Government Information Quarterly 30 (2013) S46–S58

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Government Information Quarterly

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Interdisciplinary application of structuration theory for e-government: A case study

of an IT-enabled budget reform
Gabriel Puron-Cid ⁎
Centro de Investigación y Docencias Económicas, A.C., Circuito Tecnopolo Norte s/n, Colonia Hacienda Nueva, Pocitos, 20313 Aguascalientes, Ags, Mexico

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Available online 6 December 2012 e-Government projects might fail when neglecting their multidisciplinary, complex and unstructured reality.
Interdisciplinary interaction of actors and integration of multiple structures during e-government adoption
Keywords: have made difficult for both practitioners in practice and scholars in theory. Different structuration theory
Structuration theory (ST) models have contributed to understand this phenomenon. This article proposed an interdisciplinary
Electronic government structuration theory (IST) by integrating relevant structures based on a better understanding of the
Interdisciplinary
interacting disciplines of the e-government initiative. The IST has advantages over other models because it
provides a detailed description of the case; integrates relevant structures and multiple actors' views; incor-
porates an alternative methodological bracketing of practices; and operationalizes the discursive conscious-
ness. This study examines the model by using the case of an IT-enabled budget reform in Mexico as a
contemporary case of e-government. An embedded case study design was employed using interviews of ac-
tors and analysis of official documents. Results show a broader set of interacting structures not just technol-
ogy that were possible to identify and examine by considering other disciplines. Only a subset of formal
practices prescribed for systems and policy was effectively adopted while new informal practices were
enacted. Among all, practices of collaboration, knowledge and trust were the most critical practices in the
case. Several outcomes of interaction were identified. From these findings, practical recommendations are
advised in the modalities of communication, power, and sanction.
© 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction adopted information technologies exclusively. e-Government projects

Many governments have adopted e-government initiatives to ac-
hieve different and sometimes competing goals: cost-savings, efficiency,
better public services, accountability, communication with stakeholders,
and other internal management benefits (Clemons, Reddi, & Row, 1993;
Gant, 2004; Gil-Garcia, 2005; OECD, 2003). In times of financial crises
and the needs for cost savings, “doing more with less” by using technol-
ogy has been the trite slogan. However in practice, e-government
projects might fail because of the multidisciplinary, complex and un-
structured ways these initiatives are presented in reality making integra-
tion and interdisciplinary interaction difficult in practice and in theory
(Heeks, 2006; Scholl, 2009; Van Veenstra, Janssen, & Tan, 2010).
Structuration theory (ST) has been used to build more integrated
frameworks including different structures and actors involved in
e-government and information systems (Basettihalli, Kim, Lee, & Noh,
2010; DeSanctis & Poole, 1994; Orlikowski, 2000; Walsham & Han,
1993). These efforts contribute to our understanding of e-government
mechanisms of success and failure, but neglect other interacting struc-
tures and actors involved in the phenomenon from other fields (Jones
& Karsten, 2008; Puron-Cid, 2010). e-Government initiatives are not
⁎ Fax: (5255) 5727-9873.
E-mail address: gabriel.puron@cide.edu.
are usually comprehensive sets of technological, organizational, adminis-
trative, and process innovations with applications in various areas of
government such as accounting, security, education, health, and service
delivery, to name a few. However, existing ST frameworks have placed
the technological component at the heart of the structuration process
and specifying everything else in compounded contextual or organiza-
tional characteristics. Giddens makes no emphasis on what structures
supersede others; nor does he specify a way to extend his theory in a par-
ticular field like e-government that is characterized with multiple inter-
actions between disciplines in practice. Therefore, the purpose of this
article is to develop an application to study e-government from an inter-
disciplinary perspective. Depending on the type of e-government, rele-
vant structures interacting in this projects detected by other disciplines
and fields need to be considered in e-government practice and conse-
quently in theory. Therefore, an interdisciplinary theoretical framework
of ST that better serves to understand the multiple structures interacting
in e-government, but detected from other disciplines different than in-
formation systems, is needed (Puron-Cid, 2010; Van Veenstra et al.,
2010). This paper develops an application of ST to study e-government
from an interdisciplinary perspective (now referred as interdisciplinary
structuration theory—IST).
In the field of e-government, ST applications have proofed several
advantages (Basettihalli et al., 2010; Seal, 2003; Van Veenstra et al.,

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 G. Puron-Cid / Government Information Quarterly 30 (2013) S46–S58 S47

2010; Walsham & Han, 1993): develop detailed descriptions of a case; named the interdisciplinary structuration theory (IST), with the pur-
describe and integrate the multiple structures involved; incorporate pose of: developing a detailed description of a case; integrating mul-
perspectives from different actors; identify practices as facilitators tiple and relevant structures, incorporating multiple perspectives
or inhibitors of adoption; and understand continuity or transforma- from different actors using a different methodological bracketing
tion in social structures. The IST contributes with the existing ST between reformer and implementer standpoints; operationalizing
analysis by integrating relevant structures from other disciplines the concepts of the original ST framework including the stratification
according to the type of e-government initiative and the context in model; and, providing solid basis for interdisciplinary framework
which this initiative is implemented. The complement of the IST pro- for the structuration process. The differences between the existing
vides a more solid interdisciplinary framework for ST. By using the IST ST frameworks and the proposed IST framework are not in the appli-
model, this study examines the adoption in practice of an IT-enabled cations of the concepts that traditionally characterized this theory.
budget reform in Mexico as a contemporary case of e-government The main differences between these models come from the sources
initiative. Since the late 1980s, Mexican government has reformed of knowledge in which these components were developed: mainly
its budget system involving new information systems and managerial from information systems and organizational studies literature
techniques. The last of these reforms, known as PbR-SED for its Span- (see summary of differences in Table 1). The main differences are in
ish abbreviation of “Budgeting based on Results-Performance Evalua- terms of the interdisciplinary scope of the IST, but other differences
tion System”, was recently designed and enacted in 2008 and its derived from the bracketing between formal and informal practices,
purpose is to transform the way agencies spend public resources structures, modes, and dimensions. Another distinguished variation
based on results and cost savings. The PbR-SED represents an ongoing is that the IST operationalized reflexive monitoring and rationaliza-
and complex transformation and is expected to condense the com- tion components of the stratification model, while existing ST models
ponents of the IST model. Two reformer agencies and three im- only recognize them as individual properties.
plementer agencies were analyzed to understand the intended As in the ST framework, the IST model characterizes social systems
transformation on public administration and the uneven level of as constituted by human agency through daily practices, and yet at the
adoption. The structure of the paper contains six sections including same time these practices are the media of the constitution of struc-
these introductory comments. The second section presents the IST tures (Giddens, 1979, p. 5). This is what is meant by duality of struc-
framework. The third section details research methods. The fourth ture. Structures are sets of “rules and resources, organised as
section discusses the case of the IT-enabled budget reform in Mexico. properties of social systems” (Giddens, 1979, p. 66). Human agents
A summary of results and discussion is provided in the fifth section. are “knowledgeable and capable agents who reflexively monitor
The sixth section draws some conclusions. Finally, some practical rec- their action” (Bryant & Jary, 2001, p. 12). Structuration is a continuous
ommendations are provided in the seventh section drawn from the process involving the “conditions governing the continuity or trans-
study's main findings. formation of structures, and therefore the reproduction of systems
[enacted by human agents]” (Giddens, 1979, p. 66). Social systems
2. Interdisciplinary structuration theory (IST) are sets of properties that human agents adopt in daily practice in
the form of rules and resources in three modes: signification,
ST is a general social theory that has been used in many different
disciplines and research fields. 1 However, the multiple uses and appli- Table 1
Differences between existing ST models and proposed IST model.
cations of ST have been departmentalized according to the scholars' dis-
Source: Own preparation.
ciplinary traditions and focus (Bryant & Jary, 2001). Jones and Karsten
(2008: p. 128) indicate variation on these applications because of the Existing ST models Proposed IST model
different disciplinary lenses and the lack of advice from the original Social Constituted by human Constituted by human agency while
Giddens' framework.2 This paper considers that these differences of ST systems agency while adopting adopting technology in a particular
applications across disciplines obey the attention that each discipline technology context.
Practice Medium of this constitution: Medium of this constitution: formal
pays on a particular set of structures, neglecting other critical structures design practices and user practices and informal practices.
that were detected from other disciplinary perspectives but that cer- practices.
tainly interact in the reality of e-government adoption. Human Designers and users Reformers: designers, top executives,
e-Government adoption is not in vacuum. The structures involved agents project leaders, reformer agencies,
etc.
in these types of projects depend on the type of initiative and the con-
Implementers: users, managers,
text in which they are embedded. The approach then is to consider budgeters, planners, implementer
the nature of e-government project to subsequently analyze the mul- agencies, etc.
tiple structures involved. The purpose of this study is to return the Structures Structures found relevant in Structures found relevant in
contextual nature of the ST frameworks for the study e-government information systems information systems adoption
adoption situated in a particular context. Other
by taking an interdisciplinary perspective that occurs naturally in pertinent structures found relevant in
practice, but that needs to be built consequently in theory. This other disciplines may be added.
paper develops an application of ST for the field of e-government, Structuration Methodological bracketing Methodological bracketing between
between designer and user' reformer and implementer' practices.
1 practices
There are ST applications used in the fields of accounting and budgeting (MacIntosh &
Modes Signification, domination, Signification, domination, and
Scapens, 1990; Scapens & MacIntosh, 1996), information systems (Orlikowski, 1992,
and legitimation legitimation.
2000), and inter-organizational studies (Sydow & Windeler, 1998). Other ST applications
Dimensions Communication, power, and Communication, power, and
have been used to study particular phenomena or areas like budget reforms (Van Reeth,
sanction sanction.
2002), advanced technology use (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994), and e-government
Stratification Recognized, but not included Operationalized in terms of
(Basettihalli et al., 2010; Seal, 2003; Van Veenstra et al., 2010; Walsham & Han, 1993).
2 model in corresponding individual properties of reflexive
For example, in some ST applications, the analysis starts on conditions of human
frameworks monitoring (trust) and
action (Walsham & Han, 1993), while others begin on influences from social structures
rationalization (knowledge).
(Orlikowski, 1992; Van Reeth, 2002). Some models conceptualize social structure as
Motivation was not included for
“embodied” in artifacts (i.e. technology or budget) (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994; Van
difficulties of observation.
Reeth, 2002), while others, social structures are “enacted” in practice by human agents
Perspective Information systems or Interdisciplinary perspectives
(Orlikowski, 2000). There are also different epistemological and methodological de-
organizational perspectives depending on the type of
signs. Recent applications of Adapted Structuration Theory are positivist while other
e-government initiative and context.
applications are interpretivist (Jones & Karsten, 2008, pp. 141–142).
S48 G. Puron-Cid / Government Information Quarterly 30 (2013) S46–S58

