1 6property 1

PROPERTY CASES (1-32)
1. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION vs. PHILIPPINE

BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC.
Facts:
Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass

demonstration at Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police and that
they informed the Philippine Blooming Mills Inc. (Company) of their proposed demonstration.
The company called a meeting with the officers of PBMEO after learning about the planned
mass. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by the
union,explaining further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company
because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management. It was stressed out that the
demonstration was not a strike against the company but in protest against alleged abuses of
the Pasig police.
Company informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union but
emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice
the normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the Company warned the PBMEO
representatives that workers who without previous leave of absence approved by the
Company, particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who
shall fail to report for work shall be dismissed.
Another meeting was convoked by the Company. It reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO
representatives that while workers may join the Malacañang demonstration, those from the
1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate, otherwise, they would be
dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the
PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of
their Collective Bargaining.
The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were found
guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied
by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late. They then filed with the
respondent court a petition for relief from the order dated Oct. 9,1969 on the ground that
their failure to file their motion for reconsideration on time was due to excusable negligence
and honest mistake committed by the president of the petitioner Union and of the office clerk
of their counsel. However, without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief, they
filed with the Supreme Court a notice of appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA?
Held:
No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over
property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well
as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their
exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing
space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property
and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In
the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights to freedom of expression and of assembly occupy a
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preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political
institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions."
The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for
redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised
in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed.”
2. Cruz vs Secretary of DENR

FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act
No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the
IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is
nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within
their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains
remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural
resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the
land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these
resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and
exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a
concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State.
However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains
is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
3. viTHE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, vs.CITY OF ZAMBOANGA,

SECRETARY OF FINANCECity of Zamboanga, etL-24440, March 28, 1968
Facts:
Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the
provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province. On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth
Act 39 was approved converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Sec.
50 of the Act also provided that “Buildings and properties which the province shall abandon
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upon the transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of
Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor General.”
Such properties include lots of capitol site, schools, hospitals, leprosarium, high school
playgrounds, burleighs, and hydro-electric sites.
On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into
two (2): Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. As to how the assets and obligations
of the old province were to be divided between the two new ones, Sec. 6 of that law provided
“Upon the approval of this Act, the funds, assets and other properties and the obligations of
the province of Zamboanga shall be divided equitably between the Province of Zamboanga
del Norte and the Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the Philippines, upon
the recommendation of the Auditor General.”
However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act 3039 was approved amending Sec. 50 of
Commonwealth Act 39 by providing that, “All buildings, properties and assets belonging to
the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby
transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said City of Zamboanga.”
This constrained Zamboanga del Norte to file on March 5, 1962, a complaint against
defendants-appellants Zamboanga City; that, among others, Republic Act 3039 be declared
unconstitutional for depriving Zamboanga del Norte of property without due process and
just compensation.
Lower court declared RA 3039 unconstitutional as it deprives Zamboanga del Norte of its
private properties.
Hence the appeal.
Issue:
Whether RA 3039 is unconstitutional on the grounds that it deprives Zamboanga del Norte
of its private properties.
Held:
No. RA 3039 is valid. The properties petitioned by Zamboanga del Norte is a public
property.
The validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the 50 lots and buildings
thereon in question. For, the matter involved here is the extent of legislative control over the
properties of a municipal corporation, of which a province is one. The principle itself is
simple: If the property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its
public and governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control
over it. But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is
patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of
it without due process and payment of just compensation.
The capacity in which the property is held is, however, dependent on the use to which it is
intended and devoted. Now, which of two norms, i.e., that of the Civil Code or that
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obtaining under the law of Municipal Corporations, must be used in classifying the
properties in question?
Civil Code
The Civil provide: ART. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided
into property for public use and patrimonial property; ART. 424. Property for public use, in
the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of the provincial roads, city streets,
municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for
public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities. All other property
possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without
prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
Applying the above cited norm, all the properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as
High School playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former
Zamboanga province. Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school
sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not for public use. They would fall under the
phrase “public works for public service” for it has been held that under the ejusdem generis
rule, such public works must be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the
preceding enumerated properties in the first paragraph of Art 424. The playgrounds, however,
would fit into this category.
Law of Municipal Corporations
On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of
Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public
service are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered
public, it is enough that the property be held and, devoted for governmental purposes like
local administration, public education, public health, etc.
Final Ruling
The controversy here is more along the domains of the Law of Municipal Corporations —
State vs. Province — than along that of Civil Law. If municipal property held and devoted to
public service is in the same category as ordinary private property, then that would mean
they can be levied upon and attached; they can even be acquired thru adverse possession
— all these to the detriment of the local community. It is wrong to consider those properties
as ordinary private property.
Lastly, the classification of properties other than those for public use in the municipalities
as patrimonial under Art. 424 of the Civil Code — is “… without prejudice to the provisions
of special laws.” For purpose of this article, the principles, obtaining under the Law of
Municipal Corporations can be considered as “special laws”. Hence, the classification of
municipal property devoted for distinctly governmental purposes as public should prevail
over the Civil Code classification in this particular case.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and another judgment is
hereby entered as follows:.
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(1) Defendant Zamboanga City is hereby ordered to return to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte
in lump sum the amount of P43,030.11 which the former took back from the latter out of
the sum of P57,373.46 previously paid to the latter; and
(2) Defendants are hereby ordered to effect payments in favor of plaintiff of whatever
balance remains of plaintiff’s 54.39% share in the 26 patrimonial properties, after
deducting therefrom the sum of P57,373.46, on the basis of Resolution No. 7 dated March
26, 1949 of the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General, by way of quarterly
payments from the allotments of defendant City, in the manner originally adopted by the
Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. No costs. So ordered.
4.Salas, et al v Jarencio, et al
FACTS:
The City of Manila had a Torrens Title over a 7,490-square-meter lot. The municipal Board
of Manila requested the President of the Philippines to have the lot declared as patrimonial
property of the City so that it could be sold by the City to the actual occupants of the lot. In
1964, Congress enacted Republic Act 4118 whereby the lot was made disposable or alienable
land of the State (not of the City), and its disposal was given to a national government entity,
the Land Tenure Administration.
Issue:
Whether the aforementioned land is a private or patrimonial property of the City of Manila.
Held:
The land is public property.
As a general rule, regardless of the source or classification of the land in the possession of
municipality, excepting those which it acquired in its own funds in its private or corporate
capacity, such property is held for the State for the benefit of its inhabitantsThe City
Council of Cebu, through resulting in its transformation into a patrimonial property. The
charter of City of Cebu (R.A. 3857) had authorized the City Council to close any road and
street, etc. and allowing the City to use the withdrawn property from public use, for any
other lawful purpose, whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes. The legal
situation is the same if the State itself holds the property and puts it to a different use.
When it comes to property of municipality which it did not acquire in its private or
corporate capacity with its own funds (the land was originally given to City by Spain), the
legislature can transfer its administration and disposition to an agency of the National
Government to be disposed of according to its discretion. Here it did so in obedience to the
constitutional mandate of promoting social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of the people.
The property was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in its private or
proprietary capacity. The land was part of the territory of City of Manila granted by
sovereign in its creation. Furthermore, City expressly recognised the paramount title of the
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State over its land when it requested the President to consider the feasibility of declaring
the lot as patrimonial property for selling.
There could be no more blatant recognition of the fact that said land belongs to the State
and was simply granted in usufruct to the City of Manila for municipal purposes. But since
the City did not actually use said land for any recognized public purpose and allowed it to
remain idle and unoccupied for a long time until it was overrun by squatters, no
presumption of State grant of ownership in favor of the City of Manila may be acquiesced in
to justify the claim that it is its own private or patrimonial property.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby reversed, and petitioners shall proceed with
the free and untrammeled implementation of Republic Act No. 4118 without any obstacle
from the respondents. Without costs.
5. CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY

FACTS:
From the time of Marcos until Estrada, portions of Manila Bay were being reclaimed. A law
was passed creating the Public Estate Authority which was granted with the power to
transfer reclaimed lands. Now in this case, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement
with AMARI, a private corporation. Under the Joint Venture Agreement between AMARI and
PEA, several hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands and several
portions of submerged areas of Manila Bay were going to be transferred to AMARI .
ISSUE:
Whether or not the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands,
reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution
RULING: YES!
Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain Section 3 of the Constitution: Alienable
lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or
associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease The
157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by
certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may
lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these
lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine
citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts whose “object or purpose is
contrary to law,” or whose “object is outside the commerce of men,” are “inexistent and void
from the beginning.” The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the
Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.
Del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, et al
6. Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Bercilles, G.R. No. L-40474 (August 29,
1975) Case Digest
Facts:
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The City Council of Cebu declared a parcel of land as abandoned and authorized its sale
through public bidding. Cebu Oxygen was able to purchase the land and petitioned for its
registration. The Prosecutor opposed and argued that the land is still part of the public
domain and cannot be registered.
Issue:
Whether or not the declaration of the land as abandoned by the City Council of Cebu made
the property patrimonial.
Held:
Yes, the City Council of Cebu has the legislative power to close a property or withdraw if for
public use to form part of the patrimonial property of the State.
L-24440, March 28,
The City Council of Cebu, through resulting in its transformation into a patrimonial
property. The charter of City of Cebu (R.A. 3857) had authorized the City Council to close
any road and street, etc. and allowing the City to use the withdrawn property from public
use, for any other lawful purpose.
Digest of Cases in PROPERTY (Ryan Lupos)
7. Berkenkotter v. Cu Unjieng Hijos, et al. 61 Phil. 663
Facts:
This is an appeal taken by the plaintiff, B. H. Berkenkotter, from the judgement of the CFI of
Manila dismissing his complaint against defendants.
On April 26, 1926, the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., owner of the sugar central in Mabalacat,
Pampanga, obtained a loan from defendant Cu Unjieng e Hijos, secured by a first mortgage
of two parcels of land “with all its buildings, improvements, sugar-cane mill, steel railway,
telephone line, apparatus, etc., now existing or that may in the future exist in said lots.”
Shortly after such mortgage had been constituted, the Sugar Co. decided to increase its
production by buying additional machinery and equipment. B.A. Green, the president of said
corporation applied for a loan from petitioner Berkenkotter, promising to reimburse him as
soon as he obtains additional loan from the mortgagees, herein defendants Cu Unjieng Hijos.
Petitioner granted such application and extended the amount with which the corporation
bought the additional machinery and equipment.
On June 10, 1927, Green applied to Cu Unjeing e Hijos for the additional loan but failed to
obtain such loan.
The appellant contend that the installation of the machinery and equipment in the sugar
central is not permanent in character in as much as the President of said corporation made
it appear that such property, should the latter fail to obtain the additional loan, would become
security for the sum he loaned him, said president binding himself not to mortgage or
encumber them to anybody until plaintiff is fully reimbursed for the corporation’s
indebtedness to him.
Issue:
1) Whether or not the additional machinery and equipment is considered an improvement

