Persons and Family Relations Mae paras
Calatagan Golf Club v Clemente
Facts: Clemente applied to purchase one share stock of Calatagan, indicating in his
application his mailing address, complete residential address, office and residence telephone
numbers as well as the company with which he was connected. Calatagan issued to him a
Certificate of Stock. Calatagan charges monthly dues to meet expenses for general
operations, costs for upkeep and improvement of grounds and facilities as provided for by its
Articles of Incorporation. After paying the monthly dues initially, Clemente failed to pay and
Calatagan demanded payment for the monthly dues through letters which were sent to his
mailing address but were sent back to sender with the postal note that the address has been
closed , twice. Calatagan declared Clemente delinquent for failing to pay his monthly dues
and included him in its list of delinquent members. Calatagan's board of directors adopted a
resolution authorizing the foreclosure of shares of delinquent members and the public
acution of these shares. Calatagan sent a third and final letter to the same address containing
a warning that unless Clemente settles his outstanding dues, his share will be included
among the shares to be sold at the public auction. Clemente's share was sold with the notice
of foreclosure published in the issue of Business World. Clemente learned of the sale after 4
years and filed a claim with SEC seeking to restore his shareholding in Calatagan with
damages. SEC dismissed the complaint, citing Sec. 69 of the Corporation Code which provides
that the sale of share at an auction sale can only be questioned within 6 months and
Clemente's claim was filed long after the period provided. SEC further held hat Calatagan
complied with all the requirements for a valid sale of the share, Clemente failing to inform
Calatagan that the address he supplied was no longer his address and that Clemente acted in
bad faith assuming as he claimed that his non-payment of dues would merely render his
share inactive. CA reversed SEC's ruling, restoring the share and awarded damages minnus
the unpaid monthly dues Clemente owed. CA found that SEC erred in citing a case it decided,
Caram v Valley Golf Country Club that Sec. 69 specifically refers to unpaid subscriptions to
capital stock and not to any other debt of stockholders. CA employed Art. 1140 of the Civil
Code as the proper rule of prescription which is at 8 years since Sec. 69 does not apply to
unpaid membership dues in non-stock corporations. Also Calatagan knew that the previous 2
letters it sent were sent back to them and so the demand letter would not be received by
Clemente.
Issue: W/N Calatagan is liable for damages under Art. 19 of the Civil Code.
Ruling: Sec. 69 of the Corporation Code refers specifically to unpaid subscriptions to capital
stock. The sale of delinquent stock is the non-payment of the subscription price for the share
of stock itself and the stockholder has yet to fully pay for the value of the shares subscribed.
Clemente had already fully paid for the share and Calatagan no longer had any outstanding
obligation to deprive him of full title to his share. Section 69 will only be applicable if
Clemente still has not fully paid for the share and the non-stock corporation decided to sell
such share as a consequence which is not the case at bar. Sec. 91 of the Corp. Code provides
that termination of membership in non-stock corporations are governed by its articles of
incorporation or by-laws. In accordance with it's by-laws, Calatagan sent the third and final
demand letter with the warning but it was sent ot the mailing address which Calatagan knew
was already closed. The Corporate Secretary under its by-laws is required by law to keep a
record of the addresses of all stockholder and that the Secretary needs to notify the
shareholder of the order to sell at auction of said shareholder's stock. The Corporate
Secretary being a lawyer is knowledgeable on the law and of corporate records and should
have known that the third demand letter would still have been sent back to them. Due
diligence was not exercised by the Corporate Secretary, there was even no inquiry as to the
mailing address or verification of the other addresses on record provided by Clemente and
knowing that the PO box was already closed it still persisted in sending the final demand and
warning letter to the same PO box which constituted bad faith. Calatagan's bad faith and
failure to observe its own by-laws resulted not merely in the loss of Clemente's privilege to
enjoy Calatagan's facilities but also in significant pecuniary damage to him. Knowing as
Clemente did that Calatagan was in possession of his home address as well as residence and
office telephone numbers, he had every reason to assume that the club would not be at a
loss should it need to contact him. A non-stock corporation like Calatagan is not exempt from
the obligation laid down by Articles 19-21 which obliges under law every person to act fairly
and in good faith towards one another. Clemente has sustained pecuniary injry by reason of
Calatagan's wrongful violation of its own by-laws and CA's award of moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorney's fees are warranted. Calatagan was cited in violation of Art. 32
of the CC by CA which allows recovery of damages from any private individual who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impeded or impairs the right against
deprivation of property without due process of laws. CA's decision is affirmed with costs
against Calatagan.
BLISS DEVELOPMENT CORP. /HOME GUARANTY CORPORATION vs. MONTANO DIAZ,
DOMINGO TAPAY, AND EDGAR H. ARREZA
G.R. No. 213233, August 05, 2015
VELASCO JR., J.
FACTS: Petitioner Bliss Development Corporation (BDC) (subsequently reorganized as Home
Guaranty Corporation) is the registered owner of Lot No. 27, Block 30, New Capitol Estates I,
