GRAY Arms Race Phenomenon PDF

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The Arms Race Phenomenon

Author(s): Colin S. Gray
Reviewed work(s):
Source: World Politics, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Oct., 1971), pp. 39-79
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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THE ARMS RACE PHENOMENON
By COLIN S. GRAY*
DEFINITIONS AND FUNCTIONS
SINCE the i850's therehas been intermittent but alwaysrenewed

intereston thepartof politicians, academics,and journalistsin the
particularaspectof interstate rivalrygenerallytermedan "armsrace."
Despitethe longevityof concernand the eclecticism of approach,the
primeimpetusbehindtheinquirythathas resultedin thisarticleis the
sad truththat aside fromsomewhatbanal and highlyquestionable
hypotheses we reallyknow verylittleabout arms race phenomena.
This analysiswill attempta systematic investigationof some of the
mostimportant aspectsof the subject.
It is organizedforinquiryintothe followingareas: typology, strat-
egies,outcomes,and hypotheticalexplanationsof the dynamicele-
mentsdrivingthe phenomenon.
Two observations mustprefacean attemptat definition. It should
be notedthatarmsracesdo not occuronlybetweenstatesor coalitions
of states.Those whoseeyesare firmly fixedon thegreatissuesof inter-
statepoliticstend to neglectintrastate violenceand preparations for
violence. This is probablythe mundane yet correctexplanationforthe
interstatefocusofpractically all writingrelatedto armsraces.The con-
currentarmingof the Ulsterand IrishVolunteersbetweeni910 and
1914 would appearto be as cleara case of a competitive armsrelation-
ship as we could wish for.Second,in practiceit is extremely difficult
to distinguish betweendecisionstakenprimarilyto have effectupon
the external,competitive armssituationof a stateand thosedecisions
thatare takenprimarilyfor domesticreasons.1However,thesedeci-
sions,whetherexternallyor internallyinduced,may properlybe re-
gardedas being of importanceto the armsrace. An armsrace com-
petitor,seekinga particularstateof militarybalance,will probably
not be able to ignorean opponent'sactivityon the ground that he
believesit to be inward-as opposedto outward-looking.2
* For theirhelpfulcomments upon an earlierdraftof thisarticle,I would like to
expressmy thanksto my formercolleaguesat LancasterUniversity, England,partic-
ularlyto MartinEdmonds,David Holloway,PeterNailor,and David Travers.
1 This complicationis exploredin Bruce M. Russett,What Price Vigilance?The
Burdens of National Defense (New Haven i97o), particularly13, 178.
2This pointrefersto the classicdilemmaof intentions versuscapability.It would
seem to me that,in the currentsuperpowerarms race, defensedecisionstaken to
appeasedomesticlobbiesmay have the same consequencesas if theywere unambig-
40 WORLD POLITICS
At thisjunctureit is sensibleto makea veryminimalcondition for

theexistenceof an armsracerelationship; notably, thatthereshould
be two or morepartiesperceiving themselves to be in an adversary
who are increasing
relationship, or improving theirarmaments at a
rapidrateand structuring theirrespective military postures witha
generalattention to thepast,current, and anticipated militaryand
behavior
political of theotherparties.3 In short, actorsmaymarchto
thebeatof theirowndrumsand pursuea logicof military develop-
mentand deployment thatis strictly
domestic; butthisactivitymay
serveas an armsrace "trigger" forotheractors.Indeed,it can be
arguedthata competition maybe sustained at a highleveland ac-
celeratedbythefactthattheparties do notsharea commonstrategic
logic.
Todaythesuperpowers arelockedintoa deterrent relationship,
the
of
stability which dependsupon theirboth maintaining a sufficiency
of military preparation. However,the Sovietnotionof sufficiency
mayincludethedeployment ofMIRV and ABM technologies forthe
missionsof preemption and homelanddefense.Americandoctrine
doesnotcurrently listthesemissions as beingdesirable.As indicated
in thedefinition,themilitary preparations of an arms"racing"state
willbe conducted witha generalconcern fortheactivitiesof certain
preselected A rigidpattern
parties. in theaction-reaction of competi-
tivearmament as a limiting definitionofthearmsracephenomenon
shouldnotbe implied;sucha hypothesis is simplyone explanation
of thepossiblereasoning behindarmsexpenditure.4
uously competitive in the arms race context. A somewhat more optimistic view is
provided by N. Petersen, "The Arms Race Implications of Anti-BallisticMissile De-
fences," in C. F. Barnaby and A. Boserup, eds., Implications of Anti-BallisticMissile
Systems,PugwashMonographii (London I969), 40.
3 Alternativedefinitionsmay be found in ibid., 40; Samuel P. Huntington, "Arms
Races: Pre-Requisitesand Results," in Carl S. Friedrich and Seymour E. Harris, eds.,
Public Policy, 1958 (Cambridge, Mass. i958), 4I; Arthur L. Burns, "A Graphical
Approach to Some Problems of the Arms Race," The Journal of ConflictResolution,
iII (December 1959), 326; Urs Schwarz and Laszlo Hadik, Strategic Terminology: A
Trilingual Glossary (New York i966), 35; Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute,SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament, i968169 [here-
aftercited as SIPRI Yearbook] (Stockholm i969), 44. The definitionsof these authors
are all too exclusive; Huntington and Burns stress the interstatenature of arms race
phenomena, Schwarz and Hadik require participants to endeavor to stay ahead in
the race, and the SIPRI authors equate an arms race with the "action-reaction
phenomenon."
4The debate over the various ABM decisions announced by the U.S. Govern-
ment since September i967 has drawn attentionto the possible role of differentkinds
of Soviet-American interactivepatterns in strategic armaments. The strongest state-
ment endorsing an action-reactioninterpretationof the superpower arms race is to be
found in George W. Rathjens, "The Dynamics of the Arms Race," ScientificAmeri-
can, ccxx (April i969), particularlythe diagram on 24. On the other side, consider-
THE ARMS RACE PHENOMENON 41
Thereis so muchconfusion attaching to armsracedefinitions that

it maybe helpful to clarifythebroaddefinition offeredabovebylist-
ing the basicconditions foran armsrace.
(i) Theremust be twoormoreparties, consciousoftheirantagonism.
(2) They muststructure theirarmedforceswithattention to the
probable effectiveness oftheforcesin combatwith,or as a deter-
rentto,theotherarmsraceparticipants.
(3) Theymustcompetein termsof quantity(men,weapons)and/
or quality(men,weapons,organization, doctrine,deployment).
(4) Theremustbe rapidincreases in quantity and/orimprovements
in quality.
All fourof thesefactors mustbe present forthereto be anyvalid
assertion thata particular relationshipis an armsrace.
The questionof thegenesisof armsracesis one thatmerits some
attention. Leavingasidetheoptionofa disarmed neutrality,in seeking
nationalsecurity a statewill eitherpursuesupporting alliancesor it
willseektoamassarmaments, essentiallywithinitsownterritory. This
simpleideal typology mustallow fortwo qualifications. First,the
choiceofroadsto thenationalsecurity is,byand large,a forcedone;
second,statepolicywillprobably be mixed-thatis to say,therewill
be a measure bothof allianceacquisition and of armaments increase.
Naturally, thisdiscussion refersto a groupof decision-makers who
perceive an adversary and decidethatmeasures fordefensemustbe
taken.At leastin theory, we can conceiveof a rulingelitedeciding
uponthepursuit ofa competitive armspolicyin orderto attainglory,
prestige, domestic politicaltranquillity,
or theenrichment ofdomestic
industrial allies.The problemthatis in needof empirical investiga-
tion is why stateshave in fact offeredand acceptedarms race
challenges.
It is possiblethatan armsracemightdevelopwithout therebeing
anydriving A
politicalantagonisms. quite autonomous arms increase
maybe matched bya fairly disinterestedparty,solelyas a precaution-
arymove,and hencea cycleofcloseor intermittent armament inter-
actionsandpreviously unappreciatedpoliticalantagonisms mayensue.
Priorto theopeningroundsofan armsrace,theeventual competitors
able scepticismconcerningthe action-reaction cycle may be found in Laurence

W. Martin,BallisticMissile Defence and the Alliance,The AtlanticPapers (Paris
i969), 25; WilliamT. Lee, "The RationaleUnderlying SovietStrategicForces,"I42-
78, and Richard B. Foster, "The SafeguardBMD Proposal and Arms Control
Prospectsfor the I970'S," 242-77, in William R. Kintner,ed., Safeguard:Why the
ABM Makes Sense (New York i969); JeremyJ. Stone,"When and How to Use
'SALT,'" Foreign Aflairs,XLVIII (January I970), 262-73.
42 WORLD POLITICS
are not in a situationof zero armaments. Everyarmsrace openswith

a particularratioof militaryforces.The importanceof existingdis-
paritiesin armslevelsforthe decisionto engagein a race mustawait
further investigation.
On thosemanyoccasionswhenreliablealliesare not available,states
have been encouragedeitherto issue an arms race challenge,or to
acceleratepreviouslylow-geararms race activity, followingupon an
apparentmilitary-technological opportunity. This opportunitymay
take the formof diminishedactivityby the rivalor, morelikely,the
successful development of a technology thatoffers to negate,or render
of less significance,
an existingquantitativeor qualitativeimbalance.
As examplesof this,we could cite France versusEngland in the
i840's and i85o's; GermanyversusEngland afteri906; and the Soviet
Union's missiledevelopmentand procurement policyin the middle
i950's and from i963 to 1970.
This lastexampleis a verycontentious one. It has been arguedthat
thegreatincreaseand improvement in theSovietICBM's and SLBM's
(submarine-launched ballisticmissiles) apparentin the late i960's
reflected decisionstakenin the period I96I-I965.' Thus, the building
programshave reflecteda sustaineddetermination to match and
perhaps to out-buildthe United States. A different interpretation
would be that the Soviet Union was encouragedto challengethe
Americanlead by the quantitative restraintshownby the Americans
afteri964. This latterview is a directrepudiationof the idea thatan
arms race may be restrainedby the operationof a "sympathetic
parallelism."'
With regardto the functionsof a competition, we may choose to
view an arms race as an alternativeto war, to be planned,waged,
and then won or lost-with due reward or punishment.A more
apocalyptic viewwouldbe thatan armsraceis notan alternative to war,
but is a preparationforwar. Thus, insteadof an arms race being a
bloodlessritualof preparation,7it is a raceforthatmeasureof military
superiority thatwould allow forthe exploitation of armsrace victory
in war-wagingsuccess.
The choiceof an overallview of an armsrace is directlydependent
upon the major empiricalreferents. The introductionof nuclear
5See Lee (fn. 4), i68-71, and Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, I945-
1970 (Baltimoreig7o), chap. i6.
6Ibid., 503-504; Lee (fn. 4), 147; Foster (fn. 4), 259-60.
7 Paul Smoker, "Fear in the Arms Race: A Mathematical Study," in James Rosenau,
ed., International Politicsand ForeignPolicy (New York i969), 579.
weaponshas madea veryconsiderable difference to the conductof

an armsrace.Indeed,one leadinginterpreter of LewisRichardson's
theoryofarmsraceshasdeveloped Richardson's ideaofsubmissiveness,
originally appliedto the inter-war period,withthe argument that
nuclearweaponshaveintroduced an unprecedented fearfactorinto
the pOst-1945 nucleararmsrace.8However,even if we grantthe
quantumjumps in the time-scale of contemporary war and the
destruction thatcouldbe imposedbynuclearweapons,it wouldstill
be a grossoversimplificationto assertthatpriorto 1945 armsraces
weremoreoftenthannotseriouspreparations forwar,whereassince
1945 armsracesinvolving nuclearpowersare essentially a formof
diplomatic remotefromconsiderations
activity, of the conductand
termination of war. Two vitalcomplications mustbe noted.First,
in
competition missiles, sinceat leasti959, bearsan important resem-
blancetoracesbetween landforces priorto 1945. Bothkindsofraces
are whatcan be termed"damped"or "non-self-aggravating" arms
races.9In otherwords,theneededratioof offense to defenseis such
thata strategy of militarily
exploitable superiorityis prohibitively
expensive.10 ratiorequired
The traditional foroffensive landforcesuc-
cesswas 3:i, and therequirement fora successful nuclearfirststrike
has,sincethe mutualSovietand Americandeployments of second-
strikemissiles, beenequallydifficult
to attain.The relatively low cost
8Ibid., 573. Armsracescomprisea singleclass of phenomenain international rela-
tionsand (withdue caution)a comparative analysisof differentarmsraceswill yielda
measureof generalwisdom.Withrespectto theempiricalbase of the article,thebulk
of the historicalillustrationsrefersto the followingarms races: England-France and
Russia (naval, i884-i904, withItalian,German,and Austro-Hungarian complications);
England-Germany (naval, Phase I, i898-1905, Phase II, i906-1914); England-United
States-Japan(naval, i9i8-1922, withmanycomplications-principally France
respecting
and Italy;also,it couldbe arguedthatthenatureof theWashington Treatyrestrictions
causeda redirection ratherthana termination of therace); SovietUnion-United States
(all categoriesof armaments, fromi946 to thepresent, withChinesecomplications after
i964). Otherracesare verybriefly mentionedin thetext.A detailedinventory of arms
races,by type,awaitsthe attentionof a further study.As may be deducedfromthe
breadthof the definitionofferedin the text,the arms race phenomenonis far
moreprevalentthanmanystudentsof politicswill commonlyallow. See Huntington
(fn. 3), and Quincy Wright, A Study of War, ii (Chicago 1942), 690. Itemization is
dependentupon definition.Huntington's"duel" focusfor arms races and Wright's
upon the "general"natureof recentracesrenderstheempiricalbasesof both
insistence
workssomewhatsuspectto me.
9See Malcolm W. Hoag, "On Stability in Deterrent Races," World Politics, xiii
(Julyi96i), 515.
10Providedthe word "exploitable"is qualified,it presentsno problems.However,a
SenateReportin i968 referred to theunqualifiedand mystifying notionof "exploitable
See U.S. Senate,Committee
superiority." on ArmedServices,Preparedness Investigating
Subcommittee,Status of U.S. StrategicPower [hereaftercited as Status of U.S. Strategic
Power], goth Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washington i968), 3.
44 WORLD POLITICS
tothedefense ofoffsettingan offensivebuild-uphasbeena stabilizing