subject to the mortgage executed by Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc. in favor of Cu Unjieng e Hijos.
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Held:
Yes, the additional machinery and equipment is considered an improvement subject to the
first mortgage executed by Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc. in favor of Cu Unjieng e Hijos. It is a
well-established rule that in a mortgage real estate, the improvements on the property are
included, thus all objects permanently attached to a mortgaged building or land, although
placed after the mortgage was constituted are also included.
The installation of such equipment and machinery in the sugar central in lieu of the other
less capacity existing therein, converted them into real property, it cannot be said that their
incorporation therewith was not permanent in character because, as essential and principal
elements of a sugar central, without them the sugar central would be unable to function or
carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established. Inasmuch as the central is
permanent in character, the necessary machinery and equipment installed for carrying on
the sugar industry for which it has been established must necessarily be permanent.
With regards to the alleged sale of said property to the plaintiff after such permanent
incorporation with the sugar central and while the mortgage constituted on said central
remained in force, only the right of redemption of the vendor Mabalacat Sugar Co. Inc., in
the sugar central with which said machinery and equipment had been incorporated, was
transferred thereby, subject to the right of the mortgagee.
8. Philippine Refining Co. vs Jarque 61 Phil 229
Facts:
The Philippine Refining Co., Inc., and Francisco Jarque executed three mortgages on the
motor vessels Pandan and Zaragoza. A fourth mortgage was executed by Francisco Jarque
and Ramon Aboitiz on the motorship Zaragoza.
Thereafter, a petition was filed with the CFI of Cebu praying that Francisco Jarque be
declared an insolvent debtor, said petition was granted and an assignment of all the
properties of the insolvent was executed in favor of Jose Corominas.
Neither of the first two mortgages had appended an affidavit of good faith. The third mortgage
contained such an affidavit, but this mortgage was not registered until within thirty days
prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings against Jarque while the fourth
mortgage was entered in the chattel mortgage registry within the thirty-day period before
the institution of insolvency proceedings.
Judge Jose M. Hontiveros declined to order the foreclosure of the mortgages and sustained
the special defenses of fatal defectiveness of the mortgages.
Issue:
Whether or not the mortgages of the vessels are governed by the Chattel Mortgage Law.
(Chattel: Moveable items of property which are neither land nor permanently attached to land
or a building, either directly or vicariously through attachment to real property.)
Held:
Yes. Vessels are considered personal property under the civil law. Since the term "personal
property" includes vessels, they are subject to mortgage agreeably to the provisions of the
Chattel Mortgage Law.
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A mortgage on a vessel is in the nature a chattel mortgage. The only difference between a
chattel mortgage of a vessel and a chattel mortgage of other personalty is that it is not now
necessary for a chattel mortgage of a vessel to be noted n the registry of the register of deeds,
but it is essential that a record of documents affecting the title to a vessel be entered in the
record of the Collector of Customs at the port of entry.
An affidavit of good faith appended to the mortgage and recorded therewith is required (Sec.
5 of the CM Law). The absence of the affidavit vitiates a mortgage as against creditors and
subsequent encumbrancers. A chattel mortgage of a vessel lacking an affidavit of good faith,
is unenforceable against third persons.
Note:
If the mortgage is constituted over a vehicle, it must also be made with the LTO (if a private
vehicle) or LTFRB (if it’s a public vehicle.) If it’s a ship, it’s made with the MARINA.
9. Mindanao Bus Co. vs. City Assessor

6 SCRA 197
MINDANAO BUS COMPANY - petitioner

CITY ASSESSOR, et al - respondents
Facts:
Petitioner is engaged in a public utility business, solely engaged in transporting
passengers and cargoes by motor trucks, over its authorized lines in Mindanao. It owns a
main office and branch offices. To be found in their offices are machinery and equipment,
which were assessed by the City Assessor as real properties.
The Court of Tax Appeals held that the petitioner Mindanao Bus Company is liable to the
payment of the realty tax on its maintenance and repair equipment.
Petitioner appealed the assessment, contending that said equipment are not realty.
On the other hand, respondents contend that said equipment, though movable, are
immobilized by destination, citing Art. 415 (5):
Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement

for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and
which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works.
Issue:
Whether or not the equipment may be deemed immovable within the meaning of Art. 415 of
the NCC.
Held:
No.
Movable equipment to be immobilized in contemplation of law must first be essential and
principal elements of an industry or works without which such industry or works would be
unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established.
The tools and equipment in question in this instant case are, by their nature, not essential
and principle municipal elements of petitioner's business of transporting passengers and
cargoes by motor trucks. They are merely incidentals — acquired as movables and used only
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for expediency to facilitate and/or improve its service. Even without such tools and
equipment, its business may be carried on as when if its rolling equipment is repaired or
serviced in another shop belonging to another.
Aside from the element of essentiality Art. 415 (5) also requires that the industry or works be
carried on in a building or on a piece of land. In the case at bar the equipment in question
are destined only to repair or service the transportation business, which is not carried on in
a building or permanently on a piece of land, as demanded by the law.
Hence, the equipment in question are not absolutely essential to the petitioner's
transportation business, and petitioner's business is not carried on in a building, tenement
or on a specified land, so said equipment may not be considered real estate.
10. Davao Sawmill vs. Castillo 61 SCRA 709
Davao Sawmill - plaintiff-appellant

Castillo et al - defendants-appellees
Facts:
The Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., is the holder of a lumber concession from the government. The
land upon which the business was conducted belonged to another person. On the land the
sawmill company erected a building which housed the machinery used by it. Some machines
placed in the building are mounted on foundations of cement.
Part of the lease agreement between Davao Sawmill (lessee), and the lessor was a stipulation
in which after the lease all buildings and improvements would pass to the ownership of the
lessor, which would not include machineries and accessories.
Issue:
whether or not the sawmill machineries are classified as real property (immovable).
Held:
No. The machinery must be classified as personal property.
The lessee placed the machinery in the building erected on land belonging to another, with
the understanding that the machinery was not included in the improvements which would
pass to the lessor on the expiration of the lease agreement.
The lessee also treated the machinery as personal property in executing chattel
mortgages in favor of third persons. As consequence of the judgment rendered in
favor of the Davao Light and Power Co. against Davao Sawmill, the machineries in question
were levied upon by the sheriff as personalty (as opposed to a realty) pursuant to a writ of
execution obtained without any protest being registered.
Furthermore, machineries only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of
the property or plant, but not when so placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any person
having temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. (Citing
US SC decision in Valdes vs. Central Altagracia)
11. Prudential Bank vs Panis 153 SCRA 390
Facts:
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Spouses Magcale secured a loan with Prudential Bank. To further secure said loan, the
spouses executed a Real Estate Mortgage over the residential building, with a right to occupy
the lot. The Real Estate Mortgage also included information about the Sales Patent applied
for by the spouses for the lot to which the building stood. The spouses obtained a second
loan, which was secured by another Real Estate Mortgage over the same properties. The Sec.
of Agriculture issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent over the lot which was then mortgaged to
the bank in favor of the Macales.
The spouses defaulted on both loans. Thus, the property was extrajudicially foreclosed, and
sold in a public auction.
(Miscellaneous Sales Patent: RA 730 is an act permitting sale without public auction of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain for residential purpose. The application
to purchase the land is called the Miscellaneous Sales Application and the corresponding
patent is called the Miscellaneous Sales Patent.)
The RTC held that the Real Estate Mortgage was null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not a valid real estate mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on the
land belonging to another.
Held:
Yes.
The inclusion of “building” distinct and separate from the land in the enumeration of
properties under Article 415 of the NCC can only mean that the building itself is an
immovable property.
A building by itself may be mortgaged apart from the land on which it has been built. Such
a mortgage would be still a real estate mortgage for the building would still be considered
immovable property even if dealt with separately and apart from the land. Furthermore, the
fact that the spouses executed the Real Estate Mortgage over the building before executing
the second Real Estate Mortgage over the land proved that the spouses intended for the
building to be an immovable separate and distinct from the land on which it is built.
12. Caltex vs Central Board of Assessment Appeals