Brgy. Matandang Balara, Diliman, Quezon City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 331582. On October 19, 1984, it entered into and executed a Deed of Sale over the
said property in favor of Spouses Emiliano and Leonila Melgazo (Sps. Melgazo), both of whom
are now deceased.
On May 7, 1991, a certain Rodolfo Nacua (Nacua) sent a letter to BDC, saying that Sps.
Melgazo transferred to him their rights over the property. He further expressed willingness
to pay the outstanding obligations of Sps. Melgazo to BDC. Before the property was fully
paid, however, Nacua sold his rights to Olivia Garcia (Garcia), through a Deed of Transfer of
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 Persons and Family Relations Mae paras
Rights. Later, Garcia transferred her rights to Elizabeth Reyes (Reyes). Reyes then transferred
her rights to Domingo Tapay (Tapay), who then later sold his rights to herein respondent
Montano Diaz (Diaz) for Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P600,000.00). Diaz then paid BDC the
amortizations due on the property, amounting to P406,915.15, and BDC issued a permit to
occupy the property in favor of Diaz. Diaz then introduced improvements on the property,
amounting to P700,000.00. On April 14, 1992, BDC executed a Contract to Sell in favor of
Diaz.3 On April 15, 1994, however, BDC informed Diaz that respondent Edgar Arreza (Arreza)
was claiming that the heirs of Sps. Melgazo sold to him the rights over the property. BDC
then placed Diaz’s account in “inactive status.” To resolve the conflicting claims of Arreza and
Diaz, BDC filed a complaint for Interpleader against them, before the RTC, Makati City,
Branch 146. On March 27, 1996, the Makati City RTC Branch 146 ruled that the signatures of
Sps. Melgazo transferring their rights to Nacua were mere forgeries. Thus, it ruled that Arreza
had a better right over the property. This decision became final and executory.
On August 27, 1996, Diaz filed the present complaint for sum of money against BDC before
the RTC. Both BDC and Tapay argued that their respective acts were lawful and done in good
faith.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Diaz is a purchaser for value and in good faith.
HELD: NO. For one to be considered a purchaser in good faith, the following requisites must
concur: (1) that the purchaser buys the property of another without notice that some other
person has a right to or interest in such property; and (2) that the purchaser pays a full and
fair price for the property at the time of such purchase or before he or she has notice of the
claim of another. We find that in the case at bar, the first element is lacking.
The CA, in disposing the issue of Diaz’s good faith, merely said that “considering that the
property involved is registered land, Diaz need not go beyond the title to be considered a
buyer in good faith.” We find this to be a serious and reversible error on the part of the CA.
In the first place, while it is true that the subject lot is registered lot, the doctrine of not going
beyond the face of the title does not apply in the case here, because what was subjected to a
series of sales was not the lot itself but the right to purchase the lot from BDC. A careful
review of the records of this case reveals that Diaz, in fact, failed to diligently inquire into the
title of his predecessor before entering into the contract of sale. As such, he cannot be
considered a buyer in good faith.
Notwithstanding the fact that Diaz is not an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value,
BDC is nevertheless liable to return to him the amortizations which he already paid on the
property, applying the rule on unjust enrichment.
FILINVEST LAND v. NGILAY, GR No. 174715, 2012-10-11
Facts:
Respondents were grantees of agricultural public lands located in Tambler, General Santos
City through Homestead and Fee patents sometime in 1986
Respondents were grantees of agricultural public lands located in Tambler, General Santos
City through Homestead and Fee patents sometime in 1986 and 1991... a Deed of Conditional
Sale of the above- enumerated properties in favor of petitioner Filinvest Land, Inc. was
executed.
Respondents received the downpayment for the properties on October 28, 1995.
A few days after the execution of the aforestated deeds and the delivery of the
corresponding documents to petitioner, respondents came to know that the sale of their
properties was null and void, because it was done within the period that they were not
allowed to do so and that... the sale did not have the approval of the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) prompting them to file a case for
the declaration of nullity of the deeds of conditional and absolute sale of the questioned
properties and the grant of right of way... with the RTC
According to petitioner, Ngilay and his children prevailed upon the representatives of
petitioner to make an advance payment. To accommodate the Ngilays, petitioner acceded to
making an advance with the understanding that petitioner could demand anytime the return
of the advance... payment should Ngilay not be able to comply with the conditions of the
sale.
In the present case, the negotiations for the purchase of the properties covered by the
patents issued in 1991 were made in 1995 and, eventually, an undated Deed of Conditional
Sale was executed. On October 28, 1995, respondents received the downpayment of
P14,000.000.00... for the properties covered by the patents issued in 1991. Applying the five-
year prohibition, the properties covered by the patent issued on November 24, 1991 could
only be alienated after November 24, 1996. Therefore, the sale, having been consummated
on October 28, 1995, or... within the five-year prohibition, is as ruled by the CA, void.
Nevertheless, petitioner does not err in seeking the return of the down payment as a
consequence of the sale having been declared void. The rule is settled that the declaration of
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 Persons and Family Relations Mae paras

