International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 24 (2017) 340–347

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International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijdrr

Post-disaster housing recovery guidelines for development countries based MARK

on experiences in the American continent
⁎
Leandro Torres Di Gregorioa, , Carlos Alberto Pereira Soaresb
a
Department of Civil Construction, Polytechnic School, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Av. Athos da Silveira Ramos, 149, CT - Bloco D, 2º andar, sala 207, Cidade
Universitária, Rio de Janeiro, RJ 21941-901, Brazil
b
Graduate Program in Civil Engineering, Fluminense Federal University, Rua Passo da Pátria, 156 - 3º andar - Sala 365 - Bloco "D", São Domingos, Niterói, RJ 24210-
240, Brazil

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: The main purpose of this article is to propose recommendations to the processes of post-disaster recovery in
Housing recovery development countries, focusing on housing recovery, based on the analysis of three relevant experiences in the
Natural disasters American continent. The methodology adopted is based on the study of real cases of post-disaster recovery and
Risk management the data was obtained through bibliographic research, documentary collection and also participant observation
Resilience
using the O-P-R (Observation-Participation-Reflection) model. A discussion on key aspects of housing recovery
Reconstruction
was performed based on the cases and, as a final result, recommendations are presented considering the psy-
Urban planning
chosocial and the social capital recovery, the restoration of livelihoods, the supply of temporary housing and
shelters, the selection of beneficiaries for the habitational recovery programs, the provision of permanent
housing and the governance in the disaster recovering process.

1. Introduction
With the population growth and the migratory movement from the
countryside towards the cities, there was a pressure to occupy urban
sites, and this occupation, most of the time, happened in a disorderly
manner and without taking into consideration the risk assessment of
socio-natural disasters, especially in development countries. The in-
imical effects of the disaster are directly proportional to the vulner-
ability and the exposure of the elements at risk in its numerous aspects:
physical, environmental, political, economic, organizational, institu-
tional, cultural and educational [29].
In the phase of post-disaster recovery, the dynamic is often quite
distinct from the assistance phase. The activities of rescue and social
assistance are conducted relatively fast in communities and in most part
of the world, however, the process changes in the rehabilitation period,
when individual interests in private assets are concerned [21].
Beyond the physical reconstruction, the most challenging demands
for a real recovery (for example, the restoration of the livelihood and
housing provision of affected groups) are frequently left to the interests
of the local government staff and the population [28]. According to
Leykin et al. [20], there are three aspects that contribute directly to the
community resilience (CR) in emergency times: preparedness, leader-
ship and collective efficacy. The engagement of the damaged
population in the recovery process not only gives legitimacy to the
solutions that will be put in practice, it can also improve the level of
organization and awareness of the affected groups. The rehabilitation
must reinforce feelings of solidarity and the bargaining capacity, and
also approach issues related to property rights and contribute to the
collective growth [16]. However, Davidson et al. [6] show that despite
often-good intentions at the participation of users in up-front decision-
making (within the project design and planning phases), a satisfactory
level of participation is rarely obtained and the capabilities of the users
are often significantly wasted.
There is a need of connecting recovering processes with strategies of
economic development, cultural preservation and social empowerment
and also with the participation of all communities; at the same time, it's
essential that the sharing of knowledge, partnerships and cooperation
between the stakeholders in the housing sector is encouraged [26].
Considering issues related to post disaster reconstruction, Yi and
Yang [32] mention that research efforts in developing countries in Asia
and South America are lagging behind the developed world, and Africa
is hardly covered. Aiming to contribute to reduce this gap, the present
article proposes recommendations to the process of post-disaster re-
covery in development countries, with an emphasis on restoration of
housing, based on the analysis of three relevant experiences that took
place in the American continent.

⁎
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: leandro.torres@poli.ufrj.br (L.T. Di Gregorio), carlossoares.uff@gmail.com (C.A.P. Soares).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2017.06.027
Received 24 October 2016; Received in revised form 24 April 2017; Accepted 28 June 2017
Available online 01 July 2017
2212-4209/ © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
L.T. Di Gregorio, C.A.P. Soares
2. Materials and methods
This manuscript is based on real cases of post-disaster recovery,
which data were obtained from literature, documentary collection and
participant observation. The analysis embraces three cases of post-dis-
aster recovery that happened in the American continent in the recent 20
years: hurricane Mitch (Honduras and Nicaragua, 1998), earthquake in
Haiti (2010) and flood/sediment disaster in Serrain Region of Rio de
Janeiro (Brasil, 2011). Despite the cases were originated by different
kinds of hazards (hurricane, earthquake and floods/mass movements),
these disasters were considered the most harmful in their respective
countries and their recovery process show similarities concerning pre-
existing vulnerabilities (social, economic, enviornmental, institutional),
the impact in low-income groups, disruption of social services, lack of
efficient pre-disaster recovery planning and problems in coordinating
recovery efforts/governance of the recovery process. Honduras,
Nicarágua and Haiti are the respectively the third, second and first
poorest countries (based on GDP per capita) in Latin America, but their
recovery processes, despite the massive international aid directed to
them, showed different outcomes five years later. Brazil has the greater
GDP in Latin America and did not need international aid after the
disaster, but this was not sufficient to avoid the typical problems faced
by developing countries in a disaster recovery.
