psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of
deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support. 7
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 179267. June 25, 2013.]
JESUS C. GARCIA, petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE
JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN,
JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos — or
93 percent of a total population of 93.3 million — adhering to the teachings of Jesus Christ. 1 Yet, the
admonition for husbands to love their wives as their own bodies just as Christ loved the church and gave
himself up for her 2 failed to prevent, or even to curb, the pervasiveness of violence against Filipino women.
The National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) reported that, for the years 2000-2003,
"female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these
reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in
partners." 3
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups, Congress
enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their
Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other
Purposes." It took effect on March 27, 2004. 4 aHDTAI
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women
and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e.,husband; former husband; or any
person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common child. 5 The
law provides for protection orders from the barangay and the courts to prevent the commission of further
acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties and responsibilities of barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors
and court personnel, social workers, health care providers, and other local government officials in
responding to complaints ofVAWC or requests for assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative
of the equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay
officials.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of
her minor children, a verified petition 6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus
C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional,
Private respondent's claims
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former was
eleven years her senior. They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia,17 years old, who is the
natural child of petitioner but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia,6 years old;
and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old. 8
Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved around her
husband. On the other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant, controlling, and
demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. He forbade private respondent to pray, and
deliberately isolated her from her friends. When she took up law, and even when she was already working
part time at a law office, petitioner trivialized her ambitions and prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He
was often jealous of the fact that his attractive wife still catches the eye of some men, at one point
threatening that he would have any man eyeing her killed. 9
Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of Robinson's
Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to the affair when private
respondent confronted him about it in 2004. He even boasted to the household help about his sexual
relations with said bank manager. Petitioner told private respondent, though, that he was just using the
woman because of their accounts with the bank. 10 EHTIcD
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically and
emotionally wounded. In one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on both arms and
shook her with such force that caused bruises and hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit private
respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their
daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent to his paramour and whom he blamed for
squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times. When private respondent
decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay for fear that if the latter leaves, petitioner
would beat her up. Even the small boys are aware of private respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-old son
said that when he grows up, he would beat up his father because of his cruelty to private respondent. 11
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of despair. On
December 17, 2005, while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She was found by her son
bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking her to the hospital. Private
respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time petitioner never bothered to visit, nor
apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private respondent has been undergoing therapy almost
every week and is taking anti-depressant medications. 12
When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she intends to file
charges against the bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing the manager's job. He then
packed his things and told private respondent that he was leaving her for good. He even told private
respondent's mother, who lives with them in the family home, that private respondent should just accept his
extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a child with her. 13
Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he would take
her children from her and deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had previously warned her that if she
goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo. 14
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells. He is
the President of three corporations — 326 Realty Holdings, Inc.,Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and J-Bros
Trading Corporation — of which he and private respondent are both stockholders. In contrast to the
absolute control of petitioner over said corporations, private respondent merely draws a monthly salary of
P20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill Corporation. Household expenses amounting
to not less than P200,000.00 a month are paid for by private respondent through the use of credit cards,
which, in turn, are paid by the same corporation together with the bills for utilities. 15 cDCIHT
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of P60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill
Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash advances and other benefits in hundreds of thousands of pesos
from the corporations. 16 After private respondent confronted him about the affair, petitioner forbade her to
hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the businesses of the corporations are conducted,
thereby depriving her of access to full information about said businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo,
petitioner has not given private respondent an accounting of the businesses the value of which she had
helped raise to millions of pesos. 17
Action of the RTC of Bacolod City
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private
respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO 18 on March 24, 2006
effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted hereunder:
Respondent (petitioner herein),Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling or
family home within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Restraining Order and
if he refuses, ordering that he be removed by police officers from the conjugal
dwelling; this order is enforceable notwithstanding that the house is under the
name of 236 Realty Holdings, Inc. (Republic Act No. 9262 states "regardless of
ownership"), this is to allow the Petitioner (private respondent herein) to enter the
conjugal dwelling without any danger from the Respondent. IcADSE
After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or anytime
the Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal dwelling to remove things, the
Petitioner shall be assisted by police officers when re-entering the family home.
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on Sunday, 26
March 2006 because of the danger that the Respondent will attempt to take her
children from her when he arrives from Manila and finds out about this suit.
b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her
household help and driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the
gate of the subdivision where the Petitioner may be temporarily residing.
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with the
Petitioner, directly or indirectly, or through other persons, or contact directly or
indirectly her children, mother and household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers,
letters and the like. Visitation rights to the children may be subject of a modified
TPO in the future.
d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther
PPK and ordering the Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives Unit
and the Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent's firearm
licenses. He should also be ordered to surrender any unlicensed firearms in his
possession or control.
e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including rental
of a house for them, and educational and medical expenses.
f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business. aCTHEA
g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash he
received from all the corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31 March 2006,
which himself and as President of the corporations and his Comptroller, must
submit to the Court not later than 2 April 2006. Thereafter, an accounting of all
these funds shall be reported to the court by the Comptroller, copy furnished to
the Petitioner, every 15 days of the month, under pain of Indirect Contempt of
Court.
h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente
lite,and considering the financial resources of the Respondent and his threat that
if the Petitioner sues she will not get a single centavo, the Respondent is ordered
to put up a BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE MILLION
PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.
On April 24, 2006, upon motion 19 of private respondent, the trial court issued an amended
TPO, 20 effective for thirty (30) days, which included the following additional provisions:
i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of the
Nissan Patrol and the Starex Van which they are using in Negros Occidental.
j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in
Parañaque, the continued use of the Starex van in Metro Manila, whenever they
go to Manila.
k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in two
sufficient sureties.
l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php150,000.00) per month plus rental expenses
of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) per month until the matter of support
could be finally resolved. cAaDCE
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
for Renewal of the TPO 21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the grounds that it did not (1)
comply with the three-day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further asked that the TPO be
modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by private respondent and returning the same to its rightful
owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and (2) cancelling or reducing the amount of the bond from
P5,000,000.00 to a more manageable level at P100,000.00.
Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved 22 for the modification of the TPO to allow him
visitation rights to his children.
On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to the following
modifications prayed for by private respondent:
a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal
belongings of Rosalie and her children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for
Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his
counsel, otherwise be declared in Indirect Contempt of Court;
b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in the
conjugal house in Pitimini St.,Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City within 24
hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;
 c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police
Headquarters to remove Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within eight (8)
hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, and that he
cannot return until 48 hours after the petitioners have left, so that the petitioner
Rosalie and her representatives can remove things from the conjugal home and
make an inventory of the household furniture, equipment and other things in the
conjugal home, which shall be submitted to the Court.
d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for rental
and Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three petitioners (sic) children within 24
hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise
be declared in indirect contempt of Court; DaHSIT
e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to the
Clerk of Court within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by
his counsel;
f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children upon
presentation of proof of payment of such expenses. 23
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully comply
with the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment against her and their children, private respondent
filed another application 24 for the issuance of a TPO ex parte.She alleged inter alia that petitioner
contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of which the latter was purportedly no
longer president, with the end in view of recovering the Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by private
respondent and the children. A writ of replevin was served upon private respondent by a group of six or
seven policemen with long firearms that scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard. 25
While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men allegedly attempted to
kidnap him, which incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go back to school. On another
occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and threatened her. 26 The
incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently filed a criminal complaint against her father
for violation of R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the housemaids working at
the conjugal home of a complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against private respondent. This came
about after private respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home to get her and her children's
belongings. Finding some of her things inside a housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room,
private respondent filed a case for qualified theft against Jamola. 27 CDTHSI
On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO, 28 effective for thirty (30) days, which reads as
follows:
Respondent (petitioner herein),Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through
another, acts of violence against the offended party;
2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating in any form with the offended party, either directly or indirectly;
3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives, employees
or agents, from all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her children, Rosalie
J.Garcia's three brothers, her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo,
driver Romeo Hontiveros, laundrywoman Mercedita Bornales, security guard
Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's other household helpers from a distance of
1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioners
are temporarily residing, as well as from the schools of the three children;
Furthermore, that respondent shall not contact the schools of the children directly
or indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to pay for their tuition or other
fees directly, otherwise he will have access to the children through the schools
and the TPO will be rendered nugatory;
4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and a
Walther PPK to the Court;
5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and
Php50,000.00 for rental for the period from August 6 to September 6, 2006; and
support in arrears from March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount of
Php1,312,000.00; CIaDTE
6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of
Php75,000.00 and Php25,000.00;
7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508
and a Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should the respondent fail to deliver
said vehicles, respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner another vehicle
which is the one taken by J Bros Tading;
8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise dispose
of the conjugal assets, or those real properties in the name of Jesus
Chua Garciaonly and those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of the
Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and respondent have an interest in, especially the
conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini St.,Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod
City, and other properties which are conjugal assets or those in which the
conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the respondent
have an interest in and listed in Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-2," including properties
covered by TCT Nos. T-186325 and T-168814;
9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona shall be
served a copy of this TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered not
to allow the transfer, sale, encumbrance or disposition of these above-cited
properties to any person, entity or corporation without the personal presence of
petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall affix her signature in the presence of the
Register of Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie that her signature will be
forged in order to effect the encumbrance or sale of these properties to defraud
her or the conjugal partnership of gains.
In its Order 29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO for
another ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to show cause why the TPO
should not be renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's manifestation, 30 however, that he has not
received a copy of private respondent's motion to modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its
Order 31 dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be furnished a copy of said motion. Nonetheless, an
Order 32 dated a day earlier, October 5, had already been issued renewing the TPO dated August 23, 2006.
The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:AacDHE
xxx xxx xxx
 ...it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the
Temporary Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and
extended for thirty (30) days and continuously extended and renewed for thirty
(30) days, after each expiration, until further orders, and subject to such
modifications as may be ordered by the court. STHAaD
After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the required
comment to private respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it would only be an "exercise in
futility." 33
Proceedings before the CA
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a
petition 34 for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and temporary
restraining order, challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process and
the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being "an
unwanted product of an invalid law."
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order 35 (TRO)
against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed 36 the petition for
failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the civil case,
which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity of R.A.
9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders issued by the trial court
constituted a collateral attack on said law.
His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the
Resolution 37 dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now before us alleging that —
The Issues
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE
THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT
THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW. EcHIAC
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO
CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND
VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING
THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES
VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A
BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No.
9262 AS INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN
UNDUE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY
OFFICIALS. 38
The Ruling of the Court
Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the constitutionality of R.A.
9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of the petition for prohibition
(CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner. EDIHSC
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity so
that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in the trial court,
it will not be considered on appeal. 39 Courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance
of the necessity of deciding it. 40
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of Bacolod City,
petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is "inadequate to tackle the
complex issue of constitutionality." 41
We disagree.
Family Courts have authority
and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as
Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997," family courts
have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence against women and
children. 42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated from among the branches of the
Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key cities identified. 43 To achieve
harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts
designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined
under the latter law, viz.:
SEC. 7. Venue. — The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family
Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against
women and their children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place
where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial
Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the
complainant. (Emphasis supplied) HIAESC
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of
authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal,
special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. 44 It is settled
that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, 45 "this authority being embraced in
the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion
of their conformity to the fundamental law." 46 The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the
power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement,
presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs. 47 We
said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA 48 that, "[p]lainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior
courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of
appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in
issue." Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows:
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the
law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and
orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question. aADSIc
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have
been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection order before the RTC of
Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of this Court.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children,
lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an
answer. 49 Thus:
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. — (a) The respondent may file an opposition to
the petition which he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits
of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection
order should not be issued.
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim,
cross-claim or third-party complaint,but any cause of action which could be
the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim
and third-party complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot
likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a
defending party may have against an opposing party. 50 A cross-claim, on the other hand, is any claim by
one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of
the original action or of a counterclaim therein. 51 Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that a
defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action for contribution,
indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim. 52 As pointed out by Justice
Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that could be the
subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from being
raised in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. IHcSCA
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a quo because the
right of private respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the very statute the validity of which is
being attacked 53 by petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.
The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause for the
non-issuance of a protection order.
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred
petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of a statute is
one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence. 54 Be that as it may, Section 25 of A.M. No.
04-10-11-SCnonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues, among others, viz.:
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. — In case the court determines the need for
further hearing, it may issue an order containing the following:
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be
presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in
the form of affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done
in one day, to the extent possible, within the 30-day period of the effectivity of the
temporary protection order issued. (Emphasis supplied)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when
necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection order issued is
due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) days each time
until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or renewed temporary protection order
as may be necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With the private respondent given ample protection,
petitioner could proceed to litigate the constitutional issues, without necessarily running afoul of the very
purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary procedure. DcAaSI
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition with
prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may have
proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court, he could be granted an injunctive
relief. However, Section 22 (j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of a petition
for certiorari,mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the trial court. Hence,
the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this case against the enforcement of the TPO, the
amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively hindered the case from
taking its normal course in an expeditious and summary manner.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited.
Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its enforcement, 55 with
more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a time, 56 should not be enjoined.
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a
litigant to have the same enjoined. 57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr., 58the Supreme Court of the United States
declared, thus:
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety
or with respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a
matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of
the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal
acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized
and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its
extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its
aid. (Citations omitted)
 The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the
merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect
women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the
very purpose of the law against VAWC.
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to determine
novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications. We have, time and again,
discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more reason now, in view of
private respondent's plea in her Comment 59 to the instant Petition that we should put the challenge to the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.
Intent of Congress in
enacting R.A. 9262.
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and child
abuse, which could very well be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender alone is not enough
basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under the law. 60 IHTaCE
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723, 61 which became R.A. 9262,
reveals that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi Estrada), had
originally proposed what she called a "synthesized measure" 62 — an amalgamation of two measures,
namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships
Act" 63 — providing protection to "all family members, leaving no one in isolation" but at the same time
giving special attention to women as the "usual victims" of violence and abuse, 64 nonetheless, it was
eventually agreed that men be denied protection under the same measure. We quote pertinent portions of
the deliberations:
Wednesday, December 10, 2003
Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some
women's groups have expressed concerns and relayed these concerns to me
that if we are to include domestic violence apart from against women as well as
other members of the household, including children or the husband, they fear that
this would weaken the efforts to address domestic violence of which the main
victims or the bulk of the victims really are the wives, the spouses or the female
partners in a relationship. We would like to place that on record. How does the
good Senator respond to this kind of observation?
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call
themselves "WIIR" Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not want to include
men in this domestic violence. But plenty of men are also being abused by
women. I am playing safe so I placed here members of the family, prescribing
penalties therefor and providing protective measures for victims. This includes
the men, children, live-in, common-law wives, and those related with the
family. 65
xxx xxx xxx
Wednesday, January 14, 2004
xxx xxx xxx
The President Pro Tempore. ... SDITAC
Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to
limit this to women and not to families which was the issue of the AWIR group.
The understanding that I have is that we would be having a broader scope rather
than just women, if I remember correctly, Madam sponsor.
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the
interpellation period.
I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do
not get me wrong. However, I believe that there is a need to protect women's
rights especially in the domestic environment.
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not
had the opportunity to file a case against their spouses, their live-in partners after
years, if not decade, of battery and abuse. If we broaden the scope to include
even the men, assuming they can at all be abused by the women or their spouses,
then it would not equalize the already difficult situation for women, Mr.
President. aIcDCA
I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this
position. I am sure that the men in this Chamber who love their women in their
lives so dearly will agree with this representation. Whether we like it or not, it is an
unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no matter how empowered the women
are, we are not given equal opportunities especially in the domestic environment
where the macho Filipino man would always feel that he is stronger, more
superior to the Filipino woman.
xxx xxx xxx
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?
Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up
with this bill because the family members have been included in this proposed
measure since the other members of the family other than women are also
possible victims of violence. While women are most likely the intended victims,
one reason incidentally why the measure focuses on women, the fact remains
that in some relatively few cases, men also stand to be victimized and that
children are almost always the helpless victims of violence. I am worried that
there may not be enough protection extended to other family members
particularly children who are excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for
instance, more or less, addresses the special needs of abused children. The
same law is inadequate. Protection orders for one are not available in said law.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same
protection to men, fearing that they may use this law to justify their abusive
behavior against women. However, we should also recognize that there are
established procedures and standards in our courts which give credence to
evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless
complaints. cSCADE
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to
protect the family as the basic social institution. Though I recognize the unequal
power relations between men and women in our society, I believe we have an
obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of both husband and wife and their
immediate family members, particularly children.
While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other family
members as a critical input arrived at after a series of consultations/meetings with
various NGOs, experts, sports groups and other affected sectors, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator
Legarda would be removing the "men and children" in this particular bill and focus
specifically on women alone. That will be the net effect of that proposed
amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned by the distinguished sponsor, Sen.
Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is inclined to accept
the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to
accept this, I will propose an amendment to the amendment rather than object to
the amendment, Mr. President. EcATDH
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Sotto. ...May I propose an amendment to the amendment.
The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the
distinguished proponent of the amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to
agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At
saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi iyan. Okey lang iyan.But I
cannot agree that we remove the children from this particular measure.
So, if I may propose an amendment —
The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.
Senator Sotto. — more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a
matter of fact, it is not limited to minors. The abuse is not limited to seven, six,
5-year-old children. I have seen 14, 15-year-old children being abused by their
fathers, even by their mothers. And it breaks my heart to find out about these
things.
Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular
measure will update that. It will enhance and hopefully prevent the abuse of
children and not only women. DEScaT
SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of the
men in the bill but not the children.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.
The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none,
the amendment, as amended, is approved. 66
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a
statute. 67 Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members of Congress in
limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and children only. No proper
challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it is
not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice may be perceived as erroneous but even then,
the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of
powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any
law. 68 We only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently shown
in this case.
R.A. 9262 does not violate
the guaranty of equal protection
of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early
case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union 69 is instructive: cSICHD
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality
in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that
every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of
operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as
such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that
things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same.
The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are
different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it
is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows
classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or
 practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with
one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality.
The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that
the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality.
All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that
the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law;that it must not be
limited to existing conditions only;and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class.This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and
is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a
valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal protection
clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its
protection. IDAaCc
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely
than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make
for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly states, "the
accommodation of differences ...is the essence of true equality." 70
A. Unequal power relationship
between men and women
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality
and Women's Empowerment),violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with
the unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise known as "gender-based violence".
Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on
dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, men's companions and supporters, and take on
subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to men gaining more power over women. With power
comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of men's expression of controlling
women to retain power. 71 HSaIET
The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its
Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on December 20, 1993
stating that "violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between
men and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the
prevention of the full advancement of women, and that violence against women is one of the crucial social
mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate positions, compared with men." 72
Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of gender-based
violence and developments in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered during the Joint
Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004, the pertinent portions of which
are quoted hereunder:
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against
women. The patriarch of a family was accorded the right to use force on members of
the family under his control. I quote the early studies:
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted
in patriarchy — the institutional rule of men. Women were
seen in virtually all societies to be naturally inferior both
physically and intellectually. In ancient Western societies,
women whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the
authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or
even kill, his wife if she endangered his property right over her. Judaism, Christianity
and other religions oriented towards the patriarchal family strengthened the male
dominated structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women.
Even the eminent Blackstone has been quoted in his commentaries as saying
husband and wife were one and that one was the husband. However, in the late
1500s and through the entire 1600s, English common law began to limit the right of
husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed the rule of thumb,
which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker than their
thumb. TcDAHS
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to
chastise wives or inflict corporeal punishment ceased. Even then, the preservation
of the family was given more importance than preventing violence to women.
The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed
that of the English common law. In 1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama became
the first appellate court to strike down the common law right of a husband to beat his
wife:
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife
with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her face or kick
her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities, is not
now acknowledged by our law. ..In person, the wife is
entitled to the same protection of the law that the husband
can invoke for himself.
As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more
organized. The temperance leagues initiated it. These leagues had a simple focus.
They considered the evils of alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse. Hence,
they demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and their husbands' other watering
holes. Soon, however, their crusade was joined by suffragette movements,
expanding the liberation movement's agenda. They fought for women's right to vote,
to own property, and more. Since then, the feminist movement was on the roll.
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic
violence to the public gaze. They succeeded in transforming the issue into an
important public concern. No less than the United States Supreme Court, in 1992
case Planned Parenthood v. Casey,noted:
In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately
two million women are the victims of severe assaults by their
male partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that nearly
one of every eight husbands had assaulted their wives
during the past year. The [American Medical Association]
views these figures as "marked underestimates," because
the nature of these incidents discourages women from
 reporting them, and because surveys typically exclude the Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and for
very poor, those who do not speak English well, and women other Purposes." (Citations omitted)
who are homeless or in institutions or hospitals when the
survey is conducted. According to the AMA, "researchers on B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"
family violence agree that the true incidence of partner victims of violence.
violence is probably double the above estimates; or four
At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence against
million severely assaulted women per year." cIDHSC
women and children show that —
Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to
...physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002 representing
one-third of all women will be physically assaulted by a
55.63% of total cases reported (9,903).And for the first semester of 2003, there
partner or ex-partner during their lifetime. ..Thus on an
were 2,381 reported cases out of 4,354 cases which represent 54.31%....(T)he
average day in the United States, nearly 11,000 women are
total number of women in especially difficult circumstances served by the
severely assaulted by their male partners. Many of these
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) for the year 2002, there
incidents involve sexual assault. ..In families where wife
are 1,417 physically abused/maltreated cases out of the total of 5,608
beating takes place, moreover, child abuse is often present
cases. ...(T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total number of 3,471 cases for
as well.
the first semester of 2003. Female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms
Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were
violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological committed by the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in
abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of partners. 73
women, is also common.
Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics on violence
Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, against women across an eight-year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with violations under R.A.
perhaps because they perceive no superior 9262 ranking first among the different VAW categories since its implementation in 2004, 74 thus: ADECcI
alternative ...Many abused women who find temporary
Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004-2011*
refuge in shelters return to their husbands, in large part
because they have no other source of income. ..Returning to Reported 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
one's abuser can be dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of
Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of all Cases
homicide victims in the United States are killed by their
spouses ...Thirty percent of female homicide victims are Rape 997 927 659 837 811 770 1,042 832
killed by their male partners. CHTcSE
Incestuous
38 46 26 22 28 27 19 23
Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Rape
Women Act.
Attempted
194 148 185 147 204 167 268 201
In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less Rape
successful. The United States Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human
Acts of 580 536 382 358 445 485 745 625
Rights affirmed the equality of all human beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly
adopted the landmark Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Lasciviousne
Against Women (CEDAW).In 1993, the UN General Assembly also adopted the ss
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. World conferences on
the role and rights of women have been regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen, Physical 3,553 2,335 1,892 1,505 1,307 1,498 2,018 1,588
Nairobi and Beijing. The UN itself established a Commission on the Status of
Women. TEaADS Injuries

The Philippines has been in cadence with the half — and full — steps of Sexual 53 37 38 46 18 54 83 63
all these women's movements. No less than Section 14, Article II of our 1987
Constitutionmandates the State to recognize the role of women in nation building Harassment
and to ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Our
Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child RA 9262 218 924 1,269 2,387 3,599 5,285 9,974 9,021
and its two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act
Threats 319 223 199 182 220 208 374 213
No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children,
Seduction 62 19 29 30 19 19 25 15 C. Gender bias and prejudices

Concubinage 121 102 93 109 109 99 158 128 From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes against
women are often treated differently and less seriously than other crimes. This was argued by then United
RA 9208 17 11 16 24 34 152 190 62 States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,now Vice President, chief sponsor of the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA),in defending the civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of the U.S. Congress' authority under the
Abduction/ 29 16 34 23 28 18 25 22 Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He stressed that the widespread gender biasin the U.S. has
institutionalized historic prejudices against victims of rape or domestic violence, subjecting them to "double
Kidnapping
victimization" — first at the hands of the offender and then of the legal system. 79
Unjust
90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155 Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that
Vexation
"(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the police treat it as a private matter and advise the parties to
———— ————— ————— ————— ————— ————— ————— ————— settle the conflict themselves. Once the complainant brings the case to the prosecutor, the latter is hesitant
— — — — — — — — to file the complaint for fear that it might later be withdrawn. This lack of response or reluctance to be
involved by the police and prosecution reinforces the escalating, recurring and often serious nature of
Total 6,271 5,374 4,881 5,729 6,905 9,485 15,104 12,948 domestic violence." 80

===== ====== ====== ====== ====== ====== ====== ====== Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against our women.

*2011 report covers only from January to
August
Source: Philippine National Police — Women and Children Protection Center
(WCPC)
On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and violence
against men in the Philippines because incidents thereof are relatively low and, perhaps, because many
men will not even attempt to report the situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of women who had ever
experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or more) times, compared with 11% of the smaller
number of men who had ever experienced domestic violence; and women constituted 89% of all those who
had experienced 4 or more incidents of domestic violence. 75 Statistics in Canada show that spousal
violence by a woman against a man is less likely to cause injury than the other way around (18
percent versus 44 percent). Men, who experience violence from their spouses are much less likely to live in
fear of violence at the hands of their spouses, and much less likely to experience sexual assault. In fact,
many cases of physical violence by a woman against a spouse are in self-defense or the result of many
years of physical or emotional abuse. 76 CADSHI
While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against men in
the Philippines, the same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.
In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-drawn
vehicles to pick up, gather and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or discharged by their
vehicle-drawing animals in any public highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance was
challenged as violative of the guaranty of equal protection of laws as its application is limited to owners and
drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not to those animals, although not utilized, but similarly pass through
the same streets.
The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while there may be
non-vehicle-drawing animals that also traverse the city roads, "but their number must be negligible and
their appearance therein merely occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to constitute a
menace to the health of the community." 77 The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in
actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification of persons or things
for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered
invalid. 78 TcSHaD
In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila for Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge. He used derogatory and irreverent language in reference to the complainant in a
petition for TPO and PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her as "only a live-in partner" and presenting her as an
"opportunist" and a "mistress" in an "illegitimate relationship." Judge Amila even called her a "prostitute,"
and accused her of being motivated by "insatiable greed" and of absconding with the contested
property. 81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices and lack of gender sensitivity.
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and
prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures focused on women
does not discriminate against men. 82 Petitioner's contention, 83 therefore, that R.A. 9262 is
discriminatory and that it is an "anti-male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men" law deserves scant
consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures
"to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the
elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority
or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women." 84 Justice Puno
correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence from a private
affair to a public offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the
prosecution and the judges." 85
II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to
address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy,as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared that the State values the
dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The
State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly
women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and
security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence
committed against women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms
guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
 Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international
human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party. DHECac
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified on
August 5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified by the Philippines on
October 6, 2003. 86 This Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to women equality with men
before the law 87 and shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all
matters relating to marriage and family relations on the basis of equality of men and women. 88 The
Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. 89 It is, thus,
bound by said Conventions and their respective protocols.
III. The classification is not limited to existing
conditions only, and apply equally to all members
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was
promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their
children are threatened by violence and abuse.
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. Section 3
thereof defines VAWC as:
...any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman
who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a
sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her
child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which
result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the
following acts: SACHcD
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or
physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in
nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes,
but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of
lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a
sex object, making demeaning and sexually
suggestive remarks, physically attacking the
sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to
watch obscene publications and indecent shows
or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent
acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife
and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or
sleep together in the same room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim
to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of
force, physical or other harm or threat of physical
or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C."Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions
causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of
the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment,
stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation,
repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes
causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual
or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which
the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or
to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted
deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of
common children. CDEaAI
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to
make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is
not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the
victim from engaging in any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity, except in cases
wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid,
serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73
of the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial
resources and the right to the use and enjoyment
of the conjugal, community or property owned in
common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money or properties
or solely controlling the conjugal money or
properties.
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are attributable to
research that has exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery. The acts described here are also found
in the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. 90 Hence, the argument advanced
by petitioner that the definition of what constitutes abuse removes the difference between violent action and
simple marital tiffs is tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse
petitioner in his defense. The acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide adequate contrast
between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that persons of
ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and need not guess at its meaning nor
differ in its application. 91 Yet, petitioner insists 92 that phrases like "depriving or threatening to deprive the
woman or her child of a legal right," "solely controlling the conjugal or common money or properties,"
"marital infidelity," and "causing mental or emotional anguish" are so vague that they make every quarrel a
case of spousal abuse. However, we have stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a
reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld — not absolute precision or mathematical
exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as
long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely
because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions. 93
 There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as
the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with whom the person
has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word "person" who has or
had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover,
while the law provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage,
or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under
the Revised Penal Code(RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, 94 the parents-in-law of
Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon
the allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan's husband) had community of design and purpose in
tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from
the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically. TCIEcH
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the
due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all
protections afforded by the due process clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is stripped of family,
property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without
an inkling of what happened." 95
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and
their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to
safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the
opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. 96
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party
is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to
safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or
household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that
jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody
of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to
ensure their financial support." 97
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the
petitioner 98 thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since "time
is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented," 99 the court is authorized to
issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is
in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from
the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur. 100
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order.
The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses'
affidavits to the petition. 101
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due
process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the
time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his
property, 102 in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in
the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts
could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due
process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests, 103 among which is protection of
women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that
notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days from
service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served immediately
on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on
the respondent. 104
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and
service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five (5)
days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be
indicated on the notice. 105
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied by
the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not
be issued. 106 HSCcTD
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be
apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of
petitioner of being "stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and
reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened" is a mere product of an
overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only
mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard,
either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. 107
It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO that was granted only two days earlier on April 24, 2006.
Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation
rights to his children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September 26, 2006, gave him five days (5) within
which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed or extended. Yet, he chose not to file the required
comment arguing that it would just be an "exercise in futility," conveniently forgetting that the renewal of the
questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30 days) each time, and that he could prevent the continued
renewal of said order if he can show sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner may not now
be heard to complain that he was denied due process of law.
Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC case from
the residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a "blank check" issued to
the wife to claim any property as her conjugal home. 108
The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the imagination suggest
that this is so. It states: aIETCA
SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. — The protection order shall
include any, some or all of the following reliefs:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the
offended party, regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the
purpose of protecting the offended party, or permanently where no property rights
are violated. If the respondent must remove personal effects from the residence, the
court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the
residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered his things and escort him
from the residence;
xxx xxx xxx
 Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's residence, instrumentality of the Government. 112 On the other hand, executive power "is generally defined as the
regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal and power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and
exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are violated. How then can the private enforcing their due observance." 113
respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?
As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in
The non-referral of a VAWC case his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a)
to a mediator is justified. causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child
physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of
Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of encouraging
his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public
mediation and counseling, the law has done violence to the avowed policy of the State to "protect and
order in the barangay." 114
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution." 109
We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of
Under Section 23 (c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue
certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact
thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the Commentary on Section
that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers." 115
311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as follows: 110
In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or
This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a
proceeding "whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the
proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation is a process by which parties in
accused is probably guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground to believe
equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual agreement about
that an imminent danger of violence against the woman and her children exists or is about to recur that
the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise.A
would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is,
process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the
concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of a
victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a proceeding for an
BPO. DHEcCT
order of protection is problematic because the petitioner is frequently unable to
participate equally with the person against whom the protection order has been We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and other
sought. (Emphasis supplied) law enforcement agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of violence and abuse, it would be
very unlikely that they would remain objective and impartial, and that the chances of acquittal are nil. As
There is no undue delegation of
already stated, assistance by barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their
judicial power to barangay officials.
duty to enforce the law and to maintain peace and order.
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which, under the
Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme Court and such other lower courts as may be established by law" Conclusion
and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay officials to issue protection orders. 111 The Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear
pertinent provision reads, as follows: HCDAac conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a
manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be beyond
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs);Who May Issue and How. —
reasonable doubt. 116 In the instant case, however, no concrete evidence and convincing arguments were
Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by
presented by petitioner to warrant a declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of
the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts
Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department. As we said
under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives
in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders
applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date
and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of
of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong
promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.
Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall
be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's movement against
a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an attestation by domestic violence shows that one of its most difficult struggles was the fight against the violence of law itself.
the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of If we keep that in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle of women for equality but will be its
the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. fulfillment."118 Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as it should be, sustained.
Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong
Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on WHEREFORE,the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its personal service.
SO ORDERED.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding
before the Punong Barangay. Sereno, C.J.,Carpio, Velasco, Jr.,Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr.,Perez,
Mendoza and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a Leonardo-de Castro, Abad and Leonen, JJ., see separate concurring opinion.
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
 Brion, J., see: concurring opinion.

