in case of failure exhibits nothing but the futility of our maritime laws
insofar as the protection of the public in general is concerned. We cannot
expect passengers to inquire every time they board a common carrier.
 Cursory reading of records show that Caltex had reasons to believe that MT
Vector could legally transport cargo that time of the year. It had a valid
Certification of Inspection. Long time business partner. Allowed to sail by
coastguard.
 CA reversed insofar as it held Caltex Liable
 CORLISS v. MANILA RAILROAD CO.
Negligence | March 28, 1969 | Fernando, J.
Facts:
1. Petitioner is the wife of Ralph Corliss, an air police, who died after the jeep he
was driving collided with a locomotive of defendant Manila Railroad Company.
2. RTC ruled against Corliss, holding that Ralph Corliss was eager to beat the
oncoming locomotive so he took the risk and attempted to reach the other side.
RTC also ruled out negligence imputed to Manila Railroad.
3. Witnesses of the plaintiff claim that the Jeep slowed down before reaching the
crossing. And that there was a tooting of the horn
4. Witness of the defendant-appellee, who was at the engine at the time of the
mishap, said that he already blew the siren 300m away from the crossing and
repeated it in compliance with the regulations until he saw the jeep running
between 20-25 kph, suddenly spurt. He applied the breaks but the jeep was
caught in the middle of the tracks.
 What Justice Cardozo announced would merely emphasize what was set forth
earlier that each and every, case on questions of negligence is to be decided in
accordance with the peculiar circumstances that present themselves. There
can be no hard and fast rule. There must be that observance of that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the situation demands. Thus defendant appellee
acted. It is undeniable then that no negligence can rightfully be imputed to it.
 What commends itself for acceptance is this conclusion arrived at by the lower
court: "Predicated on the testimonies of the plaintiff's witnesses, on the
knowledge of the deceased and his familiarity with the setup of the checkpoint,
the existence of the tracks; and on the further fact that the locomotive had blown
its siren or whistle, which was heard by said witnesses, it is clear that Corliss Jr.
was so sufficiently warned in advance of the oncoming train that it was
incumbent upon him to avoid a possible accident — and this consisted simply in
stopping his vehicle before the crossing and allowing the train to move on. A
prudent man under similar circumstances would have acted in this manner. This,
unfortunately, Corliss, Jr. failed to do."

Issue/Ratio Others:
 Presumption of correctness in favor of the trial court and the decision of the trial
WON there was negligence on the part of the defendant – NO court is entitled to great respect since it had the opportunity of weighing the
 Smith v. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber: among the questions most frequently testimonies.
raised and upon which the majority of cases have been decided with respect to  Other facts being alleged by Petitioner is against the evidence on record.
the application of this liability, are those referring to the determination of the
damage or prejudice, and to the fault or negligence of the person responsible
therefor. These are the two indispensable factors in the obligations under
discussion, for without damage or prejudice, there can be no liability, and
although this element is present no indemnity can be awarded unless arising from
some Peron’s fault or negligence.
 US v. Juanillo: defined negligence as the failure to observe for the protection
of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand whereby such other person
suffers injury
 Ahern v. Oregon Telephone: Negligence is want of the care required by the
circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute term and its
application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and
vigilance which the circumstances reasonable require.
 By the aforementioned tests, no negligence could be imputed to Manila
Railroad.

WON RTC erred in relying on the cases Mestres v. Manila Electric and US v.
Manlabat in ruling that it is the duty of the party who can better adjust to avoid the
collision, and that a person in control of a vehicle who crosses a railroad and does not
exercise that precaution as to be able to stop almost immediately upon the appearance
of a train, is guilty of criminal negligence – NO
 CIPRIANO and CIPRIANO ENTERPRISES v. CA and MACLIN negligence, rendering him liable for loss due to the risk required to be insured
ELECTRONICS against. Yes in both counts.
Negligence | October 30, 1996 | Mendoza, J.  Violation of statutory duty is negligence per se.
o FF Cruz and Co v. CA: Owner of a furniture shop liable for the
Facts: destruction of the plaintiff’s house in a fire which started in his
1. Petitioner Elias Cipriano is the owner of Cipriano Enterprises engaged in the establishment in view of his failure to comply with an ordinance which
rustproofing of vehicles. required the construction of a firewall
2. Private respondent Maclin Electronics, through an employee, brought a Kia Pride o Teague v. Fernandez: Where the very injury which was intended to
to petitioner’s shop for rustproofing. Vehicle was received in the shop under JO be prevented by the ordinance has happened, non compliance with the
123581 which showed date it was received for rustproofing as well as its ordinance was not only an act of negligence but also the proximate
condition at the time. Neither time of acceptance nor the hour of release was cause of the death
specified. Petitioner claims that the car was brought 10 AM of April 30, 1991  Existence of contract between petitioner and private respondent does not bar a
and was ready for release on the same afternoon – total of 6 hours. finding of negligence under the principles of quasi-delict
3. On May 1, fire broke out at the adjacent restaurant also owned by petitioner. Fire  PD 1572 requires service and repair enterprises for motor vehicles to
destroyed the shop and restaurant including the car of private respondent, despite register with the DTI. The condition for registration or accreditation
efforts to save it. The car was placed in the building to protect it from theft. includes insurance coverage.
4. Private respondent sent a letter to petitioner demanding reimbursement. Cipriano  There is statutory duty imposed on petitioner and it is for his failure to comply
denied liability on the ground of fortuitous event. with this duty that he was guilty of negligence rendering him liable to private
5. Private respondent filed a case for damages against petitioner, alleging that the respondent. Even if fortuitous event, circumstance cannot exempt petitioner
vehicle was lost due to the negligence of the petitioner through its failure to form liability for loss.
register his business with the DTI and to insure it as required by PD 1572.
a. Petitioner invoked Art. 1174 of the Civil Code and denied liability for
the loss which he alleged was due to fortuitous event.
b. Petitioner testified that he employed an electrician who does regular
inspection and had installed fire-fighting devices, and that the fire was
an accident entirely independent of his will and devoid of any
negligence on his part.
c. Petitioner also claims that the car was ready and it was private
respondent’s fault for not claiming it.
d. He claims he is not covered by PD 1572
6. Private respondent argued that petition was liable for the loss even if it was
caused by a fortuitous event. The nature of the business required him to assume
the risk because under PD 1572, petitioner was required to insure his property as
well as those of his customers.
7. RTC ruled in favor of respondent for failure to comply with PD 1572 tantamount
to act of negligence which renders them liable for the loss of the car even if it
was caused by the fire. Affirmed by CA.

Issue/Ratio

WON fire was a fortuitous event for which he cannot be held responsible for - NO
 Petitioner: cites Art. 1174, 1262 as basis to say that fortuitous event absolves
him of liability.
 Issue in this case is WON petitioner was required to insure his business and the
vehicles received by him, and if so, whether his failure to do so constituted
 FRANCISCO v. CHEMICAL BULK CARRIERS
Negligence | September 7, 2011 | Carpio, J.
Facts:
1. Francisco was the owner and manager of a Caltex station.
2. Sometime in 1993, four persons, including one Bacsa, came to the station and
introduced themselves as employees of respondent Chemical Bulk Carriers
(CBC). Bacsa offered to sell to Francisco a certain quantity of respondent’s fuel.
3. Francisco agreed to purchase said fuel and imposed the following conditions: (1)
that Petron should deliver the diesel fuel to Francisco at his business address
which should be properly indicated in Petron’s invoice; (2) delivery tank is
sealed, and (3) Bacsa should issue a separate receipt to Francisco.
4. For a period of 10 months, there were 17 deliveries that complied with the
conditions.
5. Respondent sent a demand letter to Francisco regarding the diesel fuel delivered
to him but which had been paid for by respondent. Respondent demanded
P1,000,0000 for the diesel fuel or a complaint would be filed. This was rejected
by Francisco.
6. CBCI filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against Francisco.
CBCI: Petron sold diesel fuel to CBCI but these were delivered to and received
by Francisco. Francisco then sold the diesel fuel to third persons from whom he
received payment. Francisco acquired possession of the diesel fuel without
authority from respondent and deprived respondent of the use of the diesel fuel
it had paid for. That Francisco violated Articles 19-22 of the Civil Code and
should be held liable.
Francisco: Basca who claims to be a confidential secretary of CBCI’s manager
for operations, sold fuel from CBCI. Assured him that diesel fuel was not stolen
property and that CBCI enjoyed big credit line with Petron.
7. RTC ruled in favor of Francisco and dismissed complaint. CA reversed, ruling
that Bacsa’s act was his personal act which does not bind CBCI. Francisco should
have verified with CBCI first given his long experience in the industry.
Issue/Ratio
WON CA erred in not finding that Francisco exercised require diligence of a
blind person - NO
 Petitioner: Since Francisco is blind, standard of conduct that was required of him
was that of a reasonable person under like disability. They insist that Francisco
exercised due care in purchasing the diesel by (1) asking his son to check
identity of Bacsa, (2) requiring direct delivery from Petron, (3) requiring
that he be named as consignee in the invoice, and (4) requiring separate
receipts from Bacsa to evidence actual payment.
 Standard of conduct is the level of expected conduct that is required by the nature
of the obligation corresponding to the circumstances of the person, time and
place.
o One who is physically disabled is required to use the same degree of
care that a reasonably careful person who has the same physical
disability would use
o Handicaps and infirmities, such as blindness or deafness, are treated as
part of the circumstances under which a reasonable person must act.
 Francisco, despite being blind, had been managing and operating the Caltex
station for 15 years and this was not a hindrance for him to transact business until
this time.
 Francisco failed to exercise the standard of conduct expected of a reasonable
person who is blind.
o Francisco merely relied on ID of Bacsa to determine authorization
o Francisco already expressed misgivings about the diesel fuel,
fearing it may be stolen, yet he did not verify with CBCI the
authority of Bacsa
o Francisco relied on the receipts issued by Basca which were type
written on a plain bond paper. He should have asked receipt issued
by respondent.
o CLEARLY Francisco failed to exercise the standard of conduct
expected of a reasonable person who is blind
WON it can be concluded that CBCI tacitly or expressly approved transaction –
NO
 Francisco: apparent authority for Bacsa to enter into the transaction. Even if
agent has exceeded his authority, principal is solidarily liable with the agent if
the former allowed the latter to act as though he had full powers.
 General principle is that a seller without title cannot transfer a better title that he
has. Only the owner of the goods or one authorized by the owner to sell can
transfer title to the buyer. Therefore a person can sell only what he owns or is
authorized to sell and the buyer can acquire no more than what the seller can
legally transfer.
 Owner of goods who has been unlawfully deprived of goods may recover even
from a purchaser in good faith.
 No estoppel because for estoppel to occur, the owner must by word or conduct
have caused or allowed it to appear that title or authority to sell is with the seller
and buyer should have misled.
o Bacsa not the owner of the diesel fuel
o Claim that Bacsa was authorized is not supported by evidence and self-
serving. Not even confirmed with CBCI.
 Basca cannot transfer title to Francisco as Bacsa was not the owner of the diesel
fuel nor was he authorized to sell the fuel. CBCI did not commit any act that
would have misled Francisco. Francisco did not acquire any title over the diesel
fuel.
 PNB v. SANTOS
Negligence | December 10, 2014 Leonen, J.
Facts:
1. Respondents discovered that their father maintained a premium savings account
with petitioner PNB amounting to P1,700,000 and time deposit of P1,000,000.
Respondents went to PNB to withdraw their father’s deposit.
2. Branch manager Aguilar required them to submit certain documents in relation
to the death and the estate of the father. This was complied with. They tried to
withdraw but Branch Manager Aguilar informed them that the deposit had
already been related to a certain Bernardito Manimbo. A SPA was purportedly
executed by Reyme L. Santos in favor of Manimbo and a certain Angel Santos
for purposes of withdrawing and receiving the proceeds of the certificate of item
deposit.
3. Respondents filed before RTC a complaint for sum of money and damages
against PNB, Aguilar, and John Doe. They questioned the release of the deposit
to Manimbo who had no authority form them to withdraw their father’s deposit
and who failed to present the requirements for withdrawal.
4. PNB and Aguilar denied that Angel Santos had two separate accounts with PNB.
They alleged that Angel Santos’ deposit account was originally a time deposit
converted into premium savings account. PNB also claims that Manimbo was
able to submit an affidavit of self-adjudication and surety bond, and a certificate
of payment of estate tax, all of which seemed to be regular.
5. PNB and Aguilar filed third party complaint against Manimbo, Angel Santos,
and Capital Insurance and Surety.
6. Angel Santos denied having anything to do with the SPA and the affidavit of
self-adjudication by Manimbo.
7. RTC held that PNB and Aguilar were jointly and severally liable to pay
respondents. Manimbo and Angel Santos also liable. Trial Court found that PNB
and Aguilar were both negligent in releasing the deposit to Manimbo. PNB’s
failure to notify the depositor about the maturity of the time deposit and the
conversion of the time deposit into a premium savings account were also noted.
They also failed to require the production of birth certificate to prove claimant’s
relation to the depositor.
8. Upon appeal, PNB claims that the release of deposit was pursuant to existing
policy and that the documents submitted were more than substantial than those
by respondents. PNB blamed respondents for not accomplishing the required
documents immediately. CA sustained RTC ruling.
Issue/Ratio
WON PNB was negligent -
 Petitioner: The presumptuousness and cavalier attitude of respondents gave rise
to the controversy and not its judgment call. Respondents lacked sufficient
documentation.
 The contractual relationship between banks and their depositors is governed by
the Civil Code on simple loan. Once a person makes a deposit of his or her money
to the bank, he or she is considered to have lent the bank that money. The bank
becomes his debtor, and he becomes the creditor of the bank, which is obligated
to pay him on demand.
 Default standard of diligence in the performance of obligations is “diligence of a
good father of a family.” However, other industries, because of their nature, are
bound by higher standards of diligence (high standards of integrity and
performance), e.g. common carriers.
 Similar to common carriers, banking is a business impressed with public interest.
Public reposes its faith and confidence upon banks, such that even the humble
wage earner has not hesitated to entrust his life’s savings to the bank of his choice
knowing that they will be safe in its custody and will even earn some interest for
him. It also plays significant role in commerce. Hence, given the fiduciary nature,
a special standard of diligence is attached to the exercise of the functions of a
bank.
 Simex International v. CA: Fiduciary nature affirmed in the General Banking
Law.
 Consolidated Bank and Trust v. CA: This fiduciary relationship means that
the bank’s obligation to observe "high standards of integrity and
performance" is deemed written into every deposit agreement between a bank
and its depositor. The fiduciary nature of banking requires banks to assume a
degree of diligence higher than that of a good father of a family.
 Petitioners PNB and Aguilar’s treatment of the account is inconsistent with the
high standard of diligence required of banks. They accepted Manimbo’s
representations despite knowledge of the existence of circumstances that should
have raised doubts on such representations.
 PNB and Aguilar either have no fixed standards for the release of their
deceased clients’ deposits or they have standards that they disregard for
convenience, favor, or upon exercise of discretion. Both are inconsistent with
the required diligence of banks. These threaten the safety of the depositors’
accounts as they provide avenues for fraudulent practices by third persons
or by bank officers themselves.
 Petitioner Aguilar was aware that there were other claimants to Angel C. Santos’
deposit. Respondents had already communicated with petitioner Aguilar
regarding Angel C. Santos’ account before Manimbo appeared. Petitioner
Aguilar even gave respondents the updated passbook of Angel C. Santos’
account. Yet, petitioners PNB and Aguilar did not think twice before they
released the deposit to Manimbo. They did not doubt why no original death
certificate could be submitted. They did not doubt why Reyme L. Santos would
execute an affidavit of self-adjudication when he, together with others, had
previously asked for the release of Angel C. Santos’ deposit. They also relied on
the certificate of time deposit and on Manimbo’s representation that the passbook
 was lost when the passbook had just been previously presented to Aguilar for
updating.
 In this case, petitioners PNB and Aguilar released Angel C. Santos’ deposit
to Manimbo without having been presented the BIR-issued certificate of
payment of, or exception from, estate tax. This is a legal requirement before
the deposit of a decedent is released. This tax serve as guard against the release
of deposits to persons who have no sufficient and valid claim over the deposits.
 Given the circumstances, "diligence of a good father of a family" would have
required petitioners PNB and Aguilar to verify. A prudent man would have
inquired why Reyme L. Santos would issue an affidavit of self-adjudication when
others had also claimed to be heirs of Angel C. Santos. Contrary to petitioner
Aguilar’s reasoning, the fact that Reyme L. Santos was not petitioner PNB’s
client should have moved her to take measures to ensure the veracity of
Manimbo’s documents and representations. This is because she had no previous
knowledge of Reyme L. Santos his representatives, and his signature.
 Petitioner PNB is a bank from which a degree of diligence higher than that of a
good father of a family is expected. Petitioner PNB and its manager, petitioner
Aguilar, failed to meet even the standard of diligence of a good father of a family.
Their actions and inactions constitute gross negligence. It is for this reason that
we sustain the trial court’s and the Court of Appeals’ rulings that petitioners PNB
and Aguilar are solidarily liable with each other
 o Contrary to testimony of the defense that there were signs or gasera
which was buried so that its light could not be blown off by the wind,
QUEZON CITY GOVERNMETN and TIAMZON v. DACARA none was ever presented. Contrary also to report of policeman.
Negligence | June 15, 2005 | Panganiban, J.  Negligence of a person whether natural or juridical over a particular set of events
is transfixed by the attending circumstances so that the greater the danger known
Facts: or anticipated, the greater the degree of care. Failure of the QC government to
1. Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. was driving the vehicle of his father when he rammed into comply with the statutory provision found in Art. 2189 is tantamount to
a pile of street diggings found at Matahimik street, which was then being repaired negligence per se which renders the city government liable.
by the Quezon City government. Dacarra sustained bodily injuries and the  Allegation of overspeeding was belatedly raised and not brought during the trial.
vehicle suffered extensive damage for it turned turtle. Standard of conduct is the level of expected conduct that is required by the nature of
2. Dacara tried to seek indemnification from the QC government but it failed. the obligation corresponding to the
Hence, on behalf of his son, Fulgencio Sr. filed a case for damages against
Quezon City and Engineer Tiamzon. Art. 2189.Provinces, cities, and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death
3. Defendants admitted the occurrence of the incident but claimed that the subject of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads,
diggings were provided with a mound of soil and barricaded with reflectorized streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or
traffic paint with sticks placed before or after it which was visible during the supervision.
incident. Basically, that they exercised due care by providing the area of the
diggings all necessary measures to avoid incident.
4. RTC ruled in favor of Dacara, using Art. 2189 as basis of liability of QC
government. Petitioners appealed to the CA.
5. CA affirmed decision saying that there was failure on the part of QC of placing
sufficient and adequate precautionary signs to minimize or prevent the dangers
to life. CA also ruled that the negligence of QC government was clear based on
the investigation of PFC Villafranca stating that the subject vehicle rammed into
a pile of earth from a deep excavation threat without any warning device
whatsoever. CA also ruled that CA 2189 is applicable to cases in which there has
been no death or physical injury.

Issue/Ratio

WON there was negligence

 Petitioner: they placed all necessary precautionary signs to alert the public of a
roadside construction. Dacara’s car was overspeeding and he was the one
negligent.
 Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the
result would not have occurred otherwise. Determined form the facts of each
case, combining logic, common sense, policy and precedent.
 The Court refused to rule on the cause of the turtling of the vehicle as it is a
factual issue that the RTC and CA have agreed upon. Negligence of QC was the
proximate cause of the accident as held by the lower court.
o No lighting device or reflectionized barricade or sign which would
serve as adequate warning
 PEOPLE v. VISTAN
Negligence | September 8, 1921 | Villlamor, J.

Facts:
1. While the street car of the Manila Electric Railroad Company was receiving
passengers, Vistan, who was the conductor of the street car, signaled the
motorman to move despite the fact that one Hugo Borromeo was at that very
moment about to board the car with one foot on the running board. As a result,
Hugo Borromeo had his foot crushed by the street car and said foot had to be
amputated.
2. Vistan tried to argue that the street car being in motion, Borromeo still ran after
it and attempted to board it but unfortunately missed the running board and got
involved in the accident. Witnesses were presented.
3. It was not necessary for Borromeo to run after the car in order to board it as it
was stopped when his two sons entered it. The fact is that due probably to the
abrupt motion of the car in starting, Borromeo lost his grip and fell.
a. Testified by witness Lawson
4. At the time of board the car, Borromeo was watching the man who gave the
signal to start (the conductor). It is not improbable that when the accused saw the
last passenger with both hands clinging to the holding device of the car and one
foot on the running board, he thought that the passenger had completely boarded
the car and that is why he gave the signal to start.