nullity of a contract which is void ab initio operates to restore things to the... state and
condition in which they were found before the execution thereof.[17] Petitioner is correct in
its argument that allowing respondents to keep the amount received from petitioner is
tantamount to judicial acquiescence to unjust enrichment.
Issues:
petitioner insists that the prohibition against alienation and disposition of land covered by
Homestead Patents is a prohibition against the actual loss of the homestead within the five-
year prohibitory period, not... against all contracts including those that do not result in such
an actual loss of ownership or possession
Ruling:
Petitioner argues that the correct formulation of the issue is not whether there was a
perfected contract between the parties during the period of prohibition, but whether by such
deed of conditional sale there was "alienation or encumbrance" within the contemplation of
the law.
This is wrong. The prohibition does not distinguish between consummated and executory
sale. The conditional sale entered into by the parties is still a conveyance of the homestead
patent.
The prohibition of the law on the sale or encumbrance of the homestead within five years
after the grant is MANDATORY. The purpose of the law... is to promote a definite policy, i.e.,
"to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of the public land which
the State has gratuitously given to him." Thus, the law does not distinguish between
executory and consummated sales. Where the sale of a... homestead was perfected within
the prohibitory period of five years, the fact that the formal deed of sale was executed after
the expiration of the staid period DID NOT and COULD NOT legalize a contract that was void
from its inception
Thus, the sale which created the obligation of petitioner to pay the agreed amount having
been declared... void, respondents have the duty to return the down payment as they no
longer have the right to keep it. The principle of unjust enrichment essentially contemplates
payment when there is no duty to pay, and the person who receives the payment has no
right to receive... it.[20] As found by the CA and undisputed by the parties, the amount of the
down payment made is P14,000,000.00 which shall also be the amount to be returned by
respondents.
The five-year prohibitory period following the issuance of the homestead patent is provided
under Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Commonwealth Act No.
456, otherwise known as the Public Land Act.[10] It bears stressing that the law... was
enacted to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his
family the land that the State had gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labour in
cleaning and cultivating it.[11] Its basic objective, as the Court had... occasion to stress, is to
promote public policy that is to provide home and decent living for destitute, aimed at
providing a class of independent small landholders which is the bulwark of peace and
order.[12] Hence, any act which would have the effect of... removing the property subject of
the patent from the hands of a grantee will be struck down for being violative of the law.[13]
The prohibition of the law on the sale or encumbrance of the homestead within five years
after the grant is MANDATORY. The purpose of the law... is to promote a definite policy, i.e.,
"to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of the public land which
the State has gratuitously given to him." Thus, the law does not distinguish between
executory and consummated sales. Where the sale of a... homestead was perfected within
the prohibitory period of five years, the fact that the formal deed of sale was executed after
the expiration of the staid period DID NOT and COULD NOT legalize a contract that was void
from its inception.
Unjust... enrichment exists "when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another,
or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of
justice, equity and good conscience."[18] There is unjust enrichment under
Article 22 of the Civil Code when (1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit is
derived at the expense of or with damages to another.[19]
Dalaruya v Olivia
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated June 28, 2013 and
the Resolution[3] dated November 22, 2013 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 125113 finding petitioner Antonio L. Daluraya (Daluraya) civilly liable for the death of
Marina Arabit Oliva (Marina Oliva) despite having been acquitted for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.