factorin thesuperpower armsrace.
The secondcomplication is relatedto uncertainty concerning the
armsraceviewsof theSovietleadership. In thecurrent superpower
armsrace,theidea of itsbeingmorea ritualthana preparation for
war has been steadfastly resistedby the Sovietmilitary and also,
inferentially,bySovietpoliticians.Thispointis indicated bythekinds
of defensepreparation the military havebeenpermitted to develop
and maintain, thefactthatif thearmsraceis largelya
and reflects
ritualcompetition governedby such factorsas military-industrial
interestsand possibly unforeseen technical advancesand mutualmis-
perception, thenthisentire fieldofendeavor mustbe labelledwasteful
and irrelevant or,at worst,positivelyharmful to thenationalsecurity.
Consciously or unconsciously, Sovietarmsrace strategy has stressed
preparation forwar,evento theextentof pursuing linesof develop-
ment,procurement, and doctrine that,according to Westerntheory,
couldonlyaggravate thearmsrace.Examplesofthispointhavebeen
theapparent Sovietindifferenceto America's "assured-destruction" re-
quirements by the pursuitof activemissileand passivepopulation
defenses.Also,thereis no evidence thatSovietleadersarereluctant to
developand deploymultiple warheadson thegroundsof armsrace
"instability."The basicSovietpositionwouldappearto be thatthe
almostexclusively offensivedeterrence doctrineof theUnitedStates
in thei960's was a greatmistake, comparable withsimilarly mistaken
strategiesin thepastthatstressed a singlecombination of arms(for
example,Blitzkrieg). Sovietmilitary doctrineholdsthatso long as
nuclearwar is possible, indeedwe mightsayprobable, thenonlya
balancedoffense-defense strategic-forceposture hope to insure
can
thesurvival of Sovietsociety.It is nottoo extreme to maintainthat
theSovietmilitary leadership has neverconvincingly deniedthepos-
of victory
sibility in a nuclearwar.
It mayperhapsbe grantedthattheSovietUnionplansto employ
itsstrategicforcesonlyin a defensive mode,thatis,in a preemptive or
a secondstrike. However,theritualviewof thearmsracedoesnot
excludethepossibility thatcrisisbehaviormaybe influenced by in-
dividualperceptions of relativestrategic calculated
positions, possibly
in crudearithmetic, orbyfeelings thatarequiteunrelated to prospec-
tivesuccessin war. In short,the ritualof war-preparation, though
(at leastin theWest) distantfromconsiderations of theconductof
war,maybe farfrommeaningless.
AN ARMS RACE TYPOLOGY
The term"typology" maybe thesourceof someconfusion.I do not

suggestthatthereare ten typesof arms races.My argumentis that
everyarmsraceis capableof beinganalyzedin termsof each category
of distinction.
Thus thepotentialnumberof typesof armsrace is the
numberof different combinationsof featuresthat can be extracted
fromtheten categories. This numberof typesof armsrace is greatly
enlargedby the certaintythatsome competitorswill have distinctive
featuresin theirarmsracebehavior.For example,one competitormay
be racingin only a singleweapon category,and anothercompetitor
may decide thatprudenceindicatesthe value of acquiringa mix of
quite distincttypesof weapon.
(I) NUMBERS: BILATERAL/MULTILATERAL/BILATERAL "CONNECTED" (OPEN

SYSTEM) /UNILATERAL
An argumentgivenconsiderableprominenceby Samuel Hunting-

ton was to the effectthattherecould be no such thingas a general
arms race; that in factall races were duels.1"This line of thinking
holds that any appearance of multilateralcomplexitydisguisesa
seriesof duels. The courseof post-WorldWar II international rela-
tions,down to the explosionof China's firstatomicbomb in October,
i964, inclinesthe contemporary analystto a positionof sympathyfor
the bilateralargument.However,the prospectfor the I970's is that
the international systemwill have to accommodatean increasingly
tri-polarnuclearbalance.12Donald Watt has demonstrated convinc-
ingly,fromthe evidenceof the I920's and I930's, thatall arms races
are not necessarily bilateral.13Even if we use Samuel Huntington's
empiricalbase, the evidenceof Britain'snaval relationswith France
and Russia,and thenaval relationsof FrancewithItalyand Germany
in the earlyi890's, suggesta complexityof naval buildingstandards
thatdefiesan exclusively bilateralinterpretation.14
The possibility of a bilateral"connected"or open systemarmsrace
refersto a situationin which thereare onlytwo adversaries, building
in the relevantcategoriesof weapons only againsteach other,whose
11 Huntington(fn. 3), 42.
12 has been well-explored
This possibility by HarryGelber,"The Impactof Chinese
ICBM's on Strategic Deterrence," in Kintner (fn. 4), I79-206.
13 Donald C. Watt, "The Possibility of a Multilateral Arms Race: A Note," Inter-
nationalRelations,ii (October i962), 372-77, 397.
14 See Sir Herbert Richmond, Sea Power in the Modern World (London
1934), 123.
46 WORLD POLITICS
bilateral
competition maybe stimulated by a seriesof trigger-events
originatingquitebeyondthesystem of theirarmscompetition. This
viewis easierto sustainifwe areanalyzing somegrossand undiffer-
entiatedmeasure of defense preparedness(forexample, percentage of
GNP allocatedto or expendedupondefensefunctions), ratherthan
oneor severalcategories ofmajorweaponsystems. It shouldbe noted
thatno setof armsraceadversaries can conducttheirexternaland
domestic policiesas iftheylivedin a "two-person" world.Othercon-
flictsmay triggera preparedness reaction.An interesting develop-
mentof thisargument is thewidelyacknowledged budgetaryphe-
nomenonof "fairshares." Thus,it is conceivable thatforthesakeof
bureaucraticharmony theAir Forcemightreceivea "compensation
package"(possiblyof armsrace relevance)becausethe Armyand
the Navy have expandedto fighta distantlimitedwar.
The finalpossibility amongthesedistinctions of numerical arms
raceparticipation is theapparentabsurdity of a unilateralarmsrace.
This possibilitycould referto a situation in whichone side was
"spurting"towarda levelof strength proclaimed by theotherto be
The unilateral
sufficient. natureof the racewouldofcoursebe spuri-
ous.For a timethepartycurrently aheadcouldeschewquantitative
competition,butmight,and probably would,be pursuing a qualita-
tivecompetitionso as tosecurea favorable technological andindustrial
positionforthenextround.Also,therehavebeensituations in which
a powerfeltboundtocompete withan adversary whobuilttoa legally
predetermined rhythm andwhoconsistently deniedthatitwasracing.
The fixedtempoof buildingprovidedby the GermanNavyLaws
of i898 and i900 Laws of
and the Supplementary i906, i908, and
I912placedGreatBritain, in theposition
at leastsuperficially, ofcon-
armsraceagainstan adversary
ductinga unilateral notsusceptible
to
"panics"or "holiday"proposals.15
(2) QUANTITATIVE/QUALITATIVE/QUALITATIVE-QUANTITATIVE
Logicrequires be sharply
thatthedistinction drawnin theory be-
andqualitative
tweenquantitative races.16
However, foran analysis to
haveanycontemporary itmustbe statedclearly
relevance thatall arms
15 Amongthemosthelpful guidesto Anglo-German naval rivalryare Jonathan Stein-
berg,Yesterday'sDeterrent: Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet (London
i965); E. L. Woodward, Great Britain and the German Navy (London i964, firstpub].
I935) and ArthurMarder,From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, I: The Road to
War, I904-I9I4 (London i96i).
16See Huntington (fn. 3), 65-79.
raceshave had both quantitative aspects.17

and qualitative A race
betweenrivalresearchand development
communities wouldbe no
arms race. The i968 Senate Report,Status of U.S. StrategicPower,
madethispointveryforcefully. "Forcesin beingarerequired to deter
a potentialaggressor. Pursuitof R and D to developoptionsand
hedgesagainstfuturethreats is a logicaland economical approach
totheproblem, butsuchoptions areonlytherawmaterial forthehard
decisionson deployment."18
The definitions of armsracephenomena thatstresstheminimum
condition of therebeinga competitive increment in armaments are
committing an important error.Forexample, although a state'sICBM
inventory mightshowno increment overa periodofyears, as a result
of"product improvement," thecapability ofthisinventory mighthave
beenverysubstantially enhanced. This comment is applicableto an
analysisof the succession of modelsof theMinuteman and Polaris
missiles.In practice,the quantitative and qualitative aspectsof an
armsraceinteract in an intricatemanner.It mightbe arguedthata
racemarkedby a rapidsuccession in generations of weaponsis not
a qualitativerace,but is a seriesof reasonably distinctquantitative
races.19
However, suchan assertion wouldbe misleading in itsattempt
to understate the importance of technical improvement.
One'sviewas tothedominance ofthequantitative orofthequalita-
tiveelementin armsracesis a directresultof the empirical base
selected.The beliefof SamuelHuntington thatmostarmsracesare
likelyto be single-weapon restsupon thefactthatthereare
races20
periods,perhaps lastingseveralyears, in whichthedesignofthemost
advancedweaponry is in a stateof flux,followedby relatively long
periodsofquantitative competition baseduponthequalitative plateau
attained.This argument would termAnglo-German naval rivalry
fromi905 to I9I4 an essentiallyquantitative race,despitetheintroduc-
tionof the Dreadnought and the super-Dreadnought, withgreater
displacement, witha heaviercaliberof mainarmament, a different
fuel (oil insteadof coal), and a greaterspeed.Similarly, notwith-
17 "Today's 'arms race' is qualitativeratherthan quantitative."
This commentby
Dr. Edward Teller would be endorsedby mostcontemporary strategicanalysts.U.S.
Senate,Committee on ForeignRelations,Subcommittee on InternationalOrganization
and Disarmament Affairs,Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems,
[hereaftercited as Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems], Hear-
ings,Part II, gist Cong., ist Sess. (Washingtoni969), 517. See also SIPRI Yearbook
(fn.3), chap.2.
18Status of U.S. Strategic Power (fn. i0), 2.
9Huntington (fn. 3), 71. 20 Ibid., 52.
48 WORLD POLITICS
thedisruptive
standing undercurrents
of multiple-warhead
and ABM
technologies,
the periodfromi96i to I970 mightbe characterized
as
a periodof competitive quantitativeincreasein thesecondand third
generations of theICBM. Such a loftydisdainforimprovements of
modelsand sucha one-dimensional viewwoulddo considerable vio-
lenceto history.
A footnote ofpractical relevancehereis that,althoughit maynot
standout in traditionalmeasures of armsraceprogress, competition
in strategic
doctrine, and thechangesin organization and equipment
to whichit can lead,has beenan almosttotallyneglected aspectof
qualitativerivalry.
A possibility thatincorporates featuresof both quantitativeand
qualitativerivalryis thatof an extended deployment race.In other
words,theoverallsizeoftherivalarsenals mayremainstaticand the
modelsmaynothavebeenimproved, buttheremaybe a racetoestab-
lish,initially,
a "presence" in a region,and eventuallytheremaybe
competitive regionalincreases in quantities
of weapons.
(3) PARTICIPANTS: INTER-ADVERSARY/INTER-ALLIED/INTER-SERVICE/
INTER-GROUP
Oneofthemostfruitful toaskis,"Between
questions whomarearms
racesrun?"The obviousand standard answeris, "Betweenmutually
perceived enemies."It is worthnotingthatarmsracebe-
potential
havioris alsodiscernible
in therelationsamongformalallies,among
"sister"services,and among organizedgroupswithinthe same
society.
For theinputsof manpower and treasure requiredby armscom-
theoutputs
petition, in competition
of goal-satisfaction betweenallies
maybe enhancedauthority withinthealliance,or attractiveness
(as
opposedto rival,less well-armedcontenders)to potentialally-
recruiters.
It maybe arguedthatthemostunambiguous exampleofqualitative
weaponscompetition liesnotin interstate butin therelations
relations,
ofthedevelopment programs of"sister"
armedservices.
In sucha com-
the qualityof the weapon,admittedly
petition, amongotherless
reputable shouldresultin a budgetary
criteria, victory reflected
in
favorable aboutprocurement
decisions and operatingresponsibility."
Evena briefglanceat therelations betweentheUnitedStatesArmy
21 For a case study of just such an example see Michael H. Armacost, The Politics of
Weapons Innovation: The Thor-JupiterControversy(New York i969').
and Air Forcesincei955 providesan abundanceof illustration forthis

