Professional Documents
Culture Documents
CAUSATION Jose Koh's negligence that was the immediate and proximate
A. PROXIMATE CAUSE cause of the collision. This is an unwarranted deduction as the
evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows that the car
B. EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE
swerved into the truck's lane because as it approached the
southern end of the bridge, two boys darted across the road
MCKEE v IAC, TAYAG from the right sidewalk into the lane of the car.
211 SCRA 517 - Negligence is the omission to do something which a
DAVIDE; July 16, 1992 reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or
NATURE: Appeal from decision of the IAC the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man
FACTS: would not do
- A head-on-collision took place between a cargo truck owned - The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in
by private respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a a particular case: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh. The collision resulted in negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc, ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford - Using the test, no negligence can be imputed to Jose Koh.
Escort. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to
- When the northbound Ford Escort was about 10 meters away avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away from
from the southern approach of the bridge, two boys suddenly where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite
darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the lane.
car. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and - Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, "one
entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is
headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter required to act without time to consider the best means that
attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon
truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge. reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless
- Two civil cases were filed on Jan 31, 1977. the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by
- On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben Galang his own negligence.
with the crime of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple - Assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be
Homicide and Physical Injuries and Damage to Property" was said that his negligence was the proximate cause of the
filed with the trial court. collision. Proximate cause has been defined as: that cause,
- Judge Capulong found Galang guilty of the criminal charge which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
and ordered him to pay damages. Galang appealed to IAC. efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
IAC affirmed decision. which the result would not have occurred; the proximate legal
- Judge Castaneda dismissed the 2 civil cases and awarded cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
private respondents moral damages and exemplary damages, immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
and attorney’s fee. Petitioners appealed to IAC. In its constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
consolidated decision of the civil cases, it reversed the ruling of having a close causal connection with its immediate
the trial court and ordered the defendants to pay damages. The predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting
decision is anchored principally on the findings that it was the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which
Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which caused first acted, under such circumstances that the person
the accident. The appellate court further said that the law responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent
presumes negligence on the part of the defendants, as and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
employers of Galang, in the selection and supervision of the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
latter; it was further asserted that these defendants did not might probably result therefrom.
allege in their Answers the defense of having exercised the - Although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all
diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events, it cannot be
supervising the said employee. said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths
- In an MFR, the decision for the consolidated civil cases was because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the
reversed. Hence this petition. negligent act of the truck driver, which was the actual cause of
the tragedy. The entry of the car into the lane of the truck
ISSUES would not have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded
WON respondent Court's findings in its challenged resolution the emergency signals given by the former to slow down and
are supported by evidence or are based on mere speculations, give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane.
conjectures and presumptions. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of the
road, which was the proper precautionary measure under the
HELD given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full speed
YES towards the car.
- Findings of facts of the trial courts and the Court of Appeals - The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He
may be set aside when such findings are not supported by the himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 km) per
evidence or when the trial court failed to consider the material hour along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by
facts which would have led to a conclusion different from what law on a bridge is only 30 kph. Under Article 2185 of the Civil
was stated in its judgment. Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the
- The respondent Court held that the fact that the car time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
improperly invaded the lane of the truck and that the collision - Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last
1
occurred in said lane gave rise to the presumption that the clear chance finds application here. Last clear chance is a
driver of the car, Jose Koh, was negligent. On the basis of this
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P50,000.00 each for the death of Jose Koh and Kim Koh apart as possible."
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words, the doctrine of last clear chance means that even "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause"
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though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and
of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages
though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts GLAN PEOPLE’S LUMBER AND HARDWARE V IAC (VDA.
(Article 2179, Civil Code of the Philippines). DE CALIBO and kids)GR No.70493 NARVASA; May 18, 1989
Obiter
- Phoenix and Carbonel also ask us to apply what they refer to NATURE
as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The theory here of Petition for certiorari praying for a reversal of the judgment of
petitioners is that while the petitioner truck driver was the Intermediate Appellate Court which, it is claimed, ignored
negligent, private respondent Dionisio had the "last clear or ran counter to the established facts.