114 SCRA 273
Facts:
This case is about the realty tax on machinery and equipment installed by Caltex (Philippines)
Inc. in its gas stations located on leased land.The lessor of the land, where the gas station is
located, does not become the owner of the machines and equipment installed therein. Caltex
retains the ownership thereof during the term of the lease.
The city assessor of Pasay City characterized the said items of gas station equipment and
machinery as taxable realty. But The city board of tax appeals ruled that they are personalty.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject machinery and equipment installed by Caltex in its gas stations
should be considered realty.
Held:
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Yes.
Improvements on land are commonly taxed as realty. The equipment and machinery as
appurtenances to the gas station building or shed owned by Caltex and which fixtures are
necessary to the operation of the gas station, for without them the gas station would be
useless, and which have been attached and fixed permanently to the gas station site or
embedded therein, are taxable improvements and machinery within the meaning
of the Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code.
(appurtenance: an object that is used with or for something)
13. Benguet Corp. vs CBAA 218 SCRA 271
Facts:
In 1985, the Provincial Assessor of Zambales assessed the petitioner's tailings dam as taxable
improvements.
Petitioner contended that the the dam cannot be subjected to realty tax as a separate and
independent property because it does not constitute an "assessable improvement" on the
mine because it is an integral part of the mine.
To supporty its contention, petitioner cited the following cases:

(1) Municipality of Cotabato v. Santos
dikes and gates constructed in connection with a fishpond operation as integral parts of the
fishpond.
(2) Bislig Bay Lumber Co. v. Provincial
Government of Surigao the realty tax was not imposed on a road constructed by the timber
concessionaire because the government had the right to use the road to promote its varied
activities.
(3) Kendrick v. Twin Lakes Reservoir Co. (American Case)
A reservoir dam went with and formed part of the reservoir
(4) Ontario Silver Mining Co. v. Hixon (Canada)
Involved drain tunnels constructed when mining operations were expanded... it was held that
"whatever value they have is connected with and in fact is an integral part of the mine itself."
On the other hand, Solicitor General's argues that the dam is an assessable improvement
because it enhances the value and utility of the mine.
Issue: Whether or not the tailings dam in question is an "improvement" upon the land within
the meaning of the Real Property Tax Code.
Held:
Yes.
The court ruled that the subject dam falls within the definition of an "improvement" because
it is permanent in character and it enhances both the value and utility of petitioner's mine.
The immovable nature of the dam defines its character as real property under Article 415 of
the Civil Code and thus makes it taxable under Section 38 of the Real Property Tax Code.
14. TUMALAD v VICENCIO
Facts:
12
It appears on the records that on 1 September 1955 defendants-appellants executed a chattel
mortgage in favor of plaintiffs-appellees over their house of strong materials located at No.
550 Int. 3, Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, over Lot Nos. 6-B and 7-B, Block No. 2554,
which were being rented from Madrigal & Company, Inc. The mortgage was registered in the
Registry of Deeds of Manila on 2 September 1955. The herein mortgage was executed to
guarantee a loan of P4,800.00 received from plaintiffs-appellees, payable within one year at
12% per annum.
When defendants-appellants defaulted in paying, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed,

and on 27 March 1956, the house was sold at public auction pursuant to the said contract.
As highest bidder, plaintiffs-appellees were issued the corresponding certificate of
sale.3 Thereafter, on 18 April 1956, plaintiffs-appellant commenced Civil Case No. 43073 in
the municipal court of Manila, praying, among other things, that the house be vacated and
its possession surrendered to them, and for defendants-appellants to pay rent of P200.00
monthly from 27 March 1956 up to the time the possession is surrendered.4
Defendants-appellants, in their answers in both the municipal court and court a

quo impugned the legality of the chattel mortgage, claiming that they are still the owners of
the house; but they waived the right to introduce evidence, oral or documentary. Instead,
they relied on their memoranda in support of their motion to dismiss, predicated mainly on
the grounds that: (a) the municipal court did not have jurisdiction to try and decide the case
because (1) the issue involved, is ownership, and (2) there was no allegation of prior
possession; and (b) failure to prove prior demand pursuant to Section 2, Rule 72, of the Rules
of Court.6
ISSUE:
WON the chattel mortgage is void ab initio on the ground that the subject matter of the
mortgage is a house of strong materials, and, being an immovable, it can only be the subject
of a real estate mortgage and not a chattel mortgage.
RULING:
This Court hold therein that it was a valid Chattel mortgage because it was so expressly
designated and specifically that the property given as security "is a house of mixed materials,
which by its very nature is considered personal property.
In the contract now before Us, the house on rented land is not only expressly designated as
Chattel Mortgage; it specifically provides that "the mortgagor ... voluntarily CEDES, SELLS
and TRANSFERS by way of Chattel Mortgage the property together with its leasehold rights
over the lot on which it is constructed and participation ..." Although there is no specific
statement referring to the subject house as personal property, yet by ceding, selling or
transferring a property by way of chattel mortgage defendants-appellants could only have
meant to convey the house as chattel, or at least, intended to treat the same as such, so that
they should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise.
Moreover, the subject house stood on a rented lot to which defendats-appellants merely had
a temporary right as lessee, and although this can not in itself alone determine the status of
the property, it does so when combined with other factors to sustain the interpretation that
the parties, particularly the mortgagors, intended to treat the house as personalty. Finally ,
wherein third persons assailed the validity of the chattel mortgage,27 it is the defendants-
appellants themselves, as debtors-mortgagors, who are attacking the validity of the chattel
mortgage in this case. The doctrine of estoppel therefore applies to the herein defendants-
appellants, having treated the subject house as personalty.
13
15. SERGS PRODUCTS, INC., and SERGIO T. GOQUIOLAY, vs. PCI LEASING AND
FINANCE, INC.,
Ratio: After agreeing to a contract stipulating that a real or immovable property be

considered as personal or movable, a party is estopped from subsequently claiming
otherwise. Hence, such property is a proper subject of a writ of replevin obtained by the
other contracting party.
FACTS:
PCI Leasing and Finance filed a complaint for sum of money, with an application for a writ
of replevin.
Judge issued a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and
equipment to PCI Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of the necessary expenses.
The sheriff proceeded to petitioner's factory, seized one machinery, with word that he would
return for other machineries.
Petitioner (Serg’s Products) filed a motion for special protective order to defer enforcement of
the writ of replevin.
PCI Leasing opposed the motion on the ground that the properties were still personal and
therefore can still be subjected to seizure and writ of replevin.
Petitioner asserted that properties sought to be seized were immovable as defined in Article
415 of the Civil Code.
Sheriff was still able to take possession of two more machineries
In its decision on the original action for certiorari filed by the Petitioner, the appellate court,
Citing the Agreement of the parties, held that the subject machines were personal property,
and that they had only been leased, not owned, by petitioners; and ruled that the "words of
the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the true intention of the contracting parties."
ISSUE: Whether or not the machineries became real property by virtue of immobilization.
Ruling:
Petitioners contend that the subject machines used in their factory were not proper subjects
of the Writ issued by the RTC, because they were in fact real property.
Writ of Replevin: Rule 60 of the Rules of Court provides that writs of replevin are issued for
the recovery of personal property only.
Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code provides that machinery, receptacles, instruments or
implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be
carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of
the said industry or works
In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the Writ of Seizure were placed
by petitioners in the factory built on their own land. They were essential and principal
elements of their chocolate-making industry. Hence, although each of them was movable or
personal property on its own, all of them have become “immobilized by destination because
they are essential and principal elements in the industry.”
14
However, contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as
personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming
otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from
denying the truth of any material fact found therein.
The machines are personal property and they are proper subjects of the Writ of Replevin
16. US v TAMBUNTING
FACTS:
In January of the year 1918, the accused and his wife became occupants of the upper floor
of the house situated at No. 443, Calle Evangelista, in the city of Manila. In this house the
Manila Gas Corporation had previously installed apparatus for the delivery of gas on both
the upper and lower floors, consisting of the necessary piping and a gas meter, which last
mentioned apparatus was installed below. When the occupants at whose request this
installation had been made vacated the premises, the gas company disconnected the gas pipe
and removed the meter, thus cutting off the supply of gas from said premises.
Upon June 2, 1919, one of the inspectors of the gas company visited the house in question
and found that gas was being used, without the knowledge and consent of the gas company,
for cooking in the quarters occupied by the defendant and his wife. He also admitted that he
knew he was using gas without the knowledge of the company and that he had been so using
it for probably two or three months.
ISSUE:
1. WON gas can be the subject to larceny
2. WON the quantity of gas appropriated in the two months, during which the accused
admitted having used the same, has been established with sufficient certainty to enable the
court to fix an appropriate penalty.
RULING
1.YES. In this connection it will suffice to quote the following from the topic "Larceny," at
page 34, Vol. 17, of Ruling Case Law:
There is nothing in the nature of gas used for illuminating purposes which renders it
incapable of being feloniously taken and carried away. It is a valuable article of merchandise,
bought and sold like other personal property, susceptible of being severed from a mass or
larger quantity and of being transported from place to place. Likewise water which is confined
in pipes and electricity which is conveyed by wires are subjects of larceny."
2. YES. The facts above stated are competent evidence; and the conclusion is inevitable that
the accused is at least liable to the extent of the minimum charge of P2 per month. The
market value of the property at the time and place of the theft is of court the proper value to
be proven (17 R.C.L., p. 66); and when it is found that the least amount that a consumer can
take costs P2 per months, this affords proof that the amount which the accused took was
certainly worth that much. Absolute certainty as to the full amount taken is of course
impossible, because no meter wad used; but absolute certainty upon this point is not
necessary, when it is certain that the minimum that could have been taken was worth a
determinable amount.
15
17. SANDEJAS, vs. ROBLES
FACTS:
In the present appeal, there is no question that the parties in the present and prior action
are the same or represent the same interest, and that the cause of action in both are the
same, that is, the performance or non-performance of the terms and conditions of a contract
of sale for the enforcement or resolution thereof. They only question to be determined is
whether the Court which has rendered the former judgment had jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties.
The appellants contend that the lower erred in upholding the validity of the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo during the Japanese occupation, because: (1) "The said court
had no jurisdiction to try civil case No. 21, much less to render the decision in question on
October 2, 1944;" and (2) "That granting for the sake of argument that the puppet Court of
First Instance of Iloilo had jurisdiction, yet such decision was rendered after having deprived
plaintiff of his day in court and is therefore in violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution.
As to the first question, the appellants do not question the ruling of this Supreme Court on
the validity of the judgments rendered by the courts established in these Islands during the
Japanese occupation laid down in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh,1 Off. Gaz., 779; but they
contend that, as the three parcels of land involved or sold in the contract of the sale resolved
by the prior judgment were located in the Municipality of Passi, Province of Iloilo, and "the
puppet Republic of the Philippines since the middle of the month of September, 1944, could
no longer assert its authority over the major portion of the territory of Iloilo including the
Municipality of Passi," then under the possession and control of the Panay guerrilla forces,
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo which rendered the prior judgment had no jurisdiction
over the res or the property because the action was quasi in rem, and therefore the said
judgment is null and void.
This contention is premised on the wrong assumption that the action for the resolution of a
contract of sale of a real property is an action quasi in rem. The action instituted by the
appellees to resolve the contract of sale of said parcels of land, is in personam and not quasi
in rem.
This Court quoted with approval in Grey Alba vs. Dela Cruz, 17 Phil., 61-62, the following
definition of an action in personam:
If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against some particular person,
with a judgment which generally, in theory at least, binds his body, or to bar some
individual claim or objection, so that only certain persons are entitled to be heard in
defense, the action is in personam, although it may concern the right to or possession
of a tangible thing. If, on the other hand, the object is to bar indifferently all who might
be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established,
and if anyone in the world has a right to be heard on the strength of alleging facts
which, if true, show an inconsistent interest, the proceeding is in rem. (Tyler vs.
Judges, supra.).
According to American Jurisprudence, Vol. I page 435, "An action in personam has for its
object a judgment against the person, as distinguished from a judgment against property, to
determine its status. Whether a proceeding is in rem or in personam is determined by its
nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce
16
personal rights and obligations brought against the person and based on jurisdiction of the
person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property,
or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court.
In the case of Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil., 921, we held that "The action quasi
in rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstances that in the former an
individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest
therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole
object the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment,
foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The judgment
entered in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.
With respect to the second question, from the prior judgment marked as Exhibit A of the
motion to dismiss, it appears that the appellants had submitted themselves to the jurisdiction
of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo by filing their answers to the complaint through their
Atty. Benjamin H. Tirol, the same attorney who represents them now; that they were notified
of the date set for the hearing of the action, but when the case was called for trial on
September 29, 1944, their attorney asked and obtained permission from the court to
withdraw his appearance as attorney for the appellants stating as ground therefor that it was
difficult to communicate with his clients, who went to Arevalo, a suburb of and distant of
about six or seven kilometers from the Iloilo City, capital of the Province of Iloilo; that to give
the appellants opportunity to be heard, the hearing was postponed and set on the afternoon
of the same date; and that as they did not appear on the afternoon the case was heard and
judgment was rendered on October 2, 1944, declaring the resolution of the contract between
the parties and ordering the appellees to return to the appellants the sum of P5,723.60,
received by the former from the latter as payment on account of the sum of P35,000 agreed
upon as purchase price.
And, according to the allegations in appellants' complaint, on October 25, 1944, the
appellants filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the court, and when they
tried to appeal from the decision the court denied the appeal on November 23, 1944, and
declared the judgement final and executory; and, on November 29, the appellants filed a
motion for reconsideration of the order denying the appeal, and up to the filing of the
complaint in the present case no resolution of the motion has been received by the appellants.
In view of the foregoing facts set forth in the decision Exhibit A and not contradicted or denied
by the appellants, which show that the absence from the trial of the appellants was due to
their own fault, appellants' contention that they were deprived of their day in court is
untenable. The appeal is therefore dismissed. So ordered.
Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and Tuason, JJ., concur.
18. CHING vs. CA, Asedillo