Peralta, J., is on official leave.

||| (Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, [June 25, 2013], 712 PHIL 44-176)
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 101083. July 30, 1993.]
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA,
minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINAOPOSA,
ROBERT A NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and
ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed
FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA
FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents
SIGFRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all
surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and
MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PASIGAN, minor, represented by his
parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor,
represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA
CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and
JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO, minor, represented by her
parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPARADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA,
minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY
NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE
GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents
ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA
MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their
parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE
VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents
BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all
surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and
MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed
CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA,
CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors
and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP
JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors,
represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO,
CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors,
represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and
THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,vs. THE
HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE
HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati,
Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES; RIGHT TO A
BALANCED AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY, CONSTRUED. — The complaint focuses on one specific
fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our
nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of
the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides: "SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." This right
unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article: "SEC. 15.
The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them." While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the
civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly
stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental
charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their
continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and
advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present
generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty
to refrain from impairing the environment.
2. ID.; ID.; TIMBER LICENSES; NATURE THEREOF; NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE MAY NOT BE
INVOKED; CASE AT BAR. — all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a
contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs.
Director of Forestry, (125 SCRA 302, 325 [1983]) This Court held: ". . . A timber license is an instrument by
which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license
or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this
case. 'A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither
is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation' (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this
Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property
rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576) . . ." We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. &
Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: (190 SCRA 673 684 [1990]) ". . . Timber licenses, permits and
license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition
of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely
evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or
irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly
amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus,
they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and
20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry,G.R. No. L-24548, October 27,
1983, 125 SCRA 302]." Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
"SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." In the second place, even if it is to
be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive
issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment
clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the
non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such a law could have only been
passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to
a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs.
Foster Wheeler Corp., (110 Phil. 198, 203 [1960]) this Court stated: "The freedom of contract, under our
system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable
legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the
constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police
power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare." The reason for this is
emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, (291 U.S. 502, 523, 78 L. ed. 940 947-949) quoted
in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, (22 SCRA 135, 146-147 [1968]) to wit:
"'Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of
private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference.
But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at
will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm.
Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.'" In court,
the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. (Ongsiako vs. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50
[1950]; Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp., supra; Phil. American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, supra;
Alalyan vs. NLRC, 24 scra 172 [1968]; Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54 [1974];
Kabiling vs. National Housing Authority, 156 SCRA 623 [1987]).
3. ID.; JUDICIAL REVIEW; NO LONGER IMPAIRED BY THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE;
RATIONALE. — It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive
and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution states that: "Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government." Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political
Law, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says: "The first part of the authority
represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as
conferred by law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the
courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political
departments of the government. As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the
Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the
legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave
abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of 'grave abuse of discretion,' which is a very
elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary." In Daza vs. Singson,
(180 SCRA 496, 501-502 [1989]. See also Coseteng vs. Mitra, 187 SCRA 377 [1990];
Gonzales vs. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 844 [1991]; Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA
767 [1991]) Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted: "In the case now before us, the
jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to
assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from
resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the
political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . ."
4. REMEDIAL LAW; PLEADINGS; CAUSE OF ACTION, DEFINED; CASE AT BAR. — the right of the
petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty
— under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative
Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has
the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners
maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated
their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further
TLAs should be renewed or granted. A cause of action is defined as: ". . . an act or omission of one party in
violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff,
correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right."
(Marao Sugar Central Co. vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666 [1947]; Community Investment and Finance
Corp. vs.Garcia, 88 Phil. 215 [1951]; Remitere vs. vda. de Yulo, 16 SCRA 251 [1966]; Caseñas vs. Rosales,
19 SCRA 462 [1967]; Virata vs. Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 680 [1991]; Madrona vs. Rosal, 204 SCRA 1
[1991].
5. ID.; ID.; MOTION TO DISMISS; LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION, AS A GROUND; RULE; CASE AT BAR.
— It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to
state a cause of action, the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts
alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth or falsity of the
said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to
be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment
in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? In Militante vs. Edrosolano, this Court laid down the rule
that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss
on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of
the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively
nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute." After a careful
examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative
allegations, as well as the specific averments under the subheading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate
enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be
granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for.
FELICIANO, J., concurring:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; LOCUS STANDI, CONSTRUED; CASE AT BAR. — The Court explicitly
states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and maintenance of this suit
(Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded
as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the
subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved —
membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the future
— it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek
to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen
therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental protection, as against
both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the
field or sector of activity involved. Whether such a beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and
all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental
agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the
decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES; RIGHT TO "A
BALANCE AND HEALTHFUL ECOLOGY"; INTERPRETATION. — The Court has also declared that the
complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology"
is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in
character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing
excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope
and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims
which can be subsumed under this rubric appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of
emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents,
garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and
whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares;
failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining;kaingin or slash-and-burn farming;
destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide
and other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora;
and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10
June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June
1977 — all appear to be formulations ofpolicy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of
basic policy in Article II, Sections 16 ("the right — to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to
health"). As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised
in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of
Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The
implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and
far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
3. ID.; RIGHT TO HEALTH; SHOULD SPECIFICALLY EXIST IN OUR CORPUS OF LAW. — Justice
Feliciano suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right —
a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution —
that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so
that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the
Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in
our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of
the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective
opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; CAUSE OF ACTION; LEGAL RIGHTS, AS ESSENTIAL
COMPONENTS; STANDARDS. — the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a
specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One
is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in
operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in
other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter. The second is a broader-gauge consideration
— where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be
expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of
Article VIII of the Constitution which reads: "Section 1 . . . Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." When substantive standards as
general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with
remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social
and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and
management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional
qualifications. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making
departments — the legislative and executive departments — must be given a real and effective opportunity
to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should
intervene.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which
the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and
"inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause
of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life-support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-777 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro
Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein,
now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents.
Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock
and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for
the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was
subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as a
taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines,
taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical rainforests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally
concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring
them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn." 4Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
". . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber license agreements."
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a
land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in
which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic,
biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine
cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that
in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis
of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential,
industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of
deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from
the drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams,
(b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples
of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and
the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated
at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire island of
Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e)
the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's
indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other
aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is
presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the
absence of windbreakers, (i) the flooding of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the
absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams
constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the
generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases
which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming,
otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued deforestation are so
capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice.
This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary,
photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
"CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million
hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million
hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth
rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago
and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth
forests.
11. Public records reveal that defendant's predecessors have granted timber
license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of
3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached
as Annex 'A'.
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25
hectares per hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the
Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if
not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable
damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minors' generation
and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact,
the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being
felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs —
especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may never see, use, benefit
from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the
natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens
patriae.
16. Plaintiffs have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office.
On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all
logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex 'B'.
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's, to the
continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act
violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a
country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna
and indigenous cultures which the Philippines has been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to
the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in
pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State —
'(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under
which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony
with each other;
'(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of
present and future generations of Filipinos and;
'(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is
conducive to a life of dignity and well-being'. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977).
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's
is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to —
a. effect 'a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income
and wealth' and 'make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic).'
(Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. 'protect the nation's marine wealth.' (Section 2, ibid);
c. 'conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and
resources (sic).' (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. 'protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.'
(Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural
law — and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the
instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life-support
systems and continued rape of Mother Earth." 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue
raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches
of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the
complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action
presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In
the said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against
him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting
of the reliefs prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental
law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge
gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only
represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the
respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains
sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the
Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of
generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and
self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative
obligation, per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, the safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in
granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves
a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners
maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit
that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be
revoked by the State when public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific
legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in
the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly
entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations,
according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of
whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly
addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the
petitioners' recourse is not to file an action in court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill
that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the
State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time —
usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled
unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement
or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately
cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case
No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this
matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the
complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines.
Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to
bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and
representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for
the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the
said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its
entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife,
off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has
a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the
petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the
issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule
against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
"After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help
but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the
noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a
specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong
they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the
Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague
conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action
in its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed
with political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken
cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of
'Separation of Powers' of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing
timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to
 do otherwise would amount to 'impairment of contracts' abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law." 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness
a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with
vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these
conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
"SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature."
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same
article:
"SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them."
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil
and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether
for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the
petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As
a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is
because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology
and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing
importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance
the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but
also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and
Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
"MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of
pollution — air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries
with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore,
sanctions may be provided for impairment of environmental balance." 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests. Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversibly
disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as
the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of
the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O.
No. 192, 14Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management,
development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and
grazing lands, mineral resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the
public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law
in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and
future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
"SEC. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to
ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation
of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources,
including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and
equitable access of the different segments of the population to the development and
use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for
future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a
true value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to
their utilization; development and conservation of our natural resources."
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated in Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987, 15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
"SEC. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the
Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance
and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of
making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources
equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future
generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into
account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources."
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and
enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically
speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's
being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:
"SEC. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources
shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the
State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources."
Both E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the
bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes
already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June
1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code)
were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and
improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each
other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos,
and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and
well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of
the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the
said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as
clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No.
192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect
the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim
was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the
full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
". . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other;
and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the
defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right." 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state
a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts
alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth or falsity of the
said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to
be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment
in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the
rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to
dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct
appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is
effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After a careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory
affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the subheading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be
adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may
thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the
cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees
thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 cannot be said to raise a political question. Policy
formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in
issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and
expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no
longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects
executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution states that:
"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a
distinguished member of this Court, says:
"The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power,
involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by law. The second part of
the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice
to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political
departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme
Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and
the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction
because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning
of 'grave abuse of discretion,' which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or
contract according to the disposition of the judiciary."
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
"In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable
and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented
before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it
under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases,
even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly
provides: . . ."
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts
clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
"The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing
timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For
to do otherwise would amount to 'impairment of contracts' abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law." 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping
pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his
motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity
to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license
holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses
according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest
and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be
read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
". . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend,
modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other
form of privilege granted herein . . ."
 Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director
of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
". . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber
license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a
license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public
interest or public welfare as in this case.
'A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and
is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and
the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it
create a vested right; nor is it taxation' (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the
granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or
property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576) . . ."
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
". . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments
by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the
end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely
evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the
latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the
forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or
rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are
not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause
[See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v.
Director of Forestry,G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302]."
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
"SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." 27
" 'Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are
normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both
shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract
rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his
property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work
them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate
it in the common interest.' "
In court, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with
respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the
other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged
Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The
petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the
questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ ., concur.
Narvasa, C . J . , took no part; related to one of the parties.
Puno, J ., took no part in the deliberations.
Vitug, J ., took no part; I was not yet with the Court when the case was deliberated upon.
||| (Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, [July 30, 1993])

cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not
involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber
licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a
law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be
stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose,
such a law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of
advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing
the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp., 28 this Court stated:

"The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be

absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation
aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words,
the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by
the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety,
moral and general welfare."

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life
Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit:
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 198780. October 16, 2013.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.LIBERTY
D. ALBIOS, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
September 29, 2011 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the
April 25, 2008 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC),declaring the marriage of Daniel
Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (Albios) as void from the beginning.
The Facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia
I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate
of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588. 3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her
marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as
husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying
with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest and,
therefore, null and void ab initio.
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13,
2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On
October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make a determination
for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision, 5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio,the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the
very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner
shall cease using the surname of respondent as she never acquired any right over it
and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of
respondent. ESDcIA
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED. 6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving
credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable
her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of
$2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United
States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00
because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was
entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and
should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion
for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give
their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means
to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found
that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not understand
the nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further
explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage contract and never intended to live as
husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is,
for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW WHEN IT
HELD THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF
OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONE IN JEST, HENCE,
LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF CONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for
Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and
willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being bound by it.
According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the
validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest.
The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the
purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment 9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her
marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply 10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review
on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
 The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the
sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of
lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for
the purposes of immigration. SACTIH
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of
marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages where
a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as
"limited purpose" marriages. 11 A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the
legitimization of a child. 12 Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes.
Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the time of their marriage, 13 and it
attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status. 14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 15 established the
principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage
is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married."
This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of
1986 (IMFA),which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage wasnot "entered into
for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United States." The focus, thus, shifted from
determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining the intention of evading immigration
laws. 16 It must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for immigration purposes and,
therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the
limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and inexistent. The early cases on limited purpose
marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of United States v.
Rubenstein 17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the country, the parties had
agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six months. The Court, through Judge
Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into permanent permission to stay in the country
was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
...But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is
necessary to every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties
may go through indicating the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in fact
assent, which may always be proved. ...Marriage is no exception to this rule: a
marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. ...It is quite true that a marriage without
subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage
only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the
understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to
deceive, they have never really agreed to be married at all. They must assent to
enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily
understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others. 18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, 19 which declared
as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid
marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a limited
purpose." 20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee, 21 further recognized that a fraudulent or
sham marriage was intrinsically different from a nonsubsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as
problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first
necessary. 22 At present, United States courts have generally denied annulments involving "limited
purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such
marriages as valid. 23 ACIDTE
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondent's marriage not void
In declaring the respondent's marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered
into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not
be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG's motion for reconsideration, the RTC
went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent
to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for the
respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held
that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in
the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the
parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00.
They never intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or
build a family.
The CA's assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties' supposed lack of consent.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code
provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and
deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force,
intimidation, and undue influence. 24 Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must
be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable
consequences of their act. 25 Their understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or
hypnotism. 26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there
was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent
was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely
given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage.
Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear
intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application
for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between
them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios' marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to
a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke,
with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the
parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into
such a relation. 27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to create any
legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio,not No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. 32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the
consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose. whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may
easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer
The respondent's marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer had an needed.
undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to
acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their WHEREFORE,the petition is GRANTED.The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of
objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship. There Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED,and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack
was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a of merit. SCIcTD
limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present. cEaSHC
SO ORDERED.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish
||| (Republic v. Albios, G.R. No. 198780, [October 16, 2013], 719 PHIL 622-638)
a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to
establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with
law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the
grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other
than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long
as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under
the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid. 28

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot
dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into
the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. 29 The right to marital
privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or
live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. 30Thus, marriages entered
into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title,
provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, 31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not
precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.

Although the Court views with disdain the respondent's attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest
purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent's marriage may be
considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be
valid and subsisting.

Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of
the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud,
namely, (1) non-disclosure of a previous conviction involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of
a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of
drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as
a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading
immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3),
the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no
injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage
with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot
declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they have
availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be
allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albiosalready misused a judicial
institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself
out of an inconvenient situation.
 EN BANC OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Alfonso
Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its
President Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE
[G.R. No. 204819. April 8, 2014.] PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Donato Marcos, respondents.

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in

behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE [G.R. No. 204957. April 8, 2014.]
CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER,
INC., petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary,
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S.
HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
AVILA, petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary;
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON.
HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Education;
and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of the Interior and
and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of the Interior and
Local Government, respondents.
Local Government, respondents.

[G.R. No. 204934. April 8, 2014.]

[G.R. No. 204988. April 8, 2014.]

ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI],

SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B.
represented by its President, Maria Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses Reynaldo
Lumicao, M.D., as President and in his personal capacity, ROSEVALE
S. Luistro & Rosie B. Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas,
FOUNDATION, INC., represented by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member
Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L.
of the school board and in his personal capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON,
Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho &
IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIA P. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G. NAGAC,
Traquilina Racho, Fernand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco
EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP, petitioners, vs.OFFICE OF
for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette C.
THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF
Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel Fernando C. Tangsingco,
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary,
Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses
HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of their
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health; HON.
minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta,
ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUEL
Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on behalf
A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local
of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John
Government,respondents.
Paul C. Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z.
Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Margarita Racho,
Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R.
Racho & Francine V. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor [G.R. No. 205003. April 8, 2014.]
children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie
Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for
themselves and on behalf of their minor child Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF
and on behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON.
Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R. Laws & Katrina R. SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR
Laws, petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, GENERAL, respondents.
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, HON.
CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and [G.R. No. 205043. April 8, 2014.]
Development, HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of the
Interior and Local Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF
Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA
PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson, DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Remedios Ignacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE DILG SECRETARY MANUEL A. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A.
CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE LUISTRO,respondents.
 [G.R. No. 205138. April 8, 2014.]
PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented
by its National President, Atty. Ricardo M. Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty.
Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor,
Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael
Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno and
Baldomero Falcone, petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N.OCHOA, JR., Executive
Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON.
ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, HON. MANUEL A.
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government, HON.
CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and
Development, HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National
Economic and Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO,
Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on Women, respondents.
[G.R. No. 205478. April 8, 2014.]
REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING M.D., CYNTHIA T.
DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively
known as Doctors for Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G.
MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO,
ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known as Filipinos for
Life, petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health;
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of Education; and
HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of the Interior and
Local Government, respondents.
[G.R. No. 205491. April 8, 2014.]
SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F.
PAGUIA, fox themselves, their Posterity, and the rest of Filipino
posterity,petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the
Philippines, respondent.
[G.R. No. 205720. April 8, 2014.]
PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Lorna Melegrito,
as Executive Director, and in her personal capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO,
ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA,
CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B.
PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T.
ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of the Interior and Local Government, respondents.
[G.R. No. 206355. April 8, 2014.]
MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY.
CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA, STELLA ACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUÑA
CAUSING, petitioners, vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, respondents.
[G.R. No. 207111. April 8, 2014.]
JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B.
LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and
LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
the Interior and Local Government, respondents.
[G.R. No. 207172. April 8, 2014.]
COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS
ARTADI SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE BESINGA-SARMIENTO,
AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE
VERONICA N. RODRIGO, petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
the Interior and Local Government, respondents.
[G.R. No. 207563. April 8, 2014.]
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M.
KASHIM, petitioners, vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary,
 HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health, and HON.
ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law.
And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect
the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to
profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and
with the common good." 1
To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a
developed country, leaving our people beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment.
While governmental policies have been geared towards the revitalization of the economy, the
bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a problem that concerns not only the poor, but
every member of society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to the realization of its
very purpose, that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people and the development of the country as
a whole. The legislative branch, as the main facet of a representative government, endeavors to enact
laws and policies that aim to remedy looming societal woes, while the executive is closed set to fully
implement these measures and bring concrete and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela
Cruz. Seemingly distant is the judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body that
merely casts its watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate. Passive,
yet reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to interpret
legislation vis-à-vis the most vital and enduring principle that holds Philippine society together — the
supremacy of the Philippine Constitution. AECDHS
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth
control, abortion and contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on
the subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media. From television
debates 2 to sticker campaigns, 3from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized
by members of the clergy 4 — the clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious
conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society.
Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known
as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by
Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various
sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes
down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may
produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2)
petitions-in-intervention, to wit:
(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and
Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of
their minor children; and the Magnificat Child Learning Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned
educational institution (Imbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition, 6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc.,
through its president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche 7 and several others 8 in their personal
capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari, 9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and
Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan de Oro City,
Inc., 11 Rosevale Foundation, Inc., 12 a domestic, privately-owned educational institution, and
several others, 13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);
(5) Petition, 14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic
Xybrspace Apostolate of the Philippines, 16 in their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians,
Inc., 18 and several others 19 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX); AHcaDC
(8) Petition, 20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others, 21 in their capacities
as citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C.
Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet
unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation,
Inc. 24 and several others, 25 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its
associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition, 26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc., 27 Attys. Ramon
Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Cataluña Causing, in their capacities as
citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several
others, 29 in their capacities as citizens (Juat);
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc.
and several others, 31 in their capacities as citizens (CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition 32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in
their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and
(15) Petition-In-Intervention, 33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a
citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention, 34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (BUHAY), an
accredited political party. acHETI
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the following
GROUNDS:
• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners,
notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the implementation
of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives,
intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of
 Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of
both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. 35
• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against
hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides
universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health,
as it causes cancer and other health problems. 36
• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend
that the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee respecting religion
as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of
contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes
that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the
constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom. 37 CHATEa
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal
prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it
compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on
reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and
correct information on reproductive health programs and service,
although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions. 38
In this connection, Section 5.23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
RH Law (RH-IRR), 39 provides that skilled health professionals who
are public officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or
Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural
health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural
health midwives, who are specifically charged with the duty to implement
these Rules,cannot be considered as conscientious objectors. 40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex
education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their
religious beliefs. 41
While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not
absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and
present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify
the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free
speech. 42
• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical practitionersto
involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth
program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro
bonoservices for indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution,
imprisonment and other forms of punishment. 43
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth,
a medical practitioner would effectively be forced to render reproductive
health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would mean that
the majority of the public would no longer be able to avail of the
practitioners' services. 44 ESIcaC
• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that
the RH Law discriminates against the poor as it makes them the primary
target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use. The
petitioners argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among
the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would
effectively reduce the number of the poor. 45
• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of
the Constitution. In imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for
"any violation," it is vague because it does not define the type of conduct
to be treated as "violation" of the RH Law. 46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to
due process by removing from them (the people) the right to manage their
own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and
what kind of services they shall offer." 47 It ignores the management
prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs
in accordance with their own discretion and judgment.
• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a
full range of family planning methods is plainly to curtail his right to
expound only his own preferred way of family planning. The petitioners
note that although exemption is granted to institutions owned and
operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer their patients to
another healthcare facility willing to perform the service or procedure. 48
• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the
Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law providing for mandatory
reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to
raise their children in accordance with their beliefs. 49 cCSDTI
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo
reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue
between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually
decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of their family. In the
same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered
a miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to determine whether
their child should use contraceptives. 50
• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of Legislative
authority. The petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA
of the power to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be
included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL). 51
• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26
(1), Article VI of the Constitution. 52
• The RH Law violates Natural Law. 53
• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government
Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for
reproductive health measures at the local government level and the
 ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM
under the Local Government Code and R.A. No. 9054. 54 HcDATC
Various parties also sought and were granted Leave to file their respective
comments-in-intervention in defense of the constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions in behalf of the
respondents, 55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman, 56 former officials of the Department of Health Dr.
Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberta G. Romualdez, 57 the Filipino Catholic
Voices for Reproductive Health (C4RH), 58Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros, 59 and Atty. Joan de
Venecia 60 also filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention in conjunction with several others. On
June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene. 61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray
for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1]there is no actual case or controversy
and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] same petitioners lack standing
to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which
the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation
took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued
the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed
legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013. 62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to
determine and/or identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which these
issues were to be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and
27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended
until further orders of the Court. 63 IaESCH
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty
(60) days and, at the same time posed several questions for their clarification on some contentions of
the parties. 64
The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
Prior to the RH Law)
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation
and distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country
enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices."Although contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they
could not be sold, dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a duly
licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner." 65 aTEHIC
In addition, R.A. No. 5921, 66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to
"dispensing of abortifacients or anti-conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof,
it was provided that "no drug or chemical product or device capable of provoking abortion or
preventing conception as classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be delivered or sold to
any person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population,
which recognized that the population problem should be considered as the principal element for
long-term economic development, enacted measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal
ligation to mitigate population growth. 67Among these measures included R.A. No. 6365, approved
on August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population, Creating the
Commission on Population and for Other Purposes." The law envisioned that "family planning will be
made part of a broad educational program; safe and effective means will be provided to couples
desiring to space or limit family size; mortality and morbidity rates will be further reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 79, 68 dated December 8, 1972, which, among others, made
"family planning a part of a broad educational program," provided "family planning services as a part of
over-all health care," and made "available all acceptable methods of contraception, except abortion, to
all Filipino citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods
evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of
public health, particularly, reproductive health. 69 Under that policy, the country gave priority to one's
right to freely choose the method of family planning to be adopted, in conformity with its adherence to
the commitments made in the International Conference on Population and Development. 70Thus, on
August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for Women," which, among
others, mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health services and programs for women,
including family planning and sex education. 71
The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping
at an uncontrollable pace. From a paltry number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population
of the country reached over 76 million in the year 2000 and over 92 million in 2010. 72 The executive
and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH
Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and
information to the full range of modern family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to
provide for the peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more effective, the RH
Law made it mandatory for health providers to provide information on the full range of modern family
planning methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide reproductive health education. To
put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates. ScCIaA
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the
current laws on contraception, women's health and population control.
Prayer of the Petitioners — Maintain the Status Quo
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional.
Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the very
essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is
mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante — the situation prior to
the passage of the RH Law — must be maintained." 73 It explains:
. . . . The instant Petition does not question contraception and
contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic Act
No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless
dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners find
deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State and its
agencies — the entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the
barangay officials in the remotest areas of the country — is made to play in the
implementation of the contraception program to the fullest extent possible using
taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and provider of all forms of
family planning methods and the implementer of the program by ensuring the
 widespread dissemination of, and universal access to, a full range of family planning social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the discretion to
methods, devices and supplies. 74 implement the constitutional policies and positive norms with the political departments, in particular,
with Congress. 77 It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v.
ISSUES Anti-Terrorism Council, 78 the remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has improper to assail the validity of the acts of the legislature. 79
synthesized and refined them to the following principal issues: IHCSTE Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review that the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government
over the controversy. has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be
challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure. 80 TADCSE
1] Power of Judicial Review
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the
2] Actual Case or Controversy Executive and the Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and
accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle of separation of
3] Facial Challenge powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government,
which obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
4] Locus Standi department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is
supreme within its own sphere. 81 Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power
5] Declaratory Relief
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines; 82 (b) the executive power shall be vested in the
6] One Subject/One Title Rule President of the Philippines;83 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law. 84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional: strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of government. 85

