Republic v Tan from public use or public service.
Without this, prescription cannot begin to
FACTS: Tan applied for the original registration of title of Lot No. 4080, Cad.
545-D situated in Casili, Consolacion, Cebu. She alleged that she is the
absolute owner in fee simple of the said 7,807 square-meter parcel of
residential land she purchased from a certain Julian Gonzaga on September
17, 1992. Land registration court granted Tan’s application. The court
confirmed her title over the subject lot and ordered its registration. The
Republic appealed the case to the CA, arguing that Tan failed to prove that
she is a Filipino citizen who has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot, in the concept of an
owner, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of
her application.
The CA noted that before land of the public domain can be acquired by
prescription, it must have been declared alienable and disposable
agricultural land. The CA pointed to the certification issued by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) as evidence
that the subject was classified as alienable and disposable on September 1,
1965, pursuant to Land Classification Project No. 28. The CA concluded that
Tan had already acquired the subject lot by prescription.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CENRO certification and tax declarations
presented were insufficient to prove that the subject lot was no longer
intended for public use.
HELD: In Malabanan case, we already held en banc that a declaration that
property of the public dominion is alienable and disposable does not ipso
facto convert it into patrimonial property. While a prior declaration that the
property has become alienable and disposable is sufficient in an application
for judicial confirmation of title under Section 14(1) of the PRD, it does not
suffice for the purpose of prescription under the Civil Code. Before
prescription can even begin to run against the State, the following
conditions must concur to convert the subject into patrimonial property:
1. The subject lot must have been classified as agricultural land in
compliance with Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII of the Constitution;
2. The land must have been classified as alienable and disposable
3. There must be a declaration from a competent authority that the subject
lot is no longer intended for public use, thereby converting it to patrimonial
property.
Only when these conditions are met can applicants begin their public and
peaceful possession of the subject lot in the concept of an owner.
In the present case, the third condition is absent. Even though it has been
declared alienable and disposable, the property has not been withdrawn
run because the property has not yet been converted into patrimonial
property of the State. It remains outside the commerce of man and the
respondent’s physical possession and occupation thereof do not produce
any legal effect. In the eyes of the law, the respondent has never acquired
legal possession of the property and her physical possession thereof, no
matter how long, can never ripen into ownership.
Cruz v Sec of DENR
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the
Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules
and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA
and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of
the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals
and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. (Under the Regalian
doctrine all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the state.)
ISSUE: Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD: No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution.
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs
ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain.
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains
with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the
natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners
and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the
small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in
their large scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands
of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by
native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective
of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and
possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

/Former Justice Isagani Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity
of the Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act (IPRA
Law) on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the
State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and
other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine
embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically
enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains
which may include natural resources.
In addition, Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing
definition of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” which might even
include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said
law also violate the rights of private landowners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
HELD: The Supreme Court deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation
they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same
result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruz’s petition was
dismissed and the constitutionality of the IPRA law was sustained. Hence,
ancestral domains may include public domain – somehow against the
regalian doctrine.
(Ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of lands in public
domain. The right of the native does not include natural resources, what is
given is priority rights, not exclusive rights. State not preclude from into
agreements with private entities. )
Chavez v Public estates authority
The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing agency
tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the
leasing and selling functions of the DENR (Department of Environmental and
Natural Resources) insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore
lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development
Corporation, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of
the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of
submerged areas of Manila Bay to Amari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be
transferred to Amari as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the
constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands
comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the
name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares
of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of
the public domain. The transfer (as embodied in a joint venture
agreement) to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of
the Freedom Islands, is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the
Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to Amari ownership of 290.156 hectares
of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public
domain.
/ In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to
reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the Construction and Development
Corportion of the Philippines (CDCP).
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D.
1084, tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were
transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite
Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an
agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and
owned by PEA.
By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands
to PEA. It was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312)
by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed
islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.
Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI,
a Thai-Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with
another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later
transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen.
Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of
public domain (famously known as “mother of all scams”) Peitioner Frank J.
Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary
injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI
and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President
Estrada’s admin, PEA and AMARI entered into Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves
claim that contract is null and void.
Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the
stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3
Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the
amended joint venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the
government.
Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands,
now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands
of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but
may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations.
PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the
ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable
natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or
disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for
public service. The government can make such classification and declaration
only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these
lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only
natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the
592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the
commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,
ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is
void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of
290.156 hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is
void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural
lands of the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can
classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare
them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view
of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Republic v Naguiat
Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels
of land located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales. The applicant alleges that she
is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase
from its previous owners and their predecessors-in-interest who have been
in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of
her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever
kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in
possession thereof.
Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor
her predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June
1945 or prior thereto, considering the fact that she has not established that
the lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to
alienable and disposable property.
ISSUE: Did the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other
inalienable lands of the public domain?
HELD: No, the said areas are still classified as forest land.The issue of
whether or not respondent and her predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in question
is of little moment. For, unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse
occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner,
however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as
title.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose
such classification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its
forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered
with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers.
"Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places.
The classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does
not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
Republic v CA and Dela Rosa
Jose dela Rosa filed an application for registration of a parcel of land on his
own behalf and on behalf of his children. This application was separately
opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. (Benguet) and Atok Big Wedge
Corporation (Atok).
The petitioners claimed that they have acquired the land from their parents
and that they have been in possession of the land ever since. Benguet and
Atok opposed on the ground that they have mineral claims covering the
property and had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the
land in concept of owner.
The trial court denied the application while the Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant but
subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims. In
other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la
Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights
of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.
Issue: Whether or not the CA's ruling was correct.
Held: No, the CA was incorrect. Art. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the
owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he can construct
thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations which he may
deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws
and ordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable requirements of
aerial navigation.
Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be
planting on the land while the mining locator will be boring tunnels
underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he may interfere with the
operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the
crops above. How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner, go
without encroaching on each other's rights? Where is the dividing line
between the surface and the sub-surface rights?
It is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not
only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above
it up to a reasonable height.
The rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half
agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land
must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural.
In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally
classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral — and
completely mineral — once the mining claims were perfected. As long as
mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did
not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it
was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully
occupying the surface.
Krivenko v Register of Deeds
An alien bought a residential lot and its registration was denied by the
Register of Deeds on the ground that being an alien, he cannot acquire land
in this jurisdiction. When the former brought the case to the CFI, court
rendered judgement sustaining the refusal of the Register of Deeds.
Issue: WON an alien may own private lands in the Philippines.
Held. No. “Public agricultural lands” mentioned in Sec. 1, Art. XIII of the
1935 Constitution, include residential, commercial and industrial lands, the
Court stated:
‘Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not
be alienated,’ and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation
is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving
agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be
defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their
agricultural lands in favor of aliens.
Thus Section 5, Article XIII provides:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural lands will be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
/ Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot from Magdalena
Estate Inc. in December 1941. The registration was interrupted by the war.
In May 1945, he sought to accomplish the said registration but was denied
by the Register of Deeds of Manila on the grounds that he is a foreigner and
he cannot acquire a land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko brought the case to
the CFI of Manila. The CFI ruled that he cannot own a land, being an alien.
Hence, this petition.
Issues
1. Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential
land?
2. Whether or not the prohibitions of the rights to acquire residential lot
that was already of private ownership prior to the approval of this
Constitutions is applicable at the case at bar?
RULING:
1. NO. Under the Article XIII, Section 1, of the Constitution states that:
All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State,
and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. This
means to say that, under the provisions of the Constitutions, aliens are not
allowed to acquire the ownership of urban or residential lands in the
Philippines and, as consequence, all acquisitions made in contravention of
the prohibitions since the fundamental law became effective are null and
void per se and ab initio.
2. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874
sections 120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to acquire private only
by way of reciprocity. It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in
this section refers to all private lands, whether strictly agricultural,
residential or otherwise, there being practically no private land which had
not been acquired by any of the means provided in said two sections.
Therefore, the prohibition contained in these two provisions was, in effect,
that no private land could be transferred to aliens except "upon express
authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands
the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate
land." In other words, aliens were granted the right to acquire private land
merely by way of reciprocity.
//Aliens have no right to acquire any public or private land or private
agricultural, commercial, or residential lands (except by hereditary
succession).
EXCEPTION TO KREVINKO DOCTRINE
Ching Po vs. Court of Appeals
Non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private land or to lands of the
public domain, except by way of legal succession as general rule.
But what is the effect of a subsequent sale by the disqualified alien vendee
to a qualified Filipino citizen?
If the land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a
citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.
De Castro vs. Tan
A residential lot was sold to a Chinese. Upon his death, his widow and
children executed an extrajudicial settlement, whereby said lot was allotted
to one of his sons who became a naturalized Filipino. The Court did not
allow the original vendor to have the sale annulled to recover the property,
for the reason that the land has since become the property of a naturalized
Filipino citizen who is
Collado v CA
Petitioner Collado filed with the land registration court an application for
registration of a parcel of land with an approximate area of 120.0766
hectares ("Lot" for brevity). The Lot is situated in Btgy San Isidro, Antipolo,
Rizal, covered by Survey Plan Psu-162620. Attached to application was
technical description of the Lot as Lot Psu-162620 signed by Robert C.
Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands,
which stated, "[t]his survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed."
Then petitioner Collado filed an Amended
Application to include additional co-applicants. Subsequently, more
applicants joined (collectively referred to as "petitioners" for brevity).
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, and the
Municipality of Antipolo, through its Municipal Attorney and the Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners’ application. Petitioners
alleged that they have occupied the Lot since time immemorial. Their
possession has been open, public, notorious and in the concept of owners.
The Lot was surveyed in the name of Sesinando Leyva, one of their
predecessors-in-interest, as early as March 22, 1902.
ISSUES: Whether petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.