Action in Rem and Action in Personam
FACTS:
Alfredo Ching is the legitimate son of Ching Leng; Ching Leng bought a property from Sps.
Nofuente and the former registered the property in her name on September 18, 1961, her
postal address was in Pasay City. Ching Leng died in Boston and his legitimate son was
appointed as administrator of her estate. 13 years after the death of Ching Leng, a suit was
commenced on December 27, 1978 by private respondent Pedro Asedillo against Ching Leng
for the reconveyance of said property;
17
An amended complaint was made by private respondent alleging “that on account of the fact
that the defendant has been residing abroad up to the present, and it is not known whether
the defendant is still alive or dead, he or his estate may be served by summons and other
processes only by publication.”
Summons by publication was made through “Economic Monitor”, newspaper of general

circulation in Province of Rizal, Pasay City. Since no responsive pleading was filed after the
lapse of 60 days, judgment on the merits in favor of private respondents was
made. Consequently, the title of Ching Leng was cancelled and transferred to private
respondent who sold the same to Villa Esperanza Dev., Inc.
Petitioner learned of the decision, and so he filed a petition to set it aside as null and void for
lack of jurisdiction;
Lower court decision:

RTC: At first, granted the verified petition to set aside as null and void the prior order of the
RTC; however, on motion by private respondent, the same was set aside. So, petitioner filed
for reconsideration but was denied.
*the case was elevated directly to SC
Issue: WON reconveyance and cancellation of title is in personam which cannot give
jurisdiction to the court by service of summons by publication.
(Note: private respondents argue that they are quasi in rem)
Ruling: Yes, reconveyance and cancellation of title are acts in personam.
Actions in personam and actions in rem differ in that the former are directed against specific
persons and seek personal judgments, while the latter are directed against the thing or
property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the whole
world.
An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it
binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing.
Private respondent’s action for reconveyance and cancellation of title being in personam, the
judgment in question is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased
defendant Ching Leng. Verily, the action was commenced thirteen (13) years after the latter’s
death.
According to Dumlao v. Quality plastic products, the decision of the lower court insofar as
the deceased is concerned is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he
could not have been validly served with summons. He had no more civil personality, that its
fitness to be subject of legal relations was lost through death.
Ching Leng is an innocent purchaser for value as shown by the evidence adduced in his
behalf by petitioner herein, tracking back the roots of his title since 1960, from the time the
decree of registration was issued.
18
The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another’s name after one year from the date of the decree is not to set aside the
decree but respecting it and to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for
damages if the property has transferred to an innocent purchaser for value.
19. HERNANDEZ vs. DBP
Proper venue in a real action.
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose M. Hernandez was an employee of private respondent Development Bank of

