PADILLA Gifts of Humiliation. Charis and Tragic Experience in Alcestis

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American Journal of Philology, Volume 121, Number 2 (Whole Number

482), Summer 2000, pp. 179-211 (Article)
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DOI: 10.1353/ajp.2000.0026
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AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY
GIFTS OF HUMILIATION:
CHARIS AND TRAGIC EXPERIENCE IN ALCESTIS
MARK PADILLA

Charis is always what bears charis. (Soph. Aj. 522)
Not for many does charis breed charis. (Anaxandrides fr. 69 PCG II)
A gift that does nothing to enhance solidarity is a contradiction.

—Mary Douglas on Marcel Mauss
WHETHER OR NOT in the spring of 438 B.C.E. Euripides anticipated that

his festival audience would find his production of Alcestis to be a
thought–provoking pro–satyr play, its twentieth–century “readerly au-
diences” most certainly have. The play has prompted a steady stream of
critical studies on a broad range of themes and issues. The trends in the
most recent century’s approaches to Alcestis are not necessarily tidy,
but one critic has summarized them as having three movements: inter-
est prior to World War I in the play’s lighter, comic elements; emphasis
on Euripides’ use of folktale elements, beginning in the 1920s; and ex-
ploration of the play’s more sinister elements since World War II.1
My analysis here references this scholarly tradition in the service
of an ethical–sociological reading focused on the issue of “charis,” a
theme interwoven in the play’s complex narrative levels of irony and
fairy tale, tragedy and satyr drama, and dark and light characterization.
I argue that it is possible to view Alcestis’ offer to die for Admetus as a
kind of gift, a gift that in turn effectively devalues the kinds of gifts Ad-
1 Ritoók 1977, 168–69. The edition of Alcestis used here is Diggle’s 1984 OCT.
American Journal of Philology 121 (2000) 179–211 2000 by The Johns Hopkins University Press
180 MARK PADILLA
metus is able to give. In his attempts to restore the efficacy of his own
level of traditional aristocratic gift giving, he is driven to extremes. He
offers not to remarry; misleads Heracles about the death of his wife;
and renounces his father. These acts, however, further lower his stand-
ing. Admetus’ attendance at the funeral and homecoming then lead to
an experience of tragic understanding, an anagn¬risis that offers him
perspective on the relative merits of his honor code and complicates the
reconciliation scene at the play’s end.
CHARIS AND GIFT GIVING
Charis has a root meaning of “something which delights” (cf. khair¬). In

usage, charis more typically conveys two ideas: a “favor” that one does
for another, and a feeling of “gratitude” that one has for receiving a fa-
vor.2 The term thus lends itself to a sociological inquiry involving the
cultural logic of “gift giving.” For example, as part of a study of violent
social relations in the context of honor/shame societies, William Miller
has discussed the problem of “requiting the unwanted gift.” Another
member of the recipient’s society may have chosen to give him such
a gift not in the spirit of generosity but, on the contrary, as a way to
shame him, providing him, as it were, with a “gift of humiliation.”3
The notion of gift giving as a sociological institution was pio-
neered by Marcel Mauss. Working within a framework formulated by
Emile Durkheim, Mauss posited the idea that gift giving is not identi-
fied with “charity,” for it typically implies the expectation by both giver
and recipient of a return gift; more importantly, gifts belong to a larger
dynamic that establishes social rank and assigns identity.4 The sociolo-
2 For the root meaning of charis as “delight” and for its other shades of meaning
see Bromiley 1974, 373–74. See also MacLachlan 1993, 3–12 and passim. For discussions
of the term see Kurke 1991 passim, with references to further semantic discussions (67–
68, n. 20). Mitchell (1997, 18–21) discusses the relationship of “dora, charites, and com-
modities.” Critics who discuss charis in Alcestis include Reckford (1968, 116), Scodel
(1979), Bell (1980), Conacher (1984, 1988, 37ff.), Bergson (1985, 14–16), Stanton (1990),
and MacLachlan (1993, 153–54). Pearson (1962, 148–51) comes closest to my interest in
this topic in his discussion of “excessive” charis in the play.
3 Miller 1993. His chapter “Requiting the Unwanted Gift” was excerpted in
Harper’s magazine (February 1994, 24–27) as “Giving the Gift of Humiliation”—which I

have adapted for my title here.
4 Mauss 1990. In her foreword to that edition (viii–ix), Mary Douglas clarifies this
notion in regard to a famous institution of northwestern Native Americans: “The pot-

GIFTS OF HUMILIATION: CHARIS IN ALCESTIS 181
gist Pierre Bourdieu has argued that in gift–exchange cultures, individ-

uals who offer gifts think simultaneously on two levels of engagement:
they give in a fashion that serves to exploit and dominate the recipient,
yet their words and posture can convey altruism and concern. Bourdieu
has been criticized for universalizing observations made during field-
work among the Kabyle in Africa; but his principle that primitive honor
societies lack institutional means for economic relationships, and that
individuals thus employ elaborate schemes of manipulating codes of
honor to further their needs and ambitions,5 speaks to the heart of the
social logic which Euripides’ Alcestis thematizes and renders theatrical.6
latch is an example of a total system of giving. . . . each gift is part of a system of reci-
procity in which the honor of giver and recipient are engaged. It is a total system in that
every item of status or of spiritual or material possession is implicated for everyone for
the whole community. . . . The whole society can be described by the catalogue of trans-
fers that map all the obligations between its members. The cycling gift system is the so-
ciety.” So Morris 1986a, 2: “The aim of the gift economy is accumulation for de–accumu-
lation; the gift economy is above all a debt–economy, where the actors strive to maxi-
mize outgoings. . . . The system can be described as one of ‘alternating disequilibrium,’
where the aim is never to have debts ‘paid off,’ but to preserve a situation of personal
indebtedness.”
5 See Bourdieu 1977, 4–7, 192ff. In his introduction to Bourdieu 1991, its editor
paraphrases the theory: “Instead of analyzing the exchange of gifts in terms of a formal
structure of reciprocity, in the manner of Lévi–Strauss, Bourdieu views it as a mechanism
through which power is exercised and simultaneously disguised. In a society like Kabylia,
where there are relatively few institutions in which relations of domination can be given
a stable and objective form, individuals must resort to more personalized means of exer-
cising power over others. One such means is debt: an individual can bring another under
his or her sway by enforcing the obligations deriving from usury. But there are other,
‘softer’ and more subtle means of exercising power, like the giving of gifts. By giving a
gift—especially a generous one that cannot be met by a counter–gift of comparable qual-
ity—the giver creates a lasting obligation and binds the recipient in a relation of personal
indebtedness. Giving is also a way of possessing: it is a way of binding another while
shrouding the bond in a gesture of generosity. This is what Bourdieu describes as ‘sym-
bolic violence,’ in contrast to overt violence of the usurer or the ruthless master; it is
‘gentle, invisible, unrecognized as such, chosen as much as undergone, that of trust, ob-
ligation, personal loyalty, hospitality, gifts, debts, piety, in a word, of all the virtues hon-
oured by the ethic of honour.’ In a society like Kabylia, where domination has to be
sustained primarily through interpersonal relations rather than institutions, symbolic vio-
lence is a necessary and effective means of exercising power. For it enables relations of
domination to be established and maintained through strategies which are softened and
disguised, and which conceal domination beneath the veil of an enchanted relation.”
6 Bourdieu 1991, 23–24. Miller (1993, 19–20) uses Bourdieu’s paradigm. Perhaps
the fullest exploration of the paradoxes of “the gift” is that of Derrida (1992). His com-
plex analysis of the relation of time and giving—embodied in his title, Given Time (Don-
182 MARK PADILLA
This reading of the play thus follows the work of other classical
scholars who have analyzed the dynamics of gift exchange in Greek so-
ciety, particularly in the context of xenia. As M. I. Finley famously ar-
gued in his analysis of the Odyssey, a reading informed by the work of
Karl Polanyi, xenia constitutes a primary social code in which aristo-
cratic heroes and families exchange gifts in ritualized fashions in order
to maintain or establish friendly relations, exhibit wealth, and amend
social crises.7 The question of the importance of gift exchange in an-
cient Greece has recently attracted considerable attention, including
studies by Hans van Wees and David Tandy. Van Wees (1992, 234) has
softened the notion that gift reciprocity was central to Archaic social
dynamics—suggesting, for example, that the “hospitality racket” as de-
picted in the Odyssey provides, rather, an exploitive opportunity for
itinerant visitors to gamble “on the probability that many of [their gen-
erous hosts] will never come to collect the debt owed to them.”8 On the
other hand, Tandy (1997) has renewed the Polanyi–based model in his
book on “warriors into traders,” which traces the radical development
of Greek culture in the eighth century B.C.E. from the “catastrophe”
of the Mycenaean collapse and subsequent Dark Age and also treats
the reflections of these social, political, and economic transformations
within Homeric and Hesiodic poetry.
In support of the “pro–xenia” school of inquiry, Ian Morris
(1986a) has noted that anthropologists have typically associated the so-
cial operations of gift exchange with “clan societies,” and the existence
of private property and “commodities” with “class societies”—thus im-
plying the limitation of gift–exchange models for the Archaic and Clas-
sical periods of ancient Greece.9 However, he argues that inclusion of
ner le temps)—relates interestingly to the exposition Euripides provides on the social dy-
namic of charis, in particular, how the act of gift giving “gives time,” and therefore “is
time,” but also “demands and takes time” (41). As we shall see, when Alcestis gives time
to her husband, she also takes away and repossesses this time (his life) simultaneously.
7 Finley 1979, 64–66, 95–98, 120–23. For the root d¬ see Benveniste 1969, 65–70.
Herman (1997, 10) defines “ritualized friendship . . . as a bond of solidarity manifesting it-
self in an exchange of goods and services between individuals originating from separate
social units.”
8 In another study of “reciprocity in anthropological theory” van Wees (1998) dis-
cusses the manifold levels and dynamics of reciprocity that a society transacts, concluding
that “the history of reciprocity” is still to be satisfactorily written.
9 Morris 1986a, 2–3 and passim. For a seminal work in this area of study see Gernet
1982. See also, more recently, Herman 1987; Seaford 1994; Nightingale 1996, 34–35, 39,
the archaeological record into this debate reveals the need for a more
complex model of cultural evolution, in that these historical periods
demonstrate a “mixture of features of the clan and class economies,” a
point inclusive of gift exchange. Morris further argues for the appli-
cability of a generalized principle of “gift exchange systems” to studies
of Greek society: “gift items generally have ‘exchange–order’ rather
than ‘exchange–value.’ . . . Gift objects divide up into what we can call
‘spheres of exchange,’ with objects classified into a hierarchical se-
quence of ranks, and valued not cardinally but ordinally” (1986a, 8). As
such, gift exchange with members of a social group above or below
one’s status functions to solidify the hierarchy of relations, while ex-
change within a social group offers the opportunity to form bonds of a
common identity. This notion of vertical and horizontal axes of gift ex-
change applies to Euripides’ Alcestis, in that the play’s plot structure
features a series of extraordinary gift offers that disrupt the dramatized
social relations and interactions shared by the protagonists.
Leslie Kurke, Sitta van Reden, and other scholars have followed
Morris’s lead by demonstrating the applicability of economic paradigms
for the interpretation of Greek poetic and prosaic texts. Archaic and
Classical authors may be explored for their respective strategies of rec-
onciling, mediating, or juxtaposing their perceptions of prevailing, and
ideologically competing, exchange–based value systems, systems which,
from our historical distance, would be more likely to be explained in
critical and technical terms. Morris himself offers, in a complementary
essay (1986b), an example of this notion in his examination of the Ho-
meric texts as informed by sixth–century aristocratic sensibilities, sen-
sibilities that tend to privilege, perhaps nostalgically, a gift–exchange
society over and against the increasingly encroaching commodified (or
trade–based) worldview.10 Kurke similarly positions Pindar in this inter-
stice of “embedded” and “disembedded” economies, integrating the
work of Bourdieu and Morris to analyze the semantics of charis in the
poet’s oeuvre.11 She describes a poetics in which “three spheres of gift
exchange cluster together: recompense (apoina) . . . , the bride as gift
46; Mitchell 1997. Space is insufficient here to review the bibliography on gift exchange
and reciprocity in Greek culture.
10 See, however, Sourvinou–Inwood 1995, 413–41.
11 See Kurke 1991, 87–89 (on Morris), 36 (on the issue of “symbolic capital”), 261
(on Pindar as a “master of practical logic”), 103–7 and passim (on charis).
184 MARK PADILLA
(hedna) . . . , and the hospitality of the shared table (xenia)”—a motival