The author´s field activities began with an exploratory research
through participant observation, in the city of Sao Jose do Vale do Rio
Preto, after the disaster occurred in 2011 in the mountainous region of
the State of Rio de Janeiro – Brazil (case 3), from where it was possible
to monitor the disaster response activities, especially the ones related to
rehabilitation, emergency shelter, temporary shelter, provisional
housing arrangement and part of the permanent housing provision
process.
In the results/discussion section the author brings the affected po-
pulation view in the early stages of the recovery (1 month after the
disaster) through an interview with 55 people that were living in a
structured camp. Beyond that, some information was obtained on the
participation in technical meetings, congresses and projects composed
by important global actors in the scene of natural disaster´s integral risk
management, particularly during the professional work of the first au-
thor as a Researcher of the Brazilian Centre For Monitoring and
Warnings of Natural Disasters (CEMADEN) over the years 2012 and
2013, in Brazil.
The participant observation the O-P-R model, Observation,
Participation and Reflection [19], was adopted and developed in four
phases in the field activities: initial observation, the initial observation
with some participation, participation with some observation and re-
flective observation. The work of Castro [3] is also cited once this au-
thor complemented the first author´s field work by interviewing 17
affected people in the Municipality of Nova Friburgo (also located in
the Serrain Region of Rio de Janeiro), after five years from the disaster.
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International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 24 (2017) 340–347
Fig. 1. Number of occurrences of socio-natural disasters in the
Americas between 1900–2015.
Data source: EM-DAT [8].
The disadvantages/risks and advantages/opportunities for bench-
marking from each case were discussed in Section 4 and then grouped
under six main dimensions of a housing recovery process, which im-
portance were justified in the appropriate group subsection.
In sequence, recommendations were elaborated based on the cases
discussion and focusing on three main criteria:
• Opportunity for benchmarking – recommendations were taken di-
rectly from the cases in situations that presented good results with
potential to be replicated after the necessary adaptation.
• Problems´ corrective and predictive approach – the problems (faced
in the cases or considered likely to happen) directed the re-
commendations, which were conceived aiming to prevent or miti-
gate the real/potential problems.
• Opportunity of improvements – recommendations were made in
order that some performance gain would be possible in recovery
process related to the cases analyzed.
3. International panorama
3.1. (Socio)Natural disasters
The expression “natural disaster” refers to the harmful con-
sequences produced by the impact of an event caused by natural agents
(i.e. landslides caused by heavy rain) in a sensitive system. In fact, the
causes of these harmful events are normally associated with a combi-
nation between natural and anthropic agents, in order that the ex-
pression “socio-natural disasters” may offer a more accurate meaning to
describe this kind of situation.
There are two main factors that compose the risk of a disaster: the
hazard and the vulnerability of the exposed system. It is well accepted
that man activities are determinant to the vulnerability of the exposed
system, but in fact they can also contribute to the hazard component
(i.e. the effects of man occupation in a slope will probably influence the
amount of rain necessary to trigger landslides, as well as urbanization
may worsen floods by increasing the amount of water run-off in the
basin). In fact, the number of socio-natural disasters in the Americas has
risen significantly, especially after the 60s (Fig. 1).
The conjunction between the dynamics of vulnerable occupations
and the growth of extreme natural events in frequency and magnitude
(IPCC, 2012) is responsible for a raise in the number of people affected
(without considering death cases) and financial damages provoked by
natural disasters in the American continent (Figs. 2 and 3). Haddad and
Teixeira [12] also highlight that it is important to consider interactions
both inside and outside an urban system to assess the consequences of
apparently local phenomena.
L.T. Di Gregorio, C.A.P. Soares
3.2. Presentation of the socio-natural disaster cases
The following writings compose a summary of each case that was
analyzed, containing brief descriptions of the events, their main con-
sequences and the general view of the recovery process. The main ob-
jective of this section is not to characterize the cases in detail but just to
introduce them, which aspects will be discussed in Section 4.
3.2.1. Case 1 – Hurricane Mitch, Honduras and Nicaragua, 1998
[15,17,30]
3.2.1.1. Description. Hurricane Mitch was one of the most powerful
hurricanes on record in the Atlantic basin, with maximum sustained
winds of 290 km/h. Due to its slow motion from October 29 to
November 3, Hurricane Mitch dropped historic amounts of rainfall in
Honduras and Nicaragua, with unofficial reports of up to 1900 mm.
3.2.1.2. Main consequences. Deaths due to catastrophic flooding made
it the second deadliest Atlantic hurricane in history, with 14,600
fatalities, 8058 missing people and 12,272 injured. The official
number of displaced evacuees is 441,150 and the total of affected
people is about 2112,000. Total damage and losses are estimated in $
3.79 billion.
3.2.1.3. General view about the recovery. A case of reconstruction
directed by community happened on the city of Ocotal, Nicaragua,
where the population organized itself to relocate residents of displaced
neighborhoods and highly vulnerable sites after the Hurricane Mitch in
1998. The projects of the houses and the building materials have been
proposed by a local architect; nevertheless, receiving a house was
conditioned by the participation of at least one family member in the
construction. Five years later, there are the beginnings of early systems
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International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 24 (2017) 340–347
Fig. 2. Number of people affected by socio-natural disasters in the
Americas between 1900–2015.
Data source: EM-DAT [8].
to warn populations of impending natural disasters and prepare for
them. There are also nascent efforts to relocate housing and other
buildings from vulnerable areas. But regional economies have changed
little and poverty continues to be severe. Governments have barely
begun to institutionalize the fight against corruption (a problem that
can be considered a constant man-made threat) and have only
reluctantly begun dialogues with civil society groups on themes they
consider their areas of expertise.