domination and legitimation (Giddens, 1979). Practices of signification Table 2

are interpretive schemes that human agents exercise in terms of com- Taxonomy of properties.
Source: Own preparation.
munication of categories, assumptions, and interpretations. Practices
of domination are adopted through facilities that include controls Properties Factors in the literature
over people, resources, and technology. Practices of legitimation are Contextual Social, economic, political and institutional
enacted through norms, codes of conduct, values, ideals and rights factors (Dawes & Eglene, 2008; Fountain,
to hold others accountable. Human agents reproduce the properties 2001; Gil-Garcia, 2005; Grizzle & Pettijohn,
2002; Melkers & Willoughby, 2001; Pardo,
of social systems only in social interaction with others (Giddens,
Cresswell, Thompson, & Zhang, 2006; Pollitt
1984). This interaction produces outcomes that eventually change or & Bouckaert, 2000; Van Reeth, 2002)
last the existing properties of the social system in three dimensions: Organizational From organizational culture, characteristics
communication, power, and sanction (Giddens, 1979). Outcomes of and jurisdiction (Dawes & Pardo, 2002;
communication are results in communication of meanings. Outcomes Gil-Garcia, 2005; Grizzle & Pettijohn, 2002;
Ingraham, 2007; Melkers & Willoughby,
of power are results in controls over people and resources. Outcomes
2001; Pardo, Gil-Garcia, & Burke, 2006b;
of sanction are result in evaluative judgment of conduct or sanction. Pardo et al., 2007; Van Reeth, 2002) to the
The IST framework considers the stratification model that classifies level of standard setting and strategic
human action in three ways: reflexive monitoring, rationalization, alignment (Dawes & Pardo, 2002; Fountain,
2001; Gil-Garcia, 2005; Pardo, Cresswell,
and motivation. Reflexive monitoring refers to the intentional or pur-
Dawes, & Burke, 2004; Van Reeth, 2002)
posive character of human action as a continuous process of routine Relevant discipline [budgeting] Reform strategies, format, procedures and
monitoring of their daily tasks, the environment, and others' actions. functions (Schick, 2008; Van Reeth, 2002)
Rationalization is how human agents articulate reasons for action by Information systems Characteristics of information architecture,
considering their stock of knowledge. Motivation represents desires data integration and interoperability (Dawes,
Helbig, & Gil-García, 2004; Pardo et al., 2004)
and needs of actors. Rationalization and reflexive monitoring happen
Collaboration Authority, leadership, governance and
in practical and discursive consciousness, and motivation is uncon- resource sharing (Dawes & Préfontaine,
scious (Giddens, 1979, p. 2). Practical consciousness and motivation 2003; De Lancer Julnes & Holzer, 2001;
are excluded of the IST model due to their difficulty of observation. Eglene, Dawes, & Schneider, 2007; Grizzle &
Pettijohn, 2002; Melkers & Willoughby,
The development of the IST framework followed several steps.
2001; Pardo et al., 2007; Schick, 2008; Van
First step, identification of potential disciplines involved in the Reeth, 2002)
e-government project was made. Not all e-government initiatives Rationalization Knowledge (Bouty, 2000; Fountain, 2001;
have similar characteristics and engage the same disciplines. Informa- Grizzle & Pettijohn, 2002; Karahanna &
tion systems and e-government are natural fields, but for the nature Watson, 2006; Lüder, 1992; Melkers &
Willoughby, 2001; Pardo, Cresswell,
of the IT-enabled budget reform other fields might be considered rel-
Thompson, & Zhang, 2006; Schick, 2008; Van
evant to revise. 3 For the purpose of demonstration of the application Reeth, 2002)
of the IST in the case examined in this paper, the field of budgeting Reflexive monitoring Trust (Elgarah et al., 2005; Grizzle & Pettijohn,
was only selected, but other areas may be added like accounting, pub- 2002; Pardo et al., 2004; Schick, 2008)
lic finance, management, etc. Second step, a review of literature of rel-
evant disciplines(s) was conducted to identify the multiple structures
influencing (referred as factors) or being influenced by (referred as their daily life at the level of face-to-face interaction. Informal prac-
outcomes) the adoption of e-government. The concepts of discursive tices are new and enacted without prescription.
consciousness such as rationalization and reflexive monitoring were How the IST model works? Fig. 1 graphically shows the IST model
reviewed as factors and outcomes in the literature, but related to for e-government. Because of the bracketing proposed, the initial
the concepts of knowledge and trust respectively. Table 2 shows the point of the structuration analysis starts when reformer agents
taxonomy of factors in seven main domains: contextual, organiza- prescribed formal practices based on different structures involved in
tional, budgeting, information systems, collaboration, knowledge the e-government initiative. These formal practices are the set of
and trust. Table 3 shows the taxonomy of outcomes found in the liter- rules and resources expected to be regular practices adopted by
ature and were classified in three dimensions: communication, power implementers. Based on trust, implementer agencies reflexively mon-
and sanction. This review served not only to develop a more complete itor the structural properties of the project, their environment, and
IST model, but also to build taxonomy of concepts for this research. the actions of others. Based on knowledge, implementers verbalize
Because structuration implies a continuous process between these properties as a way to rationalize its multiple structures and in-
structures and human action, Giddens explicitly suggests a methodo- teractions with other actors during its adoption. Implementers un-
logical bracketing (Giddens, 1979, pp. 94–95). ST applications brack- evenly enact these properties into their everyday practice in three
eted the structuration process in terms of different roles of agents for modes: signification, domination and legitimation. The reproduction
analytical purposes. 4 Fourth step, the proposed bracketing in this
paper is in terms of types of practice: formal or “official” practices
and informal practices. Formal practices are prescribed by reformer Table 3
agents of e-government initiative and have intentions for the adop- Taxonomy of outcomes.
Source: Own preparation.
tion of a transformation at the level of collectivities. Formal practices
can be adopted in two ways: adopted as prescribed, and unevenly Outcomes Outcomes in the literature
adopted. Informal practices are enacted by implementer agents into Communication Communication and information access with stakeholders
(Clemons et al., 1993; Melkers & Willoughby, 2001; Wang, 2002)
3 Power Efficiency and cost savings (Garson, 2004; Gil-Garcia, 2005;
Because of the intensive informational content and use in the budget process, in-
Gil-Garcia & Pardo, 2005; Ingraham, 2007; Melkers & Willoughby,
formation systems have become central to budgeting operations in organizations,
2001; Van Reeth, 2002); public service improvement (Gil-Garcia,
and vice versa (Melkers & Willoughby, 2001; OECD, 2007).
4 2005; Melkers & Willoughby, 2001); and internal management
For example, Walsham and Han (1993) identified reformer agencies at the federal
benefits for agencies (Dawes & Pardo, 2002; Gant, 2004; Melkers &
level and implementer groups at the state agencies; Orlikowski (2000) implicitly
Willoughby, 2001; Van Reeth, 2002)
bracketed her structuration analysis by considered designers and users' actions; Seal
Sanction Strengthening accountability (Gil-Garcia, 2005; Grizzle & Pettijohn,
(2003) bracketed between local government legislations, councils, management, etc.
2002; Van Reeth, 2002; Wang, 2002)
along the service delivery process.
 G. Puron-Cid / Government Information Quarterly 30 (2013) S46–S58 S49