argument.
Finally,we should not ignore intrasocietalarms competition, al-
thoughthe data on armamentsforthisarea of inquiryare extremely
elusiveand difficult
to interpret.Interesting examplesof competitive
armsrelationshipsare discerniblein the contemporary United States.
MilitantBlack Power groupsand the police have been armingand
counterarming for urban guerrillawarfarefor severalyears.Indeed,
one studyhas gone so far as to referto a racial armsrace.22
(4) EXPENDITURE: ANNUAL ARMAMENTS EXPENDITURE AS A PERCENTAGE
OF GNP INCREASING/ANNUAL INCREASE IN ARMAMENTS EXPENDITURE
INCREASING/ANNUAL ARMAMENTS EXPENDITURE STABLE/ANNUAL
ARMAMENTS EXPENDITURE DECREASING
These distinctionsoffera differentview to the focusupon weapons

in mosthistoricalstudiesof armsrace behavior.They derive,in part,
fromthe mathematicaltheoryof arms races developedby Lewis F.
Richardson. Fundamentalto theRichardsonargumentare theproposi-
tions that each side increasesits armamentsin proportionto the
absolutelevel of the otherside,thatlevel being takenas the measure
of thatstate'shostility,and that therewill be no time-lagbetween
theperception ofhostilityand thereactionto it.The effect ofperceived
hostilityupon the of
rate increase of armaments will be reinforced
by a constant"grievance"factor.In otherwords,thereis an assump-
tionof the interlockingnatureof weaponsdecisions.It maybe useful
to expandupon the writingsof GustaveLe Bon and Harold Lasswell
and to characterizeRichardson'sarmsrace theoryas beingdescriptive
of a formof "crowdbehavior."23 In the Richardsontheory,gross,un-
differentiated
defensestatistics-thelevel of hostility-andtradestatis-
tics-the measuresof friendliness-areboth taken as reflecting pre-
dictablepsychologicalreactionsto the activitiesof the adversary.
Richardson'sachievements includea seriesof writingsthatdisplay
botha paramountconcernforthe scientific, quantitativeinvestigation
of the behaviorof large numbersof individuals(crowds) and a pro-
foundmoral concernfor the unintendedconsequencesof blind psy-
chologicalreactions.More specifically,he developeda seriesof equa-
tions that have inspiredthe inquiriesand methodologyof a large
numberof devoted,thoughcritical,followers.Also, he made explicit
22
Martin Oppenheimer, Urban Guerrilla (London I970, firstpubl. i969), chap. 7.
23Gustave Le Bon, The Crowd (New York i960, firstpubl. i895); Harold Lasswell,
World Politics and Personal Insecurity (New York i965, firstpubl. I935), 63, fn. io.
50 WORLD POLITICS
in hismodelthebasicinterdependence ofarmsexpenditures, a prem-
ise thatunderliesall writings on armsraces-though thereis argu-
mentregarding the directness and the natureof the reciprocity.
Furthermore, he bothdevelopedan explicitly dynamicmodeland
soughtto cutthrough thepotential looseness of verbalidentification
and analysisof thevariables and parameters by concentrating upon
thoseelements he believedcouldbe quantified.
The theoretically
separable categoriesofarmsracesidentified in this
sectionmaybe usefulforcountries whoseofficialstatistics
arereliable,
buttheyare obviously of farlessutility foranyanalysisconcerning
the SovietUnion.24Furthermore, the action-reactionbasis for the
Richardson equationsishighly questionableas an exclusive
explanation
ofarmsraces.It wouldseemthattheanalysis oftotaldefense statistics
is fartoobluntan instrument of inquiryto be veryuseful.25 It may
be interesting
to note,fora particular set of armsraceadversaries,
thefactsconcerning totalincreaseof armaments and percentage of
GNP expendedupondefenseor percapitamilitary expenditure, but
a largesegment ofthedefense budgetmaybe quiteirrelevant to the
armsrace.In otherwords,"internal" or imperial policingdutiesmay
distorta budgetthat,according to thetheory, shouldbe a reflection
of popular"majoradversary-directed" hostility.
Behindthefirsttwodistinctions loomstheRichardsonian identifica-
tionofstable,as opposedto unstable, armsraces.An unstable raceis
one in whichthepartiesmove,at an accelerating rate,awayfroma
pointof defense-expenditure equilibrium. "The two greatEuropean
arms races of I909-I9I4 and I933-39 have been called unstablebe-
cause,themorethecontestants spent,themorerapidlytheyincreased
theirexpenditure."26
Richardson believedthatit is in armsracesin whichthe annual
increasein armaments expenditure is increasing thattheriskof war
approaches thelevelof a certainty.
This conclusion he "proves"by a
presentationof thearmsracestatistics forI909-I9I4 and 1933-I939.
As an indicatorof threat-perception,thelevelof expenditure and
24 See the Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, i969-i970 (London
i969), 5; SIPRI Yearbook (fn. 3), i98-99; William T. Lee, "Calculating Soviet National
SecurityExpenditures,"in U.S. Congress, JointEconomic Committee,Subcommitteeon
Economy in Government,The MilitaryBudget and National Economic Priorities,Part
3: The Economic Basis of the Russian MilitaryChallenge to the United States,Hearings,
gist Cong., ist Sess. (Washingtoni969), 932-34; Russett(fn. i), 8-io, 193-94. For an
overview of this problem area see Pertti Joenniemi,"Aspects on the Measurement of
Armament and Conflict,
Levels,"Cooperation iii (I970), I4I-5I.
25Note the commentson thispoint in Thomas C. Schelling,"War Without Pain, And
Other Models," World Politics, xv (April i963), 474.
26Lewis F. Richardson, Arms and Insecurity (London i960), 74-75.
itsrateofchangeis a usefulthoughimprecise guide,butthereis no

substitute ofthetangledskeinsof defense
fora detailedinvestigation
Forexample,
politics. ofthethreemajorincreasesin Americandefense
expenditure sinceI945-the Koreanrearmament, theKennedybuild-
up, and the Vietnamexpansion-only the Koreanrearmament in-
creasecan unequivocally of the
be assignedto a majorreassessment
threatapparently bytheSovietUnion.The basicinadequacy
presented
oftheRichardsonian equationsand theirdevelopmentsis thefunda-
mentalassumption ofa closeexpenditure in the
interdependence-or,
contemporary The armscompetition
jargon,action-reaction. was ex-
pressedthusby Richardson.
dx = dy =lx-by+h 27
y-ax + g and
dit dit
In responseto the new conditions imposedby nuclearweapons,
LewisRichardson modifiedhis basicequationsso as to takeaccount
or fear-factor
of thesubmissiveness mentionedabove.The new sub-
(s andr) wouldworkto dampentheexplosive
coefficients
missiveness
ofan otherwise
potential armsrace.His new,post-I945
unstable equa-
tionstookthefollowing form.
dx
dxt_ by(I- s(y -x)) -ax + g
dy -Ix (I-r(x-y))-by + h28

cit
The two possibilities identified as stableor decreasing armsrace
expenditures serveto exposethedangersof a concentration uponex-
of two sides,k and I
armaments
27 Wheret is timeand x and y are the respective
being positiveconstantsor defensecoefficients, a and b being positiveconstantsor
g and h representing
fatigueand expensecoefficients, theunchanging levelof grievance
held by each stateagainsttheother.For thebasicand comprehensive statement of the
Richardsontheoryof armsinterdependence chap. II. Important
see ibid.,particularly
criticalanalysesof the Richardsonianworld view may be foundin AnatolRapoport,
"LewisFryRichardson's MathematicalTheoryof War,"The Journalof Conflict Resolu-
tion,I (SeptemberI957), 249-99; AnatolRapoport,Fights,Games,and Debates (Ann
Arbori960), chap.I; KennethBoulding,Conflict and Defense(New York i962); Paul
Smoker,"Trade,Defense,and theRichardson Theoryof ArmsRaces: A SevenNation
Study,"journalofPeace Research,ii (I965), i6i-76; WilliamR. Caspary,"Richardson's
Model of ArmsRaces: Description, Critique,and an AlternativeModel,"International
StudiesQuarterly, xi (March i967), 63-90;MartinC. McGuire,Secrecyand the Arms
Race (Cambridge,Mass. i965), 33-38.Excellentoverviewsof thewholefieldof mathe-
maticalarmsracemodellingare providedby PeterBusch'sAppendixin Russett(fn. i),
I93-233, and by ThomasL. Saaty,Mathematical Modelsof ArmsControland Disarma-
ment(New York i968).
28 See Paul Smoker,"The ArmsRace as an Open and ClosedSystem," Paperpresented
to the4thPeace ResearchConference(Chicago,November7-8,i968), I3.
52 WORLD POLITICS
penditure as a toolforthemeasurement of thevelocity of an arms

race.For the UnitedStates,the i960's show a patternof greatly
diminishing expenditureon strategicforces(followed, admittedly, by
an increasetowardthe end of the decade). This pattern does not
reflect a lossof momentum in armsraceactivity; instead,it reflects
an increasing to "product
attention improvements." The anticipation
of theeventualprocurement of theseimproved products, it maybe
argued,had a considerable effectuponthe SovietUnion.
It is probablethatmostarmsraceparticipants willpassthrough all,
or some,of thesedistinct expenditure phases.The important point
is thatan apparentquiescenceof armsraceactivity, as reflectedin
budgetfigures, maysignify onlythecomparatively low costof sys-
temmaintenance andintenseresearch anddevelopment activity.
(5) SINGLE-WEAPON/MULTI-WEAPON
It is possibleto assertthatmostarmscompetitions, at mosttimes,

havehad as theirfocusthecontemporary dominantweapon,or in
GeneralJ.F.C.Fuller'swords,"the weapon of superiorreach or
range."29 There is certainly much justification for the view that
simple,easilyquantifiable standards of comparison have long been
in demand-inventory comparison ofa singleclassofweaponsis thus
attractiveto theanalyst.
We mightassert thatAnglo-German rivalry afteri905 was a single-
weaponrace:similarly, Soviet-American competition canbe presented
as a seriesofracesin thelatestgeneration ofstrategic weapons.There
hasbeena seriesofqualitative or development races;whatis lesscer-
tainis thatthesuperpowers haveracedto deploythelatestgeneration
of weapons.One of thecomplications, in anyanalysisthatseeksto
present Soviet-American competition as a seriesof finiteraces,is the
factthatthesetwostateshavenothad a commonstrategic doctrine.
The SovietUnionhassoughta balancedposture containing significant
offensive and defensive components, whereasthe UnitedStateshas
beenlessconstrained in itsracingefforts in offensive weaponsbythe
great expense of very extensiveair defenses. A further complication,
in a studyseekingto identify thosecategories of weaponsin which
thesuperpowers have competed, is thatthe SovietUnionchose,in
the mid-ig5o's, to deploya verysignificant continental or regional
I/MRBMforce, towhichtheUnitedStates has not chosen to respond
in kind or in mirror-fashion. The particular mix of offensive and
defensive strategicforcesandthecomposition ofgeneral-purpose forces
29 J.F.C.Fuller,Armamentand History(London I946), 2I.
maybothbe viewedin thesingle-weaponperspective,butthepotential

trade-offs
betweendifferent
systemscontributing to one strategic
mis-
sionrendera multi-weaponapproachmoreappropriate to contempo-
rarySoviet-American
competition.
Anotherexampleof multi-weapon rivalryis provided by thecon-
temporaryArab-Israeli
armscompetition: any analysisof thiscom-
wouldhavetoexaminethebalancesofboththeair (offensive
petition
anddefensive)andthearmored forces.
However, we mustadmitthat
a limitedtrade-off
betweenthesetwo categories of armament is
possible.30
(6) HIERARCHY: SINGLE-TIER/TWO-TIER, "PROXY"/TWO-TIER,
INDEPENDENT/MULTI-TIER
This sectiondrawsattention to the distinctions amongdifferent

