Special Data Feature

Journal of Peace Research

2017, Vol. 54(4) 574–587
Organized violence, 1989–2016 ª The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343317718773
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Marie Allansson, Erik Melander & Lotta Themnér
Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Uppsala University

Abstract
The dramatic increase in the number of fatalities in organized violence, seen between 2011 and 2014, did not
continue in 2015 and 2016. Rather, the notation of some 131,000 fatalities in 2014 was followed by a steep decline,
with just below 119,000 in 2015 and a little over 102,000 fatalities in 2016. Despite the decrease, the number was
the fifth highest during the entire 1989–2016 period. Most of the fatalities – over 87,000 – were incurred in state-
based conflicts, the main driver behind the trend. Just as the number of fatalities, the number of state-based conflicts,
albeit remaining on a high level, continued to decrease in 2016, going from 52 to 49, with 12 of them reaching the
level of war, with at least 1,000 battle-related deaths. Also the non-state conflicts dropped in number in 2016, from
73 to 60. This was followed by a decrease in the number of fatalities, and only one conflict caused more than 1,000
deaths. Twenty-one actors were registered in one-sided violence, down by five from 2015. A number this low has
only been recorded twice before; in both 2009 and 2010, 21 one-sided actors were listed in UCDP data. The number
of fatalities also decreased, going from almost 9,800 to a little over 6,000.

Keywords
data, non-state conflict, one-sided violence, organized violence, state-based armed conflict, war

Introduction one of the parties is the government of a state, that is,

This is the second year that the annual update from the
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) presents trends
in not only state-based armed conflict, but also non-state
conflict and one-sided violence.1 The three categories are
coded as mutually exclusive and can be aggregated as
‘organized violence’.2
Organized violence 1989–2016
The three subcategories of organized violence share the
same intensity cut-off – 25 fatalities in a calendar year.3
State-based armed conflict includes all cases where at least
1
For full definitions of all key concepts, see the Online appendix.
2
The data for all three categories included in organized violence go
back to 1989; for state-based armed conflict, they extend back to
1946.
3
It is worth noting that as soon as a dyad/actor has exceeded the 25-
fatality cut-off, all violent events involving this dyad/actor are
recorded and coded and made available in UCDP’s georeferenced
event dataset, UCDP GED, and also for years when the violence
did not cross the threshold.
armed conflicts between states and within states (govern-
ment vs. a rebel group). They include cases ranging from
small-scale conflicts, only active briefly (e.g. the
attempted coup in Lesotho in September 1998), to
large-scale wars that rage for many decades (e.g. the gov-
ernment conflict in Afghanistan, active on a high-
intensity level since 1978). Non-state conflicts include
fighting between rebel groups, militias and drug cartels
such as the conflict between the Islamic State (IS) and
Taleban, raging since 2015 in Afghanistan. It also con-
tains conflicts between informally organized groups,
notably between groups with a common identification
along ethnic, clan, religious, national, or tribal lines.
Examples include interethnic violence between Birom
and Fulani and between Fulani and Tiv in Nigeria’s
Middle Belt. Finally, One-sided violence entails the tar-
geted killing of unarmed civilians, by states (e.g. the
Afghan Taleban government’s excessive killing of
Corresponding author:
lotta.themner@pcr.uu.se
Allansson et al.
civilians, particularly in 1998, when it consolidated its
control over the northern areas of the country), or for-
mally organized non-state groups (e.g. the Ugandan
rebel group LRA’s massacres across northern Uganda,
eastern DR Congo, Central African Republic, and South
Sudan).
Building on conflict theory, UCDP defines state-
based armed conflict around political issues, that is,
incompatibilities concerning government and/or terri-
tory that are disputed by force by two parties, of which
at least one is the government of a state. (For full defi-
nitions, see the Online appendix.) Hence, state-based
armed conflicts are political in this central aspect. In
contrast, there is no requirement of any identifiable
incompatibility in the definition of non-state conflict,
which involves the use of armed force between two orga-
nized armed groups, neither of which is the government
of a state. This means that what would typically be
thought of as criminal violence, for example, turf wars
between drug cartels, may show up in the non-state
conflict category. However, much lethal criminal vio-
lence will never enter UCDP figures since the intensity
threshold – at least 25 deaths between the same two
organized groups in one calendar year – is not met, or
because many of the criminal deaths are impossible to
attribute to any identifiable actor. Thus, state-based
armed conflict captures violent political conflict, whereas
some criminal violence is coded as non-state conflict.
Neither is there any requirement of any identifiable
political issue in the definition of one-sided violence.
Sometimes one-sided violence happens as part of crimi-
nal activities, for example the numerous targeted killings
of civilians by the drug cartel Los Zetos in Mexico. Yet,
both non-state conflict and one-sided violence often
happen in close connection to wider political conflict.
Figure 1 reveals that the dramatic increase in the total
number of fatalities seen between 2011 and 2014 did not
continue in 2015 and 2016.4 Rather, the notation of
some 131,0005 deaths in 2014 – second only to the
death toll in 1994, the year of the Rwandan genocide
– was followed by a steep decline, with just below
119,000 in 2015 and a little over 102,000 fatalities in
4 7
The decline was also visible for violence involving al-Qaida, IS, and
affiliates, which was discussed in Melander, Pettersson & Themnér
(2016). An updated version of the figure presented in said article
(Figure 5), displaying fatalities in organized violence and separating
out al-Qaida, IS, and their affiliates, is available in the Online
appendix.
5
Figures used in the text are UCDP’s best estimates. For a definition
of different fatality estimates, see the Online appendix.
575
Figure 1. Fatalities in organized violence by type, 1989–2016
2016. However, despite this drop, the number remains
one of the highest recorded in the entire time period.
State-based conflict 1946–2016
Since the end of World War II, 600 dyads have been
active in 280 conflicts in 157 locations.6 Corresponding
numbers for the post-Cold War period are 357 dyads in
171 conflicts in 93 locations.
There were 49 conflicts active in 2016,7 down by
three from the previous year,8 which, together with
1991, was the peak year of the period. With this, the
increase in the number of active conflicts, recorded since
2013, was broken. The steepest rise in the number of
conflicts from one year to the next was between 2014
and 2015, from 42 to 52. This was driven almost com-
pletely by developments relating to the expansion of the
Islamic State (IS) (Melander, Pettersson & Themnér,
2016). This expansion did not continue at the same rate
in 2016. While two new countries were challenged by
the Islamist group (Jordan and Pakistan), four of the
6
Last year we incorrectly reported 159 locations due to a faulty pivot
table. UCDP counts incompatibilities concerning government,
territory, or both. While a state can only experience one intrastate
conflict over government in a given year, it can be a primary party in
several armed conflicts over government and/or territory.
For a full list of state-based conflicts in 2016, see Appendix 1.
8
Last year, we reported 50 active conflicts for 2015. Based on new
information we have added two conflicts for this year: between the
Algerian government and Jund al-Khilafah; and between the Turkish
government and IS. Tables 1–2, Figure 1, the UCDP Conflict
Encyclopedia (www.ucdp.uu.se), the UCDP Dyadic Dataset, and
the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset have been amended
accordingly.
576 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 54(4)