HELD: Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain as well as
all natural resources belong to the State. Watersheds are considered natural
resources which are not susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance
or alienation. The statute of limitations with regard to public land does not
operate against the State

Pajomayo v Manipon
FACTS: On June 5, 1963 the plaintiffs filed in the Court of First Instance of a
complaint alleging that they are co-owners pro-indiviso of the parcel of land
described in the complaint which is covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 1089 in the name of Diego Pajomayo. That they had acquired the land
as an inheritance from their late father Diego Pajomayo; that they and their
predecessor-in-interest had been in actual, peaceful and uninterrupted
possession of said property in the concept of owners for a period of more
than 70 years until the early part of the year 1956 when the defendants
dispossessed them of said property, resulting in their having suffered annual
damages amounting to around P1,100.00 representing the value of the
crops of rice; mongo, corn and vegetables that they failed to harvest;
The defendants alleged that they are the exclusive owners of a parcel of
land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 14043 issued by the office of
the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan, the said land having been adjudicated
to them in the cadastral proceedings of the Malasique. They also claim they
had acquired the land mentioned in their answer by inheritance from their
deceased father Pioquinto Manipon, and that they and their
predecessorsin-interest have been in actual, peaceful, and adverse
possession of said land for more than 70 years, to the exclusion of plaintiffs;
The Court of First Instance of Pangasinan made a finding that Original
Certificate of Title No. 1089 held by the plaintiffs was issued earlier than
Original Certificate of Title No. 14034 held by the defendants.
RTC: "WHEREFORE, the Court, rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
and against the defendants, hereby orders the latter to vacate the land in
question and deliver possession thereof to the former who are entitled
thereto as the heirs of Diego Pajomayo who is hereby declared the legal and
lawful owner of the said property. “The Register of Deeds for Pangasinan is
hereby ordered to cancel de oficio Original Certificate of Title No. 14034.
The defendants contend that the lower court erred in declaring Original
Certificate of Title No. 14034 of herein appellants null and void
notwithstanding the fact that this is not one of the reliefs prayed for by the
appellees.
HELD: The only question to be resolved in the present appeal is: which of
the two original certificates of title should prevail—the No. 1089 held by the
plaintiffs-appellees which was issued in virtue of the homestead patent, or
the No. 14034 held by the defendants-appellants which was issued in
connection with the cadastral proceedings?
Necessarily, when one of the two titles is held to be superior over the other,
one should be declared null and void and should be ordered cancelled. And
if a party is declared to be the owner of a parcel of land pursuant to a valid
certificate of title said party is entitled to the possession of the land covered
by said valid title. The decree of registration issued in the cadastral
proceedings does not have the effect of annulling the title that had
previously been issued in accordance with the provisions of the land
Registration Law (Act 496).
Thus, it has been ruled by this Court that once a homestead patent granted
in accordance with the Public Land Act is registered pursuant to Section 122
of Act 496(Land Registration Act), the certificate of title issued in virtue of
said patent has the force and effect of a Torrens Title under the Land
Registration Act.
It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that where two certificates of title are
issued to different persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the
earlier in date must prevail as between the original parties, and in of
successive registration where more than one certificate is issued over the
land the person holding under the prior certificate is entitled to the land as
against the person who relies on the second certificate.
Republic v CA and Lapina
Spouses de Vega purchased a lot in San Pablo City. At the time of the
purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens.
They then filed an application for registration of title of the two (2) parcels
of land. This time, however, they were no longer Filipino citizens and have
opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization. An
opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have presented
their respective evidence. RTC ruled in favour of the spouses. CA affirmed.
Issue: Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of
land which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the
Philippines, from a vendor who has complied with the requirements
for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
Held: Yes. As petitioner itself argues, Section 48 of the Public Land Act (CA
141) reads: Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance
of a certificate of title therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by wars or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the law employs the
terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or through his predecessor-
in-interest". Thus, it matters not whether the vendee/applicant has
been in possession of the subject property for only a day so long as the
period and/or legal requirements for confirmation of title has been
complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked
to his possession. In the case at bar, respondents' predecessors-
in- interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the disputed land not only since June 12, 1945, but even as
early as 1937. Petitioner does not deny this except that respondent
spouses, in its perception, were in possession of the land sought
to be registered only in 1978 and therefore short of the required length of
time. Open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for
the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land,
upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of
judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private
property. . . . As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as
specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is
deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a
government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and
beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application
for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the
legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the
Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. Nothing can
more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering
possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed
by the statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the
dictum of the statute itself (Section 48 [b]) that the
possessor(s) ". . . shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title ..." No proof bring admissible to overcome a conclusive
presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a
formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claims
is of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder
would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The
proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private
land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of
law from the moment the required period of possession became complete.
As was so well put in Cariño, ". . .(There are indications that registration was
expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it,
ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already
conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. (Emphasis supplied)
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land
is alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated,
must be either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the
Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]). When
the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the
land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant,
without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued (National Power
Corporation v. CA, supra). As such, the land ceases to be a part of the public
domain and goes beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose
of.
In other words, the Torrens system was not established as a means for the
acquisition of title to private land (Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149 SCRA
32 [1987]). It merely confirms, but does not confer ownership. As could be
gleaned from the evidence adduced, private respondents were able to
establish the nature of possession of their predecessors-in-interest. In the
case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino
citizens at the time of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue
thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process, the
possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held
by their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. In
addition, private respondents have constructed a house of strong
materials on the contested property, now occupied by respondent
Lapiñas mother. But what should not be missed in the disposition of this
case is the fact that the Constitution itself allows private respondents to
register the contested parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of
Article XII of the Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to
wit:
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands
shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be
a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.