cluster in which Heracles can possess a central role.12
Alcestis features similar cultural notions for its own dramatic pur-
poses in the typically complex fashion whereby Athenian theater both
incorporates and interrogates heroic material toward the aim of estab-
lishing a polis–centered view of aristocratic ideals and ideas. For exam-
ple, while epic and epinician poetics may attempt to cling to the social
values of an embedded economy, one that favors xenia over citizenship,
Athenian drama treats in complex ways such questions as the degree to
which wealth belongs to the individual oikos or collective polis and how
wealth should be manifested so as to be an appropriate expression of
civic allegiance.13 Von Reden’s observations are particularly fruitful in
this context. She argues that analysis of the representation of exchange
transactions must reach beyond the consideration of economic institu-
tions and into considerations of ideology and metaphysics, in that “the
transition from gift exchange to trade and market exchange happened
gradually alongside the ideological redefinition of social boundaries.”
More specifically, the texts of Greek authors demonstrate the need for
sensitivity to a variety of “transactional orders” whose organizations
may have had value and significance beyond a core economic expres-
sion:
Production, consumption and distribution, which in Western eyes are dif-

ferent aspects of the economic process, can all be envisaged as social or
ritual exchanges. While one is an exchange with the gods, another is an
exchange among people and yet another represents relationships be-
tween families, generations or communities. The production of crops, the
12 Kurke 1991, 114. She postulates that “the foundation and functioning of the
games can be assimilated to any one of the three spheres of gift exchange. That is, apoina,
marriage, and xenia are equivalent insofar as they are all gift–exchange models available
to Pindar to conceptualize the victor’s relationship to the games and the poet’s rela-
tionship to the victor” (134). Seaford (1994, 13–25) discusses the importance of xeneia,
hedna, and apoina in Homer.
13 See von Reden 1995, 6, 83–84, 130, and passim. Kurke (1991, 89–91) also dis-
cusses the coexistence in classical Athens of public (polis–based) and private (aristo-
cratic) systems of gift exchange. Herman (1997, 6) argues for the notion that “the city
framework superimposed itself upon this existing framework [of xenia]—superimposed
itself upon it, yet did not dissolve it. And when the city finally became established as the
dominant form of organization, dense webs of guest–friendship still stretched beyond its
bounds.” He also discusses the role of gift giving in this context (75–81). See similarly
Mitchell 1997.
inheritance of a household, marriage and procreation, social or political

service, the protection of foreign guest–friends, but also theft, murder,
adultery and trade are forms of transaction which call for a return. The
idea that most human activities are viewed as part of a series of ex-
changes over long periods of time, comprising everyday local exchange as
well as communal, inter–communal, and metaphysical relationships or
rituals, leads to the differentiation of spheres of exchange, or transac-
tional orders. Every relationship requires a different mode of exchange,
and different rules are applied. (von Reden 1995, 2–3)
In this context, von Reden herself takes up an examination of Euripi-

des’ Cyclops, a satyr play akin to the prosatyric Alcestis.14
An examination of the exchange transactions in Alcestis prompts
us to consider the “mode” and “rules” formed within the play’s struc-
ture of ideas and featured relationships. Far from constituting a the-
atrical spectacle limited to a schematic “clash of values,”15 Euripides in-
corporates the traditional exchange motifs of mortal–divine relations,
philia, charis, marriage, and xenia in a fashion that defines, to adopt
von Reden’s phrase, a “transactional order.” Charis becomes the broad
context, or master trope, for the ethical education of Admetus, a pro-
cess in which the dynamics of gift exchange become highlighted for their
contrast with tragic humanism, a process in which Admetus, on the one
hand, learns that the value of human relationships can extend beyond
transactional opportunities, and, on the other hand, discovers the con-
trol which this cultural logic possesses in determining his own choices.
The dynamics of charis in Alcestis thus become “corrupt” because acts
of giving fail to contribute to social cohesion.16 Despite the inherent
self–centeredness of individuals who give to others (a social drama un-
masked by Bourdieu), an ordered system of gift exchange should re-
inforce communal solidarity: “reciprocal giving” may rarely be what
this term ideally implies, in that its social drama assigns winners and
losers based upon the participants’ respective and often unequal holds
on transferable goods, but its rules and terms are known and shared by
all; thus they can provide an adequate framework for reinforcing, if not
14 Von Reden 1995, 135–42. Belfiore (1998, 158) discusses the propensity of Greek
tragedy to focus itself on the violation of philia and “formal reciprocal relationships.”
15 Goldfarb (1992, 121) discusses the play’s presentation of xenia and philia as con-
flicting “obligations” embodied, “for Admetus, in the characters of Alcestis and Hera-
cles”; but he does not develop the social dimensions of that issue.
16 I thus extend the notion of “corrupt sacrifice” discussed in Foley 1985, 40–45.
186 MARK PADILLA
determining, patterns of cultural identity.17 Alcestis is replete with tim∆