Social System of Human Agency

Discursive Consciousness
e-government
Reflexive Monitoring (Trust)

Rationalization (Knowledge)

Multiple
Structures
Structural Properties Structural Modalities Outcomes of Interaction
(Factors) (Dimensions) (Measurements)

Contextual Signification Communication

Practices or Organizational Domination Power
Routines
Relevant Discipline Legitimation Sanction
[Budgeting]

Information Systems

Collaboration

Formal Practices Formal Practices Formal Practices Informal Practices

Prescribed by Adopted as Prescribed by Unevenly Adopted by Newly Enacted by
Reformer Agents Implementer Agents Implementer Agents Implementer Agents

Fig. 1. IST model for e-government.

of these properties produces outcomes of communication, power or
sanction. The IST describes the structuration process as an uneven
adoption of structural properties prescribed by reformers enacted
by implementers into their routines.
3. Research methods
Researchers have the challenge to understand a multiple set of em-
bedded units, levels of analysis, and pieces of evidence dispersed across
different organizations and actors engaged in complex phenomena like
budget reforms (Van Reeth, 2002). In order to cope with this complexity,
this study adopted the embedded case study (ECS) proposed by Scholz
and Tietje (2002). This design offered flexibility to draw upon a variety
of complementary and converging data from multiple sources of evi-
dence (Scholz & Tietje, 2002). The case selected known as PbR-SED
was enacted and implemented by the federal government in Mexico in
May 8, 2008 and still ongoing in various agencies. The PbR-SED offered
a convenient and contemporary case of adoption of a budget reform
and condensed various concepts of the taxonomies of the IST model re-
ferred in Tables 2 and 3. These tables served as reference for coding,
not as deductive and strict fit-on codes. The case provided enough data
to code the categories of these taxonomies. In particular, this study
conducted a document analysis of various official sources including relat-
ed laws, manuals, presentations, training material and memos, and 30
semi-structured interviews of executives of reformer and implementer
agencies during October and November 2009 (see Table 4). The official
sources served to code formal practices of reformer agents, while inter-
views served to code informal practices of implementer agents.
The ECS requires an architecture to organize different components of
this research by ensembling the concepts of the IST model with the
Table 4
Reformer and implementer agencies studied.
Source. Own preparation.
Type of agency Name of agency Number of participants
Reformer agents Ministry of Finance (SHCP) 15
Comptroller's Office (SFP) 4 in Mexico
Implementer agents Agency 1 4
Agency 2 4 In Mexico, the budgetary system has been subject of experimenta-
Agency 3 3 tion through various reforms towards the coupling of performance
Total of participants 30
mixed qualitative methods used to collect data in three levels: (1) case
level, (2) synthesis level, and (3) subproject level (Scholz & Tietje,
2002). The case level describes background, features, context, and
process. The synthesis level examines the concepts of the taxonomies
in Tables 2 and 3 that require a more detailed level of inquiry. The
subproject level represents a lower data-level of research work of
collecting, organizing and coding different sources of data through the
taxonomy of concepts. The case and synthesis levels are developed in
further sections while the subproject level was only used for data collec-
tion and coding. Five organizations were selected based on their role in
their PbR-SED project: two agencies performing the role of reformer
agents and three agencies performing the role of implementer agents
with different sizes and responsibilities. For confidentiality and privacy
purposes the names of participants and their ascription are omitted.
The names of reformer agencies are revealed due to the difficulty to dis-
guise in terms of the comments made by their participants. The names of
implementer agencies are substituted by agencies 1, 2 and 3.
Data analysis involved triangulation between semi-structured inter-
views and official documents in order to compare separate results and
draw final conclusions. Techniques of reporting to interviewees were
used to improve its soundness as qualitative research (Yin, 2003). The
coding was conducted by using the taxonomies of concepts identified
in the literature for properties of various structures and the concepts
of discursive consciousness (see Table 2) and outcomes (see Table 3).
In specific, data was coded according to type of structure and property.
By reviewing official documents, it was possible to code a set of formal
practices prescribed by reformer agents across each concept of the tax-
onomies. Every question of the interview protocol maps each category
in the taxonomies. Afterward, data was coded by modes of signification,
domination and legitimation and by outcomes of communication,
power and sanction respectively. For each contribution only one type
of mode or outcome was coded.
4. Embedded case study of an IT-enabled budget reform
4.1. Case level: background of budget reforms as e-government initiatives
information and management techniques with information systems.
S50 G. Puron-Cid / Government Information Quarterly 30 (2013) S46–S58
In 1988, the Ministry of Finance (SHCP5) established a conceptual frame-
work for performance evaluation and applied mainframe technology to
collect data across ministries. The result was the “Executive Information
System” (SIE) that included information about budget allocation and
monitoring of public expenditure. The SIE evolved into the “Integral In-
formation System” (SII), a more integral and comprehensive information
system to assist executive decision making for expenditure control and
analysis. In 1996, the SHCP started to integrate separate components of
performance evaluation into one project called the “Budget System Re-
form” (RSP) supported by a Web-enabled system called “System of Inte-
gral Process of Programming and Budgeting” (PIPP). In March 2007, the
current president's administration presented to the Congress the “Per-
formance Evaluation System” initiative designed by the SHCP. The
initiative is known as the “Performance-based Budgeting-Performance
Evaluation System” (PbR-SED6). The proposal was finally enacted as a
constitutional reform in May 8, 2008 making the PbR-SED mandatory
government-wide.
The PbR-SED mandate stipulates two types of stakeholders: reform-
er agencies and implementer agencies. Reformer agencies are the SHCP,
the Comptroller's Office (SFP7) and the National Council of Social Policy
Evaluation (CONEVAL 8) and are responsible of the design of the
PbR-SED tools, techniques and information systems. The SHCP serves
as the responsible of the budgetary process, the SFP as the auditor and
evaluator of budget and programs, and the CONEVAL as the evaluator
of social programs. These three organizations were and are engaged in
an obligated collaborative relationship around this initiative, but only
the SHCP is responsible of coordinating the PbR-SED implementation
across implementer agencies. The rest of the agencies and state and
local governments perform the role of implementers and are responsi-
ble to adopt the PbR-SED tools, techniques and information systems
into their daily routines and operations. Fig. 2 depicts the relationship
among reformer and implementer agencies for the adoption of the
PbR-SED initiative.
As in past reforms, the PbR-SED reform also has the purpose to asso-
ciate performance information with the existing budget system. In ad-
dition, the official repository of performance information is a newly
designed Web portal of the SHCP that serves for collecting and integrat-
ing budgeting and performance information across implementer agen-
cies at the federal, state, and local levels of governments. The PbR-SED
reform has motivated a renovated interest as well as a vitriolic skepti-
cism about its adoption and benefits in the actual budget practice across
agencies and practitioners. As a constant of all these efforts, many
professionals from different agencies and at different levels of govern-
ment have collaborated to adopt the PbR-SED project by collecting
and reporting performance information using information systems
into their own operations and contexts.
4.2. Synthesis level: adoption of PbR-SED
By using the IST model, the paper analyzes the multiple social
structures of the PbR-SED reform in three modes: signification, dom-
ination, and legitimation. For each mode, this study applied the meth-
odological bracketing: formal practices and informal practices. Formal
practices were discussed as adopted as prescribed and unevenly
adopted across implementers. Informal practices were discussed as
new practices enacted by implementers. The paper finally discusses
some outcomes of communication, power and sanction found in the
case.
5
SHCP stands for the Spanish acronym of Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico.
6
PbR-SED stands for the Spanish acronym of Presupuesto basado en Resultados-
Sistema de Evaluacion del Desempeño.
7
SFP stands for the Spanish acronym of Secretaria de la Funcion Publica.
8
CONEVAL stands for the Spanish acronym of Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la
Política de Desarrollo Social.
4.2.1. Signification
Only 2 formal practices were adopted as prescribed at the signifi-
cation modality: the structure of budgetary information in the format
[budgeting] and the validation of data based on business rules in the
official system [information systems]. The adoption of these two
practices, one within budgeting and another one within information
systems, was meant to be coupled together for the adoption of the
PbR-SED initiative. The information system's practice helped to en-
force the budgetary one by validating the structure of information
requested through the system's interface. In other words, all informa-
tion captured by implementers was evaluated while capturing in the
official system using reformers' rules of business. For example, the
structure of budgetary information prescribed by reformers involves
a particular coding for budgetary and strategic information (SHCP,
2007a,2007b,2007c,2007d,2007e). These codes were tested according