From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law
has been passed by the legislature on the same subject. Thus, what governs
the disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who
has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185. Even if private
respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they
applied for registration of the properties in question, said properties
as discussed above were already private lands; consequently, there
could be no legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents
in view of what the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land
sought to be registered no longer form part of the public domain. They
are already private in character since private respondents' predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession
and occupation thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or
since 1937. The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a private land
up to a maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if urban,
or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence
(BP 185). It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of
a private land, were natural-born citizens of the Philippines. For
the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of
residential land, it is not significant whether private respondents are no
longer Filipino citizens at
the time they purchased or registered the parcels of land in question. What
is important is that private respondents were formerly natural-born citizens
of the Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for
registration in accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the
Constitution. Considering that private respondents were able to prove
the
requisite period and character of possession of their predecessors-in-
interest over the subject lots, their application for registration of title must
perforce be approved. The dissenting opinion, however, states that the
requirements in BP 185, must also be complied with by private respondents.
Specifically, it refers to Section 6, which provides:
Sec. 6. In addition to the requirements provided for in other laws for the
registration of titles to lands, no private land shall be transferred under this
Act, unless the transferee shall submit to the register of deeds of the
province or city where the property is located a sworn statement showing
the date and place of his birth; the names and addresses of his parents, of
his spouse and children, if any; the area, the location and the mode of
acquisition of his landholdings in the
Philippines, if any; his intention to reside permanently in the Philippines; the
date he lost his Philippine citizenship and the country of which he is
presently a citizen; and such other information as may be required
under Section 8 of this Act. The Court is of the view that the requirements in
Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not apply in the instant case since said requirements
are primarily directed to the register of deeds before whom
compliance therewith is to be submitted.
Nowhere in the provision is it stated, much less implied, that the
requirements must likewise be submitted before the land registration court
prior to the approval of an application for registration of title. An application
for registration of title before a land registration court should not be
confused with the issuance of a certificate of title by the register of deeds. It
is only when the judgment of the land registration court approving the
application for registration has become final that a decree of registration is
issued. And that is the time when the requirements of Sec. 6, BP 185, before
the register of deeds should be complied with by the applicants. This
decree of registration is the one that is submitted to the office of the
register of deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in favor of the
applicant. Prior to the issuance of the decree of registration, the register of
deeds has no participation in the approval of the application for registration
of title as the decree of registration is yet to be issued.
Malabanan v Republic
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land
registration before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land
situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan
claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that
he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and
continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty
(30) years. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a
twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco.
Lino had four sons– Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth
being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the
property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife,
Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by
the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and
Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the
properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle,
Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to
Malabanan.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a
Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment &
Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was
“verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land
Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and
approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.” On 3 December
2002, the RTC approved the application for registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that
Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in
finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and
for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On
23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and
dismissed the appliocation of Malabanan.
ISSUES:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may
be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be
classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient
that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant
for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a
parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land
and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with
the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either
because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be
registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in
relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their
names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree or both?
HELD: The Pertition is denied.
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those
who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership
of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of
their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and
does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable
during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure
judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable
and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the
Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of
acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands
become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained
for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422
of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can
the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public
dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person
acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil
Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may
be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary
acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial
property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and
with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s
uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty
(30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that
Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish
that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that
petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own
evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year
1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for
registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or
disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer
intended for public use service or for the development of the national
evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification
of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under
Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
//On February 20, 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for original
registration of title covering a parcel of land in Silang, Cavite which he
purchased from Eduardo Velazco and that he and his predecessors in
interest had been in open, notorious, exclusive and continuous possession
of the said land for more than 30 years.
Velazco, the vendor, alleges that this land was originally owned by his great-
grandfather which passed down to his four sons. By 1966, one of the sons
became the administrator of the properties which the son of the latter
succeeded his parents. One of the properties therein was the one sold by
the Velazco. They also presented an evidence on the classification of land to
be alienable and disposable by the DENR on March 15, 1982.
The RTC ruled in favor with them, but the CA reversed citing the case of
Republic v Hebierto.
Issue: Whether or not the registration of the property should be allowed
Held: No. Given the length discussions of questions of law, we would need
to dissect them. The case settles down the correct interpretation of Sec. 14
(1) and (2) of PD 1529 along with CA 141
1. It should be noted here first that CA 141, particularly Section 48 (b)
vests the right to ownership to those who satisfy its prerequisites, while PD
1529 Sec 14 (1) recognizes such rights. One did not repeal the other.
2. It is also recognized that the change of the term “alienable and
disposable” from “agricultural” by PD 1073 did limit the lands to be
registered, as we may take a look at Sec. 9 of CA 141.