chance" of avoiding the accident and hence his injuries, and
that Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear chance" must FACTS
bear his own injuries alone. The last clear chance doctrine of - Engineer Orlando T. Calibo, Agripino Roranes, and Maximo
the common law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Patos were on the jeep owned by the Bacnotan Consolidated
Smith but it is a matter for debate whether, or to what extent, it Industries, Inc., with Calibo at the wheel, as it approached from
has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. The the South Lizada Bridge going towards the direction of Davao
historical function of that doctrine in the common law was to City at about 1:45 in the afternoon of July 4,1979. At about that
mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule- time, the cargo track, loaded with cement bags, GI sheets,
that of contributory negligence. The common law rule of plywood, driven by defendant Paul Zacarias y Infants, coming
contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a from the opposite direction of Davao City and bound for Glan,
plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the plaintiff's South Cotabato, had just crossed said bridge. At about 59
negligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful yards after crossing the bridge, the cargo truck and the jeep
act or omission of the defendant. The common law notion of collided as a consequence of which Engineer Calibo died while
last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries. Zacarias was
plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the unhurt. As a result of the impact, the left side of the truck was
defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and slightly damaged while the left side of the jeep, including its
failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, fender and hood, was extensively damaged. After the impact,
the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a the jeep fell and rested on its right side on the asphalted road a
jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory few meters to the rear of the truck, while the truck stopped on
negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has its wheels on the road.
itself been rejected, as it has been in A2179 CC - On November 27, 1979, the instant case for damages was
- Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that filed by the surviving spouse and children of the late Engineer
may be extracted from its common law matrix and utilized as a Calibo who are residents of Tagbilaran City against the driver
general rule in negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like and owners of the cargo truck.
ours? We do not believe so. Under A2179, the task of a court, - Trial Court dismissed the complaint (and defendants'
in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence-the counterclaim) "for insufficiency of evidence." The
plaintiff's or the defendant's-was the legal or proximate cause circumstances leading to the conclusion just mentioned:
of the injury. That task is not simply or even primarily an 1. Moments before its collission with the truck being operated
exercise in chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to by Zacarias, the jeep of the deceased Calibo was "zigzagging."
imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or 2. Unlike Zacarias who readily submitted himself to
"immediate." The relative location in the continuum of time of investigation by the police, Calibo's companions who suffered
the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, injuries on account of the collision, refused to be so
is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into investigated or give statements to the police officers. This, plus
account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the Roranes' waiver of the right to institute criminal proceedings
negligent act or omission of each party and the character and against Zacarias, and the fact that indeed no criminal case was
gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest ever instituted in Court against Zacarias, were "telling
of the community. The petitioners urge that the truck driver indications that they did not attribute the happening to
(and therefore his employer) should be absolved from defendant Zacarias' negligence or fault."
responsibility for his own prior negligence because the 3. Roranes' testimony, given in plaintiffs' behalf, was "not as
unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence clear and detailed as that of Zacarias," and was "uncertain and
which had become necessary to avoid the peril precisely even contradicted by the physical facts and the police
created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or omission, To investigators Dimaano and Esparcia."
accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the 4. That there were skid marks left by the truck's tires at the
fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the scene, and none by the jeep, demonstrates that the driver of
forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. the truck had applied the brakes and the jeep's driver had not;
Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens and that the jeep had on impact fallen on its right side is
of living in society and to allocate them among the members of indication that it was running at high speed.
society. To accept the petitioners' proposition must tend to 5. Even if it be considered that there was some antecedent
weaken the very bonds of society. negligence on the part of Zacarias shortly before the collision,
Disposition CA decision is modified by reducing the in that he had caused his truck to run some 25 centimeters to
aggregate amount of compensatory damages, loss of expected the left of the center of the road, Engr. Calibo had the last clear
income and moral damages Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of chance of avoiding the accident because he still had ample
such amount room in his own lane to steer clear of the truck, or he could
simply have braked to a full stop.
- IAC reversed TC. It found Zacarias to be negligent on the
basis of the following circumstances, to wit:
1) "the truck driven by defendant Zacarias occupied the lane of
the jeep when the collision occurred,' and although Zacarias
saw the jeep from a distance of about 150 meters, he "did not
6
drive his truck back to his lane in order to avoid collision with
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totalling P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of
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purpose of depositing said funds in the current accounts of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to
RMC with PBC. It turned out, however, that these deposits, on the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him.