to several business rules specified by reformers while captured in the
official PbR-SED system as this participant described:
“According to the law and what the Congress requests, we issued a
policy memo internally. This memo adopted the formal format of
SHCP. We tell them: this is the format that you need to use to re-
port this information and we will make a system available for.”
(Participant from Agency 2.)
Different business rules were used to check implementers' capturing
in order to comply with several reformers business rules (SHCP, 2007b).
This control imposed by reformers over implementer's actions is evi-
dent through this participant from SHCP's comment (reformer):
“A great part of control of the quality of the information was
through using validation rules in our system. With them you con-
trol the internal official calendar of activities, flows of updates and
revisions. In other words you rule through the system.”
The 3 formal practices were unevenly adopted at the signification
modality: annual validity of the format [budgeting], designation of an
information system as the official repository [information systems],
and executive support [collaboration-leadership]. Some implemen-
ters reinforced the practice of annual validity based on year-by-year
basis while others adopted the multi-annual basis for their opera-
tions. The official practice requests information for the PbR-SED that
is valid only for the fiscal year subject of integration (SHCP, 2007a,
2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2007e, pp. 10–11). Although, the information
requested includes a baseline and an annual goal as a reference to
compare, the practice shows variation across implementers. Some
operations really obey a yearly basis or annual validity of information
as this participant from SHCP suggested:
“By law all the matrices of indicators, you know in the programmatic
structures are usually requested yearly. The matrix then could
change or modify year by year. So, the time span is annual. The idea
is that when you reach your perfect matrix of indicators, you should
stick on it, but at this point everyone is still experimenting.”
However, there are operations of medium- and large-term such as
contracts and investment projects that are different than for instance
the operations for wages and fringe benefits with larger periods of
time. These differences between business operations in which imple-
menters were embedded resulted in uneven adoption of the formal
practice of annual validity. An example of this difference was explicit
in some participant's comments:
“In theory, what the law says is that the resources should be spent
annually, but in reality we are not doing it. The way that people
are reporting their projects progress and financial progress is dif-
ferent. Well, in the financial aspect they may have spent 100% dur-
ing the year. However, physically their projects are 50% done
during this year, 70% next year, and 95% the following year and
 G. Puron-Cid / Government Information Quarterly 30 (2013) S46–S58
Comptroller’s Office Ministry of Finance
(SFP)
Implementer Agencies
Agency #1
Agency #2
Agency #3
. .
. .
. .
Agency #n
Fig. 2. Stakeholders and their relationships in the PbR-SED initiative.
so far. So, you are lagged in the following fiscal years. So even
when at the federal level the project should be annual, what we
decided here was to design and implement the multiannual re-
ports until our administrative units finally report the resources
are 100% spent and the projects are 100% done.” (Participant from
Agency 2.)
An official memo issued by the Central Budget Office (CBO) states
that the PbR-SED information system is the official repository of all
transactions and information for the integration of budget information
including the PbR-SED's (SHCP, 2007b). However, implementers
adopted this official system in many different ways. Some used the
official PbR-SED system at the end of the internal process of consolidat-
ing information: “We prefer to manage first the information here and
later into the SHCPs system.” (Participant from Agency 2.) Many imple-
menters first captured the PbR-SED information into their proprietary
system or Excel© applications, and once internally revised then it was
recaptured into the “official” system. In this way the information was
centralized, revised, and modified anytime, and eventually entered
into the PbR-SED system. The strategy of this uneven adoption certainly
was useful for implementer agencies to cope and control with their in-
ternal flow of information before it got under the SHCP's overview
through the official system. Here are some contributions that clarify
this point:
“Here, we follow all of our indicators by using our information sys-
tem, not of the SHCP. Some administrative units have shown us their
information systems in a way to share information about their prog-
ress and also for us to understand what we can use, […], and there-
after when all is revised we enter the information into the SHCP's
system.” (Participant from Agency 2.)“We have no information sys-
tem for this. We depend on the one provided by SHCP. […] We work
in Excel© spreadsheets and then re-capture the information into the
PbR-SED system.”(participant from Agency 3).
The exercise of executive support as a leadership mechanism was
also unevenly adopted across actors. For some top executives, the
PbR-SED project was “budgetary” so leadership was supported to budget
staff members. Executives from other implementer agencies supported
the PbR-SED project by an interdisciplinary teamwork integrated by
members from budget, IS, planning, and evaluation areas. Here are two
contributions noting these two different forms of executive support:
“Well, the director has to define a functional leader […]. A general
director of budgeting operations is usually the responsible of the
S51
National Council of
Social Policy Evaluation
(SHCP)
(CONEVAL)
State & Local Governments
Government #1
Government #2
Government #3
Government #n
whole project.” (Participant from Agency 1.)“[…] I establish coordi-
nation with other members in the budget, planning, evaluation and
IT areas to start working with. So, this selection of the team is critical
if you want to work this out […].” (Participant from Agency 2.)
There are 5 informal practices enacted as interpretative schemes
and norms of signification across implementer agencies: budgetary
focus [budgeting], homogeneity of vocabulary [budgeting], enrich-
ment of data integration [information systems], knowledge sharing
and self-learning [knowledge] and previous experience [Trust]. Bud-
getary focus represents the type of association between performance
information and budget allocation. The budgetary focus was not de-
fined or prescribed by reformers in the official format, but implemen-
ters enacted similarly by associating performance information with
the total appropriation of budget as this participant suggested:
“If in 2007 we assign one million pesos, we define goals and indi-
cators for this million. If in 2008 we assign one and half million
pesos, we define goals and indicators for one and a half. There is
no follow-up by marginal change.” (Participant from Agency 1.)
For homogeneity of vocabulary, many implementers dedicated
some time to build a common vocabulary for the PbR-SED initiative.
During working sessions, official training and activities for collection,
consolidation and revision of performance information, debates were
made over “meanings” as this contribution describes:
“We sat down with them, the owners of the budgetary programs,
someone from SHCP and SFP. Among all of us we analyze the indi-
cators and provide comments for improvement. We realized that
the level of comprehension of the concepts was not standardized;
the methodology was not well understood by all participants.
There were some experts that really knew the topic while others
did not. […] so we are still in the middle of the road of building
a common language.” (Participant from SFP.)
Knowledge sharing and self-learning were not prescribed by re-
formers. Knowledge sharing took place when an actor required infor-
mation and skills for this project and needed to interact with actors
from other organizations. Self-learning represents the intellectual
curiosity of agents for seeking new knowledge by themselves. The
simple interaction among agents around the PbR-SED motivated a
process of self-learning about other organizations' information and
skills necessary for the adoption of the reform. The data also shows
that knowledge sharing and self-learning facilitated the appreciation
S52 G. Puron-Cid / Government Information Quarterly 30 (2013) S46–S58
of multiple components and structures of the PbR-SED as this contri-
bution suggests:
“I know a lot about evaluation […], but no clue about the part of
SHCP and its vision […]. It was something that I got to study care-
fully. Get involved more in the documents, study the topics related
with the PbR-SED reform. When you see evaluation not necessar-
ily see topics of budgeting. […] So, I got to increase my budgetary
knowledge. […] Understand the budgetary classifications, budget-
ary norms. […] For us this was a fundamental framework to deal
with to understand our dialog with them. So, there was a manda-
tory reading for us.” (Participant from SFP.)
There were no formal practices designed by reformers to build trust
among participants. However, the presence of previous experience in
similar initiatives was mentioned by participants as critical to build
trust and eventually for a successful adoption of the PbR-SED. Previous
experience not only improves skills and knowledge of participants, but
also increases trust in the project and the team responsible to back the
adoption, as this participant referred:
“I felt really confident in participating on this project due to my pre-
vious knowledge and participation in similar project […]. In reality,
that made me confident to make contributions and suggestions in
the ministry, and even more to make decisions in how to conduct
things in one way or in another.” (Participant from Agency 2.)
4.2.2. Domination
There are 2 formal practices directly adopted as “official” facilities for
implementing the PbR-SED: definition of ownership of information in
the procedures [budgeting], and recognition of authority over the desig-
nated information architecture and information system management