Issue/Ratio

WON accused acted with reckless negligence as alleged in the information – NO.
Only simple imprudence or neglgience
 US v. Gomez: Distinguished simple imprudence and rash imprudence. Court
said that where immediate personal harm, preventable in the exercise of
reasonable care, is threatened to a human being by reason of a course of conduct
which is being pursued by another, and the danger is visible and consciously
appreciated by the actor, the failure to use reasonable care to prevent the
threatened injury constitutes reckless negligence. On the other hand, simple
imprudence is a mere lack of prevision in a situation where either the threatened
harm is not immediate or the danger is not openly visible.
 We are of the opinion that the act of the accused in giving the order to start the
car, when the offended party had his hands already on the holding devices of the
car and his foot on the running board, constitutes carelessness or negligence, but
does not show grave fault amounting to reckless imprudence and the accused
having acted with simple imprudence or negligence, has incurred the penalty
provided by Art. 590 of the Penal Code.
 DELA LLANA v. BIONG
Negligence | December 4, 2013 | Brion, J.
Facts:
1. Juan Dela Llana, together with Dra. Dela Llana and a certain Calimlim, was
driving along North Avenue when he was rammed in the rear end by a dump
truck containing gravel and sand. As a result, the car was violently pushed
forward and the car’s rear end collapsed and its rear windshield was shattered.
Dra dela Llana was punctured by glass splinter.
2. Traffic investigation report stated that the truck driver named Joel Primer was
reckless imprudent in driving the truck. Joel was an employee of Rebecca Biong
who was doing business under the name and style of Pongkay Trading, engaged
in a gravel and sand business.
3. A month later, Dra. Dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left
side of her neck and shoulder. The pain of Dra. Dela Llana became more intense
as days passed by and as the injury became more severe. Her health deteriorated
and at one point, she could no longer move her left arm. After consultation with
Dr. Milla, a rehabilitation medicine specialist, she was told that she suffered
whiplash injury – an injury caused by the compression of the nerve running to
her left arm and hand. Dra. Dela Llana’s condition did not improve despite three
months of extensive physical therapy.
4. She also consulted other doctors in search of a cure. Dr. Flores, neuro-surgeon,
suggested that she undergo a cervical spine surgery to release the compression
of the nerve. This operation incapacitated Dra. Dela Llana from the practice of
her profession despite the surgery. Dra. Dela Llana demanded from Rebecca
compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to pay.
5. A case was filed by Dra. Dela Llana against Rebecca for damages before the
RTC. She alleged that she lost the mobility of her arm as a result of the vehicular
accident.
6. Rebecca claims that Dra. Dela Llana had no cause of action against her as no
reasonable relation existed between the vehicular accident and Dra. Dela Llana’s
injury. The illness became manifest only one month and a week from the date of
the vehicular accident.
7. During trial, Dra. Dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness and Joel
as a hostile witness.
a. Dra. Dela Llana reiterated that she lost the mobility of her arm due to
the vehicular accident. She presented medical certificate stating that
what she suffered was a whiplash injury issued by Dr. Milla to prove
her claim. The same certificate chronicled her clinical history and
physical examinations.
b. Joel testified that his truck hit the car because the truck’s brakes got
stuck
8. Rebecca testified that Dra. Dela llana was physically fit and strong when they
met several days after the vehicular accident. And that she observed the diligence
of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of Joel – she
required him to submit a certification of good moral character, as well as
clearances prior to his employment. She also hired him only after the latter passed
a driving skills test conducted by a licensed driver-mechanic.
9. Alberto testified that he checked the truck in the morning and that it was in good
condition prior to the accident. The cause of the vehicular accident was a
damaged compressor.
10. The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. Dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of
the whiplash injury was Joel’s reckless driving. It found that a whiplash injury is
an injury caused by the sudden jerking of the spine in the neck area. It ruled that
the massive damage the car suffered only meant that the truck was over-speeding
when he should have driven at a slower pace because of poor road visibility. And
if it were indeed true that the brake of the truck was stuck, Joel should have blown
his horn, or in the first place could have prevented the collision by swerving the
truck off the road.
a. Given this negligence, there is a presumption that Rebecca did not
exercise the diligence of a good father of family in Joel’s selection and
supervision. She was vicariously liable as an employer.
b. The 3 elements necessary to establish Rebecca’s liability were present:
(1) that the employee was chosen by the employer, personally or
through another; (2) that the services were to be rendered in accordance
with orders which the employer had the authority to give at all times;
and (3) the illicit act of the employee as on the occasion or by reason
of the functions entrusted to him.
11. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC ruling. It held that Dra. Dela Llana failed
to establish a reasonable connection between the vehicular accident and her
whiplash injury by preponderance of evidence.
a. Citing Hypermix, it held that Courts will not hesitate to rule in favor of
the other party if no evidence or the evidence is too slight to warrant
an inference establishing the fact in issue.
b. Interval between the incident and the time the injury manifested was
lengthy.
c. Dra. Dela Llana did not immediately visit a hospital to check if she
sustained internal injuries after the accident. Courts cannot take
judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries.
d. Her failure to present expert testimony is fatal to her claim.
e. And the medical certificate presented did not explain how and why the
vehicular accident caused the injury.
Issue/Ratio
WON Joel’s reckless driving is the proximate cause of Dra. Dela Llana’s
whiplash injury - NO
 Petitioner: (1) Nutrimix cannot apply because the same involves the application
of provisions governing hidden defects, (2) She was able to establish by
preponderance of evidence that Joel’s act was the proximate cause of the
 whiplash injury. First, pictures of her damaged car showed that the impact was
strong. Second, Dr. Milla categorically stated in the medical certificate that she
suffered from whiplash injury. Third, her testimony that the accident caused the
injury is credible because she is a surgeon.
 Petitioner also claims that an uncorroborated medical certificate is credible if
uncontroverted and that expert opinion is not necessary if opinion merely relates
to matters of common knowledge, and that trial judges are aware of the fact that
whiplash injuries are common in vehicular collisions.
 Issue involves a question of fact and this court is not a trier of facts. As a general
rule, CA’s findings of fact are final and conclusive unless a conflict exists in
finding of the RTC and the CA, which is present in this case.
 Dra. Dela Llana failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence.
 Art. 2176 of the Civil Code provides that “whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is a quasi-delict.”
 The elements to establish a quasi-delict are: (1) damages to the plaintiff, (2)
negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose
acts the defendant must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and
effect between such negligence and the damages.
o Based on these requisites, Dra. Dela Lana must first establish by
preponderance of evidence the three elements of quasi-delict between
Rebecca’s liability can be determined.
o She should show the chain of causation between Joel’s reckless driving
and her whiplash injury. Only after she had laid this foundation can the
presumption of negligence on the part of Rebecca as employer can
arise.
 Once negligence, the damages and the proximate cause is established, only then
can Art. 2180 apply. Under Art. 2176, in relation with the fifth paragraph of Art.
2180, “an action predicated on an employee’s act or omission may be instituted
against the employer who is held liable for the negligent act or omission
committed by his employee.
 In civil cases, he who alleges has burden of proving it. Hence, burden of proving
proximate causation rests on Dra. Dela Llana.
 (1) Picture of the damaged car only shows the impact of the collision and in no
way does it show causation of the whiplash injury.
 (2) The medical certificate should not be considered in resolving the case since
it was not admitted in evidence by the RTC. Evidence, not admitted, cannot be
validly considered by the courts in arriving at their judgments.
 Assuming arguendo that the medical certificate is considered, the same has no
probative value for being hearsay since it was not attested to by the person who
has personal knowledge of the content. Court reminded that hearsay evidence,
whether or not objected to, cannot be given credence and that admissibility
should not be equated with the weight of the evidence. Admissibility depends on
relevance and competence while probative weight pertains to evidence already
submitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.
 Medical certificate only attested that Dra. Dela Llana was suffering from a
whiplash injury but failed to relate the accident to the injury.
 (3) Dra. Dela Llana’s opinion that Joel’s negligence caused her whiplash injury
has no probative value. She was the lone physician-witness during the trial. She
merely testified as an ordinary witness. Despite the fact that she is a physician,
the Court cannot give weight to her opinion that the cause of the whiplash injury
was Joel’s reckless driving.
 Under the Rules on evidence, there is a substantial difference between an
ordinary witness and an expert witness. The opinion of an ordinary witness may
be received in evidence regarding: (a) identity of a person whom he has adequate
knowledge, (b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity, (c) the
mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
 On the other hand, opinion of expert witness may be received in evidence on a
matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he shown
to possess.
 Courts, however, do not immediately accord probative value to an admitted
expert testimony, much less to an unobjected ordinary testimony respecting
special knowledge. The weight of the opinion lies in the assistance that the expert
witness may afford the courts by demonstrating the facts which serve as a basis
for his opinion and the reasons on which the logic of his conclusions is founded.
 Dra. Dela Llana’s medical opinion cannot be given probative value as she was
not presented as an expert witness. As ordinary witness she was not competent
to testify to the nature, cause an defect of a whiplash injury.
 Dra. Dela Llana did not present any testimonial or documentary evidence that
directly shows the causal relation between the vehicular accident and Dra. Dela
Llana’s injury. Her claim that Joel’s negligence caused her whiplash injury was
not established because of the deficiency of the presented evidence during trial.
Courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash
injuries. Justices and judges are only tasked to apply and interpret the laws on
the basis of the parties’ pieces of evidence and their corresponding legal
arguments.
 MALLARI, SR. and MALLARI, JR. v. CA and BULLETIN PUBLISHING
CORPORATION
Presumptions | January 31, 2000 | Bellosillo, J.
Facts:
1. One morning, the passenger jeepney driven by petitioner Mallari, Jr. and owned
by Mallari, Sr. collided with the delivery van, driven by Felix Angeles, of
respondent Bulletin Publishing Corporation, along a highway in Bataan.
2. Petitioner Mallari, Jr. testified that he went to the left lane of the highway and
overtook a Fiera which had stopped on the right lane. Before he passed said Fiera,
he saw the van of respondent Bulletin coming from the opposite direction.
3. Sketch of the accident showed the collision cocurred after Mallari, Jr. overtook
the Fiera while negotiating a curve in the highway. Impact caused the jeepney to
turn around and fall on its left side, resulting in injuries to its passengers, one of
whom died due to injuries.
4. Claudia Reyes, the widow of the passenger who died, filed a complaint for
damages with the RTC against Mallari, Sr., Mallari, Jr. and Bulletin, its driver,
and against the insurance company. The complaint claims that the collision was
caused by the fault and negligence of both drivers of the passenger jeepney and
the Bulletin delivery van.
a. RTC found that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence
of Felix Angeles, driver of van, considering the fact that the left front
portion of the delivery truck driven by Angeles hit and bumped the left
rear portion of the passenger jeepney. RTC ordered Bulletin and Felix
to solidarilly pay Reyes damages.
5. Upon appeal to the CA, the CA modified the decision and found no negligence
on the part of Angeles and Bulletin. Instead, it ruled that collision was the sole
negligence of Mallari, Jr., who admitted immediately before the collision and
after he rounded a curve on the highway, he overtook a Fiera which had stopped
on his lane and that he had seen the van before overtaking the Fiera.
Issue/Ratio
WON
 Petitioner: There is no evidence to show that petitioner overtook a vehicle at a
curve on the road at the time of the accident and that the testimony of Angeles
on the overtaking made by Mallari, jr. was not credible and unreliable.
Furthermore, RTC was in better position than CA to assess evidence and observe
witnesses.
 We cannot sustain petitioners. Contrary to their allegation that there was no
evidence whatsoever that petitioner Mallari, jr. overtook a vehicle at a curve on
the road at the time of or before the accident, the same was testified to by
petitioner during the trial.
 CA correctly found, based on the sketch and spot report of the police authorities
which were not disputed by petitioners, that the collision occurred immediately
after petitioner Mallari, Jr. overtook a vehicle in front of it while traversing a
curve on the highway. This act of overtaking was in clear violation of Sec. 41,
pars, (a) and (b) of RA 4136 as amended, otherwise known as the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code which provides that a driver of a vehicle shall
not drive to the left side of the center line of a highway in overtaking or passing
another vehicle proceeding in the same direction unless it is clearly visible that
the left side is free of incoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit
such overtaking, and that a driver shall not overtake another when approaching
a curve in the highway.
 The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of
overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that
the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do in safety.
 In the instant case, by his own admission, Mallari, jr. alwaredy saw the Bulletin
delivery van was coming from the opposite direction and failing to consider the
speed thereof since it was still dark at 5:00 AM, mindlessly occupied the left lane
and overtook two vehicles in front of it t a curve in the highway.
 Clearly, the proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of the
passenger was the sole negligence of the jeepney driver, Mallari, jr. who reckless
operated and drove his jeepney in a lane where overtaking was not allowed by
traffic rules.
 Under Art. 2185, unless there is proof of the contrary, it is presumed that a
person having a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap
he was violating a traffic regulation. Petitioners failed to overcome this legal
presumption.
WON Mallari, Sr. could also be held liable as owner - YES
 Negligence of the driver is binding against Mallari, Sr. who was the owner of the
passenger jeepney engaged as common carrier, considering that action based on
contract of carriage, courts need not make an express finding of fault or
negligence on the part of the carrier to hold it responsible for payment of
damages.
 Under Art. 1755, a common carrier is bound to carry the passenger safely as far
as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons with due regard for all the circumstances.
 Furthermore, pursuant to Art. 1759, it is liable for the death of or injuries to
passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees.
Liability of common carrier does not cease upon proof that it exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of its employees.
 Clearly, by the contract of carrier, the carrier jeepney of Mallari, Sr. assumed the
express obligation to transport the passengers to their destination safely and to
observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all the circumstances, and
any injury or death that might be suffered by its passengers is right away
attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier.
 SPOUSES PACIS v. MORALES
Presumptions | Febuary 5, 2010 | Tinga, J.

Facts:
1. Alfred Pacis was a student at Baguio Colleges Foundation who died due to a
gunshot wound in the head which he sutstained while he was at the Top Gun
Firearms and Ammunitions Store, owned by Morales, in Baguio City.
2. During the time of the accident, Morales was in Manila. His employee, Jarnague,
the regular caretaker, was also not around. Jarnague requested two sales agent to
look after the gun store and entrusted them a bunch of keys including a key to
the drawer where a loaded gun is located. The gun was brought for repair and
was hidden in the cabinet for safekeeping.
3. The sales agent later brought out the gun form the drawer and placed it on top of
the table. Pacis got hold of the gun and when he was returning it, it accidentally
went off and hit him in the head.
4. Criminal case was filed against th e sales agent but he was acquitted because of
the exempting circumstance of “accident” under Art. 12(4) of the RPC.
5. A separate civil action for damages was filed. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners
and held liable

Issue/Ratio
WON Article 2185 of the NCC, which presumes the driver of a motor vehicle
negligent if he was violating a traffic regulation at the time of the mishap, should apply
by analogy to non-motorized vehicles

Petitioner: There
 CAPILI v. CARDAÑA and CARDAÑA
Presumptions | November 2, 2006 | Quisimbing, J.
Facts:
1. Jasmin Cardaña was walking along the permiter fence of San Roque Elementary
School when a branch of a caimito tree located in the school premises fell on her,
causing her instantaneous death. Her parents, spouses Cardaña filed a case for
damages before the RTC.
2. Spouses Cardan1as alleged in the complaint that as early as 2 months before, a
resident of the barangay reported on the possible danger of the tree posed to
passerby. And that the lack of foresight and negligence of Capili caused the death
of their daughter.
3. Capili denied the accusation and claimed that Lerios did not inform her of the
danger, but only offered to buy the tree. She also denied knowing that the tree
was dead and rotting. She presented witnesses who attested that she had brought
up the offer of Lerios to the other teachers during a meeting in December and
assigned another teacher to negotiate the sale.
4. Trial Court gave credence to the claim of petitioner had no knowledge that the
tree was already dead and rotting and that Lerios merely informed her that he
was going to buy the three for firewood. It ruled that petitioner exercised degree
of care and vigilance which the circumstances require and that there was no
higherer standard of care required from her. RTC ruled that Capili is not liable.
CA on the other hand, reversed and ruled that petitioner should have known of
the condition by its mere sighting and that no matter how hectic her schedule
was, she should have had the tree removed and not merely delegated the task.
CA ruled that caimito tree was a nuisance that should have been removed.
Issue/Ratio
WON petitioner was negligent and liable for damages
 Petitioner: She was not negligent about the disposal of the tree since she had
assigned her next-in-rank to see to its disposal. And that despite her physical
inspection, she did not observe any indication that the tree was already rotten nor
did any of her teachers inform her that the tree was already rotten.
 Respondents: petitioner knew that the tree was dead and rotting, yet, she did not
exercise reasonable care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would
have done in the same situation.
 Issue on whether petitioner was negligent is not a question of act. However, this
case is an exception since the findings of CA were incongruent with findings of
the RTC.
 A negligent act is an inadvertent act. It may be merely carelessly done form lack
of ordinary prudence and may be one which creates a situation involving an
unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable action of the other, a third
person, an animal or a force of nature. A negligent act is one from which an
ordinary prudent person in the actor’ position, in the same or similar
circumstances, would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to other as to
cause him not to do the act or to do it in a more careful manner.
 Probability that the branches of a dead and rotting tree could fall and harm
someone is clearly a foreseeable danger. As principal, petitioner was tasked to
see the maintenance of the school grounds and safe ty of the children in the
premises. She was unware of the rotten state of a tree whose falling branch had
caused the death of a child speaks ill of her discharge of the responsibility of her
position.
 The fact that the student died as a result of the dead and rotting tree within the
schools’ premises shows that the tree was indeed an obvious danger to anyone
passing by and calls for application of the principle of res ipsa loquitiur.
 Requisites: (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that
it would not have happened except for defendant’s negligence, (2) the accident
must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
management/control of the person charged with negligence complained of, (3)
the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on
part of person injured.
 Effect of doctrine of res ipsa loquitiur is to warrant a presumption or inference
that the mere falling of the branch of the dead and rotting tree which caused the
death of the student was a result of petitioner’s negligence.
 Procedural effect of the doctrine is that petitioner’s negligence is presumed once
respondents established the perquisites for the doctrine to apply. One a prima
facie case of all requisites is made out, burden shifts to accused of negligence to
explain. Presumption may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence, such as
that of due care or innocence.
 Court held that petitioner’s explanation as to why she failed to have the tree
removed immediately not sufficient to exculpate her. As the principal, she was
takes dto see the maintenance of school grounds and ensure safety within the
premises. Her being unaware shows that she failed to discharge the responsibility
demanded by her position.
 Even if she had assigned disposal to another teacher, she exercises supervision
of her assignee and she failed to heck seasonably if the danger posed by the
rotting tree had been removed.
 SPOUSES VESTIL v. IAC and SPOUSES UY
Specified Cases of Quasi-Delicts | Novembe 6, 1989 | Cruz, J.
FACTS:
1. Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with the petitioner’s child in
the latter’s house. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital where she was
treated for multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead and administered an
anti-rabies vaccine. She was initially discharged but brought back one week later
due to “vomiting of saliva.” She died a day after due to broncho-pneumonia.
2. Spouses Uy sued for damages seven months later in the RTC, alleging that the
Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of “Andoy,” the dog that bit and
eventually killed their daughter. RTC dismissed the complaint.
3. IAC reversed the decision of the RTC and found that Sposues Vestil were in
possession of the house and the dog and so should be responsible under Article
2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog. They were ordered to
pay damages and other fees.
4. Respondent Vestil is now arguing that she is not the owner of the house or the
dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned and there are other
heirs to the property.
ISSUE:
WON Spouses Vestil have possession of the dog staying at the house, regardless of
the ownership of the dog and the house – YES
1. Article 2183 states that “the possession of an animal or whoever may make use
of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may
escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should
come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered
damages.
2. Vestil’s testimony that she was not in possession of the house is hardly credible.
She claims that the occupants of the house left by her father were related to him
and maintained themselves out of a common fund or by some kind of
arrangement. She mentioned as many as then of such relatives who had stayed in
the house at one time or another although they did not appear to be close kin. She
at least implied that they did not pay any rent, presumably because of their
relations with Vicente Miranda notwithstanding that she herself did not seem to
know them very well.
3. There is contrary evidence that the occupants of the house were boarders who
paid the petitioners for providing them with meals and accommodations. Purita
Vestil also appears to have hired a maid who did the cooking and cleaning in the
said house for its occupants. Her mother categorically declared that petitioners
were maintaining boarders in the house where Theness was bitten by a dog.
Marcial Lao, another witness, testified that he was indeed a border and that the
Sposues Vestil were maintaining the house for business purpose. The private
respondents submitted documentary evidence showing her application for water
connection with the Water District – suggesting that she was administering the
house in question.
4. While she is not really the owner of the house, there is no doubt that the spouses
Vestil were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. She was the only
heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical person to take care of the property
which was only 6 kilometers form her house. There is evidence showing that she
and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly, and used it as
a second house. Her own daughter was playing in the house with Theness when
the little girl was bitten by the dog. The dog itself remained in the house even
after the death of the original owner and when the incident occurred. It is also
noteworthy that the Spouses Vestil offered to assist the respondents with their
hospitalization expenses.
WON dog bite was not the cause of the death? – NO
1. Petitioner then argues that the dog bite was not the cause of the death, but rather
it was broncho-pneumonia as stated in the death Certificate. The Court said that
the respondents were able to prove that Theness developed symptoms of rabies
and that the cause of her death, asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, is a complication
of rabies. These was duly proven during the trial through the testimony of Dr/
Tautjo.
WON petitioner could be expected to exercise remote control of the dog - YES
1. Article 2180 holds possession liable even if the animal should “escape or be lost”
and so be removed from his control. It does not matter WON the dog was tame
or was merely provoked by the child. The law does not speak only vicious
animals but also tame ones as long as they cause injury.
2. These defenses are an in implied reject of their original posture that there was no
proof that it was the dog in the father’s house that bit Theness.
3. According to Manresa, the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code
is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the
possessor r user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity
and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his
utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may
cause.
 AFIALDA v. HISOLE and HISOLE 5. Defendant’s liability is made to rest on Article 1905 of the Civil Code. But action
Specified Cases of Quasi-Delicts | November 29, 1949 | Reyes, J. under that article is not tenable for the reasons already stated. If action is to be
based on article 1902 of the civil Code, it is essential that there be fault or
FACTS: negligence on the part of the defendants as owners of the animal that caused the
1. Loreto Afialda was employed by defendant spouses as caretaker of their damage. But the complaint contains no allegation.
carabaos. While tending the animals, he was gored by one of them and later died
as a consequence of his injuries.
2. A complaint for damages was filed in the trial court by petitioner alleging that
the death was neither force majeure nor fault by the plaintiff. Defendants moved
to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action. Trial court ruled in favor of
respondents.
3. Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court seeking to hold defendants liable under
Article 1905 of the Civil code which states that “the possession of an animal,
or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if
such animal should escape from him or stray away. This liability shall cease
only in case the damage should arise form force majeure or from the fault of
the person who may have suffered it.”