degreesof third-party involvement in armsrivalry. It is possibleto
imaginea number ofsuperficially similar,yetdistinct, variantsof the
two-tieredarmsrace.First,we mayidentify a situation in whichtwo
or moreclient-statesor dependent groupsare competing in pursuit
oftheirownobjectives. In thiscontext theseniorsecurity partnersare,
probablysomewhatreluctantly, compelledto maintaina dynamic
localequilibrium.
Second,we mighthypothesize an "armsracebyproxy," wherein the
providea useful,thoughperhapsfairlydispensable,
client-states out-
let fortheambitions of the armsrace"parents." The presentarms
racein theMiddleEastdisplays featuresofbothtwo-tiered armsrace
models:Israeli-American and Egyptian-Soviet relationsprovideex-
amplesofverydifferent degreesof independence of clients.
An exampleoffering greatercomplexity of clients,suppliers,and
motives is thatof theIndia-Pakistan armscompetition. In thiscase,
theUnitedStates,Britain, and theSovietUnioneitherhavesupplied
or are aboutto supplybothIndia and Pakistanwithmajorweapon
systems. China has providedlesserformsof military assistanceto
Pakistan.Of the four interested parties the
beyond subcontinent, only
Chinahas had anyinterest in thesuccessof one of thecompetitors,
and thisinteresthas beendisciplined by a lack of modernweapon
systems to supply.
The finalpointrelatesto thepossibility of therebeinga multi-tier
armsrace.This appliesveryclearlyto intrasocietal conflictssuchas
30
A good explorationof Arab-Israelirivalry(and one thatis explicitlyconcernedwith
the structureof the regional arms race) is to be found in J. C. Hurewitz, Middle East
Politics: The Military Dimension (New York i969), chaps. 24-25.
54 WORLD POLITICS
thosein theCongoand in Biafra,forwhichthearmssupplylinks
maybe long,tortuous,
and, veryoften,apparently
anonymous.
(7) ACTIONS: OFFSET/IMITATIVE/INDEPENDENT
Action-reaction is commonly invokedas theall-purpose, or at least
dominant, modelexplaining thearmsracelogicofactionsthatwould
offset
thelatestoranticipated movesoftheadversary. However, action-
reactionwill serveequallywell, thoughoftenwithless apparent
internal armsracelogic,as an explanation of thoseaspectsof arms
racebehavior whoseresultis theoftenfutileemulation of adversary
action,ratherthanitsneutralization.
An exampleofsuchimitative behavior, byoneinterpretation, would
be theincreased production ratestheUnitedStatesorderedin i955
and i956 fortheB-52in response totheprognoses ofa "bomber gap,"
an activitythatmaybe labelledas foolishly imitative,in thatitreflected
onlya concernforthe respective pre-attack inventory quantities of
strategicbombers.
The relevanceof the distinction betweenoffsetting and imitative
behavior restsupontheavailability of a "menu"of military-technical
Theremaybe periodsin a single-weapon
alternatives.3' armsracein
whichan offsetting actionis simultaneously an imitative action,but
for the Soviet-American competition, the roadsto security are so
diversethatdecisions can be roughly identified and allocatedas ap-
propriate withinthesecategories of action.However,thereare some
complications. On occasions a reaction mayhavebeenintended to be
offsetting,whereasin truthit was imitative withno, or verylittle,
neutralizing effect.Second,imitation maybe a temptation of differ-
ing attractivenessto thetwo sides.
Withregardto theSoviet-American competition, thereis no doubt
thatmilitary-technical development has had a logic of its own-a
logicthat,withinlimits, has beenequallycompelling to bothsides.32
Someofthemajorlimitsherereferred toarebasicdoctrinal preference
for a particular balanceof offense-defense, availableeconomicre-
sources,and themilitary postureindicated by geographical location.
Thus,it mayappearthatin mostcategories of weaponsthe Soviet
Unionhas beenimitating theUnitedStates,whereasa fairerinter-
pretation wouldbe that veryoftensimilar advantages beckoned toeach
31See C. B. Joynt,
"ArmsRaces and theProblemof Equilibrium,"in The Yearbook
of WorldAflairs,i964 (London i9164), 34-35.
32 By way of analogy,it shouldbe recalledthatClausewitzwroteof war: "It has
certainlya grammarof itsown,but its logicis not peculiarto itself."Carl von Clause-
witz,On War,III (London i966, firstpubl. i832), I22.
sideinturn.Thisdiscussiondoessomeviolencetothehistorical
record,
in thatalthoughthetwo sideshave a closelycomparable recordof
the kindsof systems developed,
the decisionsaboutsizablearsenal
acquisitionhavebeenverydifferent indeed.
The thirdpossibilityin thissection,identified
as "independent"
actions,is thatof armsrace movesthatmaywell be reactive, yet
neitheroffset,in a directway,an adversary'sactualor anticipated
capabilitynoremulatehisactivities.
An examplein thiscategorymight
have been the Sovietstressupon high megatonnage in the early
I96o's. 33
(8) EMBRYONIC/ONGOING
Lewis F. Richardson
identified
the periodI945-I946 as one in
which Soviet-American
arms competitionwas in embryonicform.34
The dilatoriness
ofSovietdemobilization
and thesecrecy
withwhich
the UnitedStatessurroundedits atomicprogramwerebothunan-
nouncedand possiblyunrealized
basesforan armscompetition that
wouldverysoonbe widelyvisible.The datetakenbyRichardsonand
his followers
as markingtheopeningof the Soviet-Americanarms
race is I948.
Thereis muchsensein labellinga periodofrisingpoliticaltensions
and military
moves(in theirwidestmeaning),preparatory to a burst
ofarmscompetition,oneofarmsrace"inembryo." An armsracemay
notbeginwiththepublicannouncement of an ambitious weapons-
buildingprogram-aprogram thatbothat thetimeand in retrospect
maybe seenas an unambiguous armsrace challenge, markingthe
openingofthecompetition. Instead, in thewordsofQuincyWright's
A Studyof War,therewillbe "acceleration in all countriesinvolved
of therateof armament growth. A largerproportion of theproduc-
tiveenergyof statesis devotedto military affairs . . . thoughthe
boundarieseitherin time or in space could not be veryclearly
defined."35
Despitethe greatuncertainty attaching to an embryonic period,
furtherresearchmayindicatethatformanyracestherewas a last
clearchancefortheaverting of thecompetition. I discussthispossi-
ofan armsracein embryo
bility becauseitshouldbe emphasized that,
33 An excellenttheoreticalanalysis of the arms race significanceof high-yieldweapons
is in Colonel Glenn A. Kent, On the Interaction of Opposing Forces Under Possible
Arms Agreements,Occasional Paper No. 5, Center for International Affairs,Harvard
University(March i963).
34Lewis F. Richardson, "Could an Arms Race End Without Fighting?" Nature,
CLXVIII (September 29, I951), 567-68.
35Wright(fn. 8), II, 690-9i.
56 WORLD POLITICS
in thesamewaythatacuteinternational
crisesand warsdo notoccur
withoutpreviousstormwarnings,
neitherdo armsraces.
(9) PRIMITIVE/SOPHISTICATED"
In therecentABM debatein theUnitedStates,theprimitive arms

racemodelhas beenadvancedby opponents of theNixonAdminis-
trationas bestcharacterizingthedecisions forSentinel and Safeguard
deployments. A primitive armsraceis one in whicheachparticipant
reactstothemoveofan adversary, withno thought givento theprob-
able effectof thisreaction uponthefuturemovesof the adversary;
hence,thelikelihood ofpositivefeedback is ignored. In contemporary
terminology, a primitiveactionreflects
the"fallacy ofthelastmove."37
A sophisticated armsracewouldbe one in whichall participants
recognized thattheywerein a non-zero-sum gamesituation. They
wouldrealizethatthe armsrace strategies likelyto be pursuedby
adversariesin thenextroundwilldependin partuponthestrategies
selectedforthe current round.Amongthe difficulties thatpresent
themselves forconsideration arethefollowing:(a) apparently primi-
tivearmsracebehavior maynotbe proofofthefollyoftheadversary,
but mayreflect an irresistible
domestic logic; (b) behaviorplanned
withina sophisticated framework maytranspire, in itsconsequences,
to be primitive,becauseits rationaleis insufficiently clearto thead-
versary.Finally,we shouldnotethattheappropriate frameof refer-
enceforconsidering armsracebehavior neednotnecessarily be thatof
a gamesituation in whichthecompetitors havecommonmotivations.
A sophisticated slackening of militaryeffort (a moveguidedby the
theoryof sympathetic parallelism)mightbe rewardedby a grave
militaryimbalance in favoroftheadversary.
(IO) DAMPED/UNDAMPED38
in thiscategory
The principle maybe statedas follows:to some
important thenatureoftheweapon(s)in termsofwhichthe
degree,
areracingwill determine
competitors thevelocityof therace.How-
ever,theimportanceof thedampingfactorwill restnotonlyupon
thenatureof theweapon,but also upon theobjectives
of thecom-
petitors.
In a dampedarmsraceanyattempt at superiority
shouldbe dis-
couraged cost.In otherwords,so longas thecompeti-
byitsexorbitant
36 Schelling (fn. 25), 476.
37 Herbert F. York, "MilitaryTechnology and National Security,"ScientificAmerican,
ccxxi (August i969), 26.
38 Hoag (fn. 9), 508, 5I5.
torwhois behindneedbe outnumbered bythreeor fouror moreto

one in orderforhimto standlittlechanceof survival in war,then
thecostoftheoffense willriseexponentially
bycomparison withthe
costof thedefense. Competition in thecategories
of land forcesand
ICBM's withoutindividually targetable
multiplewarheadsmay be
offeredas examples ofdampedarmsraces.Forthepurposes oftheory,
theforces areassumedto be of an approximate competence. In prac-
tice,faultystrategicand/ortacticaldoctrine
or a catastrophic
failure
in command and controlmighttotallyupsettheexpected outcome.
Undampedarmsraces,in whichthe requiredratioof forcesfor
militaryvictorywouldnotbe prohibitively expensive,mightbe ex-
pectedtobe thoseinvolving navalforces
andballistic
missilescarrying
individuallytargetable multiplewarheads.
ARMS RACE STRATEGIES39
Everyarmsracemustinvolvea processof interaction, eithercon-

tinuousor intermittent,
amonga numberof armsracestrategies. We
cannotnecessarily inferthe intendedstrategiesof participants from
theconsequent dynamic military balance.One sidemayaimfora cer-
tainratioof forcesfavorable to itselfand yetbe compelled, in the
event,tomakethebestofa definite marginin favoroftheadversary.
The strategies
pursued byeachor someofthecompetitors mayvary
overtime,notsolelyas a choiceforcedby unforeseen circumstances,
butalsobecauseperceptions mayalterand hencethestateof thebal-
anceidentifiedas desirable
maychange.
Two terms, aboveall,havedominated recentarmsracediscussion:
sufficiency Bothareemployed
and stability. veryfreelyand defysatis-
factorily
precise The determination
definition. ofhowmuchis enough
shouldincludeconsiderations of rivalgeostrategic the
responsibilities,
inferredintentionsoftheadversary,compensating advantages in other
areasimportant to thenationalsecurity, and,perhapspreeminently,
certaindomestic fora particular
preferences stateand composition of
thearmsbalance.
Stabilityhas severalunambiguous, thoughrestricted, definitions.
For example,in Richardson's inquiry,an unstablearmsraceis one
sufferingexponentialannualincrements of expenditure.In a narrow
39 A dimension of arms race strategythat (on grounds of space) I have not singled
out for separate investigationis the question of the effecton an arms race of the pos-
sible differentknowledge-statesof each arms race participantconcerning the strategies
of rivals. Explicit and vigorous attentionto this question may be found in Knut Mid-
gaard, "Arms Races, Arms Control,and Disarmament," Cooperation and Conflict,No. i
(1970), 34-40; and McGuire (fn. 27).
58 WORLD POLITICS
Americanmilitary definition,stability
maybe understood to be the
stateof a strategicrelationship in whichthe"first-strike bonus"was
eithernonexistent or extremely low.This definition holdsthatstabil-
ityis theproductof themaintenance of mutualassured-destruction
capabilities.
Thus,tolinkthetwotermsofthediscussion, a sufficiency
of assureddestruction capabilitiesinsuresstability. Unfortunately,
as
I notedabove,theSovietnotionof stability appearsto restuponthe
maintenance of strategic forcessufficient
notonlyto assureconsider-
able destruction,butalso to disruptan intended surpriseattackin a
preemptive manner andtodefendthehomeland in theeventofwar.40
Armsracestrategies arenotdevisedin a political vacuum;hence,even
if bothsuperpowers maintained the doctrine of assureddestruction
throughhostagecities,the military-technical logic of a deterrent-
sufficiencywouldbe unacceptable. The veryhighlevelofurbanization
in theUnitedStatesshouldmeanthatwhatwouldbe enoughto the
SovietUnionwouldbe farlessthantheUnitedStateswouldneedto
maintainher levelof assureddestruction. Apartfromthe counter-
force-potentialof a greatAmerican numerical superiorityin missiles,
itis inconceivablethattheSovietUnionwouldfinda grossnumerical
asymmetry politicallytolerable.
A widerinterpretation of thetermwouldholdthatstability refers
to thebeliefscurrent regarding the proximity of war. Thus,quite
apartfromanyarmament "improvements," interstatetensionmight
be low following politicalconsultationor good-will gestures.
Clearly,
sucha stability wouldbe extremely fragile.Finally,it mightbe held
thata rapidsuccession ofweapon-generations is inherentlydestabiliz-
ing,in goodpartbecausetheknownand familiarmilitary environ-
mentwouldbe changingfasterthanwouldthestrategic or tactical
viewsofmilitary planners and politicians.
As an interesting additionto theabovecomments uponsufficiency
and stability,we cannotbutnoticethefactthatmuchcontemporary
armsrace theorizing is conditioned by some aspectsof deterrence
theory. In theWestat least,thereis a verywideconsensus totheeffect
thatbyengagingin a nucleararmsraceone is doingso solelywith
theobjective ofcontinuing an effective
deterrence ofinimicalmilitary
and diplomatic In
actions. short, there is no questionof racingto
"win" or to avoid the worstconsequences of a nuclearwar. This
meansthatsufficiency maybe identified as thatsizeand configuration
ofthearsenalthatwill guarantee unacceptable damage-anymargin
40
Note the speculation on the preemptionpoint in one recent and excellent analysis,
Wolfe (fn. 5), 437, fn. 45.
abovethesufficient-for-deterrence levelmaythusbe labelledwasteful