3.2.2. Case 2 – Earthquake, Haiti, 2010 [5,11,13,14,25,31]
3.2.2.1. Description. On January 12th, 2010 at 4:53 p.m. a magnitude
7.0 earthquake struck Haiti, the strongest quake measured in the island
in over 200 years.
3.2.2.2. Main consequences. After the 2010 earthquake in Haiti,
hundreds of thousands of Haitians were made homeless and fled from
the affected areas to seek refuge in the provinces, aggravating the
already problematic economic situation of that zone. The author
sustains that the human impact is immense in a country marked by
high levels of poverty (before the disaster, approximately 67% of the
population lived with less than US$2 per day). Around 1.5 million
people, representing 15% of the population, were directly affected.
More than 220 thousand human lives were lost and 300 thousand
people were injured. The result is an exacerbation of the constant
difficulties of access to food and basic services. Somewhere around
105,000 houses were completely destroyed and over 208,000 damaged.
Beyond 1300 educational institutions and more than 50 hospitals and
health centers collapsed or became unusable. The total amount of
damages caused by the earthquake of January 12th in 2010 is estimated
at 7.80 billion, equivalent to a little more than the country's GDP in
2009.
Fig. 3. Financial damages provoked by socio-natural disasters in
the Americas between 1900–2015.
Data source: EM-DAT [8].
L.T. Di Gregorio, C.A.P. Soares
3.2.2.3. General view about the recovery. The international action in
Haiti throughout 2010 went far from meeting the new emergencies that
were imposed after the earthquake. The problems were caused by
inconsistencies and shortcomings of international cooperation provided
by the major donors, the uncontrolled and uncoordinated action of the
NGOs, by the pointless presence of military contingents and the poor
coordination between the assistance actions of Latin American
countries. The extinction of a government commission responsible for
approving the projects, in October 2011, caused an interruption in the
process of allocation of funds. An important step was the preparation
and dissemination of the Action Plan for the Reconstruction and
Development of Haiti (PARDH) by the Haitian government. The plan
presented important contribution to the rationality and efficiency of the
process by proposing to concentrate efforts in certain priority projects,
along four themes: Territorial reconstruction; Economic reconstruction;
Social reconstruction; Institutional reconstruction.
3.2.3. Case 3 – Flood and sediment disasters, Mountain region of Rio
de Janeiro, Brazil, 2011 [2,9]
3.2.3.1. Description. The torrential rains of 11th and 12th January
2011 in the state of Rio de Janeiro resulted in of the worst disaster of
the Brazilian history, causing floods, widespread landslides and several
flow movements of debris and mud. Among the affected cities, Areal,
Bom Jardim, Nova Friburgo, São Jose do Vale do Rio Preto, Sumidouro,
Petropolis and Teresopolis decreed emergency state.
3.2.3.2. Main consequences. Torrential rain in seven towns of the state's
mountainous region caused the death of more than 900 people
(excluding a number of 350 missing people) and affected 300,000
human lives. With respect to damages, the World Bank estimates a total
cost of R$ 4.78 billion, in which approximately R$ 3.15 billion
correspond to the public sector and R$ 1.62 billion are privately
owned. More than 8000 housing units were destroyed and ninety-one
percent of the estimated damage refers to the losses suffered by low-
income population.
3.2.3.3. General view about the recovery. Projects on flood control,
slopes stabilization and environmental remediation were developed.
They covered structural and non-structural actions of short (days and
weeks) and medium (months) terms aiming to improve the macro and
mesodrainage of the basins affected by the event, the recovery of
riparian areas and to propose measures to prevent and inhibit (re)
occupation of risky areas. Within the affected population resettlement
program, various forms of assistance (compensation, housing unit in
popular housing complex or acquisition of assisted housing unit) were
offered by the government. They were promised the construction of
more than 6,000 housing units. While the resettlement program is
ongoing, affected families receive government social rental support to
pay for their living expenses. The flood warning system operated by the
Environmental State Institute of Rio de Janeiro (INEA) continues to
expand and currently consists of 80 stations covering 32 municipalities
and two meteorological S-band Doppler polarimetric radar systems,
what will enable the institute to dispose of updated and reliable
information from the real-time monitoring of rainfall throughout the
territory of Rio de Janeiro.
4. Results and discussion
In this section, a discussion is performed under each of the six key
aspects that impact on housing recovery: psychosocial and social capital
recovery, restoration of livelihoods, provision of temporary shelters and
temporary housing, selection of beneficiaries for housing recovery
programs, permanent housing provision and governance in the re-
covery process.
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4.1. Psychosocial recovery and restoration of social capital
The psychological and social capital recovery has a direct (and little
explored) relationship with housing recovery, since the latter refers to
the meaning of restitution of the physical structure that supports per-
sonal and family development. Housing recovery can be used to
strengthen community relationships, develop group identity and ma-
ture processes of collective awareness and collaboration, as well as
provide the recovery process a concrete dimension, which may help in
the elaboration of trauma.
According to Villacís [31] the most of the affected by hurricane
Mitch belonged to low-income groups, whose suffering was exacerbated
by the loss of their homes, furniture and personal effects, which is of
enormous significance. Stein [24] also related difficulties to reflect
seriously on what is happening during first year after the disaster.
