DIETER HENRICH

(Heidelberg)

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS,
A C R I T I C A L I N T R O D U C T I O N TO A T H E O R Y

If any basic concept has played the leading role in the history of Western
philosophy, it is that of self-consciousness. Descartes wished to give to meta-
physics an indubitable foundation in the certainty of self of a thinking being.
Leibniz believed self-consciousness to be not only the first, indubitable
certainty of a real existent entity, but also the principle of deduction for the
justification of all fundamental concepts of ontology. And Kant followed
Leibniz, giving his ~principle a turn to the subjective; through an analysis
of the structure of self-consciousness, one can ascertain, what "knowledge"
and "understanding" in general mean. For Fichte, this structure is the unique
problem of philosophy, one which includes all others. And even for Hegel,
who wanted to put an end to this philosophy o,f subjective, certainty, the
crucial experiment for his speculative logic was the demonstration that only
such a logic is. suitable for interpreting the phenomenon of self-consciousness.
Empirically oriented philosophy has no lack of singular principles of deduc-
tion, but even for empiricism self-consciousness is an exceptional case of
unaccustomed difficulty requiring special analysis. David Hume admitted
being incapable in this one instance of finding a solution which satisfied
him,, and his scruples have yet to be overcome. But his original criticism
of those who speak of "self-consciousness" in philosophy with too. much
emphasis and who use dubious arguments drawn from this notion to buttress
their wobbly metaphysics has met with agreement and approval. In addition,
radical solutions have been proposed, which aim at doing away with con-
sciousness as a special problem and with "self-consciousness" as a meaning-
ful concept. William James was the first to make this suggestion1, and his
analysis convinced Russell, although somewhat belatedly.2 Independently o.f
this and starting from totally different presuppositions., co,ntinental philos-
ophy has arrived at similar positions, the most important of which is that o,f
Heidegger. However, this comprehensive critical undertaking, which could
count even Wittgenste.in among its adherents, has not succeeded in depriving
the term "self-consciousness" of its currency. At any rate, in such despised
 DIETER HENRICH

bordering disciplines as psychoanalysis and psychedelic philosophy, the con-

cept off "self-consciousness" remains of dominant importance; and even a
philosopher who is far removed from all such tendencies, Strawson, has
recently daimed that the structure of experience cannot be analyzed without
a concept of the identity of the cognitive subject. 8
The very fact that these radical solutions have seemed necessary and that
the various attempts have led to diametrically opposed positions indicates
that here we have a pressing fundamental problem of particular interest.
And it is with this problem, or at least with one of its most essential aspects,
that this paper deals. For the sake of argument, the investigation will start
from the assumption that consciousness is a state of affairs with which we
are familiar, and that it is a meaningful task to try to give an account of its
structure. Here one can and must ask whether consciousness is intelligible
independently or whether it can be understood only on the basis of a prior
analysis of self-consdousness. In any case, self-consciousness cannot be
understood without an analysis of consciousness. But the attempt to deter-
mine the structure of consciousness will lead to difficulties and will finally
point to a fundamental difficulty for any theory of consciousness and self-
consciousness as well. This is not the difficulty which motivated the radical
attempts to do away with all discourse about "consciousness," but it is a new
argument in their support. Thus it will become necessary to evaluate these
attempts to ban any use of the concept "self-consciousness." As a result of
this examination, a suggestion for a new type of theory of self-consciousness
will be made, a type which avoids the difficulties mentioned. Finally, the
proposed theory will be applied to the problems which have stood in the
forefront in the most significant theories of self-consciousness.
The large compass of the problems involved here makes it impossible to
give more than a sketch of the most salient aspects. Many arguments stand
in need of further daboration and clarification. One might mention still
another peculiarity of the following discussion: the train of thollghts
presented here has, like Janus, the Roman god of doorways and entrances,
two, faces. The basic thoughts belong in the context of continental philoso-
phy; the aim is to help understand the strengths and weaknesses of theories
in this tradition which are oriented towards the problems of self-conscious-
ness. One might call this the inner face. But the treatment of the problem
closely approaches the analytic discussions of self-consciousness. Thus we
have a continental problem discussed from an Anglo-Saxon perspective.

4
 SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

One can only hope that this passage over the oft-noted and oft-lamented
gulf between the two traditions proves to be possible'.

I
We begin by asking whether or not the structure of consciousness can be
analyzed from any of the commonly accepted standpoints of interpretation
(disregarding for our purposes the causal explanation of consciousness).
Now, the states o,f affairs which we designate "consciousness" are poly-
morphous, and the word itself is ambiguous. From the "behavioristic" point
of view, a certain class of modes of reaction o,f a person in the. normal
waking state, a class which doe's not include, e.g., dream-experiences, is
designated "co,nscious." But it is quite meaningful to speak of a dream-
consciousness, which must not necessarily be assumed in a sleep walker who
exhibits at least part of his normal reactions. Such considerations give rise
to a wider meaning of "consciousness" which can be grasped in behavioristic
terminology, if at all, only with the greatest difficulty. In contrast to this,
there is a narrow sense of the word, in accordance with which "conscious-
hess" is used only where attention and discrimination of objects are in
evidence, i.e., where there is a performance which takes place as the result
of a certain learning-process. In all probability it is necessary to distinguish
the broader from the narrower use, but at the same time to accept "conscious-
ness" in the broader sense as the prerequisite o.f "attention." In the following
discussion the wider sense of "consciousness" will be taken as the point of
departure. It is assumed that we are familiar with such a consciousness.
Significant experiences which illustrate our acquaintance with "conscious-
ness" in this wider sense are, e.g., the experience accompanying waking from
sleep or realizing that one is dreaming. Suddenly appeared a complex
network of sense impressions, images, and indistinct bodily feelings, often
laden with symbolic meaning, all arranged so as to create a "mood" or
"atmosphere," a world arising from nothingness, connected with the past
only through memory and re-identification. This creatio quasi ex nihilo is
extremely odd and causes little consternation only because it is very familiar.
The fact that physiologists can determine from the pattern on their encepha-
lographs when these experiences are taking place does not o,f itself tell us
how to interpret the experience we have.
Of course one can imagine a consciousness that existed uninterruptedly
or which was incapable of memory, so that it knew neither awakening to
 DIETER H E N R I C H