andpossibly evenprovocative. Becauseoneimportant schoolofdeter-
rencetheorists (finiteor minimum)has persuadedmanythatde-
terrenceis a comparatively simpleexercise thatmaybe conducted with
smallandinvulnerable forces,thetaskofthosechargedwiththecon-
tinuing conduct ofthenucleararmsracehasbeenrendered extremely
difficult.
The dominant strainof contemporary comment uponthenuclear
armsracestresses thefollyof thewholeenterprise, ratherthanthe
need forcontinued armedvigilance. This opinionmightbe traced
to thejustification of theracein theWestas deterrence ratherthan
as war or evencrisis-waging scenarios.
The termsemployed in thesucceeding paragraphs are intendedto
reflect
a composite measure ofbothquantity and qualityin categories
of weapons.Furthermore, thestrategiesoutlinedare meantto refer
to the intendeddirection of increasein armaments to an intended
proportional I suggest
relationship. that,in theory,thefollowing five
distinctstrategiesmaybe appliedin an armsrace: clearinferiority;
marginalinferiority; parity;marginalsuperiority; and clear supe-
riority.
Essentialprefatory remarks thatdifferent
are,first, may
strategies
be followed in differentcategoriesofweaponsand,second,thateach
maypursuedifferent
participant towarddifferent
strategies adversaries.
Third,a participant maynotbe thinking or planningin suchover-
simplifiedtermsas parityor superiority. The motiveunderlying the
development of a particularmilitaryposturemightbe to providefor
as manycontingencies as possible,compatible re-
with alternative
source-allocationdemands andtheinteractive ofcertain
potential kinds
ofcapability.It is possiblethatno overalljudgment upontherelative
strategic
positions oftwoarmsracingrivalscan be given-hence, the
rivalsdo notdeliberately raceto attaina particular
relativeposition.4'
( I) CLEAR INFERIORITY
A stateor groupmayprepareas bestit can eventhough,in the

testof actualwar,it mustbe defeated.
Orthodox armsracethinking
wouldexcludethissituation,butbymosttestsan armsracesituation
wouldobtain.Each side,saytheSovietUnionand Yugoslaviain the
I970's ortheSovietUnionandFinlandin 1939, wouldprepare against
all or a portionof its forcesso as to
the other,each structuring
capitalizeupon the perceivedweaknessesof the other.Preparation
41 See Lee (fn-4), I75.
60 WORLD POLITICS
forapparentnationalsuicidemay not be a commontrait,but it may

notbe as illogicalas it would appearat firstsight.The greaterpower
maybe deterredby the prospectof resistance, such resistanceperhaps
beinglikelyto proveembarrassing; futilenationalresistancemay stir
some supportfrom statesthat otherwisewould stand aside.
As an historicalfootnote,it should be rememberedthat Tirpitz's
"risktheory"held thatGreat Britaincould be blackmailedinto con-
cessionsby the prospectthatthe probablecostof Britishnaval victory
overGermanywould renderher vulnerableto the combinedfleetsof
France and Russia.42The contemporary relevanceof "risk-theory"
thinkinghas been outlinedby the currentAmericanadministration.
"A verydifficult problemthatwould face us if the Chineselaunched
or threatened to launch a nuclearattackon the United Stateshas to
do with the need for maintainingour deterrentagainst the Soviet
Union. Obviously,if we unloaded most or all of our Minuteman
missilesagainstChina,we would be leavingourselvesrelatively naked
as far as the Sovietthreatis concerned."43
(2) MARGINAL INFERIORITY
It is conceivablethat,in an armsracebetweentwo statesof unequal

economicstrength,the weaker may choose to remain behind,but
withinreach of, the war-wagingpower of the stronger. The advan-
tage of thisstrategy could be, first,thatthe strongerstatewould be
lesslikelyto accelerateitsmilitary preparationsthanit would if parity
were sought;although,second,should politicalrelationsdeteriorate,
shouldthe adversaryslackenhis armsrace efforts, or shoulda tempo-
rary military-technical advantageappear, then a lead and possibly
diplomaticor war-wagingsuccessmightbe within reach.
It mustbe admittedthatit is extremely difficult
to furnishclearand
unambiguousexamplesof the pursuitof a strategy of marginalinfe-
It
riority. may be that ImperialGermany was hopingto attaina mar-
ginallyinferior positionto GreatBritainin capitalships,once therisk
theorywas renderedinoperableby the Anglo-Frenchand the Anglo-
Russianententes. It is possiblethattheSovietUnion todayis seekinga
stateof military balancethaton the one hand can be deniedas being
a bid forsuperiority, thoughon theotherhand it insuresthata tempo-
rarymeasureof superiority mightbe attainableshouldany of thecon-
ditionsobtainthat are suggestedabove. In the long run the Soviet
42Woodward (fn. I5), II.
43U.S. House of Representatives,Committee on Appropriations,Subcommitteeson
Department of Defense and on Military Construction,Safeguard AntiballisticMissile
System, Hearings, gist Cong., ist Sess. (Washington i969), 59 [Mr. Laird, May 22,
i969].
Unionmightaspireto parity, but thecontinuing,thoughcurrently

heavily
qualified,stress
upona measureofsuperiority
bysomeimpor-
tantsectionsof theAmericandefensecommunity rendersa Soviet
postureof marginalinferiority
lessprovocative.
(3) PARITY
Betweennuclearpowers,thedeficiencies of activeand passivede-
fensesmakea mockery of attemptsto identify,withanyconfidence,
advantages attachingto anyarmsracequantities.44 In thetriangular
Soviet-American-Chinese nuclearrelationship,a grossdisparity in the
numbers ofweaponsanda notinconsiderable disparityin theirquality
might be beliedbyan apparent parityofdeterrent effect.
In onepartic-
ularviewof therisk-taking propensity of theChinese,it is probable
thattheAmerican capability fortheassureddestruction of Chinaas
a functioning societyis soonto be balancedby a Chinesecapability
forthedestruction ofa handfulofcities.45 The crisis-instability
poten-
tialinherent in suchan imbalanceof capability requiresno further
comment. ShouldChinaacquirea substantial arsenalof nuclearde-
liveryvehicles,thena Sino-Soviet or a Sino-American war might
seriouslyerodethe pre-warparitythatexistedbetweenthe United
StatesandtheSovietUnion.However, as Dr. HarryGelberhasargued,
theconsequences forsuperpower deterrent stability
thatmightfollow
sucha war withChinawouldbe moreimportant in therealmsof
popularpsychology and governmental determination than in the
realmof an erodedweaponsarsenal.46
Betweenstatesconducting an armsracewiththecontinued deter-
renceofwartheobjective, parity a number
offers ofattractions. First,
itmayserveto appeasethosedomestic criticswhomeasuresecurity by
comparison ofinventories. Second,parityshoulddeteranyarmsrace
acceleration by the adversary, beingin itselfa declaration of intent
thatno measureof inferiority will be accepted.47Third,paritymay
facilitate
balancedmeasures ofarmscontrol;indeed,thecommonac-
ceptance ofparity may,in itself,havetheeffect oflimiting armaments.
If eachpartywereto defineparityas beingitsgoal,wereto identify
the precisequantitative and qualitativemeaningit was currently
givingtotheterm, andweretostatethedependence ofthesenumbers
and characteristics of forcesupon certainfeatures of the strategic
forcesof theotherside,thenparitycouldbe a normserving to pro-
mote"sophisticated" armsrace behavior.
44 A radicallydifferent
viewis to be foundin Foster(fn.4), 254-55.
45 Strategicand Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems (fn. I7), Part I, i89-90.
46Gelber (fn. I2), i86.
47See Richmond (fn. I4), 209.
62 WORLD POLITICS
In practiceit is difficult
to give a precisemeaningto parity,even
withinthe narrowcontextof the quantityand qualityof weapons.
We mightargue thatthe Soviet-American militarybalance today is
bestdescribedas beingin a stateof parity.It could be statedthatboth
partieshave pursuedsimilarmilitarytechnologies and thatnumerical
differences among the relativesizes of particularcomponentsof their
arsenalsare unimportant. On the otherhand,we mighthold thatthe
UnitedStatesmaintainsan important qualitativeedge in multiplewar-
head technology, in missileaccuracy,possiblyin ABM technology,
and certainlyin numbersof separatedeliverablewarheads.Further-
more,it is necessaryto recognizethat different statesacquire their
strategicforceswithdifferent ends mind. weaponsparityis not
in A
necessarilya parityof diplomaticeffect.In otherwords,the United
Statesas a conservative,
status-quopowermayfeeltheneedfora meas-
ure of superiority in orderto counterbalance the perceived(or mis-
perceived)ambitionsof more activeadversaries.
(4) MARGINAL SUPERIORITY
Althoughmarginalinferiority, parity,and marginalsuperiority are

analyticallydistinguishableas separate,intendedstatesof a military
balance,in practicethesedistinctionsmaybe blurredbeyondrecogni-
tion. Industriallead-timedelay,domesticpolitics,and faultyintelli-
gence,among a myriadof othercontributory factors,mightserveto
renderan intendedparityeithermarginallyinferioror marginally
superior.
The introduction of the term"marginal"is intendedto identify
a shortlead as opposedto a long lead, or as some Cold War warriors
would have it, a nonexploitableas opposed to an exploitablelead.
Also, it mustbe admittedthattodaya long lead may be of no more
militarysignificancethana shortlead. In pre-nuclear armsraces,such
distinctionsas these were of more significance.For example,Lan-
chester'sSquare Law holdsthata conflict betweenfiringpointsshould
conclude with the victor'spreservingthe number of bases equal
to the square rootof the differencebetweenthe squaresof the num-
bersengagedon each side.48Hence, marginalsuperiority shouldresult
in disproportionatelylight damage in war.
48 In a battlebetweentwonavalforces of i2 and 9 ships,thelargersideshouldemerge
with both a meaningfulvictoryand with 7 or 8 shipsundamaged(or only slightly
damaged).F. W. Lanchester, in War (London i9i6), 28,36. A usefuldiscussion
Aircraft
of Lanchester's ideas is offered
by MalcolmW. Hoag, "IncreasingReturnsin Military
ProductionFunctions,"in Roland McKean, ed., Issues in DefenseEconomics(New
York i967), I2-I4.
Clearlythelaw is of no relevance to a nuclearconflict,

in which
it is possiblethatevena verysmallnumberof weaponscouldinflict
disproportionate damage.Indeed,the dominantFrenchschoolof
nucleardeterrence has adheredto theso-calleddoctrine of "propor-
tionaldeterrence." This doctrinerecognizes the absolutedifference
between thedestruction thatmightbe visited uponFrancebya Soviet
strikeand thedestruction thattheforcede frappemighteffect upon
the SovietUnion,but it concludesthatthe smallFrenchassured-
destruction capability would be disproportionate to the "worth"of
Franceas a destroyed wartime targetto theSovietUnion.The con-
trastto Lanchester's pre-nuclear arithmeticcouldnotbe clearer.
A statemayprefer to be slightly aheadin an armsraceso thatifa
promising line of military-technical development wereto beckon,it
wouldbe in thebestposition to gainan advantage and obtaina lead
thatcouldbe turned either to diplomaticorto war-waging advantage.
So difficultis thetaskof relativestrategic assessment,thatit is not
inappropriate to comment thatmarginalinferiority, or mar-
parity,
ginalsuperiority existessentially in theeyeofthebeholder.
(5) CLEAR SUPERIORITY
Statesmen mayfeelthat,althoughunacceptable damagewouldbe

visitedupontheircountry in theeventof war,an undeniably large
military margincouldbe of diplomatic In the firstplace,it
utility.
mightbe reasonedthatpoliticians and theirattentive publicsare im-
pressedwithnakedarithmetic. Militarysuperiority is muchdespised
in contemporary strategic
literatureas beingillusory or meaningless,
butforthosefairlyunsophisticated in strategicmatters theeffect of
feeling behindor aheadshouldnotbe dismissed too readily.Second,
it maynotbe truethatanylargemeasureof superiority is boundto
proveonlytemporary; a
indeed,thismaybe clearcaseoftheself-ful-
fillingprophecy.
Undoubtedly themostsufficientofarmsracepositions
is to be comfortablyand permanently ahead of all rivals.
Analogiesbetweendifferent pairsof statesat different periodsare
boundto be perilous, but it maybe instructive to notethatsome
observersbelievedthatGermanDreadnought construction tendedto
"increaseor decrease
in inverseratioto thatofGreatBritain."49 Sim-
one
ilarly, interpretation of Soviet-American competition in thelate
i960's mightbe thattheSovietUnionwas encouraged to makeher
successfulbidfornumerical superiorityin land-based ICBM-launchers
bythedetermination, on November 5, I964, ofa cut-off figureofone
49Woodward(fn. I5), 242, fn.I.
64 WORLD POLITICS
thousand forAmerican Minuteman deployment.50 A development of

thisargument wouldbe thattheeconomically stronger powerwould
be well-advised to state,unequivocally, thatit will maintaina clear
numerical superiorityin themostadvancedmilitary hardware. Such
a declaratory policymightserve,in thelongrun,to reducethecosts
of the competition forall parties.
However, manyassumptions areimplicit in thisargument, and the
notionof costis multidimensional. The basicassumption of thissec-
tionis thatclearsuperiority is thedesiredstateofthemilitary balance
-in whichcase,restingupon a favorable asymmetry of economic
resources,thestatethatis aheadmightbe able to restrain thecom-
petitionand also to reducetherisksinherent in a military environ-
mentofveryactivecompetition, byan unambiguous publicadherence
to a continuing doctrine of superiority.The disadvantages of sucha
doctrine mighttakesomeof thefollowing forms:(a) theadversary
growsdesperate at its inability to attainevenparity, and henceis
inducedto trya veryhigh-risk shortcut to a bettermilitary balance
(Khrushchev's Cubanmissilegamble);(b) the politicalcost of clear
inferiorityto theadversary is so high,bothdomestically and interna-
tionally,thatno optionis believedopenotherthanto strainall re-
sourcesto attaina bettermilitary balance;(c) in a situation charac-
terizedby widespread disapproval of "wasteful" expenditure related
to thearmsrace,in whichthesecurity advantages of superioritycan-
notconvincingly be demonstrated, a strategy of clearsuperiority pro-
videsmuchammunition to criticsat home and abroad.
As an armsrace strategy, the striving foran unambiguous supe-
riorityofnumbers in strategicweaponsis defensible on verytraditional
grounds. First,sucha strategy shouldprovide a widerangeofdamage-
limiting optionsforcentralwar; second,on theone handthereis a
verygreatdeal of uncertainty respecting theintentions of the arms
raceadversary and,on theotherhand,strategic intelligence,though
since i96i, is stillless than
vastlyimprovedby satellitereconnaissance
Thus,a comfortable
perfect. marginof superioritymay serveas a
hedgeagainsttheunforeseen. of thesetwo pointsI
For illustration
quotethethoughtsof SecretaryofDefenseMelvinLairdin i969 and
LordGreyofFallodenin i909:
They[SpeakersRayburnand McCormack]cautioned me,that
whileI was on thatcommittee
if I wereto makeanymistakes
50Status of U.S. Strategic Power (fn. IO), I2; Wolfe (fn. 5), 432-33.
thatI erron thesideof thenationalsecurity of thiscountry. I