The Court holds that the correct interpretation for Section 14 (1) is Naguit,
not Herbierto, the latter being only an orbiter dicta to a case where the MTC
did not acquire jurisdiction to settle the original registration. Thus:
1. The requirement of bona fide ownership since June 12, 1945 is
satisfied when at the time of the application, the land is already classified as
alienable and disposable. Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi
impediatur sentencia.
2. A contrary ruling with result to absurdity rendering the presumption
of the right nugatory and the provision inoperative, aggravated by the fact
that at the time the Philippine is still not an independent state.
3. The correct interpretation then is that if the State, at the time the
application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property
for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still
reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even
if in good faith. If the reverse is true, then there is already an intention on
the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
The Court rules that the interpretation for Sec 14 (2) requires a mix of
interpretation of Art. 1113, Art. 1137, and Art. 420-422 of the New Civil
Code.
1. It is well settled, per Art. 1113, that only objects within the
commerce of men and the patrimonial property of the State can be subject
to acquisitive or extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
2. It is also clear that in Arts. 420-422, the property of public dominion
when no longer in use, is converted into patrimonial property, if and only if,
as held in Ignacio vs. Director of Lands or Laurel vs. Garcia, there is a
positive act of the executive or legislative declaring lands to be such.
3. Hence, combining both rulings, it is clear that only when there is a
positive act, regardless if the land was classified as alienable and disposable,
that the land sought to be registered, can be acquired through prescription.
Applying to the case at bar:
1. Sec. 14 (1) is unsatisfied as the earliest tax declarations presented was
1948. No other substantive evidence was presented.
2. Sec. 14 (2) is also unsatisfied as the subject property was declared as
alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no
longer intended for public use service or for the development of the
national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The
classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion
under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition
by prescription.
Amunategui v Director of Forestry
These are two petitions for review on certiorari questioning the decision of
the CA which declared the disputed property as forest land, not subject to
titling in favor of private persons. These petitions have their genesis in an
application for confirmation of imperfect title and its registration filed with
the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The parcel of land sought to be
registered is known as Lot No. 885 of the Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz,
and has an area of 645,703 square meters.
Petitioners Roque Borre and Melquiades Borre, filed the application for
registration. In due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui filed an opposition to
the application of Roque and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they
prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of Pilar Cadastre containing
527,747 square meters be confirmed and registered in the names of said
Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The Director of Forestry, through the Prov. Fiscal
of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the application for registration of title
claiming that the land was mangrove swamp which was still classified as
forest land and part of the public domain. Another oppositor, Emeterio
Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing
117,956 square meters was concerned. Applicant-petitioner Roque Borre
sold whatever rights and interests he may have on Lot No. 885 to Angel
Alpasan. The latter also filed an opposition, claiming that he is entitled to
have said lot registered in his name.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square
meters to Emeterio Bereber and the rest of the land containing 527,747
square meters was adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share to Angel
Alpasan and 1/6 share to Melquiades Borre.
A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui
contending that the disputed lot had been in the possession of private
persons for over 30 years and therefore in accordance with Republic Act No.
1942, said lot could still be the subject of registration and confirmation of
title in the name of a private person in accordance with Act No. 496 known
as the Land Registration Act. Another petition for review on certiorari was
filed by Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, contending that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their complaint against
the Heirs of Jose Amunategui. The Borre complaint was for the annulment
of the deed of absolute sale of Lot No. 885 executed by them in favor of the
Heirs of Amunategui. The complaint was dismissed on the basis of the CA’s
decision that the disputed lot is part of the public domain. The petitioners
also question the jurisdiction of the CA in passing upon the relative rights of
the parties over the disputed lot when its final decision after all is to declare
said lot a part of the public domain classified as forest land.
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified
as forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a “mangrove swamp”.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land, not capable of
registration in the names of the private applicants.
RULING: A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does
not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may
actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or
other farmers. “Forest lands” do not have to be on mountains or in out of
the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and
other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest
land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does
not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and
until the land classified as “forest” is released in an official proclamation to
that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of
the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
Possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private
ownership. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is
needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into
alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised
Administrative Code are found in Lot No. 885 does not divest such land of
its being classified as forest land, much less as land of the public domain.
The appellate court found that in 1912, the land must have been a virgin
forest as stated by Emeterio Bereber’s witness Deogracias Gavacao, and
that as late as 1926, it must have been a thickly forested area as testified by
Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened
by the appellate court’s finding that timber licenses had to be issued to
certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask
for a license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950
that the property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous
warning from the District Forester that the same could not be done because
it was classified as “public forest.”
The court affirmed the finding that property Lot No. 885 is part of the public
domain, classified as public forest land. Petitions were DISMISSED.
/Facts:
There were two petitions for review on certiorari questioning the decision
of the Court of Appeals which declared the disputed property as forest land,
not subject to titling in favor of private persons, Borre and Amunategui.
The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an
opposition to the application for registration of title claiming that the land
was mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of
the public domain. Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition
insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956 square meters was
concerned and prayed that title to said portion be confirmed and registered
in his name.
Issue: WON the lot in question can be subject of registration and
confirmation of title in the name of the private person.