Principles:
The Facts

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 Persons and Family Relations Mae paras

On January 4, 2006, Daluraya was charged in an Information[4] for Reckless Imprudence Marla moved for reconsideration,[14] which the MeTC denied in an Order[15] dated November
Resulting in Homicide in connection with the death[5] of Marina Oliva. Records reveal that 4, 2010, clarifying that the grant of Daluraya's demurrer had the effect of an acquittal and
sometime in the afternoon of January 3, 2006, Marina Oliva was crossing the street when a that reconsideration of its Order granting Daluraya's demurrer would violate the latter's right
Nissan Vanette, bearing plate number UPN-172 and traversing EDSA near the Quezon Avenue against double jeopardy.[16] With respect to the civil aspect of the case, the MeTC likewise
flyover in Quezon City, ran her over.[6]While Marina Oliva was rushed to the hospital to denied the same, holding that no civil liability can be awarded absent any evidence proving
receive medical attention, she eventually died, prompting her daughter, herein respondent that Daluraya was the person responsible for Marina Oliva's demise.[17]
Marla Oliva (Marla), to file a criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
against Daluraya, the purported driver of the vehicle.[7] Aggrieved, Marla appealed[18] to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76 (RTC),
insisting that the MeTC failed to make any finding as to the civil liability of Daluraya, [19] which
During the proceedings, the prosecution presented as witness Shem Serrano (Serrano), an finding was not precluded by the dismissal of the criminal aspect of the case.
eye-witness to the incident, who testified that on said date, he saw a woman crossing EDSA
heading towards the island near the flyover and that the latter was bumped by a Nissan
Vanette bearing plate number UPN-172. The prosecution also offered the testimonies of (a)
Marla, who testified as to the civil damages sustained by her family as a result of her The RTC Ruling
mother's death; (b) Dr. Paul Ortiz (Dr. Ortiz), who presented his findings on the autopsy
conducted upon the body of Marina Oliva; and (c)Police Senior Inspector Lauro Gomez (PSI
In a Decision[20] dated September 8, 2011, the RTC dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
Gomez), who conducted the investigation following the incident and claimed that Marina
MeTC's ruling, declaring that "the act from which the criminal responsibility may spring did
Olivawas hit by the vehicle being driven by Daluraya, albeit he did not witness the incident.[8]
not at all exist."[21]
After the prosecution rested its case, Daluraya filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss
Marla filed a motion for reconsideration[22] which, although filed beyond the reglementary
(demurrer)[9] asserting, inter alia, that he was not positively identified by any of the
period, was nonetheless accepted. However, the RTC found the same without merit and
prosecution witnesses as the driver of the vehicle that hit the victim, and that there was no
thus, sustained the factual findings and rulings of the MeTC in its Order[23] dated May 10,
clear and competent evidence of how the incident transpired.[10]
2012.

Dissatisfied, Marla elevated the case to the CA via petition for review, maintaining that
The MeTC Ruling Daluraya must be held civilly liable.