The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or Disposition CA decision modified. The demands of substantial
negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and justice are satisfied by allocating the damage on a 60-40 ratio.
determines liability by that. Thus, 40% of the damage awarded by the respondent
- the bank's teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in appellate court, except the award of P25,000.00 attorney's
validating, officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips fees, shall be borne by private respondent RMC; only the
prepared and presented by Ms. Yabut, despite the glaring fact balance of 60% needs to be paid by the petitioners. The award
that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished of attorney's fees shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners.
contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect
to the proper validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate. PADILLA [dissent]
- Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but - the doctrine of "last clear chance" assumes that the
also on the part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical selection negligence of the defendant was subsequent to the negligence
and supervision of Ms. Mabayad. of the plaintiff and the same must be the proximate cause of
- Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case the injury. In short, there must be a last and a clear chance, not
upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and a last possible chance, to avoid the accident or injury. It must
precedent. Proximate cause is "that cause, which, in natural have been a chance as would have enabled a reasonably
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient prudent man in like position to have acted effectively to avoid
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the the injury and the resulting damage to himself.
result would not have occurred. . . ." In this case, absent the - the bank was not remiss in its duty of sending monthly bank
act of Ms. Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete statements to private respondent RMC so that any error or
duplicate copy of the deposit slip, Ms. Irene Yabut would not discrepancy in the entries therein could be brought to the
have the facility with which to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme bank's attention at the earliest opportunity. Private respondent
with impunity. failed to examine these bank statements not because it was
- Furthermore, under the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also prevented by some cause in not doing so, but because it was
referred to, at times as "supervening negligence" or as purposely negligent as it admitted that it does not normally
"discovered peril"), petitioner bank was indeed the culpable check bank statements given by banks. It was private
party. This doctrine, in essence, states that where both parties respondent who had the last and clear chance to prevent any
are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later further misappropriation by Yabut had it only reviewed the
in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to status of its current accounts on the bank statement sent to it
determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the monthly or regularly. Since a sizable amount of cash was
incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the entrusted to Yabut, private respondent should, at least, have
impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the taken care of its concerns, as what the law presumes. Its
consequences thereof. Stated differently, the rule would also negligence, therefore, is not contributory but the immediate and
mean that an antecedent negligence of a person does not proximate cause of its injury.
preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening
negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by
another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have ONG VS METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT
avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. L-7644 August 29, 1958
Here, assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in
entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the FACTS
latter with the opportunity to defraud the company, as Metropolitan owns 3 swimming pools at its filters in Balara,
advanced by the petitioner, yet it cannot be denied that the Quezon City
petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to IIt charges the public a certain fee if such wanted to use its
avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully pools
observing their self-imposed validation procedure. Dominador Ong, 14 years of age, son of petitioners,
- While it is true that had private respondent checked the went to the pools along with his 2 brothers
monthly statements of account sent by the petitioner bank to He stayed in the shallow pool, but then he told his
RMC, the latter would have discovered the loss early on, such brothers that he would get something to drink. His
cannot be used by the petitioners to escape liability. This brothers left him and went to the Deep pool.
omission on the part of the private respondent does not change Around 4pm that day, a bather reported that one
the fact that were it not for the wanton and reckless negligence person was swimming to long under water
of the petitioners' employee in validating the incomplete Upon hearing this, the lifeguard on duty dove into the pool
duplicate deposit slips presented by Ms. Irene Yabut, the loss to retrieve Ong’s lifeless body. Applying first aid, the
would not have occurred. Considering, however, that the fraud lifeguard tried to revive the boy.
was committed in a span of more than one (1) year covering Soon after, male nurse Armando Rule came to render
various deposits, common human experience dictates that the assistance, followed by sanitary inspector Iluminado
same would not have been possible without any form of Vicente who, after being called by phone from the
collusion between Ms. Yabut and bank teller Mabayad. Ms. clinic by one of the security guards, boarded a
Mabayad was negligent in the performance of her duties as jeep carrying with him the resuscitator and a
bank teller nonetheless. medicine kit, and upon arriving he injected the boy
- it cannot be denied that private respondent was likewise with camphorated oil. After the injection, Vicente left on
negligent in not checking its monthly statements of account. a jeep in order to fetch Dr. Ayuyao from the University
Had it done so, the company would have been alerted to the of the Philippines. Meanwhile, Aba ٌo continued the
series of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary. artificial manual respiration, and when this failed to
The damage would definitely not have ballooned to such an revive him, they applied the resuscitator until the two
amount if only RMC, particularly Romeo Lipana, had exercised oxygen tanks were exhausted
even a little vigilance in their financial affairs. This omission by
Investigation was concluded and the cause of death is
9
ISSUE:
1. W/N Metropolitan is liable to the Ongs for ANURAN V BUÑO
its negligence 17 SCRA 224 BENGZON, May 20, 1966
2. W/N the last clear chance doctrine may
be invoked in this case NATURE: Petition for Review by certiorari of CA decision.