[information systems]. The evidence shows how these two formal prac-
tices, one within budgeting and another within information systems,
were coupled together with the purpose of creating controls in favor
of reformers' oversight. According to reformers, implementers are re-
sponsible of their own information and reformers are just consolidators
of this information, as this participant from a reformer agency noted:
“In terms of responsibilities, each ministry is responsible of their
own budgetary programs and their own information. […] In our
training presentations, we emphatically mentioned that whatever
they report to the Congress, we will not touch it because we do not
own this information.” (Participant from SHCP.)
However, reformers have authority over the designated information
architecture and information system management (SHCP, 2007b, p. 15,
2009). The SHCP has legal authority and control over access, profiles,
workflow of the information collected, operations, and content through
the official PbR-SED system, as this participant suggested:
“I spend a lot effort and time to collect performance information in my
unit. Then, I checked my information presented at the Congress au-
thorized and published, and it was not what I captured.” (Participant
of Agency 1.)
There are 9 formal practices unevenly adopted across implementer
agencies: alignment of planning–programming–budgeting [organization-
al], authority of reformer agencies [collaboration], two practices of knowl-
edge such as definition of authority and content over official training
[knowledge], and five budgeting practices for gradual implementation
strategy and the authority over various components of the PbR-SED initia-
tive such as the definition of formats, methodology, official calendar of ac-
tivities, and roles and accesses in the information system [budgeting]. The
alignment of the phases of planning–programming–budgeting was con-
sidered a simulation due to the control environment in which perfor-
mance information was handled by reformers:
“There is not alignment with planning as a mechanism of resource
allocation, evaluation and follow-up of resources. […] As long as
SHCP keeps minimizing the aspect of planning […], this reform
won't work. They [SHCP] just don't care about your programs or
strategic planning. At the end they know that they will dictate your
budget ceiling. […] No matter how much you try to align planning,
programmatic and budgeting, all information is divorced with the
budget.” (Participant from Agency 2.)
Another formal practice divides the authority over the PbR-SED
reform among three reformer agencies: SHCP, SFP, and CONEVAL.
The co-presence of SHCP, SFP or CONEVAL for the adoption of the re-
form was successful in some agencies, while in others was problemat-
ic and conflictive. This was considered by implementer agencies as an
extra problem of coordination as this participant suggested:
“Something very important is the coordination between control
agencies. SHCP issues some policy memos while the SFP does an-
other memos and maybe INMUJERES other ones. Then, the indica-
tors are made using SHCP's standards, but SFP complains about
their construction, and discards them, or even return to the origi-
nal proposal. We pay for the lack of the coordination of control
agencies. […].” (Participant from Agency 2.)
The practice of the strategy of implementation of the budget reform
was prescribed as a gradual. However, implementers generally per-
ceived it as emergent and imposed top–down by reformers. Some agen-
cies were more prepared in producing and collecting the official
requirements than others as this participant described:
“It was totally centralized and suddenly imposed. The instruction
in January was to launch the system in April. So, we started from
zero to make something for the Congress in April. […] A little bit
with the flag of ‘I'm not asking for this, this is a Congress require-
ment. Whatever, at the end the strategy of implementation was
centralized and impositive.” (Participant from Agency 2.)
The practice of the authority over the official formats and methodolo-
gy was exclusive of SHCP. However, there is evidence that implementers
usually convert or readapt this practice within their internal operational
needs and own information requirements, rules and formats as this par-
ticipant indicated:
“The programmatic structure for FY 2008 used here was […] im-
posed by SHCP. So, according to our internal span of responsibili-
ties and function we convert or readapt this structure with our
own needs of information.” (Participant from Agency 2.)
Many implementers adopt the official calendar of activities, require-
ments and reporting with difficulties due to their different timing
operations and resources. This calendar obeys the dates and SHCP's op-
erations to integrate and present the fiscal packet to the Congress,
neglecting the nature of business operations of the rest of the agencies,
as this participant noted:
“There is a lag in times in the calendar between the stage of
programming and budgeting. According to Budget Law, the stage
of programming starts in January and ends in June. However, the
policy memos issued by the CBO indicate that this process starts
in July and ends in August. So, you waste 6 months. […] they
(reformers) request PbR-SED information in few days and even
less time to capture it into the system. Really, you only have five
brief days to do this job and involve all the administrative Units
in this crazy calendar.” (Participant from Agency 1.)
According to the Budget Law, there is a structure of responsibili-
ties in the flow of information: some elaborates the information,
others revise it, and others authorize it. Across this structure, there
 G. Puron-Cid / Government Information Quarterly 30 (2013) S46–S58
are actors from reformer and implementer agencies participating in
the process of collecting and reviewing the PbR-SED information.
However, the distribution of responsibilities in the “official” flow of
information is not clear as this participant from SHCP suggested:
“[…] Formally, we are in charge of follow-up of the information… […]
we could not follow up if the indicators were wrong, really! We did
not have the tools to follow up all this information. […] the true is that
the distribution of functions was never clear!”
There is evidence of difficulties in the definition of roles and accesses
in the flow of information in the PbR-SED system. The difficulties are in
the system access. Those in implementer agencies with roles of produc-
ing, collecting and consolidating the PbR-SED information have limited
access and time to do their job, while those in reformer agencies with
the roles of reviewing, authorizing and presenting this information
into the Congress have wider accesses to conduct their responsibilities
as this contribution pointed out:
“The optimal is that the administrative units capture the information
directly into the system. Actually, this functionality is available in the
system of SHCP but is not operable for revision in certain months, just
for the ones under revision at the end of the quarter. What happens in
the months that are not end of quarter? SHCP opens the role of cap-
ture for all months, but for revision only […]. Only during the first
20 days of the month at end of the quarter, we can revise this infor-
mation. […] We cannot revise it. […] You just realized at the end of
the road that the information presented to the Congress is different
and was modified somehow […].” (Participant from Agency 2.)
There are 6 informal practices enacted across participants: 3 contex-
tual practices for political support, influence of economic crisis and role
of control agencies; 2 organization practices for size of jurisdiction and
changes in organizational characteristics, and 2 practices for collabora-
tion of building informal liaisons and resource sharing. Political support
from the heads of ministries was a common informal practice across
participants. In general, top executives publicly approved the initiative
by supporting an internal leader or team as a way to exercise this sup-
port, as this participant suggested:
“Everybody knows that this initiative was the project of the Sub-
Minister and the Minister, and even that the project was one of
the main initiatives of this President's administration, they sup-
port the initiative as theirs.” (Participant from Agency 1.)
There was no formal practice designed by reformers for economic
factors. However, implementers informally identify the impact of the
economic crisis as critical for the adoption of this initiative:
“We are in the middle of an economic crisis, and obviously a public
finance crisis. You are not looking to allocate resources in the bud-
get; instead you are cutting resources to comply with the expendi-
ture ceilings imposed by SHCP. They are not fully using results or
performance as criteria.” (Participant from Agency 2.)
Reformers also claimed that the PbR-SED initiative was part of a
more comprehensive institutional change in government, not just
the budget system. However, the data shows that implementers rec-
ognize the role of SHCP and SFP as inhibitors of this change by build-
ing over the PbR-SED project a complex institutional framework:
“Congress determined some laws for the PbR-SED, SHCP imposes
other set of rules, SFP other norms and requirements […] we try
to adopt the PBR-SED into this complex multi-institutional and
multi-referential framework.” (Participant from Agency 3.)
At the organizational domain, there are 2 categories of new in-
formal practices: size of jurisdiction and changes in organizational
S53
characteristics. The size of the jurisdiction represents the level of
organizational complexity in terms of number of units or areas
that need to be coordinated for the adoption of the PbR-SED in
the agency. Implementer agencies refer to the size of jurisdiction
as an obstacle of adoption, the larger the size of jurisdiction the
more difficult to coordinate the adoption of the reform as this par-
ticipant explained:
“One characteristic of this ministry is that it is […] complex in terms
of number of administrative units. The ministry has 62 administrative
units, plus 32 state representations. This brings up a total of 94 units.
This is a complex task to coordinate.” (Participant from Agency 2.)
Reformers adopted the practice of change of organizational charac-