cognates,18 and these words along with the motifs of xenia infuse a pub-
lic spirit into the domestic plot; the themes of philia and charis belong
also to the myth of Admetus outside its treatment by Euripides.19
Euripides’ play skews charis relations by incorporating the theme
of death. Scholars have pointed to the central place that death has in
the play, but an aspect that has not been developed is the manner in
which Apollo’s gift to Admetus, to allow another to die in his place, es-
tablishes (in Ian Morris’s terms) a new “sphere of exchange,” a sphere
in which the figures of Apollo, Heracles, and Alcestis possess the ability
to be givers of life (bios), while Admetus is able to participate only as a
receiver of life and, consequently, in an inferior position. Admetus is
able to offer (again in Morris’s terms) only the ordinally inferior gift of
xenia, an aristocratic system of exchange that traditionally constitutes a
“top level” event and in which he has hitherto excelled. Admetus’ edu-
cation takes place in the context of this social devaluation, a process
that accrues a more subjective aspect upon his return from his wife’s fu-
neral. In the last scene of the play, Heracles would appear to mediate
the bios–xenia exchange spheres by returning Alcestis to Admetus, but
the terms of this mediation, in the form of Heracles’ trick upon his host,
in fact ironize the happy ending and serve, once again, to undermine
rather than validate the appropriateness of exchange sensibilities for
measuring human values. While Heracles ultimately adheres to his Pin-
daric roles and stays within the tradition of such gift–exchange values
as apoina, hedna, charis, and xenia, Admetus undergoes a tragic devel-
opment that allows him, at least temporarily, to reflect upon a world of
values not solely infused with heroic and aristocratic sensibilities.
17 So Kurke 1991, 94, 96: “the circulation of gifts can contribute to social differenti-
ation as well as to community. . . . Paradoxically then, it appears that gift giving both cre-
ates community and divides it.”
18 Lines 30, 53, 155, 301, 373, 434, 567, 619, 658, 733, 762, 790, 999, 1092, 1153.
19 The terms philia and charis are found in the skolion attributed to Praxilla (3; see
Cratinus, Cheir. fr. 254 PCG IV)—“Oh companion, having learned the story of Admetus,
love (philei) your friends, but avoid the base, knowing that the charis of the base is
small”—a drinking catch that Euripides may have had in mind when he composed the
play: see Scodel 1979. The alternate and associated myths of Admetus and Alcestis in-
clude Hes. fr. 54 (a–c) MW; Apollod. 1.9.15, 3.10.4; Plut. Amat. 761e; Plato Symp. 179b–c;
and Hyg. Fab. 51. For the connection of charis and Heracles in Euripides’ HF and Herakl.
see Pozzi 1993, 36–37. For a discussion of the similarities between ritualized friendship
and ordinary friendship see Herman 1997, 29–31.
THE CHARIS OF APOLLO
When he opens the play with a prologue, the god Apollo introduces
and interconnects issues of charis, humiliation, and death. Apollo states
that he “endured to accept the servant’s table, though being a god,” as
“payment” to Zeus for his murder of the Cyclopes. Apollo murdered
them to avenge Zeus’ destruction of his son, Asclepius. Asclepius de-
signed drugs that returned a dead man to life, an act of charis to hu-
mankind that prompted Zeus’ displeasure. In anthropological terms,
what Asclepius had effectively accomplished was the widening of a
sphere of exchange to allow an inferior social group (mortals) to attain
a possession (immortality) that had hitherto been restricted to, and
controlled by, a superior social group (gods). The Cyclopes had manu-
factured the means of controlling this hierarchy (forging Zeus’ lightning
bolts), and Apollo’s punishment was consequently to serve on the low-
est rung of the social ladder.
While Apollo endured his servitude, moreover, he became im-
pressed with his master’s holiness (10)—once again, a dispensation
(charis) from above (master to slave) that blurred a social hierarchy—
and secured from the Moirai Admetus’ right to “exchange another
corpse for the (powers) below” (14; cf. 42, 46). This charis on their part,
however, was attained through trickery, for Apollo made them drunk
with wine (28–34). But Admetus gains possession of the divine gift with
considerable difficulty, in that his parents and others refused to sacrifice
themselves on his behalf. His wife alone agreed to die for him, and
Apollo declares that the current day is the one “appointed” (21; cf. 105,
147, 158). This prediction is confirmed by the prompt arrival onstage of
Thanatos, a god in his own right, who can speak of himself as requiring
proper “honors” as befitting his divinity (cf. 30, 38, 53). He is also a god
in the service of unnamed “lower” powers (presumably Hades), for he
states that he has been “commanded” (49) to complete Alcestis’ death.
Thanatos is perplexed about seeing Apollo near the house and worries
that he will act illegally (30, 39, 43).
Apollo, however, as an (ironic?) agent for broadening and soften-
ing social–religious hierarchies, proceeds with the logic of gift ex-
change. He asks of Thanatos that the nether god extend “charis” (60) to
him by delaying Alcestis’ death until she is older. But Thanatos refuses
to provide this favor and demands the fulfillment of his divine honors.
In essence, the “possession of death” belongs to a social sphere (the
house of Hades) of which Apollo is not a member and within which he
188 MARK PADILLA
normally possesses no rights of exchange and dispensation. Neverthe-

less, just as he acted angrily against Zeus (hou d∆ khol¬theis, 5) by kill-
ing the Cyclopes (failed charis followed by an act of bia), Apollo grows
angry at Thanatos’ insistence upon doing his appointed job (62–71) and
taunts his adversary with the prediction of Heracles’ arrival and forced
robbery (bia, 69) of Alcestis. Apollo concludes his prediction with a
statement of open hostility: “And we will not give charis to you (in re-
turn), and even though you will do these things I will still hate you”
(69–70). The implication is that Heracles’ robbery of Thanatos will not
count as a charis (as Thanatos has refused, albeit appropriately, to ac-
knowledge Apollo as a member of his “sphere of exchange”) and thus
does not require the return of charis in compensation. Thus Euripides
constructs this conflict in a fashion that alludes to a set of motifs found
in another cycle of the god’s mythical biography: his servitude to the
Trojan Laomedon.20
Backing away now from this complex opening scene, we find the
audience, gladdened by the sight of a god advocating the interests of
mortals, becoming witnesses to an Apollo acting less justly than a
god of death. Though a champion of mortal life by fathering Asclepius
and helping Admetus, Apollo has acted against Zeus, has tricked the
Fates, and now tries to bribe Thanatos (56) and even relishes a prospec-
tive robbery (64–71). Indeed, interactions with others are not Apollo’s
strong suit, as one might expect from a player lacking appropriate cog-
nizance of bounded social relations. In his relationship with Admetus,
for example, the god seems to have given little thought to how his gift
will prove ultimately beneficial.21 The charis that Apollo gives Admetus
should be a clear benefit, since it is a return for a clear benefit—a no-
tion of which Apollo himself seems to be aware when he relates that he
and Admetus are both hosios. Apollo calls the house of Admetus phil-
tat∆ (23) and refers to Admetus as his philos (42; cf. 246–47). But his
20 Apollo had to suffer a round of servitude with Poseidon when the two gods built
the walls of Troy for Laomedon—a form of payment, moreover, for Zeus’ robbery of
Laomedon’s son, Ganymede. But the walls prove of little use for the Trojan king, for
Heracles (once again) successfully attacks them when Laomedon (Eurytus–like) reneges
on the promise to give the hero his daughter after Heracles has rescued her from the
k∆tos.
21 Nielson (1976, 94–96, 100) and Bergson (1985) have discerned Apollo’s gift as
problematic. For contrasting (morally positive and negative) views of Apollo’s behavior
see Hartigan 1991, 20, 34–35; Nielson 94–95.
gift in fact requires that a third party from their now inclusive social
group suffer death voluntarily, a self–sacrifice that will bring harm and
disgrace to Admetus: for only one of his philoi would consent to such
a request.22 The “grace” of Apollo, therefore, contains an element of
arrogance (cf., similarly, the figure of Aeschylus’ Prometheus). The
reference to the Moirai reminds us of his demonstration of pugnacious-
ness toward the Erinyes in Aeschylus’ Eumenides (723–28)—a scene in
which, once again, the god seeks to appropriate the possession rights
of another bounded social group—and it may thus be significant in
this context that the language of Apollo’s repartee with Thanatos (a
chthonic being) echoes that debate (see Italie 1950).
THE CHARIS OF ALCESTIS
With the departure of Apollo and Thanatos from the stage, the chorus
arrives, knowing that this is the prescribed day of Alcestis’ death. The
chorus admires Alcestis’ virtue and prays to Paian Apollo to save her
(91). For this group of men, death is not an issue of divine favors or pre-
rogatives; it is a crisis within their social circle of philoi, in response to
which they have come to demonstrate support and to grieve (cf. 109–11,
210–12, 369–70, 606).23 When the servant woman appears from the
house (136), she briefs them on the recent events within. The descrip-
tion is a tender one, and they respond to it with another ode, in which
they seek aid from the gods and consider the plight of Admetus, who
will be bereft of his wife. Indeed, prior to the events of the play one
22 The question of who these philoi are in relation to line 16 has been discussed by
Stanton (1990), who argues against the common view that they include, essentially, three
members: Alcestis and Admetus’ mother and father. However, if it is true that his philoi
would include his aristocratic friends at home and abroad, the play’s narrow focus pre-
cludes us from accepting this idea, particularly when—as Luschnig (1992) explores—Ad-
metus is strangely divorced from the world of heroic narrative. For the notion of Apollo
as lacking foresight and bungling the gift to Admetus see Myres 1917, 197–98.
23 Scholars sometimes condemn the chorus for its adherence to traditional mores,
particularly tl∆mosyn∆ (endurance), when Heracles proves that action is effective: see
Rosenmeyer 1963, 219–220, and Bell 1980, 48ff. But Heracles is in a mortal class of his
own and can uniquely confound the principle that death is unavoidable (part of Ananke).
The chorus has come to share the grief of a philos (see Segal 1992) and to celebrate the
kleos of a phil∆ in a fashion that keeps the play tethered to realism (see Parry 1978,
153–58). Lloyd (1985) also emphasizes the fact of death and the real problems characters
(particularly Admetus) have in coping with the crisis.
190 MARK PADILLA
would have to say that the family was a blessed and successful one. Al-
cestis and Admetus are from illustrious stock (920–21), wealthy (687),
are generous in hospitality, and generally command respect and sympa-
thy from the members of their oikos and their community. Though their
current position as powerful and wealthy rulers is in part due to Apol-
lo’s husbandry (569–96), they seem unaffected by this privilege; Alces-
tis treats servants with compassion (193–95) and in turn possesses their
affection (192–93, 767–71). The tone provided by the chorus is one of
inclusiveness, decorum, and respect for the royal family.
The entrances of Alcestis and Admetus, however, deepen and tex-
ture this aristocratic image. Scholars have sought for clues about their
implied feelings for each other prior to the opening of the play, for the
Alcestis and Admetus who emerge from the house do not seem happy
and are barely able to communicate with one another. Alcestis is dying
onstage, carried on a bier. Admetus portrays the crisis as involving
them both (246–47, 258, 264–65, 273–79) and attempts to direct her at-
tention to his own feelings of loss. But she is preoccupied with the nat-
ural elements, beset by visions of the underworld, and mindful of the
children (244–72).24 In operatic style, Alcestis then rises from her bier
to deliver a speech to Admetus. In this remarkable rh∆sis the dying
heroine discusses why she is willing to die for her husband (280–97) and
tells Admetus to “remember now for me a charis for these things”
(299). Her requested charis is that Admetus forswear remarriage, and
she bases her reasons for this request in a worry that the new wife will
maltreat their children, “for a stepmother is hostile to the children from
before, nor is a snake more savage” (309–10).
Unlike Thanatos, who refuses to honor Apollo’s plea, Admetus
eagerly agrees to fulfill his wife’s last request. In a speech whose length
24 As with the figure of Admetus (see below), critics are divided (if less so) as to
whether Alcestis’ virtue is presented ironically. Does she sacrifice herself out of “love,”
perhaps of the kind that looks forward to New Comedy (Dale 1954, xxvi; Sicking 1967),
or does she do so from a sense of duty only? Does her behavior when she first enters the
stage suggest that she has become disappointed in her husband and marriage (Wilamo-
witz 1926, 87)? That she is emotionally cold (Beye 1958)? Or will she again become dis-
enchanted with Admetus after she regains consciousness (von Fritz 1968, 81–82)? Sicking
(1967) defends Alcestis’ actions and argues that she acts from amour. Rosenmeyer (1963,
230) opts for all ways: Euripides “gives us a sort of goddess. . . . Even so, he manages to
make this goddess interesting and believable, because he endows her with the coldness of
contained fury rather than the torpor of insensitivity.” The portrait of Alcestis in Robert
Browning’s “Balaustion’s Adventures” (1871) seems to lurk behind some of this concern.
complements Alcestis’ (328–68), he begins earnestly (“This will be, this

