ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 50, 248-287 (1991) Social Cognitive Theory of Self-Regulation ALBERT BANDURA Stanford University In social cognitive theory human behavior is extensively motivated and regulated by the ongoing exercise of self-influence. The major self-regulative mechanism operates through three principal subfunctions. These include self- monitoring of one’s behavior, its determinants, and its effects; judgment of one’s behavior in relation to personal standards and environmental circum- stances; and affective self-reaction. Self-regulation also encompasses the self- efficacy mechanism, which plays a central role in the exercise of personal agency by its strong impact on thought, affect, motivation, and action. The same self-regulative system is involved in moral conduct although compared to the achievement domain, in the moral domain the evaluative standards are more stable, the judgmental factors more varied and complex, and the affec- tive self-reactions more intense. In the interactionist perspective of social cognitive theory, social factors affect the operation of the self-regulative sys- tem. © 1991 Academie Press, Ine Self-regulatory systems lie at the very heart of causal processes. They not only mediate the effects of most external influences, but provide the very basis for purposeful action. Most human behavior, being purposive, is regulated by forethought. The future time perspective manifests itself in many different ways. People form beliefs about what they can do, they anticipate the likely consequences of prospective actions, they set goals for themselves, and they otherwise plan courses of action that are likely to produce desired outcomes. Through exercise of forethought, people motivate themselves and guide their actions in an anticipatory proactive way. The capability for intentional and purposive action is rooted in sym- bolic activity. Future events cannot be causes of present motivation and action. However, by being represented cognitively in the present, con- ceived future events are converted into current motivators and regulators of behavior. In anticipatory control, behavior is directed by cognized Portions of this article contain revised and expanded material from the book Social foun- dations of thought and action: A social cognitive theory (1986, Englewood Cliffs, N Prentice-Hall) and from a chapter that originally appeared as **Self-regulation of motivation through anticipatory and self-regulatory mechanisms,”* in R. A. Dienstbier (Ed.), Nebraska symposium on motivation: Perspectives on motivation (1991, Vol. 38, Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press). Address correspondence and reprint requests to Albert Bandura, Psychol- ‘ogy Department, Jordan Hall, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305. 248 0749-5978/91 $3.00 Copyright © 1991 by Academic Press. Inc All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY 249 goals not pulled by an unrealized future state. The causal agency resides in forethought and the self-regulatory mechanisms by which it is trans- lated into incentives and guides for purposive action. The present article analyzes the structure and mechanisms of self-regulation. If human behavior were regulated solely by external outcomes, people would behave like weathervanes, constantly shifting direction to conform to whatever momentary sotial influence happened to impinge upon them. In actuality, people possess self-reflective and self-reactive capabilities that enable them to exercise some control over their thoughts, feelings, motivation, and actions. In the exercise of self-directedness, people adopt certain standards of behavior that serve as guides and motivators and regulate their actions anticipatorily through self-reactive influence. Hu- man functioning is, therefore, regulated by an interplay of self-generated and external sources of influence. STRUCTURE OF SELF-REGULATORY SYSTEMS, Self-regulation operates through a set of psychological subfunctions that must be developed and mobilized for self-directed change (Bandura, 1986). Neither intention nor desire alone has much effect if people lack the capability for exercising influence over their own motivation and be- havior (Bandura & Simon, 1977). The constituent subfunctions in the exercise of self-regulation through self-reactive influence are summarized in Fig. 1 and discussed in the sections that follow. PERSONAL STANDARDS EVALUATIVE SELF-REACTIONS. Level. POSITIVE EXPLICITNESS NEGATIVE ORIGINALITY PROXIMITY SOCIABILITY GENERALITY beers ‘TANGIBLE SELF REACTIONS DEVIANCY REWARDING [REFERENTIAL PERFORMANCES PUNISHING STANDARD NORMS QUALITY OF MONITORING >] SOCIALCOMPARISON INFORMATIVENESS SELF COMPARISON [NO SELF REACTION REOULARITY COLLECTIVE COMPARISON, PROXIMITY eee VALUATION OF ACTIVITY VALUED NEUTRAL DEVALUED PERFORMANCE DETERMINANTS PERSONAL EXTERNAL Fic. I. Structure of the system of self-regulation of motivation and action through inter- nal standards and self-reactive influences.250 ALBERT BANDURA Self-Monitoring Subfunction People cannot influence their own motivation and actions very well if they do not pay adequate attention to their own performances, the con- ditions under which they occur, and the immediate and distal effects they produce. Therefore, success in self-regulation partly depends on the fi- delity, consistency, and temporal proximity of self-monitoring. Activities vary on a number of evaluative dimensions, some of which are listed in Fig. 1. Depending on people’s values and the functional significance of different activities, they attend selectively to certain aspects of their func- tioning and ignore those that are of little import to them. The process of self-monitoring is not simply a mechanical audit of one’s performances. Preexisting cognitive structures and self-beliefs exert se- lective influence on which aspects of one’s functioning are given the most attention, how they are perceived, and how performance information is organized for memory representation. Mood states also affect how one’s performances are self-monitored and cognitively processed (Kuiper, MacDonald, & Derry, 1983). Self-monitoring of behavior that bears on personal competence and self-esteem, in turn, activates affective reac- tions that can distort self-perceptions at the time the behavior is occur- ring, as well as later recollections of it. Self-observation serves at least two important functions in the process of self-regulation. It provides the information needed for setting realistic goals and for evaluating one’s progress toward them. But there are addi- tional dynamic ways in which paying close attention to one’s thought patterns and actions in different social contexts can contribute to self- directed change. Self-diagnostic function. Systematic self-observation can provide im- portant self-diagnostic information. When people observe their thought patterns, emotional reactions, and behavior and the conditions under which these reactions occur, they begin to notice recurrent patterns. By analyzing regularities in the covariation between situations and their thought and actions, people can identify the psychologically significant features of their social environment that lead them to behave in certain ways. For those who know how to alter their behavior and modifiable aspects of their environment, the self-insights so gained can set in motion a process of corrective change. Diagnostic self-monitoring need not be confined to observing naturally occurring covariations in one’s everyday experiences or to retrospective analyses. Significant determinants of psychosocial functioning can be identified more effectively through personal experimentation (Neuringer, 1981). By systematically varying things in their daily lives and noting the accompanying personal changes, people can discover what factors influ-