teristics such as distribution of functions and shared responsibilities be-
tween areas. Implementers considered these changes as necessary
when adopting the PbR-SED reform, but complex to foresee, to make
a plan, or even to administer during the adoption of the initiative, as
this participant referred:
“It was defined the need to divide our organization into two main
areas. One area would be budgeting and the other evaluation.
However, because of nature of the project we have to coordinate
this in either of these areas.” (Participant from SHCP.)
At the collaboration domain, implementers adopted new informal
practices in two categories: authority and resource sharing. For authority,
implementer agencies started to build informal liaisons as coordination
mechanisms between reformer and implementer agencies involved in
the project. These liaisons were usually conducted through informal liai-
sons built upon existing working relationships between members of re-
former and implementer agencies:
“We have teamwork, but we also have liaisons at each of the admin-
istrative units for the elaboration of strategic planning and the
programmatic integration. So, these liaisons are responsible of the
unit's information and requirements. […] Another challenge is the
lack of involvement from the general directors of administrative
units. Then the liaisons are middle people or even administrators.”
(Participant from Agency 3.)
Resource sharing happened by coupling two sources: staff time from
international organizations for consulting and training; and unexpected
expenses and staff time from implementer agency to conduct training
and implementation meetings (such as: information technology, facili-
ties for training, reproduction of material, and multi-media equipment).
This complement of resources often required negotiation or collabora-
tion, as this comment describes:
“There is a complement of resources between us. […] For example,
if we meet in my office I provide material, coffee and cookies.
When we meet in your office, I don't know, training or whatever,
[…] you provide the material, coffee and cookies. If we meet here I
provide the meeting room, a laptop and a projector, if we meet in
your place, we expect the same back.” (Participant from SHCP.)
Some implementers who developed their own information systems
commented on the use of open sources or donated software by other
agencies as a common practice. The adoption of new technologies by
implementers required skillful staff, not exclusively IS staff:
“The system was developed here. It's free software. We have skill-
ful people here at the planning area who took the time and effort
to develop this software. The system does many things, so we just
added up in our own systems.” (Participant from Agency 1.)
For rationalization, the SHCP holds formally the authority over the
PbR-SED training program across implementer agencies and certainly
S54 G. Puron-Cid / Government Information Quarterly 30 (2013) S46–S58
imposed a mandatory “official” training provided by SHCP's staff and
consultants from different international organizations. The context
was also “officially” defined. Some implementers successfully adopted
the mandatory training and its content while others found it problem-
atic due to the inconsistent, no-practical and emergent topic. Other im-
plementers found a variation of trainers' knowledge and skills.
4.2.3. Legitimation
Only one formal practice was unevenly adopted across implemen-
ters: definition of functions of the PbR-SED reform [budgeting]. Re-
former agencies prescribed a complex set of diverse functions and
objectives for the PbR-SED reform that was difficult for implementer
agencies to translate into their routines, practices and contexts. In
spite of the complex set of 33 different functions or principles identi-
fied in official documents, only 4 functions were perceived among
participants from implementer agencies: efficiency, functional and
technical benefits, evaluation performance, and accountability.
4.2.4. Outcomes
There are expected and unexpected outcomes of communication.
About the expected outcomes, there is a divided opinion over the re-
sults of the PbR-SED in terms of: enhancing information systems and
communication, and collaboration between reformer and implemen-
ter agencies. Participants unevenly perceived the benefits of enhanc-
ing information systems and communication across stakeholders as a
result of the adoption of the PbR-SED. There are different levels of
technological and information capacity across agencies:
“We have a lot of problems […]. We do not have a solid infrastruc-
ture like the one in SHCP. We don't have the same technological
privileges that SHCP has. If you make an information or technolog-
ical requirement to your IS area, they came down and work with
you, but at the end they say: sorry we don't have it, not here!”
(Participant from Agency 2.)
The benefits of collaboration were also unevenly perceived across
implementers. For some the PbR-SED resulted in turf, in other cases
collaboration was critical as follows:
“People are more conscious about the fact that this initiative has been
gradual. It takes time and a collaborative effort among different insti-
tutions and internal and external areas.” (Participant from Agency 2.)
An unexpected outcome of communication is the result of coupling
innovations between budgeting and information systems. During the
PbR-SED adoptions, implementers developed coupled innovations of
budgeting and technology as this participant suggested:
“Information system for the programming–budgeting integration
integrated elements of operative planning that involves indicator
matrix and other elements of strategic planning.” (Participant from
Agency 1.)
Another unexpected outcome of communication was knowledge
sharing that created a more complete understanding among imple-
menters of how things work at the interior of their agencies, as this
contribution indicates:
“I start to know more about how the ministry works. I started to un-
derstand the problems of those in charge in the administrative units.
There are many with a lot of years working here and have no vision
of what they are doing. Therefore, this new mode of budgeting for
results implies sharing information, and this is exactly the painful
part: sharing information!” (Participant from Agency 2.)
As an expected outcome of power, the goal of integrating perfor-
mance information into the decision making in the budgetary process
has not been achieved yet. Some implementers attribute this failure to
the inertial use of the information by the SHCP that exclusively focuses
on budgetary operations and nor on planning or evaluation activities:
“In one way or in another we (SHCP) are still based on inertial in-
formation, they're still allocating the budget without using perfor-
mance information.” (Participant from SHCP.)
Others simply indicate that performance information produced is
unmanageable or useless for decision making at any stage of the bud-
getary process, while others consider the lack of use and interest of
the Congress and its staff as part of this failure:
“[…] They [reformers] have proliferated the amount of indicators as
much as their lack of utility or usefulness. There is too much genera-
tion of indicators that is unmanageable and the information has no
value added or usefulness, but it makes us slaves of their monitoring
and follow-up. […] Before the PBR-SED we used to have 34 indicators
now we have 200 to satisfy each of these controls agencies and the
Congress.” (Participant from SFP.)“The real problem is the political
factor. In the Congress, there are different interests or goals than just
performance of budgetary programs or performance of the institu-
tions in the budgetary process. Different interest groups, political
parties, groups from different regions, states, or even non-profit orga-
nizations, all these groups influence the decision making and how the
resources should be allocated.” (Participant from Agency 2.)
An unexpected outcome of power was the adoption of new finan-
cial rules based on performance information. Some implementers
created new financial rules such as the identification of different
sources that finance a program in order to make it more transparent
based on performance information related to these programs:
“Something that we have tried is to order our priorities in the bud-
get in terms of financial sources. For example, if our program X
comes from three different sources and funds, then the same pro-
gram is classified in three different sources. What we have tried is
to align these three different lines of financing in order to prevent
duplicities or overlapping efforts of what we do and what others
do. […] This brings some accountability about our structure of
spending and how is distributed.” (Participant from Agency 2.)
For outcomes of sanction, implementers perceived a positive ac-
countability process at the interior of the organization. Participants at
implementer organizations started to hold themselves and others ac-
countable for how the resources were allocated and spent based on per-
formance information discussed at the interior of the organization:
“At the beginning, it was very difficult, but now there is a lot of
communication across administrative units and us. […] At the be-
ginning we made an agreement to explain variations in the indica-
tors of 10%, more or less. Today we explain any variations no
matter how small or big the indicators are. I don't need to say any-
thing; they come to us and discuss it. So, I believe that in this sense
there is an internal improvement of accountability at the interior
of our ministry.” (Participant from SFP.)
5. Results and discussion
More than 30 formal practices were prescribed by reformers as
“official” interpretative schemes, facilities and rules across different
structures (contextual, organizational, information systems, budgeting,
collaboration, knowledge and trust). These practices were expected to
be adopted by implementers into their daily routines. However, only a
small set of 4 formal practices were adopted as prescribed, 13 were
unevenly adopted, and 12 new informal practices were enacted across
implementers (see Table 5). Budgeting, information systems, and collab-
oration practices were the core formal practices adopted as prescribed or
 G. Puron-Cid / Government Information Quarterly 30 (2013) S46–S58 S55