the Philippines in its Legal Department for twenty-one (21) years until his retirement on
February 28, 1966 due to illness. On August 12, 1964, in due recognition of his unqualified
service as Assistant Attorney in its Legal Department, the private respondent awarded to the
petitioner a lot, identified as Lot No. 15, Block No. W-21, in the private respondent's Housing
Project at No. 1 West Avenue, Quezon City, containing an area of 810 square meters with a
Type E house.
However, more than a week thereafter, or on October 29, 1968, the Chief Accountant and
Comptroller of the private respondent returned to the petitioner ,the aforementioned check,
informing him that the private respondent, through its Committee on Organization,
Personnel and Facilities, had cancelled the award of the lot and house previously awarded to
him on the following grounds: (1) that he has already retired; (2) that he has only an option
to purchase said house and lot; (3) that there are a big number of employees who have no
houses or lots; (4) that he has been given his retirement gratuity; and (5) that the awarding
of the aforementioned house and lot to an employee of the private respondent would better
subserve the objective of its Housing Project.
On May 15, 1969 the petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Batangas
against the private respondent seeking the annulment of the cancellation of the award of the
lot and house in his favor and the restoration of all his rights thereto. He contends that the
cancellation of said award was unwarranted and illegal for he has already become the owner
of said house and lot by virtue of said award on August 12, 1964 and has acquired a vested
right thereto, which cannot be unilaterally cancelled without his consent.
Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue,
contending that since the petitioner's action affects the title to a house and lot situated in
Quezon City, the same should have been commenced in the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City where the real property is located and not in the Court of First Instance of Batangas
where petitioner resides. On July 24, 1969, the respondent Court sustained the motion to
dismiss filed by private respondent on the ground of improper venue.
ISSUE:
WON the action of the petitioner was properly filed in the Court of First Instance of Batangas.
RULING:
YES. The Court agrees that petitioner's action is not a real but a personal action. As correctly
insisted by petitioner, his action is one to declare null and void the cancellation of the lot and
house in his favor which does not involve title and ownership over said properties but seeks
19
to compel respondent to recognize that the award is a valid and subsisting one which it
cannot arbitrarily and unilaterally cancel and accordingly to accept the proffered payment in
full which it had rejected and returned to petitioner.
Such an action is a personal action which may be properly brought by petitioner in his
residence. Under Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, "actions affecting title to, or for
recovery of possession, or for partition, or condemnation of , or foreclosure of mortgage in
real property, shall be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants
resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election
of the plaintiff"
20. DOMAGAS vs. JENSEN
GRN 158407 158407 January 17,2005
Callejo, Sr. J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Domagas filed for a forcible entry case against Jensen. Summons and complaint
were not served on respondent because the latter was apparently out of the country but it
was received by respondent’s brother Oscar who was then at the respondent’s house. The
trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Respondent did not appeal. August 20,
2000, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for the annulment of the decision of
MTC since the service of summons was ineffective, the respondent being out of the country.
The RTC decided in favor of Jensen since there was no valid service of the complaint and
summons. The CA affirmed the decision, ruling that the case was an ejectment case which
is an action quasi in rem.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the action of petitioner in the MTC against respondent is an action in
personam or quasi in rem.
RULING:
The action of the petitioner fro forcible entry is a real action and one in personam. The settled
rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a proceeding is
in rem or in personam or in quasi in rem is determined by its nature and purpose, and by
these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and
obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person,
although it may involve his right, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek
to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The
purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some
responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are suits
to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary
liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment
against a person, as distinguished from a judgment against the proprietary to determine its
state… Actions for recovery of real property are in personam.
v Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but
which are intended to operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to
the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interest of all possible claimants.
The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.
20
21. HEIRS OF OLVIGA V. CA
Facts:
In 1950, when Eutiquio Pureza, then only twelve years old, he and his father cleared and
cultivated it. Since then, the land has been known as Lot 13, Pls-84 of the Guinayangan
Public Land Subdivision. Godofredo Olviga, a son of Jose Olviga then living with the latter,
protested the survey but without respect to a one-half-hectare portion "sa dakong panulukan
ng Amihanan-Silanganan." This protest or "tutol" of Godofredo Olviga, brother of petitioners
Virgilio Olviga and Lolita Olviga Olila, is of public record in the Bureau of Lands. In said
document, Godofredo Olviga expressly admitted that the lot belonged to Eutiquio Pureza,
except the 1/2 hectare portion claimed by him (Godofredo) which was included in the survey
of Pureza's Lot 13.
Issue:
1. W/N plaintiff’s action is for quieting of title that does not prescribe, and assuming their
demand is for reconveyance of the land being based in implies trust, prescribes in 10
years?
The SC held that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implies or
constructive trust prescribes in 10 years, the point of reference being the date of registration
of the deed of the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property. But this rule
applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property, since if a person claiming
to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance,
which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not prescribe.
2. W/N the Glors’ cause of action accrued not in 1967 but in 1988, and as mere
homestead trasferees, cannot maintain an action for reconveyance?
It was held that the Glors and their predecessors-in-interest were in actual possision of the
property since 1950. Their undisturbed possession gave them the continuing right to seek
aid of a court of equity to determine nature of Olviga’s adverse claim, who in 1988, disturbed
their possession. Thus, the right to quiet the property’s tuitle which seeks reconveyance and
annulment of any certificate of title, accrues only from the time the possessor was made
aware of the adverse claim and it is only from that time that the statutory period of
prescription commences to run against him/her. It also stated that the actual possessor of a
piece of land claiming to be its owner may wait until disturbance of hiss/her possession or
the attack of hi/her title before taking steps is vindication of his/her right because his
undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to
ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his
own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
22. PINGOL V. COURT OF APPEALS
A vendee in an oral contract to convey land who had made part payment thereof, entered
upon the land and had made valuable improvements thereon is entitled to bring suit to clear
his title against the vendor who had refused to transfer the title to him. It is not necessary
that the vendee should have an absolute title, an equitable title being sufficient to clothe him
with personality to bring an action to quiet title.
FACTS:
21
In 1969, Pingol, the owner of a lot (Lot No. 3223) in Caloocan City, executed a DEED OF
ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF OF AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF [his] PARCEL OF LAND
in favor of Donasco (private respondent), payable in 6 years.
In 1984, Donasco died and was only able to pay P8,369 plus P2,000 downpayment, leaving
a balance of P10,161. The heirs of Donasco remained in possession of such lot and offered
to settle the balance with Pingol. However, Pingol refused to accept the offer and demanded
a larger amount. Thus, the heirs of Donasco filed an action for specific performance (with
Prayer for Writ of Prelim. Injunction, because Pingol were encroaching upon Donasco’s lot).
Pingol averred that the sale and transfer of title was conditional upon the full payment of
Donasco (contract to sell, not contract of sale). With Donasco’s breach of the contract in 1976
and death in 1984, the sale was deemed cancelled, and the heirs’ continuous occupancy was
only being tolerated by Pingol.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Pingol can refuse to transfer title to Donasco

(2) Whether or not Donasco has the right to quiet title
RULING:
(1) No. The contract between Pingol and Donasco is a contract of sale and not a contract to
sell. The acts of the parties, contemporaneous and subsequent to the contract, clearly show
that the parties intended an absolute deed of sale; the ownership of the lot was transferred
to the Donasco upon its actual (upon Donasco’s possession and construction of the house)
and constructive delivery (upon execution of the contract). The delivery of the lot divested
Pingol of his ownership and he cannot recover the title unless the contract is resolved or
rescinded under Art. 1592 of NCC. It states that the vendee may pay even after the expiration
of the period stipulated as long as no demand for rescission has been made upon him either
judicially or by notarial act. Pingol neither did so. Hence, Donasco has equitable title over the
property.
(2) Although the complaint filed by the Donascos was an action for specific performance, it
was actually an action to quiet title. A cloud has been cast on the title, since despite the fact
that the title had been transferred to them by the execution of the deed of sale and the delivery
of the object of the contract, Pingol adamantly refused to accept the payment by Donascos
and insisted that they no longer had the obligation to transfer the title.
Donasco, who had made partial payments and improvements upon the property, is entitled
to bring suit to clear his title against Pingol who refused to transfer title to him. It is not
necessary that Donasco should have an absolute title, an equitable title being sufficient to
clothe him with personality to bring an action to quiet title.
Prescription cannot also be invoked against the Donascos because an action to quiet title to
property in ONE’s POSSESSION is imprescriptible.
23. TITONG v. CA
22
For one to file an action to quiet title to a parcel of land, the requisites in Art 476 of the NCC
must be complied with meaning there should be an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance
setting forth the cloud or doubt over the title. Otherwise, the action to be filed can either be
ejectment, forcible entry, unlawful detainer, accion reivindicatoria or accion publiciana.
FACTS:
A 20,592 square meter parcel of land located at Barrio Titiong, Masbate is the subject
property being disputed in this case. The property is being claimed by 2 contestants, however
legal title over the property can only be given to one of them.
The case originated from an action for quieting of title filed by petitioner Mario Titong. The
RTC of Masbate decided in favor of private respondents, Vicente Laurio and Angeles Laurio
as the true and lawful owners of the disputed land. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Titong asserts that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land with an area of 3.2800
hectares and declared for taxation purposes. He claims that on three separate occasions,
private resps, with their hired laborers, forcibly entered a portion of the land containing an
approximate area of 2 hectares and began plowing the same under pretext of ownership. On
the other hand, private resps denied the claim and said that the subject land formed part of
the 5.5 hectare agricultural land which they had purchased from their predecessor-in-
interest, Pablo Espinosa.
Titong identified Espinosa as the his adjoining owner asserting that no controversy had
sprouted between them for 20 years until the latter sold lot 3749 to V. Laurio. The boundary
between the land sold to Espinosa and what remained of Titong’s property was the old
Bugsayon river. When Titong employed Lerit as his tenant, he instructed the latter to change
the course of the old river and direct the flow of water to the lowland at the southern portion
of Titong’s property, thus converting the old river into a Riceland.
Private resps, on the other hand, denied claim of Titong’s, saying that the area and
boundaries of disputed land remained unaltered during the series of conveyances prior to its
coming into his hands. Accdg to him, Titong first declared land for taxation purposes which
showed that the land had an area of 5.5 hectares and was bounded on the north by the B.
River; on the east by property under ownership by Zaragoza, and on the west by property
owned by De la Cruz. He also alleges that Titong sold property to Verano. The latter
reacquired the property pursuant to mutual agreement to repurchase the same.
However, the property remained in Titong’s hands only for 4 days because he sold it to
Espinosa. It then became a part of the estate of Espinosa’s wife, late Segundina Espinosa.
Later on, her heirs executed an “Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Simultaneous Sale”
whereby the 5.5 hectares was sold to Laurio for 5,000 pesos. In all these conveyances, the
area and boundaries of the property remained exactly the same as those appearing in the
name of Titong’s.
The court found out that 2 surveys were made of the property. First survey was made by
Titong, while the second was the relocation survey ordered by the lower court. Because of
which, certain discrepancies surfaced. Contrary to Titong’s allegation, he was actually
claiming 5.9789 hectares, the total areas of lot nos 3918, 3918-A and 3606. The lot 3479
23
pertaining to Espinosa’s was left with only an area of 4.1841 hectares instead of the 5.5
hectares sold by Titong to him.
Apprised of the discrepancy, private resps filed a protest before Bureau of Lands against 1st
survey, and filing a case for alteration of boundaries before the MTC, proceedings of which
were suspended because of instant case.
Private resps. Avers that Titong is one of the four heirs of his mother, Leonida Zaragoza. In
the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of Estate of late Zaragoza, the heirs adjudicated unto
themselves the 3.6 hectares property of the deceased. The property was bounded by the north
by Verano, on the east by Bernardo Titong, on the south by the Bugsayon River and on the
west by Benigno Titong.
Instead of reflecting only .9000 hectares as his rightful share in the extrajud settlement,
Titong’s share bloated to 2.4 hectares. It then appeared to Laurio that Titong encroached
upon his property and declared it as part of his inheritance.
The boundaries were likewise altered so that it was bounded on the north by Verano, on the
east by B. Titong, on the south by Espinosa and on the west by Adolfo Titong. Laurio also
denied that Titong diverted course of the B. river after he had repurchased the land from
Verano because land was immediately sold to Espinosa thereafter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Titong is the rightful owner of the subject property
RULING: NO
The remedy for quieting of title may be availed of under the circumstances mentioned in Art
476 of the NCC wherein it says that action to quiet title may be made as a remedial or
preventive measure. Under 476, a claimant must show that there is an instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding which casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon
owner’s title to or interest in real property. The ground for filing a complaint for quieting title
must be “instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding.”
In the case at bar, Titong failed to allege that there was an instrument, claim etc be clouded
over his property. Through his allegations, what Titong imagined as clouds cast on his title
were Laurio’s alleged acts of physical intrusion into his purported property. The grounds
mentioned are for action for forcible entry and not quieting title.
In addition, the case was considered to be a boundary dispute. The RTC and CA correctly
held that when Titong sold the 5.5 hectare land to Espinosa, his rights and possession ceased
and were transferred to Laurio upon its sale to the latter.
Thus, it is now a contract of sale wherein it is a contract transferring dominion and other
real rights in the thing sold. Titong also cannot rely on the claim of prescription as ordinary
acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for the time fixed
by law.
ACTS
24
1. 1932: Ramon Chacon was granted a Fishpond Lease Agreement
over a 15 ha mangrove swamp, which he developed into a fishpond, in
Barrio Lapasan, Cagayan, Oriental Misamis.
2. 1957: After his death, his heirs entered into a partnership
agreement, under the name Chacon Enterprises, for the purpose of
acquiring title over the fishpond. Aside from the 15 ha, this agreement also
included the adjoining eastern portion with an area of about 4 ha (disputed
area in this case). In their sales application, they alleged that the area
applied for had no indication of settlement, occupation or improvement,
except the dikes and concrete gates they owned.
3. 1968: Chacon filed an ejectment suit against the Galasino group
(respodents) who were then in actual possession of an area of 43, 792
sq.m. of the eastern portion of the land. The trial court dismissed this
action because the respondents’ houses constructed in the premises show
that they were staying and living there for more than a year already (old
and dilapidated condition of houses).
4. 1969: Chacon Enterprises filed a civil case to recover the eastern
portion alleging that the respondents occupied the land without their
consent and that they refused to vacate despite repeated demands.
 Galasino group assert absolute ownership – (1) they inherited the
land from Santiago Ebora, their deceased predecessor-in-interest,
who had been in continuous, public and exclusive possession as
the owner since time immemorial; (2) they continuously, openly
and exclusively possessed the land as owners since Ebora’s death;
(3) they have planted coconuts thereon, which now bear fruit; and
(4) that Chacon’s certificate of title is null and void.
 Respondents also filed a civil case against Chacon for annulment of
the said certificate of title and reconveyance of the land outside of