will be, do not fear”) and proceeds with the statements that Alcestis
“alone will be called my wife”; that he has “sufficient children”; that he
will mourn his entire life; that he will hate his mother and father; that
he will put a stop to merriment and music in the house; that he will
have a statue of Alcestis be made part of his bed; that he would go
down to Hades to retrieve her if he had the voice of Orpheus; and that
he will later have his body buried next to hers.
Admetus’ emotional hyperbole speaks to the theme of compen-
sation.25 As we have seen, Apollo’s earlier attempt to delay Alcestis’
death constituted an extraordinary request for charis, one that Alcestis’
own extraordinary request for charis now matches in boldness. A com-
parison of the difference between Thanatos’ refusal and Admetus’ ac-
quiescence suggests that Admetus, unlike Thanatos, is bound to the
rules of charis relations to acknowledge his subordinate role and to as-
sume the position of humbled recipient. For when Alcestis agreed to die
for Admetus—a gift of a new super–level of exchange value—she put
him in a situation in which he would remain unable to return the fa-
vor—a fact that she herself emphasizes (300). The most reciprocal form
of his compensation to her would be, of course, the action of dying on
behalf of her in turn. Admetus does not offer to do this, but his aware-
ness of the need to recompense in such a dramatic fashion makes co-
herent his repeated statements that her death will lead to his own. He
states, for example, that “with you dead I would be nothing, and in you
we live or not” (277–99); he wishes her to “lead me down with you”
(382); and he declares that “I have been destroyed if you will leave me”
(386). In other rhetorical language, he beseeches her not to “betray” (or
possibly “abandon”) him.26 The language is rhetorical because it is he,
25 In addition to its many other controversies the play sometimes touches on the
focal point of a larger debate as to whether modern readers of Greek tragedy can expect
to find (or should look for) “coherence of character” when the dramatis personae be-
come speaking subjects. Is, for example, a rh∆sis a source to search for psychological and
moral embodiment, or, rather, an occasion governed largely by the dictates of rhetoric?
For a discussion of this “relevance or rhetoric” debate see Conacher (1981), who argues
for the position that I shall be taking, namely, that even the most stylized debates do also
serve to further the audience’s understanding of a character’s interiority. For an opposite
view see Dale 1954, xxii–xxix.
26 The controversial word is prodidonai: 202, 250; cf. 290. Rivier (1968) has argued
that the harsher connotations of “betray”—emphasized by readers stressing irony and

Admetus’ failure—may be more neutral, with the sense “abandon.” See Bell 1980, 55
192 MARK PADILLA
of course, who has effectively betrayed Alcestis (while she has refused
to “betray” him, 180), and the notion that he will now perish through
grief on behalf of her would seem to tarnish the value of her sacrifice.
Nevertheless, in the play’s skewed logic, he is trapped into making such
statements. Since Alcestis is providing him with a charis that he can
never properly compensate (no matter how hyperbolic his rhetoric be-
comes)—and since his social status in relation to hers in the context of
the play’s peculiar organization of social relations has accordingly been
adjusted downward—his grieving for her must be done in a state of
open humiliation for the disparity of their gifts to one another. His cha-
ris (rhetorical gratitude) can never match her charis (heroic s¬t∆ria).27
The braver course for Admetus would have been to accept the
fate of his death and not to expect another mortal, such as his wife or
parents, to die in his place. Though the story of a wife who dies for her
husband is a motif of folktale,28 it is put into service as a tragic myth
and thus can be measured in the context of heroic ethics. Admetus’
situation is extraordinary, and scholars are divided over the question
whether he has a moral center or is a self–interested hypocrite.29 Per-
haps Euripides is experimenting with a new kind of dramatic figure, a
figure characterized more by his ignorance than by a desire to manipu-
late others for his own advantage.30 Admetus is indeed inept; he starts
n. 5; Stanton 1990, 52–53. But Rivier’s thesis is not always accepted: see Schein 1988,
197–98 n. 64.
27 See Scully 1986, 142; Conacher 1988 ad 299. The most familiar instance in Greek
literature of individuals’ exchanging noncommensurable gifts is probably the “bronze for

gold” exchange by Glaucus and Diomedes at Il. 6.232–36.
28 See Lesky 1925; Robertson 1991, 36–38. G. Smith (1983) stresses the folktale pat-
tern in her reading and sees a use of it that is “transformational” as opposed to ironic.
29 The ethical type of Admetus has been the subject of considerable debate. Some
scholars have upheld his virtue and emphasize the complexity of his situation (e.g., Bur-
nett 1971; Buxton 1985; Lloyd 1985; Thury 1988); others have found him lacking in moral-
ity, self–centered, and hypocritical (e.g., W. D. Smith 1960; Conacher 1967; Nielson 1976).
Stanton (1990) discusses the problem.
30 Thus Bradley (1980, 117): “Unselfconscious, unrehearsed in his sincerity, and
splendidly unfettered by decorum or traditional heroism, Admetus is withal an original

person, if not precisely a charming one.” Luschnig notes (1992, 26): “Admetus does not fit
into any of the other, grander or more pathetic story patterns that he tries on or that are
ill–tailored for him by others.” Another option is that he is a parodic figure (a figure of
comedy in a tragedy), but this is really to drive home the same point, switching from a
concern for character to a concern for genre. For the notion that a character of Greek
tragedy can be estranged from his mythical environment see Zeitlin 1980.
a fight with his father during a funeral, mishandles the arrangements

of Heracles’ visit, and traps himself into receiving a woman into his
house though it is not proper to do so. His father calls him “less than a
woman” (697) for his cowardice, and upon his return from the funeral
he imagines the disgraceful charges he will receive from his enemies
(954–61). On the other hand, when Alcestis dies for him onstage, she
attains a preeminent reputation in the eyes of all and embodies the aris-
tocratic ideal of the matron. The language is emphatic in this regard.
Alcestis has become arist∆ (83, 152, 235, 241, 324, 442, 742, 899), gen-
naiotat∆ (993), eukle∆s (623, 938; cf. ironically 1033), worthy of tim∆
(433–34), not dear but dearest (230), and the whole city of Pherae (156)
knows that she could not be surpassed as a wife (153). The fact that she
dies while in a state of youth (289, 471–72) and beauty (174) makes her
sacrifice comparable to heroic, male kleos, and she will be sung about
by poets in the powerful city–states of Athens and Sparta (445–54).31
She is raised, too, in religious status, for the chorus wants her tomb to
be a cult shrine (995–1005) that will accrue “honor similar to gods.”32
Admetus’ tim∆ is slipping as fast as Alcestis’ reputation is rising.
Alcestis’ request that Admetus never remarry suggests that she
too has a “human” side. Her source of respect rests on her self–sacri-
fice, but she now broadens the terms of the dialogue to feature marital
and sexual relations, a context in which Admetus has more to offer her
than words. Alcestis’ motivations in shifting the focus to marital rela-
tions are interesting to consider. She grounds her wish in a concern that
their children not suffer under the control of an evil stepmother, but it
is possible to connect this prohibition with an anecdote provided just
earlier by a servant: Alcestis was calm and composed in her prepara-
tions for death (157–74), but when she saw her marriage bed and the
site of her first sexual experience, she imagined its occupation by an-
31 Garner (1988) argues that Alcestis is modeled on Homer’s figures of Patroclus
and Hector. But since she is a woman, possession of this kleos is problematic and apt to
be subverted: see O’Higgins 1993. The audience may also be struck by what Bassi (1989,
26–27) has called “Euripides’ deliberate blurring of traditional male and female roles,” a
linguistic phenomenon rooted in the allocation of male heroic terms to a woman, and by
which “Euripides calls attention to the illusionary apparatus of his craft.”
32 Contemporary readers may wonder at the unabashed manner in which the play’s
manipulation of her identity reveals the machinations of patriarchy, particularly in the