60 45
40
50
35
40 30

30 25
20
20
15
10 10
5
0
1946
1949
1952
1955
1958
1961
1964
1967
1970
1973
1976
1979
1982
1985
1988
1991
1994
1997
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
0

1946
1949
1952
1955
1958
1961
1964
1967
1970
1973
1976
1979
1982
1985
1988
1991
1994
1997
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
2015
Extrastate Interstate Internationalized intrastate Intrastate
Minor armed conflict War

Figure 2. State-based armed conflict by type, 1946–2016

Figure 3. State-based armed conflict by intensity level,
conflicts active in 2015 did not continue in 2016 1946–2016
(Algeria, Chad, Lebanon, Yemen). The two new con-
flicts were not the result of either the formation of new particularly so since the new millennium. Since the turn
IS groups or the pledge of allegiance from additional of the century, as many as seven years have passed with
groups, which is what spawned the 2015 expansion. no conflicts fought between states, and the remaining ten
Rather, they were simply the consequence of an already years have seen either one or two active conflicts. While
established IS group crossing the border into a different the India–Pakistan conflict has been active intermit-
state. Furthermore, in most of the conflicts that contin- tently during these years, the one fought over Eritrea’s
ued to rage, IS was on the back foot. This reinforces the and Ethiopia’s contested common border was last active
notion that transnational jihadist groups are actually less in 2000. Despite the signing of an accord in that year,
formidable fighting forces than the media depicts them the two states have failed to agree on the demarcation of
to be, a theme explored with UCDP data in last year’s the border and the relationship between them remains
article (Melander, Pettersson & Themnér, 2016). In IS’s tense. In 2008, the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia
heartland in Iraq and Syria, the year 2016 saw the Isla- and Eritrea was disbanded and since then there have
mists lose control of key cities and areas. In June, the been numerous rumors of border skirmishes, but these
Iraqi commander leading the fight to recapture Fallujah have rarely been possible to verify. In 2016, tensions
declared the battle to be over and in October, Iraqi forces heightened, and came to a head on 12 June, when a
initiated an offensive aiming to retake Mosul, IS’s last battle erupted, involving medium- and long-range artil-
major stronghold in the country. As for Syria, several of lery. While reliable information on the fighting was dif-
the Islamists’ main strongholds were under pressure, ficult to come by, this time both parties agreed that the
such as Palmyra and Raqqa, and NATO estimated that fighting actually took place, with both sides accusing the
the group had lost 20% of its territory since its peak in other of initiating the two-day battle.
2015 (Mesterhazy, 2016). Moreover, the group’s West Of the 47 intrastate conflicts, as many as 18, or 38%,
Africa wing continued to suffer military setbacks in were internationalized, in the sense that external states
Nigeria, Cameroon, and Niger, and was even further contributed troops to one or both sides in the conflict.
weakened by internal splits within the movement (more Both this number and share are very high, seen in the
on this in the section on one-sided violence). In Libya, IS post 1946 context, second only to one other year: 2015,
suffered a substantial blow when the government in with 20 internationalized conflicts (39%). The prolifera-
December succeeded in recapturing Sirte, after a seven- tion of internationalized conflicts is worrying, since
month-long offensive. Under pressure in Iraq and Syria, research has shown that external troop involvement
Libya in general, and Sirte in particular, had served as a tends to both make conflicts more lethal and prolong
retreat for IS’s leadership and fighters. The city had also them (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline & Joyce, 2008; Lacina,
been the only city controlled by the group outside of Iraq 2006).
and Syria, and was considered its North African capital. In 2016, 12 conflicts reached the intensity of war,
Of the 49 conflicts, two were fought between states: with at least 1,000 battle-related deaths. An increase by
Eritrea–Ethiopia and India–Pakistan. As can be seen in one from 2015, this number is high seen over the most
Figure 2, the number of interstate conflicts has been low recent decade, but not in a longer perspective. As can be
throughout the entire 1946–2016 period, and seen in Figure 3, the 1980s was the decade worst hit by
Allansson et al.
Table I. The ten most conflict-affected countries in terms of fatalities, 1989–2016
Country Total no. of fatalities 1989–2016 state-based conflict
Rwanda 520,602
Syria 280,880
Afghanistan 180,860
Ethiopia 176,913
Iraq 106,722
DR Congo (Zaire) 102,192
Sudan 91,897
Sri Lanka 65,372
India 54,413
Nigeria 47,630
wars, with the number ranging between nine and 16, the
mean being 13 wars.
Looking beyond the number of wars to the number of
battle-related deaths, Figure 1 reveals that the decrease
seen in 2015 continued in 2016.9 With a death toll of
almost 105,000 in the state-based category, the year
2014 was the most violent year in the entire post-Cold
War period. That year, the peak of an unprecedented
increase in fatality numbers was recorded (Pettersson &
Wallensteen, 2015), driven mainly by an escalation of
the conflicts in Syria, but also by increasingly heavy
fighting in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and
Nigeria. Fatality numbers then dropped, to almost
98,000 in 2015, and then to a little over 87,000 in
2016.10 Despite this substantial decrease, the number
remains at an exceptionally high level for the post-Cold
War period, second only to the years 2013–15.
A little less than half of the fatalities recorded for state-
based conflicts in 2016 were due to the conflicts in Syria,
which caused over 40,500 fatalities, down by almost
5,000 from 2015. Thus, the overall decrease was mainly
due to developments in Syria. UCDP records three state-
based conflicts in the country: one over government
power, one against IS, fighting for the establishment of
an Islamic State, and one against the coalition SDF
9
Battle-related deaths are those incurred in direct fighting between
the parties to the conflict, in guerilla tactics and bombings, and also
those civilians that were caught in the cross-fire. For more on this, see
the Online appendix.
10
While the overall trend – driven by events in Syria – was that of a
decrease, conflict intensity remained or even escalated in other war-
torn countries. For example, in Afghanistan, the total number of
fatalities in the two wars fought increased and, at over 17,900,
reached a level not recorded before in the post-Cold War period.
Also the war in Iraq remained at a very high level of intensity in
2016, with more than 11,500 fatalities.
577
Fatalities in Fatalities in Fatalities in
non-state conflict one-sided violence
6,567 0 514,035
256,625 16,384 7,871
168,547 3,005 9,308
167,383 6,573 2,957
87,207 2,986 16,529
22,790 12,630 66,772
51,401 20,861 19,635
61,265 613 3,494
37,498 5,192 11,723
14,057 18,887 14,686
(Syrian Democratic Forces), which includes numerous
groups, with goals ranging from ousting the government
to control over Rojava, the Kurdish name for the north-
ern region of Syria. The conflict over government has
throughout been the deadliest, causing over 27,000 of
the 40,500 deaths in 2016. It was followed by the con-
flict between the government and IS, with some 13,200
fatalities. The SDF conflict was by far the smallest, with
around 150 battle-related deaths. The decline in the
number of deaths from 2015 to 2016 was entirely driven
by developments in the conflict over government power.
The reason for the decline was mainly due to a reduction
in fighting from 27 February and for some months,
resulting from a ceasefire. The ceasefire was part of a
negotiated deal, based on United Nations Security
Council Resolution 2254, passed in December 2015. It
did not include all active rebel groups, and attacks on IS
and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (commonly called al-Nusra)
continued. While ravaged by difficulties from the start,
the ceasefire did play a part in reducing the level of vio-
lence in March–May. However, despite this decrease in
fatalities, the conflict was still by far the deadliest globally.
As shown in Table I, Syria is the country with by far the
largest aggregate number of casualties in state-based con-
flict after the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, Syria is
only surpassed by Rwanda in total casualties.
Looking at fatality numbers broken down by region,
Figure 4 depicts how the center of gravity has moved
between regions over the time period. Africa saw the
bulk of fatalities in state-based conflicts early in the
period, as well as in the late 1990s, with both peaks
mainly driven by developments on the Horn. In
1989–90, the conflict between the Ethiopian Derg
regime and a range of rebel groups caused high death
tolls, and in 1999–2000 the interstate war between
Ethiopia and Eritrea was reminiscent of bloody World
578 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 54(4)

100% 14000
90% 12000
80%
10000
70%
60% 8000
50% 6000
40%
4000
30%
2000
20%
10% 0

1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
0%
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Europe Middle East Asia
Europe Americas Middle East Asia Africa Africa Asia Total