the daylight nor coming to realize that one is dreaming. However, our
knowledge of dreaming and sleep is not the only basis for our realization
that consciousness brings us the possibilities of becoming acquainted with
what we encounter and of having knowledge and experience of it. Rather,
we are also. acquainted with consciousness itself. If we were not, we could
not be able to assert with an infallible certainty (which cannot be the result
of learning) that we are having experiences. N o r would we be able to be
sure of what kind of experience it is, even when words foe communicating
it fail us. If we were not acquainted with consciousness, we would never
be able to distinguish dreamless sleep from dreaming or from waking. In
dreamless sleep itself we know nothing of waking, because in sleep no know-
ledge of sleep itself is possible. But in consciousness there is no appearance
of anything without something like an appearance og consciousness itself.
This appearance of consciousness itself must naturally be of a totally different
kind from that of, e.g., conscious images and feelings.
If one asks how such consciousness is. to be understood, it is no longer
"obvious" that it belongs to an ego, and hence is basically self-consciousness.
W e kno% to be sure, that it is a person who, begins to awaken or to dream,
but this does not mean that the consciousness-structure which we attribute
to an animal organism or a person capable of speech and action must
necessarily be related to a self. Indeed, there is nothing in the facts as we
know them to support this claim. At any rate, upon awakening a horizon of
the world spreads itself out. W e then find ourselves w i t h i n this horizon and
realize that we are waking up. And this is consistent with the fact that the
last thing to sink out of consciousness upon falling asleep is not the. feeling
of self, but rather a word of images whose clarity (and in most cases also
color intensity) has increased in proportion as their explicit reference to
the self decreased. Cousciousness does not end with some kind o,f rudimen-
tary experience of self, as one: would expect to be the case if it was essen-
tially dependent upon or related to a self.
Thus it is quite natural to begin by considering those suggested analyses
of consciousness which try to dispense with any conception of self-conscious-
ness..
1. One might attempt to interpret consciousness as a relation of the indi-
vidual dements which are its contents or data to themselves. This suggestion
was first made by Brentano and then was made more precise by Schmalen-
bach. 4 All revised phenomenologic positions, e.g., that of Sartre, seem
 SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

forced to it eventually. But both conceptual and empirical difficulties make

it untenable.
In the first place, it cannot account for an undisputed fact : consdous-
ness is always awareness of a relation between different data. If one element
does not contrast with another, consciousness never actually appears. This
is what constitutes the synthetic structure of consciousness which was. theo-
retically exploited so extensively by Kant. One can hardly maintain that this
state of affairs is the result of the contingent fact that several representations,
each of which is already an object of consciousness in its own right, always
occur simultaneously and come into connection with one. another.
Another objection is more important: if consciousness is a relation of
this type, it is certainly not a symmetric one'. This theory would require that
we ascribe to, each element given as object of consciousness two roles : the
datum of consciousness insofar as it is aware of itself, and this. datum insofar
as it is the object of awareness. Without this assumption we would not be
able to. indicate the two relata which are the minimal conditions for the
existence of the relation "consciousness." Each state' of affairs, inasmuch
as it would be both percipiens and perceptum, would be. in the position of
relating to. itself as a kind of subject. And so this suggestion shows itself
for what it really is : an attempt to import the subject-object model of the
subject o,f all consciousness into each individual datum of consciousness.
But how is one to conceive' of each object of representation as an aggregate
of subjects of consciousness ? Either there is a hierarchy of subjects of
subjects, so that subjects o,f a higher order explain the unity o.f the object
qua object of representation. But this assumption is an absurdity. Or there
is no explanation for the unity of the object of representation except inter-
action among partial subjects. But in this. case one can never understand
an individual object of representation which indudes a manifold of data.
Rather, it would be a logical truth that complex objects of representation
are represented as many times as the elementary data contained in them
- -and this is another absurdity.
2. If one wishes to maintain the interpretation of consdousness as an egoless
relatio.n, the possibility presents itself of conceiving it as a relation between
various occurrences and states of affairs. But it is clear that this attempt
can be successful only on two conditions : (a) the relation must hold ex-
dusively between the states of affairs as such, and not, for instance, between
them and some third thing which could be nothing else but a "subject,"
 DIETER HENRICH

"knowledge," or even "consciousness" itself. In this case the theory would

abandon its own program. (b) The character "psychic" or "conscious"
must not be attributable to the states of affairs by themselves, in isolation
from their relation to one 'another. In this case consciot~sness would not be
interpreted in principle as a relation, but as a property - - a suggestion which
will be discussed later.
It is difficult to satisfy both of these conditions at the same time. A
serious attempt in this direction can be made only within the framework of
the theory known as "neutral monism." But one will not find the theory
in its pure form either in James or in Russell. Both have always attributed
to the "primal stuff or material" the property of being "experienced" or
"given" - - attributes which can be justified only if one of the two conditions
mentioned is. disregarded.
There are decisive objections to an even more consistent attempt to
construct a "neutral monism." Let us assume for the moment that it is
actually the: case that no mental predicate is attributable to the state of affairs
between which the relations hold in their own right, in isolation from one
another. Then it is impossible to seewhat kind of relation could hold between
them such that this relation was necessarily conscious. It is possible that one
might find relations which we know always to appear tog'ether with con-
scionsness. But this is not to say that they are equivalent in meaning to
consciousness. If one begins with a "material or stuff" which is abstract,
i.e., experienced, and whose elements are not already psychic, any relation
between them is compatible with the assumption that, although the relation
obtains, there is no consciousness of it. Here it makes no difference at all
whether it turns out to be necessary to conceive this relation as a neurological
process, behavioristically as a behavior pattern, or even on the basis of the
construct of unsensed sensa. For in none of these cases of relations in an
abstract "stuff" would it be necessary to assume that consciousness is present.
Consequently, if it is conceivable that the relation holds both when con-
sciousness is present and when it is absent, this relation certainly cannot
pass as a suitable and adequate description of consciousness.
3. There remains the possibility of interpreting consciousness (in contrast
to a relation) as a monadic property of certain states of affairs, so that they
become "conscious" by possessing this property. It is surely possible to
assume that events with some monadic property take place in primitive
living creatures in connection with their reaction to stimuli, and to call
 SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

those events "conscious" because of this connection with stimulation. But

such events would have nothing in common with the phenomenon with
which we are familiar under the name "consciousness" - - except perhaps
the physical and physiological conditions of occurrence. As has been shown,
consciousness is not bound to individual events; it implies at least relations
and makes relations of a certain sort possible, e.g., attention and description.
But if the property "conscious" is at least partially relational, the introduction
of a new terminology does not help matters, and the difficulties o,f the two
previously discussed proposals recur unchanged.

