Volume V No.

3 May- June 1987 ISSN 0115-9097

III lib II II I I I mm

Agrarian Reform The present administration has empha-

in the Philippines i
rural development as a,focal point of its
development strategy. Agriculture has
' ' been viewed as the sector which will
t ! EDITOR'S NOTE: No other tsme since the EDSA revolution has _ bitterly polarized lead both short-term recovery and long-
the Philippine society than the proposed agrarian reform program. A_ we go to press_ run growth. However, the prospects for
the President is on the verge of signing a land reform order amMst emotional condem- sustainable growth in the agricultural
nations by both the landless and landowners, The landless,..its supposed beneficiary, sector are hampered by the highly skewed
spearheaded by the militant peasant organization, the Kilusang Magbubuldd ng Pili. distribution of landholdings which consti-
pinas (KMP) have denounced the "watered down" version of the Comprehensive tute a barrier to social and political
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) as no better than the failed Marcos-initiated prog- stability as well as to the dual goals of
rant On the other hand, the landowners have issued an impassioned threat of civil equity and efficiency. More specifically,
disorder should the order be signed and implemented an agriculture-led, employment-oriented
In a more ob/ective tone, Dr. MaLAgnes R. Quisumbing, our guestwriter for this development strategy without a signifi-
issue, tries to sort out the conflicting issues and interests based from her numerous cant land reform program will not lead to
exposure on the land reform ism_ Dr. QuisumbingtsatpresentAssistantPro[essorat a strong positive impact on the rural
the University of the Philippines' School of Economics. She has done varied studies poor, nor will it lead to sustained broad-
on Philippine agriculture and development, and of late, co.authored the section on based rural development (Day/d, 1986:
land reform in An Agenda for Action for the Philippine Rural Sector by the Agricul- 1.4). Moreover, the agriculture growth
tu_l Policy and Strategy Team; and again a co-tmthor o1"the raonogrffph In Search of process itself runs the risk of exacerbating
a Land Reform Design for the Philippines done this year by the UP Los Baffos Agri- that inequality, since benefits from new
culturalPolicy Research Program. technology, irrigation, and market infras-
Dr. Quisumbing reiterates her belief that land reform must be enacted before trueture tend to be capitalized into higher
Congress convenes in July. One notes that even the conservative Catholic Church land values, to the benefit of present
has thrown its support to this stand..But beyond the question of when looms a.btgger landowners. Finally, the existing in-
concern: Will it be a genuine land reform? Political observers believe that the answer to surgency problem can be traced to the
this indicates the course which the Aquino government is and may have been taldng people's perception of social injustice,
since it was swept to where it is now by the original people power, and this will only worsen ff redistributive
structural refo-fius are not undertaken.

CONTENTS Page
Agrarian Reform in the Philippines .................................................... 1
PIDS Working Papers ................................................................ 13
P I DS Staff Papers ............... 16
UPDATE
New Publications _' :: _ ............ 14
Seminars ,.. 15
Forthcoming Seminars ......... ......................... ............................ 15

lib I II IIII II I
DEVELOPMENT
I il I RESEARCH,NEWS
i in n ...... 2 MAY - JUNE 1987.
IIIIIIII

"'
'_.:'
,i.'. _':Oaf ' tion had the effect of reducing labor
_'"_:_t¢ oommlrc/M..¢_la._/s,a
_" _'_ "¢_(i_,. '__!ii'
•, _)J • . ,
=,
. . ." . ,.._ ,.,
Previous administrations have, in
fact, recognized the importance of land
reform as a policy issue. This is evidenced
by its continued presence in the econo-
mic and political agenda since the period
of Commonwealth. However, the actual
redistributive impact of previous prog-
rams have been limited for several
reasons. One reason is that prograrns have
remained essentially the same over the
" operations. Thereibre, the exemption of
land under landlords' direct administra-
input per hectare below an optimum
level. Second, the limitation to rice and
•
corn land induced landlords to divert
their land to other crops. Third, regula-
tions on tenancy contracts (especially the
prohibition of share tenancy)and control
on land rent reduced the incentive of
landowners to rent out their land in small
parcels, thus decreasing potential employ,
ment of landless workers (Hayami,
1987b). Finally the encouragement of
large-scale plantation agriculture served to'
perpetuate a form of production organi-
zation which is not suited to a land-
scarce, labor surplus economy like the
of the 1950s, and the 1972 shift from a
democratic to an authoritarian regime.)
While it is true that political motivation is
certainly a crucial factor in agrarian
reform, it is likewise true that in the
medium and long-term, there are
objective economic realities which are
essential to make agrarian reform sustain-
able. Thus, agrarian reform must be
viewed not only as a political nor
counter-insurgency tool (which would
lead to piecemea_ and short-term efforts)
but as a part of a broader development
strategy for the agricultural sector.
This paper aims to present and
clarify some economic issues related to
agrarian reform. It begins, by reviewing
data on Philippine rural poverty and its

past
chase thirty years, land
of tenanted (i.e. government
and its resaleput-
to Philippines.,
Another reason lbr the lukewarm relationship
proceeds to todiscuss
tenurialthepatterns;
issues ofIt the_
agri. t
tenants (Winfel, 1983]), and has not been impact of previous programs is the pre- cultural heterogeneity, economies of scale
responsive to the changing economic and dominant political motivation without and tenurial arrangements. Later, policy
political realities of the grassroots. Aside adequate consideration of the under- directions under the Aquino administra-
from the focus on tenanted land, previous lying economic factors which enable tion are cited, namely, the Agrarian and
programs have been further restricted to agrarian reform to be an economically- Natural Resources Reform Provision of
grain crops (i.e. rice and corn) on the viable proposition. Previous regimes have the 1986 Constitution, and the proposed
argument that the inclusion of export often introduced land reform policies as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Prog.
crops traditionally grown on plantations stop gap measures to appease political ram (CARP). Finally, some policies which
may disrupt production and endanger an unrest - witness the past administrations' would provide incentives for an efficient
importatit source of foreign exchange implementation of land reform policies and equitable pattern of land distribu.
earnings. At the same time, the Marcos only during crisis periods (e.g. the peasant tion in the Philippines and supportive of
administration pursued policies which, unrest in the 1930s. the Huk movement agrarian reform are discussed.
encouraged the development of large-
scale plantation agriculture and the entry Table 1. 'Total Number of Familiesby Broad Industry Group
of foreign investment into the agricultural (National Standard); Third Quarters,1980-1983
sector. Thus, whatever efforts were tnade' (in thousands)
toward redistribution of land ownership Average
in rich and corn were counteracted by Annual
policies which served to increase asset Growth
industry Group 1980 1981 1982 1983 Rate (%)
concentration ,in the plantation sector
(Quisumbingand.4driano,1987). Philippines 8677 8894 9111 9382 2.4
The combinatiori'of those two con-
flitting policy directions also served to Agriculture 4897 5042 5120 5346 3.0
create biases against the efficient utili- Non-agriculture 3780 3852 3991 3982 1.8
zation of land for increasing employment
and labor income. First, the limited Bottom 30%
application of previous programs to Total 2599 2666 2771 2812 2.5
tenanted land created a strong incentive AgricultUre 2124 2184 2217 2310 2,8
for landlords to evict tenants and Non-agriculture 475 482 514 493 1.3
cultivate their land under direct adminis-
tration. Labor input and hence, agri- Other Income
cultural output and labor income per
hectare, are usually higher in smalJ family Groups 6078 6228 6380 6525 2.4
farms than large farms, based on hired Agriculture 2773 2858 2903 3036 3.1
labor, because of the inherent difficulty Non-agriculture 3305 3370 3477 3489 1.8
in supervising wage laborers for spatially.
dispersed and ecologically diverse farm Source: NCSO

IIIIIII
'DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH NEWS 3 MAY -JUNE 1987
..... , ...........