FACTS
HELD: - On January 12, 1958, a passenger jeepney was parked on
1. No. Metropolitan is not negligent the road to Taal, Batangas. Buño, driver of said jeepney
Metropolitan has taken all necessary precautions to avoid stopped his vehicle in order to allow one of his passengers to
danger to the lives of its patrons. It has been shown that the alight. But he parked his jeepney in such a way that ½ of its
swimming pools of appellee are provided with a ring buoy, toy width (the left wheels) was on the asphalted pavement of the
roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine road and the other half, on the right shoulder of the said road.
kit. The bottom of the pools is painted with black colors so as A motor truck speeding along, negligently bumped it from
to insure clear visibility. There is on display in a conspicuous behind, which such violence that three of its passengers died,
place within the area certain rules and regulations even as 2 other passengers suffered injuries that required their
governing the use of the pools. Appellee employs six confinement at the Provincial Hospital for many days.
lifeguards who are all trained as they had taken a course - Suits were instituted by the representatives of the dead and
for that purpose and were issued certificates of the injured, to recover consequently damages against the
proficiency. These lifeguards work on schedule drivers and the owners of the trucks and also against the driver
prepared by their chief and arranged in such a way as and the owners of the jeepney.
to have two guards at a time on duty to look after the - CFI Batangas absolved the driver of the jeepney and its
safety of the bathers. There is a male nurse and a owners, but it required the truck driver and the owners o make
sanitary inspector with a clinic provided with compensation. Plaintiffs appealed to the CA insisting that the
oxygen resuscitator. And there are security guards driver and the owners of the jeepney should also be made
who are available always in case of emergency. liable for damages.
The record also shows that when the body of the minor Ong
was retrieved from the bottom of the pool, the employees of ISSUE
appellee did everything possible to bring him back to life. WON the driver and owners of the jeepney should also be
When they found that the pulse of the boy was abnormal, the made liable.
inspector immediately injected him with camphorated oil.
When the manual artificial respiration proved ineffective HELD
they applied the oxygen resuscitator until its contents were YES. An error of law was committed in releasing the jeepney
exhausted. And while all these efforts were being made, from liability. It must be remembered that the obligation of the
they sent for Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the carrier to transport its passengers safely is such that the New
Philippines who however came late because Civil Code requires “utmost diligence” from the carriers (Art.
upon examining the body found him to be already 1755) who are “presumed to have been at fault or to have
dead. All of the foregoing shows that appellee has acted negligently, unless they prove that they have observed
done what is humanly possible under the extraordinary diligence” (Art. 1756). In this instance, this legal
circumstances to restore life to minor Ong and for that presumption of negligence is confirmed by the CA’s finding that
reason it is unfair to hold it liable for his death jeepney driver in question was at fault in parking the vehicle
improperly. It must follow that the driver – and the owners – of
2. The Last Clear Chance Doctrine is inapplicable the jeepney must answer for injuries to its passengers.
in this case Obiter on Application of Principle of Last Clear Chance: The
The record does not show how minor Ong came into principle about the “last clear chance” applies in a suit between
the big swimming pool. The only thing the record the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not
discloses is that minor Ong informed his elder brothers arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the
that he was going to the locker room to drink a bottle carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be
10
of coke but that from that time on nobody knew what inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and
happened to him until his lifeless body was its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise
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retrieved. The doctrine of last clear chance simply guilty of negligence. This principle does not apply in this case.
means that the negligence of a claimant does not DISPOSITION: Judgment modified.
RAYNERA VS HICETAL PARDO victim's motorcycle that figured in the accident.
(G.R. No. 120027) (21 April 1999) Although Santos claimed the tricycle almost bumped
FACTS: into the improperly parked truck, the tricycle driver was
On March 23, 1989, at about 2:00 in the morning, able to avoid hitting the truck.