25
the circumferential dike of the fishpond.
 At the pre-trial, they agreed that the land in litigation has an area
of 43, 792 sq.m.
5. CFI dismissed Galasino group’s complaint and ordered them to
vacate the land and to surrender possession to Chacon Enterprises.
6. 1976: Upon appeal, the CA reversed the decision of CFI, holding
that the certificate of title in the name of Chacon Enterprises was null and
void insofar as it covered the portion in litigation. Chacon filed for MR on
the grounds that the action filed by Galasino group was barred by
prescription. CA denied this motion holding that the action by Galasino
group. albeit denominated as one for reconveyance, is in essence an action
to quiet title, which is imprescriptible. Hence, this petition
ACTS
1. 1932: Ramon Chacon was granted a Fishpond Lease Agreement
26
of 43, 792 sq.m.
to quiet title, which is imprescriptible. Hence, this petition
932: Ramon Chacon was granted a Fishpond Lease Agreement

27
of 43, 792 sq.m.

28
to quiet title, which is imprescriptible. Hence, this petition.

29
of 43, 792 sq.m.

30
of 43, 792 sq.m.
31
24. portfic vs cristobal
Facts:
Petition for inforcement of MOA
Spouses Clodualdo Alcantara and Candelaria Edrosalam were the original registered owners
of a parcel of land with three-door apartment, located at No. 9, 1st Street BBB,
Marulas, Valenzuela City. Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-71316 was issued in the names
of spouses Clodualdo Alcantara and Candelaria Edrosalam.
On October 2, 1968, spouses Clodualdo Alcantara and Candelaria Edrosalam sold the
subject property in favor of [petitioners] with the condition that the latter shall assume the
mortgage executed over the subject property by spouses Clodualdo Alcantara and Candelaria
Edrosalam in favor of the Social Security System.
[Petitioners] defaulted in the payment of the monthly amortizations due on the mortgage. The
Social Security System foreclosed the mortgage and sold the subject property at public
auction with the Social Security System as the highest bidder.
On May 22, 1984, before the expiration of the redemption period, [petitioners] sold the
subject property in favor of [respondent] in consideration of P200,025.89. Among others, the
parties agreed that [respondent] shall pay the sum of P45,025.89 as down payment and the
balance of P155,000.00 shall be paid on or before May 22, 1985. The parties further agreed
that in case [respondent] should fail to comply with the conditions, the sale shall be
considered void and [petitioners] shall reimburse [respondent] of whatever amount already
paid.
On the same date, [petitioners] and [respondent] executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage whereby [petitioners] sold the subject property in favor of [respondent] in
consideration of P80,000.00, P45,000.00 thereof shall be paid to the Social Security System.
On July 30, 1984, spouses Clodualdo Alcantara and Candelaria Edrosalam, the original
owners of the subject property, sold the subject property in favor of [respondent]
for P50,000.00.
On the same date, [respondent] executed a Deed of Mortgage whereby [respondent]

constituted a mortgage over the subject property to secure a P150,000.00 indebtedness in
favor of [petitioners].
[Respondent] paid the indebtedness due over the subject property to the Social Security
System.
32
On August 6, 1984, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-71316 in the names of spouses
Clodualdo Alcantara and Candelaria Edrosalam was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-113299 was issued in the name of [respondent].
On May 20, 1996, [petitioners] demanded from [respondent] the alleged unpaid balance
of P55,000.00. [Respondent] refused to pay.
On June 6, 1996, [petitioners] filed this instant civil case against [respondent] to remove the
cloud created by the issuance of TCT No. T-113299 in favor of [respondent]. [Petitioners]
claimed that they sold the subject property to [respondent] on the condition that [respondent]
shall pay the balance on or before May 22, 1985; that in case of failure to pay, the sale shall
be considered void and [petitioners] shall reimburse [respondent] of the amounts already
paid; that [respondent] failed to fully pay the purchase price within the period; that on
account of this failure, the sale of the subject property by [petitioners] to [respondent] is void;
that in spite of this failure, [respondent] required [petitioners] to sign a lease contract over
the apartment which [petitioners] occupy; that [respondent] should be required to reconvey
back the title to the subject property to [petitioners].
[Respondent] on her part claimed that her title over the subject property is already
indefeasible; that the true agreement of the parties is that embodied in the Deed of Absolute
Sale with Assumption of Mortgage; that [respondent] had fully paid the purchase price; that
[respondent] is the true owner of the subject property; that [petitioners] claim is already
barred by laches.[6]
Issue:
(1) whether Cristobal’s title to the property is valid; and
the agreement between the parties as a contract to sell, not a contract of sale. Ownership is
retained by the vendors, the Portics; it will not be passed to the vendee, the Cristobals, until
the full payment of the purchase price. Such payment is a positive suspensive condition, and
failure to comply with it is not a breach of obligation; it is merely an event that prevents the
effectivity of the obligation of the vendor to convey the title. In short, until the full price is paid,
the vendor retains ownership.
The mere issuance of the Certificate of Title in favor of Cristobal did not vest ownership in her.
Neither did it validate the
alleged absolute purchase of the lot. The registration does not vest, but merely serves
as evidence of, title.
(2) whether the Portics are in possession of the premises, a fact that would render the action
for quieting of title imprescriptible.
The issue of whether the Portics have been in actual, continuous possession of the premises is
necessarily a question of fact. Well-entrenched is the rule that findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals, when supported by substantial evidence, are final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal. This Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the CAs findings sustaining
those of the trial court, which held that petitioners had been in continuous possession of the
premises. For this reason, the action to quiet title has not prescribed.
Ruling:
Petition is GRANTED
33
25. BISHOP OF CEBU VS MANGABON
FACTS:
1. Mariano Mangabon’s parents and brothers had been in possession of a tract
of land in the district of Ermita until about the year 1877 (possession of atleast 20 years)
2. In 1878, they vacated the land by virtue of an order from the municipalitywhich
declared that the land was included within the zone of materialesFuertes (fire zone)
and the houses in which they lived upon were of lightmaterials
3. They vacated the land without objection.
4. After the land was vacated, Parish Priests of Ermita Church fenced the landand
cleaned the same without any objection on the part of anyone
5. In 1898, Mangabons entered upon the land in question and built thereon anipa house
and continued to live thereon without the consent of the parishpriest of Ermita Church
or the Bishop of Cebu
6. Roman Catholic Church, represented by the Bishop of Cebu filed an actionto recover
possession of said land; amended complaint for said land to bedeclared property of the
Catholic Church and that it be restored to the latter
7. Property had belonged to the Catholic Church from time immemorial
8. Mangabons occupied apart thereof by the mere tolerance of theCatholic Church7.
Mangabon:
9. Claims to be the owner of the land by inheritance
10. He was the legal owner when he was unlawfully ejected by the Bishop ofCebu in
1879
11. He had a right to re-enter; time for prescription has not yet expired sincehe was
ejected
TC:
Ruled in favor of Bishop of Cebu and ordered Mangabons to vacate theland
Occupation of the land by Mangabon in the year 1898 was illegal
If he thought he had a right to the land, he should have filed an actionwith the court to
recover possession and not proceed to occupy theproperty
If the Church acceded and voluntarily returned possession andacknowledged that the
property belonged to him, there would be nonecessity to file an action; but in this case,
Church has objected to theoccupation which necessitates a filing of a proper action
The possession held by Mangabon in 1898 cannot be added to theformer possession which
was interrupted in 1877 by the order of themunicipality
o Art. 466 CC:
“a person who recovers possession according to law, which is improperly lost, is considered
as having enjoyed it without interruption for all the purposes which may redound to his
benefit”
o It cannot be ascertained that the possession enjoyed by Mangabon was improperly lost
34
o It has been lost by virtue of an order from the municipality and noproof to the contrary was
presented
Issues:
1. whether, after the promulgation of the Civil Code, the accion publiciana, which had for
its object the recovery of possession in a plenary action before an action for the recovery
of title could be instituted, still existed
This quiet and peaceful possession of twenty years, more or less, thus lost in a moment,
could not be recovered in a summary action for possession after the expiration of one year,
but possession could still be recovered through the accion publiciana, which involved the
right to possess. This latter action would be then based upon the fact that he, having been
in possession for twenty years, could not lose the same until he had been given an
opportunity to be heard and had been defeated in an action in court by another with a better
right. (The same laws.) This fact of itself would have been sufficient to recover the possession,
not in summary, but in a plenary action, in which it would likewise have availed the
defendant nothing to allege that all that he did was to recover a possession improperly lost
in 1877. In one way or the other the plaintiff would have recovered such possession, in the
first case the physical possession and in the second case the right to possess, which is not
lost by the mere occupation of a third person, whether such occupation was effected violently,
secretly, or arbitrarily.
2. whether possession which is lost by the occupation of another against the will of the
former possessor is merely possession de facto or possessionde jure.ch
The right acquired by the person who has been in possession for one year and one day is the
right that the former possessor lost by allowing the year and one day to expire. The right is lost
by the prescription of the action. And the action which prescribes upon the expiration of the
year is "the action to recover or to retainpossession; " that is to say, the interdictory action.
To the fact of possession, the action for the enforcement of which prescribes after the expiration
of one year and one day, there exists without any doubt whatsoever the right to possess (or
more properly speaking in the case at bar, to continue to possess, which said right of possession
would be a right in rem, such possession would not be on a less favorable footing than a mere
possession de facto; and, if in the latter case the interdictory action lies, the action which
existed prior to the enactment of the code, to wit, the accion publiciana, should continue to lie
in the former case. The code establishes rights and the Law of civil Procedure prescribes actions
for the protection of such rights, and we can not look to the code to find any provision defining
the action which every civil right carries with it.ch
26. CHACON v CA
G.R. No: L-46418-19 Petitioner/s: Chacon Enterprises Respondent/s: The Court of Appeals,
Florentino Galasino, Francisco Gallardo, Porferio Cabacungan, Bernardino Bajulo, et al.
Ponente: J. Guerrero
Action: Petition for review by certiorari Date: September 29, 1983