Rural Poverty and Land Tenure

Patterns1 Table2. RegionalPoverty indicators,1983 and 1985.

A distributional policy such as land 1983z 191152

reform is best understood when situated
in the context of the poverty situation in URBAN RURAL
the rural areas. Following the 1983 Proverty Poverty Provorty Poverty Poverty Poverty
NEDA Development Planning Committee Region line 3 incidence line incidence line incidence
which classified the bottom 30 percent of
the income bracket as poor, a cursory (inP) (%) (inP) (%) (inP) 1%)
view of the rural poverty situation is
needed. NCR Metro Manila 840 11.2 3,282 44.1 ....
Table I provides data on the number 1. Ilocos 678 40.3 3,093 56.2 2,139 51.1
of families for agricultural and non- 2. CagayanValley 678 43,i 2,897 48.6 2;092 55.6
agricultural income groups, broken down
3. Central Luzon 696 27.4 3,153 45.2 2,104 43.8
into poor and non-poor families for the
eriod 1980 to 1983. As of the third 4. Southern Tagalog 768 31.3 3,048 50.6 2,174 59.1
uarter of 1983, there are over 5.3 5. Bicol 660 42.7 2,625 62.3 2,047 76.0
million families in the agricultural sector, 6. Western Visayas 696 50.5 3,069 65,0 2,249 76.2
representing 57 percent of total popula. 7. Central Visayas 732 48.1 2,426 58.9 1,818 73.4
tion. Over 82 percent or 2.3 million 8. EasternVisayas 654 33.00 2,733 70.1 1,822 70.5 !
families in this sector belong to the 9. Western Mindanao 768 40,1 2,650 61.6 2,025 66.0
bottom 30 percent income bracket.
10. Northern Mindanao 678 38.6 2,952 65.7 2,022 66.3
The annual growth rate of the
bottom 30 percent income bracket 11. Southern Mindanao 738 33.3 2,998 59.6 2,079 62.8
families is higher at 2.8 percent compared 12. Central Mindanao 666 28.4 2,624 56.8 2,161 67.0
to the 1.3 percent annual increase of their PHILIPPINES 39.0 3,021 52.1 2,066 63.7
non-agricultural counterparts. In general,
we can conclude that from the absolute
number of families and population
growth rates,-the agricultural sector has
experienced a substantial increase in
poverty incidence relative to the rest of 1WorldBank (1985),
_he country, 2Inter-agency
3A Working Group on Poverty Determination (1986).
Such a view, however, is limited per capita poverty line multiplied by 8 to make comparisions consistent with the
1985. The poverty line was computed based- on rice expenditure sufficient to meet
_ecause it is not based on an absolute calorie-requirements blown up to a food threshold and a total threshold. See World Bank
neasttre of deprivation nor does it con- (1985) fnrdetails.
;ider regional variations in poverty
incidence. A regional analysis of poverty
would be more usefial in identifying key Table 2 presents alternative estimates (1985). Bearing these caveats in mind, let
factors related to rural poverty, of poverty incidence in 1983 and 1985, us proceed to Table 2. The data for 1983
based on the National Census and show that regions with the highest
Statistics Office (NCSO) Integrated poverty incidences are Western Visayas
Profile of the Rural Poor Survey of Houseb.olds (ISH); computed (50%), Central Visayas (48%), Bicol
by the World Bank (1985) for 1983, and (43%), Cagayan Valley (43%), Ilocos
the Inter-Agency Working Group on (40%) and Western Mindanao (40 % ).
Regional analysis of poverty is- Poverty Determination (1986) for 1984o The lowest poverty incidence rates are
important because poverty incidence What is immediately apparent is that the in Metro Manila (11% ) and Central
varies markedly across geographic regions. World Bank poverty lines are conservative Luzon (27%).
It is also essential in identifying priority compared to those adopted by the Inter- Rural-urban breakdowns based on
areas for intervention. The identification Agency Working Group, and this tends to 1985 data show that poverty incidence is
of regions with high poverty incidence, underestimate the poverty incidence highest in the rural areas of Western
however, must be taken only as a first figures. In previous studies on the Philip- Visayas (76.2%), Bicol (76.0%), Central
step because of wide intraregional pines, the World Bank has also tended to Visayas (73.4%), Central Mindanao
variation (e.g. between provinces and use conservative poverty lines; and this (67.0%),NorthernMindanao(66.3%),and
municipalities), practice has been criticized by Mangahas Western Mindanao (66.0%). The regions
 DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH NEWS 4 MAY -JuNE 1987
_. -- III _ III!/ .. BIIIIIII ii i11 iii iml I

Figure I. Regionol Poverty Incidence Rotios

19.83 1985
"! 1

39.o _'----------_ .P.HI L. _ PHIL. _i S2J

I

i , Io t

2
1I-2_! NCR 1
ILOCOSt VALLEY NCR jI 44.1
40.3 | ' 1 1 _+:'_56,2

4.3.I _ F +_" 2 2 '

.... _=i 48.e

" CENTRAL ,,,

f31.3 i 4 LUZON V_; " . 5

BICOL 4 L_]50.6
42.7 t- 5 NCR .5 _ _ _-_62.3

5o5i
4
6 4
SOOTHER, _ _ ,, 8 6
8. I •_ 7 TAOALOG L_ _ EASTERN 7
q_
33. 0 8 ', _ "w= : 470 I

38.6 _ _..... 10 """ 10 .....

_65.7

33.. 11 1:..1 _ _59.6

-- - ... : -_-.'::' -" .8

I l I I iL I ,*_ -
, . + . . • _- I I | _ | I I I

- 9 ' 2b " 4b " dO " dO

60 40 20 0 "" WESTERN MINDA
Percent ]
I
Percent
/
12 11
CENTRAL SOUTHERN
MINDANAO MINDANAO