Regarding the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, PAHO [23] states that the
loss of habits, family, friends and neighbors, combined with the de-
struction of infrastructure, services, symbols and important places of
the country, as well as a rupture of the social order, have resulted in a
process of continuous exposure to the mental health problems. Emer-
gency relief assistance addressed immediate needs, however, rebuilding
communities requires complex interventions that link relief, re-
habilitation and development, respecting the cultural context but
drawing broader perspectives to the affected group (CARE, 2015). In
Haiti, there are unequal power relations between men and women,
what brings difficulties for women to fully participate in the develop-
ment of their household, community, and country [23].
About 1 month later the disaster in Rio de Janeiro, in 2011, Di
Gregorio [7] interviewed people that were in public shelters in the
municipality of São José do Vale do Rio Preto. 90% of the respondents
expressed their interest in starting the housing recovery process im-
mediately, under a collective construction regime. Reasons for such an
interest were basically three: the urgency of overcoming a temporary
and traumatic housing situation; the need to retake the space for
housing; and uncertainty about the effective provision of housing by the
government, especially on the issue of when the houses would actually
be delivered. In another interview conducted five years later the 2011
disaster in the municipality of Nova Friburgo, Castro [3] found that
29% of the interviewees reported relatives as fatal victims of the dis-
aster and 100% of those interviewed reported having family members
with psychological changes due to trauma caused by the disaster.
4.2. Recovery of livelihoods
Housing recovery can be used as a lever to recover the livelihoods of
the affected group. Whether through the hiring of local companies or
the promotion of individual and/or collective entrepreneurial activity,
it is necessary to understand the vocation of the affected community
and its potential for application in the activities of the housing re-
covery, directly or indirectly.
Jha et al. [17] defend that the scale of project may contribute more
strongly to reactivation of local economy and mention that because
Ocotal (Nicaragua) constructed its own adobe factory, it created much-
needed employment in an effort to reduce out-migration from the town.
Villacís [30] also mention that the recovery after hurricane Mitch called
for reducing the poverty and the environmental exploitation that had
made the region so vulnerable and lower income and damage to in-
frastructure had also a negative effect on intra-regional trade. Thus,
depending on the disaster scale, the recovery of livelihood may depend
too much on the economic recovery.
In Haiti, the precarious economic and social situation, combined
with the preexistent environmental degradation, resulted in a condition
of high socio-environmental vulnerability and low risk reduction ca-
pacity. After the 2010 disaster, these factors (coupled with poor gov-
ernance capacity in the country) further aggravated social, economic,
environmental and sanitary problems [10]. According to ONBR (2015),
L.T. Di Gregorio, C.A.P. Soares
after 5 years the country had 80% of the population living in poverty
and unemployment reached about 30% of Haitians.
The need for recovery of livelihoods was also noticed during the
recovery of the 2011 disaster in the Serrain Region of Rio de Janeiro,
when 80% of the sheltered people interviewed reported having no in-
come or having an income of up to 1 minimum brazilian wage (about $
325.00 per month). The remaining 20% had income of up to 2
minimum brazilian wages, confirming the economic vulnerability of the
affected group. Among the main needs for the recovery of livelihoods
indicated by the autonomous professionals belonging to the inter-
viewed group, the acquisition of raw material, training and equipment
were reported, once the means of production of these people had been
destroyed in the disaster. Although the government focused its efforts
on physical recovery, leaving the economic recovery and livelihoods in
the background, in the municipality of São José do Vale do Rio Preto, a
professional training centre was created based on the articulation be-
tween local entrepreneurs, the National Industrial Learning Service
(SENAI), the Social Service of Industry (SESI), the Support Service for
Micro and Small Enterprises (SEBRAE) and the National Rural Learning
Service (SENAR), in partnership with the NGO Cruzada do Menor.
4.3. Provision of temporary shelters and temporary housing
The provision of shelter and temporary housing plays a unique role
in the housing provision process as it provides the basic physical pro-
tection structure at a critical period of recovery, when losses, in-
securities, doubts and uncertainties strongly hit the affected groups.
After hurricane Mitch, many people did not have access to the social
services that would alleviate their sanitary vulnerability and around
466,000 people had to remain in shelters for several months [30]. Stein
[24] mentioned that there were no clear criteria for deciding on tem-
porary versus permanent housing solutions and some 82,000 families
were unable to return to their homes for a long time, which worsened
problems stemming from the internal and external migration of a large
number of men of working age [30]. According to UNDP [27], the early
recovery stage provided an opportunity for improving inter-institu-
tional coordination to integrate disaster reduction in the country's de-
velopment agenda.
Just after the earthquake, the Government of the Republic of Haiti
[11] mentioned that 1.3 million people were living in temporary
shelters in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince and more than 500
thousand left the disaster areas to seek refuge in the rest of the country.
The homeless population lived in temporary shelters. A year later
550,000 were in 802 camps around the country, many with poor food
supply and unhealthy conditions, exposing mainly infants and lactating
women to the risks of diseases and malnutrition [10]. According to
ONUBR [22], there were almost no camps for internal displaced people
(IDPs) in Port-au-Prince 5 years later; however, there were still about
80,000 IDPs across the country.
According to Di Gregorio [7], shortly after the disaster in the mu-
nicipality of São José do Vale do Rio Preto, it was verified the need to
shelter those affected by the event. Those who could shelter themselves
in homes of relatives and friends did it and the others were sheltered in
schools of the municipality, where it was possible to count on infra-
structure of accommodation, kitchen, warehouse and collective toilets.