II
Since the standard interpretations of consciousness, which dispense with
the assumption of an ego:, founder, let us turn to a discussion of egological
theories of consciousness. In this connection difficulties will arise which
affect theories of consciousness without an ego, too, so that one can draw
some general conclusions.
1. It has been suggested that consciousness can be understood as the relation
of an ego to any matters of fact whatsoever. Russell advocated this theory
before converting to "neutral monism," and he called the relation of the
"I" to the matter-of-fact "acquaintance. ''5 His analysis assumes that both
the subject and the acquaintance are at first not objects of consciousness.
They can be made objects of consciousness in another acquaintance-relation
which has its own subject. This "reflection" on the first-level acquaintance
can do no more than bring to consciousness that there was acquaintance
on the first level. From the fact that a relation is given, the inference, is
drawn that the retatum "subject" is also present.
Against this analysis, it could be objected that it is impossible to conceive
how a relation can be ascertained to hold if the re lata can never be im-
mediately given. If no person or subject (or whatever one wants to, call it)
who is acquainted with the state of affairs which is the object of conscious-
hess is ever given in consciousness, then it is absurd to, claim that acquaint-
ance itself is given. Certainly there are cases in which we are. convinced of
a relation, even if we cannot observe the relata. However these relations
are then explanations of other relations which can be experienced immediate-
ly with all of their relata. W e interpret immediately-given states of affairs
as relations only if all their relata could, at least in principle, equally well
be immediately given.
 DIETER H E N R I C H

This argument, by the way, does not exclude the possibility of a so-called
transcendental ego. However, if such an ego in principle cannot be expe-
rienced, it cannot be one of the relata which cause these experiences to have
a relational structure. It almost seems as if Russell wished to give both an
analysis and an explanation of the structure of co~sdousness in a single
step - - and this is surely an absurd undertaking.
2. Thus, if one wants to explain consciousness egologically, one must
proceed as follows : one must attribute self-consciousness to the subjec~ of
consciousness, and then one must try to demonstrate that this self-conscious-
ness is the real definition of any consciousness whatsoever. This is the
position of Kant and of many who followed him : the possibility of self-
consciousness defines all consciousness (at least all consciousness of the sort
with which we are familia O. This theory is in accordance with commonly
accepted notions of the structure of self-consciousness. One might call this
the reflection theory of self-consciousness.
The theory starts from the assmnpdon that entities which have self-con-
sciousness can execute acts of reflection which enable them to isolate their
own states and activities thematically and to bring them to explicit con-
sciousness. It will not be disputed that this possibility exists in entities which
are capable of being conscious of themselves. Reflection is at least one of
their most important perforu~ances. In addition, reflection really does bring
it about that these entities can "encounter" themselves, and it can motivate
them to that sdf-control and conscientious mode of behavior which is also
designated by the word "self-consciousness." But from all this it does not
follow at all that reflection is the basic structure of self-consdousness. And if
reflection does not even define self-consciousness, it is surely unsatisfactory
to use it to interpret consciousness in general as a consequence of self-con-
sciousness.
The theory which interprets consciousness as having its foundation in
self-consciousness can be developed without the assumption that the relation
of the "I" to itself has the character of an act of reflection. So (a) it is
necessary first to take up the more specific reflection theory, which defines
consciousness in general by self-consciousness, and self-consciousness by
reflection, the reflection being understood as the act of an ego. Then (b)
we shall consider a more general theory of the same type, which, although
it abandons the structural elements of the reflection theory in the narrower
sense, continues to, understand consciousness as the stir-reference of an ' T '

10
 SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

and (because of that) remains oriented toward the model of reflection.

(a) It is not difficult to see that the reflection theory is circular : if we
assume that reflection is an activity performed by a subject - - and this
assumption is hard to avoid - - it is clear that reflections presuppose an ' T '
which is capable of initiating activity spontaneously, for the ' T ' as a kind
of quasi-act cannot become aware of its reflection only after the fact. It
must perform the reflection and be conscious of what it does as the same
time as it does it. It might be possible to construct a theory of reflection
which bypasses this consequence, which seems, at first glance to be unavoid-
able. Yet .even then the circularity of the reflection theory recurs at some
other point : one cannot, by reflecting on a state of affairs:, bring it to
consciousness for the first time. In any case, reflection is an activity directed
to some end. That which is to be brought to explicit consciousness through
reflection must be present, at least implicitly, so that it can call forth the
act of reflectio,n which is directed to it. Reflection is not simply an accidental
occurrence of concentrated consciousness, of some state: of affairs. It pre-
supposes that this state of affairs has become striking or conspicuous and
has produced tensions which call forth or force tl~e concentration of attention
upon the object. For the reflection theory of self-consciousness, the state of
affairs which attracts the attention of consciousness must be the subject of
self-consciousness. Consequently, in reflection a consciousness of the subject
is presupposed; and regardless of whether this. reflection is understood as
an act of the "I" or not, the reflection theory can at most explain explicit
experience of self, but no self-cousciousness as such.
(b) But, in general, any interpretation of consciousness as the "self-
reference" of an ' T ' can be seen to be untenable on grounds totally indepen-
dent of the circularities of the reflection theory in its narrower sense : in
any case, regardless of how the ' T ' comes into relation to itself, whether
by an act of reflection or in some other way, the ' T ' must grasp itself in
self-consciousness. Since this grasping of itself must specifically be a con-
scious apprehension, the ' T ' must have some notion that that with which
it becomes acquainted in self-consciousness is itself. To this end it is not
requisite that it have any sort of conceptual knowledge o,f itself or that it
be able to give a description of itself. But, in any case, it must be able to
assert with certainty that it is itself with which it becomes acquainted in
self-consciousness, whether this self-acquaintance results from reflection or
some other manner. It is a well-known fact that this certitude is infallible,

11
 DIETER H E N R I C H

instantaneous, and so far beyond doubt that even the question, "Is the 'you'
with whom you think you are acquainted as 'yourself' really you, and not
perhaps someone .else ?" seems absurd. The question does indeed have a
meaning if it refers to an assessment of one's own habits, abilities, character
traits, etc. But doubts about such things presuppose that someone has been
identified who could be the object of such doubts. The question, " W h o am I
really ?" is weighty enough and probably can never be answered completely,
and certainly never with complete certainty. But this question presupposes
that the question, " A m I, I - - this I, the I of which I am aware, me ?"
has already been answered, or rather that any answer except "Yes" is utterly
absurd, and hence that the question itself is meaningless. The indicator ' T ' ,
assuming it to be used in its proper sense, cannot fail to refer.
This peculiarity of self-consciousness cannot be explained with the help
of any sort of reflexive relation on the. ' T ' to itself. Such an explanation
must necessarily turn out to be circular - - even disregarding all the special
problems connected with the reflection theory. In order to arrive at an
identification of itself, the 'T' must already know under what conditions it
can attribute that which it encounters, or that with which it becomes ac-
quainted, to itself. It is quite possible, and seems to occur rather often, that
beings capable of performing an identification are in principle incapable of
coming into relation to themselves. A person who tries to jump over his
own shadow is ridiculous because he could easily find out that, in all his
attempts, he has only to do with a "part" of himself. H e is capable of
discovering this because he already knows and attributes to himself so much
about his oven bodily feelings, motory impulses, and intentions, that he
ought to accept the shadow as his constant companion with comparative ease.
If he had no acquaintance with himself, an acquaintance which precedes any
encounter with an object of consciousness, he would never know what he
should attribute to, himself. He would not even be able to find any meaning
in the directive that he identify with himself something which he encounters.
Thus every reflexive relationship of the ' T ' to itself already presupposes
its familiarity with itself in a two-fold sense: first as knowledge of the
possibility of ascribing any predicate to itself, and secondly as the capacity
to distinguish from itself anything which is different from, or other than,
itself.
One cannot escape this consequence even by assuming a reflexive relation
as subsisting ab initio, so that it need never be brought forth by an act. Even