Figure 4. Fatalities by region as percentage of all fatalities
annually, 1989–2016
War I trench warfare. The region also saw high fatality
numbers in 1997–98, mainly driven by conflicts in DR
Congo, Republic of Congo, and Sudan.
In the first decade of the 21st century, and especially
the years 2006–11, the center of gravity shifted to Asia.
In 2006–07 and onwards, the conflict in Afghanistan
escalated after a period of less intense fighting, causing
large numbers of deaths. Further driving the trend was
the escalation of the conflict between the Pakistani Tale-
ban, TTP (Tehrik-i-Taleban), and the Pakistani govern-
ment from 2008 onwards, as well as the bloody end
phase of the war in Sri Lanka, in 2008–09.
For most of the period, the Middle East was not one
of the regions worst hit by state-based conflict. However,
in 2003, the invasion of Iraq by the USA and its allies
caused large numbers of deaths, and in 2012, the center
of gravity shifted to the region again, and has remained
there ever since. As discussed above, this is by and large
due to the wars in Syria, which escalated steeply in 2012;
the country has remained the deadliest worldwide since
then in terms of battle-related deaths. It is worth noting
that Syria is not the only country in the Middle East hit
hard by conflict, however, as the war in Iraq has caused
more than 10,000 fatalities in all years since 2014, when
it escalated markedly as IS launched a large-scale offen-
sive, quickly seizing large swathes of territory.
Non-state conflict 1989–2016
A total of 624 non-state conflicts have been recorded by
UCDP since 1989, with a yearly average of 36 active
conflicts. The upward trend in the number of active non-
state conflicts, recorded since 2010, did not continue in
2016. In 2016, UCDP recorded 60 such conflicts,11
11
For a full list of non-state conflicts in 2016, see Appendix 2.
Figure 5. Fatalities in non-state conflict, 1989–2016
compared to 73 the previous year. While the number
of non-state conflicts tends to oscillate from one year to
the next, the change from 2015 to 2016 was one of the
most substantial in the entire 1989–2016 period.
Despite the considerable decrease, 2016 still had the
third highest number of non-state conflicts for the period
1989–2016.
Looking at the geographical distribution of non-state
conflicts, the majority of them took place in Africa (33 of
the 60 recorded conflicts in 2016). Africa saw the same
number of conflicts in 2016 and 2015, but the conflicts
were not all the same. Whereas several of the 2015 non-
state conflicts were not active in 2016, a number of new
conflicts erupted in 2016 and several cases reignited.
Some notable examples of the latter were the conflict
between the ethnic groups Anuak and Nuer, in Ethio-
pia, and that between Marakwet and Pokot, in Kenya,
neither of which had been active since the early 2000s.
The Middle East experienced 17 non-state conflicts in
2016, a substantial decrease from the 23 recorded in
2015. This drop can partly be explained by fewer active
non-state conflicts in Syria. The Americas had eight
active non-state conflicts in 2016, a decrease from 12
in 2015. Since 2012, all non-state conflicts in the
Americas have taken place in Mexico. Finally, two
non-state conflicts were recorded in Asia in 2016, both
in Afghanistan, a decrease by three from the previous
year.
As in recent years, the most common type of non-
state conflict in 2016 was between formally organized
groups, such as, for example, rebel groups, militias, and
drug cartels, most notably in Syria and Mexico. UCDP
recorded 38 conflicts between such actors, compared to
22 between informally organized actors, such as ethnic or
religious groups. All of the active non-state conflicts in
the Middle East were between formally organized groups
and all but three were fought in Syria.
Allansson et al.
Figure 6. Fatalities in one-sided violence, by type of actor,
1989–2016
Looking at the number of people killed in this type of
violence, Figure 5 reveals that it was at its lowest in 2005,
at just over 2,100, and peaked in 2014, at nearly 12,900.
From the peak year, it decreased to almost 8,800 in
2016. Despite this decrease, 2016 was the fifth deadliest
year in the 1989–2016 period. In 2016, only one non-
state conflict caused more than 1,000 battle-related
deaths: the one between IS and SDF in Syria.
Even though Africa had considerably more active
non-state conflicts in 2016 than the Middle East, the
number of fatalities in the latter was more than twice
the number for the former, as seen in Figure 5. About
62% of the fatalities recorded in active non-state con-
flicts in 2016 occurred in the Middle East, whereas only
27% occurred in Africa.
One-sided violence 1989–2016
A total of 254 actors in one-sided violence have been
recorded by UCDP since 1989, with a yearly average of
32 active actors. The number tends to vary from one year
to the next, but figures for the last decade indicate an
overall downward trend compared to the 1990s and the
early 2000s; as many as 45 actors were recorded in 2002
and 2003. In 2016, 21 actors carried out one-sided vio-
lence,12 a decrease by five compared to 2015. A number
this low has only been recorded twice before; in both
2009 and 2010, 21 one-sided actors were listed in
UCDP data.
12
For a full list of actors engaged in one-sided violence in 2016, see
Appendix 3.
579
Moving on to the number of fatalities in this type of
violence, UCDP estimates show that at least 6,000 civi-
lians were targeted and killed by a state or a formally
organized actor in 2016. The figure is considerably lower
than in 2015, when nearly 9,800 deaths were recorded.
As shown in Figure 6, the number of deaths in the one-
sided violence category has gone down since 2014. The
2016 figure is further considerably lower than the high
levels of one-sided violence seen in much of the 1990s,