One point observed was the tendency of looting to unoccupied homes,
and the owners' fear of losing their belongings. Since the demand for
information and guidance from the sheltered people was high, the
Disaster Commander made a daily raid on the shelters, at which time he
provided clarification and noted the various demands that were pre-
sented by these people. In parallel, it was planned to transfer families
from emergency shelters to a temporary shelter with better structure,
which was built in a short time in the area of the municipal stadium.
This shelter had a structure of collective services and of psychosocial,
administrative and health support, where the families occupied tents
specially designed for disaster situations (“Shelter Box”). This transition
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International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 24 (2017) 340–347
took place about 30 days after the disaster occurred. In December 2011,
about 11 months after the disaster, the temporary shelter had been
totally demobilized. Faced with the housing problem established, the
government granted an eventual welfare benefit called "Social Rent" to
family groups [3]. The same author notes that five years after the dis-
aster, 88% of respondents reported using social rental at some time,
with 29% still receiving the benefit. It was noticed also an increase in
the rents market, due to the sudden increase in demand [7].
4.4. Selection of beneficiaries for housing recovery programs
The selection of beneficiaries is one aspect that needs to be treated
with care and accuracy, since the resources for recovery are limited and
the demands for housing in developing countries extrapolate the di-
mensions of recovery.
Stein [24] mention that nobody had clear criteria to determine who
was affected and who was eligible for assistance and pressure for having
a house emerged from conflicts between poor affected by Mitch and
historically excluded poor not affected by Mitch.
In Haiti, if there was a major migration to other departments in-
itially, due to the destruction of infrastructure in Port-au-Prince, there
was a reverse flow caused by the distribution of goods and services in
temporary shelters in the metropolitan area of the capital. This fact not
only contributed to the return of those who migrated, but also to the
migration of the poorest populations of the unaffected departments in
search of better opportunities [23].
Following the 2011 disaster, Di Gregorio [7] observed some diffi-
culty in organizing information for the purpose of registering the af-
fected population, which reduces the ability to identify frauds. The
main problem is that the prefecture of the Municipality of São José do
Vale do Rio Preto (as well as most prefectures in Brazil) did not have
updated and geo-referenced registration of the occupation of its terri-
tory, as well as the number of inhabitants residing in each house. The
same author also mentions bureaucracy in the registration of people
and in the concession of social rental, in addition to the need to identify
the profile of chronic diseases/population deficiencies that may restrict
participation in collective construction activities.
4.5. Provision of permanent housing
The provision of permanent housing is the most direct aspect of
housing recovery and consequently the one that has the greatest impact
on the lives of the affected population, with long term effects. Timing in
the provision of permanent housing is a critical factor in post-disaster
recovery in developing countries.
According to Villacís [30], the loss of life, devastation and ruin re-
sulting from the effects of a natural phenomenon, Hurricane Mitch,
were severely compounded by man-made factors and the exposed en-
vironmental degradation and extreme poverty of the region dictated
that reconstruction could not be simply rebuilding what had existed
before. Although during the permanent housing providing process new
building technologies, materials, or housing designs can be introduced,
agencies may leave little room for individual preferences by imposing
standard designs and materials [17] and introduce schemes that gen-
erate passivity among recipients (all free). Stein [24] points out some
difficulties faced in Mitch recovery: no clear criteria for deciding on
temporary versus permanent housing solutions; suitable and un-
contested land for resettlement was scarce; systems for evaluating
projects and issuing environmental permits was slow and conditions
difficult to comply; Planning, construction standards and codes where
not adequate for reconstruction; some International NGOs arrived with
little or no prior experience in the country and in housing; competition
for donor resources, land and even access to potential beneficiaries.
Despite a speeded-up housing reconstruction program of that magni-
tude entailed a far higher amount than the countries’ demonstrated
building capacity, after five years much of the damaged infrastructure
L.T. Di Gregorio, C.A.P. Soares
of Central America has been repaired [30].
International NGOs played an important role in Haiti recovery after
2010 earthquake, but five years later, almost 60,000 people are still
homeless and living in camps, and the common struggle to rebuild has
done nothing to close Haiti's deep political divisions [1].
Even emergency solutions, such as the construction of housing to
solve the problem of the nearly 9000 displaced people, had not yet
started a year after the disaster in the Serrain Region of Rio de Janeiro,
with the first delivery of permanent housing being carried out more
than two years after the event [3]. In addition, the value of the “social
rent” benefit was considered insufficient by the beneficiaries, con-
tributing for many to return to their old dwellings in areas of risk
(Jornal O Globo, 2012 apud [10]). In relation to the provision of per-
manent housing in the Municipality of São José do Vale do Rio Preto,
several restrictive issues were identified. First, there was a shortage of
land of adequate size, suitable for the construction of new housing units
and not located in areas at risk of geodynamic processes (landslides,
debris flow, etc.) and/or hydrologic processes (floods, flashfloods etc.).