Held: The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the
appellate court's finding that timber licenses had to be issued to certain
licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a
license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the
property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning
from the District Forester that the same could not be done because it was
classified as "public forest”. A forested area classified as forest land of the
public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or
settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. "Forest lands" do not have
to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea
water may also be classified as forest land. The possession of forest lands,
no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. Therefore, the lot
in question never ceased to be classified as forest land of public domain.
Republic v Southside Homeowners Association Inc
The subject matter of these proceedings for declaration of nullity of title are
parcels of land with a total area of 39.99 hectares, more or less, known as
the JUSMAG housing area in Fort Bonifacio where, military officers, both in
the active and retired services, and their respective families, have been
occupying housing units and facilities originally constructed by the AFP.
Private respondent SHAI is a non-stock corporation organized mostly by
wives of AFP military officers. Records show that SHAI was able to secure
from the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal a title – Transfer
Certificate of Title in its name to the bulk of, if not the entire, JUSMAG area.
The Rizal Registry issued TCT No. 15084 on October 30, 1991on the basis of
a notarized Deed of Sale purportedly executed on the same date by then
Director Abelardo G. Palad, Jr. of the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) in
favor of SHAI.The total purchase price as written in the conveying deed was
P11,997,660.00 or P30.00 per square meter
It appears that in the process of the investigation conducted by the
Department of Justice on reported land scams at the FBMR, a copy of the
aforesaid October 30, 1991deed of sale surfaced and eventually referred to
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination. The results of
the examination undertaken by NBI Document Examiner Eliodoro
Constantino reveals that the puported signatures in the document are
forgeries.
On October 16, 1993, then President Fidel V.Ramos issued Memorandum
Order No. 173 directing the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to institute
action towards the cancellation of TCT No. 15084 and the title acquired by
the Navy Officer’s Village Association (NOVA) over a bigger parcel within the
reservation. A month later, the OSG, in behalf of the petitioner Republic,
filed with the RTC of Pasig City the corresponding nullification and
cancellation of title suit against the private respondent SHAI, purported
signature thereon of Palad is a forgery; b) there are no records with the LMB
of (i) the application to purchase and (ii) the alleged payment of the
purchase price; and c) the property in question is inalienable, being part of a
military reservation established under Proclamation No. 423.
On pre-trial the Republic, as plaintiff therein, marked (and later offered in
evidence)the Deed of Sale dated October 30, 1991 as its Exhibit "A,"and TCT
No. 15084 as Exhibit "B."Respondent, then defendant SHAI adopted
Exhibits "A" and “B” as its Exhibits "1" and “2,” respectively.
During the trial, the Republic presented as expert witness NBI Document
Examiner Eliodoro Constantino who testified on NBI QDR No. 815-1093 and
asserted that the signature of Palad in Exhibit “A” is a forgery. For his part,
Palad dismissed as forged his signature appearing in the same document
and denied ever signing the same, let alone in front of a notary public
holding office outside of the LMB premises. Pressing the point, Palad stated
that he could not have had signed the conveying deed involving as it did a
reservation area which, apart from its being outside of the LMB’s
jurisdiction, is inalienable in the first place.
For its part, then defendant SHAI presented an opposing expert witness in
the person of Police Inspector Redencion Caimbon who testified that Palad’s
signature in Exhibit “A” is genuine. Mrs. Virginia Santos, then SHAI
president, likewise testified, saying that applications to purchase were
signed and then filed with the LMB by one Engr. Eugenia Balis, followed by
the payment in full of the contract price.
Eventually, in a decision dated October 7, 1997, the trial court rendered
judgment dismissing the Republic’s complaint as it considered the parcels
covered by the deed in question as no longer part of the FBMR. Therefrom,
the Republic went on appeal to the CA which affirmed in toto that of the
trial court.
Hence, this petition of the Republic.
ISSUE: Was the JUSMAG area, during the period material, alienable or
inalienable, as the case may be, and, therefore, can or cannot be subject of
a lawful private conveyance?
RULING:
Petitioner Republic, correctly asserts the inalienable character of the
JUSMAG area, the same having not effectively been separated from the
military reservation and declared as alienable and disposable. The
President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources, may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of
land of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Republic or any
of its branches, or for quasi-public uses or purposes. Such tract or tracts of
land thus reserved shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to sale or
other disposition until again declared alienable. Consistent with the
foregoing postulates, jurisprudence teaches that a military reservation, like
the FBMR, or a part thereof is not open to private appropriation or
disposition and, therefore, not registrable, unless it is in the meantime
reclassified and declared as disposable and alienable public land. And until a
given parcel of land is released from its classification as part of the military
reservation zone and reclassified by law or by presidential proclamation as
disposable and alienable, its status as part of a military reservation
remains,even if incidentally it is devoted for a purpose other than as a
military camp or for defense. The same is true in this case.
There is no doubt that the JUSMAG area subject of the questioned October
30, 1991sale formed part of the FBMR as originally established under
Proclamation No. 423. And while private respondent SHAI would
categorically say that the petitioner Republic had not presented evidence
that “subject land is within military reservation,”and even dared to state
that the JUSMAG area is the private property of the government and
therefore removed from the concept of public domain per se its own
evidence themselves belie its posture as their evidence both the TCT and
the Deed of Sale technically described the property as situated in Jusmag
area located at Fort Bonifacio which is now renamed Fort Mckinley a
declared a military reservation.