with the lowest rural poverty incidence

are Central Luzon (43.8%) and Ilocos Table 3. ComparativeIndex of Mean Family Incomeby Type of Family
(51.1% ). (all families -- 10O) 1980-1983.
Agricultural incomes are substantial-
ly lower than non-agricultural incomes.
It comes as no surprise, therefore, that a Types of family T h i 1981
1980 r d Q u1982
a r t • 1983
r F o u r1981
1980 t h Q 1982
u a r t e1983
r
greater number of families in the bottom
30 percent of the income distribution are All Families 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
. in
agriculture. A more detailed picture Agricultural Operators 66.0 64.2 65.0 64.1 70.2 64.8 85.7 76.7
can be obtained by examining an index Palay 67.4 64.3 64.4 61.3 81.5 75.7 97,2 109.3
of income by occupation as compared Corn 56.4 49.6 46.2 44.1 51.7 38.1 40.6 40.6
with the national average (See Table 3). Coconut 59.7 55.2 57.5 75.0 58.7 49.2 76.6 70.8
Except for livestock and poultry opera-
tors, incomes in the agricultural sector are Sugarcane 15.4 101.6 180,6 92.2 166.5 322.9 299.6 76.3
Other Crops 67.4 63.4 63.0 56.9 52,4 49.4 127.7 54.2
generally below the national average.For
example, agricultural wage laborers LivestockandPoultry 112,6 114.3 127.9 101,4 113,8 109.4 110.8 91.3
received 55.6 percent of the national Fishing 66,6 72.3 66.4 58.4 63.8 61.5 71.5 62.2
average income in 1983. AgriculturalWages
andSalaries 50.8 50.0 50,5 55.6 63,2 48.1 60.6 44.3
More recent data from the 1983 ISH
Non-agricultural 142,2 144.6 143.1 144.7 135,5 144.3 162.2 129.3
permit us to analyze the breakdown of
poverty incidence by main source of
, I I IIIII il i-
• DEVELOPMENT RESEARCHNEW£ 6 MAY--JUNE 1987
iiiii iiiilIIIi

Table 4, Area of Farms, by Type and Tenure of Operator

Philippines, 1971,
(percentage distribution)

% of
total
physical Tenureof farma
farm
Type of Farm Ow=led Rentedor Leased Other t'orms
Fully Part For share For fixed Runt free Ma==ager O[her_
Ow_md Bwnar money/ Opera_ed
produce

All types 100.0 62.9 11.0 16.3 1.9 1.6 4,1 2.2
Paiay 31.3 49.8 15,9 23.0 4.6 1.3 1.5 3.8
Corn 17,6 69.5 8.1 18.2 0.3 2.3 0.5 1,2
Coconut 25.3 73,9 7.2 14.6 0.2 1.O 1.8 1.3
Tobacco n.s. 53.8 17,3 23.4 1.4 1.2 -- 2'.9
Sugarcane 4.3 48.4 18.1 10.9 2.7 0.6 16.2 3.0
Citrus a.s. 45.4 4,5 15.1 0.1 ns. 33.5 1.4
Vegetable 0.2 62.0 12.0 17.2 3,6 2,1 0.4 2.9
tuber, roots and bulb crops 0.8 80.4 5.1 8.3 0,4 3.0 0.7 0.2
Coffee 0.6 36.5 4.1 4.6 0.2 2.6 0.8 1.3
Abaca 0.8 76.9 8.3 8.9 0.1 1.4 3.0 1.3
Banana 0.7 63.5 6.0 7.2 2,8 3.2 16,1 1.2
Pineapple 0.2 3.5 0.6 2.1 0.5 0,4 92.8 0.8
Other fruits 0.3 7.37 6.1 7,9 0.6 1.9 8.5 1,3
Chicken n.s. 64.4 9.8 10.8 4.6 0.6 5,5 4,3
Hog 0.3 60.8 15.2 11.4 1.'1 1,5 8.1 1.9
Cattle 0.5 50.5 8.6 2.8 2,8 2,1 31.9 1.4
Others 12.9 71.5 9.9 9.9 0.6 2.2 4,0 2.1

As a percen_a!leof to,at fann are_ devoreclto a specific crop n.s. meansie_'sthan 0,09 percent.
Source: NCSO, 1971 Censusof Agricu/ture, Philippines,

percenc in 1981. With respect to palay, owners decreased from 77.6 percent to highest poverty incidence,
the percentage of farm area under owner- 75.3 percent• while that rented or leased
operated status (both categories) in- increased f'rom 1.8.5 percent to 19.6
increased from 65.7 percent to 68.1 per- percent. /t is relatively easy to shift land An analysis of the commercial crops
cent from 1971 to 1981. However, the out from corn to avoid ir_clusion in OLTP (e.g. totgacco, sugarca_te, bar_ana and
percentage of palay'farm area which was because corn production does not require pineappie) is more difficult •because of
rented or lease increased from 27.6 so nmch semi-perrnanent land improve- change % category deimitionso Many of
percent .to 29,4 percent. Furtlaermore, ments as does paddy rice cultivation, these were reported as marJager-operated
while the percentage under snare tenancy A more dramatic deterioration occurred, in the 1971 cextsus; this category hasbeen
decreased, the leasehold percentage in- in coconut; a drastic decline in percentage el_nmated in _he later census, and it is
creased. This is consistent witb. the scheme of owner-operated farms t'roln 81.1 u.nciear where the category has been
to shift from share tenancy to leasehold percent to 73.8 percent; a marked in- absorbed. One approach would classify
operations, creased in share and leasehold tenancy manager-operated farms under those
trom 14.8 percent to 214.9 percent. The leased for a fixed amount of money/
The situation in corn, which was trends in tenure status of corn and produce; this is consistent with the
supposed ro 'be under the Operadon Land coconut fames are alarming, since these leasing of large tracts for plantation
Transfer Program (OLTP), is slightly crops, which have t'he highest propoltion purposes from the NatiorJal Development
worse. Corn area operated by farm of tenanted farms, are also those with the Corporation.
2[ JI llll II
lllll [ • IIIIIIIII
I
DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH NEWS 8 MAY -JuNE 1987
__ '.............. In I I I ill|l I I I nimBI I ii

Table 6 Sample Typology of Farm Enterprises and Crops in the

Philippines.

Demand Peasant Foods Industrial/Luxury Exports

Supply (Consumed primarily within Consumed by wage- (for Industrial use or
the agricultural sector, earners;available consumption by high
subsistence crops) on market income groups))

IMPORTS wheat products feed grains

milk

DOMESTIC PRODUCTION

Peasant Enterprise rice, corn, coffee,.

root crops, livestock (backyard) tobacco,
vegetables abaca

Capitalist (wage-labor) rice

enterprise (G.O. 47) palm oil pineapple
corn commercial livestock banana
rubber

Non-capitalist plantatio_ sugar coconut (for industrial sugar

enterprisc use)

coconut sugar (for Industrial coconut

(as coconut oil) use) (as copra)