male need to repress feelings of inadequacy toward and fear of “death and female sexu-
ality”; see Rabinowitz 1993, 72.
194 MARK PADILLA
other woman and, breaking down, fell tearfully onto the covers (183–
84). It is not farfetched, therefore, to suggest that Alcestis is partly mo-
tivated by jealousy, a trait which could in fact undermine rather than
bolster the welfare of her children after her death: the royal house will
now lack a woman to oversee its operations, a problem which Admetus
recognizes when he returns from the burial (935–61).33 Thus, though
Alcestis has inherited the mantle of heroic esteem associated in the epic
tradition with male achievement at the expense of life, she adapts this
position to influence another context of exchange, namely, that of sex-
ual fidelity. (See Kurke 1991, 108–34, for a discussion of the reciprocity
aspect of marriage in Greek aristocratic culture.) Alcestis’ charis be-
comes a form of control over Admetus’ future engagement with his cul-
ture’s rules of reciprocity governing marriage (hedna).
The point, therefore, is that Alcestis’ charis to her husband, like
the complex operations discussed by Bourdieu, functions on several
levels of signification: duty and regard on the one hand, and manipula-
tion and control on the other. Admetus is quick to render his response
to this request in his typical hyperbolic fashion. He offers to build a
statue of her, one which “will extend out from the marriage bed” (349),
a prospect that will provide him only with “cold joy” (353). Alcestis
later reminds the children that their father has agreed not to remarry,
“nor to dishonor me” (371–73).34 By providing this charis, therefore,
Admetus may spend his nights celibately comforted only with a statue.
The audience might have associated this imagined creation with the
statues once erected in Athenian cemeteries and thus anticipated a
tomblike aura in Admetus’ sleeping chambers. Aphrodite, as Heracles
tells it, is a force that makes life’s toils more bearable (790–91), and the
33 On this point see Rabinowitz (1993, 79), who notes that “Alcestis’ request is ex-
cessive . . . and threatens to sabotage the very oikos she dies to protect.” Beye (1958,
123–27) recognizes Alcestis’ jealousy but wrongly includes it as part of an overall con-
demnation of her: Euripides has made her character more complex than this. Burnett
(1971, 35) notes that Alcestis’ “cool precision” is mixed with “passionate idealism” but
suggests, against the proposed reading, that she “assumes that another will sleep in her
bed (181–82), but these things do not interest her.”
34 Admetus is even hesitant to accept the woman whom Heracles brings onstage; it
may give the unwanted appearance that he has taken a lover, and his language suggests
that he has already contemplated the act of sharing his bed with her (1058–60). He wor-
ries that other men in his charge will violate her (1050–53), which, according to Pandini
(1974–75, 50), “stressed his lascivious train of thought.” Halleran (1988, 126) also empha-
sizes this point.
absence of sexuality and marriage will only reinforce his public isola-
tion. To put this idea in terms of charis relations: since Admetus cannot
adequately return his wife’s favor to him, he must sacrifice an important
aspect of his human experience and present in its place perpetual out-
ward displays of gratitude to his dead wife. Bowing before his self–
sacrificing wife—whose charis is steeped in male, heroic symbolism—
Admetus is first humbled and then emasculated.
THE CHARIS OF ADMETUS
The entry of Heracles brings fresh energy to the play, particularly in the
details of his current ponos. Shockingly, however, Admetus hides from
his friend the fact of his wife’s death, stating later that he did not want
to compound his problems with an act of poor hospitality (553–60). Ad-
metus employs a rhetorically clever way to conceal the death from him
by claiming that it is the death only of an “outsider” (othneios, 532–33).
Since the husband owned the oikos, his statement is technically true. At
the same time, the sentiment compromises his sworn devotion to her.
Earlier in the play, he claims to “worship (her) philia” (279), but now
he trivializes her death by diminishing the scope of the oikos’ acts of
grieving. The extension of xenia is indeed very odd. In the mythic tradi-
tion, Heracles can be a complex guest and needs to be treated gingerly.
But here he is aware of social etiquette and is sensitive to Admetus’
situation. The chorus itself enters the sphere of the oikos by carefully
indicating that their presence could be intrusive (138–39). Heracles too
states in a matter–of–fact way that he intends to go on to another
friend’s house for accommodations (536–38) and expresses the obvious
truth that a guest is burdensome to those who are experiencing grief
(540–42), thus conforming to what Stanton (1990, 48) describes as the
“consciousness of rules which should apply in xenia relationships.”
One might suggest that Admetus, having received an extraordi-
nary gift of charis from Alcestis, has come to feel responsible for her
death and that his insistence upon helping an acquaintance at this point
constitutes an attempt to avoid public shame. But given that his offer of
xenia is also a third extraordinary offer of charis—the act of entertain-
ing Heracles during a family crisis is not required by the code of hospi-
tality exchange, even if Admetus argues that it is—it is appropriate to
place this motivation in the terms in which we have understood the
other two. Heracles is later embarrassed by his host’s charis, and he
196 MARK PADILLA
knows that it is of a type differing in kind from the xenia he shows to

Admetus in his own oikos in Argos (cf. 559–60).
This notion is epitomized in a sentence in which Heracles uses the
term charis to beg Admetus to allow his departure to another Pherian
oikos: “Release me, and I will have countless charis for you” (544). As a
point of fact, it is Admetus who owes “countless charis” to Alcestis, and
this demonstrated charis to Heracles publicly downplays the meaning
of his wife’s death. But Admetus, recognizing the drama of social rela-
tions in which his status is being downgraded, falls back upon his ap-
parently well–known virtue of offering exemplary xenia—a form of gift
exchange typically regarded as belonging among the prerogatives of in-
dividuals in the highest “sphere of exchange.” The strategy backfires,
however, for it causes the esteem he controls to fall further, and his hos-
pitality serves to undermine, rather than strengthen, his aristocratic–
heroic relationship with the illustrious son of Zeus. (Unlike Admetus,
moreover, Heracles will display the superhuman effort required to re-
deem himself.) Though Admetus prides himself on his skill at being a
host, the charis of his xenia has proven ineffective as a device to bolster
his social and perhaps also personal sense of worth. Though his desire is
to maintain his reputation as philoxenos, his action makes him what he
wishes not to be: ekhthroxenos (558).35 In a metaphor which captures
this irony, the chorus wonders at how Admetus’ nobility “veers off to-
ward aid¬s” (601); this idea is, on the surface, a compliment to a friend,
but the audience can also register the negative connotation of the verb
used here: ekpheretai, with its sense of “veer off,” as when one loses
control on a racetrack. Admetus’ father, Pheres, speaks more openly
than the chorus does; he tells his son, “Indeed, you fight shamelessly
(anaid¬s) not to die” (694). Heracles too connects issues of Admetus’
capacity for nobility (gennaios), respect (aidestheis), and guest–friend-
ship (philoxenos) when he (ironically) resolves not to be viewed as
base (kakon) due to the consequences of his host’s secretive actions
(853–60).
35 Mitchell (1997, 15) notes that the “friends–enemies polarization was one way of
organizing the world into two camps, and this division had a real consequence as a deter-
minant of social behaviour: those inside the friendship network received good for good,
or what we might term a positive reciprocity, while those outside received bad for bad, or
a negative reciprocity.” Thus Admetus experiences a crisis of this value system.
THE CHARIS OF PHERES
When Pheres enters the play in the scene following a choral ode, the
net of corrupt charis relations widens. Pheres bears funeral gifts (kos-
mos), but Admetus refuses to accept the offering and chastises his fa-
ther for “betraying him” (659). Admetus holds his father responsible
for his wife’s death because he refused to give up the last years of his
life and die on behalf of his only son. Predictably by now, Admetus
turns this refusal into an issue of charis. He states that his father ought
to offer such charis because he himself has been aidophr¬n toward his
father—for example, by “not dishonoring (his) old age” (558–59) and
by allowing Pheres to leave his property and power to him, his son, af-
ter death. Consequently, Admetus abruptly disowns his father (641) and
refuses to bury him (662–64), much to the discomfiture of the chorus
(673–74).36 Admetus’ anger over the issue of another’s withholding cha-
ris thus echoes the play’s first scene, when Apollo grew angry with
Thanatos and incited his anger in return.
Once again, issues of humiliation and death are interwoven in
the theme of charis. Admetus tries to embarrass his father for wanting
to live beyond the time that is appropriate for him (cf. 669–72), and
Pheres responds by exposing his son’s hypocrisy (675–740). Also,
Pheres’ funeral gifts have become worthless. In the cultural game of gift
exchange, which Admetus is losing as he seeks to redress the unmatch-
able debt to his honored wife, even the need to complete a burial has
become subordinate to his need to offer reciprocal charis and win back
tim∆. This idea is dramatized in that though Alcestis has died and her
body requires burial, her ideas concerning the blame for her death con-
tinue to dominate Admetus’ social relations with others. She is the first
character in the play to accuse Admetus’ parents of culpability (290–
97), and when Admetus attacks Pheres he ventriloquizes her words (see
Jones 1948, 53). In effect, Admetus eagerly wishes to display honor to
her by maintaining allegiance to her viewpoints—a requirement to
maintain self–respect in the eyes of his community at large—but his
means of accomplishing this task strangely yet also logically lead him
36 For an opposing and positive view of Admetus’ aid¬s see Burnett 1971, 39–46.
Somewhat similarly, Hartigan suggests (1991, 35): “Here . . . Apollo’s reward to Admetos
for his unfailing observance of xenia is only by the noble action of Herakles brought to a
happy resolution.”
198 MARK PADILLA
to try and strip from his biological parents the honor normally due to
them and to redirect it toward his wife (667–68). He loses cultural tim∆
by disowning his parents, but he seems to consider that this action will
increase the regard others will have for him in respect to his debt to Al-
cestis; he thus “withdraws” his store of tim∆ stored up in his parental re-
lationships and shifts its balance of honor to his heavily debited account
with Alcestis.
THE CHARIS OF HERACLES
When Heracles discovers the truth of Alcestis’ death from the unhappy
servant, he is immediately humiliated by the event. He came to Adme-
tus’ house seeking “standard” xenia, of a type which he could easily find
elsewhere in Pherae (538) and which he is able to reciprocate at his
home in Argos (559–60). He realizes, however, that he has been offered
xenia in the form of extraordinary charis and is thus thrown into the po-
sition of needing to return charis to a compensatory degree.37 Heracles’
plight is an important one in the play. His concern for his reputation be-
gins earlier, when he declares to the chorus that he does not care about
the danger involved in his ponos to tame the mares of Diomedes, be-
cause “there is no one who will see the son of Alcmene” tremble in
battle (505–6). But now the servant who waits on him describes him as
“more base” than any other xenos he has received, and he uses the lan-
guage of Heracles’ “blame tradition” to describe his appearance as be-
fitting “a ruffian thief and robber” (766).38 Heracles experiences acute
embarrassment when he learns the truth (826–34), and he returns to
the language of honor that he used in the context of his Diomedes po-
nos (837–60). His characterization suggests an adherence to traditional
aristocratic sensibilities in which his heroic actions are matched by a
37 Bergson (1985, 13) emphasizes in this context charis over shame (followed by
Stanton 1990, 47). But the two ideas are not easily separable. Indeed, one could say that
Alcestis wrestles with the distinctions between the two. Heracles is no stranger to the dy-
namics of favor exchange; at HF 1352 he speaks of the “countless charis” he will receive
from Theseus.
38 Megakleides (FGrH IV 443) states that recent poets, following Stesichorus,
“dressed” Heracles “in the guise of a l∆ist∆s (highway robber),” one of the words which
the servant uses to describe him at 766.
strict exchange–based value system—an image perhaps functioning as