thought thatwas pretty
goodadvice.5'
Whilewe payeveryregardto declaration of intention . . . we
cannotbuilduponthem . . . we are obligedby the most simple
and elementaryrequirements of precautionto act as thoughthe
presentintention
of Germany mayperadventure be subsequently
modified...52
The recordof Soviet-American strategic interactionsince I957
showsthatthedifficulties
ofguessing thefuture rateofdeployment of
weapons, therequirements of domestic and theopportunities
politics,
thrown up bytechnology haveall servedto confound thearmsrace
intentionsof bothsides.Even in the unlikelyeventof bothsides
deciding(a) upon complementary strategies(for example,parity:
parity;marginalinferiority: marginalsuperiority), and (b) upon
identicaldefinitions
in bothqualitative and quantitativerespectsof
suchtermsas parityor marginal it is equallyimprobable
inferiority,
thatthe military-industrialestablishmentsof the two sideswould
actuallyproducea closeapproximation of theintended forces,on the
predetermined dates.Therefore, a slippageor unexpected ease in
research,development,test,evaluation,
orfull-scale in only
production,
one of thecompeting countries,will placebothin unintended arms
racepositions.
ARMS RACE OUTCOMES
alarmismconcerning
Much journalistic the detailsof armsrace
mightbe avoidedifa systematic
termination wereunder-
investigation
takenof thewaysin whichhistory armsracesto have
demonstrates
endedand logicdeducesarmsracescouldend.This sectionanalyzes
armsraceoutcomes.
fivepossible
(I) WAR
"Aboveall,it [thearmsrace]keptalivetheanachronistic
idea that
wars were inevitable."53
". . . the most dangerousresultof the arms race-the mounting
fearor 'tension'
whichit creates."54
Thereis no provenrelationship
between
armsracesandwars.How-
51U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Intelligence and the ABM, Hearing,
gist Cong.,ist Sess. (Washingtoni969), 63 [June23, i969].
52 Quotedin Woodward (fn. I5), 235.
53 Philip Noel-Baker, The Arms Race (London I958), 74.
54Ibid., 78.
66 WORLD POLITICS
ever,the Studyof War investigators were convincedthat the broad

singleracesofmoderntimeswere"generally"terminated by a balance-
of-powerwar. We suspectthat this conclusionwas induced by the
verybroad scope of Wright'sunderstanding of the natureof recent
armsraces.55 A morerestrictive view,both as to dates and as to par-
ticipants,does not yieldthisbroad conclusion.
The balefuleffects of an armsrace would seem to fall in the fol-
lowingareas.First,heavyand sustainedexpenditure upon armaments
by rival partieswill resultin a fuelingof existingpredilections to
imputehostilemotives.In short,suspicionswill mount,the tension
will grow,and instability will result-instability
being definedas the
believedproximity of war.
In thisconnection, the followingcommentupon the armsrace and
the tension-war nexusby Lewis Richardsonis appropriate:"There is
some evidence that diplomaticrelationsbecome, during the tacit
mutual threatsof an arms race, such a strainthat the outbreakof
war is feltas a relief."56Harold Lasswell has also subscribedto this
argument:"Dangersto the safety, the materialclaims,and the defer-
ence demands of the 'we' group can be toleratedno longer; these
interminable provocations mustcease; the incessantalarmsof recent
yearsmustcome to an end.
"Relief"on the outbreakof war does not provethatby somemyste-
riousprocessit was the desireforsuch reliefthatwas the immediate
cause of war.
Second,an armsrace mayresultin war becauseof thebeliefof one
partythatthe militarybalance will move againstit in the future-
the "now-or-never," preventive-war syndrome.A slightvariantupon
thisthemeis the possibility of a state'schoosingwar ratherthanrisk
the domesticeconomicand politicalconsequencesof continuedcom-
petition.In thisconnection, we mightwith advantagerecallthe Rus-
sian rationalefor the installationof the Doomsday Machine as a
cut-pricedeterrent in Dr. Strangelove.
Third, a rathersimple-mindedview of the contemporary super-
powercompetition is thatthe riskof technicalaccidentis increasing
with everysucceedingweapons generation.58 There is no steadyin-
55Wright (fn. 8), 690-9i. Single,generalarmsraceswere identified as occurringbe-
tweenthe followingdates: I787-i8I5; i840-i87I; i886-i9i9; and I932-I94i (date of
writing).
56Richardson (fn. 26), 6i. 57Lasswell (fn. 23), 64.
AlbertWohlstetter
58 has repliedto thisview veryeffectively
in U.S. Senate,Com-
mitteeon Government
Operations,Subcommitteeon NationalSecurity
and International
Defense Analysis: Two Examples, gist
Operations, Planning-Programming-Budgeting,
Cong., ist Sess. (WashingtonI969), 5 [Septemberi0, i969].
creasein riskovertime;indeed,SamuelHuntington's argument that

waris mostlikelyin theopening, nervous roundsofan armscompeti-
tion,though convincing,
notparticularly is atleastas tenablea hypoth-
Commonsensesuggests
alternative.59
esisas itsjournalistic thatarma-
ments,in themselves, are onlyone elementlikelyto contribute to a
decision togo towar.The contribution ofarmaments tothelikelihood
ofan outbreak ofwar,will (bythenarrowAmerican be a
definition)
function of thecontemporary bonus":thiswillvaryover
"first-strike
time,butitwillnotnecessarily varyin thedirection ofa steady oreven
an intermittent increase.
(2) BANKRUPTCY-EXHAUSTION
This is a strictly
hypothetical I couldfindno example
possibility;
ofone,two,ormoreparties recoilingin economic ruinfroman arma-
mentscompetition: a conclusionalso reachedbyLewisRichardson.60
To the extentthatan armsrace raisestensions and focusespublic
attention uponan adversary, theboundary of tolerationof taxation
can proveremarkably elastic.The yearsI949 throughI953 in the
UnitedStatesshoweda bewildering succession state-
of authoritative
mentsuponthesubjectof"whattheeconomy can stand."6
Armsrace competitors are rarelyin a positionof approximate
equalityregarding theresources thatmaybe invested in themilitary
dimension ofthenational Eachcompetitor
security. willhavedifferent
domestic circumstancesand different foreigncommitments. For ex-
ample,despitean approximate equality in nationalincomes,Germany
spentroughly onlyhalfas muchas did GreatBritainon hernavy
didnothavetwolandfrontiers
fromi910 to I9I4:62 Britain todefend.
Withregardto the contemporary nucleararmsrace,the estimated
GNP's of the UnitedStatesand the SovietUnion for i968 were $86i
For i968 therespective
billionand $430 billionrespectively. estimated
were $79,576millionand $39,780 million.63The
defenseexpenditures
Americanfigureis inflated
by approximately $25 billionbecauseof
Vietnam;theSovietfigurerefersonlyto declareddefenseexpendi-
becauseof the uncertainty
tureand is questionable regarding the
ofrublesfordollars.Furthermore,
properexchange-rates thereis some
evidence of strategic
thatin thecategory delivery theSoviet
systems,
59Huntington (fn. 3), 63-65.
60
Richardson (fn. 26), 6i.
61See the three studies in Warner Schilling, Paul Hammond, and Glenn Snyder,
Strategy,Politics, and Defense Budgets (New York i962).
62 Wright (fn. 8), I, Tables 58-59 on 670-7I.
63 The Institutefor StrategicStudies (fn. 24), I, 5, 57. Also see Joenniemi(fn. 24).
68 WORLD POLITICS
Union was, by i968-69,spendingtwice as much as was the United

States.64
The importantpointhere is thatalthougha particularidea
of sufficiency,
hopes for a sympathetic parallelism,and competing
militaryand nonmilitary demandshave servedto depressAmerica's
strategic-forces
budget,severeeconomicstrainshouldoccurfirstin the
SovietUnion if bothsideswereto decideupon a greataccelerationin
theirstrategic-forcesprograms.
In general,it is likelythat,shortof a situationof great mutual
alarm,one side will have moreto spendor one side will be prepared
to spend more. In eithereventthe probableoutcomewould be an
armsrace victoryforone side or a war launchedby the prospective
armsraceloser.65These dramaticpossibilities
will be heavilydependent
upon the natureof the competition.In a qualitative-quantitative
race,
defeatin one phase mightbe avengedby victoryin thenext.
(3) VICTORY/DEFEAT
In the same way thatwars and crisescan be won or lost,so arms
racesmay be won or lost.However,historyprovidesveryfew exam-
ples of a party'sbeingunambiguously defeatedand thensinkingback
into a positionof sullen and near-permanent Indeed,the
inferiority.
conventional notionof victoryor defeatmustreallybe adaptedto the
particularstrategiesthat were being followed.I mentionthe possi-
bilityof clearvictoryor defeatbecauseit providesa limitingcase,not
one frequently encountered.Anglo-German naval relationsfromi898
to I9I4 would appear to providea good example of an arms race
victory:the German navy never succeededin passing throughits
"dangerzone."" Some membersof the Americandefensecommunity
were persuaded that the failure of Premier Khrushchev'sCuban
gamble and the "threeenvironments" Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of
i963 marked a decisiveand possiblyenduringarms race victoryfor
the United States.The statisticsof ICBM and SLBM deployment
sincei966 have demonstrated the prematurenatureof such a belief.
There is no evidencethat the SovietUnion acceptedthe victory/
defeatlabels.However,thepost-i963Sovietbuild-upin ICBM's (SS-9,
SS-II, SS-I3) and SLBM's (deployedin the new "Y"-class nuclear
64See JohanH6lst and WilliamSchneider,Jr.,eds., Why ABM? (Elmsford,New
York i969), chap.7; Lee (fn. 4), I73; Foster(fn. 4), 248; ThomasW. Wolfe,"Soviet
Approaches to SALT," Problems of Communism, xix (September-October I970), I-3.
The imageryof bankruptcy
65 continuesto stalk the halls of arms race rhetoric:
"If we do not adopt morediscriminationin choosingthesemanyweaponsystemswe
So said SenatorSymington
are goingto bankruptthecountry." and Foreign
in Strategic
Policy Implications of ABM Systems (fn. I7), Part I, 57.
66 Woodward (fn. '5), 43I.
submarine) wouldsuggest thatit did notdeemthei964 missileim-

balancetolerable.The i964 ICBM comparison was as follows:U.S.A.
834,SovietUnion200.67An unambiguous exampleof American con-
victionsregarding the stateof thearmsracewas providedearlyin
i965 bySecretary ofDefenseRobert McNamara:"[The Sovietleaders]
havedecidedthattheyhavelostthequantitative race,and thatthey
arenotseekingto engageus in thatconflict.... Thereis no indica-
tionthattheyarecatching up orplanning tocatchup.... Thereis no
indicationthattheyare in a raceat thistime."68
Armsracevictory and defeatmaybe recognized eithertacitlyor
formally.A tacitrecognition mighttaketheshape,as did theGerman
oneafter19I2, ofa denialofanycompetitive relationship,
or it might
taketheshapeof a treaty. A somewhat ambiguous exampleof the
latterpossibility
wouldbe theI922 Washington Naval Treaty,fixing
thecapitalshiptonnageratiosofthegreatpowers.Force-ratio agree-
mentsmay,on occasions, be intended as preventivemeasures as op-
posedto termination measures:the Anglo-German Treatyof i935
mightbe seenin thislight.69
If onestateis challenging anotherthatis alreadypowerfully armed,
an appropriate definition ofvictory mightbe to securea position(a)
notgreatly inferior,or (b) not inferior whenin combination with
another state.Finally,it is a nearcertainty thatovertimetheaimsof
eacharmsraceparticipant willalter,andwhatwouldconstitute victory
mightbe redefined.
(4) AGREED TERMINATION AT PARITY
Even shouldtwo or morestatesdesireto haltor severely restrict