1] Right to Life In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of
powers which imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of
2] Right to Health their respect for the other branches of government, in striking down the acts of the Executive or the
Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech caution. 86 CITaSA
4] The Family It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political
instability, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom obliterated. 87 In order to address this, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts
6] Due Process performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same
time, allows it to cross the line of separation — but only at a very limited and specific point — to
7] Equal Protection determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null because they were
undertaken with grave abuse of discretion. 88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of
8] Involuntary Servitude wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or
grave abuse of discretion results. 89 The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA protect those cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.
10] Autonomy of Local Governments/ARMM SETaHC In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be
limited, the Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial
DISCUSSION
scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it earlier point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive
behooves the Court to resolve some procedural impediments. branches, since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have
acted in consonance with their respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no
controversy. more authority of proscribing the actions under review. 90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of
The Power of Judicial Review the Constitution which expressly provides:

In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should
submit to the legislative and political wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises made in the
crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian democratic process" 75 and "characterized
by an inordinate amount of transparency." 76 The OSG posits that the authority of the Court to review
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
 andto determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied] AEDCHc
As far back as Tañada v. Angara, 91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review
and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as there is no other plain,
speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied
in Macalintal v. COMELEC, 92 Aldaba v. COMELEC, 93 Magallona v. Ermita, 94 and countless
others. In Tañada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy.Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the
duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial
rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy
of the Constitution is upheld." Once a "controversy as to the application or
interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant
case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate
to decide. [Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial
review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the
balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the definition
and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them. To him, judicial review is
the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation — or instrument of intervention — of the judiciary in
that balancing operation." 95
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled
authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the
rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz.: (a) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the lis mota of the case. 96 IcDHaT
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subject petitions do not present any actual case
or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented. 97They claim that the questions
raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged
with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has
been adversely affected by its operation. 98 In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law
is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or
ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an
advisory opinion. 99 The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy
scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable — definite
and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words,
the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a
denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical
question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would
be upon a hypothetical state of facts. 100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of
ripeness. 101 A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect an the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court
may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened
injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of. 102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, 103 where the constitutionality of an unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the
Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued that the Court has no authority to pass
upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that could possibly violate the
petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or act
in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not
necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is
enough to awaken judicial duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that
the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules
have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed,
it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only
becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute. 104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or
medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations
thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service
with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the
matter NOW. STaAcC
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions,
contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating
measure. 105
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First
Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not
only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. 106 These include religious
freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 107 After all, the fundamental right to
religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to
one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally
maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial
challenges to strictly penal statutes, 108 it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only
regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights. 109 The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S.,
this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. 110 Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever
vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution. DICcTa
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above
have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these
kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss
these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish
this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been
transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions.
It contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed
law has yet to be enforced and applied against them, 111 and the government has yet to distribute
reproductive health devices that are abortive. 112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine
and their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisitelocus standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental
act. 113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 114
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can
challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule
prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights
of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party
standing. 115 STaIHc
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest." 116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, 117 the Court held that in cases
of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing
requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury
to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 118 ordinary
citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders
although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an
"as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus
standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured
or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue
of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural
technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing
non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the
public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR: 119 ACIDTE
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a
petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in
this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised
herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this
nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that
rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to binder or delay, but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather
than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis
supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also
to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law
drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of
religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues
of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum
of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental
importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right
to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be
taken away before taking action. aSTAIH
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights
enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the
mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for
declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. 120 Suffice it to state that most of
the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching
implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition
under Rule 65. 121
One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates
Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, 122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According
to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation
violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent — to act as a
population control measure. 123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population
control measure, 124 and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are
both interrelated as they are inseparable. 125 THCSAE
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as
principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of
the country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also
promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to
provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full range
of modern family planning products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modern,
however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy. For said reason, the manifest
underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as
well. A large portion of the law, however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions on
access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health
care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception
pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law. 126 Indeed, remove the
provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its very
foundation. 127 As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance,
maternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management of reproductive tract
infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women." 128 TcDHSI
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E.
Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G. Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the
Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to
mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The
rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to
include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here,
the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a
liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or
impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both
"reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding
objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the
RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — The State recognizes and guarantees
the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination
of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which
includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to
choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood.cEDaTS
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so
uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or
put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject
where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication
of the real subject or scope of the act." 129 Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive
health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving
"sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that
Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life
Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the
unborn child under Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to
abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion. 130 HcDSaT
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4 (a) of
the RH Law considers contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization
and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to
the fertilized ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective
family planning products and supplies, medical research shows that contraceptives use results in
abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has life. 131 As it opposes the
initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction of
contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man. 132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to certify that the product or supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the
assailed legislation effectively confirms that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also considering that the
FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise or administer the use of these products and supplies
to prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a certification that it shall not be used for
abortifacient purposes. 133
Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the
Constitution was simply the prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not violate the
Constitution since the said law emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health care
services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be made accessible to the public. 134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives
are not abortifacients by enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to
various studies and consultations with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in the
medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to such a determination and
pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on determined as an abortive.135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to
life is not violated considering that various studies of the WHO show that life begins from the
implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is constitutional since
the law specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the
fertilized ovum are allowed. 136
The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to
life. 137 Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent
and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and
transcends any authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of
the Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws. cDHAaT
 As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the
Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act to Regulate
the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" on June 18, 1966,
prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization, 138 to the promotion
of male vasectomy and tubal ligation, 139 and the ratification of numerous international agreements,
the country has long recognized the need to promote population control through the use of
contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic development. Through the years, however, the
use of contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being a component of
demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly,
reproductive health. 140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and
health and the overall promotion of the family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No.
6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The
Magna Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national
population program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of
no-abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion." 141 As will be discussed later, these principles
are not merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional
protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.
When Life Begins *
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins
is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and
evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the individual members of the
Court could express their own views on this matter. CASIEa
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular
phrase of Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is
undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no
surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The
problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the
scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at
implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with
"fertilization" of the female ovum by the male sperm. 142 On the other side of the spectrum are those
who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus. 143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted
in their plain and ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case ofChavez v. Judicial
and Bar Council: 144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where
the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled
principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood
in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts
to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they
say. Verba legis non est recedendum — from the words of a statute there should be
no departure.
The raison d' être for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is
assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the
objective sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not
primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose
consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law
to prevail. TCEaDI
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception"
which, as described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at
fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant,
formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing into a
being like its parents. 145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of
the female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human lifecapable of survival and maturation
under normal conditions. 146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montaño, 147 it was
written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil
personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already
has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the
unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being
delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart, 148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court,
said that the State "has respect for human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and
substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was
referred to, or cited, as a babyor a child. 149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers
regarding the term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their
deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect the following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:
 "The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the
life of the unborn from the moment of conception."
When is the moment of conception?
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the
ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is human life. . . . . 150
xxx xxx xxx
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life,
it was explained: aTHCSE
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The
first question that needs to be answered is: Is the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically
categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living organisms,
it takes in nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins doing this upon fertilization.
Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies
itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell division. All these
processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no question that biologically the
fertilized ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical
"yes." At the moment of conception, the nuclei of the ovum and the sperm rupture.
As this happens 23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of
the sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found
only — and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must
conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both alive and human, then, as night follows
day, it must be human life. Its nature is human. 151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the
moment of fertilization" was not because of doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: . . . the phrase from the moment of "conception" was
described by us here before with the scientific phrase "fertilized ovum" may be
beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase
"from the moment of conception." 152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the
Constitution, it was discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the
purpose of writing a Constitution, without specifying "from the moment of
conception." EHTADa
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because
according to the Commissioner's own admission, he would leave it to Congress to
define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six months after
fertilization; and that would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now determined by
science that life begins from the moment of conception. There can be no doubt
about it. So we should not give any doubt to Congress, too. 153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that
point. Actually, that is one of the questions I was going to raise during the period of
interpellations but it has been expressed already. The provision, as proposed right
now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life
of the unborn from the moment of conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean
when the egg meets the sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to
determine whether certain contraceptives that we know today are abortifacient or
not because it is a fact that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of
the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has already occurred, the next process is for
the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root. What happens with
some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized ovum
to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision as it is proposed, these
so called contraceptives should be banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is
called abortifacient and, therefore, would be unconstitutional and should be banned
under this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress
to state whether or not these certain contraceptives are abortifacient.
Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now proposed, they are already
considered abortifacient. 154 ESDcIA
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution
emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from
the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and
the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit
Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all
contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the
need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the determination of whether
a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the courts to
decide on based on established evidence. 155 From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or
destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely,
contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that
similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally
permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Gascon: . . . . As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am
pro-life, to the point that I would like not only to protect the life of the unborn, but also
the lives of the millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I
 would just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic implications of the term
"protection of the life of the unborn from the moment of conception." I raised some of
these implications this afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation of
Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question again for a categorical
answer. CHIScD
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from
the moment of conception" we are also actually saying "no," not "maybe," to certain
contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this point in time. Is that the
sense of the committee or does it disagree with me?
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives
would be preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is yet unshaped.
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about
some contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine device which actually stops the egg
which has already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if we say "from
the moment of conception," what really occurs is that some of these contraceptives
will have to be unconstitutionalized.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. 156
The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted
by petitioners during the oral arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even
condoms are not classified as abortifacients. 157 ESCTIA
Atty. Noche:
Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.
Justice Bersamin:
There is no life.
Atty. Noche:
So, there is no life to be protected.
Justice Bersamin:
To be protected.
Atty. Noche:
Under Section 12, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
So you have no objection to condoms?
Atty. Noche:
Not under Section 12, Article II. EaCDAT
Justice Bersamin:
Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?
Atty. Noche:
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I
am discussing here Section 12, Article II, Your Honor, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
Alright.
Atty. Noche:
And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor. 158
Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby's Medical,
Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken
to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote." 159 It describes
fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the embryo
develops." 160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics), 161 used by medical
schools in the Philippines, also concludes that human life (human person) begins at the moment of
fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual, with
a unique genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue. TDCaSE
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development
begins after the union of male and female gametes or germ cells during a process known as
fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins with the contact of a sperm
(spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the
haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell. This
fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a
human being." 162
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology 163 mirror the same position. They wrote:
"Although life is a continuous process, fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary
circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human organism is thereby formed. . . . The combination of
23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the
diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo now exists as a genetic
unity."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on
the Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time
that PMA maintains its strong position that fertilization is sacred because it is at
this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are
sacred from the moment of conception, and that destroying those new lives is
never licit, no matter what the purported good outcome would be. In terms of
biology and human embryology, a human being begins immediately at
fertilization and after that, there is no point along the continuous line of human
embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being can be posited. Any
 philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this objective
scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human
organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well
defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent with
the factual evidence, and independent of any specific ethical, moral, political,
or religious view of human life or of human embryos. 164 DTAcIa
Conclusion: The Moment
of Conception is Reckoned from
Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and
more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion
is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a
scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon.
Lagman that life begins at implantation. 165 According to him, "fertilization and conception are two
distinct and successive stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and
synonymous." 166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the
implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after implantation
that pregnancy can be medically detected." 167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring.
It does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote
is not an inanimate object — it is a living human being complete with DNA and 46
chromosomes. 168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by those who had
population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also
to the Constitution. CSTEHI
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug
or device that would prevent the implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative
and further aggravate religious-based divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes — abortion and abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the
life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing
abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the
Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the unborn from
conception, explained:
The intention . . . is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion
laws ever passed by Congress or any pro-abortion decision passed by
the Supreme Court. 169
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes
abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it
finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of
fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions that embody the
policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the uterus
for implantation. 170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised
Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus: HEDCAS
1]. . . .
Section 4. Definition of Terms. — For the purpose of this Act, the
following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxx xxx xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of
methods, facilities, services and supplies that contribute to reproductive health and
well-being by addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also includes
sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal
relations. The elements of reproductive health care include the following:
xxx xxx xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management
of abortion complications; cTACIa
xxx xxx xxx.
2]. . . .
Section 4.. . . .
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and
couples, to decide freely and responsibly whether or not to have children; the
number, spacing and timing of their children; to make other decisions concerning
reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the information
and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and
reproductive health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not
include abortion, and access to abortifacients.
3]. . . .
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. — Except for prevailing laws against
abortion, any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter of
instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with
the provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the
Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To
be clear, Section 4 (a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms. — . . .
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or
the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the
FDA. SEHTAC
 As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment
of fertilization. By using the word "or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent
implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those that induce the destruction of a fetus inside
the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or aTADcH
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb,
upon determination of the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law,
consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the
State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH
Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed
exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum,
and, second,prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb (third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and
be implanted in the mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean
at all that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not declare
either that protection will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather,
it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already has life,
and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it becomes existent — all the way
until it reaches and implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and afforded
protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants — there is nothing to prevent any drug or
device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to implantation. DTAHEC
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized
ovum, the RH Law does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at
fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall, its viability is
sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier. And as
defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or destroys
the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb, is an abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any
product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that
said product and supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used as an
abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug
or device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance
when the contraceptive product or supply will be used. 171
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient
contraceptives, however, the Court finds that the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the
legislative intent and mean that "any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have
a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it
cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the proviso under the second
paragraph of the same section that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire
by any means emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that will
be used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused
their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as
follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. — For the purpose of this Act, the following
terms shall be defined as follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA. ECcaDT
Section 3.01 (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01.For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as
follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb
or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]
Again in Section 3.01 (j) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz.:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven
modern family planning method, device, or health product, whether natural or
artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized
ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's womb in
doses of its approved indication as determined by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as
"abortifacient" only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb. 172
This cannot be done.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As
they pointed out, with the insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.01 (a) and (j) of the
RH-IRR 173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.01 (a) and (j) of the RH-IRR
is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared
invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the approval
of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in
violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to
insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is
abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum. aEcHCD
 For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of
contraceptives which are actually abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism. 174
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these
contraceptives cannot act as abortive. With this, together with the definition of an abortifacient under
Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy against abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that
contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those contraceptives that do
not have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, but
also those that do not have the secondary action of acting the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the
principle that laws should be construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law
and its implementing rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word
"primarily" in Section 3.01 (a) and (j) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the validity of
Section 3.01 (a) and (j) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the primary
effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives
which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution." 175
To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the
constitutional protection of life must be upheld.
2-The Right to Health
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the
inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and
supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of
essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals. 176 Citing various studies on the matter, the
petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly increased in women
who use oral contraceptives as compared to women who never use them. They point out that the risk
is decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is contended that the use of
combined oral contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased risk of venous
thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on
risk of myocardial infarction. 177 Given the definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual health"
under Sections 4 (p) 178 and (w) 179 of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed legislation
only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives. 180 CaSHAc
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not
self-executory, it being a mere statement of the administration's principle and policy. Even if it were
self-executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities refute the claim that contraceptive pose a
danger to the health of women. 181
The Court's Position
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the
Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II
of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health
of the people, viz.:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive
approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods,
health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There
shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women,
and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and
drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate health, manpower development,
and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled
persons for their rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance, and their
integration into the mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides: CTIEac
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices
and from substandard or hazardous products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless
the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered
self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing
provisions. 182 In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 183 it was stated:
. . . Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all
provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate
of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is,
as it has always been, that —
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing
rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the
provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a
contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or
whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the
will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply
refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not
question contraception and contraceptives per se. 184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo — under
R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when
they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician — be maintained. 185 ETCcSa
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the
provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its
requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of
respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of
contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still
require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate
safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to
the public. As aptly explained by respondent Lagman:
 D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the
same cannot be dispensed and used without prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale,
Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" and
Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting
Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for Other Purposes"
are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not
inconsistent with the RH Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of
contraceptive drugs and devices are particularly governed by RA No. 4729 which
provides in full:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or
corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute whether for or without
consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale,
dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner.
"Sec. 2. For the purpose of this Act:
"(a)" Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or
portion which is used exclusively for the purpose of preventing fertilization
of the female ovum: and
"(b)" Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device,
material, or agent introduced into the female reproductive system for the
primary purpose of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3. Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the
provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of not more than five
hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or more
than one year or both in the discretion of the Court. HATICc
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"
111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No.
5921 provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and
devices. — No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever nature and
kind or device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or
otherwise be made available to the consuming public except through a
prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly established in
accordance with the provisions of this Act."
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH
Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension of the petitioners that the RH
Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives, whether
harmful or not, is completely unwarranted and baseless. 186 [Emphases in the
Original. Underlining supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law
which provides: CacEID
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. —
The DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs and monitor the usage of family planning
supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local
government bodies to plan and implement this procurement and distribution
program. The supply and budget allotments shall be based on, among others, the
current levels and projections of the following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to
space or limit their children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution
and monitoring program consistent with the overall provisions of this Act and the
guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the
provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will
procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual
dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified
medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately
done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De
Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying
contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss
of life resulting from or incidental to their use. 187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted
to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or
devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines
available to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point,
the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives
must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the
case presents itself. SICaDA
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal
contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section
9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall"
is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA.
The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive
or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the
requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from the EDL supports
this construction.
 Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal
contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective
family planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory.
There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and
effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress that
the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper
scientific examination.
3-Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by
the constitutional proscription, there are those who, because of their religious education and
background, sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of
these are medical practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of
contraceptives but also the willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing with contraceptive
use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely opposed to marital chastity, it is contrary
to the good of the transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms true
love and denies the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human life." 188 CacEID
The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that
the expenditure of their taxes on contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since
contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs. 189
2. On Religious Accommodation and
The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious
sentiments by making provisions for a conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is
nonetheless violated because the law also imposes upon the conscientious objector the duty to refer
the patient seeking reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who would be able to
provide for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious objector
to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her religious beliefs. 190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the
recognition is unduly limited, because although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a) (3)
the option to refer a patient seeking reproductive health services and information — no escape is
afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a) (1) and (2), i.e., against a patient seeking
reproductive health procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals to conscientiously object,
such as: a) those working in public health facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers involved in
the implementation of the law referred to in Section 23 (b); and c) teachers in public schools referred to
in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not recognized. 191 aTEHIC
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the
requirement to refer the matter to another health care service provider is still considered a compulsion
on those objecting healthcare service providers. They add that compelling them to do the act against
their will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 17 of the law are too secular
that they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives with abortive
effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive health services to indigents
encroach upon the religious freedom of those upon whom they are required. 192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the
person seeking reproductive health care services to another provider infringes on one's freedom of
religion as it forces the objector to become an unwilling participant in the commission of a serious sin
under Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's belief may be regulated by the State, the acts
prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor injury to the public.193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify
regulation of religious freedom because it mentions no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state
interests. It does not explain how the rights of the people (to equality, non-discrimination of rights,
sustainable human development, health, education, information, choice and to make decisions
according to religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible parenthood)
are being threatened or are not being met as to justify the impairment of religious
freedom. 194 ISCHET
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples
to attend family planning and responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of
compliance. They claim that the provision forces individuals to participate in the implementation of the
RH Law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs. 195 As the assailed law dangles the threat of
penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the petitioners claim
that the RH Law forcing them to provide, support and facilitate access and information to contraception
against their beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom.
The Respondents' Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a
specific mode or type of contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor
sanctions any religion or belief. 196 They point out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public
interest by providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive health services to ensure maternal
and child health, in line with the State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health guarantees of
the Constitution, 197 and that what the law only prohibits are those acts or practices, which deprive
others of their right to reproductive health. 198 They assert that the assailed law only seeks to
guarantee informed choice, which is an assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion
against his free will. 199 AHacIS
The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed,
the petitioners are effectively going against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same right
they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the RH Law. 200 In other words, by seeking the
declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only
the Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose this on the entire
citizenry. 201 CAETcH
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, it being a carefully balanced compromise between the
interests of the religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer —
and that of the citizen who needs access to information and who has the right to expect that the health
care professional in front of her will act professionally. For the respondents, the concession given by
the State under Section 7 and 23 (a) (3) is sufficient accommodation to the right to freely exercise
one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others. 202 Whatever burden is placed
on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration, location and
impact.203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15, the respondents claim
that it is a reasonable regulation providing an opportunity for would-be couples to have access to
information regarding parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that
those who object to any information received on account of their attendance in the required seminars
are not compelled to accept information given to them. They are completely free to reject any
information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without
intervention of the State. 204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning
is the only method acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and
surveys on the matter, they highlight the changing stand of the Catholic Church on contraception
throughout the years and note the general acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its followers
in planning their families. HEcTAI
The Church and The State
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of
people of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our
government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial
groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards all
— the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our people
generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance
and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution
reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God,
in order to build a just and humane society, and establish a Government that shall
embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and
develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of
independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice,
freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this
Constitution. TSEcAD
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God" manifested their spirituality innate
in our nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is
embodied in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in
so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of morality. 205 Moreover, in recognition of the
contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent and
accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of
religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not
encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church and State
was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz.:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect. Generally,
the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas
or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the
church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot
demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the
country. cADTSH
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another,
the Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which
refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a
religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to
protect the State from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following
mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever
be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.
Section 29.
xxx xxx xxx.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or
employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher,
minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium. ASaTHc
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees:
the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or
favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious
groups." 206 Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of public
resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of
the human conscience. 207 Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited
from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith. 208 Explaining the
concept of religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union 209 wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support
of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling
compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of
worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the
free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost
amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all
designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he
ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. Any
legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all
religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even
though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates
conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and
effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect
burden on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose
without imposing such burden.(Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 L ed. 2d. 563,
81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
 The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve
contradictory purposes. They have a single goal — to promote freedom of individual
religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits
government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and
practice, while the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the
two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the
carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices. 210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the
guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to
act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v. Secretary of
Education: 211 SacTCA
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only
by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including
religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything,
however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even
heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But
between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch
of road to travel. 212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can
be enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief
is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare." 213
Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres
to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v.
Escritor, (Escritor) 214 where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether
mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine
Constitution." 215 In the same case, it was further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these
governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote
the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to
exercise their religion without hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation is to
remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's
religion." 216 "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a
declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its
application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the
courts." 217 EcSaHA
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest
test is proper. 218 Underlying the compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a
fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny. 219 In Escritor, it was
written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits.
Beginning with the first case on the Free Exercise Clause, American Bible Society,
the Court mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not employ it.
Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty.
TheGerona case then pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious freedom
is whether it violates the established institutions of society and law.
The Victorianocase mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as well as
the doctrine that a law of general applicability may burden religious exercise
provided the law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The
case also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test.
After Victoriano, Germanwent back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed
the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly
recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the "clear and present danger" test in
the maiden case of American Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which
employed the "clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger"
test involved, in one form or another, religious speech as this test is often
used in cases on freedom of expression. On the other hand,
the Gerona and German cases set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail
over established institutions of society and law.Gerona, however, which was the
authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which employed
the "grave and immediate danger" test. Victoriano was the only case that
employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as explained previously, the
use of the test was inappropriate to the facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in American Bible Society,
Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and present danger" and "grave
and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily discernible or
immediate effects. The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having been
overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not
appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves
purely conduct arising from religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test
is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct
has different effects on the state's interests: some effects may be immediate
and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect
the interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or
delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the state would suffice
to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys
a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights — "the most inalienable and sacred of
all human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of
the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire
constitutional order of limited government is premised upon an acknowledgment of
such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order
to build a just and humane society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert,
only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit this
fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a right with just a
colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling
interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious
liberty. The test requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one,
for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less
powerful ones until they are destroyed. In determining which shall prevail
between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the
guide. The "compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering
religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to the paramount
interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved
conduct, i.e., refusal to work an Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest"
test, by upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to protect the very
state, without which, religious liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the original.
Underlining supplied.]
 The Court's Position
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use
of contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modern reproductive health measures is
moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or
belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship,
ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church . . . are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are
outside the province of the civil courts." 220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be
understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without
authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to
determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.CcAITa
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious
beliefs and convictions. It is replete with assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets
of his religion or defy his religious convictions against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law respecting
religious freedom are the following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons
including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive
health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make
decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions,
ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section 2,
Declaration of Policy]
2. The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and
the foundation of the family which in turn is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant
thereto, the State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance
with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy] THDIaC
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without
bias, to all methods of family planning, including effective natural and modern
methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and
effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research
standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and
marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of
identifying marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide funding
support to promote modern natural methods of family planning, especially the
Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their
religious convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and
couples to have the number of children they desire with due consideration to the
health, particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to them
and in accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious convictions.
[Section 3(f)]
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family
planning methods that are in accordance with their religious convictions and
cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's obligations under various
human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs),
women's and people's organizations, civil society, faith-based organizations, the
religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and
population and development policies, plans, and programs will address the priority
needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to
respond to the needs and aspirations of the family and children. It is likewise a
shared responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired number
of children, spacing and timing of their children according to their own family life
aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness, health status,
sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions.
(Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of
contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an
anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be
respected. cHESAD
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with
religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither
cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause
the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to
a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot
enhance its population control program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of
contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its
legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One
cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line
between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and
unto God the things that are God's. 221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly
respects diverse religious beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion
cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions commonly
mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care
and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious
objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government
legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the
Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the conscientious
objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law,
unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the
accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors
for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny. CHEDAc
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious
freedom has been burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a
conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the law and the abandonment of his
religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The
scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs are
incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the
religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his
will, refers a patient seeking information on modern reproductive health products, services,
procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to
perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has
written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience. 222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however,
a false compromise because it makes pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act
that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they
cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by
indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free
speech, it being an externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to
be silent. With the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that should be
afforded to individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply
being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what is in his mind and
the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. 223 While the RH Law seeks to provide freedom of
choice through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience
and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's
religion. 224
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one
hand, and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive
health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to determine the timing,
number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious
freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly,
aconscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he
would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the
principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the
case of Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board, 225 that the midwives
claiming to be conscientious objectors under the provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could
not be required to delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor ward who were involved in
abortions. 226 The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined according to whether the
person was taking part 'directly' or 'indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity and
uncertainty." 227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same —
they could not be forced to assist abortions if it would be against their conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned
and operated by a religious group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of
the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer
under Section 7 and Section 23 (a) (3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative
of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23 (a) (1) and (a) (2) in relation to Section 24,
considering that in the dissemination of information regarding programs and services and in the
performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health care service providers
should be respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive
Secretary 228 it was stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of
our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status,
well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to
profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with
the liberty of others and with the common good." 10
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure
compliance. Without set consequences for either an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be
toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an effective implementation of a law
is a constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment
of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines
to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear
inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow. HTSAEa
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or
municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising
midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with
the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be
considered as conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious
objection clause should be equally protective of the religious belief of public health officers. There is no
perceptible distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The
protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners
without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, the freedom to believe
is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off
even if one acquires employment in the government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the
hierarchy of human values. The mind must be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or
religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or through the media and, thus,
seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in
such concept then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and petition,
and freedom of association. 229
The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH
Law itself but also because it is violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting
respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must
prevail. ISHaCD
Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law . . . in your Comment-in-Intervention on page 52,
you mentioned RH Law is replete with provisions in upholding the
 freedom of religion and respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you
affirmed this with qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed you
have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?
Congressman Lagman:
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not
thoroughly dissected the nuances of the provisions.
Justice Mendoza:
I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law.
But in the IRR it says: ". . . skilled health professionals such as provincial,
city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses,
supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are
specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the
RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious
objectors." Do you agree with this?
Congressman Lagman:
I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
Justice Mendoza:
In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can
be conscientious objectors, skilled health professionals cannot be
considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not
against the constitutional right to the religious belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must
prevail. 230
Compelling State Interest
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense
of the subject provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain
conscientious objectors in their choice of services to render; and 2] discharge the burden of proof that
the obligatory character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The
OSG was curiously silent in the establishment of a more compelling state interest that would
rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right not to adhere to an action contrary to his
religious convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and evasion.
The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the following: EHITaS
Justice De Castro:
Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. . .
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:
. . . which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling
State interest in imposing this duty to refer to a conscientious objector
which refuses to do so because of his religious belief?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Ahh, Your Honor, . . .
Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling
State interest, this is an ordinary health legislation involving
professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise
matter. This is a regulation by the State of the relationship between
medical doctors and their patients. 231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free
exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement
of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat,
State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. 232
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also
means the freedom to act or not to act according to what one believes. And this
freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented
from acting according to one's belief. 233 HDIATS
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an
individual in the perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing,
number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is contingent on whether
or not the mother decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or supply given to her or
whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon
those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks
consultation on reproductive health matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the
conscientious objector's religious freedom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a person's fundamental right
to religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to show
that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means.234 Other
than the assertion that the act of referring would only be momentary, considering that the act of referral
by a conscientious objector is the very action being contested as violative of religious freedom, it
behooves the respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to
achieve its objective without violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health concerns of
women may still be addressed by other practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related
procedures with open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to perform
an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional
freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the
right to health is protected. Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A. No. 4729 or the
Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710,
otherwise known as "The Magna Cartaof Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to
health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on comprehensive health
services and programs for women, in fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. — (a) Comprehensive Health
Services. — The State shall, at all times, provide for a comprehensive,
culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and programs covering all
stages of a woman's life cycle and which addresses the major causes of women's
mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive health
services, due respect shall be accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights
of the spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions, and
the demands of responsible parenthood, and the right of women to protection from
hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and substances. DcaCSE
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address
pregnancy and infant health and nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family
planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and
health services without prejudice to the primary right and duty
of parents to educate their children;
(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections,
including sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like
breast and cervical cancers, and other gynecological
conditions and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related
complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and
children victims and survivors shall be provided with
comprehensive health services that include psychosocial,
therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions and assistance
towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction
pursuant to ethical norms and medical standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health
problems of women and girls. In addition, healthy lifestyle
activities are encouraged and promoted through programs and
projects as strategies in the prevention of diseases. ICaDHT
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. — The State
shall provide women in all sectors with appropriate, timely, complete, and accurate
information and education on all the above-stated aspects of women's health in
government education and training programs, with due regard to the following:
(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of
the youth and the development of moral character and the right
of children to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and
rectitude for the enrichment and strengthening of character;
(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including
fertility awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling
state interest was "Fifteen maternal deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of unintended
pregnancies, lives changed, . . . ." 235 He, however, failed to substantiate this point by concrete facts
and figures from reputable sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the
Filipino maternal mortality rate dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still
no RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation, the proponents still insist that such number of
maternal deaths constitute a compelling state interest. aSTAcH
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare
programs for Filipino women, they could not be solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable
stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law.
While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care
procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made
in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations,
the right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical
practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother
in grave danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested: "the
forced referral clause that we are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not
contemplate an emergency." 237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is
morally obliged always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one
should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. — May we please remind the principal
author of the RH Bill in the House of Representatives of the principle of double-effect
wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never justified
to bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict situation between the life of the child and
the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both
lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it
ismedically impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is intended to
the other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of the child's life or the
mother's life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor
would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted against the
child because both their lives are equally valuable. 238
 Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of
the child may be resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As
quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case would have been
more than justified considering the life he would be able to save. EScAHT
Family Planning Seminars
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15 239 as a condition for the issuance of a
marriage license, the Court finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the
government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of the
petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on
parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of
family planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As
correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive any information during their attendance in the required
seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to them, are completely free to reject the
information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without
the intervention of the State.
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23 (a) (2) (i) thereof violates the
provisions of the Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates
disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity and total
development. 240
The Court cannot but agree.
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic
social institution. In fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation
of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its
total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation
of the family and shall be protected by the State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with
their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood; DcTaEH
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and
nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
The right of families or family associations to participate in the
planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect
them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains
provisions which tend to wreck the family as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the
father from participating in the decision making process regarding their common future progeny. It
likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply because she is already
a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23 (a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: . . .
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health
procedures on any person of legal age on the ground of lack of consent or
authorization of the following persons in the following instances: CTEaDc
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case
of disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the
procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]
The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and
vasectomy which, by their very nature, should require mutual consent and decision between the
husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art.
XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a family."
One person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the same
Section 3, their right "to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that
affect them" is equally recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving
absolute authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from
participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly result in
bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the population.
This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an inviolable
social institution. 241
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which
belongs to the couple, not just one of them. Any decision they would reach would affect their future as
a family because the size of the family or the number of their children significantly matters. The
decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses
as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private
right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the State should
see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-de Castro, Section 19 (c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise
known as the "Magna Carta for Women," provides that women shall have equal rights in all matters
relating to marriage and family relations, including the joint decision on the number and spacing of
their children. Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3 (v) of the RH Law states, is a shared
responsibility between parents. Section 23 (a) (2) (i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray
the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family by giving to only one spouse the
absolute authority to decide whether to undergo reproductive health procedure. 242 TaCDcE
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy
and such state intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the
Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first recognized in Morfe v. Mutuc, 243 where
the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to privacy as such is accorded
recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection." 244 Morfe adopted the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 245 where Justice William O. Douglas wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights — older than
our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for
better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It
is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not
political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives
a criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy
of married persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples.
Justice Douglas inGriswold wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various
guarantees create zones of privacy." 246
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide. aEHASI
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will
be undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law
provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. — . . . .
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning
services, whether natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed
access to modern methods of family planning without written consent from their
parents or guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage.HIaAED
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision making process of the
minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is
already cut off just because there is a need to tame population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and
guidance of her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to
providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It
does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and
strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of
moral character shall receive the support of the Government." 247 In this regard, Commissioner
Bernas wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right
of parents. It imports the assertion that the right of parents is superior to that
of the State. 248 [Emphases supplied]
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over
their minor-child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the
very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the
violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and
strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that the
State affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming the
foundation of the family and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the
care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second
paragraph of Section 7 or with respect to the consenting spouse under Section 23 (a) (2) (i), a
distinction must be made. There must be a differentiation between access to information about family
planning services, on one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family
planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned, the Court
finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor referred to under the
exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her own
body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State
to protect both the life of the mother as that of the unborn child. Considering that information to enable
a person to make informed decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance of ones' health,
access to such information with respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation, the
fear that parents might be deprived of their parental control is unfounded because they are not
prohibited to exercise parental guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in deciding
whether to accept or reject the information received. SAHITC
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening
cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who
has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for
lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate medical
care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23 (a) (2) (ii) 249 should be struck down.
By effectively limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it
denies the parents their right of parental authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical
procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as
provided in the first sentence of Section 23 (a) (2) (ii), the parents should not be deprived of their
constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an affront to the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.
5-Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the
teaching of Age- and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine
and/or imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom. According to the petitioners, these
provisions effectively force educational institutions to teach reproductive health education even if they
believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their students. 250 Citing various studies
conducted in the United States and statistical data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that the
prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and breakdown
of families; the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of
society; and promotion of promiscuity among the youth. 251 ScCEIA
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law
is premature because the Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a
curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can only speculate on the content,
manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they will
contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering
the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or
validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of
moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935
Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in
preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance on
the role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary,"
that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State. 252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral
development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the
youth and their important role in nation building. 253 Considering that Section 14 provides not only for
the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but also for values formation; the development of
knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and violence against
women and children and other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social
and emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage
behavior; gender and development; and responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of
the RH-IRR and Section 4 (t) of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage
behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and emotional changes among adolescents — the Court
finds that the legal mandate provided under the assailed provision supplements, rather than supplants,
the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health
education program shall be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations,
school officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it will be in line with the
religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the
petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3 (1) of the Constitution is without
merit.254 aDSHCc
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their
participation in the reproductive health education program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law
on the ground that the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should an
actual case be filed before it.
6-Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due
process clause of the Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a) (1) mentions a "private health
service provider" among those who may be held punishable but does not define who is a "private
health care service provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only makes
reference to a "private health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals
operated by religious groups from rendering reproductive healthservice and modern family planning
methods. It is unclear, however, if these institutions are also exempt from giving reproductive
health information under Section 23 (a) (1), or from rendering reproductive health procedures under
Section 23 (a) (2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of
incorrect information, but at the same time fails to define "incorrect information."
The arguments fail to persuade. AHCTEa
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its
application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to
accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it
leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary
flexing of the Government muscle. 255 Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute
are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in
relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed together with the other parts and
kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service
provider," reference must be made to Section 4 (n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health
service provider," viz.:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care
institution, which is duly licensed and accredited and devoted primarily to the
maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease prevention,
diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury,
disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2)
public health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midwife; (3)
public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay
health worker who has undergone training programs under any accredited
government and NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in
the community after having been accredited to function as such by the local health
board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health
(DOH). ACIDTE
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of
"private health care service provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that
they are used synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated
to render reproductive health service and modern family planning methods, includes exemption from
being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures.
Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from
being obligated to render reproductive health service and modern family planning
methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health
information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are
broad enough to include the providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care
service providers who intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect information regarding
reproductive health programs and services. For ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby
quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. — The following acts are prohibited:
 (a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who
shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof,
and/or intentionally provide incorrect information regarding
programs and services on reproductive health including the
right to informed choice and access to a full range of legal,
medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning
methods; STaCcA
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or
model or with established rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty,
morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the truth. 257 On the other hand, the word "knowingly"
means with awareness or deliberateness that is intentional. 258 Used together in relation to Section
23 (a) (1), they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the
nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health. Public health and safety demand
that health care service providers give their honest and correct medical information in accordance with
what is acceptable in medical practice. While health care service providers are not barred from
expressing their own personal opinions regarding the programs and services on reproductive health,
their right must be tempered with the need to provide public health and safety. The public deserves no
less.
7-Equal Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the
Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because it makes them the primary target of the
government program that promotes contraceptive use. They argue that, rather than promoting
reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively
reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the
poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding principles 259 and definition of terms 260 of the law.
They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory
reproductive health education program imposed by the RH Law renders it unconstitutional. ScTIAH
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, 261 the Court had the occasion to expound on
the concept of equal protection. Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that
of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due
process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair
play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more
specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due
process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted
partiality on prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection
clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires
that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose
of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express
terms of a statute or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted
authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the
state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals
solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just
those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government
including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state
denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is
taken. DHCSTa
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to
all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality
among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid
must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the
law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all
members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it
must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. "The
classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not
necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that
the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree.
Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered
by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual
belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is
substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of
the law to him." IECAaD
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or
so constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be
of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that
should otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases supplied; citations
excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care
program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII
of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged
by providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive
approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods,
health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There
shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled,
women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to
paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized
couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit
to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH
Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section
3 (l) explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the
advancement of reproductive health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and
does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise
that the assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to have children only if they would raise
them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to
simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government programs to promote basic
reproductive health care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory
reproductive health education program under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the
children of those who are less fortunate attend public educational institutions does not amount to
substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial
distinction rests between public educational institutions and private educational institutions,
particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational
institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the
teaching of reproductive health education.
8-Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the
constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed
legislation requiring private and non-government health care service providers to render forty-eight (48)
hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude because it
requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their will. 262
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can
hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service
providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover, the
OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation of medical
practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken. EIcSTD
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public
interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and
promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a
privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this
power includes the power of Congress 263 to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of
professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the
public safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such
right altogether. 264
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the
presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion. 265 A
reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private and
non-government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than
non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private
and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which
kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it
all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service
against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with
PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a
necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state
interest. EAICTS
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized
that conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and
convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bono or otherwise.
9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to
determine whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL). 266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power
but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the only
government entity empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so. It should be
understood that health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with
what is ordinarily understood as "health products." In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3720, as
amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created
an office to be called the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of
Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office of the Secretary and
shall have the following functions, powers and duties: TcaAID
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the
rules and regulations issued pursuant to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health
products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the
implementation of this Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of
health products standards, and to recommend standards of identity, purity, safety,
efficacy, quality and fill of container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to
serve as basis for the issuance of appropriate authorization and spot-check for
compliance with regulations regarding operation of manufacturers, importers,
exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments and
facilities of health products, as determined by the FDA;
"xxx xxx xxx
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products
prior to the issuance of appropriate authorizations to ensure safety, efficacy,
purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers,
exporters, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and non-consumer users of health
products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that said
product has caused or contributed to the death, serious illness or serious injury to a
consumer, a patient, or any person; TDEASC
 "(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified
complaint for health products, whether or not registered with the
FDA Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist order is
valid for thirty (30) days and may be extended for sixty (60) days only after due
process has been observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal
of any health product found to have caused death, serious illness or serious
injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe,
dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned to implement the
risk management plan which is a requirement for the issuance of the appropriate
authorization;
xxx xxx xxx.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific
to enable the agency to carry out the mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole
agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped
with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary
implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting only
food and medicines that are safe includes "service" and "methods." From the declared policy of the RH
Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that are proven
medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and
evidence-based medical research standards. The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was
explained in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 267 as follows: cDEICH
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and
the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems
demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created
peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected
reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become
necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the
legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to
provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.
10-Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes
upon the powers devolved to local government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local
Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the
delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. —
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall
continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently
vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of
national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local
government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such
other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to
efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated
herein. HcSCED
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, . . . .
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and
responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect
of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the
same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects,
facilities, programs and services. 268 Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public
works and infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and
servicesfunded by the National Government under the annual General
Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly
or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section,
except in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly
designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs
and services. [Emphases supplied]
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless
an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for
which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations
act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. 269 A
complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and
services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it. 270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the
establishment of health care facilities, 271 the hiring of skilled health professionals, 272 or the training
of barangay health workers, 273 it will be the national government that will provide for the funding of
its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the say when it
comes to national priority programs which the local government is called upon to implement like the
RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LGUs are merely encouraged to provide
these services. There is nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making the
availability of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH
Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by
the local governments. EHSTDA
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be
equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III,
Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by
petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous region, refer
to the policy statements for the guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied upon by
the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional government, which
can, in no manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that
would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the
Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et
imperio in the relationship between the national and the regional governments. 274Except for the
express and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to
exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of
general concern or common interest. 275
11-Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law, 276 suffice it to say that
the Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only
guidepost is the Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as
natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity
to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are mere
thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The
jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual
law of the past or present. 277 Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it
cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 278 the very case cited
by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty-bound to examine every law or action and
whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used
sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is
applicable. 279 aCHcIE
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It
does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program
of the government by providing information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily
available to the public, especially to the poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to
provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality
reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the
religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes
to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands
accountable to an authority higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group
cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modern society leaves
enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so
that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that
what it seeks to address is the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be
said that the cause of these perennial issues is not the large population but the unequal distribution of
wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth
remains in the hands of the very few. cACTaI
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The
European and Asian countries, which embarked on such a program generations ago, are now
burdened with ageing populations. The number of their young workers is dwindling with adverse
effects on their economy. These young workers represent a significant human capital which could
have helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to
reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas
Filipino Workers. This is because we have an ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What
would happen if the country would be weighed down by an ageing population and the fewer younger
generation would not be able to support them? This would be the situation when our total fertility rate
would go down below the replacement level of two (2) children per woman. 280
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use
coercive measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it.
Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law. SDHITE
. . . . But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down.
Its duty is to say what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the
same as saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of
circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of
the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it
the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise
from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact
remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the premises. But as always,
with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate
function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation
and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore limited, and
accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as
enacted by the lawmaking body. 281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation
and enhancement of the prior existing contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with coercive
measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will still be the
Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for
women or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the assailed
legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family
planning method should be maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares
R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which
are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL: SCEDAI
1] Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require
private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow
minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modern methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2] Section 23 (a) (1) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section
5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to
disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or
her religious beliefs.
3] Section 23 (a) (2) (i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow
a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No.
8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4] Section 23 (a) (2) (ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit
the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5] Section 23 (a) (3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section
5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a
patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible
regardless of his or her religious beliefs; SDAaTC
6] Section 23 (b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24
thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs
or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of
his or her religious beliefs;
 7] Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro
bono reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing
PhilHealth accreditation; and
8] Section 3.01 (a) and Section 3.01 (j) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily"
in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra viresand, therefore, null and void for
contravening Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order,
dated July 16, 2013, is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been
herein declared as constitutional.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr. and Perez, JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., tingnan ang aking opinyong sumasang-ayon at sumasalungat.
Carpio and Abad, JJ., see concurring opinion.
Leonardo-de Castro, J., with separate concurring opinion.
Brion, J., see: separate concurring opinion.
Del Castillo, Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Leonen, J., see separate dissent.
||| (Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, 204957, 204988, 205003, 205043, 205138,
205478, 205491, 205720, 206355, 207111, 207172 & 207563, [April 8, 2014], 732 PHIL 1-99)
 N BANC
[G.R. No. 190582. April 8, 2010.]
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON
REMOTO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J p:
. . . [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much.
That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to
differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.
Justice Robert A. Jackson
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 1
One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that others
may make different choices — choices we would not make for ourselves, choices we may disapprove
of, even choices that may shock or offend or anger us. However, choices are not to be legally
prohibited merely because they are different, and the right to disagree and debate about important
questions of public policy is a core value protected by our Bill of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is
built on genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity and difference in opinion.
Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the definitions
and demands of morality. In many cases, where moral convictions are concerned, harmony among
those theoretically opposed is an insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies the paradox — philosophical
justifications about what is moral are indispensable and yet at the same time powerless to create
agreement. This Court recognizes, however, that practical solutions are preferable to ideological
stalemates; accommodation is better than intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric. This will
allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously, then, at least, civilly.
Factual Background
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009 2 (the First
Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 2009 3 (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228
(PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELEC's refusal to
accredit AngLadlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known
as the Party-List System Act. 4 CDAHaE
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in
2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for
accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership
base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition 5 for registration with the COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and
under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and
gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of
negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and
that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections. 6 Ang Ladlad laid out its national
membership base consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its
platform of governance. 7
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner's evidence, the COMELEC (Second
Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:
. . . This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the
Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:
. . . a marginalized and under-represented sector that is
particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender
identity.
and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:
. . . refers to a person's capacity for profound emotional,
affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with,
individuals of a different gender, of the same gender, or more than one
gender."
This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner
tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:
For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even
their women did change the natural use into that which is against nature:
And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned
in their lust one toward another; men with men working that which is
unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense of their error
which was meet.
In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:
For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women "ye
are indeed a people transgressing beyond bounds." (7.81) "And we
rained down on them a shower (of brimstone): Then see what was the
end of those who indulged in sin and crime!" (7:84) "He said: "O my Lord!
Help Thou me against people who do mischief" (29:30).
As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated
October 2, 2008: CcADHI
The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as
indicated in the Petition's par. 6F: 'Consensual partnerships or
relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age'. It is further
indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: 'In
2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were
 estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history of Sodom and
Gomorrah).
Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit,
license, relationship, or accreditation. Hence, pertinent provisions of the
Civil Code and theRevised Penal Code are deemed part of the
requirement to be complied with for accreditation.
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which
defines nuisance as 'Any act, omission, establishment, business,
condition of property, or anything else which . . . (3) shocks, defies; or
disregards decency or morality . . .
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: 'The
contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Art. 1409 of
the Civil Code provides that 'Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy' are
inexistent and void from the beginning.
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, penalizes 'Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and
exhibitions and indecent shows' as follows:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and
exhibitions, and indecent shows. — The penalty of prision mayor or a fine
ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such
imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:
1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines
openly contrary to public morals;
2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their
knowledge in any form; the editors publishing such literature; and the
owners/operators of the establishment selling the same;
(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other
place, exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being
understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays,
scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are prescribed by
virtue hereof, shall include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone
crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for
violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to
abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law,
public order, morals, good customs, established policies, lawful orders,
decrees and edicts.
3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints,
engravings, sculpture or literature which are offensive to morals. THADEI
Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating
immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when it said that it "or any of its
nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws,
rules, or regulations relating to the elections."
Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be
exposing our youth to an environment that does not conform to the teachings of our
faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and writer in the U.S.A. said in one
article that "older practicing homosexuals are a threat to the youth." As an agency of
the government, ours too is the State's avowed duty under Section 13, Article II of
the Constitution to protect our youth from moral and spiritual degradation. 8
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration, 9 three commissioners voted to overturn the
First Assailed Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, ReneV. Sarmiento, and Armando
Velasco), while three commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlad's Motion for Reconsideration
(Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph).
The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion,
upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating that:
I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941
Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list
system. Even assuming that it has properly proven its under-representation and
marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlad's expressed sexual orientations per
se would benefit the nation as a whole.
Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the
party-list system of electing congressional representatives is to enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations
and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives.
If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an
organization to represent its constituencies, then all representative organizations
would have found themselves into the party-list race. But that is not the intention of
the framers of the law. The party-list system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and
acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of persons. Rather, the party-list
system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized
individualswhose interests are also the nation's — only that their interests have
not been brought to the attention of the nation because of their under
representation. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having
mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the
nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain
just that.
II. No substantial differentiation
In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine
jurisprudence, courts do not recognize lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and bisexuals
(LGBT) as a "special class" of individuals. . . . Significantly, it has also been held that
homosexuality is not a constitutionally protected fundamental right, and that
"nothing in the U.S. Constitution discloses a comparable intent to protect or promote
the social or legal equality of homosexual relations," as in the case of race or religion
or belief. EcHTCD
xxx xxx xxx
 Thus, even if society's understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of
LGBT's is elevated, there can be no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still
males and females, and they will remain either male or female protected by the
same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.
xxx xxx xxx
IV. Public Morals
. . . There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or
Muslim religious practices. Neither is there any attempt to any particular religious
group's moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as moral parameters
and precepts are generally accepted public morals. They are possibly
religious-based, butas a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its more than
500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts
espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into society and these are not
publicly accepted moral norms.
V. Legal Provisions
But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of
the land. Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision
mayorupon "Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly
contrary to public morals." It penalizes "immoral doctrines, obscene publications and
exhibition and indecent shows." "Ang Ladlad" apparently falls under these legal
provisions. This is clear from its Petition's paragraph 6F: "Consensual partnerships
or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age. It is further indicated in
par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: 'In 2007, Men Having Sex with
Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000. Moreoever, * Article
694 of the Civil Code defines "nuisance" as any act, omission . . . or anything else . . .
which shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality . . . ." These are all
unlawful. 10
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed
Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad'sapplication for
accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction
against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin printing the final ballots
for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.
On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its
Comment on behalf of COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010. 11 Instead of filing a
Comment, however, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, requesting that it be given until January 16,
2010 to Comment. 12 Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in support of petitioner's
application. 13 Thus, in order to give COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate its position, we
required it to file its own comment. 14 The COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed its
Comment on February 2, 2010. 15
In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary restraining
order on January 12, 2010, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court,
directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing the Assailed Resolutions. 16
Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to
Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-in-Intervention. 17 The CHR
opined that the denial of Ang Ladlad's petition on moral grounds violated the standards and principles
of the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHR's motion
to intervene. DcaECT
On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene 18 which motion
was granted on February 2, 2010. 19
The Parties' Arguments
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by
using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion.
Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy,
freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the
Philippines' international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlad's petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in
denying petitioner's application for registration since there was no basis for COMELEC's allegations of
immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their own special interests and concerns which should
have been recognized by theCOMELEC as a separate classification. However, insofar as the
purported violations of petitioner's freedom of speech, expression, and assembly were concerned, the
OSG maintained that there had been no restrictions on these rights.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and
genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly
dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the
sectors enumerated by the Constitution andRA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in
its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC's
field personnel.
Our Ruling
We grant the petition.
Compliance with the Requirements of
the Constitution and Republic Act No.
7941
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad's application for registration on the ground that the
LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related
to any of the sectors in the enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we
explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, 20 "the
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive". The crucial element is
not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with
the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it
alleged that it had nationwide existence through its members and affiliate organizations.
The COMELEC claims that upon verification by its field personnel, it was shown that "save for a few
isolated places in the country, petitioner does not exist in almost all provinces in the
country." 21 EaISTD
This argument that "petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its
national existence" is a new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was "not being
truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to • ONE BACARDI AaITCS
comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections." Nowhere was this ground for denial of
petitioner's accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is • Order of St. Aelred (OSAe)-Metro Manila
quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioner's alleged non-existence were already available
• PUP LAKAN
to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is irregular
procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a change in respondent's theory, and a serious violation of • RADAR PRIDEWEAR
petitioner's right to procedural due process.
• Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc.-Metro Manila
Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal
of Ang Ladlad's initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. • San Jose del Monte Gay Association-Bulacan
Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at
least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 • Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family-Rizal
members in its electronic discussion group. 22 Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be "a national
LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the following LGBT • Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP)-Metro Manila
networks:"
• Soul Jive-Antipolo, Rizal
• Abra Gay Association
• The Link-Davao City
• Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB)-Aklan
• Tayabas Gay Association-Quezon
• Albay Gay Association
• Women's Bisexual Network-Metro Manila
• Arts Center of Cabanatuan City-Nueva Ecija
• Zamboanga Gay Association-Zamboanga City 23
• Boys Legion-Metro Manila
Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT,
• Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS) it is no surprise that they found that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In fact,
if COMELEC's findings are to be believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is
• Can't Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC)-Metro Manila registered as Ang Ladlad's principal place of business.