12
 SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

a permanent self-identification is simultaneously unavoidable, and inexpli-

cable. It is no use distinguishing conceptual knowledge of the self from an
original, non-conceptual acquaintance, which is asserted to, require neither
conceptual identification nor description. 6 It is certainly quite correct that
such a certainty o,f self must be assumed. The very immediacy of this cer-
tainty of self forces us to this conclusion. When I ask, " A m I in pain ?",
it is absurd to add, "And are the pains which I feel really my own ?" The
absurdity of th~s further question also points to. the necessity of assuming
an immediate certainty of self. v The reflection theory of self-consciousness
does not take this into account and is open to attack on this point. But even
with this assumption the situation is only slightly improved as long as all
consciousness which is. dependent on an ego is described and, at the same
time, explained as a relation of this ego to itself. The circularity in the
concept of such a self-related knowledge is not removed by attributing to
it a qudity og immediacy.
We are now in a position to, formulate the reasons, why the second ego-
logical theory of consciousness is in principle untenable. In the first place,
it contained an ambiguity with respect to the ' T ' which comes into relation
to itself : it is not dear whether this ' T ' is to have knowledge of itself prio,r
to relating to itself or not. Yet this very undarity is indispensable if the
theory is to be convincing. If the undarity is removed by an unambiguous
decision for or against the conscio~lsness of the "I-subject," the weakness of
the theory becomes apparent. Either the ' T ' which relates to itself as subject
is already conscious of itself; then the theory is circular as an explanation
of consciousness, since it presupposes not only consciousness, but even self-
consciousness. Or the ' T ' as subject is not conscious of itself and has no
acquaintance with itself - - in which case it cannot be understood how it
could .ever come to be in a position to predicate anything of itself, to
recognize anything it encountered as itself, or even to, examine what it
encountered with a view to determining whether or not it belonged to
itself. 8
Thus one can conclude that those theories which try to explain conscious-
ness as an egological self-reference also fail, at least if they do not employ
conceptual means totally different from those discussed up to now.
Only now does the problem of a theory of consciousness appear in all
its difficulties - - for the objection which is decisive against the second
egological theory is equally valid against any theory which attempts to

13
 DIETER H E N R I C H

explain consciousness as an egoless self-reference through a model oriented

on reflection, even if the theory renounces the whole egological conceptual
apparatus. In principle it makes no difference at all whether it is an ' T '
with specific distinguishing properties or an "anonymous" egoless conscious-
ness which stands as subject in a relation to itself. In both cases there would
have to be an identifying recognition or acquaintance, and consequently the
circular subject-object relation of self-knowledge would formally be present.
If a theory of consciousness is to be possible from the onset, it must be able
to avoid this circularity. But this is obviously no easy task. The theory of
consciousness must be developed in contrast to a model of consciousness
whose dominance up to now seems not to be accidental, but to have its
roots in the primary self-interpretation of self-consciousness. This fact gives
great importance to the critical introduction to the theory of consciousness :
only through criticism of these self-interpretations of consciousness, which
have long since become traditional, can the peculiar dimension of the pro-
blem of consciousness appear distinctly.

III
The egological theory of consciousness only seemingly showed a way out of
the aporiai of the theory which took consciousness as an egoless relation.
It led to an objection which was not only decisive against the egological
theory, but which also added a further argument against a theory of con-
sciousness as a relation without an ego. This is sufficient cause to remember
that the discussion up to now has proceeded on the assumption that we are
acquainted with consciousness as a fundamental phenomenon. But it seemed
to be impossible to come to any understanding of the structure of this
"fundamental phenomenon." Instead, it seemed as if each attempt necessarily
ended in a circular interpretation. So it seems pertinent to remember that
the assumption of the investigation is not beyond dispute. It has been
claimed that consciousness cannot be understood as a phenomenal state of
affairs, grasped by introspection. This thesis was arrived at quite indepen-
dently of the aporiai of the theory of consciousness, but it is supported better
by them than by any of the other arguments in its favor.
Thus, although we cannot undertake anything like an exhaustive discussion
of the attempts to do away with the very concept of an experiencing con-
sciousness, we must at least give some arguments which support the assump-
tion that we are acquainted with "consciousness" as a fact.

14
 SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

The conviction that this acquaintance exists cannot be undermined by

any arguments of the Humean sort against the reality of the ego,. It is cer-
tainly true that we can never observe consciousness as such, but only the
states of affairs which are the objects of consciousness and their relations
to one another. This is quite obvious if consciousness is the prerequisite, os
any sort of observation. If consciousness is given the status of a condition,
it might seem that it could not belong to the class o,f entities which can be
known directly. This inference would have far-reaching implications, for
we have already shown that, in that case, there would be' no, grounds for
assuming the existence of consciousness at all. But this consequence can be
avoided. It is clear that images of perception and imagination are not the
only data of consciousness, and hence that consciousness is not to, be taken
as coextensive with perception. Rather, cognitive acts o,f all kinds, induding
acts involving judgment and application of rules, are instances of conscious
operations. Because of their intentional character, consciousness itself can
be brought to awareness in them. So it can be directly known, even though
not immediately given. The theory I am about to. sketch is intended as a
theory of such a cognitive access to consciousness.
A further consequence is that consciousness cannot be made accessible
to investigation through acts which can be described as "introspection."
If there is such an activity, it is restricted to the small domain of so-called
mental states (e.g., feelings and emotions) which can be unambiguously
localized relative to the body. Neither thoughts nor perceptions nor images
of imagination can be directly associated with consciousness of the body,
which forms the framework of reference for the activity of "introspection."
In a formal sense, consciousness is explicitly given only in contrast to
the experienced contents of consciousness. Following Broad, 9 o,ne could
call this process "inspection." But in that case "inspection" is o,nly a special
form of reflection, reflection upon the conditions of experiencing anything.
Such conditions need not necessarily be restricted in their occurrence to the
domain enclosed by a living body. It is at least conceivable that they might
be only functionally dependent on this domain.
The fact that the model of introspection and description breaks down
as an explanation of our acquaintance with consciousness ought not to be
used as an argument against the existence of such acquaintance because,
if it exists at all, it is to be expected that these models will be insufficient
since they both refer to acts which can be performed only if conscious life