with the peak year of 1994 when hundreds of thousands
of civilians were killed in the Rwandan genocide.
The reduction in recorded fatalities in one-sided vio-
lence from 2015 to 2016 can partly be explained by
developments in Nigeria, where IS and Jama’atu Ahlis
Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (commonly called Boko
Haram) 13 have been weakened. The August 2016
change in regional leadership, which deposed Abubakar
Shekau, also seems to have led to a behavioral shift away
from large-scale attacks against Muslim civilians, to a
focus on Christian civilians (which only make up around
2% of the population in the worst hit areas) and the
military.
A clear majority of the recorded one-sided violence in
2016 was carried out by non-state actors, as opposed to
states, which has been the case in recent years (see Figure
6). Despite the substantial decrease in IS killings in
Nigeria, the group was still responsible for more than
half (61%) of the total number of civilians killed in one-
sided violence. The killings were carried out in several
countries in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, with the
majority taking place in Syria and Iraq.14 Looking at
the period 1989–2016, it is worth noting that IS was
the only non-state actor that was active in multiple
regions during the same year (other groups, for example
al-Qaida, have been active in more than one region, but
not during the same year).
13
In March 2015, Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau pledged
allegiance to the Islamic State, and, upon acceptance, the group
became integrated into the latter. However, in August 2016, the IS
central command announced a change in the leadership for its West
Africa province, effectively deposing Shekau. With this, Shekau and a
faction of the group re-formed Boko Haram, and for the last five
months of the year, the two were both active in the region.
14
While the number of recorded IS incurred fatalities in one-sided
violence in Iraq was high, it does not capture the many civilians killed
in, for example, the battle over Mosul. These fatalities are instead
recorded as part of the state-based category due to a UCDP coding
rule that establishes that all deaths from cross-fire, shelling, etc.
should be recorded as battle-related deaths. The same applies for
Syria, where the bulk of civilian fatalities are coded in the state-
based category for this exact reason, and only a fraction as one-sided.
580
Conclusion
The total number of fatalities in organized violence
declined in 2016, from just below 119,000 in 2015 to
a little over 102,000. This means that the world has seen
a decline of more than 20% in the number of fatalities in
the two years following the latest peak in 2014, when the
number of people killed was around 131,000. Despite
this good news, the number in 2016 was the fifth highest
during the entire 1989–2016 period, and we have no
way of knowing if this two-year reduction will become a
new downward trend. As in all previous years except
1994, when the Rwandan genocide took place, the trend
in fatalities is driven mainly by state-based armed con-
flicts. Of the 47 intrastate conflicts active in 2016, as
many as 18, or 38%, were internationalized, in the sense
that external states contributed troops to one or both
sides in the conflict.
Replication data
The complete datasets (UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict
Dataset, UCDP Dyadic Dataset, UCDP Battle-Related
Deaths Dataset, UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset, and
UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset) updated to 2016
are found at http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/. Older ver-
sions of these datasets can also be found at this address
(all datasets) and www.prio.no/cscw/armedconflict (the
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset). The tables and
figures in this article were created directly from the Excel
sheets available at the UCDP web page. Detailed
descriptions of the individual cases are found in the
UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia at www.ucdp.uu.se.
Replication data for this article can be found both at
http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ and https://
www.prio.org/jpr/datasets/.
Acknowledgements
Numerous colleagues in Uppsala have contributed to the
data collection, notably Simon Pierre Boulanger Martel,
Mihai Croicu, Emma Elfversson, Garoun Engström,
Daniel Finnbogason, Helena Grusell, Stina Högbladh,
Gabrielle Lövquist, Henrik Persson, Therese Pettersson,
Margareta Sollenberg, and Samuel Taub. Also summer
interns Sebastian Hellberg and Victoria Lecomte were of
journal of PEACE RESEARCH 54(4)
great help. A special thanks for comments on the first
draft by Gabrielle Lövquist, Therése Pettersson and
Anders Themnér. We are grateful to Martin Tegnander
for assistance with designing Figures 1 and 6.
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ERIK MELANDER, b. 1969, PhD in Peace and Conflict
Research (Uppsala University, 1999); Professor at the
Department of Peace and Conflict Research and Director of
the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Uppsala University;
articles published in journals such as Journal of Conflict
Resolution, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Peace
Research, and Journal of Gender Studies; forthcoming book
The Peace Continuum: What It Is and How To Study It
(coauthored with Christian Davenport & Patrick Regan,
Oxford University Press).
LOTTA THEMNÉR (previously Harbom), b. 1975, MA in
Peace and Conflict Research (Uppsala University, 2002);
project leader, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department
of Peace and Conflict Research: articles on conflict data
published in the Journal of Peace Research and SIPRI
Yearbook since 2005; editor of States in Armed Conflict
between 2004 and 2012.
Allansson et al. 581