]_conomic Issues in Agrarian
Reform
A The Need for a Comprehensive
Program
A genuiile land refonu program,
being a question of just distribution of
returns to land and natural resources,
should :not be viewed as specific to any
crop, to type of tenure, or economic size
of operational landholding (David, 1986:
1.5). The pitfalls of confining agrarian
refoma to specific crops or to particular
tenurial forms not only create incentives
for evasion, but also lead to neglect of
crops/forms of productive organization
where inequality is more pronounced,
However, one of the difficulties of formu-
lating such a comprehensive scheme is
the underlying heterogeneity of the
agrictfltural sector,
The agricultural sector is ciaaracte-
rized by different production and market-
ing arrangements across crops: Following
de Janvry (1981), a typology of form
enterprises can be made based on: (1) the
mode of production to which they belong
(primitive community, semifeudal, or
capitalist); (2) their respective status in
the labor market, (whether family or
hired labor is predominant); and (3) the
degree of control they exercise over the
state. The typology of farm enterprises
can then be interfaced with a typology of
crops based on conditions of supply and
demand. Supply comes from imports and
domestic production, the latter coming
from capitalist and peasant enterprises
where the differentiating variables are
jointly the scale of production and the
use of hired labor. Demand- conditions,
on the other hand, provide a basis for the
classification of crops into four cate-
gories: peasant foods, wage foods, indus-
trial and luxury crops, and exports, based
on geographic locus of disappearance, the
weight of the crops in the consumer price
index, and the share of the crop market-
ed.
A typology of the agricultural sector
would show the diversity of production
arrangements in the.Philippines as shown
in Table 6. For example, rootcrops, rice,
corn and vegetables are typically ga'own
on small-scale peasant farms, while corn-
mercial farms and agribusiness corpora-
tions (e.g. those growing bananas and
pineapples for export) would be classi-
fled as capitalist enterprises because of
large scale operations and the use of wagt_
labor_ There are also non-capitalist planta-
tions such as those in sugar and coconut,
where the predominant arrangement is
tenancy or wage labor, the latter being
differentiated from capitalist enterprises
due to the existence of other social and
institutional ties between the worker and
the landlord (as in the hacienda system
of Negros). The technical requirements
for each crop as well as its labor institu-
tions may be different so that a single
agrarian reform scheme may not be
uniformly applicable. However, this
does not negate the need for the redistri-
bution of land ownership and access to
rental income from land. Due to the
difference in production-marketing ar-
rangements across crops and variations in
patterns of land ownership, which may
have cultural and ecological bases (e.g,
tribal and communal lands), land reform
DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH NEWS 9 MAY -JuNE 1987
I HIH III I II IIiIII

programs must be flexible in design and for custom flowing; sugar planters in contract farming schemes or collective
implementation. Thus, attention must be Negros say that a farm size of 50 hectares ownership.
given to various institutional arrange- enables efficient use of such large-scale
ments under which this can take place, machinery. However, this bottleneck for
small holders can be solved through the C. TenurialArrangement
use of the custom-plowing service of
B. Economies of Scale tractors, which is readily available in the A major issue in the land reform
sugar areas of Batangas and Bukidnon, debate is whether or not the government
where both small and large sugar planters should impose the type of tenure rela-
The loss of economies of scale is coexist. Thus, diseconomies of scale tions on land reform beneficiaries. For
often used against the extension of land need not be inherent to small farms so example, the shift from share tenancy to
reform to the plantation sector. It is long as a viable rental market for leasehold tenancy was instituted on the
often argued that parcelling out or machinery and other support services grounds that: (1)sharetenancyisineffi-
dividing the operational unit may disrupt exists, cient compared to fixed rent (leasehod
production processes, with detrimental. Data from sugar farms also indicate tenancy) or wage labor; (2)share tenancy
effects in productivity. This argument is that small farms may be more cost- is the most exploitative form of produc-
based on two premises: First, land efficient in producing sugar (Habits, tion relations; and (3)the tenant should
reform is equated to the subdivision 1977). Table 7 shows that small sugar be liberated fromhis "feudal bondage" to
of operating units, and second, significant farms incur the least cost to produce the landlord.
_economies of scale exist in the plantation one picul of sugar. The cost per picul Despite the popular appeal Of such
sector. However, both arguments do not even increased for longer farm size care- arguments, however, restrictions on the
have convincing empirical evidence in
gories. Furthermore, a comparison with form of tenancy may have negative impli-
their favor. First, land reform involves the other sugar-producing Asian countries cation and may, in fact, be unfounded.
redistribution of ownership, and is not reveals that the Philippines has extra- First, •theoretical studies have shown that,
equated with the subdivision of the
ordinarily large farms. The Philippines all other things being equal, in the pre-
operational unit. In this case, the loss of
is an anomaly since almost half of its sence of risk and uncertainty, share-
economies of scale is moot and academic, total sugar cane area consists of farms cropping is equivalent to a combination
since the farm enterprise will still be
exceeding 50 hectares in size, while farms of fixed-rent of fixed-wage contracts
operated as a large unit, though owner- smaller than 5 hectares account for (Newbery, 1977, Reid, 1976). Empirical
ship will be democratized. Second, the
99 percent of sugar cane farms in studies in the Philippines(e.g.Ministryof
existence of economies of scale in agri- Taiwan, 99 percent in Japan, 6°35 per- Agrarian Reform, 1983) also show no
culture is subject to question. Recent cent in India, and 72 percent in Pakistan. significant productivity differences
studies (e.g. Hayami and Ruttan, 1985, Habito points out that if other countries between tenure categories, while farm
Ch. 6; Hayami, 1987a) have shown that, have done well with predominantly small practices, farm inputs and irrigation are
although increasing returns in agricultural
sugar cane farms, there seems to be no variables which do affect farm produc-
production tend to prevail in high-wage reason why the Philippines, cannot. If tion. Thus, singling out tenanted farms on
economies that demand large-scale capital economies of scale do exist m processing the basis of the inefficiency argument is
equipment to save on labor, agriculture in and marketing activities, small farmers not justifiable. Second, assuming that
low-wage developing economies is can still take advantage of these through labor income is the major source of
generally characterized by constant ...... , • JlJ m,
returns or even scale diseconomles. Even
in the case of commercial crops such as
sugar, scale economies appear to exist Table 7. Sugar Production Costs for Different Farm Sizes.
only in processing activities but not in
farm production itseff. -..................
A recent study based on field obser- Farm Size " AverageCostper Picul (_'1
rations (H_ami, Quisumbing and
Adriano, 1987) has concluded that scale ..... _ :_=_
economies do not exist in the production Small farms ( IO hectares and below) IO7.50
of most tree crops such as coconuts,
coffee, and cacao. Production and Medium forms (between IO to 50 hectares) 124 .OO
marketing of these crops require neither
large-scale machinery nor central manage- Large farms (above 50 hectares ) 120 .OO
ment, both of which could be pos_ible
sources of scale economies. In the case of
$ouroe of basic data : PHILSUCOM_ A :5aheme for the Rationalization of the Philippine SuE(If
sugar, however, scale economies seem to I_dustry,1985, InHablto(1987).
be linked to the use of large-scale tractors ................ _,,
• . ] ." li_

' I IIIII I IIIII II llllll I II III

lllIllllllll
DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH NEWS 10 MAY - JUNE 1987
I I A Ill
income for the tenant and agricultural generate enough cash income, or to avail.

accruing the
laborer, to land
share or
of capitaT'may be shares
labor vis-a-vis more their desirecredit
of outside to sources
becomehaveleaseholders
expressed ! "." .' .""::':i'i.
i::':'.::'!'
'/.!.:. '"" '"' i
";'"i.i'"":".!'. .:i..'"'i;
')" ' ''!":'"'"i'i"!'"i"i:i
crucial in defining "exploitation" than (Hayami, Quisumbing and Adriano, ' :.:..".ii.i:i._,
:::i.. :tlf
the form of tenancy itself. That is, other 1987:9). Thus, it may be wiser to make a .......
"'""" '
forms of production organization which transition to leasehold status optional, comzng:".:
are not characterized by tenancy may Furthermore, ' it is crucial that support ....'....'
. ,:elite",,
..''.'.