theircompetition,an appropriate ofparity
definition maybe extremely
difficult
toreach.The background hasfoundno better
tothisdifficulty
expressionthanthatby AdmiralSir HerbertRichmond:"Parityin
theinstrumentswhichconstitute navalstrengthis a mathematical
pos-
buta strategical
sibility sinceit doesnottakeintoconsidera-
absurdity
tiontheconditions underwhichthoseinstruments havetobe used,or
thefacilities
whichsubserve theirneeds and without whichtheycan-
notbe used."70
Armsracetermination at parityis possible,
providedthata very
67 The Institute
forStrategicStudies(fn.24), 55.
68 Quoted in Status of U.S. Strategic Power (fn. IO), 2.
69 Sir HerbertRichmond,Statesmen and Sea Power (London I946), 293. It would
be onlyfairto assertthatforGermanythistreatywas morea "huntinglicense"thana
restraint.
70 Richmond (fn.I4), 257-58.
70 WORLD POLITICS
restricted
definition
is maintained
concerning
themilitary
instruments
thatare to be precisely
balanced.For example,theAnglo-American
equalityof tonnageagreedupon in Washingtonin I922 maybe taken
as the outstanding, if not totallyhappy,example of the "one-power
standard."Parity,as a likelyarms race outcome,has attractedcon-
siderableattentionas a resultof acceleratedSovietmissiledeployment
in the late i960's and the Americanarms race move of deployinga
limitedABM screen.Indeed,it is probablenow thatthe SovietUnion
will negotiatean arms-limitation package on the basis of nothing
shortof an acknowledgedparity.For the negotiationof an agreed
freezeupon numbersof nucleardeliveryvehicles,therivaldelegations
to the StrategicArms LimitationTalks would have to consider,as
besttheycould,the performance parametersand growthpotentialof
each separatedeliverysystem.Also, theywould have to be informed
of the missionsthateach side desiresits varioussystemsto be able to
accomplish.The difficulty with mathematicalparity,as suggested
above by AdmiralRichmond,is thatit mustignoresuch disturbing
parametersas geostrategiclocation,asymmetry of dislike,and im-
balance of strategicintelligenceprovision.
(5) RESOLUTION OF POLITICAL DIFFERENCES
Like an old soldier,an armsrace maysimplyfade away. Historical-

ly,theclassicexampleoftheoutcomeofpoliticalresolution is provided
by the Anglo-Frenchand Anglo-Russianententesof 1904 and I907.
To lay greatstressupon thishighlydesirableoutcomeis to denyone
of the central paradoxes of contemporary internationalrelations;
namely,thatan armsraceis notnecessarily verysensitiveto a lessening
tensions.The otherside of the coin is thatan armsrace
of interstate
may not be acceleratedby an increasein tensions.7'
Soviet-American relationshave outgrowntheirCold War phases
and are now in a stateof not untypicalgreat-power rivalry.However,
althoughgreat-power rivalsmustalwaysbe watchfulof the military
preparations of others,not all great-power rivalryreachesthe pitchof
intensityin militarypreparationthatwould warrantdefinition as an
armsrace. Here it should be stressedthatthereis no clear dividing
line betweena situationof attention or concernand one of armsrace.
The "atmospherics" of detentein the i960's do not constitute, or even
approach,such a resolutionof politicaldifferences as was exemplified
71See the comments of decouplingpolitical
of MarshallShulmanon the desirability
in "The Effectof ABM on US-
relationsfromthe issuesof strategicconfrontation
SovietRelations,"in AbramChayesand JeromeWiesner,eds., ABM: An Evaluation
of the Decision to Deploy an AntiballisticMissile System (New York I969), 158.
bythe"diplomaticrevolution" of I904. It mightbe held thatarmscon-

trolmustprecedeand contributeto a lesseningof tensions,leading
to a furtherbrakingof thearmsrace and thenceto morefundamental
politicalargreement.This questionof "armsfirst"or "tensionsfirst"
has been well attackedby Philip Noel-Bakerand J. David Singer.72
ARMS RACE DYNAMICS
Despitethe thintrickleof armsrace speculationthatmaybe traced

to Kant and certainlyto thenineteenth-century Englishliberalsof the
Cobdeniteschool,post-I945interestin armsrace workingshas been
minimaland has onlyrecently been galvanizedby thedebateoverthe
ABM in the United States.Most scholars,politicians,and journalists
havebeencontentwiththesureknowledgethatthereis a superpower
armsrace.It is only overthe ABM, wherethe liberaloppositionhas
been compelledto make explicitits assumptions concerningthe logic
of superpowerinteraction, thatanalystshave begunto realizethatwe
are certainof remarkably littlein the regionof armsrace dynamics.
This commentappliesparticularly to the principlesbelievedto under-
pin Sovietdecisionsupon strategicforces.
There are a considerable numberof hypotheses regardingarmsrace
dynamicsthatcontendforanalyticalpriority. Broadly,the hypotheses
fall into two distinguishable, though far from mutuallyexclusive,
doctrinalcamps. These camps are here labelled action-reaction and
domesticprocess.
( I) ACTION-REACTION
thinkingis the beliefthat an arms
At the basis of action-reaction
a system-thatis, "a set of componentswith
race situationconstitutes
identifiableattributes,among which patternedrelationshipspersist
over a periodof time."73By contrast,thosescepticalof the systemic
natureof thearmsrace phenomenonare bothunconvincedthatmany
of the attributeshave been adequatelyidentifiedor understood,and
convincedthat the relationships are far frombeing patterned.One
crisp example of the action-reaction world-viewis that offeredby
Paul Smokerwhen he says thatan arms race is "a cybernetic set of
interactingsub-systems."74The action-reactionmodel may be termed
72See Noel-Baker (fn. 53), chaps. 6-7; J. David Singer, "Threat Perception and the
Armament-TensionDilemma," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, ii (March I958),
90-I05.
73 Andrew Scott, The Functioning of the InternationalPolitical System (New York
i967), 27.
74Smoker(fn. 27), I73.
72 WORLD POLITICS
either"tight"or "loose,"depending upon theassumption madere-

specting thenatureof thesystem, whether it is openor closed.This
is not an abstrusedistinction, forcentralto any investigation of a
particulararmsrace,withinthe action-reaction framework, is the
questionofwhattriggers a reaction.
It is importantto remember thatanystudyof theaction-reaction
mechanism mustbe informed of the theoretical possibility
of two
temporally distinct
formsof reaction and of fouridentifiable classes
of triggeringor fuelingevents.The temporaldistinction has been
labelledsequential/anticipatorybyJohanHolst.75 He proceeds todem-
onstrate theconsiderable contemporary relevance of thisdistinction.
The sequentialreactionis simplythatwhichsucceeds an adversary ac-
tiontowhichsomecounter is felttobe appropriate, eitherofan offset
or of an emulative nature.The anticipatory reactionhas prompted
someobservers to comment thatthesuperpower armsraceworksby
an action-overreactiondynamic.
The fourdistinguishable classesof triggering eventsmaybriefly be
listedas follows: (i) a military-technological
triggerinternalto the
arms race system;(2) a politicaltriggerinternalto the arms race
system;(3) a military-technologicaltriggerexternalto the armsrace
system;(4) a politicaltriggerexternalto the armsrace system.
To date,forthe contemporary superpowerarmsrace,attentionhas
focusedupon the military-technological triggersboth internalto the
arms race systemand relevantto the configuration of the strategic-
forceposturesof the adversaries.Indeed,an extremedevelopmentof
thisview would hold to an interpretationof the armsrace thatwould
emphasizethe technologicalautonomyof strategicinteraction.76 The
high priestof action-reaction by superpowermilitary-technological
triggerhas been RobertMcNamara:
Whateverbe theirintentions-whatever be ourintentions,actions-
potentialactions-on eithersiderelatingto the
or evenrealistically
build-upof nuclearforces,be theyeitheroffensive or defensive
weapons,necessarily triggerreactionson theotherside.
phenomenonthatfuelsan arms
It is preciselythisaction-reaction
race.77
75H6lst and Schneider (fn. 64), i62.
76See Milton Leitenberg, "The Present State of the World's Arms Race," Coopera-
tion and Conflict,
No. 3 (1970), i88-89.
77Remarks before United Press InternationalEditors and Publishers,San Francisco,
Calif., September x8, i967, Appendix 4 in U.S. Congress, JointCommittee on Atomic
Energy, Subcommitteeon MilitaryApplications,Scope, Magnitude, and Implications of
It wouldseemprudent forthestudent of armsracesto investigate

thepossibilityofpolitical as well.Forexample,
trigger-events a change
or prospectivechangein leadership mightalterone side'sviewofthe
strategic-forceposturedesirablefor the future;diplomaticactivity
mightprompt a revision in theestimateofthepolicyguidelines being
followedby theadversary.
The action-reaction triggering potential of activities
filteringinto
thearmsracesystem fromitsenvironment mustbe givensomeatten-
tion.The questionarisesas to whetherthe alliesof the armsrace
principals shouldbe considered as beinginternal or external to the
armsrace.78 No generalansweris possible. Alliesmay,by theirown
behavior, stimulate the armsprogramof the adversary. Also,allies
mightsuccessfully generate demandsforarmsthatare additionalto
thosebelievedto be essentialby the principals. In thesewaysthe
actionsof alliesshouldbe viewedas beingexternal to thearmsrace
system.Alliedcontributions mayalso be substitutes forarmaments
thatwould otherwise have to be foundby the principals-tothat
extentit is reasonable to viewthemas beinginternal to thesystem.
One sideor theothermayfeelcompelledto developand deploy
weaponsand deviseorganizations that,primarily, are responsive to
threatsperceived in diversepartsof theworld,quiteapartfromany
directmachination by therival.Thesedevelopments mightserveto
improve a state'sarmsraceposition. Suchexternal threatfrombeyond
thesystem couldbe of a military or of a politicalnature,probably
ofboth.
(2) DOMESTIC PROCESS
It seemsnotunfairto suggest thatthosepersuaded of therealityof

a reasonably ofreciprocal
tightpattern arelikelyto findit.
interaction
Persistent,
thoughvariable,time-lags in reactionscan be explained
awayas beingtheproductof an inevitable bureaucratic
inertia.79
It
maywellbe thattheUnitedStatesis moreproneto theanticipatory
reactionoroverreactionthanis theSovietUnion,in goodpartbecause
oftheasymmetry of information availableto theadversaries
respect-
ing each other'sweaponsdevelopment and deployment intentions.
However,the action-reaction interpretationof America'sarmsrace
behavior has beenoverstressed. has beenmade
Similarinterpretation
Missile Programs,Hearings,goth Cong., ist Sess.
the United States Antiballistic
(Washingtoni967), I07.
78 Note Watt's criticismof Huntingtonon this question (fn. I3), 374. Also see
Russett(fn. i), chap.4.
7" Shulman (fn. 70), I54-55.
74 WORLD POLITICS
of someSovietactivities-largely becauseof the paucityof reliable

knowledge regarding the Sovietdefensedecision-making process.A
modeloftightstrategic reciprocityhastheadvantage ofa comprehen-
sibleand familiar strategiclogic,and it cannoteasilybe challenged.
Whichever viewofthesuperpower armsraceis themoreaccurate, it
is apparentthatmoredetailedstudiesare urgently requiredof the
defensepoliticsof bothcountries. This is a taskfor the political
scientistratherthanforthestrategic analyst.
If takentotheextreme, thedomestic process hypothesis woulddeny
theexistence ofan armsrace.One statement ofthishypothesis would
be thatto understand the progressof a particular armsrace,we
shouldfocusattention not upon threatperception-that is, upon
triggers beyondthestatesin question-butupondomestic processes,
strategic doctrines,moods,bureaucracies, and interests thatinteract
toproducedefense decisions.80
Oncean adversary has beenidentified,
a closewatchwillbe keptuponhisshifting capabilitiesandintentions,
butthemajorpressures forchangein forcestructure willbe internally
derived. This hypothesis holdsthatinterstate interaction is boundto
occur,butthatthemajority ofinterstate armsraceswillinvolvestates
of roughly paralleltechnology and withbasesof resources adequate
formostphasesand levelsof expenditure.81 The participants will be
almostcertain to be following, or at leastconsidering, similarlinesof
military-technicaldevelopment. Furthermore, beliefin a closepattern
of action-reaction wouldunderrate the significance of the different
worldviews,and problems
responsibilities, of theparticipants.
The mostimportant domesticinfluences on armsrace behavior
maybe identified as being(i) inertia, (2) technological momentum,
(3) interest,
(4) epidemiology, (5) absolute planning, (6) strategic
doctrine, its
(7) government, structure and the balanceof powerbe-
tweenits agencies, and (8) geographical location.
The inertiafactorrefers to theexplanation thatactivity relatedto
thearmsracewillbe pursuedbypoliticaland military bureaucracies
as an ongoingand expectedaspectof theirdailylives,thatis, until
thereis somedramatic changein theworld-view andeventually in the
basicpoliciesof theincumbent administration.
Technological momentum refersto thefactthatscientists and engi-
One of the most persuasive statementsof this view is provided by Steinberg (fn.
80
I5), Introduction.Steinberg'scomment upon Anglo-German naval rivalryis applicable
to the i960's. "The treadmill aspect of the Anglo-German arms race was not caused by
the technologybut by the politics of the participants"24.
81 Any resource disparity may prove significant if all competitors are equally
alarmed. However, the evidence would suggest that alarm is unlikely to persist.Thus,
economicallyweaker states are not necessarilypriced out of a competition.
neerswill producea new generation of weapons,regardless of their