a throwback to Pindar’s presentations of the hero.39
When Heracles continues, he places his dilemma in the context
of charis relations involving issues of shame and death: “It is necessary
for me to save (s¬sai) . . . Alcestis and to provide Admetus with charis”
(840–42). Somewhat paradoxically, in that he praises the host who has
humiliated him, he intends to protect his social rank by battling
Thanatos or traveling to Hades: “I have trust that I will lead Alcestis
up, so as to place her in the hands of my xenos, who received me into
his house nor drove me away, even though struck by a heavy disaster;
being noble (gennaios), he hid the disaster, respecting (aidestheis) me.
Who in Thessaly is more philoxenos, or in Greece? Thus he will not say
that, being noble (gennaios), he helped a base (kakon) man” (853–60).
When Heracles returns with the veiled Alcestis, he claims his
renewed right to be viewed as “noble guest–friend” (gennaion xenon,
1120).40 But he never catches on to the irony of wanting to repair his
reputation to a blundering host, a weakness which allows him to con-
tinue to serve as a foil to Admetus—who now returns to the stage with
a heightened sense of moral awareness, a development that recenters
the play.
ADMETUS’ TRAGIC EDUCATION:

ANANKE VERSUS CHARIS
When he returns from the funeral, Admetus experiences grief and em-
barrassment and again resorts to hyperbole to express the extent of his
unhappiness. Yet a change has come over the protagonist, and his senti-
ments now have a more genuine tone.41 When he wishes for death (864)
39 See Kurke (1991, 51) on the role of Heracles in Nemean 4. The linkage of the
saga of Peleus (a figure used to characterize the victories of Timasarchus at the Theban
games) to references to the “blessed court of Heracles” and the Pillars at Gadez adheres
paradigmatically to the spatial “frame” of the victor’s journey to and from the athletic
context: oikos to contest, and contest back to oikos.
40 Accepting line 1120 as genuine, against Diggle: see Halleran 1988.
41 Many critics have appreciated this point (though some maintain disbelief in Ad-
metus’ sincerity even here)—in what has become the arti manthan¬ issue. See Luschnig
(1992, 25): “Only after the funeral does Admetus finally come to see himself playing his
own part in his story.”
200 MARK PADILLA
and “envies the dead” (866), he appears to break free from an obsessive
concern with charis relations, and he responds to Alcestis’ death with
greater emotional depth and human understanding. He looks bitterly
on marriage and the raising of children and then engages in a sorrowful
kommos with the chorus. In a speech thereafter he lays bare his grief
and shame. He comments upon the irony of how Alcestis is luckier than
he, for she will always be eukle∆s and be free from troubles (935–38).
By contrast, he himself will be driven to grief when he is inside his
home, with its empty bed, dirty floor, and weeping children (944–50).
And when he goes outside, he will be subject to ridicule and attack by
his enemies (954–61). That these criticisms he imagines echo those of
his father indicates that he realizes the folly of his actions: he under-
stands now to what degree his identity depended upon his role as a hus-
band—a sentiment that influenced Alcestis’ decision, more percep-
tively, to die for her husband (287–88). Thus Admetus is humbled in
high tragic style by the error of his reasoning: his math∆mata are his
path∆mata. This theme is introduced early in the play: the servant
woman tells the chorus that “master did not know (what kind of wife
he had) until he suffered (path∆i)” (145). It continues with the way in
which Admetus now contrasts himself with his eukle∆s wife: “I, on the
other hand, who should not be alive, having passed my fate, will lead a
painful life; I have just learned this (arti manthan¬)” (939–40).42 Earlier
he has used clever language to hide the fact of Alcestis’ death, telling
Heracles that she “lives and does not live” (521; cf. 141). Now it is Ad-
metus who suffers such a fate; he inhabits a tomblike house and, ful-
filling the earlier words of the chorus (242–43), “deprived of his arist∆
wife, will live his life in a lifeless span of time.”43 He experiences death–
in–life, while Alcestis possesses a death infused with timeless honor.
The chorus follows this scene with an ode to help their king gain
perspective and to philosophize on the overarching power of Ananke
(Compulsion), a goddess on the cosmic level of Zeus (962–72), whose
traits include being harder even than the “iron of the Chalybes” (980–
81)—a sentiment that suggests that she lacks any capacity for charis.
42 Bell 1980, 59: “The death of Alkestis . . . shows to Admetus the conditions of life
itself. These are conceived as a nexus of natural (parental–filial) and contractual (marital
and hospitable) relationships, and as the structures they entail in individual moral life.”
43 For the difference between Alcestis’ last moments in the house and Admetus’
experience here, see Burnett 1971, 37–38. Gregory (1979) explores the idea of Admetus’
death–in–life.
This ode is important here, for it establishes the context for the extraor-
dinary talent of Heracles in rescuing Alcestis. Heracles will prove able
to overcome the principle of death’s “compulsion” because he is able to
overpower Thanatos, as Apollo predicts in the play’s first scene. As the
son of Zeus and the agent of Apollo, moreover, Heracles seems able to
resolve the conflict between the two Olympian gods that was caused by
the medicinal deeds of Asclepius, Apollo’s son, who was blasted by a
thunderbolt for bringing a man back to life. But Heracles is presumably
not similarly punished for rescuing Alcestis. Thus he simultaneously
mediates divine and mortal crises—a general role which may hark back
to earlier tragic, rather than satyric, roles featured at the Greater Dio-
nysia.44 Heracles’ triumph here also resonates with Kurke’s discussion
(1991, 104) of the meaning of “victory” in the tradition of epinician po-
etry, namely, as an expression of divine charis that binds (aristocratic)
community by locating the meaning of the triumph in a cosmological
frame of reference. Apollo and Heracles are also connected in Alcestis
through their respective uses of the bow, and the weapon would likely
have been part of both figures’ costumes.45
And yet Heracles returns to Pherae not as some new god46 but as
a philos of Admetus in a xenia relationship and a figure who, in this so-
cial context, drives the plot forward to its next and final presentation of
charis relations. Heracles enters the stage with a veiled and silent Al-
cestis and misinforms his host about her identity by telling him that she
44 Vollkommer 1988, 63. The surviving evidence does not reveal whether Alcestis
introduces Heracles to the story of Alcestis’ self–sacrifice. But if he featured in earlier ac-
counts, such as Phrynichus’ Alcestis, perhaps Euripides first employs Heracles in a way
that extends his narrative function beyond the mere folkloric persona of a s¬t∆r. See,
similarly, Conacher 1988, 33–35; Ebeling 1898; G. Smith 1983, 141–43.
45 See, further, Padilla 1998b, 21, 30–31. Thury (1988, 210–11) also comments on the
relationship of Apollo and Heracles in the play, but in the context of distinguishing their
dramatic presentation from the psychological assessment of their mythology proposed by
Philip Slater. Castellani (1979, 488) discusses how the servant in the play would have
been dressed in black (for mourning), thus matching Thanatos, while Heracles would
have entered the stage crowned with myrtle, just as Apollo would have been crowned
with laurel. For the problems why and how Heracles does not become polluted in the
house, whereas Apollo would, see Buxton 1985, 85. Padilla (1998a) discusses the tradition
of the satyric Heracles.
46 Indeed, objectively speaking, it would be a reasonable assumption to think that
the chorus and all of Pherae would turn their attention to this miracle and celebrate the
defeat of Thanatos: it is really a “bigger story” than the sacrifice of Alcestis for her hus-
band (see Luschnig 1992, 17).
202 MARK PADILLA
is a prize from an athletic contest; he also asks Admetus to look after