Appendix 1. State-based armed conflicts active in 2016

This list includes all conflicts that exceeded the minimum threshold of 25 battle-related deaths in 2016 and fulfilled
the other criteria for inclusion.1 The column Year shows the latest range of years in which the conflict has been active
without interruption. The start year is found in parenthesis in the Incompatibility column, which indicates when the
armed conflict reached 25 battle-related deaths for the first time. If a conflict has been inactive for more than ten years or
if there has been a complete change in the opposition side, the start year refers to the onset of the latest phase of the
conflict. For more complete information on the conflict- and dyad history, see (a) the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict
Dataset and the UCDP Dyadic Dataset at http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ and (b) the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s
online conflict encyclopedia at www.ucdp.uu.se. The column ‘Intensity in 2016’ displays the aggregated conflict
intensity in terms of the number of battle-related deaths. Thus, if more than one dyad is active in the conflict, the
intensity column records their aggregated intensity. Three fatality estimates are given in the table: low, best and high.
Appendix 1.
Intensity in 2016

Location Incompatibility Opposition organization(s) in 2016 Year Low Best High

EUROPE
Azerbaijan
Territory (Nagorno- Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh2 2014–16 141 141 263
Karabakh) (1991)
Russia Territory (Islamic IS (Islamic State) 2015–16 64 66 82
State) (2015)
Ukraine Territory DPR (Donetsk People’s Republic), LPR 2014–16 246 255 285
(Novorossiya) (Lugansk People’s Republic)3
(2014)
MIDDLE EAST
Egypt Territory (Islamic IS 2015–16 268 268 272
State) (2015)
Iraq Government4 (2004) IS 2004–16 11,280 11,508 11,925
Jordan Territory (Islamic IS 2016 34 34 35
State) (2016)
Syria Government5 (2011) Syrian insurgents 2011–16 15,664 27,235 27,235
Syria Territory (Islamic IS 2013–16 7,027 13,205 13,205
State)6 (2013)
Syria Government/ SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) 2016 158 158 159
Territory (Rojava
Kurdistan) (2016)
Turkey Government (2016) TAK (Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistan: Kurdistan 2016 399 402 402
Freedom Falcons), YSK (Yurtta Suhl Konseyi:
Peace at Home Council)
Turkey Territory (Islamic IS 2015–16 1,153 1,190 1,173
State) (2015)
Turkey Territory (Kurdistan) PKK (Partiya karkeren Kurdistan: Kurdistan 2015–16 1,070 1,070 1,080
(1983) Worker’s Party)
Yemen Government (2009) Forces of Hadi7 2009–16 2,534 2,536 2,582
ASIA
Afghanistan Government8 (1978) Taleban 1978–2016 14,408 15,777 21,669
Afghanistan Territory (Islamic IS 2015–16 2,100 2,141 2,544
State)9 (2015)
Bangladesh Government (2016) JMB (Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh) 2016 39 39 39
India Government (1991) CPI-Maoist (Communist Party of India-Maoist) 1996–2016 240 264 319
India Territory (Kashmir) Kashmir insurgents10 1990–2016 281 281 296
(1990)
India Territory (Western UNLFW (United Liberation Front of Western 2015–16 44 44 66
South East Asia) South East Asia)
(2015)
(continued)
582 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 54(4)