ISSUE:
WON the owner of the animal is liable when the damage is caused to its caretaker –
NO
1. According to the lower court, the owner of an animal is answerable only for
damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused to the caretaker of the
animal the owner would be liable only if he had been negligent or at fault under
Article 1902 of the same code. Plaintiff contends that Article 1905 does not
distinguish between damage caused to a stranger and damage caused to the
caretaker and makes the owner liable whether or not he has been negligent or at
fault.
2. It is important to distinguish between a case where an animal caused injury to a
stranger or third person and a case where the person injured was the caretaker of
the animal. The statute names the possessor or user of the animal as the person
liable for “any damages it may cause,” and this for the obvious reason that the
possessor or user has the custody and control of the animal and is therefore the
one in a position to prevent if rom causing damage.
3. In the present case, the animal was in custody and under the control of the
caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker’s
business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone,
including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances,
was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for
which he must take the consequences.
4. The Court cited a decision of the Spanish Supreme Court which said that the
death of an employee who was bitten by a feline which his master had asked him
to take to his establishment was by declared to be “a veritable accident of labor”
which should come under the labor laws rather than under Article 1905 of the
Civil Code.
 VILLANUEVA v. DOMINGO and DOMINGO
Specified Cases of Quasi-Delicts | September 20, 2004| Corona, J.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Prisicilla Domingo is the registered owner of a silver Lancer with
respondent Leandro Domingo as authorized driver. One evening, the silver lancer
was cruising along the middle lane of South Superhighway at a moderate speed
when a green Lancer, owned by petitioner Villanueva, and driven by one
Renador Ocfemia, hit and bump the left portion of the silver lancer resulting to
the latter hitting two vehicles.
2. In the Traffic Accident Report, it was stated that the driver of the green lancer
was driving with expired license and was intoxicated. Hence, the prosecutor
recommended the filing of information for reckless imprudence resulting to
damage to property and physical injuries.
3. Villanueva claimed that he was no longer the owner of the car at the time of the
mishap because it was swapped with a Pajero owned by one Albert Jaucian.
Albert Jaucian claimed that he was not the registered owner of the car and that
he and his company could not be held subsidiary liable as employer of Ocfemia
because the latter was off-duty and not performing a duty related to his
employment.
4. Trial court found petitioner liable and ordered him to pay damages and fees. CA
upheld the decision of the trial court but changed the amount of fees awarded.
ISSUE:
May the registered owner of a motor vehicle be held liable for damages arising from
a vehicular accident involving his motor vehicle while being operated by the employee
of its buyer without the latter’s consent and knowledge – YES
1. We have consistently ruled that the registered owner of any vehicle is directly
and primarily responsible to the public and third persons while it is being
operated. The rationale behind such doctrine was explained in Erezo v Jepte:
a. The principle upon which this doctrine is based is that in dealing with
vehicles registered under the Public Service Law, the public has the
right to assume or presume that the registered owner is the actual
owner thereof, for it would be difficult for the public to enforce the
actions that they may have for injuries caused to the by the vehicles
being negligently operated if the public should be required to
prove who the actual owner is. How would the public of third persons
know against whom to enforce their rights in case of subsequent
transfer of the vehicles? We do not imply by his doctrine, however,
that the registered owner may not recover whatever amount he had paid
by virtue of his liability to third persons from the person to whom he
had actually sold, assigned or conveyed the vehicle. Under the same
principle the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for
a public service, should primarily be responsible to the public or
to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle is
being driven on the highways or streets. The members of the Court
are in agreement that the defendant-appellant should be held
liable to plaintiff-appellee for the injuries occasioned to the latter
because of the negligence of the driver, even if the defendant-
appellant was no longer the owner of the vehicle at the time of the
damage because he had previously sold it to another.
There is presumption that the owner of the guilty vehicle is the
defendant-appellee as he is the registered owner in the Motor Vehicles
Office. The Revised Motor Vehicle Law provides that no vehicle may
be used or operated upon any public highway unless the same is
properly registered. It has been stated that the system of licensing and
the requirement that each machine must carry a registration number,
conspicuously displayed, is one of the precautions taken to reduce the
danger of injury to pedestrians and other travelers form the
carelessness management of automobiles. And to furnish a means of
ascertaining the identity of persons violating the laws and ordinances,
regulating the speed and operation of machines on the highway. Not
only are vehicles to be registered and that no motor vehicles are to be
used or operated without being properly registered for the current year,
but that dealers in motor vehicle shall furnish the Motor Vehicles
Office, a report showing the name and address of each purchaser of
motor vehicle during the previous month and the manufacturer’s serial
number and motor.
WON Petitioner can be liable even if the driver was not authorized - YES
1. Petitioner insists that he is not liable for damages since the driver of the vehicle
at the time of the accident was not an authorized driver of the new vehicle, citing
First Malayan Leasing and Finance v. CA which implies that to hold the
registered owner liable for damages, the driver of the vehicle must have been
authorized, allowed and permitted by its actual owner to operate and drive it.
Thus, if the vehicle is driven without the knowledge and consent of the actual
owner, then the registered owner cannot be held liable for damages. This was the
theory used in Duavit v. CA in the Court’s decision to absolve the registered
owner from liability after finding that the vehicle was virtually stolen from the
owner’s garage by a person who was neither authorized nor employed by the
owner.
2. Court held that this argument lacks merit. WON the driver is authorized or not
by the actual owner is irrelevant to determining the liability of the registered
owner who the law holds primarily and directly responsible for any accident,
injury or death caused by the operation of the vehicle in the streets and highways.
To require the driver of the vehicle to be authorized by the actual owner before
the registered owner can be held accountable is to defeat the very purpose why
motor vehicle legislations are enacted in the first place.
3. First Malayan is applicable to him since the case involves the same set of facts –
registered owner had previously sold the vehicle to someone else and was being
driven by an employee of the new owner. Duavit is inapplicable since the vehicle
the vehicle was not transferred to another.
4. There is no unauthorized use because he petitioner voluntarily delivered his car
to Jaucian as part of the downpayment for a vehicle he purchased from Jaucian.
Thus, he could not claim that the vehicle was stolen from him since he voluntarily
ceded possession thereof to Jaucian. It was the latter, as the new owner, who
could have raised the defense of theft to prove that he was not liable for the acts
of his employee Ocfemia.
5. The main purpose of vehicle registration is the easy identification of the
owner who can be held responsible for any accident, damage or injury
caused by the vehicle. Easy identification prevents inconvenience and
prejudice to third party injured by one who is unknown or unidentified. To
allow a registered owner to escape liability by claiming that the driver was
not authorized by the new owner results in the public detriment the law
seeks to avoid.
6. The issue of WON the vehicle during the accident was authorized is not at
all relevant to determining the liability of the registered owner. This must
be so if we are to comply with the rationale and principle behind the
registration requirement under the motor vehicle law.
 LACSONAY v. BEROG
Specified Cases of Quasi-Delicts | December 3, 2014 |
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Lacsonay visited the Mary Help of Christians chapel to check the
status of its construction. He had earlier promised the engineer that he will bring
the harabas, a vehicle registered under the name of Felisa, on April, 22 1994, to
be used to help clean the area. On said date, Prudencio needed to go out of town
and assigned Severo Ontuca (Ontuca) to drive the harabas in his stead, to which
Ontuca agreed.
2. Upon arrival in the chapel to clean the area, an enraged Daniel Bautista (Bautista)
allegedly threatened Ontuca with a bolo and demanded the ignition key of the
harabas. Ontuca handed the key. Bautista took the harabas, while Ontuca tried to
chase and ride the Harabas
3. The Harabas hit a Toyota corolla which resulted to injuring Fidel Berog (Fidel),
11yrs old, who was sandwiched between 2 toyota corollas while he was fixing
his bike.
4. After the initial collision, Bautista ran away, Ontuca then held the steering wheel,
but in the process had ran over the leg of Fidel. Fidel was brought to the hospital
where his leg got amputated as it was crushed from the incident
5. The parents of Fidel filed a complaint for damages against the Prudencio, Ontuca,
Felisa and Bautista. Prudencio and Ontuca filed and answer, while Felisa and
Bautista were in default.
6. Laconsay and Ontuca denied liability and averred:
a. Prudencio authorized Ontuca to drive the car
b. Felisa is the registered owner of the car and that she is already living
abroad;
c. Prudencio was out of town when the accident happened;
d. Bautista forcibly gained possession of the Harabas while armed with a
15-inch bolo;
e. that Bautista has never been the driver or employee of Prudencio;
f. That only Bautista should be held liable for damages;
7. RTC ruled in favor of the parents of Fidel and held that Ontuca was the driver
when the car ran over Fidel’s leg. CA affirmed the decision and found Ontuca
took over the steering wheel during the second impact which caused the injury
to the leg
ISSUE
WON Prudencio is liable for the damages caused by the event – YES
1. 2184 in relation to Art. 2180, the obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is demandable
only for one’s own acts or omissions but also for the persons for whom one is
responsible.
2. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though
the former are not engaged in any trade or business.
3. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage.
4. The obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible
5. Art 2180 and 2194 provides for the solidary liability of two or more persons who
are liable for Quasi delict
6. Under 2180 an employer may be held solidarily liable for the negligent act of his
employee. A presumption arises that the employer failed to exercise the due
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection or supervision of its
employees whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to
another. To avoid liability, the employer must present proof that he exercised
care and diligence in the selection and supervision of his employee
7. In the case at bar, The Court agrees with the CA's pronouncement that Lacsonay
cannot deny being Ontuca's employer on April 22, 1994. Ontuca was authorized
by Lacsonay to drive the Harabas because he could trust him which Ontuca
confirmed.
8. Lacsonay cannot avoid liability on the basis of the registration of Felisa's
ownership over the Harabas as it was shown he had been entrusted with it when
she left for abroad. Lacsonay’s written complaint in the barangay also contained
his signature as Felisa's "authorized representative." He also has control of its
use.
9. The operator of record continues to be the operator of the vehicle in
contemplation of law, as regards the public and third Person, and is responsible
for the consequences incident to the vehicles operation, and who should be held
out as the employer of the driver.
10. To give effect to this policy, the actual operator and employer shall be considered
as the agent of the operator of record.
11. Felisa and Prudencio, as employers, share a vicarious liability for the negligent
use of the Harabas for failing to establish their having exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of employees. Felisa,
as registered owner, and Prudencio, who, without being the registered owner, but
who had control of the use the car are both liable to Fidel
 SERRA v. MUMAR
Specified Cases of Quasi-Delicts | Mar 14, 2012| Carpio
FACTS:
1. This case is about a vehicular accident which happened along the National Highway
in Brgy. Apopong, General Santos City.
2. Amando Tenerife was driving his Toyota Corolla sedan on the National Highway
heading in the direction of Polomolok, South Cotabato.
3. He noticed that the van owned by petitioner Paulita "Edith" Serra (petitioner) coming
from the opposite direction, trying to overtake a passenger jeep, in the process
encroached on his lane.
4. The left side of the sedan was hit so Amando had to swerve to the left and ended on
the other side of the road.
5. The van on the other hand, collided with a motorcycle which was just 12 meters
behind the sedan.
6. The rider of the motorcycle, Mumar, sustained injuries which led to his death.
7. Petitioner denied that she was overtaking.
a. She alleged that the sedan sideswiped her because its left tire burst.
b. Consequently, the left front tire of the van also burst and the van's driver,
Marciano de Castro (de Castro), lost control of the vehicle.
c. The van swerved to the left towards Mumar's motorcycle. The impact
resulted in the death of Mumar.
8. Respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner for damages by reason of Reckless
Imprudence resulting to Homicide and Attachment. RTC found Serra liable. CA
affirmed.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
WON Editha Serra was negligent and therefore liable for damages. – Yes, petitioner is
negligent.
1. There is an application of Article 2184, the owner was in the vehicle.
2. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are liable for the damages caused
by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks.
3. Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there
instantly arises a presumption that the employer failed to exercise the due diligence
of a good father of the family in the selection or supervision of its employees. The
liability of the employer is direct or immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior
recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such
employee.
4. Moreover, under Article 2184 of the Civil Code, if the causative factor was the
driver’s negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable
if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence.
5. Petitioner failed to show that she exercised the level of diligence required in
supervising her driver in order to prevent the accident.
a. de Castro had only been her driver for one year and she had no knowledge
of his driving experience or record of previous accidents.
b. de Castro was the one who maintained the vehicle and would even remind
her "to pay the installment of the car.”
c. At the time of the accident, Serra did not know what was happening and
only knew they bumped into another vehicle when the driver shouted.
d. Serra left the scene to ask help from her brother, leaving the other
passengers to come to the aid of her injured driver.
On Damages awarded
1. The court said that Damages for loss of earning capacity is in the nature of an actual
damage and therefore, must be proven by documentary evidence.
2. However, the following are the exceptions. That is, documentary evidence not
necessary for the award of such damages
a. the deceased is self-employed earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the
deceased’s line of work no documentary evidence is available
b. the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws
3. SC held that CA erroneously awarded the damages for loss of earning capacity when
it relied solely on Nelfa’s testimony. Amando’s salary is more than minimum wage
therefore does not fall under the exceptions.
RULING: WHEREFORE, we GRANT IN PART the petition. We AFFIRM WITH
MODIFICATION the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 July 2009 and Resolution
dated 27 July 2010 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00023-MIN. We ORDER petitioner to pay
respondent the following:
1. Civil indemnity of ₱50,000.00;
2. Temperate damages of ₱25,000.00, in lieu of the award for burial expenses;
3. Moral damages of ₱50,000.00; and
4. Interest on the total monetary award at the rate of 12% per annum from the finality of
this decision until the award is fully satisfied.
Notes:
FACTS 3. In any case, article 2189 states that it is not necessary for the liability therein
1. Respondent Teotico was at the corner of Old Luneta and Burgos avenue, within a established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or
“loading and unloading” zone, waiting for a jeepney. He was about to board the municipality. It only requires that the local government has either control or
jeepney when he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted manhole along Burgos supervision over the street road. Hence, even if national highway, the circumstance
Avenue. would not necessarily detract from its control or supervision by the City under RA
2. Because of the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole, breaking his eyeglasses and 409. In fact, Section 18 of RA 409 states that the maintenance of the streets is within
causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid, impairing his vision. Several the power of the Municipal Board and this section has not been repealed by any other
persons helped bring him to the PGH where he was treated. Aside from the laceration law up to date.
in his eyelid, he also suffered contusions in his extremities.
3. As a consequence, respondent Teotico filed with the CFI a complaint for damages
against the City of Manila and its officers.
4. City of Manila: they have exercised diligence by constantly covering the manhole
whenever the City receives a report despite the fact that the iron cover being used to
cover were constantly stolen due to the lucrative scrap iron business prevailing.
5. CFI ruled in favor of City of Manila. CA affirmed except as to liability of City of
Manila. Hence the case.