This difficulty originated mainly in the rugged relief of the munici-
pality, which is located in a valley [7]. Also worthy of note is the lack of
work structure of the Municipal Works Department in response to the
high demand for emergency services, such as debris removal, urban
cleaning, demolitions, interdictions and housing inspection reports. In
this way, it was observed that, simultaneously with the housing needs,
there were several other necessities that contributed to the delay of the
activities of provision of permanent housing [7]. The same author noted
in an interview with sheltered people that about 90% of these recipients
reported that they not only believed, but would immediately accept to
start rebuilding their homes under a community effort. However, the
Municipal Works Department understood that this modality of re-
construction was not adequate. In fact, since there is the problem of
land scarcity, there has been a need to build multifamily buildings ra-
ther than individual houses, which in principle requires the expertise of
a construction company (solution adopted by the government). Ac-
cording to Castro [3], five years after the disaster, 35% of respondents
in the municipality of Nova Friburgo received built houses donated by
the government, 12% received state compensation and rebuilt their
homes independently, 24% used only of own resources or donated by
relatives or church to build their dwellings, and 29% still received so-
cial rent. However, it can be seen from the reports and answers during
the period that, for the interviewees, a significant decrease was per-
ceived in their housing status, since 65% considered that the current
housing situation is worse when compared to the time before the dis-
aster. In addition, among the interviewees, 47% did not consider their
current residence adequate to the number of occupants [3]. The dis-
content of the victims in relation to their dwellings can be attributed, to
some extent, to the great migration of districts that occurred after the
disaster (65% no longer live in their neighborhoods of origin which had
strong ties of friendship and support). Even considering physical se-
paration, 59% said they continue to maintain contact with former
neighbors [3]. In addition, 50 houses built by the Municipality of Nova
Friburgo, which had pending completion of the works, were invaded by
families that, for the most part, were not registered for the receipt of
homes under construction (Jornal A Voz da Serra, 2016, apud [3]).
4.6. Governance in the recovery process
Governance of the recovery process as a whole (now not just
housing) has a major impact on the housing recovery process, as the
political-cultural context and the organizational capacities of a coun-
try's institutions define the capacity for reaction, mobilization and
management of resources (internal and external), as well as recovery
priorities.
The effects of Mitch brought to light institutional weaknesses flawed
development processes, and a generalized perception that natural dis-
asters are unusual, isolated events which require forecasting and fast
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reaction [27]. The need for a coherent set of policies and procedures,
and a system approach to address decades of risk accumulation and
increasing vulnerability amongst the poorest sectors of the population
was clearly identified [27]. Delegates from donor nations, Central
American countries, and multilateral lending and development agencies
agreed on a final statement, the so-called “Stockholm Declaration,”
with priorities to guide the reconstruction and transformation process
[30]. Villacís [30] points out that millions of dollars have been given in
foreign assistance mainly to implement mostly technical and, in many
cases, repetitive and uncoordinated projects and very few technical
studies have actually been implemented in practice. The author also
states that there is no practical way to determine whether Nicaragua's
risk of natural disasters is higher or lower than before the disaster.
Although Stein [24] observed difficulties in deciding who has to do
what and who leads the provision and operation of infrastructure and
services, in less than a year, and with scarce financial resources, Ni-
caragua endorsed a new legal and institutional framework for disaster
reduction [27] Jha et al. [17] defend that community driven re-
construction has high levels of flexibility (including modifications in
the house design) and accountability and provides control for owners
over reconstruction, but one should considerer the risk in that local
contractors may capture community construction committees that
manage large amounts of resources.
Initially, summary of Needs from PDNA pointed a total of $11.5
billion distributed under the themes: governance, environment &
disaster risk management, social sectors, infrastructure, production
sectors, cross-cutting [11]. According to Knox [8], the political morass
is one of the big reasons why the billions in relief and recovery aid
(estimated in $13.5 billion) haven't been enough to rescue Haiti from
the disasters that fate keeps flinging its way. The original plan was to
set up a trust fund that would be controlled by the Haitian Ministries of
Health and Environment. But that's not the way foreign aid to Haiti
works. With few exceptions, donor nations and nongovernmental or-
ganizations insist on keeping control of their projects, which are set
according to their own priorities [18]. In the case of Haiti, the vul-
nerability of the population to threats must be reduced by strength-
ening the country's resilience. This means a long-term process of sus-
tainable economic and social development [10].
Concerning the disaster in the Serrain Region, limitations were
found in the post-disaster risk reduction capacity due to factors such as
low community participation, deficient articulation among institutions,
insufficient records and poor Municipal Risk Reduction Plans, appli-
cation of resources with a focus on punctual and non-systemic solu-
tions, the existence of institutional and community vulnerabilities,
among others [4]. Despite of that, the megadisaster of 2011 also caused
a complete institutional restructuring in risk management across the
country, creating the Federal Law 12.608/12, which establishes the
Brazilian Protection and Civil Defence Policy. From this adverse event it
was created the Brazilian Centre for Monitoring and Warnings of Nat-
ural Disasters (CEMADEN) and strengthened the Brazilian Centre of
Risk and Disaster Management (CENAD) to mitigate the risks of natural
disasters in 821 priority municipalities in Brazil. Freitas et al. [10] notes
that disaster risk reduction policies must be integrated with local and
regional development policies, acting with transparency and social
participation in the social and environmental determinants of health
and reducing social and environmental vulnerability.
5. Recommendations
Based on the discussion presented in the previous section, re-
commendations for housing recovery process in development countries
were organized in Table 1, according to the key dimensions previously
defined.
Furthermore, the main players that would be responsible for the
implementation of each recommendation were suggested [inside the
brackets], considering the following convention:
L.T. Di Gregorio, C.A.P. Soares
Table 1
Recommendations on broader aspects of a housing recovery process in development
countries.