• Cebu Pride-Cebu City Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance
with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside fromCOMELEC's moral objection and the
• Circle of Friends belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled
that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites
• Dipolog Gay Association-Zamboanga del Norte
under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies
• Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY) in AngLadlad's morality, or lack thereof.
Religion as the Basis for Refusal to
• Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG)-Metro Manila
Accept Ang Ladlad's Petition for
• Gay Men's Support Group (GMSG)-Metro Manila Registration

• Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS)-Lanao del Norte Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our
• Iloilo City Gay Association-Iloilo City non-establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious matters." 24 Clearly,
"governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality." 25 We
• Kabulig Writer's Group-Camarines Sur thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the
Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
• Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should
• LUMINA-Baguio City depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings
beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular
• Marikina Gay Association-Metro Manila
purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor: 26
• Metropolitan Community Church (MCC)-Metro Manila . . . The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular,
not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as
• Naga City Gay Association-Naga City
expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order but public moral
 disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms." Otherwise,
if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals,
the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what some might
regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be
compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious
belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if
government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or
endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or
non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a result, government will
not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those
whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.
In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality
as expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is,
the government proscribes this conduct because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to
those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society"
and not because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other.
Although admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might have a compelling
influence on those engaged in public deliberations over what actions would be
considered a moral disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they might also be
adherents of a religion and thus have religious opinions and moral codes with a
compelling influence on them; the human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal
and spiritual institutions of society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with
heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian
in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and discernible secular purpose
and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. . . . Recognizing the
religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in society,
however, the Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a
benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must
pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious
liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus,
although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could
allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests. 27
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny
Ang Ladlad's Petition for Registration
Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and
homosexual conduct may be religion-based, it has long been transplanted into generally accepted
public morals. The COMELEC argues: aIcCTA
Petitioner's accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group
consists of LGBTs but because of the danger it poses to the people especially the
youth. Once it is recognized by the government, a sector which believes that there is
nothing wrong in having sexual relations with individuals of the same gender is a
bad example. It will bring down the standard of morals we cherish in our civilized
society. Any society without a set of moral precepts is in danger of losing its own
existence.28
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps
homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the
reasons behind this censure — religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family,
and procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle.
Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct.
Evidently, therefore, these "generally accepted public morals" have not been convincingly
transplanted into the realm of law. 29
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed
by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that "there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that
the group's members have committed or are committing immoral acts." 30 The OSG argues:
. . . A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of
a different gender, or more than one gender, but mere attraction does not translate
to immoral acts. There is a great divide between thought and action. Reduction ad
absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would have its
hands full of disqualification cases against both the "straights" and the gays."
Certainly this is not the intendment of the law. 31
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why
special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELECcondescended to justify its
position that petitioner's admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably
damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course, do not suggest that the state is wholly without
authority to regulate matters concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize
that the government will and should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society.
Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions,
situate morality on one end of an argument or another, without bothering to go through the rigors of
legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the
bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our scrutiny.
We also find the COMELEC's reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws
flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as "any act,
omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards
decency or morality," the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any
local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. 32 A violation of Article 201
of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a
criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not
proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal
proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability. SDIaCT
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental
interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial
of Ang Ladlad's registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and
disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest. Respondent's
blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals
themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective
targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.
Equal Protection
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides "nor shall
any person be denied equal protection of the laws," courts have never interpreted the provision as an
absolute prohibition on classification. "Equality," said Aristotle, "consists in the same treatment of
similar persons." 33 The equal protection clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall
be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the
same place and in like circumstances. 34
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor
targets a suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to
some legitimate government end. 35 In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral
ng Pilipinas, 36 we declared that "[i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection
challenges . . . have followed the 'rational basis' test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative
classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution." 37
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual
conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner.
Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists
to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed,
even if we were to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state
interest here — that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority — is not a legitimate state interest
that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause. The COMELEC's
differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of
legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of
or dislike for a disfavored group.
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political
parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general
application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list
system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELEC's act of differentiating LGBTs from
heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other law
distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly
fail. We disagree with the OSG's position that homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes
of the equal protection clause. 38 We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class
meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and
it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be
recognized under the same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made
"an unwarranted and impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances of the case."
Freedom of Expression and
Association
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to
persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means. 39 It is in the public
square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. As
we held in Estrada v. Escritor: 40
In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is
distilled in the public square. Where citizens are free, every opinion, every prejudice,
every aspiration, and every moral discernment has access to the public square
where people deliberate the order of their life together. Citizens are the bearers of
opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and these
citizens have equal access to the public square. In this representative democracy,
the state is prohibited from determining which convictions and moral judgments may
be proposed for public deliberation. Through a constitutionally designed process,
the people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle in this
democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral judgments is
finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely reflect the beliefs and preferences of
the majority, i.e., the mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of
adopting and accepting a constitution and the limits it specifies — including
protection of religious freedom "not only for a minority, however small — not only for
a majority, however large — but for each of us" — the majority imposes upon itself a
self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride
roughshod over the dissenting minorities.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society,
and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend,
shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its
views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech
for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one. aAcDSC
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal
in this country. It follows that both expressions concerning one's homosexuality and the activity of
forming a political association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming public
perception that homosexual conduct violates public morality does not justify criminalizing same-sex
conduct. 41 European and United Nations judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights
claimants on both privacy and equality grounds, citing general privacy and equal protection provisions
in foreign and international texts. 42 To the extent that there is much to learn from other jurisdictions
that have reflected on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly illuminating. These
foreign authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine courts, may nevertheless have persuasive
influence on the Court's analysis.
In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that
existing free speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order to justify
the prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, public institutions must show that their actions
were caused by "something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint." 43
With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe,
with its vibrant human rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly
stated that a political party may campaign for a change in the law or the constitutional structures of a
state if it uses legal and democratic means and the changes it proposes are consistent with
democratic principles. The ECHR has emphasized that political ideas that challenge the existing order
and whose realization is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of
expression through the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or
unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of the population. 44 A political group should not be
hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political issues in order to find
solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned. 45 Only if a political party incites violence or puts
forward policies that are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom
of association guarantee. 46
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is
distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the other
hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships
between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too,
are entitled to hold and express that view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy
precludes using the religious or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from
consideration the values of other members of the community.
Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights litigants.
It well may be that this Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy between the rigid
constitutional analysis of this Court and the more complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not
suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a clear-cut strong consensus favorable to
gay rights claims and we neither attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality
through this Decision.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent
punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their right to
voluntarily associate, then there has been no restriction on their freedom of expression or association.
The OSG argues that:
There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any
assembly denied. [COMELEC] simply exercised its authority to review and verify the
qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party applying to participate in the party-list
system. This lawful exercise of duty cannot be said to be a transgression of Section
4, Article III of the Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
A denial of the petition for registration . . . does not deprive the members
of the petitioner to freely take part in the conduct of elections. Their right to vote will
not be hampered by said denial. In fact, the right to vote is a
constitutionally-guaranteed right which cannot be limited.
As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner
contends that the denial of Ang Ladlad's petition has the clear and immediate effect
of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the capacity of its members to fully and equally
participate in public life through engagement in the party list elections.
This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a
privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. . . . 47
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate
in the party-list system, and — as advanced by the OSG itself — the moral objection offered by
the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has
been precluded, because of COMELEC's action, from publicly expressing its views as a political party
and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equally-qualified party-list
candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioner's fundamental rights.
Non-Discrimination and International
Law
In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise,
international human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its attempt to bring about a more
just and humane world order. For individuals and groups struggling with inadequate structural and
governmental support, international human rights norms are particularly significant, and should be
effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so that such norms may become actual, rather than
ideal, standards of conduct.
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote
human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to
the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR. SIaHDA
The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:
Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit
any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection
against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application
relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although
sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of
the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26
should be construed to include "sexual orientation." 48 Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies
have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various
international agreements. 49
The UDHR provides:
Article 21.
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives.
Likewise, the ICCPR states:
Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the
distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely
chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be
by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the
free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his
country.
As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to electoral
participation is elaborated by the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 25
(Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows:
1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every
citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and to be elected
and the right to have access to public service. Whatever form of constitution or
government is in force, the Covenant requires States to adopt such legislative and
other measures as may be necessary to ensure that citizens have an effective
opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic
government based on the consent of the people and in conformity with the
principles of the Covenant.
xxx xxx xxx
15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand
for elective office ensures that persons entitled to vote have a free choice of
candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand for election, such as minimum age,
must be justifiable on objective and reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise
eligible to stand for election should not be excluded by unreasonable or
discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or descent, or by reason
 of political affiliation. No person should suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any
kind because of that person's candidacy. States parties should indicate and explain
the legislative provisions which exclude any group or category of persons from
elective office. 50

We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of
giving effect to the Philippines' international law obligations, the blanket invocation of international law
is not the panacea for all social ills. We refer now to the petitioner's invocation of the Yogyakarta
Principles (the Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and
Gender Identity), 51 which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms
that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said
Principles which are not reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find basis in any
of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice. 52 Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged
principles of international law to ascertain their true status. ATDHSC
We also hasten to add that not everything that society — or a certain segment of society —
wants or demands is automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may
be added to or subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate that much of what passes for human rights
today is a much broader context of needs that identifies many social desires as rights in order to
further claims that international law obliges states to sanction these innovations. This has the effect of
diluting real human rights, and is a result of the notion that if "wants" are couched in "rights" language,
then they are no longer controversial.
Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a
declaration formulated by various international law professors, are — at best — de lege ferenda —
and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary
international law is characterized by the "soft law" nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of
principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of
which amount to no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of either State practice
or opinio juris. 53
As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case are
emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and religious communities are
divided in opinion. This Court's role is not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to
apply the Constitution and laws as best as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the
knowledge that our democracy is resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of
the Commission on Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228
(PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioner's
application for party-list accreditation.
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 80391. February 28, 1989.]
SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, petitioner, vs. CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC
ALI, SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD TOMAWIS, GERRY
TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO PALOMARES,
JR.,RAKIL DAGALANGIT, and BIMBO SINSUAT, respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Office for petitioner.
Makabangkit B. Lanto for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; AUTONOMOUS REGIONS OF MINDANAO UNDER P.D. 1618;
SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK; EXPULSION OF MEMBER; INVALID FOR LACK OF DUE PROCESS. —
We hold that the expulsion in question is of no force and effect. In the first place, there is no showing that the
Sanggunian had conducted an investigation, and whether or not the petitioner had been heard in his
defense, assuming that there was an investigation, or otherwise given the opportunity to do so. On the other
hand, what appears in the records is an admission by the Assembly (at least, the respondents) that "since
November, 1987 up to this writing, the petitioner has not set foot at the Sangguniang Pampook." To be sure,
the private respondents aver that "[t]he Assemblymen, in a conciliatory gesture, wanted him to come to
Cotabato City," but that was "so that their differences could be threshed out and settled." Certainly, that
avowed wanting or desire to thresh out and settle, no matter how conciliatory it may be cannot be a
substitute for the notice and hearing contemplated by law. While we have held that due process, as the term
is known in administrative law, does not absolutely require notice and that a party need only be given the
opportunity to be heard, it does not appear herein that the petitioner had, to begin with, been made aware
that he had in fact stood charged of graft and corruption before his colleagues. It cannot be said therefore
that he was accorded any opportunity to rebut their accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now
levelled amount to mere accusations that cannot warrant expulsion.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT JUSTIFIED; NO ONE SHOULD BE PUNISHED FOR SEEKING REDRESS IN
THE COURT. — The resolution appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by the other Assemblymen
against the petitioner arising from what the former perceive to be obduracy on the part of the latter. Indeed,
it (the resolution) speaks of "a case [having been filed] [by the petitioner] before the Supreme Court . . . on
question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly — an act which some
members claimed unnecessarily and unduly assails their integrity and character as representative of the
people," an act that cannot possibly justify expulsion. Access to judicial remedies is guaranteed by the
Constitution, and, unless the recourse amounts to malicious prosecution, no one may be punished for
seeking redress in the courts.
3. ID.;ID.;ID.;POWER TO DISCIPLINE ITS MEMBERS; SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW IN CASE OF
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. — Reinstatement is in order with the caution that should the past acts of
the petitioner indeed warrant his removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so minded, to
commence proper proceedings therefor in line with the most elementary requirements of due process. And
while it is within the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts
are nonetheless subject to the moderating hand of this Court in the event that such discretion is exercised
with grave abuse.
4. ID.; ID.; EXTENT OF SELF-GOVERNMENT GRANTED THERETO. — The autonomous governments of
Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by Presidential Decree No. 1618 promulgated on July 25,
1979. Among other things, the Decree established "internal autonomy" in the two regions "[w]ithin the
framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and
its Constitution," "with legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities"'
specified therein. It requires the autonomous regional governments to "undertake all internal administrative
matters for the respective regions," except to "act on matters which are within the jurisdiction and
competence of the National Government," "which include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) National
defense and security; (2) Foreign relations; (3) Foreign trade; (4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign
exchange, banking and quasi-banking, and external borrowing, (5) Disposition, exploration, development,
exploitation or utilization of all natural resources; (6) Air and sea transport; (7) Postal matters and
telecommunications; (8) Customs and quarantine; (9) Immigration and deportation; (10) Citizenship and
naturalization; (11) National economic, social and educational planning; and (12) General auditing." In
relation to the central government, it provides that "[t]he President shall have the power of general
supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions . . .
5. ID.; ID.; ID. — An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of
Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in
which the central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first
place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over
Autonomous Regions." In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to
discharge chiefly administrative services.
6. ID.;LOCAL AUTONOMY; DECENTRALIZATION OF ADMINISTRATION DISTINGUISHED FROM
DECENTRALIZATION OF POWER. — Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power
and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national
development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises
"general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He
has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local
governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its
own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a
constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the
autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.
7. ID.; LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. — Under the 1987
Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two senses, thus: Section 1. The territorial
and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter
provided. Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy . . . Sec. 15. There shall
be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage,
economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution
and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. An autonomous
government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X sec. 15.] is subject alone to
the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On
the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the Razul, Pampook Speaker of Region XI, Zamboanga City and the petitioner in his
national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). capacity as Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII, in a letter which reads:

8. ID.; AUTONOMOUS REGIONS OF MINDANAO UNDER P.D. 1618; SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK;
"RECESS" CALLED BY THE SPEAKER HELD AS VALID. — It is true that under Section 31 of the Region
XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the
Sangguniang Pampook," but it provides likewise that "the Speaker may, on [sic] his discretion, declare a
recess of short intervals." Of course, there is disagreement between the protagonists as to whether or not
the recess called by the petitioner effective November 1 through 15, 1987 is the "recess of short intervals"
referred to; the petitioner says that it is while the respondents insist that, to all intents and purposes, it was
an adjournment and that "recess" as used by their Rules only refers to "a recess when arguments get
heated up so that protagonists in a debate can talk things out informally and obviate dissension [sic] and
disunity." The Court agrees with the respondents on this regard, since clearly, the Rules speak of "short
intervals." Secondly, the Court likewise agrees that the Speaker could not have validly called a recess since
the Assembly had yet to convene on November 1, the date session opens under the same Rules. Hence,
there can be no recess to speak of that could possibly interrupt any session. But while this opinion is in
accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the
petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could do so. In the second place,
the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a
plausible reason for the intermission sought. Thirdly, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it
does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they
opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances,
we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.
The Committee on Muslim Affairs will undertake consultations and
dialogues with local government officials, civic, religious organizations
and traditional leaders on the recent and present political developments
and other issues affecting Regions IX and XII.
The result of the conference, consultations and dialogues would hopefully
chart the autonomous governments of the two regions as envisioned and
may prod the President to constitute immediately the Regional
Consultative Commission as mandated by the Commission. LLphil
You are requested to invite some members of the Pampook Assembly of
your respective assembly on November 1 to 15, 1987, with venue at the
Congress of the Philippines.
Your presence, unstinted support and cooperation is (sic) indispensable.
5. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to Acting Secretary
Johnny Alimbuyao of the Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that there shall be no
session in November as "our presence in the house committee hearing of confess
take (sic) precedence over any pending business in batasang pampook ..."
6. In compliance with the aforesaid instruction of the petitioner, Acting Secretary
Alimbuyao sent to the members of the Assembly the following telegram:

TRANSMITTING FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM SPEAKER LIMBONA QUOTE
CONGRESSMAN JIMMY MATALAM CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE
DECISION
COMMITTEE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS REQUESTED ME TO ASSIST
SAID COMMITTEE IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED
AUTONOMY ORGANIC NOV. 1ST TO 15. HENCE WIRE ALL
ASSEMBLYMEN THAT THERE SHALL BE NO SESSION IN
SARMIENTO,J p: NOVEMBER AS OUR PRESENCE IN THE HOUSE COMMITTEE
HEARING OF CONGRESS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ANY
The acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII are assailed in this petition. The antecedent facts are PENDING BUSINESS IN BATASANG PAMPOOK OF MATALAM
as follows: FOLLOWS UNQUOTE REGARDS.

1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was appointed as 7. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's
a member of the Sangguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government, advice, with the following assemblymen present:
Region XII, representing Lanao del Sur.
1. Sali, Salic
2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative
Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly for brevity). 2. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)

3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members. Two of said members, 3. Dagalangit, Rakil
respondents Acmad Tomawis and Rakil Dagalangit, filed on March 23, 1987 with
the Commission on Elections their respective certificates of candidacy in the May 11, 4. Dela Fuente, Antonio
1987 confessional elections for the district of Lanao del Sur but they later withdrew 5. Mangelen, Conte
from the aforesaid election and thereafter resumed again their positions as
members of the Assembly. 6. Ortiz, Jesus
4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the 7. Palomares, Diego
Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier
 8. Sinsuat, Bimbo Twelve (12) members voted in favor of the motion to declare the seat of
the Speaker vacant; one abstained and none voted against. 1
9. Tomawis, Acmad
Accordingly, the petitioner prays for judgment as follows:
10. Tomawis, Jerry
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that —
After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized
to preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all (a) This Petition be given due course;
Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative, hence, the chair declared said
seat of the Speaker vacant. (b) Pending hearing, a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued
enjoining respondents from proceeding with their session to be held on November 5,
8. On November 5, 1987, the session of the Assembly resumed with the following 1987, and on any day thereafter;
Assemblymen present:
(c) After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by
1. Mangelen Conte — Presiding Officer respondents of their session on November 2, 1987 as null and void;

2. Ali Salic (d) Holding the election of petitioner as Speaker of said Legislative Assembly or
Batasan Pampook, Region XII held on March 12, 1987 valid and subsisting, and(e)
3. Ali Salindatu Making the injunction permanent. llcd
4. Aratuc, Malik Petitioner likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable. 2
5. Cajelo, Rene Pending further proceedings, this Court, on January 19, 1988, received a resolution filed by the
Sangguniang Pampook "EXPELLING ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA FROM MEMBERSHIP OF THE
6. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)
SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK, AUTONOMOUS REGION XII," 3 on the grounds, among other things, that
7. Dagalangit, Rakil the petitioner "had caused to be prepared and signed by him paying [sic] the salaries and emoluments of
Odin Abdula, who was considered resigned after filing his Certificate of Candidacy for Congressmen for the
8. Dela Fuente, Antonio First District of Maguindanao in the last May 11, elections ...and nothing in the record of the Assembly will
show that any request for reinstatement by Abdula was ever made ..." 4 and that "such action of
9. Ortiz, Jesus Mr. Limbona in paying Abdula his salaries and emoluments without authority from the
Assembly ...constituted a usurpation of the power of the Assembly," 5 that the petitioner "had recently
10. Palamares, Diego
caused withdrawal of so much amount of cash from the Assembly resulting to the non-payment of the
11. Quijano, Jesus salaries and emoluments of some Assembly [sic]," 6 and that he had "filed before the Supreme Court
against some members of Assembly on question which should have been resolved within the confines of
12. Sinsuat, Bimbo the Assembly," 7 for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and
academic".8
13. Tomawis, Acmad
The first question, evidently, is whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation) has made
14. Tomawis, Jerry the case moot and academic.
An excerpt from the debates and proceeding of said session reads: We do not agree that the case has been rendered moot and academic by reason simply of the expulsion
resolution so issued. For, if the petitioner's expulsion was done purposely to make this petition moot and
HON. DAGALANGIT: Mr. Speaker, Honorable Members of the House,
academic, and to preempt the Court, it will not make it academic. LLjur
with the presence of our colleagues who have come to attend the session
today, I move to call the names of the newcomers in order for them to cast On the ground of the immutable principle of due process alone, we hold that the expulsion in question is of
their votes on the previous motion to declare the position of the Speaker no force and effect. In the first place, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had conducted an
vacant. But before doing so, I move also that the designation of the investigation, and whether or not the petitioner had been heard in his defense, assuming that there was an
Speaker Pro Tempore as the Presiding Officer and Mr. Johnny investigation, or otherwise given the opportunity to do so. On the other hand, what appears in the records is
Evangelista as Acting Secretary in the session last November 2, 1987 be an admission by the Assembly (at least, the respondents) that "since November, 1987 up to this writing, the
reconfirmed in today's session. petitioner has not set foot at the Sangguniang Pampook." 9 To be sure, the private respondents aver that
"[t]he Assemblymen, in a conciliatory gesture, wanted him to come to Cotabato City," 10 but that was "so
HON. SALIC ALI: I second the motions.
that their differences could be threshed out and settled." 11 Certainly, that avowed wanting or desire to
PRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or objections on the two motions thresh out and settle, no matter how conciliatory it may be cannot be a substitute for the notice and hearing
presented? The chair hears none and the said motions are approved. ... contemplated by law. LibLex
While we have held that due process, as the term is known in administrative law, does not absolutely
require notice and that a party need only be given the opportunity to be heard, 12 it does not appear herein
that the petitioner had, to begin with, been made aware that he had in fact stood charged of graft and
corruption before his colleagues. It cannot be said therefore that he was accorded any opportunity to rebut
their accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now levelled amount to mere accusations that cannot
warrant expulsion.
In the second place, the resolution appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by the other Assemblymen
against the petitioner arising from what the former perceive to be obduracy on the part of the latter. Indeed,
it (the resolution) speaks of "a case [having been filed] [by the petitioner] before the Supreme Court . . . on
question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly — an act which some
members claimed unnecessarily and unduly assails their integrity and character as representative of the
people," 13 an act that cannot possibly justify expulsion. Access to judicial remedies is guaranteed by the
Constitution, 14 and, unless the recourse amounts to malicious prosecution, no one may be punished for
seeking redress in the courts. llcd
We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of the petitioner indeed warrant
his removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so minded, to commence proper proceedings
therefor in line with the most elementary requirements of due process. And while it is within the discretion of
the members of the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts are nonetheless subject to the
moderating hand of this Court in the event that such discretion is exercised with grave abuse.
It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the Sangguniang Pampook(s) are "autonomous," the courts
may not rightfully intervene in their affairs, much less strike down their acts. We come, therefore, to the
second issue: Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted,
subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-government given
to the two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?
The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by Presidential Decree
No. 1618 15 promulgated on July 25, 1979. Among other things, the Decree established "internal
autonomy" 16 in the two regions "[w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution," 18 specified therein.
It requires the autonomous regional governments to "undertake all internal administrative matters for the
respective regions," 19 except to "act on matters which are within the jurisdiction and competence of the
National Government," 20 "which include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) National defense and security;
(2) Foreign relations;
(3) Foreign trade;
(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-banking, and
external borrowing,
(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all natural
resources;
(6) Air and sea transport;
(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;
(8) Customs and quarantine;
(9) Immigration and deportation;
(10) Citizenship and naturalization;
(11) National economic, social and educational planning; and
(12) General auditing." 21
In relation to the central government, it provides that "[t]he President shall have the power of general
supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions . . . 22
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local
governments "more responsive and accountable," 23 and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social
progress." 24 At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs
and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" 25 over
them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." 26 He has no control over
their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. 27
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local
governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its
own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a
constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the
autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency. 28
But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy to Muslim Mindanao under the 1987
Constitution involves, truly, an effort to decentralize power rather than mere administration is a question
foreign to this petition, since what is involved herein is a local government unit constituted prior to the
ratification of the present Constitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve that controversy now, in this case,
since no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the proper time and in the proper case. prcd
Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two senses, thus:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines
are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. 29
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. 30
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of
thisConstitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines. 31
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X sec. 15.] is
subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of
"autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the
supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local
Government). 32 If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its
acts are, debatably, beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of
the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category
only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction.
An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao
persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the
central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place,
mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous
Regions." 33 In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge
chiefly administrative services, thus:
SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook.— The Sangguniang Pampook shall
exercise local legislative powers over regional affairs within the framework of
national development plans, policies and goals, in the following areas:
(1) Organization of regional administrative system;
(2) Economic, social and cultural development of the Autonomous Region;
(3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for the Autonomous Region;
[sic] his discretion, declare a recess of "short intervals." 36 Of course, there is disagreement between the
protagonists as to whether or not the recess called by the petitioner effective November 1 through 15, 1987
is the "recess of short intervals" referred to; the petitioner says that it is while the respondents insist that, to
all intents and purposes, it was an adjournment and that "recess" as used by their Rules only refers to "a
recess when arguments get heated up so that protagonists in a debate can talk things out informally and
obviate dissension [sic] and disunity." 37 The Court agrees with the respondents on this regard, since
clearly, the Rules speak of "short intervals." Secondly, the Court likewise agrees that the Speaker could not
have validly called a recess since the Assembly had yet to convene on November 1, the date session opens
under the same Rules. 38 Hence, there can be no recess to speak of that could possibly interrupt any
session. But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in
question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he
could do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of
Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Thirdly, assuming that a valid
recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What
appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny.
Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the
ground of good faith.

(4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous Region;

(5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region;
(6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as provided for in this Decree;
(7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools established by the
Autonomous Region;
(8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health, welfare and other social
services, programs and facilities;
(9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions languages and culture
indigenous to the Autonomous Region; and
It does not appear to us, moreover, that the petitioner had resorted to the aforesaid "recess" in order to
forestall the Assembly from bringing about his ouster. This is not apparent from the pleadings before us. We
are convinced that the invitation was what precipitated it. llcd
In holding that the "recess" in question is valid, we are not to be taken as establishing a precedent, since, as
we said, a recess can not be validly declared without a session having been first opened. In upholding the
petitioner herein, we are no him a carte blanche to order recesses in the future in violation of the Rules, or
otherwise to prevent the lawful meetings thereof.
Neither are we, by this disposition, discouraging the Sanggunian from reorganizing itself pursuant to its
lawful prerogatives. Certainly, it can do so at the proper time. In the event that he petitioner should initiate
obstructive moves, the Court is certain that it is armed with enough coercive remedies to thwart them. 39

(10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law, including the enactment of In view hereof, we find no need in dwelling on the issue of quorum.
such measures as may be necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII, is
people in the Autonomous Region.
ENJOINED to (1) REINSTATE the petitioner as Member, Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII; and (2)
The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to assure that REINSTATE him as Speaker thereof. No costs.
enactment and acts of the Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong
Tagapagpaganap ng Pook are in compliance with this Decree, national legislation, SO ORDERED.
policies, plans and programs.
||| (Limbona v. Mangelin, G.R. No. 80391, [February 28, 1989], 252 PHIL 813-830)
The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the Batasang Pambansa. 34

Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question,
with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker. Cdpr

Briefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his ouster as Speaker on the grounds that: (1) the Sanggunian,
in convening on November 2 and 5, 1987 (for the sole purpose of declaring the office of the Speaker
vacant),did so in violation of the Rules of the Sangguniang Pampook since the Assembly was then on
recess; and (2) assuming that it was valid, his ouster was ineffective nevertheless for lack of quorum.

Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that
under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned
except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook," 35 but it provides likewise that "the Speaker may, on
 EN BANC Milaor Camaligan

Naga Magarao
[G.R. No. 189793. April 7, 2010.]
Pili Bombon

SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE Ocampo Calabanga
ROBREDO, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its
3rd District Caramoan Sangay 372,548
Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS Garchitorena San Jose
R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO LARRAZABAL, respondents.
Goa Tigaon

Lagonoy Tinamba
DECISION
Presentacion Siruma

4th District Iriga Buhi 429,070

PEREZ, J p: Baao Bula

Balatan Nabua
This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In this original action, petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon Bato
C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the
nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the
Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur
and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment." Petitioners Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of
consequently pray that the respondent Commission on Elections be restrained from making any Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province.
issuances and from taking any steps relative to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San
Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by second legislative district. The following table 3 illustrates the reapportionment made by Republic Act
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on31 October 2009, or fifteen
No. 9716: AIaSTE
(15) days following its publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation. 1 In
substance, the said law created an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by District Municipalities/Cities Population
reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.
Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a
population of 1,693,821, 2 distributed among four (4) legislative districts in this wise: 1st District Del Gallego 176,383
District Municipalities/Cities Population Ragay

Lupi
1st District Del Gallego Libmanan 417,304 Sipocot
Ragay Minalabac Cabusao
Lupi Pamplona 2nd District Libmanan San Fernando 276,777
Sipocot Pasacao Minalabac Gainza
Cabusao San Fernando Pamplona Milaor
2nd District Gainza Canaman 474,899 Pasacao
3rd District Naga Camaligan 439,043 (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at
(formerly 2nd Pili Magarao least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative. DIcSHE
District) Ocampo Bombon
(4) . . . (Emphasis supplied).
Canaman Calabanga
The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the above-cited provision is the
4th District Caramoan Sangay 372,548 minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district. 7 The petitioners theorize that,
save in the case of a newly created province, each legislative district created by Congress must be
(formerly 3rd Garchitorena San Jose
supported by a minimum population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid. 8 Under this view, existing
District) Goa Tigaon legislative districts may be reapportioned and severed to form new districts, provided each resulting
district will represent a population of at least 250,000. On the other hand, if the reapportionment would
Lagonoy Tinamba result in the creation of a legislative seat representing a populace of less than 250,000 inhabitants, the
reapportionment must be stricken down as invalid for non-compliance with the minimum population
Presentacion Siruma requirement.