ISSUE
Which between RA 409 and Article 2189 should apply – Article 2189
1. City of Manila: RA 409 which states that city shall not be liable or held for damages
or injuries to persons or property arising from failure of the mayor, Board of any other
officer to enforce the provisions of the chapter or any law or ordinance, should apply
since it is a special law as opposed to Art. 2189 of the Civil Code.
2. CA correctly applied the Civil Code. It is true that insofar as its territorial application
is concerned, RA 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation, but as
regards the subject-matter of the provisions, Section 4 of RA 409 establishes a general
rule regulating the liability of City of Manila for damages or injury arising from
failure of city officers to enforce provisions of the RA or other law or ordinance or
form negligence. On the other hand, Article 2189 constituted a particular prescription
making “provinces, cities and municipalities liable for damages for the death of or
injury suffered due to the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings and other public works under their control of supervisions.
3. Section 4 of RA 409 refers to liability arising from negligence in general, regardless
of object. Whereas, Article 2189 governs liability due to “defective streets” in
particular. Hence, Article 2189 is decisive.
WON City of Manila can be liable given the fact that it does not own the national
highway - YES
1. It is based upon an allegation of fact not made in the answer of the City. The City in
his answer to the complaint of Respondent said that the streets were and have been
constantly kept in good condition and regularly inspected and the storm drains and
manholes thereof covered by the City and officers who have been ever vigilant in the
performance of their respective functions. Hence, City had in effect admitted that the
street was under its control and supervision.
2. The allegation that the street is a national highway was made for the first time in its
MR to the decision of CA. Question of fact not raised in trial court.
 TAMARGO, TAMARGO, TAMARGO, v. CA, RTC, BUNDOC and BUNDOC
Vicarious Liability | June 3, 1992| Feliciano, J.
FACTS:
1. SPs. Rapisura had earlier filed a petition to adopt 10 year old Adelberto Bundoc
through a special proceeding before the CFI.
2. After the filing of the petition, and before it was granted, Adelberto Bundoc shot
Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle which resulted to her death.
3. A civil complaint for damages was filed with the RTC by petitioners who are the
adoptive, and natural parents of Jennifer Tamargo, against respondent spouses Victor
and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto’s natural parents with whom he was living at the time
of the accident.
4. A criminal information for homicide through reckless imprudence was also filed
against Adelberto Bundoc but he was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability
on the ground that he had acted without discernment.
5. The petition for adoption was granted after the incident. Hence, in the answer of
spouses Bundoc, they claimed that they are not the indispensable parties to the action
since parental authority had shifted to Sps. Rapisura from the moment the successful
petition for adoption was filed.
6. The Tamargos contended that since Adelberto was actually living with the spouses
Bundoc, parental had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting
of a petition for adoption.
7. RTC dismissed complaint, ruling that respondent spouses Bundoc were not
indispensable parties to the action. MR denied. Motion to appeal dismissed for going
beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
8. Petitioner went to CA on a petition for certiorari but this was dismissed by the
appellant court saying that petitioners have lost right to appeal.
ISSUES:
WON the effects of adoption insofar as parental authority is concerned, may be given
retroactive effect as to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a
damage case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter when
actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents – NO
1. It is not disputed that Adelberto’s voluntary act of shooting Tamargo with an air rifle
gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him by virtue of Article 2176.
2. The law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads: “the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible. The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company. The responsibility shall cease when the person prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
3. The principle of parental liability is a species of what is designated as vicarious
liability, or the doctrine of “imputed negligence” under Anglo-American tort law,
where a person is not liable only for torts committed by himself, but also for those
committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is
responsible.
4. Thus, parental lability is made a natural and logical consequence of the duties and
responsibilities of parents – their parental authority – which includes the instruction,
controlling and disciplining of the child.
5. Basis is Cangco v. Manila Raildroad Co: with respect to extra-contractual obligation
arising from negligence, whether of act or omission, it is competent for the legislature
to elect – and our legislature has so elected – to limit such liability to cases in which
the person upon whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable or, on the
contrary, for reasons of public policy, to extend that liability without regard to the
lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility for the negligence of those
persons whose acts or omissions are imputable by a legal fiction, to others who are in
a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them.
6. Civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with
them, may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code.
Civil law assumes that wen an unemancipated child living with its parents commits a
tortious act, the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural
duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control.
7. Parental dereliction is only presumed and the presumption can be overturned
under Article 2180 by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a
good father of family to prevent damage.
8. In the instance case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto occurred when parental
authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents. It would
thus follow that the natural parents who had actual custody then of the minor are the
indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
9. SPS. BUNDOC: parental authority transferred upon filing of petition for adoption.
Hence, free of any responsibility. Art. 36 of Child and Youth Welfare Code states that
the decree of adoption shall be effective as of the date the original petition was filed
and Art. 39 states that the effect of adoption is the dissolution of authority by the
natural parents.
10. Court: basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the existing
relationship between the parents and the minor child living with them and over whom,
the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control.
11. Art 58: parents are responsible for damage caused by child under their parental
authority in accordance with Civil Code. Art. 221 of the family code states that
parents shall be liable for tortious acts committed by their children living in their
company.
12. We do not believe that personal authority is properly regarded having been
retroactively transferred to any vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses,
at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect
may be given to the decree of adoption as to impose a liability upon the adopting
parents accruing at the time when the adopting parents had no actual or physical
custody over the adopted child.
13. Retroactive effect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption
where such is essential to permit the accrual for some benefit or advantage in favor of
the adopted child.
14. In the instant case, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the
Rapisura spouses as to burden them with liability for. A tortious act that they could
not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented would be unfair and
unconscionable especially since during that thime they were in the United States and
had no physical custody over the child.
15. Such result would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying
the doctrine of vicarious liability. No presumption of parental dereliction on the part
of the adopting parents could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to
their control at the time the tort was committed.
16. Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides that parental authority shall
be vested during trial custody precisely because the adopting parents are given actual
custody of the child using the period. In the instant case, the shooting took place either
before or after the trial custody, at a time Adelberto was not in under the custody of
the Rapisura spouses.
17. Hence, Bundoc spouses are indispensable parties.
 METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION, MUSA, TOLENTINO,
CELEBRADO, and GSIS v. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. ROSALES
Vicarious Liability | November 16, 1998| Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
1. Liza Rosalie, a 3rd year high school student of UPIS and the daughter of private
respondents, was crossing Katipunan when she was hit by a bus operated by petitioner
MMTC and driven by petitioner Musa. She was brought to the hospital but later died.
2. Musa was found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and sentenced
to imprisonment by the RTC. The decision was based from RTC’s finding that Musa
drove the bus at a speed of 25 kph, too fast for a busy road like Katipunan, and failed
to even realize upon impact that he had already bumped the victim.
3. Respondent spouses Rosales filed an independent civil action for damages against
petitioners MMTC, Musa, General Manager Tolentino, dispatcher Celebrado, and the
GSIS as the insurer. RTC found MMTC and Musa guilty of negligence and ordered
them to pay for damages. Both parties appealed to the CA. CA affirmed RTC ruling.
ISSUE:
WON MMTC should not be held liable since it exercised due diligence of a good father
of family in the selection and supervision of Musa – NO.
1. Responsibility of employers for the negligence of their employees in the performance
of their duties is primary, that is, the injured party may recover from the employers
directly, regardless of the solvency of their employees.
2. Rationale for Vicarious Liability: The justification is a rule of policy, a deliberate
allocation of risk. The losses caused by the torts of employees, which are sure to occur
in the conduct of the employer’s business, are placed upon that business itself, as a
required cost of doing business. They are placed upon the employer because it is only
just that the employer who gains from the business connected in the accident, and
who can better able to absorb and distribute them through prices, rates or liability
insurance, should be the one to absorb the costs. Furthermore, an employer who is
held strictly liable is under the greatest incentive to be careful in the selection,
instruction and supervision of his servants, and to take every precaution to see that
the enterprise is conducted safely.
3. Campo v. Camarote: Presumption of negligence exists because it is difficult for any
injured person as a result of carelessness of a driver to prove the negligence or lack
of due diligence of the owner of the vehicle in the choice of the driver. If the driver is
negligent and causes damage, the law presumes that the owner was negligent and
imposes upon him the burden of proving the contrary.
4. Employers may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of their employees
only if they can show that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.
5. Employers have the burden of proving that they have exercised such diligence, both
(1) in the selection of the employee who committed the quasi-delict, and (2) in the
supervision of the performance of his duties.
6. In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as
to their qualifications, experience, and service records. With respect to the supervision
of employees, employees should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor
their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. To
establish these factors in a trial involving vicarious liability, employers must submit
concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
7. MMTC sought to prove that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
with respect to the selection of employees by presenting mainly testimonial evidence
on its hearing procedure. According to MMTC, applicants are required to submit
professional driving licenses, certifications of work experience, and clearances from
the NBI; to undergo tests of their driving skills, concentration, reflexes, and vision;
and to complete training programs on traffic rules, vehicle maintenance, and standard
operating procedure during emergency cases.
8. MMTC’s evidence consist entirely of testimonial evidence (1) that transport
supervisors are assigned to oversee field operations in designated areas; (2) that the
maintenance department daily inspects the engines of the vehicles; and (3) that for
infractions of company rules there are corresponding penalties. MMTC however
failed to present Musa’s record of interview, results of examinations, and of his
service.
9. MMTC submitted brochures and programs of seminars for prospective employees on
vehicle maintenance, traffic regulations and driving skills, and are given tests to
determine driving skills, concentration, reflexes and vision. However, there is no
record that Musa attended such training programs and passed the examinations before
he was employed.
10. Normally employers keep files concerning the qualifications, work experience,
training, evaluation and discipline of their employees. Fialure of MMTC to present
such proof puts in doubt the credibility of its witnesses.
11. As held in Central Taxicab Corporation v. Ex-Meralco Employees Tranpsortation
Corporation, failure of company to produce in court any record for other
documentary proof to establish that it had exercised all the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of its drivers and uses argues strongly
against its pretension.
12. Noteworthy that in another case involving MMTC, testimonial evidence of identical
content, which MMTC showed to prove it exercised diligence of a good father of
family in selection and supervision fo employees, was held to be insufficient to
overcome presumption of negligence against it.
WON Tolentino and Celebrado can be held liable as managers – NO
1. Although fourth paragraph of Art. 2180 mentions “managers” among those made
responsible for the negligent acts of others, it is settled that this term is used in the
said provision in the sense of “employers.” Thus, Tolentino and Celebrado cannot be
held liable for the tort of Pedro Musa.
Court says basis of presumption sa previous case. Included ni sir.
This case emphasizes na iba ang selection (criteria, etc), and ang supervision. Di pala
ganon kadali???? Dapat alam ng employee yung rules!!
 FONTANILLA and FONATANILLA v. HON. MALIAMAN and NATIIONAL
IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION
Vicarious Liability | December 1, 1989| Paras, J.
FACTS:
1. A pickup owned and operated by respondent National Irrigation Administration,
driven by Hugo Garcia, an employee of NIA as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle
ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son of petitioners, and Restituto Deligo. As a result,
Fontanilla and Deligo were injured and brought to the hospital. Fontanilla later died.
2. Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent NIA who, at the time of the accident,
was a licensed professional driver and who qualified for employment as such regular
driver of respondent after having passed the written and oral examinations on traffic
rules and maintenance of vehicles given by NIA authorities.
3. Spouses Fontanilla against NIA before the CFI for damages in connection with the
death of their son resulting from the aforestated accident.
a. RTC ruled in favor of Sps. Fontanilla and ordered NIA to pay damages and
actual expenses to petitioners. MR denied.
4. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CFI with SC.
ISSUE:
WON the award of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fee is legally proper
in a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict which resulted in the death of petitioners’
son. - YES
HELD:
Petitioners: the award of moral damages is allowed under Article 2206 (3) which provides
that the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for mental anguish yb reason of the death of the deceased. Should
moral damages be granted, the award should be made to each of petitioners-spouses
individually and in varying amounts depending upon proof of mental and depth of
intensity of the same, which should not be less than P50,000 for each of them. Decision of
CFI made an impression that NIA acted with gross negligence because of the accident and
subsequent failure of the NIA personnel including the driver to stop in order to give
assistance to the victims. Thus, by reason of gross negligence, petitioners become entitled
to exemplary damages under Arts. 2231 and 2229.
1. The issue can be answered with the application of Arts. 2176 and 2180. Article 2176
states that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
2. Article 2180 states that “employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees” and that “the state is responsible in like manner when it acts through a
special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the
task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in 2176 shall apply:
3. Liability of state has two aspects: (1) its public or governmental aspects where it is
liable for the tortious acts of special agents only, and (2) its private or business aspects
(as when it engages in private enterprises) where it becomes liable as an ordinary
employer.
4. In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the damage caused by the
tortious acts or conduct of its special agent.
5. Under Art. 2180(6), the State has voluntarily assumed liability for acts done through
special agents. The State’s agent, if a public official, must not only be specially
commissioned to do a particular task but that such task must be foreign to said
official’s usual government functions. If the state’s agent is not a public official, and
is committed to perform non-governmental functions, then the state assumes the role
of an ordinary employer and will be held liable for its agent’s tort. Where the
government commissions a private individual for a special government task, it is
acting through a special agent within the meaning of the provisions.
6. Certain functions which can be performed only by the government are
“governmental” in character which makes the State immune from tort liability.
7. A service which might be provided a private corporation, particularly when it collects
revenues from it, is considered a “proprietary” one as to allow liability for the torts of
agents within the scope of their employment.
8. Respondent NIA is an agency exercising proprietary functions expressly provided in
Section 1 of RA 3601
a. A body corporate is hereby created which shall be known as NIA…”
b. The NIA shall have the following powers and objects… (c) to collect from
the users of each irrigation system constructed by it such fees as may be
necessary to finance the continuous operation... (d) to do all such other
things and to transact all such business as are directly or indirectly
necessary
9. NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality and not a mere agency of
the government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-governmental functions,
it now becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting from the
tortious acts of its driver-employee. NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary
employer and is liable for damages.
10. Assumption of liability is predicated upon existence of negligence on part of NIA.
Negligence of supervision.
11. It will be noted from the decision of the RTC that “as a result of the impact, Fontanilla
was thrown to a distance 50 meters away from the point of impact while Deligo was
thrown further away. The impact took place almost at the edge of the cemented
portion of the road. RTC also said that the impact was so strong as shown by the fact
that the vehicle suffered defects on the radiator guard, the hood, the fender and a crack
on the radiator.
12. The incident took place in Maharlika National Road, an urban area. Considering the
fact that victim was thrown 50 meters away is a strong indication that Garcia was
driving at a high speed. Confirmed by the fact that the pick-up suffered substantial
damage and the fact that NIA group was then “in a hurry to reach the campsite as
early as possible” as showed by their non-stopping to find out what they bumped.
13. There was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the reason that they were
travelling at a high speed within the city limits and yet the supervisor, Ely Salonga,
failed to caution and make the driver observe the proper and allowed speed within the
 city. Such negligence is aggravated by desire to reach their destination without even
checking whether or not the vehicle suffered damage from the object it bumped, thus
showing imprudence and recklessness on the part of both the driver and supervisor in
the group.
14. This Court has ruled that even if employer can prove the diligence in the selection
and supervision, still if he ratifies the wrongful acts, or take no step to avert further
damage, employer still liable.
15. Vda de Bonficacio v. BLT Bus Co: a driver should be especially watchful in
anticipation of other who may be using the highway and his failure to keep a proper
look out for reasons and object sin the line to be traversed constitute as negligence.
 SPS. PALISOC v. BRILLANTES, VALENTON, DAFFON and QUIBULUE
Vicarious Liability | October 4, 1971 | Teehankee J.
FACTS:
1. Plaintiffs Sps. Palisoc are parents of 16-year old Dominador Palisoc, a student in
automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute. Defendant Brillantes was a
member of the Board of Directors of the Institute, Valenton, the president thereof, and
Quibulue he instructor of the class to which the deceased belonged. Defendant Daffon
is the classmate. The institute was initially a single proprietorship but lately became
incorporated.
2. Dominador Palisoc and Daffon were classmates. They were together in the laboratory
room with another classmate, Desiderio Cruz, working with a machine during recess
when Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman.
Because of this remark, Palisoc slapped lightly Daffon on the face. Daffon, in
retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face which was followed by other
fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc treated but was followed by Daffon until Palisoc
stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face-first. First aid was
administered to him but he was not revived and never regained consciousness until
he died.
3. The plaintiffs filed the action for damages arising from the death of their son at the
hands of a fellow student defendant Daffon, at the laboratory room of the said
institute. RTC found Daffon liable but absolved from liability the other defendant-
officials of Manila Technical Institute. The RTC justified this by saying that Art. 2180
is not applicable since this contemplates the situation where the control or influence
of the teachers and heads of schools over the conduct and actions by the pupil
superseded those of parents and that there was no evidence that the accused Daffon
lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendant officials of the schools.
Hence, they cannot be held liable.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred in absolving the defendant school officials instead of holding
them jointly liable as tortfeasors with Daffon – YES
1. Lower court absolves defendant-school officials on the ground that the provisions of
Art. 2180 hold that “teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades… liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students and apprentices, so long as they remain
in their custody” are not applicable to the case at bar since “there is no evidence that
the accused Dafon lived and boarded with the officials of the school.” This was based
on the Court’s dictum in Mercado v. CA that “it would seem that the clause ‘so long
as they remain in their custody contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and
boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil
superseded those of the parents. This dictum had been made in rejecting the
contention that the school of the son of petitioner should be held more responsible
than him as father for acts done by his son on a classmate.
2. The Mercado dictum was based on another dictum in the case of Exconde v. Capuno
where the only issue involved was WON the defendant-father could be held civilly
liable for damages resulting from a death caused in a motor vehicle accident driven
unauthorized and negligently by his minor son. Nevertheless, the dictum in such
earlier case that “it is true that under the law above-quoted, teachers or directors of
arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while
they are under their custody, but this provision only applies to an institution of arts
and trades and not to any academic education institution” was expressly cited and
quoted in Mercado.
3. The case at bar was instituted directly against the school officials and squarely raises
the issue of liability of teachers and heads of schools under Art. 2180 for damages
caused by their pupils and students against fellow students on the school premises.
Here, the parents of the student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved since
Daffon was already of age at the time of the incident. There is no question that the
school is a non-academic school as Manila Technical Institute is a technical
vocational and industrial school.
4. Court holds that under the code, defendants head and teacher of the Manila Technical
Institute are liable jointly for damages to plaintiff-parents for. The death of the latter’s
minor son at the hands of Daffon at the school’s laboratory room.
5. No liability attaches to Brillantes as a mere member of the school’s board of directors.
School itself cannot be held liable since it has not been properly impleaded. Since the
school was incorporated, it should have been brought as party-defendant.
6. The rationale behind liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their
pupils and students, so long as they remain their custody, is that they stand to a certain
extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentsis and are called upon to
“exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child.” This is expressly
provided for in Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code.
7. In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school
heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it
becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper
supervision of the student’s activities during the whole time that they are at attendance
in the school, including recess time, as well as to take necessary precautions to protect
the students in their custody form dangers and hazards that would reasonable be
anticipated, including injuries that some students themselves may inflict willfully or
through negligence on their fellow students.
8. As summarized by JBL Reyes in his dissenting opinion in Exconde, the basis of
presumption of negligence under the now 2180 is some culpa in vigilando that the
parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority
and where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the
latter, and not the parent, should be the one answerable for the torts committed while
under his custody for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with
the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while
the child is under the instruction.
9. RTC erred in absolve defendants-school officials on the ground that they cannot be
held liable under Art. 2180. The Phrase “so long as the students remain in their
custody” means the protective and supervisory custody of that the school and its
heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are
at attendance in the school, including recess time. Nothing in the law requires that
 for such liability to attach, pupil who commits the tortious acts must live and board in
the school.
10. Valenton and Quibule must be held jointly and severally liable for the quasi-delict of
Daffon. The unfortunate death resulting from the fight could have been avoided, had
said defendants complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over the
activities of the students in the school premises to protect their students from hard. In
any case, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability by
proving that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage.

AMADORA v. CA, COLLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS, LLUCH,
DAMASO, DICO, ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFON and VALENCIA
Vicarious Liability | April 15, 1988 | Cruz, J.
FACTS:
1. Alfredo Amador, 17 years old, was in the auditorium of Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos when Daffon fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, killing him.
2. Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence.
3. Petitioners, victim’s parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180
against Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector, the HS principal, the dean of boys,
the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students. CFI held the
defendants, except the other students, were liable to the plaintiffs for damages.
4. CA reversed and absolved everyone. It ruled that Art. 2180 was not applicable as the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an academic
institution of learning. It also held that the students were not in the custody of the
school at the time of the incident as the semester had already ended, that there were
no clear identification of the fatal gun, and that in an event, the defendants had
exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the injury.
5. Petitioners: their son was in the school to finish his physics experiment as a
prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then under the custody of the private
respondents. The petitioners also said that the negligence of the school is shown by
the presence of the gun which was earlier confiscated from Gumban, a companion of
Daffon when the latter fired the gun, by Damaso but later returned to him without
making a report to the principal or taking any further action.
6. Private Respondents: Alfredo Amador had gone to the school only for the purpose
of submitting his physics report and that he was no longer in their custody because
the semester had already ended. No proof that the gun was the same.
ISSUE:
HELD:
1. Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the interpretation of Article
2180 invoked by both parties. Three cases have so far been decided in connection
with the provisions:
a. Exconde v. Capuno- a student of an elementary school attended the
Rizal day parade on instructions of the city school supervisor and
boarded a jeep after the parade and too over its wheel and drove it so
reckless that it turned turtle resulting in the death of two of its
passengers. The student was found guilty and his founder was held
solidarily liable with him in damages under Article 1903 (Now 2180)
for the tort committed by the 15 year old boy. The obiter dictum of
Justice Angelo exculpated the school on the ground that it was not a
school of arts and trades. JBL Reyes, dissented and argued that it was
the school authorities who should be held liable since the rule imposed
on (1) teachers in general, and (2) heads of school of arts and trades in
particular. Modifying clause “of establishments of arts and trades”
should apply only to “heads” and not “teachers”.
b. Mercado v. CA – A student cut a classmate with a razor blade during
recess time at the Lourdes Catholic School and the parents of the victim
sued the culprit’s parents for damages. Justice Labrador declared in
obiter that the school was not liable because it was not an establishment
of arts and trades. Furthermore, the custody requirement had not been
proved as this contemplates a situation where the student lives and
boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influences
on the pupil supersede those of the parents.
c. Palisoc v. Briallantes – 16 year old killed by a classmate with fist
blows in the lab of Manila Technical Institute. Although the wrongdoer
was not boarding in the school, the head and the teacher in charge were
held solidarily liable. Justice Teehankee said in the footnote that he
agreed with Justice JBL Reyes’ dissent in Exconde case that even
students already of age are covered by the provision since they were
equally in the custody of the school but added that since the school
involved at bar is a non-academic school, the question as to the
applicability of the cited codal provision to academic institutions will
have to wait another case wherein it may probably be raised. This is
the case.
2. Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San Jose Recoleto has been
directly impleaded and is sought to be held liable under Art. 2180. Unlike in
Palisoc, it is not a school of arts and trades bu tan academic institution of learning.
Parties have already directly raised the question of WON Article 2180 covers
even establishments which are technically not schools of arts and trade, and, if
so, when the offending student is supposed to be “in its custody.”
3. The provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-
academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in
nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the
teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This
is the general rule.
4. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only
he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule.
5. Following the canon of reddendo singular singulis, “teachers” should apply to
the words “pupils and students” and “heads of establishments of arts and trades”
to the word “apprentices.” Court conforms to the dissenting opinion of JBL
Reyes in Exconde
6. There really is no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-
academic schools insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned.
Same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under his control
and supervision, whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching. Court
cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should be exercised by the school
authorities on the basis only of the nature of their respective schools.
7. If the teacher of the academic school is to be held answerable for the torts without taking disciplinary actions. Colelgio de San Jose Recoletos cannot be
committed by his students, why is it the head of the school only who is held liable held directly liable since only the teachers or the head of the school of arts and
where the injury is caused in a school of arts and trades? trades may be held responsible.
a. The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically
the head of the school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over
his pupils than the head of the academic school. The old school of arts
and trades were engaged in the training of artistans apprenticed to their
master who personally and directly instructed them on the technique
and secrets of their craft. The head of the school of arts and trades was
such a master and so was personally involved in the task of teaching
his students, who usually even boarded with him and so came under
his constant control, supervision and influence.
b. On the other hand, the head of the academic school was not as involved
with his students and exercised only administrative duties over the
teachers who were the persons directly involved with his students and
exercised only administrative duties over the teachers who were the
persons dealing directly with the students. Head of academic school
had then only a vicarious relationship with the student. While he could
not be directly faulted for the acts of the student, the head of the school
of arts and trades because of his closer ties with him, could be so
blamed.
8. It is concerned that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view of the
expansion of the schools of arts and trades, the consequent increase in their
enrollment, and the corresponding diminution of the direct and personal contract
of their heads with the students. Students. Art. 2180 however remains unchanged.
In its present state, the provisions must be interpreted by the Court according to
its clear and original mandate until the legislature sees fit to enact necessary
amendment.
9. In view of the court, the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long
as the is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises,
whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended. Too tenuous to
argue that the student comes under the discipline only upon the start of class
notwithstanding that before that day he has already registered and thus placed
himself under its rule. Neither should such discipline be deemed needed upon the
last day notwithstanding that there may still be certain requisites to be satisfied
for completion of the course. As long as it can be shown that the student is in the
school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, the exercise of
legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student
privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues.
Even if the student is just relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates
and friends.
10. Dicon not negligence because his absence cannot be taken against him since he
was not required to report to school. It is the dean of the boys who should be
liable because of the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier confiscated an
unlicensed gun from one of the students and returned the same later to him
 MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP. and HENDRY v. CA and
TOIAS
FACTS:
1. Respondent Tobias was employed by Petitioner Globe Mackay in a dual capacity
as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations
manager. One day, petitioner Globe Mackay discovered fictitious purchases and
other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos.
2. Tobias claims that it was he who discovered and reported the anomalies to his
superior Eduardo Ferraren and to the Executive Vice President and Generael
Manager of Globe Mackay petitioner Herbert Hendry. However, he later became
the suspect of Tobias and he was forced to take a one-week leave.
3. When Tobias returned to work, petitioner Hendry called him a “crook” and a
“swindler” and was ordered to take a lie-detector test and submit a specimen of
his handwriting, signature, and initials for examination by the police
investigators.
4. The Police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report which cleared
respondent Tobias of participation. Petitioner Hendry was not satisfied and hired
a private investigator who found respondent Tobias guilty. Petitioner Hendry
then suspended respondent Tobias and prepared to file criminal charges against
him.
5. The Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner submitted a second
laboratory crime report reiterating the previous findings that the handwritings,
signatures, and initials appearing in the documents involved in the fraudulent
transaction were not those of respondent Tobias. The lie detector tests also
yielded negative results.
6. Notwithstanding this two reports, petitioners filed with fiscal of Manila a
complaint for multiple accounts of estafa against respondent Tobias. All were
dismissed by the fiscal and by the Secretary of Justice.
7. In the meantime, respondent was terminated from his employment. He filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal but the same was dismissed by the labor arbiter
but granted by the NLRC. During the pendency of the appeal with the Office of
the President, both parties agreed on a compromise agreement.
8. Respondent Tobias sought employment with another Telecommunications
Company. But petitioner Hendry wrote a letter stating that Tobias was dismissed
by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty.
9. Hence, respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged
unlawful, malicious, oppressive and abusive acts of petitioner. RTC rendered
judgment in favor of respondent and ordered petitioner to pay him actual
damages, moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fee amounting to
P330,000. CA affirmed in toto.
ISSUE: WON petitioners are liable for damage to private respondent
HELD:
1. Petitioners: They could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise of
their right to dismiss private respondent
2. Tobias: Because of petitioners’ abusive manner in dismissing him as well as for
the inhuman treatment he got from them, petitioners must indemnify him from
damages he suffered.
3. One of the innovations of the NCC is the codification of “some basic principles
that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and
for the stability of the social order.” This sought to remedy the defect of the old
Code.
4. Article 19 provides: “every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act within justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith.
5. This article is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, and sets
certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s
rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. The law therefore
recognizes that though a right may be legal and granted by law, it may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality as when such right is exercised
in a manner which does not confirm with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
results in damage to another.
6. The Court then said that while Article 19 sets out the rule, the action for damages
can be found in either in Article 20 or 21. Article 20 applies when there is a
violation of a law while Article 21 serves as a catch all provision.
7. The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights or Article 19 has
been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or 21, or other provision of
law, depends on the circumstances of each case.
8. In the instant case, the Court found that petitioners have indeed abused the right
that they invoke, causing damage to respondent Tobias and for which the latter
must now be indemnified.
9. Petitioner Hendry’s reaction towards respondent Tobias upon uncovering the
anomalies was less than civil. An employer who harbors suspicions that an
employee has committed dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate
action such as ordering an investigation and directing the employee to go on a
leave, but the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was
certainly uncalled for.
10. The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee
should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the
effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusive, then the employer is
liable for damages to the employee.
11. Under the circumstances of the instant case, petitioners clearly failed to exercise
in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to
recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21.
12. But since there were succeeding tortious acts such as the threats to file countless
of suits if Tobias did not confess, and the writing of a letter to RETELCO stating
that Tobias was dismissed due to dishonesty, petitioners are liable for damages
consistent with Art. 2176 of the Civil Code.
13. The Court also held that the right to institute criminal prosecutions cannot be
exercised maliciously and in bad faith. To do so would be a clear perversion of
the function of the criminal processes and of the courts of justice. To constitute
malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by
a design to vex and humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately by
the defendant knowing that the chargers were false and groundless. In the instant
case, the trial court made a finding that petitioners acted in bad faith in filing the
criminal complaint. In addition, the Court finds it significant that the criminal
complaints were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case filed by
Tobias against petitioners. This explains the haste in which the complaints were
field, which the trial court earlier noted.
14. Petitioners, to prove their good faith, point to the fact that only six complaints
were filed against Tobias when they could have filed one hundred cases.
However, petitioners’ good faith is believed by the threat made by Hendry after
the filing of the first complaint that one hundred more cases would be filed
against Tobias. In effect, the possible filing of one hundred more cases was made
to hang like the sword of Damocles over the head of Tobias.
15. In conclusion, considering the haste in which the criminal complaints were
filed, the fact that they were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal
case against petitioners, the threat made by Hendry, the fact that the cases
were filed notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias,
coupled by the eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is led into no
other conclusion that petitioners were motivated by malicious intent in filing
the 6 complaints against Tobias.
RELLOSA and ORTEGA v. PELLOSIS, MOSTE, and RADAM
FACTS:
1. Respondents were lessees of a parcel of land, owned by one Marta Reyes, located
in Malate, Manila. Respondents had built their houses on the land which, over
the years, underwent continuous improvements.
2. After the demise of Marta, the land was inherited by Victor Reyes. Victor
informed respondents that, for being lessees of the land for more than 20 years,
they would have a right of first refusal to buy the land.
3. Sometime in the early part of 1989, without knowledge of respondents, the land
occupied by them was sold to petitioner Ortega who was able to ultimately secure
title to the property in her name.
4. Petitioner Otega filed a petitioner for condemnation of the structures on the land
with the Office of the Building Official of City of Manila
5. Respondents filed with the RTC a suit for the “Declaration of Nullity of the Sale”
made in favor of petitioner Ortega predicated upon their right of first refusal
which was claimed to have been impinged upon the sale of the land to petitioner
Ortega without their knowledge.
6. The Office of the Building Official issued a resolution ordering the demolition
of the houses of respondents. The following day, petitioner Ortega, together with
petitioner Rellosa, hired workers to commence the demolition of respondents’
houses. However, due to the timely intervention of the police, the intended
demolition did not take place following talks between petitioner Rellosa and
counsel who pleaded that the demolition be suspended since the order sought to
be implemented was not yet final and executory.
7. Respondents filed their appeal contesting the order of the Office of the Building
Official. Petitioners then once against hired workers and proceeded with the
demolition of the houses.
8. Respondents field a civil case with the RTC of manila praying that petitioners be
ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages for the untimely demolition of the
houses. The RTC dismissed the complaint and instead, ordered them to pay
petitioners moral damages. CA reversed the decision saying that when the
buildings were demolished, respondents still had time to perfect an
administrative appeal since the period to do so has not yet lapsed and the order
itself has not become final and executory. Hence, petitioners appealed the order
of the CA.
ISSUE: WON petitioners are liable for damages - YES
HELD:
1. Petitioners: the order of the Office of the building Official was eventually
upheld on appeal by the DPWH in its decision. Furthermore, the structures
subject matter of the demolition order were declared to be dangerous structures
by the Office of the Building Official and, as such, could be abated to avoid
danger of the public.
2. A right is a power, privilege, or immunity granted under a constitution, statute or
decisional law, or recognized as a result of long usage, constitutive of a legally
enforceable claim of one person against another.
3. Petitioner while possessing the right to enjoy and to exclude any person from the
enjoyment and disposal of the land pursuant to her ownership, cannot exercise
these rights is without limitations.
4. The abuse of rights rule established in Article 19 of the Civil Code requires
every person to act with justice, to give everyone his due; and to observe
honesty and good faith. When a right is exercised in a manner which discards
these norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which
the actor can be held accountable.
5. In the instant case, at the time petitioners implemented the order of demolition,
barely five days after respondents received a copy thereof, the same was not yet
final and executory. The Law provided for a fifteen-day appeal period in favor
of party aggrieved by an adverse ruling of the Office of the Building Official but
by the precipitate action of petitioners in demolishing the house for respondents,
the latter were effectively deprived of this recourse.
6. The fact that the order was later affirmed was of no moment. The action of
petitioners up to the point where they were able to secure an order of demolition
was not condemnable but implementing the order unmindful of the right of
respondents to contest the ruling was a different matter and could only be held
indefensible.
 PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK v. GOMEZ
FACTS:
1. Respondent Gomez was a teller at the Domestic Airport Branch of petitioner
PCIB when a certain Colin Harrington opened a Savings Account with the
branch.
2. The following day, Harrington presented two genuine bank drafts issued by the
Bank of New Zealand. The first was in the sum of $724.57 payable to “C.R.
Harrington” while the second was in the sum of $2,004.76 payable to “Servants
C/C..R. Harrington”
3. PCIB, oh the other hand, alleged that it was a certain Sophia La’o, as a
representative of Harrington, who presented the bank drafts for deposit.
4. Upon receipt of the draft, Josephine asked her immediate supervisor, Eleanor
Flores, whether the drafts payable to “Servants C/C.R. Harrington” were
acceptable for deposit to the savings account of Harrington. Flores answered in
the affirmative, and after receiving from the bank’s foreign exchange supervision
a Philippine Currency conversion of the amounts in the drafts, Josephine received
the deposit slip and entered it into the account of Harrington.
5. On two separate dates, a certain individual representing himself as Harrington
withdrew the sums of P45,000 and P5,600. Bank then discovered that the person
who made the withdrawals was an imposter, and thus, owned Harrington P50,600
representing the amounts of the bank drafts in his name.
6. Petitioner PCIB issued a memo asking respondent Josephine to explain why no
disciplinary action should be taken against her for having accepted the bank
drafts for deposits. Josephin reasoned that being a new teller, she was not yet
fully oriented with the aspects of the job. She also asked the approval of her
immediate supervisor prior to receiving the deposits.
7. PCIB deducted the amount of P423.38 form Josephine’s salary. And after due
investigation, PCIB issued another memorandum finding Josephine grossly
negligent and liable for performing acts in violation of established operating
procedures. The memorandum required Josephine to pay the amount of P50,600
through deductions in her salary, allowance, bonuses and profit sharing until the
amont is paid.
8. Josephin wrote the PCIB to ask for the basis of its findings that she was grossly
negligent and liable. RTC found that PCIB did not even responded to the letter.
PCIB however, alleged that she was afforded due process and the deductions
initially made were merely a withholding pending the investigation.
9. PCIB also admitted that it had started to deduct the amount of P200 from
Josephine’s salary as well as 50% of her bonuses and profit sharing.
10. Josephine filed a complaint for damages with prayer for preliminary injunction
before the RTC of Makati, claiming that PCIB had abused its rights by gradually
deducting from her salary the amount the bank had to pay Harrington. RTC
rendered judgment in favor of Josephine and ordered PCIB to pay her actual
damage, moral damage, and attorney’s fees. RTC considered the manner of
deducting form the salary and allowance of Josephine as having been rendered
in bad faith and contrary to morals, good custom and public policy. This was due
to the fact that there was an already a deduction even before a memo was issued
finding her liable
11. On appeal, PCIB argued that RTC had no jurisdiction over the labor dispute. CA
affirmed RTC decision and held that PCIB estopped form questioning
jurisdiction when it filed an answer with counterclaim. CA also affirmed
findings.
ISSUE: WON CA erred in finding that petitioners are liable under Articles 19 and 21
of the Civil Code – NO
Held:
1. Josephine’s cause of action is based on a quasi-delict or tort under Article 19 in
relation to Article 21, hence, the civil courts have jurisdiction over the subject
matter. It ha snothing to do with the employer-employee relationship.
2. Court is not trier of facts especially when CA affirms RTC’s ruling. PCIB seeks
a relief form the Court on the issue of propriety of the award. Hence, petition
must fail as Rule 45 bars SC from considering factual issues.
3. The “abuse of right principle” found in Article 19 states that every person in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties must act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. The legal sanctions
for violations of this principle are found in Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.
4. While the PCI has a right to penalize employees for acts of negligence, the right
must not be exercised unjustly and illegally.
5. In the instant case, the PCIB made deductions on Josephine’s salary even if the
investigation was still pending. Belatedly, the PCIB issued a memo finding
Josephine grossly negligent and requiring her to pay the amount which the bank
erroneously paid to Harrington’s imposter. When Josephine asked for legal and
factual basis, PCIB refused to give any. Furthermore, PCIB continued to make
deductions on the salary, bonuses and allowance of respondent Josephine.
6. RTC and CA also noted that while Josephine was penalized, other employees of
the bank involved in the subject transactions were not. It was respondent
Josephine who was made solely responsible for the loss without giving any basis
therefor. It was emphasized that the subject deposit could not have been received
by the bank and entered in Harrington’s savings account without the participation
of the other bank employees. PCIB could have exercised prudence before taking
oppressive actions against Josephine.