Psychosocial recovery and restoration of “social capital”
a) Along with other aspects of the recovery, it is important to structure a
psychosocial recovery of short (days and weeks), medium (months) and long
(years) terms. It is necessary that such assistance starts soon after the disaster,
even without government support. [G, D, C]
a) Experiences such as relocation and job loss cause severe and traumatic changes in
the lifestyle of the people affected and should be avoided. [G, D]
a) The reconstruction must be oriented in order to recover the affected group and
ensure that the community's disarrangement is contained. [G, D]
a) The creation of a Recovery Committee - with strong community action - to follow
and participate actively in the process is desirable. [G, D, C]
Recovery of livelihoods
a) During the recovery process is required special attention regarding to actions for
the maintenance of the affected population's livelihood. [G, D]
a) The availability of funding for the recovery of the businesses and the affected
population livelihoods is also an important measure. [G, D]
a) In case there is a need to relocate, alternatives to prevent the loss of the
livelihoods or family connections in the relocated population should be
evaluated. If this is not possible, they should be considered compensatory
measures to facilitate the acceptance by the beneficiaries. [G, D]
a) It is important to set goals and converging lines of work for the housing recovery
and for the livelihoods, taking advantage of the reconstruction opportunities to
generate value to affected communities. [G, D, C]
a) It might be interesting to use production programs with ecological appeal and
intensive labor use, since they can bring benefits such as the provision of local
jobs and the involvement of beneficiaries in the recovery process. [G, D, C]
a) One should evaluate the relation benefits/disadvantages of employing
prefabricated systems in temporary housing because, although they are fast, they
may require early maintenance, go against the construction culture of the
community and hamper the involvement of local workers in the activity of
specialized construction. [G, D]
a) It is recommended that the recovery program also assists the displaced people
who have not had their homes destroyed, in the form of money, food, clothing, or
other means that is made suitable. It is important to determine limits and
duration for the aid. [G, D]
Provision of temporary shelters and temporary housing
a) The shelter must respect the family groups and, as far as possible, the other
existing social groupings (neighbors, friends, etc.). [G, D]
a) The adaptation of existing buildings (e.g., public buildings, uninhabited
buildings, etc.) may be an alternative to the provision of shelter, if a quick
conversion is possible. [G]
a) The transition from emergency shelters to temporary shelters or temporary
housing must be made as soon as possible. Besides allowing the resumption of the
original function of the buildings used as emergency shelters, this transition aims
to provide decent conditions for the homeless and displaced population while
they wait for a permanent housing solution. [G, D]
a) The granting rent benefits should be carried out in an assisted way, with the
participation of the government in the negotiation of lease as well as in the
selection of locations where families will move in order to avoid occupations in
risk areas. [G]
a) To prevent speculation in the price of rents and ensure the availability of real
estate after the disaster, funding for repair in affected rented buildings can be
conditioned to restrictions of rental prices. [G]
a) Depending on the magnitude of the disaster, the local government may have to
work alongside with other cities able to receive the homeless, bearing in mind the
need of monitoring these people and keeping the assistance conditions in all
necessary aspects. [G]
a) The security guarantee to the property of the victims who have to vacate their
homes is also important to be considered. A frequently reported problem during
the evacuation of buildings at risk is the possibility of theft, if the owner has no
time to remove their belongings and have to vacate their property quickly.
Another important aspect is the security guarantee against illegal occupation of
the vacant dwellings. [G]
a) Quality control mechanisms of construction materials are required, even in the
case of temporary houses, since many of them end up being utilized for the
construction of permanent housing. After the initial investment in the purchase, it
is desirable that modular and mobile homes can be used in multiple disaster
events. [G, D]
i) The temporary shelter at the site of the future permanent housing allows
continuous monitoring of the construction by beneficiaries and savings in
logistics and displacement actions, in case there is the employment of the
beneficiaries' work in the construction. [G, D]
a) The type of temporary shelters and temporary housing, as well as the type of
materials used, should preferably be designed so that they are recycled or used for
the (re)construction of permanent housing or for the restoration of existing
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International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 24 (2017) 340–347
Table 1 (continued)
buildings, in order to cause the least possible impact. [G, D]
Selection of beneficiaries for housing recovery programs
a) It is recommended that the following criteria are considered fundamental when
choosing the beneficiaries of the housing recovery: to have resided at the site
affected by the disaster, lack of resources for rebuilding and not having received
housing assistance from another source. [G, D]
a) Regarding the presentation of evidence, by the beneficiary, that the occupation of
the affected realty is legitimate, the criteria should be established according to the
context of the locality; considering that not always the exigence of a document of
property rights to land is going to be possible. [G, D]
a) It is also important to define in a clear and objective manner the criteria for
granting benefits to people who: are tenants, have more than one affected
property, or are invaders. It is also necessary to take into account the number of
people living in the property, for housing benefit sizing purposes. [G, D]
a) It is desirable that the housing recovery program also allows the attending of the
owners who have more than one residence, possibly in the form of financing, in
order to increase the stock of homes available in the post-disaster. [G]
a) It is important that the homeless and displaced people who were already inserted
into housing programs are registered and mobilized. In these cases, the
mechanisms of the reconstruction process adaptation to pre-existing programs
can be studied. [G]
Provision of permanent housing
a) If a permanent replacement is inevitable, the ideal is to be held near the previous
location, since it is guaranteed that it has an acceptable level of risk, in order to
keep as many references as possible to the affected population. [G, D]
a) However, the issue of keeping or not the attractiveness of the urban space should
be evaluated further. It may be necessary to cause the temporary impairment of
the places where evacuation (or not re-occupation) is needed by measures such as