Appendix 1. (continued)

Intensity in 2016

Location Incompatibility Opposition organization(s) in 2016 Year Low Best High

India, Territory (Kashmir) 2014–16 67 67 79
Pakistan (2014)
Myanmar Territory (Arakan) HaY (Harakah al-Yaqin: Faith Movement of 2016 82 84 133
(2016) Arakan)
Myanmar Territory (Kachin) KIO (Kachin Independence Organization) 2011–16 31 32 47
(2011)
Pakistan Government11 TTP (Tehrik-i-Taleban Pakistan: Taleban 2007–16 543 545 545
(2007) Movement of Pakistan)
Pakistan Territory BLA (Baluchistan Liberation Army), UBA 2011–16 89 89 89
(Balochistan) (United Baloch Army)
(2004)
Pakistan Territory (Islamic IS 2016 68 68 68
State) (2016)
Philippines Government (1969) CPP (Communist Party of the Philippines) 1999–2016 92 92 101
Philippines Territory ASG (Abu Sayyaf Group), BIFM (Bangsamoro 1993–2016 295 322 337
(Mindanao) Islamic Freedom Fighters)
(1972)
Thailand Territory (Patani) Patani insurgents12 2003–16 49 50 50
(2003)
AFRICA
Algeria Government (1991) AQIM (al-Qaida Organization in the Islamic 1991–2016 82 86 91
Mahgreb)
Cameroon Government (2015) Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad 2015–16 32 32 32
(People Committed to Propagating the
Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad)13
Cameroon Territory (Islamic IS 2015–16 189 189 206
State) (2015)
Congo Government (2016) Ntsiloulous 2016 51 51 51
Eritrea, Territory (Common 2016 25 25 200
Ethiopia border) (2016)
Ethiopia Territory (Ogaden) ONLF (Ogaden National Liberation Front) 1998–2016 25 25 50
(1993)
Ethiopia Territory (Oromiya) OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) 2015–16 25 25 292
(1977)
Kenya Territory Al-Shabaab (The Youth) 2015–16 49 49 83
(Northeastern
Province and
Coast) (2015)
Libya Territory (Islamic IS 2015–16 1,596 1,678 2,709
State)14 (2015)
Mali Government15 Ansar Dine, AQIM (al-Qaida Organization in 2012–16 96 96 111
(2009) the Islamic Mahgreb)
Mozambique Government (2013) Renamo (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana: 2016 26 26 26
Mozambican National Resistance)
Niger Territory (Islamic IS 2015–16 274 274 281
State)16 (2015)
Nigeria Government17 Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad 2011–16 177 177 193
(2009) (People Committed to Propagating the
Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad)
(continued)
Allansson et al. 583

Appendix 1. (continued)

Intensity in 2016

Location Incompatibility Opposition organization(s) in 2016 Year Low Best High

Nigeria Territory (Islamic IS 2015–16 2,210 2,213 2,311
State)18 (2015)
Rwanda Government19 FDLR (Forces démocratiques de libération du 2016 129 129 129
(2001) Rwanda: Democratic Liberation Forces of
Rwanda)
Somalia Government20 Al-Shabaab (The Youth) 2006–16 1,199 1,925 3,116
(2006)
South Sudan Government (2011) SPLM/A In Opposition (Sudan People’s 2011–16 710 710 1,130
Liberation Army/Movement In Opposition)
Sudan Government (1983) SRF (Sudan Revolutionary Front) 1983–2016 1,308 1,314 2,326
Uganda Government21 ADF (Alliance of Democratic Forces) 2013–16 132 132 133
(1980)
AMERICAS
Colombia Government (1964) ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional: National 1964–2016 30 30 30
Liberation Army)
USA Government22 Al-Qaida (The Base) 2001–16 117 117 146
(2001)
Total number of battle-related deaths in 2016 66,948 87,266 98,726
1
See Online appendix for definitions.
2
The Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh was supported by troops from Armenia.
3
DPR and LPR were supported by troops from Russia.
4
The Iraqi government was supported by troops from Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Jordan, Netherlands, Saudi
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and United States of America.
5
The Syrian government was supported by troops from Iran and Russia.
6
The Syrian government was supported by troops from Iran and Russia.
7
Forces of Hadi was supported by troops from Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and United Arab
Emirates.
8
The Afghan government was supported by troops from Pakistan and United States of America.
9
The Afghan government was supported by troops from Pakistan and United States of America.
10
A large number of groups have been active. Some of the groups active in 2016 were Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed.
11
The Pakistani government was supported by troops from Afghanistan.
12
E.g. BRN-C (Barisan Nasional Revolusi-Coordinate), GMIP (Gerekan Mujahideen Islam Pattani), and RKK (Runda Kumpulan Kecil).
13
Commonly called Boko Haram.
14
The Libyan government was supported by troops from United States of America.
15
The Malian government was supported by MINUSMA, involving troops from Armenia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, China, Congo, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia,
Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, Indonesia, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Liberia, Lithua-
nia, Madagascar, Mauritania, Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Rumania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sweden, Switzerland,
Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America, and Yemen. France also contributed troops via the French-led counter-
terrorism Operation Barkhane, which succeeded Operation Serval (2013–14).
16
The Nigerien government was supported by troops from Chad and Nigeria.
17
The Nigerian government was supported by troops from Cameroon.
18
The Nigerian government was supported by troops from Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.
19
The Rwandan government was supported by troops from DR Congo.
20
The Somali government was supported by AMISOM, involving troops from Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra
Leone, and Uganda. Also United States of America contributed troops on the side of the government.
21
The Ugandan government was supported by troops from DR Congo.
22
The US government was supported by troops from Afghanistan and Pakistan.
584 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 54(4)