5th District Iriga Buhi 429,070
(formerly 4th Baao Bula
District) Balatan Nabua
Bato
Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual recitals by both parties of the
origins of the bill that became the law show that, from the filing of House Bill No. 4264 until its approval
by the Senate on a vote of thirteen (13) in favor and two (2) against, the process progressed step by
step, marked by public hearings on the sentiments and position of the local officials of Camarines
Sur on the creation of a new congressional district, as well as argumentation and debateon the issue,
now before us, concerning the stand of the oppositors of the bill that a population of at least 250,000 is
required by the Constitution for such new district. 4
Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval of the Bill by
the Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City, which was a part of the former
second district from which the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were taken for inclusion in the new
second district. No other local executive joined the two; neither did the representatives of the former
third and fourth districts of the province.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs
afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. 5 The petitioners claim that the
reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is
unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000
or only 176,383.
Petitioners rely on Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited
250,000 minimum population standard. 6 The provision reads:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) . . .
(2) . . .
In support of their theory, the petitioners point to what they claim is the intent of the framers
of the 1987 Constitution to adopt a population minimum of 250,000 in the creation of additional
legislative seats. 9 The petitioners argue that when the Constitutional Commission fixed the original
number of district seats in the House of Representatives to two hundred (200), they took into account
the projected national population of fifty five million (55,000,000) for the year 1986. 10According to the
petitioners, 55 million people represented by 200 district representatives translates to roughly 250,000
people for every one (1) representative. 11Thus, the 250,000 population requirement found in Section
5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is actually based on the population constant used by the
Constitutional Commission in distributing the initial 200 legislative seats.
Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning legislative districts independently from
the creation of a province, Congress is bound to observe a 250,000 population threshold, in the same
manner that the Constitutional Commission did in the original apportionment.
Verbatim, the submission is that:
1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first district
of Camarines Sur failed to meet the population requirement for the
creation of the legislative district as explicitly provided in Article VI,
Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended thereto; and
2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional representation as
provided in Article VI, Section 5 paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) of the
Constitution. 12
The provision subject of this case states:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall
be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations. EaHcDS
(2) . . .
 (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress
shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards
provided in this section.
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, seek the
dismissal of the present petition based on procedural and substantive grounds.
On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are guilty of two (2) fatal
technical defects: first, petitioners committed an error in choosing to assail the constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 9716 via the remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court; and second, the petitioners have no locus standi to question the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 9716.
On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent distinction between
cities and provinces drawn by Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The respondents
concede the existence of a 250,000 population condition, but argue that a plain and simple reading of
the questioned provision will show that the same has no application with respect to the creation of
legislative districts in provinces. 13 Rather, the 250,000 minimum population is only a requirement for
the creation of a legislative district in a city.
In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a fixed population requirement for the
reapportionment of districts in provinces. Therefore, Republic Act No. 9716, which only creates an
additional legislative district within the province of Camarines Sur, should be sustained as a perfectly
valid reapportionment law.
We first pass upon the threshold issues.
The respondents assert that by choosing to avail themselves of the remedies
of Certiorari and Prohibition, the petitioners have committed a fatal procedural lapse. The respondents
cite the following reasons: EHITaS
1. The instant petition is bereft of any allegation that the respondents had acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
2. The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be directed against a tribunal,
board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial functions. Respondents maintain that in
implementing Republic Act No. 9716, they were not acting as a judicial or
quasi-judicial body, nor were they engaging in the performance of a
ministerial act.
3. The petitioners could have availed themselves of another plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Considering that the main
thrust of the instant petition is the declaration of unconstitutionality
of Republic Act No. 9716, the same could have been ventilated through
apetition for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court has only
appellate, not original jurisdiction.
The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners had failed to show that they had
sustained, or is in danger of sustaining any substantial injury as a result of the implementation
of Republic Act No. 9716. The respondents, therefore, conclude that the petitioners lack the required
legal standing to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
This Court has paved the way away from procedural debates when confronted with issues
that, by reason of constitutional importance, need a direct focus of the arguments on their content and
substance.
The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the application of
procedural rules, 14 as well as relaxed the requirement of locus standiwhenever confronted with an
important issue of overreaching significance to society. 15
Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) 16 and Jaworski v. PAGCOR, 17 this Court sanctioned momentary
deviation from the principle of the hierarchy of courts, and took original cognizance of cases raising
issues of paramount public importance. The Jaworski case ratiocinates: CAaSED
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a
petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in
this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised
herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this
nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that
rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather
than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis
supplied)
Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled in Kilosbayan v.
Guingona, 18 Tatad v. Executive Secretary, 19 Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority 20 and Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, 21 just to name a few, that absence
of direct injury on the part of the party seeking judicial review may be excused when the latter is able to
craft an issue of transcendental importance. In Lim v. Executive Secretary, 22 this Court held that in
cases of transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely, and so, the
standing requirements may be relaxed. This liberal stance has been echoed in the more recent
decision on Chavez v. Gonzales. 23
Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing principles must
apply. The beaten path must be taken. We go directly to the determination of whether or not a
population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
legislative district in a province.
We deny the petition.
We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption
of constitutionality. 24 Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a
clear showing that a specific provision of the fundamental law has been violated or transgressed.
When there is neither a violation of a specific provision of the Constitution nor any proof showing that
there is such a violation, the presumption of constitutionality will prevail and the law must be upheld.
To doubt is to sustain. 25
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population
that must compose a legislative district. TaCDIc
As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the
Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district.
 The second sentence of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly
provides: "Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a
district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district onthe other. For while a province is
entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a
population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other
conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a
province. 26
Plainly read, Section 5 (3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population
only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities was, in turn,
the subject of interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v.COMELEC. 27
In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854, which
was the law that converted the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City. As it
happened, Republic Act No. 7854 created an additional legislative district for Makati, which at that
time was a lone district. The petitioners in that case argued that the creation of an additional district
would violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution, because the resulting districts would be
supported by a population of less than 250,000, considering that Makati had a total population of only
450,000. The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the law and the validity of the newly
created district, explaining the operation of the Constitutional phrase "each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand," to wit:DTEScI
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the
latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred
fifty thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one
representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990
census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district
may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement
of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population
has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be
entitled to at least one congressional representative. 28 (Emphasis supplied)
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement
for cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative,
it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of
an additional district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if
an additional legislative district created within a city is not required to represent a population of at least
250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional district in a province,
considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and
regardless of its population.
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a
province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section
461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. — (a) A province may be created if it has an
average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than
Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of
the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau;
or DTAcIa
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely
an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.
Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran through the
deliberations on the words and meaning of Section 5 of Article VI.
The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at least two hundred fifty
thousand" may be gleaned from the records of the ConstitutionalCommission which, upon framing the
provisions of Section 5 of Article VI, proceeded to form an ordinance that would be appended to the
final document. The Ordinance is captioned "APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA
AREA." Such records would show that the 250,000 population benchmark was used for the 1986
nationwide apportionment of legislative districts among provinces, cities and Metropolitan Manila.
Simply put, the population figure was used to determinehow many districts a province, city, or
Metropolitan Manila should have. Simply discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose, population
had to be the determinant. Even then, the requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not taken as an
absolute minimum for one legislative district. And, closer to the point herein at issue, in the
determination of the precise district within the province to which, through the use of the population
benchmark, so many districts have been apportioned, population as a factor was not the sole, though
it was among, several determinants.
From its journal, 29 we can see that the Constitutional Commission originally divided the
entire country into two hundred (200) districts, which corresponded to the original number of district
representatives. The 200 seats were distributed by the Constitutional Commission in this
manner: first, one (1) seat each was given to the seventy-three (73) provinces and the ten (10) cities
with a population of at least 250,000; 30 second, the remaining seats were then redistributed among
the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Area "in accordance with the number of their
inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio." 31 Commissioner Davide, who later
became a Member and then Chief Justice of the Court, explained this in his sponsorship remark 32 for
the Ordinance to be appended to the 1987 Constitution:
Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of
legislative seats which are, in turn, apportioned among provinces and cities with a
population of at least 250,000 and the Metropolitan Area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio. The population is based on the 1986 projection, with the 1980 official
enumeration as the point of reckoning. This projection indicates that our population
is more or less 56 million. Taking into account the mandate that each city with at
 least 250,000 inhabitants and each province shall have at least one
representative, we first allotted one seat for each of the 73 provinces, and
each one for all cities with a population of at least 250,000, which are the
Cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de
Oro, Davao and Zamboanga. Thereafter, we then proceed[ed] to increase
whenever appropriate the number of seats for the provinces and cities in
accordance with the number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio. (Emphasis supplied). cEAIHa
Thus was the number of seats computed for each province and city. Differentiated from this,
the determination of the districts within the province had to consider "all protests and complaints
formally received" which, the records show, dealt with determinants other than population as already
mentioned.
Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the Constitutional Commission narrates:
INTERPELLATION OF MR. NOLLEDO:
Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including Puerto Princesa in the
northern towns when it was more affinity with the southern town of Aborlan,
Batarasa, Brooke's Point, Narra, Quezon and Marcos. He stated that the First
District has a greater area than the Second District. He then queried whether
population was the only factor considered by the Committee in redistricting.
Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the Committee took into
account the standards set in Section 5 of the Article on the Legislative Department,
namely: 1) the legislative seats should be apportioned among the provinces and
cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with their inhabitants on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio; and 2) the legislative district must be
compact, adjacent and contiguous.
Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not met when Puerto
Princesa was included with the northern towns. He then inquired what is the
distance between Puerto Princesa from San Vicente.
xxx xxx xxx
Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa has a population of
75,480 and based on the apportionment, its inclusion with the northern towns would
result in a combined population of 265,000 as against only 186,000 for the south. He
added that Cuyo and Coron are very important towns in the northern part of
Palawan and, in fact, Cuyo was the capital of Palawan before its transfer to Puerto
Princesa. He also pointed out that there are more potential candidates in the north
and therefore if Puerto Princesa City and the towns of Cuyo and Coron are lumped
together, there would be less candidates in the south, most of whose inhabitants are
not interested in politics. He then suggested that Puerto Princesa be included in the
south or the Second District.
Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered during the
period of amendments. He requested that the COMELEC staff study said
proposal. 33
"PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO
On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that it was
explained in the interpellations that District I has a total population of 265,358
including the City of Puerto Princesa, while the Second District has a total
population of 186,733. He proposed, however, that Puerto Princesa be included in
the Second District in order to satisfy the contiguity requirement in the
Constitution considering that said City is nearer the southern towns comprising the
Second District. DEIHAa
In reply to Mr. Monsod's query, Mr. Nolledo explained that with the
proposed transfer of Puerto Princesa City to the Second District, the First District
would only have a total population of 190,000 while the Second District would have
262,213, and there would be no substantial changes.
Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledo's proposal to insert Puerto Princesa City
before the Municipality of Aborlan.
There being no objection on the part of the Members the same was
approved by the Body.
APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING OF PALAWAN
There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being
no objection, the apportionment and districting for the province of Palawan was
approved by the Body. 34
The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000 population figure. It was decided by the
importance of the towns and the city that eventually composed the districts.
Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further narrates:
At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regalado made a
reservation with the Committee for the possible reopening of the approval of Region
I with respect to Benguet and Baguio City.
REMARKS OF MR. REGALADO
Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the Committee, Baguio City
and Tuba are placed in one district. He stated that he was toying with the idea that,
perhaps as a special consideration for Baguio because it is the summer capital of
the Philippines, Tuba could be divorced from Baguio City so that it could, by itself,
have its own constituency and Tuba could be transferred to the Second District
together with Itogon. Mr. Davide, however, pointed out that the population of Baguio
City is only 141,149.
Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of Baguio may be lower
during certain times of the year, but the transient population would increase the
population substantially and, therefore, for purposes of business and professional
transactions, it is beyond question that population-wise, Baguio would more than
qualify, not to speak of the official business matters, transactions and offices that are
also there. cSTCDA
Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Lima's statement that unless Tuba and
Baguio City are united, Tuba will be isolated from the rest of Benguet as the place
can only be reached by passing through Baguio City. He stated that the Committee
would submit the matter to the Body.
 Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on his amendment, Mr.
Regalado stated that the Body should have a say on the matter and that the
considerations he had given are not on the demographic aspects but on the fact
that Baguio City is the summer capital, the venue and situs of many government
offices and functions.
On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the Body approved the
reconsideration of the earlier approval of the apportionment and districting of Region
I, particularly Benguet.
Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the
amendment of Mr. Regalado was put to a vote. With 14 Members voting in favor and
none against, the amendment was approved by the Body.
Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of the amendment,
Benguet with Baguio City will have two seats. The First District shall comprise of the
municipalities of Mankayan, Buguias, Bakun, Kabayan, Kibungan, Bokod, Atok,
Kapangan, Tublay, La Trinidad, Sablan, Itogon and Tuba. The Second District shall
comprise of Baguio City alone.
There being no objection, the Body approved the apportionment and
districting of Region I. 35
Quite emphatically, population was explicitly removed as a factor.
It may be additionally mentioned that the province of Cavite was divided into districts
based on the distribution of its three cities, with each district having a city: one district "supposed to be
a fishing area; another a vegetable and fruit area; and the third, a rice growing area," because such
consideration "fosters common interests in line with the standard of compactness." 36 In the districting
of Maguindanao, among the matters discussed were "political stability and common interest among
the people in the area" and the possibility of "chaos and disunity" considering the "accepted regional,
political, traditional and sectoral leaders." 37 For Laguna, it was mentioned that municipalities in the
highland should not be grouped with the towns in the lowland. For Cebu, Commissioner Maambong
proposed that they should "balance the area and population." 38
Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district apportionment, we
stated in Bagabuyo v. COMELEC 39 that: TcSHaD
. . . Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of
the districts. The Constitution, however, does not require mathematical
exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of
representation. . . . . To ensure quality representation through commonality of
interests and ease of access by the representative to the constituents, all that the
Constitution requires is that every legislative district should comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. (Emphasis supplied).
This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the uncompromising stand of
petitioner that an additional provincial legislative district, which does not have at least a 250,000
population is not allowed by the Constitution.
The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear lesson.
Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution can, the
petition find support. And the formulation of the Ordinance in the implementation of the provision, nay,
even the Ordinance itself, refutes the contention that a population of 250,000 is a constitutional sine
qua non for the formation of an additional legislative district in a province, whose population growth
has increased beyond the 1986 numbers.
Translated in the terms of the present case:
1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of
1,693,821 in 2007 is — based on the formula and constant number of 250,000 used
by the Constitutional Commission in nationally apportioning legislative districts
among provinces and cities — entitled to two (2) districts in addition to the four (4)
that it was given in the 1986 apportionment. Significantly,
petitioner Aquino concedes this point. 40 In other words, Section 5 of Article VI as
clearly written allows and does not prohibit an additional district for the Province of
Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic Act No. 9786;
2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on the
protests and complaints against strict conformity with the population standard, and
more importantly based on the final districting in the
Ordinance on considerations other than population, the reapportionment or the
recomposition of the first and second legislative districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a new legislative district is valideven
if the population of the new district is 176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted upon by
the petitioners. EcIaTA
3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No. 4264,
were:
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped
municipalities;
(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the
discussion from the reconfigured District One; and
(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the
redistricting of Districts One and Two. 41
Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with the increased
population of the erstwhile Districts One and Two, point to the utter absence of abuse of discretion,
much less grave abuse of discretion, 42 that would warrant the invalidation of Republic Act No. 9716.
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of the first and
second legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting additional
district should not be considered. Our ruling is that population is not the only factor but is just one of
several other factors in the composition of the additional district. Such settlement is in accord with both
the text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the Constitutional
debates on the exact issue presented by this petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the
Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such
Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.
SO ORDERED.
 Corona, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del
Castillo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Puno, C.J., I join the dissenting opinion of J. Carpio.
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Carpio Morales, J., please see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Brion, J., I join opinion of J. CC Morales.
Abad, J., is on official leave.
Villarama, Jr., J., I join Justice Morales' concurring and dissenting opinion.
||| (Aquino III v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189793, [April 7, 2010], 631 PHIL 595-652)
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 188078. January 25, 2010.]
VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G. MORADA,
and
MINERVA ALDABA MORADA, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ONELECTIONS, r
espondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9591
(RA 9591), creating a legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan, for violating the minimum
population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.
Antecedents
Before 1 May 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through four
legislative districts. The First Legislative District comprised of the city of Malolos 1 and the
municipalities of Hagonoy, Calumpit, Pulilan, Bulacan, and Paombong. On 1 May 2009, RA
9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos' City Charter, 2by creating a separate legislative district for
the city. At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591 were filed in Congress in 2007, namely, House Bill
No. 3162 (later converted to House Bill No. 3693) and Senate Bill No. 1986, the population of Malolos
City was 223,069. The population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no
dispute that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the
National Statistics Office (NSO) that "the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be
254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000." 3
Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of Malolos City, filed this petition
contending that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of
250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress as provided under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contended that
Congress' use of projected population is non-justiciable as it involves a determination on the "wisdom
of the standard adopted by the legislature to determine compliance with [a constitutional
requirement]." 4 DECSIT
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition and declare RA 9591 unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5
(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution.
The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have
"a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand." 5 The only issue here is whether the City of
Malolos has a population of at least 250,000, whether actual or projected, for the purpose of creating a
legislative district for the City of Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010 elections. If not, then RA
9591 creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos is unconstitutional.
House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated Certification of Regional Director Alberto N.
Miranda of Region III of the National Statistics Office (NSO) as authority that the population of the
City of Malolos "will be 254,030 by the year 2010." The Certification states that the population of
"Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291." The Certification further states that it was "issued
upon the request of Mayor Danilo A. Domingo of the City of Malolos in connection with the proposed
creation of Malolos City as a lone congressional district of the Province of Bulacan." 6
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic
projections, is without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to
issue the Certification. The Certification is also void on its face because based on its own growth rate
assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010. In addition,
intercensal demographic projections cannot be made for the entire year. In any event, a city whose
population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in the "immediately
following election" 7 after the attainment of the 250,000 population.
First, certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections
are declared official by the National Statistics Coordination
Board(NSCB). Second, certifications based on demographic projections can be issued only by the
NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Third,intercensal population projections
must be as of the middle of every year.
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 135 8 dated 6 November 1993 issued by President
Fidel V. Ramos provides:
SECTION 6. Guidelines on the Issuance of Certification of Population
sizes Pursuant to Section 7, 386, 442, 450, 452, and 461 of the New Local
Government Code. HEcaIC
(a) The National Statistics Office shall issue certification on data that it
has collected and processed as well as on statistics that it has estimated.
(b) For census years, certification on population size will be
based on actual population census counts; while for the intercensal years, the
certification will be made on the basis of a set of demographic projections or
estimates declared official by the National Statistical Coordination Board
(NSCB).
(c) Certification of population census counts will be made as of the
census reference date, such as May 1, 1990, while those of intercensal
population estimates will be as of middle of every year.
(d) Certification of population size based on projections may specify the
range within which the true count is deemed likely to fall. The range will correspond
to the official low and high population projections.
(e) The smallest geographic area for which a certification on population
size may be issued will be the barangay for census population counts, and the city
or municipality for intercensal estimates. If an LGU wants to conduct its own
population census, during off-census years, approval must be sought from the
 NSCB and the conduct must be under the technical supervision of NSO from
planning to data processing.
(f) Certifications of population size based on published census results
shall be issued by the Provincial Census Officers or by the Regional Census
Officers.Certifications based on projections or estimates, however, will be
issued by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda does not state that the demographic
projections he certified have been declared official by the NSCB. The records of this case do not also
show that the Certification of Regional Director Miranda is based on demographic projections
declared official by the NSCB. The Certification, which states that the population of Malolos "will be
254,030 by the year 2010," violates the requirement that intercensal demographic projections shall be
"as of the middle of every year." In addition, there is no showing that Regional Director Miranda has
been designated by the NSO Administrator as a certifying officer for demographic projections in
Region III. In the absence of such official designation, only the certification of the NSO Administrator
can be given credence by this Court.
Moreover, the Certification states that "the total population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1,
2000 is 175,291." The Certification also states that the population growth rate of Malolos is 3.78% per
year between 1995 and 2000. Based on a growth rate of 3.78% per year, the population of Malolos of
175,291 in 2000 will grow to only 241,550 in 2010. DcICEa
Also, the 2007 Census places the population of Malolos at 223,069 as of 1 August
2007. 9 Based on a growth rate of 3.78%, the population of Malolos will grow to only 248,365 as of 1
August 2010. Even if the growth rate is compounded yearly, the population of Malolos of
223,069 as of 1 August 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of 1 August 2010. 10
All these conflict with what the Certification states that the population of Malolos "will be
254,030 by the year 2010." Based on the Certification's own growth rate assumption, the population of
Malolos will be less than 250,000 before the 10 May 2010 elections. Incidentally, the NSO has no
published population projections for individual municipalities or cities but only for entire regions and
provinces. 11
Executive Order No. 135 cannot simply be brushed aside. The OSG, representing
respondent Commission on Elections, invoked Executive Order No. 135 in its Comment, thus:
Here, based on the NSO projection, "the population of the Municipality of
Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78
between 1995-2000." This projection issued by the authority of the NSO
Administrator is recognized under Executive Order No. 135 (The
Guidelines on the Issuance of Certification of Population Sizes), which states:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Certification of population size based on projections may
specify the range within which the true count is deemed likely to fall. The
range will correspond to the official low and high population projections.
xxx xxx xxx
(f) Certifications of population size based on published census
results shall be issued by the Provincial Census Officers or by the
Regional Census Officers. Certifications based on projections or
estimates, however, will be issued by the NSO Administrator or his
designated certifying officer. 12 (Emphasis supplied)
Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be
based on an official and credible source. That is why the OSG citedExecutive Order No. 135,
otherwise the population projection would be unreliable or speculative.
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution provides:
Any province that may be created, or any city whose population may
hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of
members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and
according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the
Constitution. . . . . (Emphasis supplied) ITCHSa
A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in the
"immediately following election." In short, a city must first attain the 250,000 population, and
thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city shall have a district representative. There is
no showing in the present case that the City of Malolos has attained or will attain a population
of 250,000, whether actual or projected, before the 10 May 2010 elections.
Clearly, there is no official record that the population of the City of Malolos will be at
least 250,000, actual or projected, prior to the 10 May 2010elections, the immediately following
election after the supposed attainment of such population. Thus, the City of Malolos is not
qualified to have a legislative district of its own under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
On the OSG's contention that Congress' choice of means to comply with the population
requirement in the creation of a legislative district is non-justiciable, suffice it to say that questions
calling for judicial determination of compliance with constitutional standards by other branches of the
government are fundamentally justiciable. The resolution of such questions falls within the checking
function of this Court under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government. 13
Even under the 1935 Constitution, this Court had already ruled, "The overwhelming weight
of authority is that district apportionment laws are subject to review by the courts." 14 Compliance with
constitutional standards on the creation of legislative districts is important because the "aim of
legislative apportionment is 'to equalize population and voting power among districts.'" 15
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We DECLARE Republic Act No.
9591 UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Carpio Morales, Brion, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., and Perez, JJ., concur.
Corona, Nachura, Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta and Bersamin, JJ., join the dissent of J.
Abad.
Velasco, Jr., J., took no part due to relationship.
Abad, J., see dissenting opinion.
Mendoza, J., is on leave.
||| (Aldaba v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188078, [January 25, 2010], 624 PHIL 805-823)
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 188078. March 15, 2010.]
VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G. MORADA,
and
MINERVA ALDABA MORADA, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ONELECTIONS, r
espondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J p:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration of
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) of the Decision dated 25 January 2010. 1
The COMELEC grounds its motion on the singular reason, already considered and rejected
in the Decision, that Congress' reliance on the Certification of Alberto N. Miranda (Miranda), Region III
Director, National Statistics Office (NSO), projecting Malolos City's population in 2010, is
non-justiciable. The COMELEC also calls attention to the other sources of Malolos City's population
indicators as of 2007 (2007 Census of Population — PMS 3 — Progress Enumeration Report) 2 and
as of 2008 (Certification of the City of Malolos' Water District, dated 31 July 2008, 3 and Certification of
the Liga ng Barangay, dated 22 August 2008) 4 which Congress allegedly used in enacting Republic
Act No. 9591 (RA 9591). The COMELEC extends its non-justiciability argument to these materials.
We find no reason to grant the motion.
First. It will not do for the COMELEC to insist that the reliability and authoritativeness of the
population indicators Congress used in enacting RA 9591 are non-justiciable. If laws creating
legislative districts are unquestionably within the ambit of this Court's judicial review power, 5 then
there is more reason to hold justiciable subsidiary questions impacting on their constitutionality, such
as their compliance with a specific constitutional limitation under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution that only cities with at least 250,000 constituents are entitled to representation in
Congress. To fulfill this obligation, the Court, of necessity, must inquire into the authoritativeness and
reliability of the population indicators Congress used to comply with the constitutional limitation. Thus,
nearly five decades ago, we already rejected claims of non-justiciability of an apportionment law
alleged to violate the constitutional requirement of proportional representation:
It is argued in the motion to reconsider, that since Republic Act
3040 improves existing conditions, this Court could perhaps, in the exercise of
judicial statesmanship, consider the question involved as purely political and
therefore non-justiciable. The overwhelming weight of authority is that district
apportionment laws are subject to review by the courts[:] TCDcSE
The constitutionality of a legislative apportionment act is a
judicial question, and not one which the court cannot consider on the
ground that it is a political question.
It is well settled that the passage of apportionment acts is not so
exclusively within the political power of the legislature as to preclude a court from
inquiring into their constitutionality when the question is properly brought before it.
It may be added in this connection, that the mere impact of the suit upon
the political situation does not render it political instead of judicial.
The alleged circumstance that this statute improves the present
set-up constitutes no excuse for approving a transgression of constitutional
limitations, because the end does not justify the means. Furthermore, there is
no reason to doubt that, aware of the existing inequality of representation, and
impelled by its sense of duty, Congress will opportunely approve remedial
legislation in accord with the precepts of the Constitution. 6 (Emphasis supplied;
internal citations omitted)
To deny the Court the exercise of its judicial review power over RA 9591 is to contend that
this Court has no power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government," a duty mandated under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. Indeed, if we
subscribe to the COMELEC's theory, this Court would be reduced to rubberstamping laws creating
legislative districts no matter how unreliable and non-authoritative the population indicators Congress
used to justify their creation. There can be no surer way to render meaningless the limitation in Section
5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. 7
Second. Under Executive Order No. 135 (EO 135), the population indicators Congress used
to measure Malolos City's compliance with the constitutional limitation are unreliable and
non-authoritative. On Miranda's Certification, (that the "projected population of the [City] of Malolos
will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78[%] between 1995 and 2000"),
this fell short of EO 135's requirements that (a) for intercensal years, the certification should
be based on a set of demographic projections and estimates declared official by the National
Statistical and Coordination Board (NSCB); (b) certifications onintercensal population estimates will
be as of the middle of every year; and (c) certifications based on projections or estimates must be
issued by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Further, using Miranda's own
growth rate assumption of 3.78%, Malolos City's population as of 1 August 2010 will only be 249,333,
below the constitutional threshold of 250,000 (using as base Malolos City's population as of 1 August
2007 which is 223,069). That Miranda issued his Certification "by authority of the NSO administrator"
does not make the document reliable as it neither makes Miranda the NSO Administrator's designated
certifying officer nor cures the Certification of its fatal defects for failing to use demographic projections
and estimates declared official by the NSCB or make the projection as of the middle of 2010.
Nor are the 2007 Census of Population — PMS 3 — Progress Enumeration Report, the
Certification of the City of Malolos' Water District, dated 31 July 2008 and the Certification of the Liga
ng Barangay, dated 22 August 2008, reliable because none of them qualifies as authoritative
population indicator under EO 135. The 2007 Census of Population — PMS 3 — Progress
Enumeration Report merely contains preliminary data on the population census of Bulacan which
were subsequently adjusted to reflect actual population as indicated in the 2007 Census results
(showing Malolos City's population at 223,069). The COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), adopts Malolos City's claim that the 2007 census for Malolos City was "sloped to
make it appear that come Year 2010, the population count for Malolos would still fall short of the
constitutional requirement." 8 This unbecoming attack by the government's chief counsel on the
integrity of the processes of the government's census authority has no place in our judicial system.
The OSG ought to know that absent convincing proof of so-called data "sloping," the NSO enjoys the
presumption of the regularity in the performance of its functions. CDHaET
 The Certification of the City of Malolos' Water District fares no better. EO 135 excludes from constitutional requirements of geographic unity and population floor, ensuring efficient representation
its ambit certifications from a public utility gathered incidentally in the course of pursuing its business. of the minimum mass of constituents.
To elevate the water district's so-called population census to the level of credibility NSO certifications
WHEREFORE, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of
enjoy is to render useless the existence of NSO. This will allow population data incidentally gathered
respondent Commission on Elections dated 22 February 2010 is DENIED WITH FINALITY. Let no
by electric, telephone, sewage, and other utilities to enter into legislative processes even though these
private entities are not in the business of generating statistical data and thus lack the scientific training, further pleadings be allowed.
experience and competence to handle, collate and process them. SO ORDERED.
Similarly, the Certification of the Liga ng Barangay is not authoritative because much like the ||| (Aldaba v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188078 (Resolution), [March 15, 2010], 629 PHIL
Malolos City Water District, the Liga ng Barangay is not authorized to conduct population census, 537-546)
much less during off-census years. The non-NSO entities EO 135 authorizes to conduct population
census are local government units(that is, province, city, municipality or barangay) subject to the prior
approval of the NSCB and under the technical supervision of the NSO from planning to data
processing. 9
By presenting these alternative population indicators with their widely divergent population
figures, 10 the COMELEC unwittingly highlighted the danger of relying on non-NSO authorized
certifications. EO 135's stringent standards ensuring reliability of population census cannot be diluted
as these data lie at the core of crucial government decisions and, in this case, the legislative function
of enforcing the constitutional mandate of creating congressional districts in cities with at least 250,000
constituents.
There can be no doubt on the applicability of EO 135 to test the constitutionality of RA 9591.
The COMELEC invoked EO 135 to convince the Court of the credibility and authoritativeness of
Miranda's certificate. 11 It is hardly alien for the Court to adopt standards contained in a parallel
statute to fill gaps in the law in the absence of an express prohibition. 12 Indeed, one is hard-pressed
to find any distinction, statistically speaking, on the reliability of an NSO certification of a city's
population for purposes of creating its legislative district and for purposes of converting it to a
highly-urbanized or an independent component city. 13 Congress itself confirms the wisdom and
relevance of EO 135's paradigm of privileging NSO certifications by mandating that compliance with
the population requirement in the creation and conversion of local government units shall be
proved exclusively by an NSO certification. 14 Unquestionably, representation in Congress is no less
important than the creation of local government units in enhancing our democratic institutions, thus
both processes should be subject to the same stringent standards.
Third. Malolos City is entitled to representation in Congress only if, before the 10 May
2010 elections, it breaches the 250,000 population mark following the mandate in Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution that "any city whose population may hereafter increase
to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at
least one Member." COMELEC neither alleged nor proved that Malolos City is in compliance with
Section 3 of the Ordinance. IDaEHC
Fourth. Aside from failing to comply with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution on the
population requirement, the creation by RA 9591 of a legislative district for Malolos City, carving
the city from the former First Legislative District, leaves the town of Bulacan isolated from the
rest of the geographic mass of that district. 15 This contravenes the requirement in Section 5 (3),
Article VI that each legislative district shall "comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact,
and adjacent territory." It is no argument to say, as the OSG does, that it was impracticable for
Congress to create a district with contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory because Malolos city lies
at the center of the First Legislative District. The geographic lay-out of the First Legislative District is
not an insuperable condition making compliance with Section 5 (3) impracticable. To adhere to the
constitutional mandate, and thus maintain fidelity to its purpose of ensuring efficient representation,
the practicable alternative for Congress was to include the municipality of Bulacan in Malolos City's
legislative district. Although unorthodox, the resulting contiguous and compact district fulfills the
 EN BANC On October 12, 2009, the President approved Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9716, 8 which
reapportioned the legislative districts in Camarines Sur in the following manner:EICSTa