Reynaldo Raynera was on his way home. He was riding a It has been said that drivers of vehicles "who bump
motorcycle traveling on the southbound lane of East the rear of another vehicle" are presumed to be "the
Service Road, Cupang, Muntinlupa. The Isuzu truck was cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other
travelling ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. evidence". The rationale behind the presumption is
The truck was loaded with two (2) metal sheets that the driver of the rear vehicle has full control of the
extended on both sides, two (2) feet on the left and three situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle in
(3) feet on the right. There were two (2) pairs of red front of him.
lights, about 35 watts each, on both sides of the metal We agree with the Court of Appeals that the
plates. The asphalt road was not well lighted. responsibility to avoid the collision with the
front vehicle lies with the driver of the rear vehicle.
At some point on the road, Reynaldo Raynera crashed
his motorcycle into the left rear portion of the truck trailer,
which was without tail lights. Due to the collision,
CANLAS V, CA
Reynaldo sustained head injuries and he was rushed to
Purisima; February 28, 2000
the hospital where he was declared dead on arrival.
Edna Raynera, widow of Reynaldo, filed with the RTC
Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari
a complaint for damages against respondents Hiceta and
Facts:
Orpilla, owner and driver of the Isuzu truck.
-Sometime in August, 1982, Osmundo S. Canlas, and Vicente
At the trial, petitioners presented Virgilio Santos. He Mañosca, decided to venture in business and to raise the
testified that at about 1:00 and 2:00 in the morning of capital needed therefor. The former then executed a Special
March 23, 1989, he and his wife went to Alabang, market, Power of Attorney authorizing the latter to mortgage two
on board a tricycle. They passed by the service road
parcels of land situated in San Dionisio, (BF Homes)
going south, and saw a parked truck trailer, with its Paranaque, Metro Manila, each lot with semi-concrete
hood open and without tail lights. They would have residential house in the name of the SPS Canlas. Osmundo
bumped the truck but the tricycle driver was quick in Canlas agreed to sell the said parcels of land to Vicente
avoiding a collision. The place was dark, and the truck
Mañosca, for and in consideration of P850,000.00,
had no early warning device to alert passing motorists. P500,000.00 of which payable within one week, and the
Trial court: respondent’s negligence was the balance of P350,000.00 to serve as his (Osmundo's)
immediate and proximate cause of Raynera’s death. investment in the business. Thus, Osmundo Canlas delivered
CA: The appellate court held that Reynaldo Raynera's to Vicente Mañosca the transfer certificates of title of the
bumping into the left rear portion of the truck was the parcels of land involved. Vicente Mañosca, as his part of the
proximate cause or his death, and consequently, transaction, issued two postdated checks in favor of Osmundo
absolved respondents from liability. Canlas in the amounts of P40,000.00 and P460,000.00,
respectively, but it turned out that the check covering the
ISSUE: bigger amount was not sufficiently funded.
1. whether respondents were negligent, and if so, -On September 3, 1982, Vicente Mañosca was able to
2. whether such negligence was the proximate cause of the mortgage the same parcels of land for P100,000.00 to a certain
death of Reynaldo Raynera. Attorney Manuel Magno, with the help of impostors who
misrepresented themselves as the spouses, Osmundo Canlas
and Angelina Canlas. On September 29, 1982, private
HELD: respondent Vicente Mañosca was granted a loan by the
We find that the direct cause of the accident was the respondent Asian Savings Bank (ASB) in the amount of
negligence of the victim. Traveling P500,000.00, with the use of subject parcels of land as
behind the truck, he had the responsibility of avoiding security, and with the involvement of the same impostors who
bumping the vehicle in front of him. He was in control of the again introduced themselves as the Canlas spouses. When the
situation. His motorcycle was equipped with headlights to loan it extended was not paid, respondent bank extrajudicially
enable him to see what was in front of him. He was foreclosed the mortgage.