35
FACTS
1. 1932: Ramon Chacon was granted a Fishpond Lease Agreement over a 15 ha mangrove
swamp, which he developed into a fishpond, in Barrio Lapasan, Cagayan, Oriental Misamis.
2. 1957: After his death, his heirs entered into a partnership agreement, under the name
Chacon Enterprises, for the purpose of acquiring title over the fishpond. Aside from the 15
ha, this agreement also included the adjoining eastern portion with an area of about 4 ha
(disputed area in this case). In their sales application, they alleged that the area applied for
had no indication of settlement, occupation or improvement, except the dikes and concrete
gates they owned.
3. 1968: Chacon filed an ejectment suit against the Galasino group (respodents) who were
then in actual possession of an area of 43, 792 sq.m. of the eastern portion of the land. The
trial court dismissed this action because the respondentsâ houses constructed in the
premises show that they were staying and living there for more than a year already (old and
dilapidated condition of houses).
4. 1969: Chacon Enterprises filed a civil case to recover the eastern portion alleging that the
respondents occupied the land without their consent and that they refused to vacate despite
repeated demands. Â· Galasino group assert absolute ownership â (1) they inherited the land
from Santiago Ebora, their deceased predecessor-in-interest, who had been in continuous,
public and exclusive possession as the owner since time immemorial; (2) they continuously,
openly and exclusively possessed the land as owners since Eboraâs death; (3) they have
planted coconuts thereon, which now bear fruit; and (4) that Chaconâs certificate of title is
null and void. Â· Respondents also filed a civil case against Chacon for annulment of the said
certificate of title and reconveyance of the land outside of the circumferential dike of the
fishpond. Â· At the pre-trial, they agreed that the land in litigation has an area of 43, 792
sq.m.
5. CFI dismissed Galasino groupâs complaint and ordered them to vacate the land and to
surrender possession to Chacon Enterprises.
6. 1976: Upon appeal, the CA reversed the decision of CFI, holding that the certificate of title
in the name of Chacon Enterprises was null and void insofar as it covered the portion in
litigation. Chacon filed for MR on the grounds that the action filed by Galasino group was
barred by prescription. CA denied this motion holding that the action by Galasino group.
albeit denominated as one for reconveyance, is in essence an action to quiet title, which is
imprescriptible. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
1. Whether the action by the Galasino group has already prescribed? â NO Chacon
Enterprisesâ arguments:
More than 12 years had elapsed from the date the title was transcribed into the registration
book of the Office of Register of Deeds (Sept 24, 1956) up to the time the Galasino group filed
the civil case for annulment of the certificate of title.
Their action would have prescribed after four years from September 1956.
If right of Galasino group is based on implied or constructive trust, prescription would set in
after 10 years from registration.
36
Either way, the action shall have been barred by prescription.
HELD
1. Although Galasino group’s complaint in the civil case was captioned or denominated for
Annulment of Title and/or Reconveyance, the averments of lawful ownership and actual
possession constitute a cause of action for quieting of title or removal of a cloud over such
title.
2. This Court had held that the actions to quiet title to property are imprescriptible (Sapto v
Fabiana). There is settled jurisprudence that one who is in actual possession of a piece of
land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title
is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being that his
undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to
ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his
own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession (Sapto case reiterated
in Faja v CA).
3. In the present case, the filing of ejectment cases by Chacon is tantamount to an admission
on their part that it was not in material possession of the land. Also, the ejectment suit was
dismissed after a finding that the Galasino group had been staying and living in the premises
for more than a year already.
4. Equitable doctrine of laches does not also apply in this case. Records show that the
respondents lose no time in asserting their rights. After the CFI dismissed Chacon’s ejectment
suit against them in 1968, they filed a case the following year, contesting the validity of the
title obtained by the Chacon Enterprise. There was no long inaction or inexcusable neglect
on the part of the Galasino group which would bar them from seeking to enforce their rights.
(see notes for elements of laches)
ISSUE 2
Whether or not the respondents have established their possession of the land (since time
immemorial)?
YES
HELD
1. This issue is factual and beyond the courtâs power to review.
2. The disputed finding of the CA is duly supported by evidence:
a. Galasino group’s predecessor-in-interest Santiago Ebora had been in possession of the

land which adjoing the eastern boundary of the 15 ha fishpond.
b. Santiago had built his house, planted coconut trees and nipa palms thereon. He had
converted a portion into a salt bed and after his demise in 1920, his children and
grandchildren succeeded to the possession of the land and they erected their houses and
planted coconut trees thereon.
c· Commissioner to the Court who conducted an investigation of the area found pieces of
evidence that corroborate the anterior possession of the Galasino group and their predecessor
37
-- that the houses had been built for so many years and that some of the coconut trees
planted are approximately 30-40 years old.
3. While the Galasino group failed to produce any tax declaration or tax receipt to
substantiate their claim, these are not indispensable proof of title to real property.
Testimonial and other evidence may be sufficient.
4. Chacon Enterprise also committed fraudulent misrepresentation, giving grounds for the
cancellation of their title. As stated in the sales application (which was made the basis of the
questioned Torrens title), the area applied for had an indication of settlement, occupation or
improvements, but as the findings revealed, Galasino group and their predecessor-in-interest
had been in actual possession of the disputed 4-hectare portion of the land.
5. Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act), Section 91 supports the cancellation of title
due to existence of bad faith, fraud, concealment or fraudulent and illegal modification of
essential facts in an application. This provision is intended to ensure that applicants, whether
for homestead, sale, lease or free patent, state only the truth in their respective application,
especially with regard to material facts. For this purpose, the last two sentences provide for
the procedure by which the government may discover or determine the truth of the facts set
forth in the application.
6. Lastly, Charon Enterprises questions whether the land in litigation was either the western
or eastern portion of the area. The Court said that the exact location of the disputed area was
already established as the area they have agreed upon during the pre-trial.
DISPO
Petition denied. CA decision is affirmed in toto.
27. German Management v. Court of Appeals

In February 1982, the spouses Manuel and Cynthia Jose contracted with German
Management and Services, Inc. for the latter to develop their landholdings into a residential
subdivision. The spouses also executed a special power of attorney to that effect.
German Management started the project in February 1983, however, German Management
discovered that the land was being possessed by Ernest0 Villeza et al who were the farmers
tilling the said land at that time. German Management spoke with Villeza et al but the farmers
refused to vacate the land as the farmers claimed that they have been occupying the land for
twelve years.
Nevertheless, German Management went on to develop the property and demolished the
properties of the farmers without acquiring a court order. In turn, Villeza et al filed a case of
forcible entry against German Management. In its defense, German Management invoked the
Doctrine of Self-help which provides that:
The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the
enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion
or usurpation of his property. (Article 429, Civil Code)
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of self-help is applicable in this case.