The Republic has, since the filing of its underlying complaint, invoked
Proclamation No. 423. In the process, it has invariably invited attention to
the proclamation’s specific area coverage to prove the nullity of TCT No.
15084, inasmuch as the title embraced a reserved area considered
inalienable, and hence, beyond the commerce of man.
The October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale purportedly executed by Palad, assuming
its authenticity, could not plausibly be the requisite classifying medium
converting the JUSMAG area into a disposable parcel. And private
respondent SHAI’s unyielding stance that would have the Republic in
estoppel to question the transfer to it by the LMB Director of the JUSMAG
area is unavailing. It should have realized that the Republic is not usually
estopped by the mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents.
Since the parcels of land in question allegedly sold to the private respondent
are, or at least at the time of the supposed transaction were, still part of the
FBMR, the purported sale is necessarily void ab initio. Moreover, Article XII,
Section 3[of the 1987 Constitution forbids private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain, except through
lease for a limited period.
The interplay of compelling circumstances and inferences deducible from
the case, also cast doubt on the authenticity of such deed, if not support a
conclusion that the deed is spurious.
1. Palad categorically declared that his said signature on the deed is a
forgery. The NBI signature expert corroborated Palad’s allegation on
forgery.Respondent SHAI’s expert witness from the PNP, however, disputes
the NBI’s findings. In net effect, both experts from the NBI and the PNP
cancel each other out.
2.Palad signed the supposed deed of sale in Manila, possibly at the LMB
office at Plaza Cervantes, Binondo. Even if he acted in an official capacity,
Palad nonetheless proceeded on the same day to Pasig City to appear
before the notarizing officer. The deed was then brought to the Rizal
Registry and there stamped “Received” by the entry clerk. That same
afternoon, or at 3:14 p.m. of October 30, 1991to be precise, TCT No. 15084
was issued. In other words, the whole conveyance and registration process
was done in less than a day. The very unusual dispatch is quite surprising.
Stranger still is why a bureau head, while in the exercise of his functions as
the bureau’s authorized contracting officer, has to repair to another city just
to have a deed notarized.
3. There is absolutely no record of the requisite public land application to
purchase required under Section 89 of the Public Land Act. There is also no
record of the deed of sale and of documents usually accompanying an
application to purchase, inclusive of the investigation report and the
property valuation. The Certification under the seal of the LMB bearing date
November 24, 1994 and issued/signed by Alberto Recalde, OIC, Records
Management Division of the LMB pursuant to a subpoena issued by the trial
court attest to this fact of absence of records. Atty. Alice B. Dayrit, then
Chief, Land Utilization and Disposition Division, LMB, testified having
personally looked at the bureau record book, but found no entry pertaining
to SHAI.
4. In its Answer as defendant a quo, respondent SHAI states that the “deed
of sale specifically meritorious Official Receipt No. 6030203 as evidence of
full payment of the agreed purchase price” An official receipt (O.R.) is
doubtless the best evidence to prove payment. While it kept referring to
O.R. No. 6030203 as its evidence of the required payment, it failed to
present and offer the receipt in evidence. We can thus validly presume that
no such OR exists or, if it does, that its presentation would be adverse to
SHAI.
A contract of sale is void where the price, which appears in the document
as paid has, in fact, never been paid.
5. The purchase price was, according to the witnesses for SHAI, paid in full in
cash to the cashier of the LMB the corresponding amount apparently
coming in a mix of P500 and P100 denominations. Albeit plausible, SHAI’s
witnesses’ account taxes credulity to the limit.
TCT No. 15084 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal issued on the basis of such
Deed are declared void and cancelled
Republic v CA and Republic real estate corp
On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all
municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own
expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any
foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide, construct,
maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as
such municipalities and chartered cities may determine in consultation with
the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.
Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay
for the reclamation of foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and entered
into an agreement with Republic Real Estate Corporation for the said
project.
Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that the
agreement between RREC and the City of Pasay was void for the object of
the contract is outside the commerce of man, it being a foreshore land.
Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the
commerce of man because RA 1899 gives a broader meaning on the term
“foreshore land” than that in the definition provided by the dictionary.
RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision
was affirmed by the CA with modifications.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged
area.
II. Whether or not “foreshore land” and the reclaimed area is within the
commerce of man.
HELD:
The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the opinion
of the respondent court that the term “foreshore land” includes the
submerged areas. To repeat, the term "foreshore lands" refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is
alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a
seashore between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a
low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually
marked by a beach scarp or berm.(Webster's Third New International
Dictionary)
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing,
we cannot broaden its meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If
the intention of Congress were to include submerged areas, it should
have provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only signify
the exclusion of submerged areas from the term “foreshore lands.”
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121,
as amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have
been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and
therefore ultra vires and null and void.