15
 DIETER H E N R I C H

is already in progress. Familiarity with consciousness cannot be understood

as the result of any type of initiated activity. Such familiarity must already
be present whenever consciousness comes into being. N o one can say that
he tried to come to consciousness in the way he can try, e.g., to reflect,
introspect, or observe.
The conditions of verification of the proposition that "consciousness is
present" will be correspondingly peculiar. In the case of other persons, veri-
fication will be based on the fact that they can perform activities which
cannot be understood without the assumption of consciousness, i.e., on the
basis of an operational definition. But in this way, as is well known, neither
consciousness itself nor the access to it can be understood. A conscious
person can make his own acquaintance with consciousness explicit by calling
to mind the fact that he has memories, is capable of drawing distinctions,
and stands in the context of a life of on-going experience, and that none
of these activities is comprehensible without the assumption of consciousness.
A special, theoretically interesting possibility is a description of the differing
forms of consciousness, e.g., dream-consciousness, in contrast to the con-
sciousness of eidetic imagery or to waking consciousness. But "conscious-
hess" in general and acquaintance with consciousness are the presuppositions
of any such distinctions. Obviously, consciousness is not general in the
sense of a genus remotllm. This would be the case only if the modi of con-
sciousness existed in isolation, in~tependently of one: another, and were not
transformable into one another, as is actually the case. Forms of conscious-
ness cannot be understood as "species," but rather only as varying states
of the basic phenomenon of consciousness, which is always presupposed.
If one allows the help of a metaphor, one is tempted to say that it is more
likely that consciousness has access from itself to us, than that we have
a method by which we make it accessible to us. W e will see that this
metaphor can be given a theoretically justified meaning.
Arguments against the reality of consciousness which are oriented towards
Hume's criticism of a "spiritual substance" are not cogent, because it is
impossible and unavoidable to specify the peculiar conditions of access to
consciousness. They are not comparable to the conditions of access to the
phenomenon made possible by consciousness. This apology for the assump-
tion o~ consciousness can be supplemented by a criticism of the most impor-
tant attempts at a reduction of consciousness.
Two attempts to reduce consciousness from its privileged status as a

16
 SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

phenomenon which must always be presupposed have been made in the

last decades and have received much attention. One of these is a radical
behaviorism, a behaviorism which does not restrict itself to declaring so-
called inner states intersubjectively inaccessible and hence irrelevant to
scientific research. Such a behaviorism would have to claim that "inner
states," too, have to be understood, on analogy to the behavior of persons,
as modes of conditioned reaction - - as subcutaneous conditioned reflexes,
as it were. But it is beyond dispute that this attempt runs into difficulties
in the interpretation of perception and eidetic imagination, difficulties which
are in principle insuperable. 1~
Wittgenstein had another alternative in mind in the Investigations. Here
he tried to show that all cases in which terms belonging to the family of
"consciousness" are used can be described in such a way that no reference
to quasi-inner states need be assumed. They were to be conceived as modes
of communication in the context of intersubjective action. Wittgenstein's
successors have had good reasons for abandoning this radical position. None
of them still denies the fact of subjective experience. Wittgenstein's insight
has been restricted to such an extent that his followers claim only that
the use of the terms of a presumed mental language will be predominantly
determined by the intersubjective context. With this restriction, one can
no longer speak of an "analytic" reduction of the problems associated with
consciousness.
A third possibility might be a type of "inner physics," like that outlined
by Herbart nearly 200 years ago) 1 Here inner events were to be investigated
with the same categories, the same mathematics, and with respect to the
same forms of unity as material occurrences in space and time. At the very
start, this mental physics faces the difficulty that, in contradistinction to
the established physical sciences, it must determine the status and mode
of access to the domain of phenomena which it intends to treat. Since we
have already shown that consciousness cannot be conceived as a relation,
it clearly cannot be understood as a system of especially complex relations.
Thus the question of the peculiarity of consciousness refers to the accessibility
of those relations which are given in consciousness as its objects. This
question must be acknowledged to be legitimate .even if the system is to be
investigated in a way analogous to that used in investigating the relations
between material bodies - - ignoring for the moment the further problem
of whether or not such a method of investigation would be exhaustive. Only

17
 DIETER H E N R I C H

in conjunction with this question it is possible, and indeed necessary, to

consider that at least some of the events of mental physics are given in
the modus of immediate and indubitable acquaintance, and that this type
of immediate, indubitable acquaintance is not to be found in the results
of any of the established physical sciences. It is still reasonable to suppose
that any procedure for verifying a theory must make use of this acquaintance.
If one could not count on the ability of persons under certa.~n conditions
to become unequivocally aware of states of affairs and to incorporate them
into their world without further significant doubt, there could be no
justification for empirical propositions at all.
In this connection the special mode of access to mental events need not
even mean that they are in principle infallib~e. Even the awareness of at
least some important groups of mental events is guided by learning processes
and hence is corrigible in principle. Any correction must lead to the falsi-
fication of theories which rely on data accepted on the basis of incomplete
learning processes. Nevertheless, the awareness itself is of indubitable
certainty and in this regard superior to any consciousness of a physical
object. Such consciousness of physicaJ objects does not usually count on
deception, but it can remain significant despite recognition of the necessity
of acknowledging the possibility of deception. He who has learned to use
color words cannot doubt that a patch of color seen in full daylight is blue.
One cannot say the same for any of the entities which are the objects of
physics. Such certainty is either made possible by the basic conditions of
consciousness or, at any rate, must be understood in conjunction with
it. Thus one need not even assume that the state of affairs which forms the
basis of the verification is given in exclusive privacy to only one person.
It is conceivable that the consciousness of many persons might take cogni-
zance of the same state of affairs, which would then belong to. the world of
each.
In any case, a person is more than a creature in a world, with two classes
of attributes, of which only one, namely that containing predicates referring
to his body, is intersubjecfively verifiable. 12 A person lives at the same
time in a coordinate system to which belong all states of affairs which are
accessible to him. This is what makes it meaningful to speak of the person's
"world." As far as the descriptions which formed our starting point are
concerned, one might just as well call it the person's "consciousness." The
use of the indicator "this" is meaningful only in the context or this world.

18
 SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

This world is an ultimate state of affairs for each person. From this it does
not follow that it is excluded a priori to try to explain this state of affairs
by a universal scientific theory. Indeed, many reasons support such an
attempt. But such a theory would have to be able. to make this state, of
affairs as such causally intelligible. So in any case it would first have to
come to darity about the peculiar constitution of consciousness, and it would
certainly not be a theory which disputed the existence of consciousness as .a
reality or our acquaintance with it.