Unclear cases of state-based armed conflict in 2016

Cases that have been completely rejected because they definitely do not meet the criteria of armed conflict are not
included in the list below. For the conflicts listed here, the available information suggests the possibility of the cases
meeting the criteria of armed conflicts, but there is insufficient information concerning at least one of the three
components of the definition: (a) the number of deaths, (b) the identity or level of organization of a party or (c) the
type of incompatibility. The unclear aspect may concern an entire conflict or a dyad in a conflict that is included
above.

Location/
government Opposition organization(s) Unclear aspect
Angola FLEC-FAC (Frente da libertação do enclave de Cabinda-Forças armadas de Cabinda: Front No. of deaths
for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda-Armed Forces of Cabinda)
Burundi FOREBU (Les Forces Républicaines du Burundi: Republican Forces of Burundi), RED- Identity of
Tabara organization
DR Congo Kamwina Nsapu Incompatibility
Philippines Maute group Incompatibility
Somalia Forces of Abdiqadir Mumin Incompatibility
Tunisia IS (Islamic State) Identity of
organization

Appendix 2. Non-state conflicts active in 2016

This list includes all non-state conflicts that exceeded the minimum threshold of 25 deaths in 2016 and fulfilled the
other criteria for inclusion.1 The column ‘Start year’ shows the first year when the non-state conflict caused at least 25
fatalities (since 1989). The column ‘Fatalities in 2016’ displays the number of people killed, in the low, best and high
estimate.

Appendix 2.
Fatalities in 2016

Location Side A Side B Start year Low Best High

MIDDLE EAST
Syria Ahrar al-Sham, FSA (Free Syrian IS (Islamic State) 2016 110 110 113
Army), Jabhat Fateh al-Sham,
Jaysh al-Islam
Syria Ahrar al-Sham Jund al-Aqsa 2016 40 40 43
Syria Ahrar al-Sham, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) 2016 44 44 84
Syria Ahrar al-Sham, Jabhat Fateh IS 2016 221 223 223
al-Sham, Southern Front
Syria Fatah Halab IS 2015 84 84 84
Syria Fatah Halab SDF 2015 196 213 214
Syria Fatah Halab, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham SDF 2015 74 74 74
Syria FSA, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, Jaysh SDF 2016 25 25 26
al-Islam, Levant Front
Syria Hawar Kilis Operations Room IS 2016 556 560 570
Syria Hawar Kilis Operations Room SDF 2016 127 129 140
Syria, Lebanon IS Jabhat Fateh al-Sham 2014 124 124 152
Syria IS NSA (New Syrian Army) 2016 25 25 25
Syria IS SDF 2015 2,868 2,870 2,895
(continued)
Allansson et al. 585

Appendix 2. (continued)

Fatalities in 2016

Location Side A Side B Start year Low Best High

Syria Jaysh al-Islam, Jaysh Asoud al- Tahrir al- Sham Army 2016 100 100 101
Sharqiya, Martyr Lieutenant
Ahmed Abdou Brigades, Rahman
Corps
Syria Mare’ Operations Room IS 2015 56 56 59
Yemen AQAP (al-Qaida in the Arabian Forces of Hadi 2015 321 322 323
Peninsula)
Yemen IS Forces of Hadi 2015 404 404 412
ASIA
Afghanistan IS Taleban 2015 167 181 201
Afghanistan Taleban High Council of Afghanistan Islamic 2015 184 184 370
Emirate
AFRICA
CAR anti-Balaka, FPRC (Front populaire UPC/Ali Darass Fulani supporters 2016 29 29 29
pour la renaissance de (Union pour la Paix en
Centrafrique: Popular Front for Centrafrique: Union for Peace in
the Rebirth of the Central African the Central African Republic)
Republic)
CAR FPRC UPC/Ali Darass Fulani supporters 2016 124 124 124
DR Congo Baluba Batwa 2016 82 82 112
DR Congo Hutu Nande 2016 58 58 65
DR Congo APCLS (Alliance des patriotes pour NDC-Rénové (Nduma Défense du 2016 73 73 73
un Congo libre et souverain: Congo – Rénové: Reformed
Alliance of the People for a Free Nduma Defense of Congo),
and Sovereign Congo), FDLR UPDI-Mazembe (Union des
(Forces démocratiques de Patriotes pour la Défense des
libération du Rwanda: Democratic Innocents-Mazembe: Union of
Liberation Forces of Rwanda), Patriots for the Defense of the
Nyatura Innocents – Mazembe)
Ethiopia Anuak Nuer 2002 28 28 64
Ethiopia Murle Nuer 2006 150 150 216
Ivory Coast Fulani Koulango, Lobi, Malinké 2016 33 33 33
Kenya Marakwet Pokot 2001 30 30 30
Libya Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Forces of the House of 2014 230 230 287
Council Representatives
Libya Derna Mujahideen Shura Council Forces of the House of 2016 29 29 29
Representatives
Libya Derna Mujahideen Shura Council IS 2015 65 65 65
Libya Forces of the House of IS 2015 86 87 152
Representatives
Libya SRF (Sudan Revolutionary Front) Subol Al-Salam Brigade 2016 44 44 44
Mali Bambara Fulani 2016 28 28 37
Mali CMA (Coordination des GATIA (Groupe autodéfense 2016 50 51 104
Mouvements de l’Azawad: Touareg Imghad et alliés: The
Coordination of Azawad Self-defence Group of Imghad
Movements) Touareg and its Allies)
Nigeria Agatu Fulani 2013 154 154 372
Nigeria Black Axe Eyie 2011 52 52 53
Nigeria Christians (Nigeria) Muslims (Nigeria) 1991 115 127 148
Nigeria Fulani Bwatiye 2016 58 58 63
(continued)
586 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 54(4)