TAN and LUZURGIAGA v. VALERIANO
FACTS:
1. On January 2001, the Holy Name Society held a multi-sectoral consultative
conference at the Bulan Parish Compound. Respondent Valeriano, the president
of the organization, delivered a welcome address during the conference which
lambasted certain official specifically petitioners who were councilors, Gilana
and Vice Mayor Gonzales.
2. Petitioners, together with Gilana and Gonzales, filed before the CSC an
administrative complaint against Valeriano who was an incumbent resident
auditor of the Commission on Audit. Believing that the real purpose of the
conference was to choose candidates who will be endorsed by the Holy Name
Society, petitioners, Gilana and Gonzales charged Valeriano with acts of
electioneering and engaging in partisan politics.
3. COA was furnished with a copy of administration complaint but did not take any
action in view of the pendency of the case before CSC. CSC dismissed the
complaint due to procedural defect of not having the complaint-affidavit filed
under oath without prejudice to re-filing.
4. Petitioners re-field a complaint-affidavit before CSC but later withdrew. In the
meantime, petitioners and Gilana filed another administrative complaint before
the Ombudsman for violation of RA 6713 in relation to Section 55 of the
Administrative Code. This was dismissed by the Ombudsman for lack of
evidence.
5. Aggrieved by the turn of events, Valeriano filed before RTC a complaint for
damages against petitioners. RTC ruled that the act of filing numerous cases
against Valeriano by petitioners was attended by malice, vindictiveness, and bad
faith.
6. RTC observed that Valeriano earned the ire of petitioners because he was the one
who organized and led the sponsorship of the Multi-sectoral Consultative
Conference which was attended by opposition leaders who were allowed to air
their views freely relative to the theme: “Facing Socio-Economic Challenges in
the 3rd Millennium, Its Alternative for Good Governance,” a theme which is
not totally apolitical considering that it pertains to alternative good governance.
RTC observed as well the fact that respondent Valeriano was singled out by
petitioners, Gilana, and Gonzales although his participation was only to deliver
the Welcome Address, is indicative of malice. Furthermore, the filing of
numerous cases before the CSC, COA and Ombudsman, eventually founded out
to be unsubstantiated, is reflect of ill will or desire for revenge.
7. CA reversed insofar as Gonzales and Gilana were concerned but affirmed as
against petitioners. It held that Gonzales and Gilana did not act with malice to
vex or humiliate Valeriano by the mere act of initiating an admin case against
him with the CSC and Ombudsman. On the other hand, the act of re-filing
their complaint with CSC, notwithstanding the pendency of admin case with
ombudsman, shows bad faith. Intent to prejudice was also shown when they
did not inform their lawyer of the pending case with the Ombudsman.
ISSUE: WON petitioners acted with malice or bad faith in filing the admin complaints
against Valeriano – NO
HELD:
1. As a general rule, SC is not a trier of facts. However, after reviewing the records
and the conclusions arrived at by the lower courts, we find that they had
misappreciated the factual circumstances in this case thereby qualifying an
exception to the rule.
2. Article 19 requires that everyone must act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith. The law recognizes a limitation on all rights;
that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct must be observed. A right,
thought by itself legal because it is recognized or granted by law, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19, and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed and wrongdoer must be
held responsible.
3. The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence of a legal
right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) with the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another.
4. The existence of malice is the fundamental element in the abuse of right. In an
action to recover damages based on malicious prosecution, it must be established
that the prosecution was impelled by legal malice. There is necessity of or poof
that the suit was patently malicious as to warrant the award of damages
under Articles 19 to 21 or that the suit was grounded on malice or bad faith.
5. There is malice when the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to
vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberated by the
defendant knowing that his chargers were false and groundless. The award
of damages arising from malicious prosecution is justified if any only if it is
proved that there was misuse or abuse of judicial processes. Concededly, the
mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make
one liable for malicious prosecution.
6. In this case, what prompted the petitioner to initiate the complaint was
Valeriano’s vital participation in the multi-sectoral conference that was held
wherein certain local officials were the subject of criticisms.
7. No less than the Constitution prohibits such officers and employees in the civil
service in engaging in partisan political activity. The same prohibition can be
found in the Administrative Code.
8. During the consultative conference held, speakers were allowed to criticize
certain incumbent local officials. The conference was held at a time so close to
the holding of the 2001 elections. Valeriano, an employee of the COA, was
incidentally, the president o fhte organization that organized the event. Given the
law’s prohibition on public officers and employees from engaging in certain
 forms of political activities, it could reasonably be said that those who had filed
the complaints against Valeriano before CSC and Ombudsman had done so as
they had reason to believe that Valeriano was violating the prhobition. It cannot
be said that the complaints were filed simply out of malice.
9. SC disagreed with CA that the mere re-filing of the complaint with CSC is reason
to hold petitioners liable especially since the dismissal was merely on ground of
technicality and that the CSC itself directed that the dismissal without prejudice.
It is a doctrine well-entrenched in jurisprudence that the mere act of submitting
a case to the authorities for prosecution, of and by itself, does not make one liable
for malicious prosecution, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty
on the right to litigate.
10. Valeriano failed to prove that the subject complaints against him were motivated
purely by a sinister design. Elementary rule that good faith is presumed and bad
faith must be proven by he who alleges the same. Petitioners cannot be held liable
for damages.
 PETROPHIL CORP. v. CA, DR. TERNIDA-CRUZ, VERA, MULIG,
CUENCA, and CUENCA
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Phil Corporation entered into contract with private respondent
Ternida-Cruz, allowing her to haul and transport any and all packages and/or
bulk products of Petrophil. The contract provided, among others, that Petrophil
could terminate the contract for breach, negligence, discourtesy, improper and/or
inadequate performance or abandonment.
2. Paragraph 11 also stipulated that the contract shall be for an indefinite period,
provided that Petrophil may terminate contract at any time with 30 days prior
notice.
3. In a letter, Petrophil, through its Operations Manager, advised Dr. Cruz that it
was terminating her contract pursuant to paragraph 11. Dr. Cruz filed with the
RTC a complaint against Petrophil seeking the nullity of the termination of
contract for being unjustified.
4. Private respondents, all truck drivers of Dr. Cruz, also filed for damages against
Petrophil Operations Manager Antonio Santos, and other officers of Petrophil.
5. Dr. Cruz testified during the hearing that the termination of her contract was a
retaliation against her for allegedly sympathizing with the then striking Petrophil
employees and for informing the PNOC president of anomalies perpetrated by
some of its officers and employees. Driver Jessie de Vera corroborated these
allegations and testified that before the termination of the contract, Petrophil
officials reduced their hauling trips to make life harder for the drivers so that they
would resign from the employ of Dr. Cruz.
6. Petitioner denied that Petrophil officials were out to starve Dr. Cruz’s driver for
their support of her. They professed that the hauling trips were reduce because
the company was assigning hauling trips on the basis of compartmentation and
not on a first-come first-serve. Witnesses for Petrophil testified that there was a
strike and Dr. Cruz and her husband were at the picket line, refusing to load
petroleum products, resulting in the disruption of delivery to service stations in
Metro manila and in the provinces, resulting to loss of sales and revenues.
7. RTC ruled in favor of Dra Cruz and held Petrophil liable for damage. Dr. Cruz
appealed for the inclusion of actual damages which was granted by the CA. Both
the RTC and CA found that the termination of the contract was “for cause” and
that the procedures set forth in petitioner’s policy guidelines should be followed.
ISSUE: WON the hauling contract needed interpretation
HELD:
1. Contract provided for two ways of terminating the contract, and, one mode does
not exclude the other. Although the contract provided for causes for termination,
it also stated in paragraph 11 that the contract was for an indefinite term subject
to the right of Petrophil ito terminate it any time after a written notice of 30 days.
2. When the language of the contract is clear, it requires no interpretation. Thus, the
finding that the termination of the contract was “for cause”, is immaterial. When
petitioner terminated the contract “without case”, it was required only to give Dr.
Cruz a 30-day prior written notice, which it did in this case.
ISSUE: WON petitioner was guilty of arbitrary termination of the contract which
would entitle Dr. Cruz to damages – YES
HELD:
1. Before Petrophil terminated the contract, there was a strike of its employees at
the Pandcan Terminal. Dr. Cruz and her husband were seen at the picket line and
were reported to have instructed their drivers not to load petroleum products. At
the resumption of the operation in Pandcan terminal, Dr. Cruz’s contract was
suspended for one week and eventually terminated.
2. Based on these circumstance, CA like the RTC concluded that Petrophil
terminated the contract because of Dr. Cruz’s refusal to load petroleum during
the strike. CA found that this to be a retaliation or punishment for her
sympathizing with the striking employees.
3. Nowhere in the record do we find that petitioner asked her to explain her actions,
Petrophil simply terminated her contract. These factual findings are binding and
conclusive on us, especially in the absence of any allegation that said findings
are unsupported by evidence, or that the appellate and trial courts
misapprehended the facts.
4. In terminating the hauling contract of Dr. Cruz without hearing her side on the
factual context above described, petitioner opened itself to charge of bad faith.
5. While Petrophil had the right to terminate the contract, petitioner could not act
purposely to injure private respondent.
6. In BPI Express Card Corp v. CA, we held that there is abuse of a right under
Article 19 if the following elements are present: (1) there is a legal right or duty,
(2) which is exercised in bad faith, and (3) for the sole purpose of prejudicing or
injuring another.
7. We find all these three elements present in the instant case. Hence, we are
convinced that the termination by petitioner of the contract with Dr. Cruz calls
for appropriate sanctions by way of damages.
8. Petitioner: NO other evidnece that the termination of the contract was done with
deliberate intent to harm or for the sole purpose of prejudicing the
respondent=drivers.
9. Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that every person who, contrary to law,
willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for
the damage done. Petitioner might not have deliberately intended to injure the
respondent-drivers but as a consequence e of its willful act directed against Dr.
Cruz, respondent-drivers lost their jobs and consequently, suffered loss of
income.
10. There is no requirement under Article 20 that the act must be directed at a specific
person, but it suffices that a person suffers damage as a consequence of a
wrongful act of another in order that indemnity could be demanded from the
wrongdoer. Hence, CA did not err in awarding damages to respondent drivers.
 SO PING BUN v. CA, TEKHUA ENTERPRISING CORP, and MANUEL
TIONG
FACTS:
1. Tek Hua Trading Co., through its managing partner, entered into 4 lease
agreements with lessor DCCSI for the use of premises located in Binondo, being
used to store its textiles. The contracts each had a one-year term but provided
that should the lessee continue to occupy the premise after the term, the lease
shall be on a month-to-month basis.
2. When the contracts expired, parties did not renew, but Tek Hua continued to
occupy the premises. Tek Hua Trading was dissolved and the original members
of the same, including Manuel Tiong, former respondent Tek Hua Enterprising
Corp.
3. The managing partner of the original Tek Hua trading died and his grandson,
petitioner So Ping Bun, occupied the warehouse for his own textile business –
Trensdetter Marketing.
4. Lessor DCCSI sent letters addressed to Tek Hua enterprises informing the latter
of the 25% increase in rent. This was reduced to 20% but then increased against
to 30%. DCCSI warned that failure of the lessee to accomplish the contracts shall
be deemed as lack of interest on the lessee’s part and agreement to the
termination of the lease. Private respondents did not answer the letters, but the
contracts were not rescinded.
5. Private respondent Tiong sent a letter to petitioner asking him to vacate the
property as he will be using the warehouse. Petitioner refused to vacate and
requested for a formal contract of lease with DCCSI in favor of his company,
Trendsetter Marketing. Petitioner claimed that after the death of his grandfather,
he had been occupying the premises for his textile business and religiously paid
rent. DCCSI acceded to the request and lease contracts were executed in favor of
Trendsetter.
6. Private respondents filed a suit for injunction for the nullification of the lease
contracts. RTC rendered the decision nullifying the lease contracts. MR denied.
CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON petitioner guilty of tortuous interference of contract
HELD:
1. Damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury, and damages are
the compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
2. One becomes liable in an action for damages for nontrespassory invasion of
another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if (a) the other has
property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered
with, (b) the invasion is substantial, (c) the defendant’s conduct is a legal cause
of the invasion, and (d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or
unintentional and actionable under general negligence rules.
3. One of the duty which the law of torts is concerned with is with respect for the
property of others, and a cause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an
unlawful interference by one person of the enjoyment by the other of his private
property. This may pertain to a situation where a third person induced a
party to renege on or violate his undertaking under a contract.
4. The elements of tort interferences are: (1) existence of a valid contract, (2)
knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of contract, and (3)
interference of the third person is without legal justification or excuse.
5. In the case before us, petitioner asked DCCSI to execute lease contract in his
favor, and as a result, petitioner deprived respondent corporation of the latter’s
property right. Clearly, the three elements of tort interference are present in the
case.
6. HOWEVER, interference with another’s business relations may be justified
where the actor’s motive is to benefit himself (such as furthering his own
financial or economic interest), and not to cause harm to the other. This is
enshrined in the case of Gilchrist v. Cuddy
7. In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner prevailed upon DCCSI to lease the
warehouse to his enterprise at the expense of respondent corporation. Though
petitioner took interest in the property of respondent corporation and
benefited from it, nothing on the record imputes deliberate wrongful
motives or malice on him.
8. Petitioner: argues that damage is an essential element of tort interference and
since RTC and CA ruled that private respondents were not entitled to damages,
it follows that he must be solved from liability. Section 1314 of the NCC
categorically provides that “any third person who induced another to violate
the contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party.”
9. While it is true that the lower courts did not award damages, this was only
because the extent of damages was not quantifiable. As held in Gilchrist, where
it was difficult to determine the extent of damage and there was nothing on record
to serve as basis thereof, the Court will refrain from awarding damages.
10. While the SC does not encourage tort interferes seeking their economic interest
to induce into existing contracts at the expense of other, we find that the conduct
herein complained of did not transcend the limits forbidding an obligatory for
damages in the absence of any malice. Business desire is there to make some
gain to the detriment of the contract parties.
11. Lack of malice, precludes damage. But it does not relieve petitioner of the legal
liability for interfering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones. The
respondent Court correctly confirmed the permanent injunction and
nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI and Trensdetter
Marketing, without awarding damages.
NUANCE: Iba yung relief na ginrant
 ALLAN C. GO, vs MORTIMER F. CORDERO
FACTS:
1. Mortimer F. Cordero, Vice-President of Pamana Marketing Corporation
(Pamana), ventured into the business of marketing inter-island passenger vessels.
2. After contacting various overseas fast ferry manufacturers from all over the
world, he came to meet Tony Robinson, an Australian national based in Brisbane,
Australia, who is the Managing Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia
(AFFA)
3. Robinson signed documents appointing Cordero as the exclusive distributor of
AFFA catamaran and other fast ferry vessels in the Philippines.
4. As such exclusive distributor, Cordero offered for sale to prospective buyers the
25-meter Aluminium Passenger catamaran known as the SEACAT 25.
5. After negotiations with Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson, lawyers of Allan
C. Go who is the owner/operator of ACG Express Liner of Cebu City, Cordero
was able to close a deal for the purchase of two (2) SEACAT 25
6. Accordingly, the parties executed Shipbuilding for one high-speed catamaran
(SEACAT 25) US$1,465,512.00. Per agreement between Robinson and
Cordero, the latter shall receive commissions totalling US$328,742.00, or
22.43% of the purchase price, from the sale of each vessel.
7. Cordero made two (2) trips to the AFFA Shipyard in Brisbane, Australia, and on
one (1) occasion even accompanied Go and his family and Landicho, to monitor
the progress of the building of the vessel.
8. He shouldered all the expenses for airfare, food, hotel accommodations,
transportation and entertainment during these trips. He also spent for long
distance telephone calls to communicate regularly with Robinson, Go, Tecson
and Landicho.
9. Later, Cordero discovered that Go was dealing directly with Robinson when he
was informed by Dennis Padua of Wartsila Philippines that Go was canvassing
for a second catamaran engine from their company which provided the ship
engine for the first SEACAT 25.
10. Cordero tried to contact Go and Landicho to confirm the matter but they were
nowhere to be found, while Robinson refused to answer his calls.
11. Cordero immediately flew to Brisbane to clarify matters with Robinson, only to
find out that Go and Landicho were already there in Brisbane negotiating for the
sale of the second SEACAT 25
12. Cordero filed a complaint seeking to hold Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landicho
liable jointly and solidarily for conniving and conspiring together in violating his
exclusive distributorship in bad faith and wanton disregard of his rights, thus
depriving him of his due commissions from the first sale and unpaid commission
for the sale of the second vessel and damages epresenting expenses for airplane
travel to Australia, telecommunications bills and entertainment, on account of
AFFA’s untimely cancellation of the exclusive distributorship agreement.
13. Petitioners state that it was Cordero who stopped communicating with Go in
connection with the purchase of the first vessel from AFFA and was not doing
his part in making progress status reports and airing the client’s grievances to his
principal, AFFA, such that Go engaged the services of Landicho to fly to
Australia and attend to the documents needed for shipment of the vessel to the
Philippines.
a. Cordero misinterpreted the asking for the price of the wartsila engine
as indication that Go was buying a second vessel.
b. Landicho and Tecson had no transaction whatsoever with Cordero who
had no document to show any such shipbuilding contract
c. Cordero no longer had cause of action for his commission for the sale
of the second vessel considering the termination of his authority
14. TC ruled in favor of Cordero
ISSUE: Whether petitioner Cordero has the legal personality to sue the respondents
for breach of contract - YES (W/N there was tortuous interference)
1. While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for breach of contract
because only parties can breach contractual provisions, a contracting party may
sue a third person not for breach but for inducing another to commit such breach.
2. Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be
liable for damages to the other contracting party.
3. The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2)
knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of a contract (3)
interference of the third person is without legal justification.
4. The presence of the first and second elements is not disputed.
a. Through the letters issued by Robinson attesting that Cordero is the
exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines, respondents were
clearly aware of the contract between Cordero and AFFA represented
by Robinson.
b. Evidence on record showed that respondents initially dealt with and
recognized Cordero as such exclusive dealer of AFFA high-speed
catamaran vessels in the Philippines. In that capacity as exclusive
distributor, petitioner Go entered into the Memorandum of Agreement
and Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 with Cordero in behalf of AFFA.
5. 3rd Element
So Ping Bun v CA: Where there was no malice in the interference of a contract,
and the impulse behind one’s conduct lies in a proper business interest rather
than in a wrongful motive, a party cannot be a malicious interferer. Lack of
malice precludes damages. But it does not relieve petitioner of the legal liability
for entering into contracts and causing breach to existing ones
6. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an
intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. It is Bad faith or bad motive
7. The act of Go, Landichico and Tecson in inducing robinson and Affa to enter
into another contract directly with ACG express line to obtain a lower price for
 the second vessel resulted in AFFA’s breach of contract to pay Cordero’s
commission and termination of Cordero as their exclusive distributor
8. It is not malicious if it is pursuant to a proper business interest but petitioners
transgressed the bounds of permissible financial interest to benefit themselves at
the expense of Cordero
9. They went directly to robinson after Cordero had closed a deal for them the
purchase of two seacat 25 from AFFA and attending to their concers and spent
money for their trip to Australia
10. When the petitioners went to Robinson directly for the purchase of a second
vessel, Landichico and Tecson continued to demand Cordero their commission
from Cordero’s commission
11. Petitioners connived not only in ensuring Cordero would have no participation
in the contract for the sale of the second vessel but also that Cordero would not
be paid the balance of his commission from the first sale