Table 5
Formal and informal practices.

Practices Mode Reformers Implementers

*

Formal (1) Structure of information format [Budgeting] S AP AP

practices (2) Validation of data based on business rules in the official system [Information systems] S AP AP
directly
(3) Definition of ownership of information in the procedures [Budgeting] D AP AP
adopted
(4) Recognition of authority over the designated information architecture and information D AP AP
system management [Information systems]

Formal (1) Annual validity of the format [Budgeting] S AP UA

practices (2) Designation of an information system as the official repository [Information systems-data S AP UA
integration]
unevenly
(3) Executive support [Collaboration-leadership] S UA UA
adopted
(4) Alignment of planning-programming-budgeting with organizational goals and strategies D UA UA
[Organizational]

(5) Gradual implementation strategy [Budgeting] D UA UA

(6) Authority in the definition of formats and methodology in the initiative [Budgeting] D UA UA

(7) Definition of an official calendar of activities in the budgetary process [Budgeting] D AP UA

(8) Definition of responsibilities in the flow of information [Budgeting] D UA UA

(9) Definition of roles and accesses in the information system [Budgeting] D AP UA

(10) Definition of authority of reformer agencies in the initiative [Collaboration-authority] D UA UA

(11) Definition of authority over the training program [Knowledge] D UA UA

(12) Definition of content of training program [Knowledge] D UA UA

(13) Definition of functions of the PbR-SED reform [Budgeting] L UA UA

Informal (1) Budgetary focus [Budgeting] S - NE

practices (2) Homogeneity of vocabulary [Budgeting] S NE -
newly (3) Enrichment of data integration [Information systems] S - NE
enacted
(4) Knowledge sharing and self-learning [Knowledge] S NE -

(5) Previous experience in this type of projects creates trust in the project [Trust] S - NE

(6) Political support from head of Ministries [Contextual] D - NE

(7) The influence of economic crisis on public finance and budget allocation [Contextual] D - NE

(8) The recognition of the role of control agencies in the change of the institutional framework D - NE
[Contextual]

(9) Size of jurisdiction [Organizational] D - NE

(10) Changes in organizational characteristics [Organizational] D NE -

(11) Building formal liaisons [Collaboration-authority] D NE NE

(12) Resource sharing [Collaboration-resource sharing] D NE NE

* Types of modes: S (signification); D (domination); and L (legitimation).

AP: Practices that are adopted by implementer agents as prescribed by reformer agents (“adopted as prescribed”);
UA: Practices that are unevenly adopted by implementer agents (“unevenly adopted”);
NE: Practices that are newly enacted by implementer agents (“newly enacted”).