even result in lower employment and
labor income, and may even have higher
concentrations in asset ownership. Per-
haps the most obvious example would be
wage labor on sugar plantations and
capitalist enterprises like multinational
agribusiness plantations. Third, since rural
product and factor markets are imperfect,
the landlord (ff he is not an absentee)
may
neededserve as the conduit
to purchase productionfor inputs,
credit
Abolishing the social and economic
institutions of tenancy without pro-
viding adequate support services through
other institutional arrangements
have detrimental effects on the viability
of the small farmer. Fourth, the issue of
landless workers, who would be excluded
from a tenure-based identification of land
reform beneficiaries, is completely
neglected. Finally, .restrictions may lead
to even more inequitable production
arrangements. There is an increased
incentive to evict tenants (and substitute
hired labours) to avoid inclusion in land
reform, thus reducing the amount of
employment and labor income,
!::.i'.'
"' ...'..:.":i
"".'':":'.'.!'::.'i..':::..i:'."..'.':.i'".[".".:":":"'"'"
............... .:i:"7.:
"'..'..i..:...."'._ .':':"':..':"'
"::.:the ;._-s°cial":"and
ol,,:,renancy
adequate,
'.:!.........:..:.:".
The above arguments do not imply
that tenurial change is undesirable,
Rather, these suggest that legislation, of
tenurial changes without the provision of
other . support mechanisms may be
counterproductive. For example, the
often.legislated abolition.of share tenancy,
may not be beneficial to the farmer who
-is short of cash. On the other hand, share
tenants who have already been able to
services be part and parcel of a land
reform strategy, (e.g. extension services
to increase the skills and productivity of
the farmer_beneficiary, and credit prog-
rams) to enable him to purchase neces-
sary production inputs.
" '
. ...............
i!:':'"
...... '.... "'""':'
.".
i'"..'.
may
i.'.':.
!.'";.'":":' ..:'.""ii'i"."'".: '" :' (1) The progam
Recent Development on
Agrarian. Reform 2
One of the major differences of the
proposed agrarian reform program from
its predecessors is that it is mandated in
the 1986 Constitution. Unlike previous
land reform policies, the scope and
'("."..: coverage of the proposed program are sti-
' pulated in the newly ratified Constitu-
tion. Article XIII, specifically Sections 4
to 8 stipulatedthat all agricultural lands,
sup,..i.i regardless of the crops being cultivated
or their legal categories, (i.e., public or.
private) shall be covered by the agrarian
reform program. The potential coverage
includes some 12 million hectares of cul-
".'i_.'"" tivated lands and four million hectares
:':"" of uncultivated and idle lands affecting
approximately 30 million farmers,
regular farmworkers and their respective
families as beneficiaries,
The Constitution also provides that
the principle of agrarian reform shall be
applied to the disposition and exploita-
tion of natural resources especially those
suitable for agricultural purposes. Like.
wise, it empowers the government to
formulate provisions which protect the
rights of subsistence fishermen and fish-
gro
':th_
.wottldil
': ::i':i.'.:"''
'
...i.". :..
''
'..
.:'...
.. ....... '..i.i.:.'iiiii.
'...ii
'''''''
:.'
:
..
'..:....:i.!.:):....ii'
..; workers to a _,.lU..t._- share from their labor
in the utilization of marine and f.ishing
...: resources" (Article XIH,
. Section 7).
Moreover, the Constitution also pro=
..........:.:.._
vides the legal framework for the imple-
"..:.:
mentation aspects of th.e progr_n. In
particular, the Constitution provides that:
should, ensure land-
owners of "just compensation" for all
their lands which have been affect by
land reform; (2) Congess may prescribe
the retention limit hased on a number of
criteria ranging from "ecological, deve-
lopmental, or equity considerations";
(3) incentives for voluntary land-sharing
schemes shall be provided by the state;
(4) One of the state's primary fimctions
in the program is to ensure that the
physical and marketing infrastructures
essential to the production and distribu-
tion of the agricultural commodities
shall be adequately provided; (5) Partici-
pation by all parties who will be affected
by the program should be elicited in the
formulation of the agrarian reform
scheme; and (6) The eovernment should
develop mechanisms which will encourage
landowners to invest the proceeds of the
program to agribusiness/industrial under-
takings.
Some critics (e.g. Lard, 1.986) point
out that the abovementioned clauses
could restrict the equitable distribution
of all agricultural croplands and natural
resources. For instance, if just compen-
sation were equated to the market value
of the agricultural lands (which is the
interpretation of the Constitutional Com-
mission), then the redistribution of lands
to small farmers and farmworkers will not
jibe with the true spirit of. the land
DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH NEWS
IIIII11
reform program. Rather, such a redi.s-
tribution would 0e equivalent to an
exchange act_vi_y in a land market.
Further, since majority of the prospecCive
beneficiaries of this program (i.e. the
small farrn growers and farmworkers)
belong to the lowes'c income rung of the
country, a land price that is no different
from its markec value would certainly be
beyond the financial reach oi these bene-
ficiaHes,
Another loophole m this Constltu-
tional legislation pertatr.s to the t'etention
limit. Not only is Congress accorded
much leeway m terms of identifying the
appropriate land ceiling but more amport-
antly, another seccionintheConsutution
stipulates hectarage limits for public agri-
cuhuraliands that can de owned or leased
by private corporat:ions an.d Filipino
individuals. Specxiicaily, Article XIII of
the newly-ratified Constitution, section 3
states that:
"Priva_e corporarzons or associations
may not hold such alienaole lands of the
public' domain except, by lease,, for a
,period nor exceeding rwen_-five years,
renewable Ibr not more than twenty-
five years, renewable ]br not more than
twenty-live .years, and not to exceed
one thousand hectares in area. Cin'zens
of the Phii'ippines may l'ease not more
than five thousand nectua'es, or acquire
not more than twelve hectares thereby'by
purchase, homestead, or grant, "' (under-
scorings added),
Although this section incl.udes a condi-
tional clause which particularly takes into
accoun_ the '_r¢qtiirernei:tts of agrarian
retorm '_ (refer to paragraph 2 of section
3), the past experience of the country is
replete with instances whereby private
foreign and domestic corporations as well
as local individuals were able to augment
their landholdings by using a sindiar
Constitutional stipulation (refer to
ArticZeXIIin the 1915 Constitution).
Lastly, if"the mechanics of the laud
refoml program were letI fbr Congress
to decide, its actual implementation may
be considerably delayed. Moreover, it"
Congie_s will be dominated by people
coming front 'the landlord and elite group,
then one could expect that the redistri-
butive potential of the land reform pro-
11
visions would be substantially watered
down.
This is one of the reasons why the
present govermnent is trying to produce
a land ret0rm package which already
derans the concepts and the mechanics
for irnpierrlenting the agrarian reform
proga-am. The essential components of
this program are discussed 'below.
"Agrarian reform must be
viewed not only as a political
nor counter-insurgency tool but
as a part of a broader develop-
ment strategy for the agricul-
llgrai sector, ""
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Progrmn (CARP)
The proposed Comprehensive Agra-
rian Reform' Prograrn is the cornerstone
of the Aqumo Adrmnistration's land
refbma strategy. Although the CARP is
still currently being examined (especially
the mechanics of its implementation and
possible sources of financing), the form
and content of the program have akeady
been developed.
The CARP, which will affect
approxnnately 11.1 million hectares of
agricultural lands (or roughly one half of
the total area of arable lands), is intencted
to take effect between 1987 and 1992.
The CARP is divided into four programs,
based on the land category covered and
its proposed time frame. Table 5 provides
a description of these programs.
The first phase (Program A) calls
for the completion of Operation Land
Transfer under P.D. 27 as well as the
implementation of the landed estates
program. This covers some 1.3 million
hectares of tenanted rice and corn lands,
or 12 percent o1" the total proposed
reform area. Program A can be under-
taken under existing laws.
Program B involves the expansion of
land relbrm to idle and abandoned lands,
and lands that will be expropriated. The
affected land area is estimated at 939,000
hectares, 18 percent of the total land
reform area (.See Table 8). This program
MAY -JuNE 1987
can be implemented under RA 3844 and
LOI 227, or und_ the series of Executive
Orders regartiing sequestered lands.
Among the three programs which
will affect privately-owned agricultural
lands (i.e. Programs A, B and C), Program
C encompasses the largest hectarage as it
involves some 3.5 million hectares or
approximately 35 percent of total land
retorm areas (See Table 8). This ranks
second to the area classified under
Program D (it should be pointed out that
the latter program is concerned with
public and not privately-owned lands).
Ot the 3.5 million hectares in Program C,
lands categorized as plantations utilizing
wage labor account t'or 2.33 million
hectares, or 61 percent. The remaining
area consists of 562,000 hectares of
tenanted rice and corn retained areas and
957,000 hectares of tenanted non-rice
and corn areas. There is a concensus how-
ever, that the haciendas and agribusiness
plantations are the most politicaUy-
sensitive, since there is no existing land
reform legislation covering plantation
agriculture.
Lastly, Program D involves the
distribution of five million hectares' of
pubhc alienable and disposable lands
suited for agriculture, and which can be
reformed under Commonwealth Act 141
and Executive orders issued by President
Aquino.
The Department of AgrarianReform
(DAR) plans to implement Programs, A,
B, and D in 1987, leaving the contro-
versial Program C tbr implementation in
1989. The terminal year for the comple-
tion .of the four programs is set at 1992,
the year when President Corazon Aquino
ends her six-year term.
At present, the Cabinet Action Corn-
mittee is finalizing the mechanics of the
CARP before Congress is convened in
July 1987. The purpose is to define this
program and. begin its implementation
prior to the convening of Congress; it is
hoped that its immediate implementa-
tion would reduce dramaticaUy the
backlog (in terms of time and finances)
that would result ff Congress .were left
to design the agrarian reform pl'ogram.
Currently, however, the Committee
is still laced with several constraints,
primarily financial in nature. It is
estimated that some P63 billion would
DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH NEWS 12 MAY -JUNE 1987
...... II II II II I