this presumed slave. Admetus balks at this proposal, because the action
will violate his promises to Alcestis: she had asked him only not to re-
marry, but he seems to have pledged celibacy in her honor. His keeping
of a female slave in the house could thus be seen as a violation of that
promise and of his wish to be viewed publicly as fully honoring his dead
wife (1057–61). But Heracles insists, and Admetus capitulates. It is only
at this point that Heracles reveals Alcestis’ identity and the play comes
to an unexpectedly “happy” ending.47
THE CHARIS OF HERACLES, REVISITED
The question why Heracles decides to play such a trick on Admetus

leads to several answers. On the surface, the dolos is retaliatory, be-
cause Admetus had earlier embarrassed him: “I crowned my head and
poured libations to the gods in your house, which is experiencing bad
fortune. I reproach you, reproach you, for (my) having suffered this”
(1015–17). Another answer, however, brings us to the theme of charis.
On the one hand, Heracles’ rescue constitutes of course another act of
extraordinary charis: he risks death to provide a gift to his host in re-
turn for his host’s xenia, actions that suggest a “top level” sphere of ex-
change. On the other hand, the transfer of Alcestis takes the form of a
dolos whose outcome further tarnishes Admetus’ already beleaguered
reputation. The nature of this dolos is a controversial topic among read-
ers of the play, and there are many possible viewpoints of its signifi-
cance.48
47 Would the audience have expected Apollo’s prophecy to be fulfilled? Not neces-
sarily: see Hamilton 1978.

48 The dolos forges a bond of philia out of xenia for the two protagonists (Stanton
1990, 46); it is a principle of performative therapy in which Admetus and Alcestis are
both resurrected from death (one metaphorically from grief, the other literally) and are
reunited in life (Segal 1992; cf. Bell 1980, 72, on “philia in action”); it is an anticipation of
a “second marriage” (Luschnig 1992, 26; Buxton 1985; Foley 1985, 87–88; Halleran 1988;
Rabinowitz 1993, 95–97); it provides a lesson on the proper value of life and death (Brad-
ley 1980); and the dolos is a “smutty trick” at the expense of Alcestis by which two men
reconcile (Rabinowitz 1993). Heracles possessed his own conflicts regarding these two
statuses upon his marriage to Hebe and entry to Olympus—judging by the probable ref-
erence to him as xenos in Archippus’ Herakles Gam¬n, fr. 8 PCG II.
Close to my own approach to the scene, but with less attention to

the possibility of irony, is Richard Garner’s argument that the play
makes reference to the heroic tradition of the Iliad. He detects Ho-
meric and Pindaric language in Euripides’ diction; Heracles’ lesson to
the servant is also epinician, in his view, and its import conditions Hera-
cles’ trick on Admetus.49 My own perspective on the scene also points
up heroic aspects but considers the diverging stances of the two male
philoi, one figure who is deeply marked by the emotional experience of
returning home from a funeral to a wifeless domos, the other figure
fresh from mortal combat. The scene features a tension between the
two stances: Heracles employs the strategies of traditional gift exchange
in a fashion that (strangely) collapses reciprocal and hierarchical inten-
tions, while Admetus engages in a more humanistic view of “posses-
sions” as objects whose values are not fully contained by the dynam-
ics of gift exchange. The play thus moves toward an ironic portrayal
of aristocratic solidarity, with a “degraded” but enlightened Admetus
matched against a socially elevated but morally limited (cf. Apollo)
Heracles.
Heracles’ dolos does possess a hard edge. Though Admetus
wrongly conceals his wife’s death, Heracles’ retaliatory trick would ap-
pear to gain recompense (apoina, another high–level exchange event)
from Admetus in a cruel way, and one seemingly directed toward his
social vulnerabilities. Indeed, Heracles presses the ruse well after Ad-
metus insists that he does not wish to accept the woman. He tells his
friend: “Alas! Take this woman from my sight, by the gods, lest you de-
stroy me, someone already half–destroyed. Looking, I think I see my
wife. It agitates my heart, and springs of water are pouring from my
eyes. I am wretched, as I taste this fresh pain” (1064–69). Heracles uses
the language of charis to counter Admetus’ objection to taking in the
49 Garner 1988, 70: “The lessons may mean little to the distraught servant, but they
prepare us for Heracles’ meeting with Admetus in the final scene. The epinician tone
continues past Heracles’ ‘victory speech’ into his conversation with Admetus. Admetus
fears blame (1157), but Heracles has nothing but praise for him (1093, 1095); for χρις,
which has been mentioned so frequently in the play (60, 70, 299, 544, 660, and 842), is fi-
nally descending on Admetus (1074, 1101). He will share in the victory with the victorious
Heracles (1103) as a good Olympic victor should, and he will in turn praise Heracles
(1109). The play ends with new orders replacing the former ones: mourning has been
turned into feasting and dance (1155–56), a conversion of what might have been bad to
what is certainly good, which is the ancient function of much Greek poetry.”
204 MARK PADILLA
girl: “If I had such power so as to lead your wife from the house of
Hades to the light, I would provide this charis for you (1073–74). . . .
Obey. For perhaps charis will fall opportunely (1101).” He thus disre-
gards the show of public concern Admetus must exhibit and feel for his
wife and features the girl’s value as belonging to an exchange system, a
rhetorical strategy that adheres to the same cultural logic that Admetus
once used when seeking a substitute victim for his continued life. Ad-
metus would easily have given in to his request—that is, at a time prior
to the funeral—and his initially strong reluctance before Heracles at
this point measures the extent of his growth in understanding a moral
dimension of philia, namely, that it involves self and other, not other in
exchange for self. Philia is essential for his identity, social standing, and
well–being.50 The notion that Admetus must learn a lesson on the na-
ture of friendship may seem ironic, for the play makes clear that he is
philoxenos, a trait which the chorus finds important enough to celebrate
in an ode (569–605). However, while xenia may be phil∆ to him, what is
“dear” to him has become “strange.” In other words, Admetus may be
philoxenos, but he is also a stranger to philia. The chorus, in the ode
just cited, describes him as visited by many guests (polyxeinos, 569).
But this term residually shares its connotation in Hesiod’s Works and
Days as “overly lavish,”51 with the import that Admetus is “too much
defined by xenia.”
Early in the play, Admetus has told Alcestis that “I have sebas
(sebomestha) for your philia” (279). Sebazomai had the early meaning
“to be afraid of” and then, by extension, became a verb expressing an
experience of awe, wonder, and reverence (cf. LSJ s.v.; Dale 1954 ad
279). This word thus suggests that Admetus is estranged from their
philia, notwithstanding the context of her extraordinary offer to die in
his stead. Now, however, Heracles tells Admetus to “eusebei (have good
sebas) toward xenous” (1148), and he considers himself as his philos
(1008–11).52 Once again, Heracles seeks to focus the meaning of the
50 See Schein 1988, 193–98, for an analysis of how Admetus retains an “instrumen-
tal and self–serving” investment in philia in his relationships, something that he partly
but not wholly loses in the course of the play.
51 Hes. Op. 715. The poet warns against becoming polyxeinos or axeinos. Pindar
uses the term to describe Corinthian prostitutes (fr. 122.1 MS), and Aeschylus uses the
term—interestingly in this context—as an epithet of “Zeus of the dead” (Suppl. 157).
52 Schein (1988, 193, 202–3) discusses Heracles’ dictum and argues that “Herakles
magnifies and validates such guest–friendship, according it a virtually divine status and
girl’s transfer in the strict, “high level” aristocratic context of social re-
lations, but Admetus, having been stripped of his full membership in
that class through the earlier actions, as well as his personal experience
since, seems to be somehow aware of a morality based on differing
principles.
As a man of action, Heracles further attempts to condition Adme-
tus’ response by forcing him to complete an act of betrayal. Betrayal, in
Greek terms, is antithetical to philia, for it shatters the sense of social
cohesion and group uniformity. Heracles insists that Admetus ignore
his promises to his wife and take the veiled woman into the house with
his own right hand (1117). Admetus compares this act to Perseus’ be-
heading of Medusa (1118). This comparison heightens the intensity of
the disparity between the two meanings of the act of transfer. In Hera-
cles’ sensibilities (he is Perseus’ great–grandson) it is akin to a heroiza-
tion and maintains cultural notions of male dominance over the femi-
nine. In contrast to this outward ideal, Admetus is more focused on the
emotional aspects, and he identifies rather with the potential terror of
Perseus before the gorgon.53 This notion of disparity is suggestive of a
double–edged rite of passage, in which he is symbolically being initi-
ated into heroic manhood, a thematic structure rendered ironic by the
fact that he is a grown man. Admetus has, indeed, been subject to at-
tacks on his manhood (cf. 696–97), and Heracles’ actions initiate him to
a gendered identity for which loyalty to philoi is paramount—loyalty
that should include appropriate aid¬s for his deceased wife.54
sanction.” The passage forms, with the play’s first scene, “a divine frame that seems to re-
duce the significance of the marriage–tie between Admetus and Alcestis in contrast to
that of his guest–friendships with Apollo and Herakles” (202). For the idea that when
Heracles convinces Admetus to take the hand of the veiled woman—“the man and not
the house must possess her”—Admetus is forced to continue a “process of deinstitution-
alization” of his attitude toward his family (Luschnig 1990, 34–36).
53 Ketterer (1990, 16) suggests that “as in The Winter’s Tale, the resolution is
marked by the appearance of a statue which is not a statue and which apparently has the
power to turn others into stone as well.”
54 The notion that Heracles might oversee this operation of engendering a certain
sense of loyalty—cf. his insistence that Admetus “save” her (s¬ize, 1020, 1120)—is bol-
stered by his roles in male initiation rites. In Athens he was invoked in several such pro-
cedures (in the oinist∆ria at the Apatouria and in the ephebic oath), and the chorus refers
to the Carneia (448–49), a Spartan cult in which Apollo (Heracles’ cultic double in the
play) oversees the maturation rites. Heracles enters the play en route to capturing the
mares of Diomedes, and the pattern of this myth provides a dim but resonant connection
with a possible early ritual of Greek societies in which a boy first proves his manhood by
206 MARK PADILLA
What lesson Admetus has in fact learned by the end of the play—
if, of course, he finds clarity of this kind—is best left for each audience
and reader to determine. Admetus’ immediate response suggests sadly
and happily that Heracles has successfully pulled him into his sway. Ad-
metus wishes to entertain Heracles again (1151) and invites the citizens
to take a holiday (1154–58). Nevertheless, given that the play is pro-
satyric and links tragedy and satyr drama together, it is appropriate to
consider what moral lessons have been featured. In particular, we see a
world whose breakdown of charis relations, beginning with the actions
of the gods, has caused a chain of events in which Admetus has experi-
enced an ironic lesson in life. The lesson is ironic because, while his so-
cial status falls, he seems to break through the motivations of gift ex-
change to understand a more humanistic set of values. This view of his
marriage is not ultimately part of the aristocratic value system, whose
male embodiment is Heracles, the son of Zeus and the ally of Apollo.
While Alcestis learns to manipulate the requirements of the featured
exchange system, Admetus undergoes a tragic awakening, but its prog-
ress is stopped short by Heracles’ education and “test” of his philia. We
may link this notion to the play’s first scene, one in which the conversa-
tion between Apollo and the defiant Thanatos takes on a politicized
character, with the death god assuming a democratic stance against
Apollo’s aristocratic one (55–59). For Admetus has ultimately found
the reality of death—embodied by the character of Thanatos—to be a
value which he once had feared, but which has now provided him, even
in an existential sense, with a moral depth that he has hitherto lacked.
receiving charis from an older male (Walcot 1978). Such an experience would entail edu-
cation about reciprocity (Bremmer 1980, 285). Rabinowitz (1993, 96–97) emphasizes male
“homosocial ties of initiation” that always seem to attend Alcestis in myth, as we also see
in the play’s final scene. O’Higgins (1993, 82 n. 14) explores this idea in the context of
Winkler’s thesis (1990) that tragedy functioned as part of an ephebic institution, including
the Carneia. The festival initiated youths into masculine virtues of soldiery. Though
Heracles was not connected with the event, the Heracleidae were: see Burkert 1985, 235.
On the cult of Apollo Carneios see Hooker 1980, 58–60. Pettersson (1992, 71–72) con-
cludes that “the Karneia was the final stage of a ritual cycle centred on rites of initia-
tion . . . and the initiation ritual had as its goal the preparation of the young men as war-
riors.” Jourdain–Annequin (1986) and Padilla (1998b, 8, 27–29) discuss Heracles’ connec-
tions with rites de passage. Heracles has orchestrated this scene, and it takes on further
initiatory resonance in that Alcestis herself will require a procedural ceremony before
fully reentering the living. (For the motif of rebirth from false death see Betts 1965.) The
aspect of liminality is sustained throughout the play by the manner in which Alcestis’
death is presented (Buxton 1985 and 1987).
Satyr drama was fading as a potent genre when Euripides pro-