IV
Let us assume that the arguments just sketched have been fully elaborated
and are convincing. Then it is legitimate and indeed unavoidable to look
for another way out of the aporetic embarrassment which was the negative
result of our criticism of models of consciousness. This attempt must be
guided by the course and results of our critidsm. It has already been
mentioned that it is obviously extremely difficult to interpret the familiar
phenomenon "consciousness" by direct description. And this difficulty
seems to be of a sort which makes it practically impossible to overcome :
the temptation to interpret consciousness on the model of reflection is so
great that it probably has its grounds in the structure of consciousness itself.
In cases such as these, it is probably best to describe the subject-matter in
contrast to the interpretation-model which has proved unsuitable, and thus
to approach it ex negativo. So the minimal program for a theory of con-
sciousness is : to conceive consciousness in such a way as to preserve all
the features which make the reflection theory plausible, without allowing
the consequence which makes it untenable (the circularity in interpretation).
These circularities resulted from two assumptions : (1) consciousness is
explained as the self-reference of a subject. Since one cannot avoid attributing
to this subject the property "conscious," the explanation is redundant.
(2) Consciousness is explained as knowing self-reference of a subject.
Since one cannot avoid attributing to the subject of this self-reference know-
ledge of itself, without which it would never be able to find itself as itself,
the explanation is circular. Thus the task is to describe consciousness, so that
it is neither knowing self-reference nor identification with itself. But the
description must be of such a nature as clearly to show that we are
immediately acquainted with consciousness, so that no case of consciousness
is possible in which doubts about its own existence occur.

19
 DIETER H E N R I C H

In the critical discussion of theories of consciousness, we have left

undecided the question of whether or not consciousness must be defined in
reference to a subject. Theories of consciousness of both types led, in the
final analysis, to similar aporiai; and because of this faultiness of their
logical structure, none of them adds much support to either the assumption
that consciousness must always have a subject or that consciousness is
egoless. But, after having formulated the minimal conditions of a theory
of consciousness, one can say that the assumption of an egoless consciousness
has definite advantages. Reflection is the model of the circular interpretation
of consciousness. Presumably it is the accomplishment of an active principle
which self-consciously concentrates its attention. If consciousness must be
thought in contrast to the reflection model, it seems rational to leave out
of consideration the consciousness which an "I-principle" has of its own
performances. Consciousness is something which must precede all perform-
ances directed at an end and must be prior to the self-consciousness ego. This
thesis also agrees best with our experience in the situations in which
we are immediately aware of consciousness and which we took as our
starting point : awakening and realizing that one is dreaming.
But this does not mean that an ' T ' and a self do not in any sense appear
in the context of consciousness. This is the daim which Sartre tried to make
convincing, but his arguments were inadequate. Even if consciousness is
primary against selfhood, a self can nevertheless establish itself and become
efficacious within the structure of consciousness. And this is actually the
case. W e are incapable of understanding any phenomenon - - conscious
concentration on an object, the solution of a problem, the decision m favor
of a plan of action or the anxious expectation of an event - - without this
assumption. Whatever this self might be, it is at least an active principle
of organization in the field of consciousness, la Even if such organizations
are not its only accomplishments, the self belongs to the field of conscious-
ness, at least insofar as these organizations do. It is probably even necessary
to assume that consciousness always makes its first appearance in an ego-
logical orientation. Piaget has shown TM precisely that the infant lives quite
egocentrically and supposes this egocentridty to be "natural." The infant
associates the world, both as an objective reality and as a background for its
moods, with its own feeling of self - - naturally, in the case of an infant
all this occurs unthematically. As we know, this egocentricity is never
completely eliminated. But, nevertheless, it is not the fundamental pheno-

20
 SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

menon of consciousness, but only a mode of its organization, which

presumably already includes the characteristic potentialities of humanity:
the potentiality to develop and to overcome egocentricity.
Because of its ability to reflect upon itself, this active principle can
rightly be called "self," "ego," or "subject." But it is of decisive importance
to make dear and hold fast to the principle that the awareness of this
active principle, which may have the name "I" or "self," is not as such an
active performance, that this awareness cannot be attributed to the "I"
itself. Even those who have distinguished a more original "experience" or
"enjoyment" of self from reflexive self-knowledge have missed this point.
The idea of a self is so intimately bound up with the possibility of freely
executed reflection, that there is a temptation to represent the original
ability of the self freely to dispose of itself, as a product of itself. But the
knowledge the self has of itself is a fundamental situation which can be
explained only by its function as an organizing prindple of an egoless
consciousness.
But how is this consciousness itself to be interpreted ? The answer to
this question must be unsatisfactory in the first instance, given the state of
our knowledge and the unsuitability of our concepts which are oriented
towards reflection. So we will restrict ourselves to giving an answer with the
help of, and in the framework of, the procedure of contrast already de-
scribed.
If reflection is a performance, the consciousness which makes it possible
must be described, in contrast to it, as an occurrence. Naturally, it is an
occurrence of a special sort: it does not take place within a system of
relations of fact; it is utterly singular and without connection to anything
else. One can associate with it events of other types only because it is
'acquainted with itself; and because of this, given a series of further
assumptions, it can bring forth knowledge of the conditions of its own
occurrence. But consciousness in itself is utterly out of relation to any state
in which consciousness is not present - - for instance, dreamless sleep.
Furthermore, it is an occurrence which makes possible an indeterminate
number of other occurrences, for example, perceptions and feelings. Such
occurrences are in principle related to one another - - a fact which makes
it understandable to conceive consciousness itself as a relation. But it is
actually only the grounds of possibility of a type of relation, and, as such,
one might better describe it as a dimension or medium: it cannot exist

21
 DIETER H E N R I C H

without a system of relations between elements given to consciousness which

are themselves different from consciousness. And it is the last member of
the series of conditions which make these relations possible, If one gives
such a description, one must immediately add that it is a dimension of a
special kind : an exclusive dimension. It is impossible to imagine two cases
of consciousness which overlap or which come together as constituents to
form a kind og "space" of consciousness. Each consciousness is utterly ex-
dusive in regard to each other consciousness. This proposition is immediately
and analytically true. And the possibility of combining different cases of
consciousness, so that a consciousness of higher order comes into being, is
a purely speculative possibility.
If consciousness is conceived as a dimension, finally one has to add that it
is a dimension which contains knowledge of itself, for there is no. con-
sciousness of anything without consciousness being known at the same time
and vice versa. We are conscious of a state of affairs only in the context of
a conscious life, in which acquaintance with "being conscious of a state of
affairs" is always present. This acquaintance is only implicit, that is, it is
no~: the object of attention or reflection, but it is not a mere potential ac-
quaintance in the sense of a disposition to know. If we use the term "di-
mension" in the description of consciousness, we cannot avoid giving it this
predicate, for we cannot say that the cognizance, of the fact that consciousness
exists is itself an unconscious one. Hence it must be a peculiar case among
the occurrences within the dimension.
But qualifications are necessary. In accor with what we have learned
s the breakdown of the reflection theory, this coexistence of conscious-
ness as a dimension and knowledge of consciousness cannot by any means be
conceived of as self-identification. This would immediately lead back to the
circularity. W e must say that one cannot occur without the other; but we
must avoid saying that consciousness is its oven object. Without the con-
scious cognizance of the fact that consciousness exists, there wonld be no
consciousness at all. But neither this occurrence nor the dimension containing
it refer to themselves. Consequently, the acquaintance with consciousness is
also necessarily incomplete, as far as its object is concerned : it does not
imply knowledge about the necessary connection between consciousness and
the cognizance of it. This knowledge is conceptual, and it is accessible only
as the result of rational, reflecting activities. Consciousness is not its own
master : it does not bring itself into existence through self-objectification.