be required to finance the four programs.

Table 8. The Four Programs of the Land transfer acquisitions alone would
ComprehensiveAgrarianReform Program cost the government about P28 billion (or
(CARP) 44 percent of the total financial cost of
the CARP, assuming the state will sub-
sidize 20 percent of the total land corn-
PROGRAM LAND TIME pensation value. The total expenditures
CATEGORY DESCRIPTION TARGETAREA FRAME include the following: P13.0 billion for
Area Percentto credit services, P5.6 billion for extension
Ithoumndh_=tares} total services, P8.0 billion for the agro-forest
development projects, P3.0 billion for
Program A Tenanted rice land census, and P5.4 billion for other
and corn lands operational and administrative expenses.
In terms of funding sources, the
under P.D. 27 1,300 11.7 1987-1989
Committee hopes to finance 59 percent
- Landsnot yet of the CARP's cost through foreign loans
covered by DAR 722 6.5 whi/_ the remaining 41 percent shall be
- Lands covered by EPs 11 n.s generated from the domestic economy.
- Lands covered by LCs 562 5.1 At present, the Committee, with the
assistance of the Inter-Agency Tas_
Program B Private lands 939 8.5 1987-1989 Force, is carefully examining various
- Idle and mechanisms of obtaining funds from both
abandonedlands 189 1.7 foreign and local institutions/sources at
- Foreclosed lands 300 2.7 the lowest cost possible.
- Sequestered farms 50 0.4 There is also the question of just
- Voluntary offers 300 2.7 compensation for landowners. This issue
= Lands to be expropriated 100 0.9 is intimately linked to the subsidy which
the government is willing to fund and is
Program C Plantations, etc., capable
i of financing, as well as its
which are affordabillty from the perspective of the
privatelands 3,852 prospective beneficiaries.
., - Haciendasunder
' land administration 2,333 21.0 Some Suggestions for Acting
-- Tenantedrice and corn
land with the retention At this point, there is no question,,
limit 562 5.1 that there is a popular demand for 11I
- Tenanted non-rice and genuine agrarian reform program.
corn croplands 957 8.6 National public opinion polls (Mangahas,
1987) consistently show the sentiment of
Program D Public alienable the majority as: (1) the extent of land
and disposablelands reform under the Marcos regime was
suitable for insufficient (64% ); (2) most would
agriculture 5,000 45.1 1987-1989 approve the extension of land reform
- Public A & D coverage to all crops (67%), tenure forms
land suitablefor (65%), natural resources (61%) and pub-
agriculture ("handog lic lands (62%); and (30, 60) percent of
titulo"), DAR settle- the respondents are willing to pay a tax
ments, or logged-over to Finance an expanded land refbrm
lands, areasof cancelled/ program.
However, land reform is still an
expired PLAs, TLAs, urgent and unresolved issue. While a
FLAs, andunnecessary majority (63%) are satisfied with govern-
and civilian reservations ment efforts on land reform so far, only
TOTAL lands 11,091 100.0 half (51%) think that government has
done better in this area than the Marcos
Source of Basic Data: Gerardo Bulatao's discussion of the A¢ce/erated Land Reform Program administration, and two-fifths (39 %) felt
during a PIDs Media Forum on Agrarian Reharm held lastFebruary I3, I987o that there has been no change yet. Final-
ly, two-thirds (65%); would like the
IIlIIIIlI IIII III
DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH
IIIII I IIIIIIlll
President to enact land reform legislation
right away to include Hacienda Luisita
and not wait for Congress. All these
results are indicative of the urgency of
an accelerated land reform program and
tile special need for the President's family
to participate in it (Mangahas, 1987:4).
The comprehensive nature of the
proposed agrarian reform program is a
marked departure from its predecessors,
Given current political realities and bud-
getary constraints, however, the like-
lihood of the dilution of the program's
redistributive intent increases with each
day's delay in the promulgation and
implementation of land refoml legisla-
tion. Political pressure from land groups
demanding exemption from the program,
_i_ increase in the proposed seven hectare
cenfion limit, and more generous modes
of-compensation is mounting. Further-
more, there is a growing tendency to
leave the implementation details to Cong-
ress. Unfortunately, history has shown
that Congress tends to adopt a less redis-
tributive stance towards land reform legis-
NEWS 13 MAY -JUNE 1987
lation. Thus, at this moment perhaps the the bureaucracy to seek "institutional
most formidable barrier to land reform rent at the expense of the poor who have
would be the landed elites who stand to little legal knowledge (Hayami, Quisum-
lose their economic and political bases bingandAdriano, 1987:15).
due to land reform.
Notwithstanding politieally-motiva-
ted opposition to the program, land
reform will not succeed in bringing about
a substantial improvement in efficiency NOTES
and equity unless it is supported by
policies designed to reduce incentives 1This section is based largely on two
to hold land for speculation or hoarding papers, namely Quisumbing and Cruz
as,well as to increase incentives for labor (1986) and Mangahas and Quisumbing
use.. Certain policies can be implemen- (1.986).
ted immediately, such as a ceilhlg on
aggregate landholdings, a progressive land 2This section is taken from a review
tax and the deregulation of tenancy of past land reform programs and accom-
contracts as a complementary measure plishments in Quisumbing and Adriano
to the proposed prognun. Finally, to (1987).
ensure the success of land reform, its
rules must be simple, transparent, and 3Based on the presentation of
uniform. Complex regulations and inclu- Gerardo Bulatao, Undersecretary for
sions of numerous clauses for exceptions Planning, Department of Agrarian Re-
will reduce the chances of effective form, at the Philippine Institute for
implementation. Moreover, it will en- Development Studies' Media Forum on
courage activities from landed elites and Agrarian Reform, 13 February 1987.