[G.R. No. 207851. July 8, 2014.] District Before the Enactment of After the Enactment of

R.A. No. 9716 R.A. No. 9716

ANGEL G. NAVAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and NELSON
B. JULIA, respondents.
1st Libmanan, Minalabac, Del Gallego, Ragay, Lupi,

Pamplona, Pasacao, San Sipocot, Cabusao

DECISION
Fernando, Del Gallego,

Ragay, Lupi, Sipocot,

REYES, J p: Cabusao

A politician thinks of the next election —

a statesman of the next generation.
2nd Naga City, Pili, Ocampo, Libmanan, Minalabac,
- James Freeman Clarke, American preacher and author
Camaligan, Canaman, Pamplona, Pasacao, San
The Case
Magarao, Bombon, Fernando, Gainza, Milaor
A provincial board member cannot be elected and serve for more than three consecutive terms.
But then, the Court is now called upon to resolve the following questions. First. What are the consequences Calabanga, 9 Gainza,
to the provincial board member's eligibility to run for the same elective position if the legislative district,
which brought him or her to office to serve the first two consecutive terms, be reapportioned in such a way Milaor
that 8 out of its 10 town constituencies are carved out and renamed as another district? Second. Is the
provincial board member's election to the same position for the third and fourth time, but now in
representation of the renamed district, a violation of the three-term limit rule?
3rd Caramoan, Garchitorena, Naga City, Pili, Ocampo,
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari with an Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction 1 filed under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court to assail Goa, Lagonoy, Presentacion, Camaligan, Canaman,
the following resolutions of the public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC):
Sangay, San Jose, Tigaon, Magarao, Bombon,
(a) Resolution 2 (first assailed resolution) issued by the Second Division on March 5,
Tinambac, Siruma Calabanga
2013, in SPA No. 13-166 (DC), granting the petition filed by Nelson B.
Julia (Julia), seeking to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy 3 (COC) as
Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Camarines
Sur (Sanggunian) of Angel G. Naval (Naval), who is allegedly violating 4th Iriga City, Baao, Balatan, Caramoan, Garchitorena,
the three-term limit imposed upon elective local officials as provided for in
Article X, Section 8 4 of the 1987 Constitution, and Section 43 Bato, Buhi, Bula, Nabua Goa, Lagonoy,
(b) 5 of the Local Government Code (LGC); and
Presentacion, Sangay,
(b) En Banc Resolution 6 (second assailed resolution) issued on June 5, 2013, San
denying Naval's Motion for Reconsideration 7 to the Resolution dated
March 5, 2013. Jose, Tigaon, Tinambac,

Antecedents Siruma

From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Naval had been elected and had served as a member of
the Sanggunian, Second District, Province of Camarines Sur.
5th Iriga City, Baao, Balatan,
 Bato, Buhi, Bula, Nabua
Notably, 8 out of 10 towns were taken from the old Second District to form the present Third
District. The present Second District is composed of the two remaining towns, Gainza and Milaor, merged
with five towns from the old First District.
In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members of the Sanggunian, Third
District. He served until 2013.
In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anew and was re-elected as Member of the Sanggunian, Third
District.
Julia was likewise a Sanggunian Member candidate from the Third District in the
2013 elections. On October 29, 2012, he invoked Section 78 10 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and
filed before the COMELEC a Verified Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy 11 of Naval. Julia posited that Navalhad fully served the entire Province of Camarines Sur for
three consecutive terms as a member of the Sanggunian, irrespective of the district he had been elected
from. The three-term limit rule's application is more with reference to the same local elective post, and not
necessarily in connection with an identical territorial jurisdiction. Allowing Naval to run as
a Sanggunian member for the fourth time is violative of the inflexible three-term limit rule enshrined in the
Constitution and the LGC, which must be strictly construed. 12 HSATIC
The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division
In the first assailed resolution issued on March 5, 2013, the COMELEC Second Division
cancelled Naval's COC on grounds stated below:
[W]hen a candidate for public office swears in his COC that he is eligible for the
elective posts he seeks, while, in reality, he knowingly lacks the necessary
requirements for eligibility, he commits a false material misrepresentation
cognizable under Section 78 of the [OEC].
xxx xxx xxx
The Supreme Court[,] in the case of Lonzanida v. [COMELEC][,] detailed
the important components of [Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution]:
This Court held that the two conditions for the application of
the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms
in the same local government post and 2) that he has
fully served three consecutive terms. It stated:
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local
officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve in the same
elective position. Consequently, it is not enough
that an individual has served three consecutive
terms in an elective local office[;] he must also
have been elected to the same position for the
same number of times before the disqualification
can apply. . . .
. . . The first requisite does not only describe a candidate who has been
elected for public office for three consecutive terms. The candidate must have been
elected in the same local government post. This connotes that the candidate must
have been in the same elective position serving the same constituency who elected
him to office for three consecutive terms.
xxx xxx xxx
The three-term limit rule was designed by the framers of the
Constitution to prevent the monopoly of power centered only on a chosen few. The
said disqualification was primarily intended to forestall the accumulation of massive
political power by an elective local government official in a given locality in order to
perpetuate his tenure in office. The framers also considered the necessity of the
enhancement of the freedom of choice of the electorate by broadening the selection
of would-be elective public officers. By rendering ineligible for public office those
who have been elected and served for three consecutive terms in the same public
elective post, the prohibition seeks to infuse new blood in the political arena.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . [T]he new Third District where [Naval] was elected and has served is
composed of the same municipalities comprising the previous Second District,
absent the towns Gainza and [Milaor]. The territorial jurisdiction [Naval] seeks to
serve for the term 2013-2016 is the same as the territorial jurisdiction he previously
served. The electorate who voted for him in 2004, 2007 and 2010 is the same
electorate who shall vote for him come May 13, 2013 Elections. They are the same
group of voters who elected him into office for three consecutive terms. EAIaHD
The resolution of this Commission in the case of Bandillo, et al[.] v.
Hernandez (SPA No. 10-078) 13 cannot be applied in the case at bar. Hernandez
who then hailed from Libmanan belonged to the First District of Camarines Sur.
With Republic Act 9716, Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao and San
Fernando, all originally belonging to the First District, were merged with Gainza and
Milaor to form the Second District. With the addition of the municipalities of Gainza
and Milaor, it cannot be said that the previous First District became the Second
District only by name. The voters of Gainza and Milaor added to the electorate of the
new Second District formed a different electorate, different from the one which voted
for Hernandez in the 2001, 2004 and 2007 elections. In the case at bar, the
municipalities comprising the new Third District are the same municipalities that
consisted of the previous Second [District], absent Milaor and Gainza.
The Supreme Court, in Latasa v. [COMELEC], ruled that the conversion
of the municipality into a city did not convert the office of the municipal mayor into a
local government post different from the office of the city mayor[.]
xxx xxx xxx 14 (Citations omitted)
The Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc
In the second assailed resolution issued on June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en
banc denied Naval's Motion for Reconsideration to the above. The COMELEC pointed out that absent the
verification required under Section 3, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Naval's motion was
instantly dismissible. Nonetheless, theCOMELEC proceeded to discuss the demerits of Naval's
motion, viz.:
 The conditions for the application of the three-term limit rule are present in
the instant case as the records clearly establish that [Naval] is running for the 4th
time for the same government post. To put things in a proper perspective, it is
imperative to review and discuss the salient points in the case of Latasa v.
[COMELEC]. The case involves the question of whether or not a municipal mayor,
having been elected and had already served for three (3) consecutive terms, can
run as city mayor in light of the conversion of the municipality to a city. In applying
the three-term limit rule, the Court pointed out that the conversion of the municipality
into a city did not convert the office of the municipal mayor into a local government
post different from the office of the city mayor. The Court took into account the
following circumstances: (1) That the territorial jurisdiction of [the] city was the same
as that of the municipality; (2) That the inhabitants were the same group of voters
who elected the municipal mayor for three (3) consecutive terms; and (3) That the
inhabitants were the same group of voters [over] whom he held power and authority
as their chief executive for nine years.
Anchoring from the said case, it is therefore clear that the position to
which [Naval] has filed his candidacy for the 13 May 2013 . . . Elections is the same
position for which he had been elected and had served for the past nine (9) years.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The following circumstances establish that the subject posts are one
and the same: First, the territorial jurisdictions of the two (2) districts are the same
except for the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor which were excluded by R.A. No.
9716; Second, the inhabitants of the 3rd District of Camarines Sur, where [Naval] is
presently running as member of the [Sanggunian], are the same voters who elected
him for the past three (3) consecutive terms; and Lastly, the inhabitants of the [3rd]
District are the same group of voters whom [Naval] had served as member of the
[Sanggunian] representing the 2nd District. DTAIaH
. . . The enactment of R.A. No. 9716 did not convert [Naval's] post [into
one] different from [w]hat he [previously had]. As correctly ruled by
the Commission(Second Division), [Naval] ha[d] already been elected and ha[d]
already served in the same government post for three consecutive terms, . . .[.]
xxx xxx xxx. 15 (Citations omitted)
Unperturbed, Naval is now before the Court raising the issues of whether or not
the COMELEC gravely erred and ruled contrary to law and jurisprudence:
I. IN FINDING THAT NAVAL HAD ALREADY SERVED FOR THREE
CONSECUTIVE TERMS IN THE SAME GOVERNMENT POST; 16
II. IN IGNORING THE FACT THAT SANGGUNIAN MEMBERS ARE ELECTED BY
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS; 17 and
III. WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PROHIBITION CONTEMPLATED BY SECTION 8,
ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 43 (B) OF
THE LGCAPPLIES TO NAVAL. 18
The Arguments of the Contending Parties
In support of the instant petition, Naval alleges that the First, Second and Third Legislative
Districts of Camarines Sur are not merely renamed but are composed of new sets of municipalities. With the
separation of Gainza and Milaor from the other eight towns which used to comprise the Second District, the
voters from the Third Legislative District are no longer the same ones as those who had elected him to office
in the 2004 and 2007 elections.
Naval further invokes Article 94 19 of Administrative Order No. 270 prescribing the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the LGC to argue that Sanggunianmembers are elected by districts. Thus, the
right to choose representatives in the Sanggunian pertains to each of the districts. Naval was elected
as Sanggunian member in 2004 and 2007 by the Second District. In 2010 and 2013, it was the Third District,
which brought him to office. Essentially then, Naval's election in 2013 is merely his second term
as Sanggunian member for the Third District.
Naval likewise cites Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC 20 to point out that for the disqualification on the
ground of the three-term limit to apply, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms
in an elective local office, but it is also required that he or she had been elected to the same position for the
same number of times. 21
Naval also assails as erroneous the COMELEC's interpretations of the rulings in Latasa v.
COMELEC 22 and Bandillo, et al. v. Hernandez. 23 In Latasa, the Court applied the three-term prohibition
only because notwithstanding the conversion of the Municipality of Digos into a city, the mayor was to serve
the same territorial jurisdiction and constituents. Naval asserts that the same does not hold true in his
case. Naval further avers that in Bandillo, which finds more application in the instant petition,
the COMELEC ruled that the three-term limit cannot be invoked in a situation where the legislative districts
have been altered. An extraction or an addition both yields a change in the composition of the voters.
Naval further emphasizes that he garnered the majority of the votes from his constituents, whose
will and mandate should be upheld. Besides, Julia's counsel already withdrew his appearance, indicating
no less than his client's lack of interest in still pursuing Naval's ouster from office. 24
In its Comment, 25 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeks the denial of the instant
petition. The OSG contends that Naval had been elected and had fully served the same local elective post
for three consecutive terms. Naval thus violated Section 78 of the OEC when he filed his COC despite
knowledge of his ineligibility.Naval's reliance on Bandillo is also misplaced since in the said case, two
towns were instead added to form a new district. Apparently then, in Bandillo, there was a new set of voters.
The OSG also alleges that Naval is not entitled to the issuance of injunctive reliefs by this Court. No clear
and unmistakable right pertains to Naval and it is his eligibility to be elected as Sanggunian member for the
Third District which is the issue at hand.
Ruling of the Court
The Court denies the petition. TCacIA
As the issues are interrelated, they shall be discussed jointly.
The case before this Court is one of first impression. While the contending parties
cite Latasa, Lonzanida v. COMELEC, 26 Borja, Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC, 27 andBandillo, which all
involve the application of the three-term limit rule, the factual and legal circumstances in those cases are
different and the doctrinal values therein do not directly address the issues now at hand.
In Latasa, the issue arose as a result of the conversion of a municipality into a city. The then
municipal mayor attempted to evade the application upon him of the three-term limit rule by arguing that the
position of a city mayor was not the same as the one he previously held. The Court was not convinced and,
thus, declared that there was no interruption of the incumbent mayor's continuity of service.
In Lonzanida, a candidate ran for the mayoralty post and won in three consecutive elections.
While serving his third term, his opponent filed an election protest. Months before the expiration of the
mayor's third term, he was ousted from office. He ran again for the same post in the immediately
succeeding election. A petition was thereafter filed assailing his eligibility to run as mayor on the ground of
violation of the three-term limit rule. The Court ruled that the mayor could not be considered as having
served a full third term. An interruption for any length of time, if due to an involuntary cause, is enough to
break the elected official's continuity of service.
In Borja, the mayor of Pateros died and was succeeded in office by the vice mayor. In the two
immediately succeeding elections, the latter vied for and won the mayoralty post. When he ran for the same
position for the third time, his disqualification was sought for alleged violation of the three-term limit rule.
The Court ruled that when he assumed the position of mayor by virtue of succession, his service should not
be treated as one full term. For the disqualification to apply, the candidate should have been thrice elected
for and had served the same post consecutively.
In Aldovino, preventive suspension was imposed upon an elected municipal councilor. The Court
ruled that the said suspension did not interrupt the elective official's term. Although he was barred from
exercising the functions of the position during the period of suspension, his continued stay and entitlement
to the office remain unaffected.
In Bandillo, a case decided by the COMELEC, Gainza and Milaor were added to five of the ten
towns, which used to comprise Camarines Sur's old First District, to form the new Second District.
The COMELEC declined to apply the three-term limit rule against the elected Provincial Board
member on the ground that the addition of Gainza and Milaor distinctively created a new district, with an
altered territory and constituency.
In the case before this Court, the task is to determine the application of the three-term limit rule
upon local elective officials in renamed and/or reapportioned districts. In the process of doing so, it is
inevitable to discuss the role of elections and the nature of public office in a democratic and republican state
like ours.
The Role of Elections in our
Democratic and Republican State,
and the Restraints Imposed upon
Those Who Hold Public Office
The Court begins with general and undeniable principles.
The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them. 28
Then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno explained the character of a republican state and a
public office, viz.:
A republic is a representative government, a government run by and for
the people. It is not a pure democracy where the people govern themselves directly.
The essence of republicanism is representation and renovation, the selection by
the citizenry of a corps of public functionaries who derive their mandate from
the people and act on their behalf, serving for a limited period only, after which
they are replaced or retained, at the option of their principal. Obviously, a republican
government is a responsible government whose officials hold and discharge their
position as a public trust and shall, according to the Constitution, 'at all times be
accountable to the people' they are sworn to serve. The purpose of a republican
government it is almost needless to state, is the promotion of the common welfare
according to the will of the people themselves. 29 (Emphasis ours and italics in the
original)
In Tolentino v. COMELEC, 30 Justice Puno likewise characterized the role of the electoral
process in the following wise: ECcTaH
The electoral process is one of the linchpins of a democratic and
republican framework because it is through the act of voting that government by
consent is secured. Through the ballot, people express their will on the defining
issues of the day and they are able to choose their leaders in accordance with the
fundamental principle of representative democracy that the people should elect
whom they please to govern them. Voting has an important instrumental value in
preserving the viability of constitutional democracy. It has traditionally been taken as
a prime indicator of democratic participation. 31 (Citations omitted and italics ours)
The importance of elections cannot therefore be over emphasized. Thus,
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In
the exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of
government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its importance,
the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or
restricted by law. . . . . 32 (Italics ours)
Hence, while it is settled that in elections, the first consideration of every democratic polity is to
give effect to the expressed will of the majority, there are limitations to being elected to a public
office. 33 Our Constitution and statutes are explicit anent the existence of term limits, the nature of public
office, and the guarantee from the State that citizens shall have equal access to public service. 34 Section
8, Article X of our Constitution, on term limits, is significantly reiterated by Section 43 (b) of the LGC.
Moreover, the Court has time and again declared that a public office is a public trust and not a vested
property right. 35
The Deliberations of the Members
of the Constitutional Commission
on the Three-Term Limit's
Application to Local Elective
Officials
Following are entries in the Journal of the Constitutional Commission regarding the exchanges of
the members on the subject of the three-term limit rule imposedon local elective officials:
VOTING ON THE TERMS OF LOCAL OFFICIALS
With respect to local officials, Mr. Nolledo, informed that the Committee on Local
Governments had not decided on the term of office for local officials and
suggested that the Body decide on the matter.
xxx xxx xxx
On Mr. Bacani's inquiry regarding local officials, Mr. Davide explained that local
officials would include the governor, vice-governor and the members of the
provincial board; the city mayor, city vice-mayor and members of the city board;
and the municipal mayor, municipal vice mayor and members of the municipal
council. He stated that barangay officials would be governed by special law, to
which Mr. Nolledo agreed.
xxx xxx xxx
MOTION TO VOTE ON THE PROPOSALS RELATIVE TO ALTERNATIVE NO. 3
In reply to Mr. Guingona's query on whether the Committee had decided on the
interpretation of "two reelections", Mr. Davide suggested that the matter be
submitted to a vote.
Thereupon, Mr. Romulo moved for a vote on whether Alternative No. 3 as
proposed by Mr. Garcia, would allow a local official three terms, after which
he would not be allowed to seek any reelection; or whether, as interpreted
by Mr. Davide, it would mean that after two successive reelections or a
consecutive period of nine years, he could run for reelection after the lapse
of three years.
xxx xxx xxx
RESTATEMENT OF THE PROPOSALS
Mr. Garcia reiterated that the local officials could be reelected twice, after
which, they would be barred from ever running for reelection.
On the other proposal, Mr. Davide, on behalf of the Committee, stated that
local officials after two reelections would be allowed to run for reelection
after the lapse of three years.
xxx xxx xxx
MANIFESTATION OF MR. ROMULO
Upon resumption of session, Mr. Romulo manifested that the Body would
proceed to the consideration of two issues on the term of Representatives and
local officials, namely: 1) Alternative No. 1 (no further reelection after a total of
three terms), and 2) Alternative No. 2 (no immediate reelection after three
successive terms). ScTIAH
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. GARCIA ON ALTERNATIVE NO. 1
Mr. Garcia stated that he was advocating Alternative No. 1 on four grounds: 1) to
prevent monopoly of political power because the country's history
showed that prolonged stay in public office could lead to the creation of
entrenched preserves of political dynasties; 2) to broaden the choice so that
more people could be enlisted to the cause of public service; 3) no one is
indispensable in running the affairs of the country and that
reliance on personalities would be avoided; and 4) the disqualification from
running for reelection after three terms would create a reserve of statesmen
both in the local and national levels.
He added that the turnover in public office after nine years would ensure the
introduction of new ideas and approaches. He stressed that public office
would no longer be a preserve of conservatism and tradition, and that public
service would no longer be limited to those directly holding public office, but would
also include consultative bodies organized by the people.
INQUIRY OF MR. REGALADO
In reply to Mr. Regalado's query whether the three terms need not be served
consecutively, Mr. Garcia answered in the affirmative.
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. MONSOD ON ALTERNATIVE NO. 2
Mr. Monsod stated that while the new Constitution would recognize people power
because of a new awareness, a new kind of voter and a new kind of Filipino, at
the same time, it pre-screens the candidates among whom the people would
choose by barring those who would have served for nine years from being
reelected. He opined that this would actually require an additional qualification
for office to a certain number of people.
He stressed that, while the stand of the Commission is to create a reserve of
statesmen, their future participation is actually limited to some areas and only for
a certain period of time. He added that it is not for the Commission to
decide on the future of our countrymen who may have more years ahead of
them to serve the country.
xxx xxx xxx
INQUIRY OF MR. OPLE
xxx xxx xxx
Thereupon, speaking in support of Mr. Monsod's manifestation, Mr. Ople
expressed apprehension over the Body's exercise of some sort of
omnipotent power in disqualifying those who will have served their
tasks. He opined that the Commission had already taken steps to prevent
the accumulation of powers and prequisites that would permit officials to
stay on indefinitely and to transfer them to members of their families. He
opined, however, that perpetual disqualification would deprive the people of
their freedom of choice. He stated that the Body had already succeeded in
striking a balance on policies which could ensure a redistribution of
opportunities to the people both in terms of political and economic power.
He stated that Philippine politics had been unshackled from the two-party system,
which he said was the most critical support for the perpetuation of political
dynasties. Considering that such achievement is already a victory, Mr. Ople
stated that the role of political parties should not be despised because the
strength of democracy depends on how strong political parties are, that a
splintering thereof will mean a great loss to the vitality and resiliency of
democracy.
Mr. Ople reiterated that he was against perpetual disqualification from
office. DAaIHT
xxx xxx xxx.
MR. GARCIA'S RESPONSE TO MR. OPLE'S STATEMENTS
Mr. Garcia stated that there are two principles involved in Alternative No. 1: 1)
the recognition of the ambivalent nature of political power, and 2)
the recognition of alternative forms of public service. He stated that it is
important to remember the lessons learned from the recent past; that public
service is service to the people and not an opportunity to accumulate political
power, and that a prolonged stay in public office brings about political
dynasties or vested interests. Regarding political parties, he stated that it
will encourage the constant renewal of blood in party leadership, approach,
style and ideas. He opined that this is very healthy for a pluralist and
multi-party democracy.
On the recognition of alternative forms of public service, Mr. Garcia stressed that
public service could be limited to public office since many good leaders who were
in the streets and in jail fought against the dictatorship. He stressed that public
service would also mean belonging to consultative bodies or people's councils
which brought about new forms of service and leadership.
REMARKS OF MR. ABUBAKAR
Mr. Abubakar stated that in any democracy the voice of the people is the
voice of God. He stated that if the people want to elect a representative to serve
them continuously, the Commission should not arrogate unto itself the right to
decide what the people want. He stated that in the United States, a Senator had
served for 30 years.
xxx xxx xxx
REMARKS OF MS. AQUINO
Ms. Aquino stated that she differs from the views advanced by Mr. Garcia and Ms.
Tan, although she stated that they spoke of the same premises. She stated that
she agrees with them that leaders need not be projected and developed
publicly in an election as leaders are better tempered and tested in the
various forms of mass struggles and organized work. She stated that if the
people are to be encouraged to have their own sense of responsibility in national
leadership, what ultimately matters is the political determination of the citizenry to
chart their own national destiny. She opined that the Body should allow the
people to exercise their own sense of proportion and imbibe the salutary
effects of their own strength to curtail power when it overreaches
itself. She stressed that in the final analysis, the Commission cannot legislate
into the Constitution the essence of new politics as it is a chastening
experience of learning and unlearning. Adverting to Mr. Garcia's statement
that politics is an imperfect art, she stated that the Commission could correct
politics with all its imperfections and flaws by a constitutional provision. She
opined that perpetual disqualification cannot provide the cure. She maintained
that perpetual disqualification is, at best, a palliative which could also be
counter-productive, in the sense that it could effectively foil the possibilities of real
public service.
REMARKS OF MR. BACANI
Mr. Bacani stated that when the Body granted the illiterates the right to vote and
that proposals were made to empower the people to engage in the legislative
process, the Body presupposed the political maturity of the people. He
observed that in this instance, political maturity is denied with the
constitutional bar for reelection. He opined that the Body should stick to the
premise that the people are politically mature.
REJOINDER OF MR. GARCIA
By way of rejoinder to Mr. Bacani's statements, Mr. Garcia stated that the
proposal was basically premised on the undue advantage of the incumbent
in accumulating power, money, party machine and patronage and
not on lack of trust in the people.
Mr. Garcia stated that politics is not won by ideals alone but by solid organized
work by organizations. He stated that with three terms, an official would have
served the people long enough.
xxx xxx xxx
VOTING ON THE TWO ALTERNATIVES
Thereafter, the Body proceeded to vote by ballot on the two alternatives.
xxx xxx xxx
RESULT OF THE VOTING
The result of the voting was as follows: EcICDT
Alternative No. 1 (no further election after three successive terms) — 17 votes
Alternative No. 2 (no immediate reelection after three successive terms) — 26
votes
With 17 votes in favor of Alternative No. 1 and 26 in favor of Alternative No. 2, the
Chair declared Alternative No. 2 approved by the Body. 36 (Emphasis and italics
ours)
The Constitution mandates the
strict implementation of the
three-term limit rule.
The Court notes that in the process of drafting the Constitution, the framers thereof had not
discussed with specifity the subject of the three-term limit rule's application on reapportioned districts.
From the above-cited deliberations, however, the divergent stances of the members of the
Constitutional Commission on the general application of the three-term limit rule show. On one side were
those who espoused the stern view that perpetual disqualification to hold public office after three
consecutive terms would ensure that new blood would be infused into our political system. More choices for
the voters would give fuller meaning to our democratic institutions. On the other side of the fence were
those who believed that the imposition of term limits would be tantamount to squandering the experience of
seasoned public servants and a curtailment of the power of the citizens to elect whoever they want to
remain in office.
In the end, 26 members of the Commission cast their votes in favor of the proposal that no
immediate re-election after three successive terms shall be allowed.On the other hand, 17 members stood
pat on their view that there should be no further reelection after three successive terms.
Clearly, the drafters of our Constitution are in agreement about the possible attendant evils if
there would be no limit to re-election. Notwithstanding their conflicting preferences on whether the term limit
would disqualify the elected official perpetually or temporarily, they decided that only three
consecutive elections to the same position would be allowed. Thereafter, the public official can once again
vie for the same post provided there be a gap of at least one term from his or her last election. The rule
answers the need to prevent the consolidation of political power in the hands of the few, while at the same
time giving to the people the freedom to call back to public service those who are worthy to be called
statesmen.
 The compromise agreed upon by the drafters of our Constitution was a result of exhaustive
deliberations. The required gap after three consecutive elections is significant. Thus, the rule cannot be
taken with a grain of salt. Nothing less than its strict application is called for.
Ratio legis est anima. 37
"A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied.
A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and
circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which
induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and
calculated to effect that purpose." 38
In Aldovino, the Court describes the
three-term limit rule as inflexible.
In Aldovino, a local elective official pleaded exemption from the application of the three-term
limit on the ground that there was an interruption in his service after the penalty of suspension was imposed
upon him. Although not in all four with Naval's case, there are principles enunciated therein which
undeniably hold true, viz.:
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective
office and limits an elective official's stay in office to no more than three consecutive
terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X.
Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time — three
years — during which an official has title to office and can serve. . . .[.]
xxx xxx xxx
The "limitation" under this first branch of the provision is expressed in
the negative — "no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms." This formulation — no more than three consecutive terms — is a clear
command suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
This examination of the wording of the constitutional provision and of the
circumstances surrounding its formulation impresses upon us the clear intent to
make term limitation a high priority constitutional objective whose terms must be
strictly construed and which cannot be defeated by, nor sacrificed for, values of less
than equal constitutional worth. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . . [T]he Court signalled how zealously it guards the three-term limit rule.
Effectively, these cases teach us to strictly interpret the term limitation rule in favor
of limitation rather than its exception.
xxx xxx xxx
[In] Latasa v. Commission on Elections . . .[,] [t]he Court said:
This Court reiterates that the framers of the
Constitution specifically included an exception to the people's
freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the
evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a
particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the
same office. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Section 8, Article X —
both by structure and substance — fixes an elective official's term of office and limits
his stay in office to three consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed, no
less, by citing voluntary renunciation as an example of a
circumvention. . . . . 39(Citations omitted, italics and emphasis in the original and
underscoring ours)
Reapportionment and its Basis
Reapportionment is "the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes
in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation." 40 The aim of
legislative apportionment is to equalize population and voting power among districts. 41 The basis for
districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province and not the number of registered
voters therein. 42 DAETHc
R.A. No. 9716 and the Reapportioned
Districts of Camarines Sur
Sections 1 to 3 of R.A. No. 9716 provide:
Section 1. The composition of the current First (1st) and Second (2nd)
Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur is hereby reapportioned in
order to create an additional legislative district to commence in the next
national elections after the effectivity of this Act.
Section 2. In furtherance of the reapportionment mandated by this Act, the
municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao and San Fernando
of the current First (1st) Legislative District are hereby consolidated with the
municipalities of Gainza and Milaor of the current Second (2nd) Legislative
District, to comprise the new legislative district authorized under this Act.
Section 3. The result of the reapportionment described in this Act are
summarized as follows:
a) First District — The remaining municipalities in the current First (1st)
Legislative District shall continue to be designated as the First
(1st) Legislative District, composed of the following
municipalities: Del Gallego, Ragay, Lupi, Sipicot and Cabusao;
b) Second District — This new legislative district shall be composed of
the municipalities enumerated in Section 2 hereof;
c) Third District — The current Second (2nd) Legislative District shall
be renamed as the Third (3rd) Legislative District, composed
of the following: Naga City and the municipalities of Pili,
Ocampo, Camaligan, Canaman, Magarao, Bombon and
Calabanga;
 d) Fourth District — The current Third (3rd) Legislative District, without
any change in its composition, shall be renamed as the Fourth
(4th) Legislative District, composed of the following
municipalities: Caramoan, Garchitorena, Goa, Lagonoy,
Presentacion, Sangay, San Jose, Tigaon, Tinambac and
Siruma; and
e) Fifth District — The current Fourth (4th) Legislative District, without any
change in its composition, shall be renamed as the Fifth (5th)
Legislative District, composed of the following: Iriga City and
the municipalities of Baao, Balatan, Bato, Buhi, Bula and
Nabua. (Italics and emphasis ours)
word "rename." Although the qualifier "without a change in its composition" was not found in Section 3 (c),
unlike in Sections 3 (d) and (e), still, what is pervasive is the clear intent to create a sole new district in that
of the Second, while merely renaming the rest.
The following statutory construction rules surface: DIcTEC
First, the general rule in construing words and phrases used in a statute
is that, in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, they should be given their
plain, ordinary and common usage meaning; the words should be read and
considered in their natural, ordinary, commonly accepted usage, and without
resorting to forced or subtle construction. Words are presumed to have been
employed by the lawmaker in their ordinary and common use and acceptation.