22
 SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

And it does not imply an adequate understanding of itself to which it can

lead only by means of the rational self in human beings. This could have
interesting consequences for the relation between thinking and consciousness.
But, in any case, enough has been said to show that new circularities can
be avoided. By renouncing the thesis that the dimension of consciousness
contains itself, one would, of course, be much more readily assured that there
are no circularities. The conclusions concerning self-consciousness would not
be at all affected by this. But it would lead to the denial of what seems to
be a basic fact : namely, that consdousness is bound to an acquaintance with
consciousness, a fact which is an ultimate one in the description of conscious-
ness.
An explanation with the concepts and theories of neurology might per-
haps exhibit the indissoluble bond between the two phenomena. Comparable
connections can already be folmd in its explanatory apparatus, e.g., between
integration and the excitation of brain processes. ( W e need not speak here
of the problem posed by the attempt to determine the scientific status o,f
such explanations.) And if such a double nature of consciousness resists
further analysis and yet seems too strange to be a credible assumption one
must call to mind the case of time-consciousness. The experience of the tem-
poral duration of events and the cognizance of the temporal duration of this
experience always occur together. And it can be shown that if this were not
the case, experience of temporal duration would be impossible.
On the basis of considerations such as these, the diffioalties in the notion
of self-consdousness can be resolved. Self-consciousness must always be con-
scious of something which must have further properties in addition to the
property of being conscious. Otherwise, self-consciousness would be an
empty concept, like that of a relation without relata. N o w we have reason to
assume that an organizing activity takes place: in consciousness. This activity
can be called the "self," and it can be the name for that which makes "self-
consciousness" more than the empty reference of a relation to itself. Since
this activity itself belongs to the dimension of consciousness, there is always
acquaintance with it. And since it is an activity, it can execute acts of re-
flection, by means of which it comes to an isolated, explicit consciousness of
itself. This enables it to guide activities, and finally to guide them as reason
in accordance with a plan, following principles which have been critically
examined. Before this, however, there is already sdf-consciousness (as con-
sciousness of the self), but it is anonymous, and it is neither the possession

23
 DIETER H E N R I C H

nor the accomplishment of the self. And by making possible activities which
are attributed to the self, it is appropriated by the self in a derivative sense as
explicit knowledge which is available for free use in reflection. Thus it seems
to resemble a productive generation of self which causes its own presuppo-
sitions to be forgotten.
This is surely no more than that the rough outline of a theory which intro-
duces its concepts ex negativo, partly in order to bypass circularities otherwise
unavoidable. This sketch is obviously incapable of tracing "consciousness"
back to something else, or even of describing it as a special case of something
more general. W e will not attempt to decide whether this situation can be
improved or whether we have already reached the limits of what can pos-
sibly be known of such fundamental phenomena. In any case, a beginning of
a lhematization of the phenomenon "consciousness" has been accomplished,
a thematization which fulfils the minimal requirement of being free from
contradiction. Self-reference belongs to consciousness only insofar as we come
to an understanding of it : it is consciousness and knowledge of conscious-
ness in one. The knowing self-reference which is present in reflection is not
a basic fact, but is rather an explication which isolates what is the basic fact.
And this reflection is possible only if we assume, not any sort of explicit
self-consciousness of self, but rather an implicit selfless consciousness of self.

V
Such a theory seems capable of application in many different areas of philo-
sophy. Here we will place it in only two of its possible perspectives : histori-
cal and practical. First, let us try to use it to help understand the strengths
and weaknesses of several historical theories of consciousness.
Fichte was the first to notice the circularity in all commonly accepted no-
tions of consciousness and, in particular, in the Kantian theory of transcen-
dental apperception. Even his first, highly paradoxical pronouncements
about the Ego were made with the intention of .eliminating this circularity. It
was clear to him that it is impossible to understand the "I" as a conscious
subject which makes itself its object. So he replaced this concept with that
of an absolute activity which was itself unconscious, but which instanta-
neously brought forth a conscious "I," its object, and the mutual relation of
each to the other. He was forced to this assumption because he could not
relinquish the idea that the self is dependent on itself alone and must be
described as an activity. Yet his early Doctrine of Science itself led to new

24
 SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

inconsistencies. Fichte recognized this and tried to develop a new philosophy.

This philosophy accepts the fact that the "I" must remain ununderstood, as
a simple unity or absolute primal activity. It must be reconstructed as a plu-
rality of equi-primordial elements which cannot be separated from one an-
other, but which cannot be reduced to one another. In rarely noticed and, up
to now, misunderstood manuscripts Fichte approached most closely the thesis
defended here. Yet even in these manuscripts he understood the "I" as an
identifying self-reference : as original cognizance of its own activity, which
knows in advance its own essence. W e have seen that this concept of self is
secondary in the structure of consciousness as a whole. Fichte always took this
as the fundamental concept. He even succeeded in developing it without cir-
cularity, but at the cost of a construction which cannot be verified phenome-
nally and which he himself could never consolidate into a firm conclusion. 16
In contrast to Fichte, Hegel always started from the assumption that self-
consciousness cannot be made intelligible in its own terms alone:. As we know
today, he was the first to give an analysis of the type of relation in which the
relata are independent of one another and yet are necessarily related to one
another? T But, as distinct from Fichte, he never freed himself from the re-
flection theory of self-consciousness, and so caused all subsequent Hegel-
ianism to remain dogmatic and unproductive in the theory of consciousness.
He continually described self-consciousness as the "coming-to-itself" of some-
thing which is already, "an sich," self-reference, i.e., in exact accordance with
the reflection model, which presupposes everything it tries to demonstrate.
And he does this in spite of the fact that his analysis of other sorts of rela-
tions placed at his disposal quite different conceptual schemes for analysis.
Even though the thought that reflection could take place only in the context
of social interaction, he never got free of the reflection model because his
account of the structure of reflection which results is in no, way influenced
by its social origin.
It was Heidegger who brought vigorous criticism to bear on the view which
regarded the idea of self-consciousness as the first evidence in a philosophic
deduction and which conceived of man as a being which makes itself its ob-
ject through reflection. But Heidegger did not investigate "self-conscious-
ness" in regard to its inner pre-conditions; rather, he replaced it by another
mode of self-reference - - the temporal structure of a project into the future
and the coming back from it to Dasein in its historically determined present.
In this way reflection is eliminated, to be sure, insofar as it occurs instanta-

