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Introduction
The need for interpretation arises from the fundamental difference of understandings in
meanings, contexts, political scenarios, words, etc. Methods of interpretation are required for
us to reach an outcome that can uphold justice and good conscience. As we usher in the era of
technology this paper offers an model inclusive of technology and prevalent interpretation
methods that is opposed to the practical reasoning model. This paper will walk through the
arguments of the authors showing its reasons for agreement and disagreement wherever
necessary
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20151334 | Abri Sunny Anthraper
outweigh the positives of using this interpretative method. At least in the India context,
separation of powers is a concept that is respected usually not to be defiled by governments,
legislatures nor judiciaries. There are multiple tests given to test the validity of an act so passed.
If the text can be seen as valid, the judges must respect the act and the purpose it stands for.
Conscientiously speaking an act might be against the moral compass of a judge sitting on the
bench but their job is not to read their own versions of the purpose into the act but rather to try
and find the true purpose of the act regardless of how it affects their moral compass, assuming
that it is not ultra vires the constitution.
This paper agrees with the authors’ attack on textualism on several accounts, that the
context of the values of the interpreter must be considered which itself makes it unreliable. In
addition to this, there is the criticism of relying only on the words strictly which is a concern
that in effect nullifies the need to interpret at all.
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Opinion
This paper suggests a form of statutory interpretation that will work in tandem with
technological advancements like artificial intelligence as human beings tire out and can suffer
from mental exhaustion. The model suggested is purpose-based textualism that will find
consistencies throughout the legal history of the statute and only staying connected to the root
purpose for which a statute gets implemented, not to have its purpose stretched beyond the
initial purpose intended.
Taking the text as the final intention of the legislature the model does not concern itself
with what could have been the intentions behind the passing of a legislation but rather would
use its time to deduce evidence and history that will show the purpose of the legislation.
Instances of the use of the legislation without meeting any hinderances. Case laws on how
different issues related to the legislation got resolved. Inconsistencies in the law itself when
enacting legislation that might go against the basic structure doctrine.
The paper recognises the downfall of such a model in cases where new legislation is
having its first issue in court. But this is exactly where the textualist part of the model kicks
into place. With the advancements in technology, it is easy to find out inconsistencies when a
legislature is enacting a new law. A more diligent legislature will result in much better-drafted
laws that will be in congruence with the constitution. Thus, the text will speak the purpose of
the statute and the purpose will be limited by the text. The intentions should not be given heed
as it is the enacted law that governs people and the judiciary must only concern itself with
methods on how to tackle such issues.
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Bibliography
1. William, Eskridge N., and Philip J. Frickey. “Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning.” Yale Law
2. Manning, John F. “The New Purposivism.” The Supreme Court Review, vol. 2011, no. 1, 2012, pp. 113–
3. Dockhorn, Klaus, and Marvin Brown. “Hans-Georg Gadamer's ‘Truth and Method.’” Philosophy &
4. Fuller, L. L. “American Legal Realism.” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 76,
5. Rissland, Edwina L. “Artificial Intelligence and Law: Stepping Stones to a Model of Legal
Reasoning.” The Yale Law Journal, vol. 99, no. 8, 1990, pp. 1957–1981. JSTOR,
www.jstor.org/stable/796679.
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