PIDS WORKING PAPERS

W.P. #8309 Economic Incentives and Comparative Ad- W.P. #8501 A Review of Welfare in the Coconut Industry.
vantage in the Philippine Cotton Industry. Sylvia N, Guerrero.
= Arsenio BalisacarL W.P0 # 8502 Financing the Budget Deficit in the Philippines.
W.P, #8401 Interseetotal Capital Flows and Balanced Agro- EliM. Remolona_
Industrial Development in the Philippines, W.P. #8601 Trade Liberalization Experience in the Philip,
Manuel S. J. de Leon pines,, 1960-84. Florian Alburo and Geoffrey
W.P. #8402 Forest Land Management in the Context of Shephera_
National Land Use. Adolfo E Revilla, Jr. W.P. #8602 lnte_Tated Summary Report: Population Ptes-
W.P. #8403 Policy Issues on Commercial Forest Manage. sure and Migration - Implications for Upland
ment. Cerenilla A, Cruz and Marian Segura. Development. Ma. Concepcion Z C_ruz.
delosAngele_ W.P. #8603 Factors Affecting the Choice of Location: A
W.P. #8404 The Impact of Government Policies on Forest Survey of Foreign and Local Firms in the
Resources Utilization. Gerald C Nelson. Philippines. Alejandro N. Herrin and Ernesto
W.P. #8405 Population Pressure, Migration and Ma rket M. Pernia.
Implications for Upland Development. Ma. W.P. #8701 Macroeconomic Adjustment in the Philippines:
Concepcion Cruz. 1983-85. Manuel F. Montea
W.P. #8406 Tenme, Technology and Productivity of Agro.
for_txy Schemes. Ana Doris Capistrano and W.P. #8702 Costs of A_icultural Credit in the Philippines:
The Short-Run Effects of Interest Rate De-
Sam Fujisak,_ regulation. Irma C Corales and Carlos E.
W.P. #8407 Environmental Effects of Watershed Modifi-
Cueva_
cations. Wilfredo P. David.
W.P. #8408 Management and Cost of Watershed Reforest. W.P. #8703 Can the Informal Lenders Be Co*Opted into
ation: The pantabansan and Magat, Jose A, Government Credit 1Programs? Emmanuel
Galvez. F. Esguerro.

W.P. # 8409 Workshop Papers on "The Consequences of W.P. #8704 Comparative Bank Study: A Background Paper.
Small Rice FarmMechanizationin the Philip- MarioR Lambert¢
 ::1987

:: : :: :: info_al: ::
ers: as _0fiduits:i:The:paperdkscusses clientele inthe Philippines ::: ::: : : :: :
.... Primary data were::coitected fr0m a::
.... :: .... Sample of rural banks, brafiches of privaie
:i: : : : : :: : ::ReSults: of the :showed that : commercial banks and vrivate:: develop:
:::::::::
::::::::: : ::: :: : ::;:::::::: ;: :: the generally :ment banks. Analysis Was mailflYbased ::
:::::: :: : ::high :rate:::0f :recovery 0f :governmem, on secondary and more aggregative data, ::
.... : : funds und:er:fiie istbe high: fhe fi_dings could aid Jr_formulating the
:: : :::::::: ::::::: : : : : ::penaity: rate: 6f 42 percent for all past due research design for the comparative bank :
comparativeiy higher studies.:: : ........ .......
reason: Results Showed that the performance i
:: is: :the USe::of entities ::other: than banks : 0if these financial instituti0ns is some :i
: to extend:Credit:to farmers:: : ......... way: conditioned by the.:_oper_ng:pollcy:
: :basic prJn_ framework i:e,_ RBs and PDBs did little : ::

..... ...............
:: ii:ciplesi:and:pr0cessess
: rnraifinancial:marketsi that::are at work
One:is:tile naturalin : savings
financial mobilization
support the?_ : because of
got from
:::: _- ....... ...... ieciaiJzationlamong:rural:lenders accord-goVernment:and Central Bal_k; lnc0n!: :::::
: t61their:iC0nlpetition: advantage, of trast, KBs brancl'_esdid: intensive savings:: : ::::
Which:the division oflab0r:between funds i mobilization drive in regi.r_ns:ontside the

.... i ..... .... one as, i National.notable

find.'mg:is However :o_
benefits t0 be:gained:fr0m linking credit rating:near: the NatiOnal Capital: Region
: transactionS: m other :m_rkets. The ad, operate like branches of KBs. The:strong::
:: vantage :of the i:informal lender over the competitive eavirolm_ent could i::

formal iender is that the former does not : compelled them to operate as efficiently:.: i
i:s:g0od: for both. as: ::
....... ........... of the: tfiree finantiial

:::: ::: ii: :: :t :more: el:- I_1 ::: ::

........ :: :::::::: :: ..... ..... _'.IN'/A ......

:::: ::::::: : ::::: :::: :::

ibfis::::::
co,mpr:ise: an: impi

........ Research Fe!lowi Philippine ::

ais0 :::: : :: ::..... :::: : : Insti_ te:.for Developme:nt S mdie_and :::::::::: : :: :
::::::: : :::: Ad]unct Research
.......
Fellow;Energy
: , : and EnvironmentalPolicyCenter, :: : :::
corn: ::, ::Phdippme : :: i ]oh n E Kenned F:ScI_O0Iof: : : i ::: : :::i
GoVemment, Harvard University : :

:with: : : ..........
Project:: : This :paper uses: a simple:m0del:t0: :::::: :::::
.... P :, , ..... , n estimate both..... the ..... :

the elastlm,les of demand,: for e!eetrmity ma

........ :::: performance: :::of (RiBs): developing eCOnOmy: : :
::::c0:nduits:oi : implications: for: eiectricity :pricing :policy :: ::
_e:r:fo6iises::: :banks: refo_si: The specific :c_,tactetistics: of : :
its i: electrlcit 3
spiectswb,ch: t sold
.... p g
i :

: :ii : .... ........... ...............