contemporary armsracerelevance, simplybecauseit is theirtaskand
becausethefrontiers of knowledge beckontheinquisitive. In other
words,expensive research and development may,by "sunk
activity,
costs"and dependent-industry arguments, forecloseuponnondeploy-
mentdecisions. So longas modernity in weaponsis favoredand re-
searchactivity is well funded,weaponsscientists will continueto
developnew and improved models.Decisionsabouttimingand size
of production-run maybearno preciserelationship to thecontempo-
raryactivity of therival.It willbe sufficient to know,probably in a
generalway,thatthe adversary is workingalong similarlines of
technical development.
The argument of intereststatesthatnecessary armsrace reaction
rationalesformanymajordefensedecisionsare merelyrationaliza-
tionsforthedomestic interests
ofthedecision-makers. Theseinterests
couldbe thehealthofa political constituency, theprestige ofan armed
service,or thecontinued vitalityofa centerofindustrial excellence.
The epidemiological argument holdsthatan armsraceshouldbe
seenas twoormorenationwide diseases.82 Oncearousedto an external
danger, irresponsiblepoliticians,soldiers, and journalists
industrialists,
can tapthenational"preparedness syndrome." Naval scares,bomber,
missile,and security gapscan be invokedforelectoral advantage. The
inherent uncertainty regarding adversary intentions,and thedifficulty
ofpredicting thescaleofweaponsdeployment overtime,lenda cer-
tainplausibility to everyidentification of a future yearof maximum
danger.
Another factor worthy ofattention is theone I identify as absolute
planning. We maysupposethata stateobserves theprobablecourse
ofmilitary policyofitsrival,identifies an appropriate forcestructure
and thenbuildsaccording to its own blueprint-insensitive evento
fairlylargechangesin therival'sprograms.83 Economyofproduction
shouldbe facilitated, a senseof stability engendered, and possibly an
ease of annualparliamentary approvalof expenditure assured.Fur-
thermore, regularity ofbuildingtempomightdiscourage rivals.Such
could
an interpretation notexplainthetotality of a singlestate'sbe-
haviorin an armsrace,butit doescontainmorethana germoftruth
forsomephasesof mostarmsraces.
Those who believethat an approximate symmetry of military
82See Rapoport, Fights, Games, and Debates (fn. 27), Part I, chap. 3; Lasswell (fn.
23), chaps- 3-4.
83See Huntington (fn. 3), 50-54.
76 WORLD POLITICS
forces,both qualitativeand quantitative, is requiredbeforean arms

racecan seriously be restrained,
mustconfront thefactthateach party
will hold to different notionsconcerningthe best deterrentto war
and the mosteffective way to conductmilitaryoperations.Strategic
dialoguemay lead, not to a convergence of doctrines,but ratherto a
recognition of differentstrategic
principles.The ideologyof one party
mightlead it to expecta surpriseattackby the war-mongering "ad-
venturists"; such a beliefcould be a parameterfor militaryprepara-
tion.Hence, a preemptive capability,despiteitseffecton positivefeed-
back to the adversary,might appear to be a necessaryprecaution.
Historicalexperience, in combination witha strongbeliefin the prob-
abilityof war, mightcause a partyto seek a balancedoffense-defense
structure in its strategicforces.This preference could be impervious
to technologicaldevelopments, to periodsof detente,or to warnings
concerninginstability in the armsrace.
There can be no questionbut thatdefensedecisionsare influenced
in theirsubstanceby the organizationalstructureand the decision-
making processesinvolvedin their consideration.84 The degree of
autonomyof the armed servicesand even the traditionalsupremacy
of one particularbranchof themmightdirectthe verdicton a partic-
ular issue. A somewhatextremeview of the superpowerarms race
might be that bomber and artilleryemphasesare to be detected,
respectively, in Americanand Sovietstrategic doctrines.Civil-military
relationsis anotheraspectof thedomesticprocessthatmightinfluence
the substanceof decisionsimportantto an arms race. Civilian com-
mand overthe scale and directionof defenseexpenditure will differ
fromcountry to countryand fromtimeto time.The degreeand nature
of such controlis a crucialvariableinfluencing armsrace behavior.
The finaldomesticfactorto be consideredis that of geographical
location.Location will influence,though not determine,choice of
allies and is verylikelyto offerquite distinctstrategicopportunities.
The continentallocationof the SovietUnion has profoundlycondi-
tionedits strategicdoctrineand has allowed for the deploymentof
medium-range weapon systemsthatcould exploitthe close proximity
of areas whose territorial integritythe rivalbelievedto be vital.The
geographicalconsideration could be expandedso as to includethedis-
84Russett draws attention to the difficultyof controlling
militaryexpendituresin a
politicalsystemthatensuresa wide dispersionof authority. The degreeof Cabinetor
Politburocontrolof expenditure is limitedin any executivestructureby the plurality
of strongvestedinterests. However,the U.S. government offersan extremeexample
of how an institutionalized balance of power may frustrate attemptsto brake arms
racingactivity(fn. I), I84-9L.
tinctresource-base ofan armsracecompetitor, itspopulation distribu-
tion,and thedefense problems thatsuchdistribution imposes.
It mustbe understood thatthesedomestic factorswill interact to
producea stimulation tothearmsracingincentives perceived tobe im-
perativebecauseof theexternal threat. The factors mostcommonly
linkedare technological momentum, the competition in fundsand
prestigebetweenthearmedservices, and theinterest of thedefense
corporations in thesellingoftheirproducts. As a subject forcomment,
thearmsraceoffers muchmaterial fora polemic.I hopethatthecom-
plexitypresented inthisarticlemight servetodiscipline theverynarrow
focusof muchcontemporary criticism-for example,thatthesuper-
powerarmsraceis an instrument of"outdoor relief"foran amorphous
butsinister "military-industrialcomplex."
Thusfar,I havesuggested twobroadthesesconcerning armsrace
dynamics, action-reaction anddomestic process. However, ifourunder-
standing of thearmsracephenomenon is to improve, theneedis for
synthesis.It is unfortunate thatmanyAmerican politicians and aca-
demicsseemtohavetakentheirstandupontheissuesoftheABM and
multiple-warhead deployments and thenhaveadheredto theappro-
priatethesisconcerning thedynamics ofthearmsrace.The majority of
thosespeaking uponnationalsecurity affairs in theJohnson Adminis-
andtheliberalopposition
tration, totheNixonAdministration's ABM
decisions,haveadheredoverwhelmingly to a fairlyexclusive action-
reactioninterpretation ofthearmsrace.On theotherhand,theNixon
spokesmen on nationalsecurity and themoreconservative ofstrategic
analystsarefarlesssatisfied withaction-reaction.
Theremustbe a measureof action-reaction, or therewouldbe no
armsraceat all. In otherwords,armsraceparticipants mustmaintain
a generalattention to thedeveloping military postureof theirrivals.
The argument between an autonomy ofseparate military development
anda closereciprocity ofaction-reaction mustberesolved intoanunder-
standing thataction-reaction can be eithercloseor distant. The arms
racerival(s)providevital,thoughpossibly intermittent, flowsofdata
thatserveto trigger armsracereactions.
However,thedomestic processesof a statewill determine whether
therearetobe reactions ornot,whether thereis anyavailablereaction
thatwouldbe bothexpedient andrelevant, andalsothescaleandtim-
ingofa reaction. Eachstatewillhaveitsownproblems anditsprefer-
encesas tothebestwayofsolvingthoseproblems. Thus,it canbe said
thattheAmerican Sentinel andSafeguard decisions wereofa category
thatwouldbe considered bytheSovietUnionas potentially requiring
78 WORLD POLITICS
an armsracereaction, butto predicttheSovietreactionor nonreaction,

an analystwould have to have masteredmoredetailconcerningcon-
temporary Sovietdefensepoliticsthan would appear currently to be
availablein the West.
Most of thoseconvincedof the preeminence of action-reactiongive
passingreference to thefactthatthereare also otherfactorsdrivingthe
armsrace.Havinggivena passingreference, theythenoffer littleserious
or prolongedanalysisthatmightsubstantiate theclaimsforthepriority
accordedaction-reaction.For example,GeorgeRathjens,in hisexcellent
study,"The Dynamicsof the Arms Race," bothrecordsthatthereis
"a considerabledebate"concerning theroleof action-reactionand that
action-reactionhas been "a major stimulant"to the armsrace.85Both
of thesestatements are appropriateand beyondquestion,but it is not
unreasonableto wonderwhat the othermajor stimulantshave been
and how important a roletheyhave played.
The argumentof thisarticleis thattherehas beenso littlesystematic
studyof arms race behaviorthatwe cannot reasonablyassume the
dominanceeitherofaction-reaction or ofdomesticprocessexplanations.
We cannotreferto "the basic laws" of the armsrace,86becauseit is
almostcertainthatdifferent factors
havebeenofpreeminent importance
to eachcompetitor duringdifferentphasesoftheraceand thatdifferent
factorsare accordeddifferentweightsin each country.
ARMsRACE STUDY: THE WAY FORWARD

Apartfromthe requirement fora refinement and revisionof such
a structureforinquiryas that outlined in thisarticle,theway forward
to a morecompleteand usefulunderstanding of armsracesshouldbe
markedby the followingsteps: (a) a full and criticalguide to the
relevantliterature;(b) a seriesof case studiesof particulararmsraces;
(c) a comparativeanalysisof armsraces.Althoughthe separatecase
studiesshould be concernedwith askingverygeneralquestions,the
followingquestionsshould be the explicitconcernof a comparative
analysisof armsraces.This listis by no means exhaustive, and some
particularquestionshavealreadybeen raised and briefly discussed
above.
Genesis.Why have therebeen armsraces?What has been believed
to be theattractionsof thisparticularroad to security?
85 Rathjens (fn- 4), I9.
One group of authors has referred to such "laws." See Union of Concerned
86
Scientists,ABM:ABC, in U.S. House of Representatives,Committee on Armed Services,

Hearings on Military Posture, FY 1970, 9Ist Cong., ist Sess. (Washington i969),
2I40-54.
Function.Once an armsraceis begun,regardless of the original

motives,whatfunctions hastheconduct ofsucha raceperformed,both
fortheparticipantsandfortheinternational system?
Typology.Whatkindofarmsraceshavetherebeen?
Strategy.
Whatarmsraceobjectives haveguidedcompetitors? What
is therelationship
between thenatureoftheweaponsandthestrategies
pursued?Whatimpacthavedifferent "knowledge-states" concerning
theprograms ofrivalshaduponthesubsequent courseofan armsrace?
Outcome. How havearmsracesended?
Dynamics. How havearmsraces"worked"? Whathasbeenthebal-
ancebetweenexternal and domestic
driving factors?To whatextent
havethesefactors beenmutually supporting?
Thesestudiesshouldbe pursuedby,or in concert with,students
of the domesticpoliticsof the countries concerned-not solelyby
thosefascinatedbythelogicofstrategicinteraction.

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Trustees of Princeton University

The Arms Race Phenomenon

DEFINITIONS AND FUNCTIONS

SINCE the i850's therehas been intermittent but alwaysrenewed

At thisjunctureit is sensibleto makea veryminimalcondition for

Thereis so muchconfusion attaching to armsracedefinitions that

able scepticismconcerningthe action-reaction cycle may be found in Laurence

are not in a situationof zero armaments. Everyarmsrace openswith

weaponshas madea veryconsiderable difference to the conductof

tothedefense ofoffsettingan offensivebuild-uphasbeena stabilizing

AN ARMS RACE TYPOLOGY

The term"typology" maybe thesourceof someconfusion.I do not

(I) NUMBERS: BILATERAL/MULTILATERAL/BILATERAL "CONNECTED" (OPEN

An argumentgivenconsiderableprominenceby Samuel Hunting-

raceshave had both quantitative aspects.17

and Air Forcesincei955 providesan abundanceof illustration forthis

These distinctionsoffera differentview to the focusupon weapons

itsrateofchangeis a usefulthoughimprecise guide,butthereis no

dy -Ix (I-r(x-y))-by + h28

penditure as a toolforthemeasurement of thevelocity of an arms

It is possibleto assertthatmostarmscompetitions, at mosttimes,

maybothbe viewedin thesingle-weaponperspective,butthepotential

This sectiondrawsattention to the distinctions amongdifferent

In therecentABM debatein theUnitedStates,theprimitive arms

torwhois behindneedbe outnumbered bythreeor fouror moreto

ARMS RACE STRATEGIES39

Everyarmsracemustinvolvea processof interaction, eithercon-

abovethesufficient-for-deterrence levelmaythusbe labelledwasteful

A stateor groupmayprepareas bestit can eventhough,in the

forapparentnationalsuicidemay not be a commontrait,but it may

It is conceivablethat,in an armsracebetweentwo statesof unequal

Unionmightaspireto parity, but thecontinuing,thoughcurrently

(4) MARGINAL SUPERIORITY

Althoughmarginalinferiority, parity,and marginalsuperiority are

Clearlythelaw is of no relevance to a nuclearconflict,

Statesmen mayfeelthat,althoughunacceptable damagewouldbe

thousand forAmerican Minuteman deployment.50 A development of

thatI erron thesideof thenationalsecurity of thiscountry. I

ever,the Studyof War investigators were convincedthat the broad

creasein riskovertime;indeed,SamuelHuntington's argument that

Union was, by i968-69,spendingtwice as much as was the United

submarine) wouldsuggest thatit did notdeemthei964 missileim-

Even shouldtwo or morestatesdesireto haltor severely restrict

Like an old soldier,an armsrace maysimplyfade away. Historical-

bythe"diplomaticrevolution" of I904. It mightbe held thatarmscon-

ARMS RACE DYNAMICS

Despitethe thintrickleof armsrace speculationthatmaybe traced

either"tight"or "loose,"depending upon theassumption madere-

It wouldseemprudent forthestudent of armsracesto investigate

It seemsnotunfairto suggest thatthosepersuaded of therealityof

of someSovietactivities-largely becauseof the paucityof reliable

neerswill producea new generation of weapons,regardless of their

forces,both qualitativeand quantitative, is requiredbeforean arms

an armsracereaction, butto predicttheSovietreactionor nonreaction,

ARMsRACE STUDY: THE WAY FORWARD

Scientists,ABM:ABC, in U.S. House of Representatives,Committee on Armed Services,

Function.Once an armsraceis begun,regardless of the original

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