HELD: No. The Doctrine of Self-help is not applicable because at the time when German
Management excluded the farmers, there’s no longer an actual or threatened unlawful
physical invasion or usurpation. That actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion by the
38
farmers have already lapsed 12 years ago when they began occupying the said land. In fact,
they were already peaceably farming the land.
What should have been the remedy by German Management?
German Management should have filed either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria to
lawfully eject the farmers.
But the farmers are not the real owners and in fact, the spouses Jose have a lawful title over
the land?
Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet
possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Further, there is now
a presumption of ownership in favor of the farmers since they are the ones occupying the
said property. They can only be ejected either by accion publicianaor accion
reivindicatoria through which the spouses Jose’s better right may be proven.
28. De La Paz v. Panis

An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be brought for the purpose of settling a
boundary dispute.
FACTS:
Eduardo Aviles, the predecessor of the petitioners is the bother of defendant Camilo. They
inherited their lands from their parents and have agreed to subdivide the same amongst
themselves. The area alloted (sic) to Eduardo Aviles is 16,111 square meters more or less,
to Anastacio Aviles is 16,214 square meters more or less, while the area alloted to
defendant Camilo Aviles is 14,470 square meters more or less.
Defendant’s land composed of the riceland portion of his land is 13,290 square meters, the
fishpond portion is 500 square meters and the residential portion is 680 square meters, or
a total of 14,470 square meters.
The Petitioners claim that they are the owners of the fish pond which they claim is within
their area. Defendant Camilo Aviles asserted a color of title over the northern portion of the
property with an area of approximately 1,200 square meters by constructing a bamboo
fence (thereon) and moving the earthen dikes, thereby molesting and disturbing the
peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over said portion.
Petitioners say that the fences were created to unduly encroach to their property but the
defendant said that he merely reconstructed the same.
Petitioners brought an action to quiet title but were denied thus this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners filed the right action
RULING:
No, Petitioners filed the wrong action. This is obviously a boundary dispute and as such the
action must fail.
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently
valid or effective but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable,
and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to
quiet the title.
39
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon a title to real
property or any interest therein.
Petitioners fail to point out any any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
that could been a “cloud” to their title. In fact, both plaintiffs and defendant admitted the
existence of the agreement of partition dated June 8, 1957 and in accordance therewith, a
fixed area was allotted to them and that the only controversy is whether these lands were
properly measured.
A special civil action for quieting of title is not the proper remedy for settling a boundary
dispute, and that petitioners should have instituted an ejectment suit instead. An action for
forcible entry, whenever warranted by the period prescribed in Rule 70, or for recovery of
possession de facto, also within the prescribed period, may be availed of by the petitioners,
in which proceeding the boundary dispute may be fully threshed out.
29. vda de Aviles v. ca
*none*
30. Baricuatro vs. CA
In 1968, deceased Baricuatro, Jr. susbstituted by his legal heirs, bought 2 lots on installment
from Galeos. After the sale, petitioner introduced improvements and started to reside in 1970.
At the time the action for quieting of title was filed in the trial court, petitioner had an unpaid
balance.
However, 2 months from the sale, respondent sold the entire subdivision, including the 2 lots
to 2nd buyer. After the sale of the entire subdividion, the 2nd buyer allegedly took possession
and developed the same for residential purposes. He registered the deed of sale covering the
subdivision, secured TCT, subdivided, and acquired individual titles. In 1974, he sold the 2
lots to 3rd buyers who caused the TCT and tax declarations in their names, then demanded
from petitioner to vacate the said lots but the letter refused.
RTC declared the 3rd buyers as the owners. CA affirmed decision.
Petitioner argues that the general principles on trust must be applied and not Article 1544.
Respondent buyers assert that Torrens system should be upheld and that an innocent
purchaser for value, relying solely on an unencumbered title, should be protected.
ISSUE: Whether of not the 3rd buyers – and not the petitioner – are the owners who bought
the lots in good faith.
HELD: No. The petitioners are owners. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the
removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property, “…not
only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said
immovable respect and not disturb the other but also for the benefit of both, so that he who
has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated (Art 476)
The 3rd buyers are not in good faith, on the basis of the letter which the latter sent to the
petitioner, reminding the petitioner of his overdue account and warning him that if he could
not come up with the proper solution, it would be his last chance. “Art. 1544. If the same
thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the
person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith… “Uraca vs. Court of
40
Appeals: “xxx xxx the prior registration of the disputed property by the second buyer does
not by itself confer ownership or a better right over the property. Article 1544 requires that
such registration must be coupled with good faith. Jurisprudence teaches us that “(t)he
governing principle is primus timpore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge
gain by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer’s rights except where
the second buyer registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first”. While 3rd buyers
bought the disputed lots from 2nd buyers in 1974, they registered the deeds only in 1976. On
cross, 3rd buyer admitted he visited the petitioners residence in 1975. Thus, 3rd buyers cannot
claim good faith. The registration by them was done in bad faith, hence, it amounted to no
“inscription” at all.
Phil Stock Exchange vs. CA”A holder in bad faith of a certificate is not entitled to the
protection of law, for the law cannot be used as a shield for frauds.
31. BA Finance v. CA
*none
32. PEZA v. Fernandez

Lot 4673 was registered in the names of Florentina Rapaya, Victorino Cuizon among others
covered by an OCT. Sometime thereafter, Jorgea Igot-Soro ño et al executed an Extra-judicial
Partition claiming to be the only surviving heirs of the registered owners, through which they
were issued a TCT.
Said lot was among the object of an expropriation proceeding before the RTC. Said RTC
approved the compromise Agreement b/w the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) and
Igot-Soroño et al wherein EPZA would pay a certain amount in exchange for the subject
property.
EPZA acquired title to said land by virtue of the RTC decision and was issued a corresponding
TCT.
The Heirs of the Florentina Rapaya and Juan Cuizon filed a complaint to nullify several
documents including the TCT issued to EPZA for they were excluded from the extrajudicial
settlement of the estate.
EPZA filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription and was denied thus elevated
the case to the CA wherein the CA ruled that the heirs of Igot-Soroño defrauded the other
heirs by falsely representing that they were the only heirs enabling them to appropriate the
land in favor of EPZA. This method of acquiring property created a constructive trust in favor
of the defrauded party and grants them the right to vindicate regardless of the lapse of time.
Thus, the case at bar.
ISSUE/S:
1) Whether or not private respondent’s claim over the expropriated land has prescribed
2) Whether or not reconveyance lies against expropriated property
HELD:
1) YES. As provided in the Rules of Court, persons unduly deprived of their lawful
participation in a settlement may assert their claim only w/in the 2-year period after the
settlement and distribution of the estate. However, this prescriptive period will not apply to
those who had not been notified of the settlement.
41
The Private respondents are deemed to have been notified of the extrajudicial settlement since
it was registered and annotated on the certificate of title over the lot.
The only exception to this rule is when the title still remains in the hands of the heirs who
have fraudulently caused the partition of the said property. In the case at bar, the title has
already passed to an innocent purchaser for value, the gov’t through EPZA.
Their remedies of action for reconveyance resulting from fraud, and action for reconveyance
based on an implied constructive trust has already prescribed as well the former having
prescribed 4 years from the discovery and the latter prescribing 10 years from the alleged
fraudulent registration.
2) NO. Reconveyance is a remedy for those whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another’s name. However, this cannot be availed once the property
has passed to an innocent purchaser for value. Since the property has already passed to the
gov’t in an expropriation proceeding, EPZA is entitled to enjoy the security afforded innocent
3rd persons and their title to the property must be preserved.
However, the private respondents are not w/o remedy. They can sue for damages their co-
heirs.
42
43

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PROPERTY CASES (1-32)

1. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION vs. PHILIPPINE

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass

2. Cruz vs Secretary of DENR

3. viTHE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, vs.CITY OF ZAMBOANGA,

Hence the appeal.

Law of Municipal Corporations

The land is public property.

5. CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY

1) Whether or not the additional machinery and equipment is considered an improvement

8. Philippine Refining Co. vs Jarque 61 Phil 229

9. Mindanao Bus Co. vs. City Assessor

MINDANAO BUS COMPANY - petitioner

Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement

10. Davao Sawmill vs. Castillo 61 SCRA 709

Davao Sawmill - plaintiff-appellant

11. Prudential Bank vs Panis 153 SCRA 390

12. Caltex vs Central Board of Assessment Appeals

(appurtenance: an object that is used with or for something)

13. Benguet Corp. vs CBAA 218 SCRA 271

To supporty its contention, petitioner cited the following cases:

14. TUMALAD v VICENCIO

When defendants-appellants defaulted in paying, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed,

Defendants-appellants, in their answers in both the municipal court and court a

Ratio: After agreeing to a contract stipulating that a real or immovable property be

Sheriff was still able to take possession of two more machineries

1. WON gas can be the subject to larceny

Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and Tuason, JJ., concur.

18. CHING vs. CA, Asedillo

Summons by publication was made through “Economic Monitor”, newspaper of general

Lower court decision:

Ruling: Yes, reconveyance and cancellation of title are acts in personam.

19. HERNANDEZ vs. DBP

Proper venue in a real action.

Petitioner Jose M. Hernandez was an employee of private respondent Development Bank of

20. DOMAGAS vs. JENSEN

GRN 158407 158407 January 17,2005

Callejo, Sr. J.:

22. PINGOL V. COURT OF APPEALS

(1) Whether or not Pingol can refuse to transfer title to Donasco

Whether or not Titong is the rightful owner of the subject property

over a 15 ha mangrove swamp, which he developed into a fishpond, in

Barrio Lapasan, Cagayan, Oriental Misamis.

2. 1957: After his death, his heirs entered into a partnership

agreement, under the name Chacon Enterprises, for the purpose of

included the adjoining eastern portion with an area of about 4 ha (disputed

applied for had no indication of settlement, occupation or improvement,

except the dikes and concrete gates they owned.

3. 1968: Chacon filed an ejectment suit against the Galasino group

(respodents) who were then in actual possession of an area of 43, 792

action because the respondents’ houses constructed in the premises show

and dilapidated condition of houses).

4. 1969: Chacon Enterprises filed a civil case to recover the eastern

consent and that they refused to vacate despite repeated demands.

 Galasino group assert absolute ownership – (1) they inherited the

land from Santiago Ebora, their deceased predecessor-in-interest,

who had been in continuous, public and exclusive possession as

the owner since time immemorial; (2) they continuously, openly

and exclusively possessed the land as owners since Ebora’s death;

(4) that Chacon’s certificate of title is null and void.

 Respondents also filed a civil case against Chacon for annulment of

the said certificate of title and reconveyance of the land outside of

of 43, 792 sq.m.