.....
.........
 SeCretariat: and the ASEAN Col_u_nittee Board approach; lhnit exclusion list: use The Ptailippme institwte fbr Develop_il
:::i::onTrade atidTouriSm Participants came a differentiated appr0ach peculiar to" the l ment St-t_dies (IDk_;)
"P _' 'together with The
' Agricultural t.redit Pohcy Louncit. .....
:::academe, gOver_m_ent::sector: eonC'rete C0ndffions Of member com_tries; " ' ...._ " .......
S:
.... I r0f lndustries::i
i : Jower: doi_iestlC)
standstill c0ntent
and e_ent_ilal requirement;
rol:lback of con- (ACPC), andh01d
(OSU); witJ 'the a Ohi0:
two:day State University:
workshop
:: use: of process : requh'ement; non- "Rural Financial Markets Research," on: i:
'tl_e most:sueces_thl organlzatior_s tariff: barriers periodic assessment of:: 19..20 August,. 1987. The venue f0rl the: :

• mong develop:: use o!ASEAN industrial : workshop is ihe Operations Room of:
In: his:rep0rt, he: noted: : cooperation to increase complimer tar_-NEDA sa: Makati Builomg, Amorsoto St., : : :
.......... esia;Mala_;i : _ies' and esiablisttrnent of a DeveIo _nent : LegazpiVNage, Makati ....
Ba._k of Asean_ .... ......:.... :: ....... :

:newly:industriaiizing countrk S) ......

at::rio:st dyfmrnic :rates iri .the seven_ :
..... iel e:ighties,: however An in-house sem.inar )o discuss a :
: _F _ ,

from page: i4) ........ Completed research study On "mancmg :

...... The Society for lnternationa_ Deve- Public Sector De_eioprnent Expenditure:::
analysis:. The demand iopmentl (SID): is holding its 19th World in the Philipp:mes, 1975.1985," will. be i
Conference ::on: "POverty:: DeVelopment held on Augast ?, 1987 at the NEDA sa :: :
::Manila Electr ic: cam;: :i: cOilec{ive Survival':, 01i:Marcli 25..29 Makati Bldg, ]?his seminar will be the first i ii
:: Tile sub-: o/f a series t00e presented by Dr. Rosario
are G. Manasan, prir;cipal i_vestigator of
Poverty study: ........ : : : ...... : :
:electlrici:tY:! i crisis in the:Th:rd World and the Lessons :
_:::priee
Viron:: The PISS,: together with
:and :to: a certain::extent:i: tique::0
national:.
....f tile NOn:Gover_maental System; Development Resea_'ch '_center-_:
..... Marc:h:27:Pubiic ReSponsibilities andthe: (IDRC):is t_oldh_g a Workshop ion the: :

ifiSe price:: :Role of::tile State; March CoUective: _.YpJand Resource PoLicy:ProgaoaunPro:
i :i ject members:to present tlieia,preiin'iina-t'y i
........... if: _slwillbe:: reports and to: alloW project membersl :
)g::in:Devel0pinent and and selected participants to make recom: i : : ::
:mendations : before project: results: a*;6::
GraSsroots: finaliz,
 PIDS STAFF PAPERS

1. S.P. #8201 An Analysis of Fertilizer in the Philippines. tuxing: A Short Empirical Note. Erlinda iV[..
Cristina C David and Arsenio M. Balisacar_ Medalla.
(printed also in J. P.D. 1981). 19. S.P. #8502 A Decomposition Analysis of Philippine Export
2. S.P. #8202 Credit and Price Policies in Philippine Agri- and import Pexformance, 1974-198Z Ponciano
culture. Cris'tina C David. S, [nta[, Jr.
3. S.P. 4#8203 Government Policies and Farm Mechanization 20. S.P. #8503 Philippine Export and Terms of Trade Instabi-
in the Philippines. Cristina C. David. lity, 1965-1982. Ponciano S. lnral, ,h.
4. S.P. #8204 Shadow Prices of Goods and Resources in the 21. S.P. #8504 Methodology for Measuring Protection and
Philippines: AnAssessment.ErlindaM. Medalla. Comparative Advantage. Erlinda M. Medalla
5. S.P. #8205 Aal Analysis of the Behavior of the Commercial and John H. Powe1:

Banks. Mario 1_ Lamberte. 22. S.P. #8505 Food, Fuel and Urbanization in the Philippines.
6. S.P. #8301 Exchange Rate Flexibility and intervention Ale]andro N. I-lerrin, Manuel E Monres, Rodol.
Policy in the Philippines. 1973-1981. Filologo fo F. Florentino.
Pante, Jr. 23. S.P. #8506 Rural Development Experience: Economic Per-
7. S.P. #8302 On the Use of the DRC Criterion in Selecting spectives. RobertE. Evensor_
Projects. Erlinda M. Medalla. 24. S.P. # 8507 Financial Liberalization and the Internal Strue-
8. S.P. #8303 Monetary Aggregates and Economic Activity. ture of the Capital Markets: The Philipph-,.e
Mario R. Lambert_ Case. Mario B. Larabert_
9. S.P. #8304 Effective Protection Rates and Internal Indkect
25. S.P. # 8508 The Rural Banking System: Need for RefOrms:-
Taxes in the Philippine Setting. Rosario G.
ManasarL Mario B. Lamberte
10. S.P. #8305 Response to Balance of Payments Crisis in the 26. S.P. #8509 Social Adequacy and Economic Effects of
1970s, Korea and the Philippines. John H, Social Security: The Philippine Case: Mario B.
Powen Lamberte.
11. S.P. #8 101 A Study of Philippine Real Property Taxation. 27. S.P. #8601 Impact of BOI Incentives on Rate of Return,
Ca3_¢tano W. Paderanga, Jr. Factor Prices and Relative Factor Use: A
12. S.P. 4#8402 Public Enterprise in the Philippines in i982: Comparative Analysis of Incentives Under the
A Definitional and Taxonomical Exercise. Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 (P.D. 1789)
Rosario G. Manasan. and the Investment Incentive Policy Act
13. S.P. #8403 Estimating the Shadow Exchange Rate, the (B.P. 391). Rosario G. Manasan.
Shadow Wage Rate and the Social Rate of . 28. S.P. #8602 Financial Reforms and Balance-of-payments
Discount for the Philippines. Erlinda M. Crisis: The Case of the Philippines. Eli Remo-
M edalkz lona and Marto Lamberte.
14. S.P. #8404 Development Finance and State Banking: A 29. S.P. #8603 A Macroeconomie Overview of Public Enter-
Survey of Expetience. EditaA. Tar_ prises in the Philippines, 1975-1984. Rosario
15. S.P. #8405 Derived Protection for Nonffaded Prirnary G. Manasart
Product. Erlinda M. Medalla. 30. S.P. #8701 Revenue Performance of National Government
:16. S_P. #8406 Modelling the Effects of Devaluation on Prices_ Taxes, 1975-1985. Rosario G. Manasan and
Output and the Trade Balance: The Philippine Rosario G. Querubin
Experience. Mb_ Cecilia Gonzales. 31. S.P. # 8702 Rural Financial Markets: A Review of lAtera-
l7. S.P. #8407 The Development Bank of the Philippines and ture. Mario B. Lamberte and Joseph Lira.
the Financial Crisis, A Descriptive AJmlysis. 32. S.P. #8703 Residential Demand for Electricity and Pricing
Mario B. Lamberte. Policy Implication in a Developing Economy:
18. S.P. #850i The Protection Structure, Resource Flows and The Case of the Philippines. Clodualdo R, Fran-
the Capital-Labor Ratio in Philippine Manufae- cisco.

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