In an Order[11] dated May 24, 2010, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 38
(MeTC) granted Daluraya's demurrer and dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. It The CA Ruling
found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were wanting in material details and
that they failed to sufficiently establish that Daluraya committed the crime imputed upon
In a Decision[24] dated June 28, 2013, the CA granted the petition and reversed the RTC
him.[12]
Decision, ordering Daluraya to pay Marla the amounts of p152,547.00 as actual damages,
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.[25] In so ruling, the CA held
Deconstructing the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses individually, the MeTC found
that the MeTC's Order showed that Daluraya's acquittal was based on the fact that the
that: (a) Marla merely testified on the damages sustained by her family but she failed to
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As such, Daluraya was not
identify Daluraya as the driver of the vehicle that hit her mother; (b) Serrano also did not
exonerated from civil liability.[26]
identify Daluraya as the driver of the said vehicle; (c) Dr. Ortiz merely testified on the autopsy
results; and (d) PSI Gomez, while he did investigate the incident, likewise declared that he did
Moreover, the CA considered the following pieces of evidence to support its finding that
not witness the same.[13]

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 Persons and Family Relations Mae paras
Daluraya must be held civilly liable: (a) the inadmissible sworn statement executed by
Daluraya where he admitted that he drove the subject vehicle which hit Marina Oliva; (b) the
conclusion derived from Serrano's testimony that the woman he saw crossing the street who
was hit by a Nissan Vanette with plate number UPN-172, and the victim who eventually died,
are one and the same; (c) the Philippine National Police Referral Letter of one Police Chief
Inspector Virgilio Pereda identifying Daluraya as the suspect in the case of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide involving the death of Marina Oliva, and stating that he
brought the victim to the Quezon City General Hospital for treatment but was declared dead
on arrival; and (d) the subject vehicle was registered in the name of Daluraya's aunt, Gloria
Zilmar,[27] who authorized him to claim the vehicle from the MeTC.[28]
Daluraya filed a motion for reconsideration,[29] which the CA denied in a Resolution[30] dated
November 22, 2013,hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue advanced for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA was correct in
finding Daluraya civilly liable for Marina Oliva's death despite his acquittal in the criminal case
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The acquittal of an accused of
the crime charged, however, does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability. [31] In Manantan
v. CA,[32] the Court expounded on the two kinds of acquittal recognized by our law and their
concomitant effects on the civil liability of the accused, as follows:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has
been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held
liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the
question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds
other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of
the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily
established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only.[33]
In Dayap v. Sendiong,[34] the Court explained further:
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the
civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction
of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused
is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon
the crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be
deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that
the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the
accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the
right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that
the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. This is because
when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence both on the
criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the
prosecution. What the trial court should do is issue an order or partial judgment granting the
demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused, and set the case for continuation of trial
for the accused to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case and for the private
complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall render
judgment on the civil aspect of the case.[35] (Emphases supplied)
In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court requires that the judgment state "whether the
evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist."[36]
A punctilious examination of the MeTC's Order, which the RTC sustained, will show that
Daluraya's acquittal was based on the conclusion that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist, given that the prosecution was not able to establish that he
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 Persons and Family Relations Mae paras

was the author of the crime imputed against him. Such conclusion is clear and categorical
when the MeTC declared that "the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are wanting in
material details and they did not sufficiently establish that the accused precisely committed
the crime charged against him."[37] Furthermore, when Marla sought reconsideration of the
MeTC's Order acquitting Daluraya, said court reiterated and firmly clarified that "the
prosecution was not able to establish that the accused was the driver of the Nissan Vanette
which bumped Marina Oliva"[38] and that "there is no competent evidence on hand which
proves that the accused was the person responsible for the death of Marina Oliva."[39]

Clearly, therefore, the CA erred in construing the findings of the MeTC, as affirmed by the
RTC, that Daluraya's acquittal was anchored on reasonable doubt, which would necessarily
call for a remand of the case to the court a quo for the reception of Daluraya's evidence on
the civil aspect. Records disclose that Daluraya's acquittal was based on the fact that "the act
or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist" in view of the failure of the
prosecution to sufficiently establish that he was the author of the crime ascribed against him.
Consequently,his civil liability should be deemed as non-existent by the nature of such
acquittal.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 28, 2013 and the
Resolution dated November 22, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 125113 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated September 8, 2011 and the Order
dated May 10, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76 are REINSTATED.

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