ISSUE: WON the respondents may be held liable for damages to Cordero for his
unpaid commissions and termination of his exclusive distributorship appointment by
the principal, AFFA.

HELD:
1. The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with contractual
relations cannot be held liable for more than the amount for which the party who
was inducted to break the contract can be held liable. Respondents Go, Landicho
and Tecson were therefore correctly held liable for the balance of petitioner
Cordero’s commission from the sale of the first SEACAT 25, in the amount of
US$31,522.09 or its peso equivalent, which AFFA/Robinson did not pay in
violation of the exclusive distributorship agreement, with interest at the rate of
6% per annum from June 24, 1998 until the same is fully paid.
2. Respondents having acted in bad faith, moral damages may be recovered under
Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
 ALMARIO v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.
The Catch-Alls | September 11, 2007| Carpio-Morales, J.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Vicente Almario was hired by respondent Philippine Airlines as a
Boeing 747 Systems Engineer.
2. 7 years after being hired, Almario who was then 39 years of age, and a Boeing
737 First Officer at PAL, successfully bid for the higher position of Airbus 300
First Officer. Since said higher position required additional training, he
underwent, at PAL’s expense, more than 5 months of training consisting of
ground schooling in Manila and flight simulation in Melbourne, Australia.
3. After compiling the training course, Almario served as First Officer of PAL.
After 8 months of service, he resigned due to “personal reasons.”
4. The respondent’s Vice President for Flight Operations sent petitioner a letter to
reconsider his resignation, otherwise he will be made to pay for the costs that
was incurred by PAL for his training amounting to around P700,000.
5. Despite the letter, Petitioner pushed through with his resignation. Petitioner’s
counsel sought PAL’s explanation behind the letter considering that petitioner
did not sign anything regarding any reimbursement. Respondent PAL did not
reply, prompting petitioner’s counsel to send two letters to follow, as well as the
release of petitioner’s clearances which he needed to avail of his benefits.
6. Respondent PAL filed a complaint against petitioner before the RTC for
reimbursement of P851,107 worth of training costs, attorney’s fees equivalent to
20% of the said amount, and costs of litigation. PAL invoked the existence of an
innominate contract of do ut facias (I give that you may do) with petitioner
Almario in that by spending for his training, he would render service to it until
the costs of training were recovered in at least 3 years. Petitioner, having resigned
before the 3-year period, should be ordered to reimburse the costs of training.
7. Almario denied the existence of any agreement with PAL that he would have to
render service to it for three years after his training with the consequence of
reimbursing the training costs should he fail to do so. Petitioner pointed out the
1991-1994 Collective Bargaining Agreement between PAL and the Airline
Pilot’s Association of the Philippines, of which he was a member, carried no such
agreement.
8. Hence, Almario prayed for the award of actual damages on account of PAL’s
withholding of the necessary clearances which he needed in order to obtain his
lawful benefits, and moral and exemplary damages for malicious prosecution and
unjust harassment.
9. PAL replied stating that it has the right to be reimbursed based on Article XXIII,
Section 1 of the 1991-1994 CBA which was taken from the decision of the
Secretary of Labor who ruled that a pilot should remain in the position where he
is upon reaching the age of 57, irrespective of whether or not he has previously
qualified in the Company’s turbo-jet operations. The rationale is that a pilot who
will be compulsorily retired at age 60 should no longer be burned with training
for a new position. Article XXIII, Section 1, provides that Pilots 57 years of age
shall be frozen in their position. The reason why pilots 57 years of age are no
loner qualified to bid for a higher position is because they have only 3 years left
before the mandatory retirement age of 60, hence, PAL would no longer be able
to recover whatever training expenses it will have to incur.
10. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner having found no provision in the CBA
between PAL and ALPAP stipulating that a pilot who underwent a training
course must serve PAL for at least three years failing which he should reimburse
the training expenses. The CA reversed after finding that Almario is liable under
the CBA between PAL and ALPAP, and under Article 22. MR denied.
ISSUE: WON Petitioenr should pay for the training costs – YES
HELD:
1. Petitioner: There is lack of any written contract or explicit provision in the CBA
obliging him to reimburse the costs incurred by PAL for his training. He also
argues that there can be no unjust enrichment because petitioner was entitled to
the benefit of training when his bid was accepted and that PAL di dnot suffer any
injury because the failure to include a reimbursement provision in the CBA was
freely entered into by the negotiating parties.
2. The petition fails. Petitioner cites Samahang Manggagawa sa Top Form
Manufacturing-United Workers of the Philippines v. NLRC in support of the
claim that the CA erred in interpreting the CBA as an ordinary civil law contract
and in reading into it a clause that was not agreed to during the negotiation and
not expressly stated in the CBA. On the contrary, the ruling in that case supports
PAL’s position. In that case the court held that CBA provisions should be
construed liberally rather than narrowly and technically, and the courts must
place a practical and realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration to
the context in which it is negotiated and purpose which it is intended to serve.
3. In the case In re Labor Dispute at the Philippines Airlines, Inc., the Secretary
of DOLE, passing on the failure of PAL and ALPAP to agree on the terms and
conditions for the renewal of their CBA and construing Section 1 of Article
XXIII held that PALS proposed an amendment to freeze the position of pilots
who have reached the age of 55, premised on the idea that the return on
investment for training is 5 years. To reach a compromise, the provision now
reads that the freeze will apply to pilots who have reached the age of 57. And
this new provision is reflected in the relevant CBA agreement.
4. Arturo Gabanton, PAL’s Senior Vice President for Flight Operations testified on
PAL’s practice on underwriting the training costs of its pilots at the time Almario
was trained, with the exception of benefitting therefrom in order to recover the
cost of training.
5. It bears noting that when Almario took the training course, he was about 39 years
old, 21 years away from the retirement age. Hence, with the maturity, expertise
and experience he gained form the training course, he was expected to serve PAL
for at least three years to offset the prohibitive costs thereof.
6. The Court also held that Article 22 of the Civil Code should apply which states
that “every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other
means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the
latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.”
7. The Court further held that the provision on unjust enrichment recognizes the
principle that one may not enrich himself at the expense of another. Admittedly,
PAL invested for the training of Almario to enable him to acquire a higher level
of skill, proficiency, or technical competence so that he could efficiency
discharge the position of First Officer. Give n that PAL expected to recover the
training costs by availing of petitioner’s services for at least three years. The
expectation of PAL was not fully realized due to Petitioner Almario’s resignation
after only 8 months of service following the completion of the training course.
He cannot reuse to reimburse the costs of training without violating the principle
of unjust enrichment.
 LORIA v. MUÑOZ
The Catch-Alls | October 15, 2014 | Leonen, J.
FACTS:
1. Respondent Ludolfo Muñoz filed a complaint for sum of money and damages
with an application for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against
Petitioner Loria with the RTC.
2. In the said complaint, Mun1oz alleged that he has been engaged in construction
under Ludoflo Muñoz Construction. Petitioner Loria visited him in his office to
invite respondent to advance P2,000,000 for a subcontract of a P50,000,000
river-dredging project in a nearby town.
3. Petitioner represented that he would make arrangements such that Elizaldy Co,
owner of Sunwest Construction and Development Corporation, would turn out
to be the lowest bidder for the project. Elizaldy Co would pay P8,000,000 to
ensure the project’saware to Sunwest. After the award to Sunwest, Sunwest
would subcontract 20% or P10,000,000 worth of the project to Muñoz. Since
Muñoz had known Loria for five years, respondent accepted the proposal
4. Respondnet Muñoz requested his bank to release P3,000,000 from his joint
account with his business partner, Christopher Co, to a certain Grace Delos
Santos. Petitioenr Loria then obtained the money from Delos Santos. Four days
later, P1,800,000 of the P3,000,000 was returned to Muñoz.
5. Loria collected Muñoz’s P700,000 balance. After deducing Loria’s personal
loans, Muñoz issued a check to Loria for P481,800.
6. The project to dredge the Masarawag and San Francisco Rivers was subjected to
public bidding. The project was awarded to the lowest bidder, Sunwest
Construction and Development Corporation. SUnwest allegedly finished
dredging the Rivers without subcontracting Muñoz. Hence, Muñoz demanded
Loria to return his P2,000,000. However, Loria refused to return the money.
7. Muñoz fisrt charged Loria and Elizaldy Co with estafa. This case was dmsmissed
by the MTC for lack of probable cause. Muñoz then filed a complaint for sum of
money. Petitioner Loria answered the complaint, admitting to receiving
P481,800 but argued that the complaint did not state a cause of action against
him. According to Lroia, he followed up the project’s approval with the Central
Office of the DPWH as agreed upon and was therefore, entitled to representation
expense. Furthermore, Loria argued that Muñoz was guilty of forum shopping
since an earlier complaint for estafa had already been dismissed .
8. The RTC held that Loria must return the P2,000,000 he received because he
would be “unduly enriching himself at the expense of Muñoz. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON Loria is liable for P2,000,000 to Muñoz for violating the principle of
unjust enrichment - YES
HELD:
1. Petitioner: Principle of unjust enrichment does not apply in the case. The
agreement was void for being in violation of the RPC, the Anti Grat and Corrupt
Practices Act, among others. Hence, Loria submits that the parties were in pari
delicto and Muñoz should not be allowed to recover the money he gave under
the contract.
2. Under Article 22 of the Civil Code, “every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession
of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return
the same to him.”
3. There is injust enrichment “when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss
of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.”
4. The principle of unjust enrichment has two conditions: (1) a person must have
been benefited without a real or valid basis or justification, (2) the benefit was
derived at another person’s expense or damage.
5. In this case, Loria received P2,000,000 from Muñoz for a subcontract of a
government project to dredge two rivers in ALbay. However, contrary to the
parties’ agreement, Muñoz was not subcontracted for the project. Nevertheless,
Loria retained the P2,000,000. Hence, Loria was unjustly enriched. He retained
Muñoz’s money without valid basis or justification. Under Article 22, Loria must
return the P2,000,000 to Muñoz.
6. Contrary to Loria’s claim, Section 6 of PD 1594 does not prevent Muñoz from
recovering his money. A subcontract is void only if not approved by the
Department Secretary. In this case, it is premature to rule on the legality of the
agreement precisely because the subcontract did not even push through. No
actual agreement was proven in evidence. The Secretary of the DPWH could
have approved the subcontract, allowed under PD 1594.
7. Even assuming that there was a subcontracting agreement that is void, this Court
has allowed recovery under a void subcontract as an exception to the in pari
delicto doctrine.
a. Gonzalo v. Tarnate, Jr.: DPWH aawarded the contract to Gonzalo to
improve a section of the Mountain Province Road. Onzalo then
subcontracted the supply of materials and labor to Tarnate without the
approval of the Secretary of the DPWH. This court ruled that the
subcontract was void for being contrary to law and that generally,
parties to an illegal contract may not recover what they gave under the
contract under the doctrine of in pari delicto. Nevertheless, the Court
allowed Tarnate to recover because the application of the doctrine of
in pari delicto is not always rigid. An exception exists when its
application contravenes well-established public policy. The prevention
of unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of the State which
is an exemption to the in pari delicto doctrine.
8. In this case, both the trial and appellate court found that Loria received
P2,000,000 for a subcontract of the river-dredging project. This was never denied
by Loria as well as failing to fulfill his agreement. Throughout the proceedings,
he was not able to justify why he was retaining the P2,000,000. Under Article
22, he must return the P2,000,000 to Muñoz
 CABRERA v. AMECO
The Catch-Alls | June 20, 2012
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Cabrera, the sole proprietor of Sto. Rosario Marble Plant entered into
a rental contract with Prime Machine, inc., for the lease of one Samsung Wheel
Type Backhoe at the rate of P1,050 per hour. PMI subsequently delivered said
backhoe to Marble Plant’s site.
2. Another rental contract was entered into by Cabrera and PMI for the elase of one
CAT 200 Excavator at the rate of P1,050 per hour. PMI delivered the Excavator
to Marble Plant’s site.
3. AMECO Contractors Rental informed Cabrera that PIM had already ceased
doing business, and as a result of a joint venture agreement, AMECO had
acquired all the assets of PMI including the Backhoe and Excavator leased to
him and the corresponding credits and receivables due to PMI. Accordingly,
AMECO billed Cabrera for the use of the equipment.
4. Cabrera and AMECO executed two new contracts for the rent of the Backhoe
and Excavator each at the rate of P1,050 per hour. Few months after, AMECO
sent Cabrera a Statement of Account informing him of his past due account. In
order to settle Cabrera’s unpaid obligations, AMECO and Cabrera agreed to meet
but Cabrera failed to appear. Despite repeated demands, Cabrera failed to settle
his unpaid account.
5. AMECO filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against Cabrera and
Marble Plant with the RTC. AMECO claimed that the unpaid rent owed by
Cabrera and Marble Plant already amounted to P1,960,939. Thus, it prayed that
Cabrera be ordered to pay the amount due.
6. Cabrera, in his answer, admitted the execution of the rental contracts but asserted
that the amount claimed by AMECO was bloated and exaggerated. He said that
Marble Plant had stopped its quarrying operations for almost 8 months. He
pointed out that the renewal of the said rental contracts was subject to the
condition of the resumption of the quarrying operations of Marble Plant. Thus,
Cabrera claimed that he was under no obligation to pay rent for the equipment
for the period that Marble Plant ceased its quarrying operations.
7. RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent AMECO and ordered Cabrera to
pay P1,581,350 for the rent, among others. MR denied.
8. On appeal to the CA, Cabrera claimed that Marble Plant did not use the Backhoe
and the Excavator for the 8-month period and that the said heavy equipment were
leased out by AMECO to other quarrying plants. He also insisted that he is not
liable to pay rent for the heavy equipment during the period that Marble Plant
Ceased its quarrying operations. CA affirmed RTC ruling, holding that the
agreement did not contain any condition for the continuation of the lease being
hinged upon the continuation of the Marble Plant. Furthermore, CA held that
there is nothing in the said contracts which supported Cabrera’s claim that he is
not liable to pay rent in case of Marble Plant’s cessation of operations. On the
contrary, the contracts stipulated that rent should still be paid despite non-use of
equipment. MR denied.
ISSUE: WON Cabrera is liable to pay AMECO for the lease even during the time
when Cabrera did not use the equipment - YES
HELD:
1. Petitioner: (1) the cessation of Marble Plant’s quarrying operations is a
fortuitous event which effectively forestalled his obligation to AMECO for the
payment of rent of the lease heavy equipment, and (2) notwithstanding the
provisions of the rental contracts on payment of rent despite non-usage, he should
not be made to pay the rent of the leased heavy equipment for the period that
Marble Plant ceased its quarrying operation because it would result to unjust
enrichment.
2. The Court first said that it agrees with the CA that the terms of the contract leave
no doubt upon the intention of the parties therein. That nowhere in the said rental
contracts was it ever stated that the obligation to pay the rent for the lease of the
heavy equipment would be forestalled in the event of the cessation of operations.
3. Cabrera cannot be allowed to evade an otherwise valid binding obligation to the
detriment of AMECO by the mere expedient of alleging that they had agreed that
no rent is due in the event of a cessation Marble Plant’s quarrying operation.
4. Cabrera’s assertion that the cessation of Marble’s plants quarrying operations is
a fortuitous event is but a foray in the dark. The Court, in Southeaster College
Inc. v. CA explained the concept of caso fortuito which basically is an event
which takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen. The court then
enumerated the elements of fortuitous events and said that the present case cannot
be considered a fortuitous event since it was not impossible to foresee and not
impossible to avoid.
5. Cabrera’s claim that there is unjust enrichment on the part of AMECO if he was
made to pay is untenable. Article 22 provides for the principle of unjust
enrichment. In a nutshell, it is when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss
of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience. It requires two
conditions: (1) that a person is benefitted without a valid basis or justification,
and (2) that such benefit is derived at the expense of another.
6. Contrary to petitioner Cabrera’s assertions, the principle of unjust enrichment
finds no application in this case. The benefit which would be derived by AMECO
should Cabrera pay for the rent of the equipment for the period that Mable Plant
ceased its operations definitely has a valid basis. Caberara’s payment of the rent
for the said period is but proper as it was agreed upon by him and AMECO in
the rental contracts which they executed.
7. Court also found Cabrera’s invocation of equity untenable. By no amount of
equity consideration would suffice to behoove this Court to turn a blind eye to
the celar import of the contract executed by Cabrera and AMECO.