Republic v CA and Del Rio
FACTS: The subject land in this case is situated 20 meters away from the
shores of Laguna de Bay. Said land was owned by Benedicto del Rio. After
the death of Benedicto, the land was acquired by his son Santos Del Rio. The
private oppositors in this case sought and obtained permission from Santos
Del Rio to construct duck houses on said land. The private oppositors,
however, violated their agreement and instead constructed residential
houses thereon. Santos then filed an ejectment suit against the private
oppositors and later on sought to register the land. Meanwhile, private
oppositors simultaneously filed their respective sales applications with
Bureau of Lands, and they opposed Santos del Rio’s application for
registration.
The CFI of Laguna dismissed the application for registration. Applicant
appealed and obtained a favourable judgment from the Court of Appeals.
The Director of Lands and the private oppositors filed their respective
petitions for review on said decision to the Supreme Court.
The Director of Lands contends that since a portion of the land is covered
with water four to five months a year, the same is part of the lake bed of
Laguna de Bay and therefore it cannot be the subject of registration.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the parcel of land in question is public land; and
2. Whether or not applicant private respondent has registerable title to the
land.
HELD: The inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux
of tides." It cannot be considered a foreshore land, hence it is not a public
land and therefore capable of registration as private property provided that
the applicant proves that he has a registerable title. The purpose of land
registration under the Torrens System is not the acquisition of lands but
only the registration of title which applicant already
possesses over the land.
While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of
ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence
of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by
prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the
property. Applicant by himself and
through his father before him, has been in open, continuous, public, peacef
ul, exclusive and adverse possession of the disputed land for more than
thirty (30) years and has presented tax declarations and tax receipts.
Applicant has more than satisfied the legal requirements. Thus, he is clearly
entitled to the registration in his favor of said land.
Republic v Regulto
Spouses Regulto own a parcel of land which they acquired by virtue of a
deed of absolute sale. The subject property originated from a Free Patent
property. Sometime in April 2011, DPWH apprised the spouses that the
construction of its road project will traverse their property. DPWH offered
them just compensation. However, DPWH withdrew its offer because the
title of their land originated from a Free Patent title, which contained a
reservation in favour of the government of an easement of right of way to
60 meters for public highways and similar works that the government or any
public or quasi-public service enterprise may reasonably require for carrying
on their business, with payment of damages for the improvements only. The
spouses filed a complaint for payment of proper just compensation,
damages with prayer for issuance of TPO and/or writ of preliminary
injunction against the petitioners. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground that the spouses do not have cause of action, however the RTC
denied it. Petitioners filed a motion for the issuance of the writ of
possession of the subject property in their favour, which the RTC affirmed.
The RTC dismissed the Motion for Reconsideration of the spouses and
ordered the petitioners to pay the spouses just compensation for the
affected portion.
Issue: Whether the petitioners are liable for just compensation in enforcing
the Government’s legal easement of right-of- way on the subject property,
which originated from the 7,159 sq. m. of public land awarded by free
patent to the predecessor-in- interest of the Spouses Regulto.
Held: Partially Granted. The Court held that a legal easement of right-of-
way exists in favour of the Government over the land that was originally a
public land awarded by free patent even if the land is subsequently sold to
another. Lands granted by patent shall be subject to a right-of- way not
exceeding 60m. in width for public highways, irrigation ditches, aqueducts
and other similar works of the government or any public enterprise, free of
charge, except only for the value of the improvement existing thereon that
may be affected. The reservation contained in the OCT of lands granted by
free patent is not limited by any time period, thus, the same is subsisting.
This belies the supposition that the Government waived the enforcement of
its legal easement of right-of- way on the subject property when it did not
oppose the subdivision of the property in 1995. Although petitioners are not
obliged to pay just compensation, they are not free from any liability as to
the consequences of enforcing the said right-of- way, considering that more
than half of the property shall be devoted to the bypass road. They are
liable to pay just compensation for the remaining area.
Land Bank of the Philippines v Republic
On September 26, 1969, an original certificate of title was issue in favor of
Bugayong, which emanated from a sales patent issued in Bugayong's name
on September 22, 1969. The original certificate of title was cancelled and
was replaced by 4 transfer certificate of titles, all in the name of
Bugayong. Bugayong then sold all 4 lots to different people.
One of the lots was sold to the spouses Du. Afterwards, Du divided the land
into 2 lots. One of the lots was sold to Lourdes Farms, Inc., who then
mortgaged the property to Land Bank of the Philippines.
The validity of the original certificate of title was then question by some
residents of the land who filed a formal petition before the Bureau of Lands.
Issues:
Whether or not the original certificate of title issued on September 26, 1969
is valid.
Whether or no the mortgage agreement of Lourdes Farms, Inc. and Land
Bank of the Philippines is valid.
Held:
The Bureau of Lands found out that at the time the sales patent was issued
to Bugayong, the land was still classified as a forest zone; it was declared as
alienable and disposable land only on March 25, 1981. Forest lands cannot
be owned by private persons and is not registrable under the land
registration law. Thus, the original certificate of title is invalid as the it was
issued when the land was still classified as a forest zone.

The subject land, being a public domain, cannot be encumbered, attached,

or be the subject to levy and sold at public auction to satisfy a
judgment. Hence, the mortgage agreement is invalid.