traversing the service road where the prescribed -On January 15, 1983, Osmundo Canlas wrote a letter
speed limit was less than that in the highway. informing the respondent bank that the execution of subject
Traffic investigator Cpl. Virgilio del Monte testified that mortgage over the two parcels of land in question was without
two pairs of 50-watts bulbs were on top of the steel their (Canlas spouses) authority, and request that steps be
plates, which were visible from a distance of 100 taken to annul and/or revoke the questioned mortgage. On
meters Virgilio Santos admitted that from the tricycle January 18, 1983, petitioner Osmundo Canlas also wrote the
where he was on board, he saw the truck and its office of Sheriff Maximo O. Contreras, asking that the auction
cargo of iron plates from a distance of ten (10) meters. sale scheduled on February 3, 1983 be cancelled or held in
In light of these circumstances, an accident could have abeyance. But respondents Maximo C. Contreras and Asian
been easily avoided, unless the victim had been Savings Bank refused to heed petitioner Canlas' stance and
driving too fast proceeded with the scheduled auction sale.
and did not exercise dues care and prudence -Consequently, on February 3, 1983 the herein petitioners
demanded of him under the circumstances. Virgilio instituted the present case for annulment of deed of real estate
mortgage with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
11
impostors to submit additional proof of their true identity. only to the depositor or his authorized representative
For not observing the degree of diligence required of banking - In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a breach of
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institutions, whose business is impressed with public interest, contract, there is a presumption that the defendant was at fault
or negligent. The burden is on the defendant to prove that he
was not at fault or negligent. Solidbank failed to discharge this and he should not proceed if he cannot do so in safety. For
burden. (they could have presented the teller to whom the failing to observe the duty of diligence and care imposed on
passbook was left, but they didn’t) drivers of vehicles abandoning their lane, petitioner must be
- L.C. Diaz was not at fault that the passbook landed in the held liable. Iran could not be faulted when in his attempt to
hands of the impostor. Solidbank was in possession of the avoid the pick-up, he swerved to his left. Petitioner’s acts had
passbook while it was processing the deposit. After completion put Iran in an emergency situation which forced him to act
of the transaction, Solidbank had the contractual obligation to quickly. An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation
return the passbook only to Calapre, the authorized of danger and is required to act without much time to consider
representative of L.C. Diaz. SolidBank’s negligence in returning the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
the passbook was the proximate cause. danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what
- The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better
parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own
later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to negligence.
determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one Reasoning The doctrine of last clear chance states that a
who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding
do so, is chargeable with the loss. Stated differently, the an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his
antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the
from recovering damages caused by the supervening consequences of the accident. But what has been shown is the
negligence of the defendant, who had the last fair chance to presence of an emergency and the proper application of the
prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. emergency rule. There was no clear chance to speak of. Iran
- We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the swerved to the left only to avoid petitioner’s pick-up, which was
present case. Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to already on a head to head position going against Iran’s
negligence in the performance of its contractual obligation to Tamaraw jeepney immediately before the vehicles collided. No
L.C. Diaz. This is a case of culpa contractual, where neither the convincing proof was adduced by petitioner that Iran could
contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his last clear chance have avoided a head-on collision.
to avoid the loss, would exonerate the defendant from liability. Dispositive
Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by the The appealed decision is AFFIRMED.
plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by
the plaintiff but does not exculpate the defendant from his
breach of contract.
DISPOSITIVE:Decision affirmed, modification only to damages
ENGADA V CA
QUISUMBING, J.: June 20, 2003
NATURE
Petition for review seeking the reversal of the decision of the
CA which affirmed with modification the judgment of the RTC
of Iloilo City
FACTS
- On November 29, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Edwin
Iran was driving a blue Toyota Tamaraw jeepney bound for
Iloilo City. On board was Sheila Seyan, the registered owner of
the Tamaraw. The Tamaraw passengers allegedly saw from
the opposite direction a speeding Isuzu pick-up, driven by
petitioner Rogelio Engada. When it was just a few meters away
from the Tamaraw, the Isuzu pick-up’s right signal light flashed,
at the same time, it swerved to its left, encroaching upon the
lane of the Tamaraw and headed towards a head-on collision
course with it. Seyan shouted at Iran to avoid the pick-up. Iran
swerved to his left but the pick-up also swerved to its right.
Thus, the pick-up collided with the Tamaraw, hitting the latter at
its right front passenger side. The impact caused the head and
chassis of the Tamaraw to separate from its body. Seyan was
thrown out of the Tamaraw and landed on a ricefield. Seyan
incurred P130,000 in medical expenses. The Toyota Tamaraw
jeepney ended up in the junk heap. Its total loss was computed
at P80,000.
ISSUES
1. WON petitioner’s negligence was the proximate cause of the
accident
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HELD
1. YES. Ratio It is a settled rule that a driver abandoning his
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