General will

PHILOSOPHY OF ROUSSEAU
WRITTEN BY:
 André Munro
See Article History

Alternative Title: volonté générale

General will, in political theory, a collectively held will that aims at

the common good or common interest. The general will is central to the
political thought of the Swiss-born French political philosopher Jean-Jacques
Rousseau and an important concept in modern republican thought. Rousseau
distinguishes the general will from the particular and often contradictory wills
of individuals and groups. In The Social Contract (1762), Rousseau argues
that freedom and authority are not contradictory, since legitimate laws are
founded on the general will of the citizens. In obeying the law, the individual
citizen is thus only obeying himself as a member of the political community.

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constitution: Rousseau and the general will

Whereas Hobbes created his unitary sovereign through the mechanism of

individual and unilateral promises and whereas Locke prevented excessive

concentration of power by requiring the cooperation of different organs of

government for the accomplishment of different purposes, Rousseau merged all

individual citizens into…

The notion of the general will precedes Rousseau and has its roots in
Christian theology. In the second half of the 17th century, Nicolas
Malebranche attributed the general will to God. God, Malebranche argued,
mostly acts in the world through a set of “general laws” instituted at the
creation of the world. These laws correspond to God’s general will, in
contradistinction to particular expressions of God’s will: miracles and other
occasional acts of divine intervention. For Malebranche, it is because God’s
will expresses itself mainly through general laws that we can make sense of
the apparent contradiction between God’s will to save all of humankind and
the fact that most souls will not actually be saved. Rousseau’s own
understanding of the general will emerged from a critique of Denis Diderot,
who transforms Malebranche’s understanding of the general will into
a secularconcept but who echoes Malebranche by defining it in universalistic
terms. In his article “Droit naturel” (“Natural Right”) published in 1755 in
the Encyclopédie, Diderot argues that morality is based on the general will of
humankind to improve its own happiness. Individuals can access
this moralideal by reflecting on their interest as a member of the human race.
The general will, Diderot believes, is necessarily directed at the good since its
object is the betterment of all.
For Rousseau, however, the general will is not an abstract ideal. It is instead
the will actually held by the people in their quality as citizens.
Rousseau’s conception is thus political and differs from the more universal
conception of the general will held by Diderot. To partake in the general will
means, for Rousseau, to reflect upon and to vote on the basis of one’s sense
of justice. Individuals become conscious of their interest as citizens, according
to Rousseau, and thus of that of the republic as a whole, not through spirited
discussions but, on the contrary, by following their personal conscience in the
“silence of the passions.” In this sense, the public assembly does not debate
so much as disclose the general will of the people. Rousseau argues that the
general will is intrinsically right, but he also criticized in some works (mainly in
his Discourse on the Sciences and Arts, 1750) the rationalist elevation of
reason above feelings. This has provoked scholarly debates about the rational
and affective dimensions of the general will. On the one hand, the general will
reflects the rational interest of the individual (as citizen) as well as that of the
people as a whole. On the other hand, the general will is not purely rational
because it emerges out of an attachment and even love for one’s political
community.
Rousseau assumed that all people are capable of taking the moral
standpoint of aiming at the common good and that, if they did so, they
 would reach a unanimous decision. Thus, in an ideal state, laws express

the general will. While citizens m General will

PHILOSOPHY OF ROUSSEAU
WRITTEN BY:
 André Munro
See Article History

Alternative Title: volonté générale

General will, in political theory, a collectively held will that aims at

the common good or common interest. The general will is central to the
political thought of the Swiss-born French political philosopher Jean-Jacques
Rousseau and an important concept in modern republican thought. Rousseau
distinguishes the general will from the particular and often contradictory wills
of individuals and groups. In The Social Contract (1762), Rousseau argues
that freedom and authority are not contradictory, since legitimate laws are
founded on the general will of the citizens. In obeying the law, the individual
citizen is thus only obeying himself as a member of the political community.