25
 DIETER H E N R I C H

neously and is without a life-project. But its structure is retained unchanged,

even if in a different substantive context, so that in this respect Heidegger
falls short of Fichte. After Sein und Zeit, Dasein does become something
conditioned for Heidegger too - - made possible by an anonymous "Ereig-
his." The manner in which this is to be understood is never discussed, and
Heidegger never reaches the point of realizing that Dasein is conditioned in
the interior of its understanding of itself.
Finally, let us show how the conception of consciousness as the egoless
foundation of self-consciousness allows us to interpret one of the most inter-
esting doctrines of modern moral philosophy. Against Kantian ethics, both
Fichte and Hegel raised the objection that it did not distinguish between two
forms of moral conduct. These two modes of behavior differ in the way in
which the agent understands himself in them. On the one hand, there' is
acting in the consciousness of the will's power to realize the ideals and de-
mands to which the agent knows himself committed. This mode of action is
essentially ambiguous because, in addition to the goal of the action, it always
has regard for the confirmation of the agent's own energy and independence.
Consequently, it is totally incapable of achieving that which is commonly ac-
cepted as being the most valuable mode of behavior: cheerful, selfless
readiness to sacrifice, without any inclination to demonstrate the agent's
moral power to himself or to others. This mode of moral activity is funda-
mentally different from the first and must be explained in a totally different
way : in this mode the agent has no regard for his own freedom or energy,
but only for the context to which his action belongs. He considers himsdf
as a part of a moral order which realizes itself in him, to the extent that it
is realized through and by him.
It is easy to see that the difference between these two modes of action can
be explained in the context of the theory presented here as the difference of
two ways in which the' agent, the subject of the action, can appropriate his
"self." The self of consciousness has a natural tendency to grasp its own o~-
ganizing function and to interpret itself as. a being which is capable of re-
fle.ctio,n and of action controlled by reflection. Such understanding is ne-
cessarily the first mode in which an autonomous agent comes to explicit
knowledge' o.f himself; nevertheless, it is inadequate. The agent can and must
realize that his self-knowledge is determined by a consciousness of which he
is not the master and which makes possible all his activities and achieve-
ments. In such an understanding the self overcomes reflection as the real

26
 SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

definition of its actuality and dignity. The philosophy of the East has much
to say about how the constitution of consciousness changes fundamentally in
this overcoming of self. But against it one must remember that this over-
coming of reflection can occur only after reflection has developed and can
only be carried out by reflection itself. A person who gains an adequate un-
derstanding of himself does not return to a state of sheer empty conscious-
ness. Such a consciousness may be possible for a man in certain extreme si-
tuations, and in this way he can get an idea of what awareness is like in
animals, with whom we have more in common than the reflection theory
could admit. The reflection theory could not avoid assimilating consciousness
to a spontaneous, autonomous activity which was its own cause. It thus
placed an infinite gulf between us and the animals, and it must assume part
of the responsibility for hundreds of years of scandalous behavior toward
them on our part. Yet it remains true that human consciousness is to be
defined by the: possibility of reflection. And the freedom which arises in
overcoming reflection as a principle sufficient unto itself is only the freedom
of employing reflection in the right way.
So the old maxim finds a new justification : self-control, overcoming one-
self, is the royal road to self-knowledge and the only way to gain one's real
self.
This excursus into moral philosophy leads us bad( again to the problem of
a theory o,f consciousness. It has been shown that all attempts at such a theory
which were not committed to some kind of reductio.nism were caught up in
the circularities of the reflection theory, a model of the' self-reference of con-
sciousness which is obviously unsuitable, but whose weakness no one has
been able to recognize (except Fichte, who, at least saw the basic error). This
can best be explained by assuming that all these theories followed the pri-
mary self-interpretation of sdf-consciousness - - the partial, but provisional,
truth that stir-consciousness is activity which can be freely directed to various
ends and which is controlled by reflection. The theory itself succumbed to a
tendency to conceal the real state of affairs, a tendency which results from
the very structure of consciousness itself. So it is the first task of a theory of
self-consdousness to recognize this tendency and to oppose it through a
criticism o,f all variants of the reflection model. But this is sufficient to
bring the theory of sdf-consciousness out of the embarrassing position be-
tween radical reductionism and contradictory interpretation, a position
which it has occupied for centuries.

27
 DIETER HENRICH

* This article was read at Yale, Princeton, and Columbia Universities in z969 and 197o. Cf.
" S e l b s t b e w u s s t s e i n : Kritische Einleitung in eine Theorie,'" in Hermeneutik und Diatektik
(T~ibingeu : Mohr, 2970), pp. 257-284.

NOTES
1 " D o e s Consciousness Exist ?'" in Essays in Radical Empiricism (19121, p. 1-58.
2 The Analysis of Mind (I92z), pp. 9 ff; cf. also An Outline of Philosophy (I927), Chapter XX.
3 The Bounds of Sense (z968), p. I17.
4 F. Brentano, PsyehoIogie, 1,2,2; H. Schmalenbach, Das Sein des Bewusstseins, Philosophischer
Anzeiger IV, I92.
5 B. Russell, On the Nature of Acquaintance, third part, The Monist, I9~4; now in Logic and
Knowledge (I956).
6 H.J. Paton, " T h e Idea of the Self," in University of California Publications, Vol. VIII, pp.
7~-Io5.
7 Cf. Sidney Shoemaker, "Self-Reference and Self-Awareness," in Journal of Philosophy, Vol.
LXV, ~9, I968; Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity (~963), Chapter 3, PP. 8I ff.
8 The circttlarity into which the ego.logical theory fails is p r i m a r i l y a circularity of logical
structure in the explanation of consciousness : x (self-reference) explains y (self-consciousness)
and y explains z (consciousness). But x presupposes y and z. Because of the ambiguity in the
way in which the theory is formulated, the circularity in the explanation cannot be distin-
guished unequivocally f r o m an a m b i v a l e n t description of self-consciousness.
9 C.D. Broad, The Mind and Its Place in Nature (1925), pp. 291 ff.
10 B.F. Skinner, " B e h a v i o r i s m at Fifty," originally in Science, CXL, I96~; n o w also in Beha-
viorism and Phenomenology, T.W. W a r m , Ed. (I964), pp. 79 ff. Blanshard and Skinner, " T h e
Problem of Consciousness ~ a D e b a t e , " in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXVII,
I966/67, pp. 317 ff. D.M. A r m s t r o n g , A Materialist Theory of The Mind (London, 1968), pp. 54
ff.
11 PsychoIogie als Wissenschaft, 2. Tell, first edition (1825), p. ~4o.
12 ][.R. 1ones, " H o w Do I K n o w W h o I A m ? " Proceedings of the AristoteIean Society, suppl.
XLI, 1967, pp. l ff.
11 Cf. Henri Ey, "'La conscience," Le Psychologue, Vol. z6.
14 Piaget, La formation de concept du monde chez l'enfant.
I s Cf. footnote Io.
1.6 D. Henrich, Fichtes urspri~ngtiche Einsicht (Frankfurt x967).
17 D. Henrich, " A n f a n g u n d Methode der L o g i k " in Hegelstudien, Beiheft I.

28