the removal of existing infrastructure. [G]
a) It is important that access to the building materials is facilitated to the affected
communities through the availability of credit or subsidies. [G, D]
a) On the planning of the reconstruction project, it is important to check the
capacity of local suppliers and take measures to ensure the purveyance of
resources, be it strengthening and privileging local providers or through other
actions. [G, D]
a) The use of the beneficiaries’ manpower in the housing reconstruction/recovery
can reduce costs, but the results usually are better when they involve jobs that do
not require qualification. [G, D, C]
a) In situations where the manpower is also formed by the owners/beneficiaries,
physical and health assessments should be carried out to determine the
possibilities and limitations of the work to be performed by each one of them. [G,
D, C]
a) Demolition operations, debris cleanup and construction are more easily
conducted if the beneficiaries are not living on site. [G, D, C]
a) The training of people who play the hole of multipliers (training of trainers) in
construction techniques to be employed in the project can be an important way of
disseminating knowledge on operations using beneficiaries' manpower. [G, D]
i) The relocation of risky areas must be followed by an improvement in the life
quality of the affected population, demolition of unoccupied houses and
construction of public leisure facilities in areas where the permanent occupation
is not allowed. [G]
a) In small-scale disasters, the dynamic of the reconstruction processes and the
routine construction can be very close. It becomes necessary to identify the
restrictions of the production chain of construction. Steps must be taken to curb
corruption in disaster situations and to establish a structure of resource recovery
control. [G]
a) Housing reform actions with resilient construction techniques are also possible, as
long as accompanied by technical assistance, adequate infrastructure and
guidance for risk mitigation. [G, D, C]
Governance in the recovery process
a) The post-disaster recovery must be planned and implemented in a
multidisciplinary way, reflecting the needs of the areas of health and social
services, natural and cultural resources, livelihoods, economy, housing, and
infrastructure. The quality of the technical staff reflects directly on the security of
the housing provision process and the accuracy of the assessments. [G]
a) After a major disaster, it is important that the local government provide a
coordinating framework that meets the interests of the donors and contractors,
aligning and leveraging their efforts with the recovery needs. [G]
a) The presence and timely guidance from the government, especially through the
civil protection, welfare and health agencies are absolutely essential for the
physical and psychological security of the population. These actions and
informations should be available in the shortest possible time, preferably from the
outset of the triggering event, known as the "golden hour". [G]
a) The active participation of the affected community should be ensured and the
legitimacy of their leaders before the community interests verified. It is necessary
to hear the very people affected to achieve the best solution. [G, D, C]
a) If the affected area does not have conditions to uplift itself, including the (lack of)
(continued on next page)
L.T. Di Gregorio, C.A.P. Soares
Table 1 (continued)
production capacity, it is necessary to organize the demands, articulate with the
donors and organize a funding structure and a use of resources that is transparent,
preferentially in the form of a joint working group. [G, C]
a) While driving the crisis is necessary to assess crisis scenarios in sequence, in
which the necessary resources and capabilities must be compatible with the
complexity required. [G]
a) During the recovery process, what needs to be done is the revaluation and update
of the prevention measures as well as local and regional urban planning directed
to the mitigation of the disaster risks. [G]
a) The creation of the monitoring system and alerts can help reduce the human and
material damage caused by natural disasters, since it allows the anticipation of
emergency measures for risk mitigation. [G, C]
• C – Community;
• D – Donnors (private organizations – generally without profitable
purposes – that contribute to the recovery process by donating re-
sources to the affected community);
• G – Government.
6. Conclusions
Based on three post-disaster recovery experiences in development
countries located in the American continent and also in field experi-
ences from the authors, they were analysed the disadvantages/risks and
advantages/opportunities for benchmarking and recommendations
were made considering the following key areas of a housing recovery
process: psychosocial and social capital recovery, the recovery of live-
lihoods, the provision of temporary shelters and temporary housing, the
selection of beneficiaries for reconstruction programs, permanent
housing provision and the governance in the recovery process.
Case 1 (hurricane Mitch, Honduras and Nicaragua, 1998) presented
strong aspects related to the relevance of community participation in
each part of the recovery process, while case 2 (earthquake, Haiti,
2010) strongly focused in the importance of a well defined recovery
management process, where the government need to assume the co-
ordination and guarantee transparency and accountability. It is high-
lighted that case 3 showed to be especially important for the re-
commendations, once it is considered the most important socio-natural
disaster in Brazil and, besides that, the authors could participate di-
rectly and indirectly of activities, projects and studies related to this
case, what increased and improved the sense of perception to different
aspects of the situation.
It is expected that this article contributes to the overall under-
standing of the disaster recovery process, with emphasis on housing
recovery and then can be useful to managers of the recovery process,
facilitating the decision-making in critical situations.
Despite the recommendations had been developed aiming a disaster
housing recovery process in development countries, some of them may
also apply for developed countries. However, it is understood that there
are many different aspects to be considered, once the availability of
founds and capabilities for recovery is quite different in development
countries comparing to developed ones. This way, the conclusions of
this paper are more adherent to development countries, which face
similar problems/challenges in terms of economics, social and institu-
tional aspects. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy the importance of a critical
evaluation of the applicability of the recommendations and the neces-
sary adjustments must be made in each case, according to the pecu-
liarities of the affected systems.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the reviewers for the comments
that enabled the improvement of this work. We also thank CNPQ/
CAPES and FAPERJ, for their support in the research that originated
this work.
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International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 24 (2017) 340–347
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