duced this play early in his career (438 B.C.E.), and the soon–to–be mas-
ter of ironic tragedy likely experimented with the dramatic form. If
Alcestis is not a great tragedy, Euripides demonstrates through it an im-
pressive grasp of the possibilities of Dionysiac drama, and several of his
more penetrating and sharp–edged plays would soon follow. As such,
the play provides a “cold delight” (353) akin to what Admetus expects
to feel from his bedside statue of Alcestis, as well as a warmer joy
which the “dances” and “sacrifices” that the citizens of Pherae enjoy af-
ter Alcestis’ return to life (1153–55) might bring.55
BUCKNELL UNIVERSITY
e–mail: mpadilla@bucknell.edu
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PADILLA Gifts of Humiliation. Charis and Tragic Experience in Alcestis

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American Journal of Philology, Volume 121, Number 2 (Whole Number

For additional information about this article

A gift that does nothing to enhance solidarity is a contradiction.

WHETHER OR NOT in the spring of 438 B.C.E. Euripides anticipated that

180 MARK PADILLA

CHARIS AND GIFT GIVING

Charis has a root meaning of “something which delights” (cf. khair¬). In

Harper’s magazine (February 1994, 24–27) as “Giving the Gift of Humiliation”—which I

notion in regard to a famous institution of northwestern Native Americans: “The pot-

GIFTS OF HUMILIATION: CHARIS IN ALCESTIS 181

gist Pierre Bourdieu has argued that in gift–exchange cultures, individ-

182 MARK PADILLA

GIFTS OF HUMILIATION: CHARIS IN ALCESTIS 183

184 MARK PADILLA

(hedna) . . . , and the hospitality of the shared table (xenia)”—a motival

Production, consumption and distribution, which in Western eyes are dif-

GIFTS OF HUMILIATION: CHARIS IN ALCESTIS 185

inheritance of a household, marriage and procreation, social or political

In this context, von Reden herself takes up an examination of Euripi-

186 MARK PADILLA

determining, patterns of cultural identity.17 Alcestis is replete with tim∆

GIFTS OF HUMILIATION: CHARIS IN ALCESTIS 187

THE CHARIS OF APOLLO

188 MARK PADILLA

normally possesses no rights of exchange and dispensation. Neverthe-

GIFTS OF HUMILIATION: CHARIS IN ALCESTIS 189

THE CHARIS OF ALCESTIS

190 MARK PADILLA

GIFTS OF HUMILIATION: CHARIS IN ALCESTIS 191

complements Alcestis’ (328–68), he begins earnestly (“This will be, this

that the harsher connotations of “betray”—emphasized by readers stressing irony and

192 MARK PADILLA

literature of individuals’ exchanging noncommensurable gifts is probably the “bronze for

splendidly unfettered by decorum or traditional heroism, Admetus is withal an original

GIFTS OF HUMILIATION: CHARIS IN ALCESTIS 193

a fight with his father during a funeral, mishandles the arrangements

31 Garner (1988) argues that Alcestis is modeled on Homer’s figures of Patroclus

manipulation of her identity reveals the machinations of patriarchy, particularly in the

194 MARK PADILLA

GIFTS OF HUMILIATION: CHARIS IN ALCESTIS 195

THE CHARIS OF ADMETUS

196 MARK PADILLA

knows that it is of a type differing in kind from the xenia he shows to

GIFTS OF HUMILIATION: CHARIS IN ALCESTIS 197

THE CHARIS OF PHERES

198 MARK PADILLA

THE CHARIS OF HERACLES

GIFTS OF HUMILIATION: CHARIS IN ALCESTIS 199

strict exchange–based value system—an image perhaps functioning as

ADMETUS’ TRAGIC EDUCATION:

200 MARK PADILLA

GIFTS OF HUMILIATION: CHARIS IN ALCESTIS 201

202 MARK PADILLA

is a prize from an athletic contest; he also asks Admetus to look after

THE CHARIS OF HERACLES, REVISITED

The question why Heracles decides to play such a trick on Admetus

sarily: see Hamilton 1978.

GIFTS OF HUMILIATION: CHARIS IN ALCESTIS 203

Close to my own approach to the scene, but with less attention to

204 MARK PADILLA

GIFTS OF HUMILIATION: CHARIS IN ALCESTIS 205

206 MARK PADILLA

GIFTS OF HUMILIATION: CHARIS IN ALCESTIS 207

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