unevenly adopted. Curiously, the emphasis of the informal practices was
over contextual, collaboration and organizational practices. This finding
points out the uneven levels of adoption. Reformer agencies emphasize
the structures and practices of what they consider the core business of
the PbR-SED initiative (budgeting and information systems practices)
while implementer agencies stress the structures and practices of what
they deem relevant for their operations and context (contextual, organi-
zational, collaboration practices, knowledge and trust). The data also
shows that domination and signification are the most common modes
in which practices are prescribed by reformers or adopted across
implementers.
Table 6 covers expected and unexpected outcomes of communica-
tion, power and sanction. Again, the data shows uneven levels of
adoption between reformers and implementers. For reformers, the
expected results were enhancing information systems and communi-
cation, and collaboration between reformer and implementer agen-
cies, in order to adopt performance information in the budgetary
process. However, for implementers the benefits were developed in
terms of coupling innovations between new budgeting techniques
and information systems, a more comprehensive understanding of
how things work in the ministry, adoption of new financial rules
based on performance information, and internal accountability. The
S56 G. Puron-Cid / Government Information Quarterly 30 (2013) S46–S58
Table 6
Expected and unexpected outcomes of interaction.
Outcomes
Expected outcomes
Enhancing information systems and communications between reformer
and implementer agencies
Collaboration between reformer and implementer agencies
Adoption of performance information in the budgetary process
Unexpected outcomes
Coupled innovations between budgeting and information systems for the
integration of budgetary and performance information
Comprehensive understanding of how things work for the ministry
through knowledge sharing among participants
Adoption of new financial rules based on performance information.
Strengthening accountability at the interior of agencies
* Types of outcomes: C (communication); P (power); and S (sanction).
AP: Practices that are adopted by implementer agents as prescribed by reformer agents (“adopted as prescribed”);
UA: Practices that are unevenly adopted by implementer agents (“unevenly adopted”);
NE: Practices that are newly enacted by implementer agents (“newly enacted”).
data shows that outcomes of communication and power are the most
common results in the adoption.
6. Conclusions
e-Government initiatives try to attempt the hackneyed slogan of
“doing more with less” by using technology. However in practice,
e-government projects might fail because of the multidisciplinary, com-
plex and unstructured ways these initiatives are presented in reality
making integration and interdisciplinary interaction difficult in practice
and in theory. This study developed and applied ST framework to study
e-government using a contemporary case of an IT-enabled budget re-
form by considering the multiple social structures and actors from
reformer and implementer agencies involved in collaboration. An appli-
cation of ST named Interdisciplinary Structuration Theory (IST) was de-
veloped to examine this case. Due to the nature of the case and its
context, this framework was developed from an interdisciplinary view
based on the contributions in the literature from information systems
and budgeting fields. For the purpose of demonstration of the applica-
tion of the IST in this particular case, the field of budgeting was only se-
lected, but other areas may be added in future studies like accounting,
public finance, management, or other fields. This depends on the type
of e-government initiative and the context in which this project is
implemented.
The IST framework was useful for the following reasons. The IST
served to understand the IT-enabled budget reform as a process of
adoption of compounding multiple structures across multiple actors
from different organizations involved in the initiative. This study
found evidence of overlapping structures during the adoption of
IT-enabled budget reform. It was evident that human agents adopt
different structural properties. The IST framework was useful to un-
derstand and map the level of adoption of the different structures
involved in e-government projects. The IST served not only to under-
stand the emphasis of budgetary and information systems' practices
prescribed by reformers, but also to understand the uneven adoption
of these practices enacted by implementers along with other struc-
tures such as contextual, organizational, technological, collaboration,
knowledge and trust structures. In general, the analytical bracketing
between formal and informal practices was useful since reformers
Mode Reformers Implementers
*
C UA UA
C UA UA
P UA UA
C NE NE
C NE NE
P NE
S NE -
prescribed various formal practices for the adoption of the PbR-SED
reform, but participants adopted them unevenly and enacted new in-
formal practices. Only a small subset of practices was directly adopted
by implementers as prescribed by reformers. Most of structural prop-
erties were unevenly adopted and new informal practices were iden-
tified. These findings are important because from different theoretical
grounds, the literature has focused on reformers' perspective
neglecting the implementers' view. Therefore, the application of the
IST model draws a more complete view of these two sides in the
structuration process.
The structures of the PbR-SED initiative were enacted through for-
mal and informal practices. Previous ST models in the literature have
similar findings, but are specialists on structures within technology
(Basettihalli et al., 2010; DeSanctis & Poole, 1994; Orlikowski, 2000;
Seal, 2003; Van Veenstra et al., 2010; Walsham & Han, 1993). The
IST model contributed with the inclusion of structures from “relevant
disciplines” according to the type of e-government. Other ST applica-
tions in the literature neglected critical structures interacting in
e-government, like the structures within budgeting, collaboration,
knowledge and trust found in the case studied in this paper. There-
fore, the IST application was valuable to identify the practices embed-
ded in multiple structures and complex interactions that either
facilitate or impede implementation of IT-enabled budget reform.
Based on identifying formal and informal practices, this framework
helped to explain why some agencies are quite successful in
implementing the budget reform's structures into their organization-
al routines (producing the expected transformation), while others do
not even comply with its basic formal requirements (maintaining
continuity). The main reason of a successful adoption across agencies
is the capacity of understanding the limits and opportunities of
adopting the formal practices prescribed by reformer agencies and
the informal practices adopted by implementer agencies. There are
three main causes of a successful adoption: (1) the ability of adopting
informal practices of communication between reformer and imple-
menter agencies, and between the different staffs at the interior of
the agency; (2) the skills to distribute clear authority and responsibil-
ities (power practices) across different executives, project leaders,
and staff members in the agency; and (3) the aptitude to set clearly
sanctions for conduct and expected behavior. These three causes of
 G. Puron-Cid / Government Information Quarterly 30 (2013) S46–S58
successful adoption of e-government are discussed in detail in the fol-
lowing practical recommendations section.
The architecture of the Embedded Case Study (ECS) design was
useful to organize the research effort in a more organized and struc-
tured way. The short stakeholder analysis conducted at the case
level of the ECS was valuable to identify critical actors in the process
of structuration and to select the five agencies, 2 reformer and 3 im-
plementer agencies, studied in this research. The research work of
collecting, organizing and coding different sources of data through
the taxonomy of concepts at the sub-project level of the ECS was use-
ful to conduct the analysis at the synthesis level and eventually to
present the results.
There are some methodological implications to operationalize ST. A
first implication is the difficulty to code data in the context of a duality
of structures. The duality concept brings a dilemma to the researcher
who had to make decisions about what constitutes human agency and
what constitutes the structure in the phenomena. In this study, formal
practices capture social structures prescribed by reformers while infor-
mal practices capture human action instantiated by implementers. How-
ever, in other studies the structuration analysis starts on human agency
continuing or changing social structures (Walsham & Han, 1993). Anoth-
er difficult methodological implication was the coding of structural
modes and dimensions. With few guidelines from Giddens' framework,
the researcher had to adventure in mapping these concepts in the data.
In strictly Giddens' sense, these modes and dimensions coexist in every
human action and structure, but for analytical purpose the researcher
has to separate them. Therefore, the researcher becomes the main
research instrument in which the structuration concepts and data
come through. This implies an important limitation that brings along im-
portant risks. Future research may redefine, test and refine the IST model
grounded in this study. According to the type of e-government initiative,
the review of literature conducted in this study focused on two com-
patible fields: information systems and budgeting. However, future
research should review the literature of relevant disciplines and struc-
tures depending on the type of e-government.
7. Practical recommendations
For any e-government project that tries to lead more efficient and
effective governments, reformers and implementers need to be aware
that they involve the interaction of multiple structures. In our case
study, budget reforms do not just only deal with seeming structures
and people around budget and technology, but also with other struc-
tures (i.e. context, institutions, organizations, collaboration, knowl-
edge, and trust). A stakeholder analysis may also provide important
insights of relevant actors around the project. In our case a common
consideration is to limit the project's community on budget or infor-
mation systems' staffs, when there are other members in the organi-
zation that also co-participate in this type of initiatives. Based on this
research, some practical recommendations draw from learning about
the structuration process of formal and informal practices (see
Table 7). These recommendations can help decision makers in gov-
ernment, either in the role of reformer or implementer, to “do more
with less” during the implementation of e-government initiatives in
three dimensions: communication, power, and sanction. The recom-
mendations for communication are drawn from the ability of agen-
cies in successfully adopting formal and informal practices for
defining methods and information, involve different organizations
and staff members in collaborative and participatory efforts, deliver-
ing clear messages, supporting knowledge sharing, creating a com-
mon vocabulary, among others. The recommendations of power
include proper and clear distribution of authority and responsibilities
over resources and people within the organization and across differ-
ent staffs and organizational boundaries involved in the project. Fi-
nally, the advice for sanction suggests a clear definition of scope and
goals of the initiative in the organization.
S57
Table 7
Practical recommendations.
Source: Own preparation.
Recommendations
Communication Involve reformer and implementer agencies in the definition of
the structure of information.
Define with implementer agencies time frames and validity rules
of the information collected.
Specify with implementers the budgetary focus of performance
information.
Develop a common vocabulary or glossary of terms.
Evaluate and recognize potential barriers in the operation of two
information systems: the official administered by reformers and
proprietary administered by implementers.
Evaluate the different and possible levels of data validation and
define the general rules of validation.
Create mechanisms of enrichment and integration of data
between reformer and implementer agencies.
Incorporate mechanisms of executive support and communication
with those who lead the project in implementer agencies.
Maintain a directory of latent and valuable staff members with
previous experience in this type of initiatives and follow-up their
careers for future reforms.
Recognize participation of valuable staff members through
public appreciation and other type of incentives to promote trust
among implementers.
Promote and support knowledge sharing mechanisms and
self-learning methods.
Power Assess with implementers the influence of social, political,
economic and institutional factors.
Assess with implementers barriers to align organizational goals
and strategies with budgetary programs.
Assess with implementers other organizational characteristics
like size of jurisdiction.
Assess with implementers the control agencies' institutional
framework.
Define with implementers a strategy of implementation at the
interior of their organization.
Set an agreement with implementers about formats,
methodology, calendar of activities, and deliverables across the
budgetary process.
Define the ownership of performance information.
Establish with implementers the set of responsibilities in the
flow of information.
Assess and define different profiles of users (roles and accesses) in
the official system according implementers needs.
Define minimum requirements for the official and proprietary
systems.
Evaluate and define authority of representatives of reformer
agencies over the budget reform initiative at the level of
operations of implementer agencies.
Build liaisons or networks of the initiative across implementer and
reformer agencies.
Establish mechanisms of resource sharing for the adoption of the
initiative.
Develop relevant programs and content of training considering
implementers' needs.
Sanction Reformers should clearly define the goals and purpose of the
initiative at different levels and stages of the project.
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Dr. Gabriel Puron-Cid obtained his Ph.D. in Public Administration from the Rockefeller
College, University at Albany, New York. His areas of interest are e-government, open
government, open data, applications of data and technology for policy analysis, perfor-
mance management and evaluation, public budget management, and government ac-
counting. His studies cover multidisciplinary aspects of law, economics, management,
and TICs around these topics. Some of his publications discuss the joint adoption of
management, budgeting and technology in the context of collaboration and participa-
tion. He collaborates in research projects in the U.S. and Mexico funded by the CIDE,
INEGI, and CONACYT.