READ MORE ON THIS TOPIC

constitution: Rousseau and the general will

Whereas Hobbes created his unitary sovereign through the mechanism of

individual and unilateral promises and whereas Locke prevented excessive

concentration of power by requiring the cooperation of different organs of

government for the accomplishment of different purposes, Rousseau merged all

individual citizens into…

The notion of the general will precedes Rousseau and has its roots in
Christian theology. In the second half of the 17th century, Nicolas
Malebranche attributed the general will to God. God, Malebranche argued,
mostly acts in the world through a set of “general laws” instituted at the
creation of the world. These laws correspond to God’s general will, in
contradistinction to particular expressions of God’s will: miracles and other
occasional acts of divine intervention. For Malebranche, it is because God’s
will expresses itself mainly through general laws that we can make sense of
the apparent contradiction between God’s will to save all of humankind and
the fact that most souls will not actually be saved. Rousseau’s own
understanding of the general will emerged from a critique of Denis Diderot,
who transforms Malebranche’s understanding of the general will into
a secularconcept but who echoes Malebranche by defining it in universalistic
terms. In his article “Droit naturel” (“Natural Right”) published in 1755 in
the Encyclopédie, Diderot argues that morality is based on the general will of
humankind to improve its own happiness. Individuals can access
this moralideal by reflecting on their interest as a member of the human race.
The general will, Diderot believes, is necessarily directed at the good since its
object is the betterment of all.
For Rousseau, however, the general will is not an abstract ideal. It is instead
the will actually held by the people in their quality as citizens.
Rousseau’s conception is thus political and differs from the more universal
conception of the general will held by Diderot. To partake in the general will
means, for Rousseau, to reflect upon and to vote on the basis of one’s sense
of justice. Individuals become conscious of their interest as citizens, according
to Rousseau, and thus of that of the republic as a whole, not through spirited
discussions but, on the contrary, by following their personal conscience in the
“silence of the passions.” In this sense, the public assembly does not debate
so much as disclose the general will of the people. Rousseau argues that the
general will is intrinsically right, but he also criticized in some works (mainly in
his Discourse on the Sciences and Arts, 1750) the rationalist elevation of
reason above feelings. This has provoked scholarly debates about the rational
and affective dimensions of the general will. On the one hand, the general will
reflects the rational interest of the individual (as citizen) as well as that of the
people as a whole. On the other hand, the general will is not purely rational
because it emerges out of an attachment and even love for one’s political
community.
Rousseau assumed that all people are capable of taking the moral standpoint
of aiming at the common good and that, if they did so, they would reach a
unanimous decision. Thus, in an ideal state, laws express the general will.
While citizens may be wrong and deceived, according to Rousseau, they will
aim at justice as long as they pursue the interest of the people rather than
follow their interest as individuals or as members of different groups. Seen
from this perspective, the individual who breaches the law is acting not only
against the instituted government but also against that individual’s higher
interest as a member of the political community. In a famous passage of The
Social Contract, Rousseau argues that forcing this individual to abide by the
law is thus nothing else than “forcing him to be free.” On this basis, critics
such as Benjamin Constant and J.L. Talmon have accused Rousseau of
being an authoritarian thinker and, in the second case, a forefather
of totalitarian politics. Talmon’s indictment has, however, been largely
discredited.
While scholars differ on the meaning of this passage, there is wide agreement
that Rousseau is concerned with preserving civil liberty and autonomy, not
with giving free reign to government. In fact, the concept of the general will
also implies a proscription against despotism. For Rousseau, government is
only legitimate insofar as it is subordinated to popular sovereignty or, in other
words, follows the general will of the people. Government loses all legitimacy
the moment it places itself above the law to pursue its own interest as a
separate political body.
The concept of the general will had a deep and lasting influence on modern
republican thought, particularly in the French tradition. The Declaration of the
Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 (article 6), a founding document of
the current French Constitution, defined law as the expression of the general
will
ay be wrong and deceived, according to Rousseau, they will aim at justice as
long as they pursue the interest of the people rather than follow their interest
as individuals or as members of different groups. Seen from this perspective,
the individual who breaches the law is acting not only against the
instituted government but also against that individual’s higher interest as a
member of the political community. In a famous passage of The Social
Contract, Rousseau argues that forcing this individual to abide by the law is
thus nothing else than “forcing him to be free.” On this basis, critics such
as Benjamin Constant and J.L. Talmon have accused Rousseau of being
an authoritarian thinker and, in the second case, a forefather of totalitarian
politics. Talmon’s indictment has, however, been largely discredited.
While scholars differ on the meaning of this passage, there is wide agreement
that Rousseau is concerned with preserving civil liberty and autonomy, not
with giving free reign to government. In fact, the concept of the general will
also implies a proscription against despotism. For Rousseau, government is
only legitimate insofar as it is subordinated to popular sovereignty or, in other
words, follows the general will of the people. Government loses all legitimacy
the moment it places itself above the law to pursue its own interest as a
separate political body.
The concept of the general will had a deep and lasting influence on modern
republican thought, particularly in the French tradition. The Declaration of the
Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 (article 6), a founding document of
the current French Constitution, defined law as the expression of the general
will