Appendix 2. (continued)

Fatalities in 2016

Location Side A Side B Start year Low Best High

Nigeria Fulani Tiv 2011 210 210 289
Nigeria Igbo Fulani 2016 58 58 58
Nigeria IS Yan Gora 2015 34 34 34
South Sudan Lou Nuer Murle 2006 101 101 101
South Sudan Maban Uduk 2016 48 48 86
South Sudan Panyar Dinka Waat Dinka 2016 62 62 62
South Sudan Panyar Dinka, Rek Dinka Waat Dinka 2016 86 86 86
Sudan Awlad Omran clan Awlad Serur (Misseriya) 2016 43 43 43
Sudan Falata Salamat Baggara 2015 45 45 45
Sudan Ma’aliyah Rizeigat Baggara 2002 27 27 27
Sudan Mahadi Rizeigat Abbala 2016 26 26 26
Sudan Masalit Rizeigat Baggara 2016 39 39 39
Uganda Bakonzo Bamba 2016 30 30 30
AMERICAS
Mexico Beltrán Leyva Cartel Sinaloa Cartel 2008 68 68 285
Mexico Gulf Cartel Los Zetas 2010 42 42 49
Mexico Jalisco Cartel New Generation Los Zetas 2011 197 197 197
Mexico Jalisco Cartel New Generation Sinaloa Cartel 2015 145 145 145
Mexico Juarez Cartel Sinaloa Cartel 2004 59 59 59
Mexico Los Ardillos Los Rojos 2015 62 62 177
Mexico Los Zetas - Cártel del Noreste faction Los Zetas - Old School Zetas faction 2016 43 43 43
Mexico Los Zetas - Jorge Ivan Hernandez Los Zetas - Juan Pedro Salvador 2016 48 48 48
Cantu faction Saldivar Farias faction
Total number of fatalities in non-state conflicts in 2016 8,717 8,773 10,138
1 See Online appendix for definitions.

Appendix 3. One-sided violence in 2016

This list includes all cases of one-sided violence that exceeded the minimum threshold of 25 fatalities in 2016 and
fulfilled the other criteria for inclusion.1 The column ‘Start year’ shows the first year when one-sided violence caused
at least 25 fatalities (since 1989). The column ‘Fatalities in 2016’ displays the number of civilians killed, in the low,
best and high estimate.

Appendix 3.
Fatalities in 2016

Location Actor Start year Low Best High

MIDDLE EAST
Iraq Government of Iraq 1990 78 108 111
Iraq, Syria, IS (Islamic State) 2004 3,494 3,718 4,041
Nigeria2
Syria Syrian insurgents 2012 29 29 30
Turkey TAK (Kurdistan Freedom Falcons: Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistan) 2016 37 37 37
ASIA
Afghanistan, Taliban 1996 149 149 285
Pakistan
India CPI-Maoist (Communist Party of India-Maoist) 2005 93 93 104
(continued)
Allansson et al. 587

Appendix 3. (continued)

Fatalities in 2016

Location Actor Start year Low Best High

Pakistan TTP (Tehrik-i-Taleban Pakistan, Taleban Movement of Pakistan) 2007 230 230 233
AFRICA
Burkina Faso, AQIM (al-Qaida al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Maghrib al-Islami, al-Qaida 2004 39 39 45
Ivory Coast, Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb)
Mali
Central African 3R (Return, Reclamation, Rehabilitation) 2016 50 50 50
Republic
Central African FPRC (Front populaire pour la renaissance de Centrafrique: Popular 2013 37 37 37
Republic Front for the Rebirth of the Central African Republic)
Central African FPRC, MPC/Al Khatim rebels (Mouvement patriotique de Centrafrique: 2016 37 37 37
Republic Patriotic Movement for the Central African Republic)
Central African UPC/Ali Darass Fulani supporters (Union pour la Paix en Centrafrique: 2014 58 58 58
Republic Union for Peace in the Central African Republic)
DR Congo ADF (Alliance of Democratic Forces) 1997 174 174 191
DR Congo UPDI-Mazembe (Union des Patriotes pour la Défense des Innocents– 2016 73 73 73
Mazembe)
Ethiopia Government of Ethiopia 1989 266 266 272
Nigeria Government of Nigeria 1990 71 71 71
Nigeria, Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad 2010 193 193 210
Cameroon
Somalia, Kenya Al-Shabaab 2008 99 109 123
South Sudan Government of South Sudan 2012 110 110 144
South Sudan SPLM/A In Opposition (Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement In 2013 41 41 41
Opposition)
Sudan Government of Sudan 1989 437 439 498
Total number of fatalities from one-sided violence in 2016 5,795 6,061 6,691
1 See Online appendix for further information regarding definitions.
2 The vast majority of the violence took place in these three countries. However, killings were also registered in Afghanistan, Bangladesh,
Belgium, Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, France, Germany, Lebanon, Libya, Niger, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Yemen.