CONCEPCION v. CA and SPS. NESTOR NICOLAS AND ALLEM NICOLAS
Articles 26, 27 and 28 | January 31, 2000| Bellosillo, J.
FACTS:
1. Respondents Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas were lessees of Florence
Concepcion. Nestor Nicolas was engaged in the business of supplying
government agencies and private entities with office equipment, appliances and
other fixtures on a cash purchase or credit basis. Florence Concepcion joined this
venture by contributing capital on the condition that after her capital investment
was returned to her, any profit earned would be divided equally between her and
Nestor.
2. Petitioner Rodrigo Concepcion, brother of the deceased husband of Florence,
accosted Nestor at Nestor’s apartment and accused him of conducting an
adulterous relationship with Florence.
a. “Hoy Nestor, kabit ka ni Bing! Binigyan ka pa pala ni Bing
Concepcion ng P100,000 para umakyat ng Baguio. Pagkaakyat mo at
ng asawa mo doon ay bababa ka uli para magkasarilinan kayo ni Bing.”
3. Nestor went with Rodrigo, upon the latter’s dare, to see some relatives of the
Concpecion family who allegedly knew about the relationship. However, these
relatives denied knowledge of the affair. The same accusation was hurled by
Rodrigo against Nestor when the two confronted Florence in her residence.
Florence denied the imputations and Rodrigo backtracked saying that he just
heard the rumor from a relative. Thereafter, Rodrigo called Florence over the
telephone reiterating his accusation and threatening her that should something
happen to his sick mother, in case the latter learned about the affair, he would
kill Florence.
4. Because of the incident, Nestor Nicolas felt extreme embarrassment and shame
to the extent that he could no longer face his neighbors. Florence Concepcion
also ceased to do business with him by not contributing capital anymore so much
so that the business venture of the Nicolas spouses declined as they could no
longer cope with their commitments to their clients and customers. Allem
Nicolas also started to doubt Nestor’s fidelity resulting to frequent bickerings and
quarrels between the spouses.
5. Nestor was forced to write Rodrigo demanding public apology and payment of
damages. Rodrigo ignored the demand for which reason the Nicolas spouses filed
a civil suit against him for damages.
a. Rodrigo denied that he maligned Nestor my accusing him publicly of
being Florence’s lover. He claims that he only desired to protect the
name and reputation of the Concepcion family which was why he
sought an appointment with Nestor through Florence’s son to ventilate
his feelings about the matter..
6. The RTC ordered Petitioner Rodrigo to pay respondent spouses for damages. CA
affirmed.
ISSUE:
HELD:
1. Petitioner: in awarding damages to private respondents, the CA was without legal
basis to justify its verdict. The alleged act imputed to him by respondent spouses
does not fall under Articles 26 and 2219 of the Civil Cod since it does not
constitute libel, slander or any other form of defamation. Neither does it involve
prying into the privacy of another’s residence or meddling with or disturbing the
private life or family relation of another.
2. The factual findings provide enough basis in law for the award of damages by
the CA in favor of respondents. The Court rejected the argument of petitioner
that no legal provision supports such award as the incident being complained of
does not fall under Art. 26 nor Art. 2219. The incident charged of petitioner was
no less than an invasion on the right of respondent Nestor as a person.
3. The Philosophy behind Art. 26 underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our
civil law. The Code commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the
human personality must be exalted. The sacredness of human personality is
a concomitant consideration of every plan for human amelioration. The
touchstone of every stem of law, of the culture and civilization of every
country, Is how far it dignifies man. If the statues insufficiently protects a
person from being unjustly humiliated, in short, If human personality is not
exalted – then the laws are indeed defective. Thus, under this article, the rights
of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violation of a
person’s dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind.
4. The violations mentioned in the codal provisions are not exclusive but are mere
examples and do not preclude other similar or analogous acts. Damages therefore
are allowable for actions against a person’s dignity, such as profane insulting,
humiliating, scandalous or abusive language. Under Art. 2217, moral damages
which include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, etc, may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.
5. There is no question that private respondent Nestor Nicolas suffered mental
anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation as a
proximate result of petitioner’s abusive, scandalous and insulting languge.
6. We cannot help noting this inordinate interest of petitioner to know the truth
about the rumour and why he was not satisfied with the separate denials made by
Florence and Nestor. He had to confront Nestor face to face, invade the latter’s
privacy, and hurl defamatory words at him in the presence of his wife and
children, enighbors and friends, accusing him – a married man – of having an
adulterous relatiship with Florence. This definiteily caused private respondent
much shame and embarassmetn that he could no longer show himself in his
neighborhood without feeling distraught and debased. This brought dissension
and distrust in his family where before there was none.
 MANOLOTO, CIFRA, ARCILLA, CATALAN, HOLT, JONGCO, JONGO,
and JONGO v. VELOSO
Articles 26, 27 and 28 | October 6, 2010 | De Castro, J.

FACTS:
1. Petitioners are lessors of a residential house which was leased to respondent at a
rate of P17,000. An action was instituted on the ground of respondent’s failure
to pay rental despite repeated demands. Respondent denied the non-payment of
rentals and alleged that he made an advance payment of P825,000 when he paid
for the repairs done on the leased property.
2. MeTC decided in favor of petitioners and ordered respondent to vacate the
premises and pay the petitioners the sum of P306,000 corresponding the rentals
of almost 2 years. On appeal to the RTC, the METC decision was reversed. The
RTC ruling became final and executory after successive appeals to the CA and
the SC.
3. While the respondent’s appeal of the MeTC judgment in the unlawful detinaer
case was pending, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint for breach of
contract and damages against petitioners. In the said complaint, petitioner alleged
two causes of action: (1) for damages because the respondent supposedly
suffered embarrassment and humiliation when petitioners distributed copies of
the MeTC decision in the unlawful detainer case to the homeowners of
Horseshoe village while respondent’s appeal was still pending before the RTC,
and (2) for breach of contract since petitioners, as lessors, failed to make
continuing repairs on the subject property to preserve and keep it tenable. .
4. Petitioners prayed for the dismissal of the compalint on the ground that
respondent had no cause of action since the MeTC decision was a matter of
public record and its disclosure to the public violated no law or any legal right of
the respondent. RTC dismissed for violating rule against splitting cause of action,
lack of jurisdiction, and failure to disclose the pendency of a related case. The
CA gave due course to the appeal. CA then held that RTC should have proceeded
with the trial on the merits of the first cause of action because although
respondent may have stated the same factual antecedents that transpired in the
unlawful detainer case, such allegations were necessary to give an overview of
the facts leading to the institution of another case between the parties before the
RTC acting.in its original jurisdiction. CA then found that petitioners were liable
for damages. The CA held that even if court decisions are public documents,
distribution of the same during pendency of an appeal was clearly intended to
cause respondent some form of harassment and/or humillation so that respondent
would be ostracedzed by his neighbors.

HELD:
 NESSIA v. FERMIN and MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIAS
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Jose Nessia filed a case against respondents Mayor Jesus Fermin and
the Municipality of Victorias, Negros Occidental for damages for refusing to act
on the vouchers covering petitioner Nesssia’s claim for of travel expenses
incurred in the performance of his official duties as the then Deputy Municipal
Assessor of Victorias.
2. Petitioner Nessia claims in the complaint that respondent Mayor Fermin
deliberately ignored and caused the non-payment of the vouches in question
because Nessia defied the former’s request to all municipal officials to register
and vote in Victorias in the 1980 local elections.
3. Fermin disputed the allegations and claims that Nessia could not be approved
because they exceeded the budgetary appropriations therefor. Respondent
Victorias added that Nessia was blamable for his predicament because he neither
gave Fermin the justification for drawing funds in excess of the budgetary
appropriations nor amended his vouchers to conform thereto.
4. RTC ruled in favor of Petitioner Nessia after finding that respondent Fermin
maliciously refused to act on plaintiff’s vouchers, bolstered by his inaction on
Nessia’s follow-up letters inquiring on the status thereof. The RTC also found
that the vouchers were received by the Secretary of Fermin, thereby negating his
contention that the vouchers were not received by him. Even if the vouchers
never reached him, trial court nevertheless found Mayor Fermin answerable
because he should have made inquiries into their whereabouts upon receipt of
Nessia’ follow-up letters. In line with Fermin’s admission that he did nothing on
the vouchers, RTC awarded damages to Petitioner Nessia but less than what the
latter prayed for. Both Nessia and Fermin elevated the case to CA.
5. CA dismissed Nessia’s complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action
because the complaint itself as well as Nessia’s own testimony admitted that
Fermin acted on the vouchers as may be drawn from the allegations that Fermin
denied the claims. CA held that petitioner failed to show that the vouchers have
been received, and even if received could not be approved for payment because
they were submitted late and were not supported by an appropriation.
ISSUE: WON respondent may be liable under Art. 27 - YES
HELD
1. The SC sustained the trial court because RTC is afforded greater weight and
respect when it comes to conflicting testimonies. As between the findings of the
CA drawn simply from the reading of the records and the transcript of
stenographic notes, and the determination of the trial court which heard the case,
the opinion of the latter deserves greater acceptance, even if both conclusions are
supported by evidence. The SC found no error in RTC’s appreciation of the
contradictory testimonies relating to the dispute on the receipt of the vouchers,
the determination of the RTC that they were actually received should be
followed.
2. The claim that the name inscribed on the lower left portion of the transmittal
letter does not appear to be the customary signature of the Mayor’s secretary does
not convincingly show that she did not receive the vouchers, nor was it
convincingly shown that the signature purportedly herds was not actually her
handwriting.
3. Since proof of the receipt of the vouchers has not been confuted, the secretary
should have indicated on the letter she received that the enclosures therein were
not so enclosed or attached, otherwise, it could be presumed that they were
actually enclosed o reattached thereto, and properly received by the addressee.
4. Moreover, the version favoring receipt of the vouchers carries the presumption
of regularity in official acts, more so that the handwritten name of the secretary,
which closely resembles her signature, immediately following the list of
enclosures.
5. As regards the alleged response of Fermin to Nessia (basta indi lang ako
magapprove sang vouchers mo), the same should have been interpreted in
Ilonggo as refusal to approve or disapprove, considering that Nessia testified on
it to clarify an earlier statement that “I presented him my vouchers but he did not
act on it.”
6. CA further contended that Nessia may not claim relief under Art. 27 because his
theory of unjust inaction is incompatible with his allegations in the complaint
that Fermin refused/denied the vouchers. The SC does not agree that the
allegations in the complaint alluded to, i.e., “plaintiff presented the said claims
to the defendant Fermin, but refused and continued to refuse the payments
thereof” and “defendants refused and continue to refuse to pay” should be
construed as admission of the act of disapproval. Refusal to pay is not inferred
solely from disapproval of claims but form inaction thereon a well.
7. On the defense of lack of appropriation: while it is true that Fermin may not
be compelled by mandamus to approve vouchers because they exceeded the
budgetary appropriations, he may, nevertheless, be held liable for damages
under Art. 27 for malicious inaction because he did not act on the vouchers.
This provision against official inaction finds its ally in Sec. 3. Par. (f) of RA 3019
as amended or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which criminalizes
“neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient
justification, to act within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him
for the purpose of discriminating against any interested party.”
8. It is apparent that public officials are called upon to act expeditiously on matters
pending before them. For only in acting thereon may the plaintiff continue on to
the next step of the bureaucratic process. On the other hand, official inaction
brings to a standstill the admin process and the plaintiff is left in the darkness of
uncertainty. In this regard, official “inaction” cannot be equated with
disapproval.
 PHILIPPPINE MATCH CO. LTD., v. CITY OF CEBU, and ACTING
TREAUSRER ZABATE
FACTS:
1. Ordinance No. 279 of Cebu City is “an ordinance imposing a quarterly tax on
gross sales or receipts of merchants, dealers, importers and manufacturers of any
commodity doing business” in Cebu City. It imposes a sales tax of one percent
on the gross sales, receipts or value of commodities sold, bartered, exchanged or
manufactured in the city in excess of P2,000 a quarter.
a. Section 9 of the ordinance provides that, for purposes of the tax, “all
deliveries of goods or commodities stored in the City of Cebu, or if not
stored are sold” in that city, “shall be considered as sales” in the city
and shall be taxable.
b. Hence, under the tax ordinance, sales of matches consummated outside
of the city are taxable as long as the matches sold are taken from the
company’s stock stored in Cebu City.
2. Petitioner Philippine Match Co., Ltd., is engaged in the manufacturing of
matches. It ships cartons of matches from Manila to its branch office in Cebu
City for storage, sale and distribution within the territories and districts under its
Cebu-branch or the whole Visayas-Mindanao region.
3. The company does not question the tax on the sales of matches consummated in
Cebu City, meaning matches sold and delivered within the city. But it assails the
legality of tax which the city treasurer collected on out-of-town deliveries of
matches, to wit: (1) sales of matches booked and paid for in Cebu City but
shipped directly to customers outside of the city; (2) transfers of matches to
salesmen assigned to different agencies outside of the city, and (3) shipments of
matches to provincial customers pursuant to salesmen’s instructions.
4. Sales of matches booked and paid for in Cebu City but shipped directly to
customers outside for the city refer to orders for matches made in the city by the
company’s customers, by means of personal or phone calls, for which sales
invoices are issued, and then the matches are shipped from the bodega in the city,
where the matches had been stored, to the place of business or residences of the
customers outside of the city, duly covered by bills of lading. The matches are
used and consumed outside of the city.
5. The company sent a letter to the city treasurer seeking for the refund of the sales
tax paid for out-of-town deliveries of matches. The City treasurer denied the
request, invoking Section 9 of the ordinance.
6. Petitioner filed a complaint praying that the ordinance be declared void insofar
as it taxed the deliveries of matches outside of Cebu City and that the city be
ordered to refund the company P12,844 as excess sales tax paid, and that the city
treasurer be ordered to pay damage.
7. The trial court sustained the tax on the sales of matches booked and paid for in
Cebu City although the matches were shipped directly to customers outside of
the city. It held that the said sales were consummated in Cebu city because
delivery to the carrier in the city is deemed to be a delivery to the customers
outside of the city. But the trial court invalidated the other two assailed taxes and
ordered the city treasurer to refund the sum of P8,923 as taxes paid on the
invalidated taxes which it characterized as a “storage tax” and not a sales tax
which is consummated outside the city and hence, beyond the city’s taxing
powers.
8. The City did not appeal from the decision but the petitioner company appealed
from that portion of the decision upholding the tax on sales of matches to
customers outside of the city but which sales were booked and paid for in Cebu
City, and also from the dismissal of its claim for damages against the city
treasurer.
ISSUE: WON the City of Cebu can tax sales of matches which were perfected and
paid for in Cebu City but the matches were delivered to customers outside of the city
– YES
HELD:
1. The appeal is devoid of merit because the city can validly tax the sales of matches
to customers outside of the city as long as the orders were booked and paid for
in the company’s branch office in the city. Those matches can be regarded as
sold in the city, as contemplated in the ordinance, because the matches were
delivered to the carrier in Cebu City.
2. The municipal board of Cebu City is empowered “to provide for the levy and
collection of taxes for general and special purposes in accordance with law.” The
taxing power validly delegated to cities and municipalities is defined in the Local
Autonomy Act. Chartered cities are allowed to impose percentage taxes.
Furthermore, taxing power of cities may be used (1) upon any person engaged in
any occupation or business or exercising any privilege; (2) for services rendered
by those political subdivisions or rendered in connection with any business,
profession or occupation being conducted therein, and (3) to levy, for public
purposes, just and uniform, licensees or fees.
3. Applying the jurisdictional test, it is at once obvious that sales of matches to
customers outside of Cebu City, which sales were booked and paid for in the
company’s branch office in the city, are subject to the city’s taxing power. The
instant case is easily distinguishable from the Shell Company case where the
price of the oil sold was paid outside of the municipality of Sipocot, the entity
imposing the tax.
ISSUE: WON the city treasurer is liable to pay exemplary damages – NO
1. The claim for damages is predicated on Articles 19, 20, 21, 27 and 2229 of the
Civil Code. IT is argued that the city treasurer refused and neglected without just
cause to perform his duty and to act with justice and good faith. The company
faults the city treasurer for not following the opinion of the city fiscal, as legal
adviser of the city, that all out-of-town deliveries of matches are not subject to
sales tax because such transactions were effected outside of the city’s territorial
limits.
2. The city treasurer argued that: (1) in enforcing the tax ordinance in question, he
was simply complying with his duty as collector of taxes; (2) he had no choice
but to enforce the ordinance because according to Section 357 of the Revised
Manual of Instructions to Treasurer’s, a “tax ordinance will be enforced in
accordance with its provisions” until declared illegal or void by a competent
court, or otherwise revoked by the council or board from which it originated; and
(3) the Secretary of Finance had reminded him that a tax ordinance approved by
the provincial board is operative and must be enforced without prejudice to the
right of any affected taxpayer to assail its legality in the judicial forum. The
fiscal’s opinion on the legality of an ordinance is merely advisory and has no
binding effect.
3. Article 27 of the Civil Code provides that “any person suffering material or moral
loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause,
to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against
the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be
taken.”
4. Article 27 presupposes that the refusal or omission of a public official is
attributable to malice or inexcusable negligence. In this case, it cannot be said
that the city treasurer acted willfully or was grossly negligent in not refunding to
the plaintiff the taxes which it paid under protest on out-of-town sales of matches.
5. The record reveals that the city treasurer honestly believed that he was justified
under the Section of the tax ordinance in collecting the sales tax on out-of-town
deliveries, considering that the company’s branch office was located in Cebu
City and that all out-of-town purchase orders for matches were filled up by the
branch office and the sales were duly reported to it.
6. The City Treasurer acted within the scope of his authority and in consonance
with his bona fide interpretation of the tax ordinance. The fact that his action was
not completely sustained by the courts would not render him liable for damages.
7. As a rule, a public officer whether judicial, quasi-judicial, or executive, is not
personally liable to one injured in consequence of an act performed within the
scope of his official authority, and in the line of his official duty.”
8. Where an officer is invested with discretion and is empowered to exercise his
judgment in matters brought before him, he is sometimes called a quasi-judicial
officer, and when so acting he is usually given immunity from liability to persons
who may be injured as the result of an erroneous or mistaken decision, however
erroneous his judgment may be, provided the acts complained of are done within
the scope of the officer’s authority, and without willfulness, malice or corruption.
9. It has been held that an erroneous interpretation of an ordinance does not
constitute nor does it amount to bad faith that would entitle an aggrieved party to
an award for damages. The salutary rule may be applied in this case.
 WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION v. JESICHRIS
MANFUACTURING CORPORATION
FACTS:
1. Respondent Jesichris Manufacturing Company filed a complaint for damages
for unfair competition with prayer for permanent injunction to enjoin petitioner
Willaware Products Corporation from manufacturing and distributing plastic-
made automotive parts similar to those of respondent.
2. Respondent alleged that since its registration in 1992, it has been manufacturing
and distributing throughout the Philippines plastic-made automotive parts.
Respondent alleged that in view of the physical proximity of petitioner’s office
to respondent’s office, and in view of the fact that some of the respondent’s
employees had transferred to petitioner, petitioner had developed familiarity with
respondent’s products, especially its plastic-made automotive part.
3. Respondent learned that petitioner Willaware Products had been manufacturing
and distributing the same automotive parts with exactly similar design, same
material and colors but was selling these products at a low price. Respondent
alleged that it had originated the use of plastic in place of rubber in the
manufacture of automotive underchassis parts. Petitioner’s manufacture of the
same parts with plastic material was taken from respondent’s idea of using plastic
for automotive parts. Also, petitioner deliberately copied respondent’s
products all of which acts constitute unfair competition and contrary to law,
and have caused respondent damages in terms of lost and unrealized profits
in the amount of P2,000,000.
4. Petitioner denied all the allegations of respondent except for the fact that its
office is near the office of respondent, that some of the employees transferred,
and that over the years it had developed familiarity with respondent’s prdoucts,
especially its plastic-made automotive parts.
5. Petitioners claim that there can be no unfair competition as the plastic-made
automotive parts are mere reproductions of original parts and their
construction and composition merely conforms to the specifications of the
original parts of motor vehicles they intend to replace. Thus, respondent
cannot claim that it “originated” the use of plastic for these automotive parts.
And even assuming that respondent indeed originated the use of these plastic
automotive parts, it still has no exclusive right to use, manufacture and sell these
as it has no patent over these products. Furthermore, respondent is not only the
exclusive manufacturer of these plastic-made automotive parts as there are other
establishments which were already openly selling them to the public.
6. RTC ruled in favor of respondent Jesischris Manufacturing. It ruled that
petitioner Willaware Products clearly invaded the rights or interest of respondent
by deliberately copying and performing acts amounting to unfair competition.
The RTC further opined that under the circumstances, in order for respondent’s
property rights to be preserved, petitioner’s act of manufacturing similar plastic-
made automotive parts such as those of respondent’s and the selling of the same
products to respondent’s customers, which it cultivated over the years, will have
to be enjoined.
7. Upon appeal to the CA, petitioner asserts that if there is no intellectual property
protecting a good belonging to another, the copying thereof for production and
selling does not add up to unfair competition as competition is promoted by law
to benefit customers. Petitioner also contends that it did not lure away
respondent’s employees to get trade secrets and pointed out that the plastic spare
parts sold by respondent are treaded in the market and the copying of these can
be done by simply buying a sample for a mold to be made.
8. Respondent on the other hand, averred that copyright and patent registrations are
immaterial for an unfair competition case to prosper under Article 28 of the Civil
Code. It stresses that the characteristics of unfair competition are present in the
instant case as the parties are trade rivals and the petitioner’s acts are contrary to
good conscience for deliberately copying its products and employing its former
employees.
9. CA affirmed the ruling of RTC.
ISSUE: WON petitioner committed acts amounting to unfair competition under
Article 28 of the Civil Code – YES
HELD:
1. The instant case falls under Article 28 of the Civil Code on human relations, and
not unfair competition under RA 8293, as the present suit is a damage suit and
the products are not covered by patent registration. Hence, the existence of patent
registration is immaterial in the present case.
2. The concept of “unfair competition” under Article 28 is very much broader than
that covered by intellectual property law. Under the present article, which
follows the extended concept of “unfair competition” in American jurisdictions,
the term covers even cases of discovery of trade secrets of a competitor, bribery
of his employees, misrepresentation of all kinds, interference with the fulfillment
of a competition’s contracts, or any malicious interference with the latter’s
business.
3. Article 28 provides that “unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or
industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit,
machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall give
rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage.” From the
foregoing, it is clear that what is being sought to be prevented is not competition
per se but the use of unjust, oppressive or high-handed methods which may
deprive others of a fair chance to engage in business or to earn a living. Plainly,
what the law prohibits is unfair competition and not competition where the means
used are fair and legitimate.
4. In order to qualify the competition as “unfair”, it must have 2 charachteristics:
(1) it must involve an injury to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve
acts which are characterized as “contrary to good conscience,” or “shocking to
 judicial sensibilities,” or otherwise unlawful. These includes force, intimidation,
deceit, machination, or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method.
5. Here, both characteristics are present. FIRST, both parties are competitors or
trade rivals, both being engaged in the manufacture of plastic-made automotive
parts. SECOND, the acts of the petitioner were clearly “contrary to good
conscience” as petitioner admitted having employed respondent’s former
employees, deliberately copied respondent’s products and event went to the
extent of selling these products to respondent’s customers. To bolster this point,
CA correctly pointed out that petitioner’s hiring of the former employees (De
Guzman and Yabut) of respondent and petitioner’s act of copying the subject
plastic parts of respondents were tantamount to unfair competition.
6. Thus, it is evident that petitioner is engaged in unfair competition as shown by
his act of suddenly shifting his business from manufacturing kitchenware to
plastic=made automotive parts; his luring the employees of the respondent to
transfer to this employ and trying to discover the trade secrets of respondents.
7. Moreover, when a person starts an opposing place of business, not for the sake
of profit to himself, but regardless of loss and for the sole purpose of driving his
competitor out of business so that later on he can take advantage of the effects of
his malevolent purpose, he is guilty of wanton wrong.

NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORK, INC. and CONSOLIDATED
BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. HON. DY, MEER, MAXIMO,
FERNANDEZ-GARCIA, and CITY OF CAUAYAN
Independent Civil Actions | April 2, 2009 | Tinga, J.
FACTS:
1. Bombo Radyo Philippines operates several radio stations throughout the
Philippines. These stations are operated by corporations organized and
incorporated by Bombo Radyo, particularly petitioners Newsounds, and CBS.
Among the stations run by Newsounds is Bombo Radyo Cauayan, an AM radio
broadcast station operating out of Cauayan City. CBS, in turn, runs Star FM
Cauayan.
2. In 1996, Newsounds commenced relocation of its broadcasting stations,
management office and transmitters on property located in Cauayan City,
Isabela. The property is owned by CDC, affiliate corporation under Bomba
Radyo network. CDC was issued by then municipal government of Cauayan a
building permit authorizing the construction of a commercial establishment on
the property. After complying with the procedures and securing necessary
permits, a building was erected on the property where the stations operated.
3. Petitioners applied for renewal of the mayor’s permit. The City Assessor’s Office
noted on CDC’s Declaration of Real Property filed for Real Property confirmed
that based on existing file, the property was classified as “commericla”.
Representatives of petitioners fomrmally requesting City Zoning Administrator
Maximo to issue a zoning clearance ofr the property but Maximom required
petitioners to first submit an approved land conversion papers from DAR
showing that the propert was converted from prime acgricultural land to
commercial land, or an approved resolution from the Sanggunian authorizing the
re-classification fo the property.
4. Due to this refusal by Maximo to issue the zoning clearance, petitioners were
unable to secure a mayor’s permit. Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus with
the RTC to compel the issuance of the mayor’s permit. RTC denied petitioner’s
accompanying application for injunctive relief. Hence, they filed a special civil
action for certiorari with the CA but the same was dismissed because of
availaibility of other remedies. RTC dismissed the mandamus action for being
moot and academic.
5. Newsounds tried to secure a DAR Order but failed to do so.
6. Eventually, the City (through the City Administrator, City Legal Officer, and
Mayor) closed the radio stations. This was reopened in view of the prohibition
against closing radio stations during election period. It was closed again, and then
reopened again. Finally, it was permanently closed in June 2004.
7. Newsounds filed a petition for mandamus with RTC, with application for TRO
and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction, but this was denied. CA affirmed.
8. Hence this petition for certiorari, claiming violation of the constitutional right to
free speech and of the press, as the acts of the City were politically motivated.
9. POLITICAL BACKGROUND: Prior to 2002, petitioners had not been frustrated
in securing the various local government requirements for the operation of their
stations. It was only in the beginning of 2002, after the election of respondent
Ceasar Dy as mayor of Cauayan, that the local government started to impose
these new requirements substantiating the conversion of CDCs property for
commercial use. Petitioners admit that during the 2001 elections, Bombo Radyo
was aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that
appear to have favored Respondent Dy and other members of the Dy political
dynasty. Respondents efforts to close petitioners radio station clearly intensified
immediately before the May 2004 elections, where a former employee of DZNC
Bombo Radyo, Grace Padaca, was mounting a credible and ultimately successful
challenge against the incumbent Isabela governor, who happened to be the
brother of respondent Dy. It also bears notice that the requirements required of
petitioners by the Cauayan City government are frankly beyond the pale and not
conventionally adopted by local governments throughout the Philippines.
ISSUE: WoN the acts of the City violated the constitutional rights of Newsounds –
YES
1. The political circumstances above show that the steps employed by the City to
ultimately shut down Newsounds’s radio station were ultimately content-based,
which warrants heightened or strict scrutiny from the Court.
2. The immediate implication of the application of the strict scrutiny test is that the
burden falls upon the City officials as agents of government to prove that their
actions do not infringe upon Newsounds’s constitutional rights. As content
regulation cannot be done in the absence of any compelling reason, the burden
lies with the government to establish such compelling reason to infringe the right
to free expression. The City was not able to prove any compelling reason.
3. The City had no valid cause at all to even require Newsounds to secure approved
land conversion papers from the DAR showing that the property was converted
from prime agricultural land to commercial land. That requirement, assuming
that it can be demanded by a local government in the context of approving
mayors permits, should only obtain upon clear proof that the property from where
the business would operate was classified as agricultural under the LGUs land
use plan or zoning ordinances and other relevant laws. No evidence to that effect
was presented by the City either to Newsounds, or to the courts.
ISSUE: WoN Newsounds is entitled to mandamus injunction and mandamus – YES
1. At the time Newsounds filed their special civil action for mandamus on 15 April
2004, their radio stations remained in operation despite an earlier attempt by
respondents to close the same, by virtue of an order rendered by the COMELEC.
The mandamus action sought to compel respondents to immediately issue
petitioners zoning clearances and mayors permit for 2004. During the pendency
of the action for mandamus, respondents finally succeeded in closing the radio
 stations, and it was possible at that stage for petitioners to have likewise sought 6. Newsounds is entitled to P500k attorney’s fees.
the writs of prohibition and/or certiorari. Petitioners instead opted to seek for a
writ or preliminary mandatory injunction from the trial court, a viable recourse WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the Court of
albeit one that remains ancillary to the main action for mandamus. We had Appeals and the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan City, Branch 24, are hereby
previously acknowledged that Newsounds is entitled to a writ of preliminary REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant petition for mandamus is hereby
mandatory injunction that would have prevented the closure of the radio stations. GRANTED and respondents are directed to immediately issue petitioners zoning
2. In addition, we hold that the writ of mandamus lies. Mandamus lies as the proper clearances and mayors permits for 2004 to petitioners. Respondents are ordered to pay
relief whenever a public officer unlawfully neglects the performance of an act the damages.
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For the year 2004, Newsounds
had duly complied with the requirements for the issuance of the same mayors
permit they had obtained without issue in years prior. There was no basis for the
City to have withheld the zoning clearances, and consequently the mayor’s
permit, thereby depriving Newsounds of the right to broadcast as certified by the
Constitution and their particular legislative franchise.

RELEVANT ISSUE: WoN entitled to damages – YES

1. Newsounds asked for P8M temperate damages, P1M exemplary damages, and
P1M attorney’s fees.
2. Given the City’s clear violation of Newsounds’s constitutional guarantee of free
expression, the right to damages from the City is squarely assured by Article 32
(2) of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly
or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any
of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter
for damages:
(2) Freedom of speech
3. Lim v. Ponce de Leon: public officials in the past have abused their powers on
the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties,
and the object of Article 32 of the Civil Code is to put an end to official abuse by
plea of the good faith. The application of Article 32 not only serves as a measure
of pecuniary recovery to mitigate the injury to constitutional rights, it likewise
serves notice to public officers and employees that any violation on their part of
any persons guarantees under the Bill of Rights will meet with final reckoning.
4. Newsounds is entitled to P4M as temperate damages, in view of the lost potential
income during the time it was closed from 2004 up to 2006, when the SC issued
the writ of preliminary injunction.
5. Newsounds is entitled to P1M as exemplary damages, since temperate damages
are available. Public officers who violate the Constitution they are sworn to
uphold embody a poison of wickedness that may not run through the body politic.
The City, by purposely denying the commercial character of the property in order
to deny Newsounds the exercise of their constitutional rights and their business,
manifested bad faith in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive and malevolent manner.
 SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. and PANLILIO v. SOLUTA,
SANTOS, BERNATE, DELOLA, MATILLA and GLOWHRAIN-SILAHIN
UNION CHAPTER
Independent Civil Actions | February 20, 2006 | Carpio-Morales, J..
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Panlilio was the VP for Finance of Silahis International Inc while
respondents were employees of the hotel and officers of the union.
2. Coronel Floro Maniego (Maniego), General Manager of the Rapier
Enforcement Professional Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. (REPISA)
which the hotel contracted to provide its security force, had been receiving
reports that sale and/or use of marijuana, dollar smuggling, and prostitution
were going on in the union office at the hotel and that there existed a theft
syndicate, he conducted a surveillance, with the approval of Panlilio, of
suspected members and officers of the union.
3. One morning Panlilio, and others entered the union office located at the hotel
basement, with the permission of union officer Henry Babay who was apprised
about the suspected illegal activities, and searched the premises in the course of
which Villanueva found a plastic bag under a table. When opened, the plastic bag
yielded dry leaves of marijuana.
4. Panlilio ordered Maniego to investigate and report the matter to the authorities.
RESPONDENTS:
5. Loida Somacera laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed overnight at the female
locker room at the basement of the hotel.
6. At dawn, she woke up and saw five men in barong tagalog whom she failed to
recognize but she was sure were not employees of the hotel, forcibly opening
the door of the union office. She heard the door of the union office opened.
7. Union officer Soluta was trying in vain to open the door of the union office,
Loida narrated to him what she had witnessed at dawn. Soluta thus immediately
lodged a complaint before the Security Officer.
8. They tried to open the door but, men in barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived
and started hitting Soluta so they ran to the female locker room, called for police
assistance.
9. Panlilio thereupon instructed Villanueva to force open the door, and the latter
did. Once inside, Panlilio and his companions began searching the office, over
the objection of Babay who even asked them if they had a search warrant. A
plastic bag was found containing marijuana flowering tops.
10. As a result of the discovery of the presence of marijuana in the union office and
after the police conducted an investigation of the incident, a complaint against
the 13 union officers was filed before the Fiscal’s Office of Manila. RTC
acquitted the accused. On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the decision
of the trial court.
11. Soluta and his fellow union officers filed a Complaint against respondents
including the prosecuting Fiscal and attorney who assisted in the prosecution of
the case against them, for malicious prosecution and violation of their
constitutional right against illegal search.
12. RTC held Panlilio, Maniego and Villanueva jointly and severally liable for
damages as a result of malicious prosecution and illegal search of the union
office. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision with modification. It ruled that
petitioners, et al. civilly liable for damages for violation of individual
respondents’ constitutional right against illegal search, not for malicious
prosecution
ISSUE: WON CA erred in ruling that petitioners are liable for damages under Art. 32
of the Civil Code and the search was unreasonable - NO
HELD:
1. ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly
or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any
of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter
for damages:
xxxx
(9) The right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
2. In this case it is not even necessary that the defendant in this article should have
acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise it would defeat its main purpose which
is the effective protection of individual rights. It suffices that there is a violation
of the constitutional right of the plaintiff
3. Petitioners already received reports in late 1987 of illegal activities allegedly
undertaken in the union office and Maniego conducted surveillance of the union
officers.
4. Yet, in the morning of January 11, 1988, petitioners and their companions barged
into and searched the union office without a search warrant, despite ample time
for them to obtain one, and notwithstanding the objection of Babay.
5. The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality, it not falling
under any of the exceptional instances when a warrantless search is allowed by
law. Petitioners’ violation of individual respondents’ constitutional right
against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for the award of
damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
6. The petitioners’ claim that property rights by the hotel as the owner of the room
where the union office holds does not justify the search
7. The respondents were the lawful occupants and only they could raise the validity
of the search and seizure
8. No waiver of right in this case. The right to waive against unreasonable searches
and seizure is a personal right, which may be waived expressly or impliedly, a
waiver by implication cannot be presumed.
a. There must be proof of the following: (a) that the right exists; (b) that
the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of
the existence of such right; and, (c) that the said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right.
b. the waiver must be voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made.
9. Violation of one’s constitutional right against illegal search and seizure can be
the basis for the recovery of damages under Article 32 in relation to Article
2219(6) and (10) of the New Civil Code
10. Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person directly or indirectly
responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another.
it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages under Article 32; the
person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused
to the aggrieved party.
11. Petitioners, together with Maniego and Villanueva, the ones who orchestrated
the illegal search, are jointly and severally liable for actual, moral and exemplary
damages to individual respondents in accordance with the provision of Article
32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code.

APARICIO v. HON. ANDAL Republic, National Treasurer, COA
Independent Civil Actions | July 25, 1989 | Sarmiento, J.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner, Atty. Lolito Aparicio filed a Motion for Inhibition against Judge
Ermelindo Andal for several criminal and civil cases being handled by the latter.
2. Respondent Judge denied such motion.
3. Petitioner now filed a case against the Judge for grave abuse of discretion in
denying such motion and was claiming damages under Art. 32 of the Civil Code
in relation to the constitutional provision that all public officers must at all times
be accountable to the people.
a. He also alleges that there was hostility between him and the judge
sparked by his filing of a petition for certiorari and administrative cases
against the judge before the motion for inhibition was denied.
4. Respondent, on the other hand, denied all allegations.
a. Judge Andal maintains that the motion for inhibition did not cite any
valid grounds to justify his inhibition.
b. He also said he was not aware of such cases filed against him and that
he does not have anything against petitioner since he did not know him
personally.
c. He also claimed that he doesn’t have the luxury of time to resent such
cases since he had a lot of cases to worry about.
d. He said that the claim for damages was without basis and is purely
speculative and imaginary.
ISSUE: WON the Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion?
– NO.
HELD:
1. The Court held that there was no grave abuse of discretion since the motion did
not cite any valid grounds, which was also admitted by petitioner. (SEE NOTES)
a. Petitioner merely stated that the judge knew of the cases, therefore he
denied such motion out of resent.
2. Court also agreed with the Solicitor General that the state of hostility brought up
by petitioner was purely imaginary.
a. There was no manifestation of such hostility.
b. Judge had no time to entertain such emotions due to the case load he
was handling.
c. The judge does not normally resent such filing of cases since he filed
them too when he was still practicing.
3. The Court has held that mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari
commenced in relation to a case pending before the lower court, does not
interrupt the course of the latter when there is no writ of injunction restraining it.
4. Also, the mere filing of an administrative case does not interrupt proceedings,
since this may be abused and all cases pending would not be solved.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is entitled to damages under Art. 32? – NO.
1. First, the Court said that there was no violation of such right since the denial of
the motion was not whimsical and was done in a regular manner.
2. In Aberca v. Ver, we postulated thus: "The purpose of the above codal provision
is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and freedom enshrined in
the constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred
rights with impunity." Under said article judges are excluded from liability,
provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code
and other penal statute.
RULING: Petition DENIED. Petitioner was also REPRIMANDED for conduct
unbecoming of an officer of the court.
NOTE:
On his claim for damages against Judge Andal in these same proceedings, the
petitioner-lawyer invokes Art. 32 of the Civil Code which provides in part:
Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following
rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial,
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witness in his behalf:
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
Rule 137, Section 1 of the new Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Disqualification of Judges — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any
case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor
or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according
to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or
decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record.
 PEOPLE v. LIPATA
Independent Civil Actions | April 20, 2016 Carpio, J.
FACTS:
1. Appellant Lipata was charged with murder for the death of one Ronaldo Cuenco
who was stabbed to death. Appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the charge.
2. The Evidence of the prosecution
a. Mercelinda Valzado, sister-in-law of victim, testified that she was
about leave the house to go to the market when she saw appellant, his
brther Lipata and a certain Rudy attacking the victim by repatedly
stabbing him. She recalled that the assailants used a tres cantos, an ice
pick and a broken piece of glass of Red Horse. The victim managed to
take the knife away from appellant and brandished the same at his
attacked but later fell to the ground. He was rushed to the hospital but
was pronounced dead on arrival.
b. Criz Cueno, daughter of the victim, testified that she saw Lipata
together with Larry Lipata and Rudy Lipata stab her father to death in
front of their house.
3. Evidence of the Defense
a. Presented a sole witness in the person of appellant himself. Acccording
to appellant, he was resting in his house when two children, namely
Jon and a certain Rommel called him and told him to help his brother,
Larry Lipata. He immediately rushed to his brother and upon arrival he
saw Larry being stabbed by the victim. He instantenously assisted his
brother but the victim continued stabbing Larry, causing himt o fall to
the gorund. Appellant then managed to grab the knife from the victim
and stab the victim. He later fled because he was wounded. He was
brought to the hospital for treatment where he was apprehened by
police officers
4. The RTC noted htat since appellant raised the justifying circumstance of defense
of a relative, he hypothetically admitted the commission of the crime. Hence, the
burden of proving his innocence shifted to appellant. RTC found that the defense
failed to adequately establish the element of unlawful aggression, one of the three
elements for self-defense. There was no imminent or actual danger to the life of
appellant or of his brother Larry. On the contrary, the three Lipata brothers
employed teachery and took advantage of their superior strength when they
attacked Cueno. Cueno suffered 17 stab wounds which is inconsistent with the
defense of a relative.
5. CA agreed with the RTC and dismissed the appeal.
6. Appellant died prior to final judgment. Hence, the Court required the aprties to
submit their supplemental briefs on the civil aspect of the case if they so desire.
7. PAO manifested that considering the civil liability arose from and is based solely
on the act complained of (murder), the same does not survive the death of the
deceased appellant. Hence, the civili liability is extinguished because of the death
of appellant.
HELD:
1. Because of appellant’s death prior to the promulgation of the CA decision, there
is no further need to determine appellant’s criminal liability. Appellant’s death
has the effect of extinguishing his criminal liability under Artcile 89(1) of the
RPC.
2. As to the civil liability, the Court in People v. Bayotas, reconciled the differing
doctrines on the issue of WON the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his civil liability. In Bayotas, the SC concluded that upon
the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused,
the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso
facto extinguished grounded at it is on the criminal
3. The Court also ruled that if the private offended party, upon extinction of the
civil liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission
complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111, and file a separate civil
action predicated not only on the felony but on other sources of obligation.
4. The Court then proceeded to distinguish the defendants among the different
causes of action. If the act or omission complained of arises from quasi delict or
by provision of law, results in an injury to person or real or personal property,
the separate civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator of the
estate pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 of the ROC. HOWEVER, if the act or
omission complained of arises from contract, the separate civil action must be
filed against the estate of the accused pursuant to Section 5, Rule of the ROC.
5. To Summarize: (1) Death of accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely
thereon; (2) the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than
delict (laws, contract, quasi contract, quasi-delict); (3) where the civil liability
survives, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing
a separate civil action and subject to section 1, Rule 111 of the ROC, enforceable
against executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the
source of obligation and (4) Private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of
his right to file this separate civil action by prescription in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to extinction,t he private offended
party instituted together therewith the civil action. The statute of limitations on
the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case.
6. The promulgation of the Revised ROC in 2000 provided for the defect of the
death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal
action, reflecting Bayotas.
7. Contrary to PAO’s Manifestation, Cueno died because of appellant’s fault.
Appellant caused damage to Cueno through deliberate acts. Appellant’s civil
liability ex quasi-delicto may now be pursued because appellant’s death, before
the promulgation of final judgment, extinguished both his criminal liability and
civil liability ex delicto.
8. Despite the recognition of the survival of the civil liability for claims under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the current Rules, pursuant ot
Bayotas, require the private offended party, or his heirs, in this case, to institute
a separate civil action to pursue their claims against the estate of the deceased.
The independent civil actions under Arts. 32, 33, 34 and 2176 as well as claims
from sources of obligation other than delict, are not deemed instituted with the
criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without
reservation. The separate civil action proceeds independently of the crimil
proceedings and requires only a preponderance of evidence. Civil action which
may thereafter be instituted against the state or legal representatives of the
decedent is taken from the new provisions of Section 16 or Rule 3 in relation to
the rules for prosecution claims against his estate in Rules 86 and 87.
9. Upon examination of the submitted pleadings, we found that there was no
separate civil case instituted prior to the criminal case. Neither was there any
reservation for filing a separate civil case for the cause of action arising from
quasi-delict. Under the present Rules, the heirs of Cueno should file a separate
civil case in order to obtain financial retribution for their loss. The lack of a
separate civil case for the cause of action arising from quasi-delict leads us the
conclusion that, a decade after Cueno’s death, his heirs cannot recover even a
centavo from the amounts awarded by the CA.
 SPS CIRSTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPS. LITO and MARIA
SANTOS v. CA, HEIRS OF MABASA, and RTC
Independent Civil Actions | April 20, 2016 Carpio, J.

FACTS:
1. Plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa died during the pendency of the case and was
substituted by Ofelia Mabasa his surviving spouse. The plaintiff owns a parcel
of land with an apartment erected thereon. Plaintiff was able to acquire said
property through a contract of sale with Sps. Rayos and Quintero as vendors.
Said property may be described
2. When said property was purchased y Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the
premises and who were acknowledged by plaintiff as tenants. However, one of
said tenants vacated the apartment asd when plaintiff Mabasa went to see the
premises, hesaw that there had been built oan adobe fence in the first
passeageway making it narraoweder in