As a result of the reapportionment made by R.A. No. 9716, the old Second District of Camarines Second, a word of general significance in a statute is to be taken in its
Sur, minus only the two towns of Gainza and Milaor, is renamed as the Third District and now configured as ordinary and comprehensive sense, unless it is shown that the word is intended to
follows: 43 be given a different or restricted meaning; what is generally spoken shall be
generally understood and general words shall be understood in a general
Before the Enactment of After the Enactment of sense. 44 (Citations omitted)

RA 9716 RA 9716 The Court looks to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. 45

In Naval's case, the words of R.A. No. 9716 plainly state that the new Second District is to
be created, but the Third District is to be renamed. Verba legis non est recedendum. The terms used in a
2nd District 3rd District legal provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it,
based on the postulate that the framers mean what they say. 46
Population: 474,899 Population: 439,043
The verb create means to "make or produce something new." 47 On the other hand, the
Gainza Naga verb rename means to "give a new name to someone or something." 48 A complete reading of R.A. No.
9716 yields no logical conclusion other than that the lawmakers intended the old Second District to be
Milaor Pili
merely renamed as the current Third District.
Naga Ocampo It likewise bears noting that the actual difference in the population of the old Second District from
that of the current Third District amounts to less than 10% of the population of the latter. This numerical fact
Pili Canaman
renders the new Third District as essentially, although not literally, the same as the old Second District.
Ocampo Camaligan Hence, whileNaval is correct in his argument that Sanggunian members are elected by district, it does not
alter the fact that the district which elected him for the third and fourth time is the same one which brought
Canaman Magarao him to office in 2004 and 2007.

Camaligan Bombon The application upon Naval of the

three-term limit rule does not
Magarao Calabanga undermine the constitutional
requirement to achieve equality of
Bombon representation among districts.
Calabanga The rationale behind reapportionment is the constitutional requirement to achieve equality of
representation among the districts. 49 It is with this mindset that the Court should consider Naval's
R.A. No. 9716 created a new Second argument anent having a new set of constituents electing him into office in 2010 and 2013.
District, but it merely renamed the
Naval's ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the three-term limit rule, does not undermine
other four.
the right to equal representation of any of the districts in Camarines Sur. With or without him, the renamed
The Court notes that after the reapportionment of the districts in Camarines Sur, the current Third Third District, which he labels as a new set of constituents, would still be represented, albeit by another
District, which brought Naval to office in 2010 and 2013, has a population of 35,856 less than that of the old eligible person. ACTaDH
Second District, which elected him in 2004 and 2007. However, the wordings of R.A. No. 9716 indicate the
intent of the lawmakers to create a single new Second District from the merger of the towns from the old The presumed competence of the
First District with Gainza and Milaor. As to the current Third District, Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 9716 used the COMELEC to resolve matters
 falling within its jurisdiction is SO ORDERED.
upheld.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
"Time and again, the Court has held that a petition for certiorari against actions of Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe and Leonen, JJ., concur.
the COMELEC is confined only to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and
substantial denial of due process, because the COMELEC is presumed to be most competent in matters
falling within its domain." 50
||| (Naval v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207851, [July 8, 2014], 738 PHIL 506-538)
"In a special civil action for certiorari, the burden rests on the petitioner to prove not merely
reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
public respondent issuing the impugned order, decision or resolution." 51 "Grave abuse of discretion arises
when a court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence." 52

In the case at bar, the Court finds the COMELEC's disquisitions to be amply supported by the
Constitution, law and jurisprudence.

Conclusion
In sum, the Court finds no compelling reason to grant the reliefs prayed for by Naval. For the
Court to declare otherwise would be to create a dangerous precedent unintended by the drafters of our
Constitution and of R.A. No. 9716. Considering that the one-term gap or rest after three
consecutive elections is a result of a compromise among the members of the Constitutional Commission,
no cavalier exemptions or exceptions to its application is to be allowed. Aldovino affirms this interpretation.
Further, sustaining Naval's arguments would practically allow him to hold the same office for 15 years.
These are the circumstances the Constitutionexplicitly intends to avert.

Certainly, the Court accords primacy to upholding the will of the voting public, the real sovereign,
so to speak. However, let all the candidates for public office be reminded that as citizens, we have a
commitment to be bound by our Constitution and laws. Side by side our privileges as citizens are
restrictions too.

Einer Elhauge, a faculty member from Harvard Law School, wrote an article entitled "What Term
Limits Do That Ordinary Voting Cannot." 53 In the article, Greek mythology was tapped to make a tempting
analogy. The gist of the story follows.

In Odyssey Book XII, the goddess Circe warned Odysseus of the Sirens who seduce all men
approaching them with their voices. Those who fell into the Sirens' trap never returned home to their wives
and children. A clever strategy was thus hatched to secure safe passage for Odysseus and his men. The
men were to plug their ears with wax to muffle the songs of the Sirens. Odysseus, on the other hand, was to
be tied to the mast of the ship so he could still listen to the songs, which may contain clues on how they can
get home. When the wind died down, Odysseus heard beautiful voices calling out to them. The voices were
incomparable to anything he had ever heard before. Even when Odysseus knew that the irresistible voices
were coming from the Sirens, he struggled with all his strength to free himself from the ropes, but was
unable to do so. The voices became fainter as the men continued to row. When the voices can no longer be
heard, Odysseus realized how he had nearly been beguiled. They had made it through safely and
Odysseus was untied. It was their clever plan which kept them all alive. 54

The same lesson holds true in the case before this Court. The drafters of the
Constitution recognized the propensity of public officers to perpetuate themselves in power, hence, the
adoption of term limits and a guarantee of every citizen's equal access to public service. These are the
restrictions statesmen should observe for they are intended to help ensure the continued vitality of our
republican institutions. IEaCDH

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated
March 5, 2013 and June 5, 2013 of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 13-166 (DC) are AFFIRMED.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 176970. December 8, 2008.]
ROGELIO
Z. BAGABUYO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J p:
Before us is the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, 1 with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction, filed by
Rogelio Bagabuyo (petitioner) to prevent the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from
implementing Resolution No. 7837 on the ground thatRepublic Act No. 9371 2 — the law
that Resolution No. 7837 implements — is unconstitutional. DEICTS
BACKGROUND FACTS
On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro's then Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula filed
and sponsored House Bill No. 5859: "An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative
District of the City of Cagayan de Oro." 3 This law eventually became Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9371. 4 It increased Cagayan de Oro's legislative district from one to two. For the election of May 2007,
Cagayan de Oro's voters would be classified as belonging to either the first or the second district,
depending on their place of residence. The constituents of each district would elect their own
representative to Congress as well as eight members of theSangguniang Panglungsod.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 9371 apportioned the City's barangays as follows:
Legislative Districts — The lone legislative district of the City of
Cagayan De Oro is hereby apportioned to commence in the next
national elections after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Bonbon,
Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua, Iponan, Baikingon, San Simon,
Pagatpat, Canitoan, Balulang, Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi, Taglimao,
Tuburan, Pigsag-an, Tumpagon, Bayanga, Mambuaya, Dansulihon, Tignapoloan
and Bisigan shall comprise the first district while barangays Macabalan, Puntod,
Consolacion, Camaman-an, Nazareth, Macasandig, Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa,
Cugman, FS Catanico, Tablon, Agusan, Puerto, Bugo, and Balubal and all urban
barangays from Barangay 1 to Barangay 40 shall comprise the second district. 5
On March 13, 2007, the COMELEC en Banc promulgated Resolution No.
7837 6 implementing R.A. No. 9371. EaTCSA
Petitioner Rogelio Bagabuyo filed the present petition against the COMELEC on March 27,
2007. 7 On 10 April 2008, the petitioner amended the petition to include the following as respondents:
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita; the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management;
the Chairman of theCommission on Audit; the Mayor and the members of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Cagayan de Oro City; and its Board of Canvassers. 8
In asking for the nullification of R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional
grounds, the petitioner argued that the COMELEC cannot implementR.A. No. 9371 without providing
for the rules, regulations and guidelines for the conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the
division or conversion of a local government unit. He prayed for the issuance of an order directing the
respondents to cease and desist from implementing R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC Resolution No.
7837, and to revert instead to COMELEC Resolution No. 7801 which provided for a single legislative
district for Cagayan de Oro.
Since the Court did not grant the petitioner's prayer for a temporary restraining order or writ
of preliminary injunction, the May 14 National and Local Electionsproceeded according to R.A. No.
9371 and Resolution No. 7837.
The respondent's Comment on the petition, filed through the Office of the Solicitor General,
argued that: 1) the petitioner did not respect the hierarchy of courts, as the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) is vested with concurrent jurisdiction over cases assailing the constitutionality of a statute;
2) R.A. No. 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House of
Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution; 3) the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply
when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a
province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place; and 4) R.A. No. 9371 did not bring
about any change in Cagayan de Oro's territory, population and income classification; hence, no
plebiscite is required. AEDCHc
The petitioner argued in his reply that: 1) pursuant to the Court's ruling in Del Mar v.
PAGCOR, 9 the Court may take cognizance of this petition if compelling reasons, or the nature and
importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its jurisdiction; 2) Cagayan de Oro
City's reapportionment under R.A. No. 9371 falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of cities under Section 10, Article X of theConstitution;
3) the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units involve a common denominator — the material change in the political and economic rights of the
local government units directly affected, as well as of the people therein; 4) a voter's sovereign power
to decide on who should be elected as the entire city's Congressman was arbitrarily reduced by at
least one half because the questioned law and resolution only allowed him to vote and be voted for in
the district designated by the COMELEC; 5) a voter was also arbitrarily denied his right to elect the
Congressman and the members of the city council for the other legislative district, and 6) government
funds were illegally disbursed without prior approval by the sovereign electorate of Cagayan De Oro
City. 10
THE ISSUES
The core issues, based on the petition and the parties' memoranda, can be limited to the
following contentious points:
1) Did the petitioner violate the hierarchy of courts rule; if so, should the instant
petition be dismissed on this ground?
2) Does R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of
Cagayan de Oro City, or does it involve the division and conversion of a
local government unit?
3) Does R.A. No. 9371 violate the equality of representation doctrine?
OUR RULING
 Except for the issue of the hierarchy of courts rule, we find the petition totally
without merit.
The hierarchy of courts principle.
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. 11 It was pursuant to this
original jurisdiction that the petitioner filed the present petition.
While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals 12 and the RTCs, 13 a direct
invocation of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and especially set out in the petition. Reasons of practicality, dictated by an
increasingly overcrowded docket and the need to prioritize in favor of matters within our exclusive
jurisdiction, justify the existence of this rule otherwise known as the "principle of hierarchy of
courts".More generally stated, the principle requires that recourse must first be made to the
lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. 14
Among the cases we have considered sufficiently special and important to be exceptions to
the rule, are petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus andquo warranto against our nation's
lawmakers when the validity of their enactments is assailed. 15 The present petition is of this nature;
its subject matter and the nature of the issues raised — among them, whether legislative
reapportionment involves a division of Cagayan de Oro City as a local government unit — are reasons
enough for considering it an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts. Additionally, the petition
assails as well a resolution of the COMELEC en banc issued to implement the legislative
apportionment that R.A. No. 9371 decrees. As an action against a COMELEC en banc resolution, the
case falls under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court that in turn requires a review by this Court via a Rule 65
petition for certiorari. 16 For these reasons, we do not see the principle of hierarchy of courts to be a
stumbling block in our consideration of the present case. TEcHCA
The Plebiscite Requirement.
The petitioner insists that R.A. No. 9371 converts and divides the City of Cagayan de Oro as
a local government unit, and does not merely provide for the City's legislative apportionment. This
argument essentially proceeds from a misunderstanding of the constitutional concepts of
apportionment of legislative districts and division of local government units.
Legislative apportionment is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as the determination of the
number of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative
body. 17 It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of
voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the
districts. 18 Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts
brought about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of
representation. 19
Article VI (entitled Legislative Department) of the 1987 Constitution lays down the
rules on legislative apportionment under its Section 5 which provides:
Sec. 5(1). (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred fifty members unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
continuous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative. aCATSI
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section.
Separately from the legislative districts that legal apportionment or reapportionment speaks
of, are the local government units (historically and generically referred to as "municipal corporations")
that the Constitution itself classified into provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. 20 In its
strict and proper sense, a municipality has been defined as "a body politic and corporate constituted by
the incorporation of the inhabitants of a city or town for the purpose of local government
thereof." 21 The creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of local government
units, i.e., of provinces, cities, municipalities, andbarangays, are covered by the Article on Local
Government (Article X). Section 10 of this Article provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance
with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political unit directly
affected. ICcDaA
Under both Article VI, Section 5, and Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution, the authority
to act has been vested in the Legislature. The Legislature undertakes the apportionment and
reapportionment of legislative districts, 22 and likewise acts on local government units by setting the
standards for their creation, division, merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries and by actually
creating, dividing, merging, abolishing local government units and altering their boundaries through
legislation. Other than this, not much commonality exists between the two provisions since they are
inherently different although they interface and relate with one another.
The concern that leaps from the text of Article VI, Section 5 is political representation and
the means to make a legislative district sufficiently represented so that the people can be effectively
heard. As above stated, the aim of legislative apportionment is "to equalize population and voting
power among districts". 23 Hence, emphasis is given to the number of people represented; the
uniform and progressive ratio to be observed among the representative districts; and accessibility and
commonality of interests in terms of each district being, as far as practicable, continuous, compact and
adjacent territory. In terms of the people represented, every city with at least 250,000 people and
every province (irrespective of population) is entitled to one representative. In this sense, legislative
districts, on the one hand, and provinces and cities, on the other, relate and interface with each other.
To ensure continued adherence to the required standards of apportionment, Section 5 (4) specifically
mandates reapportionment as soon as the given standards are met.
In contrast with the equal representation objective of Article VI, Section 5, Article X, Section
10 expressly speaks of how local government units may be "created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered". Its concern is the commencement, the termination, and the
modification of local government units' corporate existence and territorial coverage; and it speaks of
two specific standards that must be observed in implementing this concern, namely, the criteria
established in the local government code and the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Under the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160)
passed in 1991, the criteria of income, population and land area are specified as verifiable indicators of
viability and capacity to provide services. 24 The division or merger of existing units must comply with
the same requirements (since a new local government unit will come into being), provided that a
division shall not reduce the income, population, or land area of the unit affected to less than the
minimum requirement prescribed in the Code. 25 ITHADC
A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the
requirement of a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a
plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local
government unit. 26 In contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or
reapportionment provision. In Tobias v. Abalos, 27 a case that arose from the division of the
congressional district formerly covering San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate districts, we
confirmed this distinction and the fact that no plebiscite is needed in a legislative reapportionment. The
plebiscite issue came up because one was ordered and held for Mandaluyong in the course of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city, while none was held for San Juan. In explaining why this
happened, the Court ruled that no plebiscite was necessary for San Juan because the objective of the
plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as required by Article X,
Section 10 the Local Government Code; the creation of a new legislative district only followed as a
consequence.In other words, the apportionment alone and by itself did not call for a plebiscite, so that
none was needed for San Juan where only a reapportionment took place.
The need for a plebiscite under Article X, Section 10 and the lack of requirement for one
under Article VI, Section 5 can best be appreciated by a consideration of the historical roots of these
two provisions, the nature of the concepts they embody as heretofore discussed, and their areas of
application.
A Bit of History.
In Macias v. COMELEC, 28 we first jurisprudentially acknowledged the American roots of
our apportionment provision, noting its roots from the Fourteenth Amendment 29 of the
U.S. Constitution and from the constitutions of some American states. The Philippine Organic Act of
1902 created the Philippine Assembly, 30the body that acted as the lower house of the bicameral
legislature under the Americans, with the Philippine Commission acting as the upper house. While the
members of the Philippine Commission were appointed by the U.S. President with the conformity of
the U.S. Senate, the members of the Philippine Assembly were elected by representative districts
previously delineated under the Philippine Organic Act of 1902 pursuant to the mandate to apportion
the seats of the Philippine Assembly among the provinces as nearly as practicable according to
population. Thus, legislative apportionment first started in our country. IcHTED
The Jones Law or the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 maintained the apportionment
provision, dividing the country into 12 senate districts and 90 representative districts electing one
delegate each to the House of Representatives. Section 16 of the Act specifically vested the Philippine
Legislature with the authority to redistrict the Philippine Islands.
Under the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Section 5 retained the concept of legislative
apportionment together with "district" as the basic unit of apportionment; the concern was "equality of
representation . . . as an essential feature of republican institutions" as expressed in the leading case
of Macias v. COMELEC. 31 The case ruled that inequality of representation is a justiciable, not a
political issue, which ruling was reiterated in Montejo v. COMELEC. 32 Notably, no issue regarding
the holding of a plebiscite ever came up in these cases and the others that followed, as no plebiscite
was required.
Article VIII, Section 2 of the 1973 Constitution retained the concept of equal representation
"in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants andon the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio" with each district being, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent
territory. This formulation was essentially carried over to the 1987 Constitution, distinguished only
from the previous one by the presence of party-list representatives. In neither Constitution was a
plebiscite required.
The need for a plebiscite in the creation, division, merger, or abolition of local government
units was not constitutionally enshrined until the 1973 Constitution. However, as early as 1959, R.A.
No. 2264 33 required, in the creation of barrios by Provincial Boards, that the creation and definition of
boundaries be "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected". In 1961, the Charter of
the City of Caloocan (R.A. No. 3278) carried this further by requiring that the "Act shall take effect after
a majority of voters of the Municipality of Caloocan vote in favor of the conversion of their municipality
into a city in a plebiscite." This was followed up to 1972 by other legislative enactments requiring a
plebiscite as a condition for the creation and conversion of local government units as well as the
transfer of sitiosfrom one legislative unit to another. 34 In 1973, the plebiscite requirement was
accorded constitutional status. CcHDSA
Under these separate historical tracks, it can be seen that the holding of a plebiscite was
never a requirement in legislative apportionment or reapportionment. After it became constitutionally
entrenched, a plebiscite was also always identified with the creation, division, merger, abolition and
alteration of boundaries of local government units, never with the concept of legislative apportionment.
Nature and Areas of Application.
The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5 speaks of may, in a sense, be called a
political unit because it is the basis for the election of a member of the House of Representatives and
members of the local legislative body. It is not, however, a political subdivision through which functions
of government are carried out. It can more appropriately be described as a representative unit that
may or may not encompass the whole of a city or a province, but unlike the latter, it is not a corporate
unit. Not being a corporate unit, a district does not act for and in behalf of the people comprising the
district; it merely delineates the areas occupied by the people who will choose a representative in their
national affairs. Unlike a province, which has a governor; a city or a municipality, which has a mayor;
and abarangay, which has a punong barangay, a district does not have its own chief executive. The
role of the congressman that it elects is to ensure that the voice of the people of the district is heard in
Congress, not to oversee the affairs of the legislative district. Not being a corporate unit also signifies
that it has no legal personality that must be created or dissolved and has no capacity to act. Hence,
there is no need for any plebiscite in the creation, dissolution or any other similar action on a legislative
district.
The local government units, on the other hand, are political and corporate units. They are
the territorial and political subdivisions of the state. 35 They possess legal personality on the authority
of the Constitution and by action of the Legislature. The Constitution defines them as entities that
Congress can, by law, create, divide, abolish, merge; or whose boundaries can be altered
based on standards again established by both the Constitution and the Legislature. 36 A local
government unit's corporate existence begins upon the election and qualification of its chief executive
and a majority of the members of its Sanggunian. 37
As a political subdivision, a local government unit is an "instrumentality of the state in
carrying out the functions of government." 38 As a corporate entity with a distinct and separate
juridical personality from the State, it exercises special functions for the sole benefit of its constituents.
It acts as "an agency of the community in the administration of local affairs" 39 and the mediums
through which the people act in their corporate capacity on local concerns. 40 In light of these roles,
theConstitution saw it fit to expressly secure the consent of the people affected by the creation,
division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of local government units through a
plebiscite. cCSEaA
These considerations clearly show the distinctions between a legislative apportionment or
reapportionment and the division of a local government unit. Historically and by its intrinsic nature, a
legislative apportionment does not mean, and does not even imply, a division of a local government
unit where the apportionment takes place. Thus, the plebiscite requirement that applies to the division
of a province, city, municipality or barangay under the Local Government Code should not apply to
and be a requisite for the validity of a legislative apportionment or reapportionment.
R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC Res. No. 7837
R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a reapportionment legislation passed in
accordance with the authority granted to Congress under Article VI, Section 5 (4) of the Constitution.
Its core provision — Section 1 — provides:
SEC. 1. Legislative Districts. — The lone legislative district of the City
of Cagayan de Oro is hereby apportioned to commence in the next
national electionsafter the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Bonbon,
Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua, Iponan, Baikingon, San Simon,
Pagatpat, Canitoan, Balulang, Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi, Taglimao,
Tuburan, Pigsag-an, Tumpagon, Bayanga, Mambuaya, Dansulihon, Tignapoloan
and Bisigan shall comprise the first district while barangays Macabalan, Puntod,
Consolacion, Camaman-an, Nazareth, Macansandig, Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa,
Cugman, FS Catanico, Tablon, Agusan, Puerto, Bugo and Balubal and all urban
barangays from Barangay 1 to Barangay 40 shall comprise the second district.
Under these wordings, no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political and corporate entity
takes place or is mandated. Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a single unit and its administration
is not divided along territorial lines. Its territory remains completely whole and intact; there is only the
addition of another legislative district and the delineation of the city into two districts for purposes of
representation in the House of Representatives. Thus, Article X, Section 10 of theConstitution does
not come into play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two
districts.
Admittedly, the legislative reapportionment carries effects beyond the creation of another
congressional district in the city by providing, as reflected inCOMELEC Resolution No. 7837, for
additional Sangguniang Panglunsod seats to be voted for along the lines of the congressional
apportionment made. The effect onthe Sangguniang Panglunsod, however, is not directly traceable
to R.A. No. 9371 but to another law — R.A. No. 6636 41 — whose Section 3 provides: EAcIST
SEC. 3. Other Cities. — The provision of any law to the contrary
notwithstanding the City of Cebu, City of Davao, and any other city with more than
one representative district shall have eight (8) councilors for each district who
shall be residents thereof to be elected by the qualified voters therein, provided
that the cities of Cagayan de Oro, Zamboanga, Bacolod, Iloilo and other cities
comprising a representative district shall have twelve (12) councilors each and all
other cities shall have ten (10) councilors each to be elected at large by the
qualified voters of the said cities: Provided, That in no case shall the present
number of councilors according to their charters be reduced.
However, neither does this law have the effect of dividing the City of Cagayan de Oro into two political
and corporate units and territories. Rather than divide the city either territorially or as a corporate entity,
the effect is merely to enhance voter representation by giving each city voter more and greater say,
both in Congress and in the Sangguniang Panglunsod.
To illustrate this effect, before the reapportionment, Cagayan de Oro had only one
congressman and 12 city council members citywide for its population of approximately 500,000. 42 By
having two legislative districts, each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro now effectively
has two congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of the city's population. In terms of services for
city residents, this easily means better access to their congressman since each one now services only
250,000 constituents as against the 500,000 he used to represent. The same goes true for
the Sangguniang Panglungsod with its ranks increased from 12 to 16 since each legislative district
now has 8 councilors. In representation terms, the fewer constituents represented translate to a
greater voice for each individual city resident in Congress and in the Sanggunian; each congressman
and each councilor represents both a smaller area and fewer constituents whose fewer numbers are
now concentrated in each representative. The City, for its part, now has twice the number of
congressmen speaking for it and voting in the halls of Congress. Since the total number of
congressmen in the country has not increased to the point of doubling its numbers, the presence of
two congressman (instead of one) from the same city cannot but be a quantitative and proportional
improvement in the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in Congress.
Equality of representation.
The petitioner argues that the distribution of the legislative districts is unequal. District 1 has
only 93,719 registered voters while District 2 has 127,071. District 1 is composed mostly of
rural barangays while District 2 is composed mostly of urban barangays. 43 Thus, R.A. No.
9371 violates the principle of equality of representation.
A clarification must be made. The law clearly provides that the basis for districting shall be
the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province, not the number of registered voters therein. We
settled this very same question in Herrera v. COMELEC 44 when we interpreted a provision in R.A.
No. 7166 and COMELECResolution No. 2313 that applied to the Province of Guimaras. We
categorically ruled that the basis for districting is the number of inhabitants of the Province of
Guimaras by municipality based on the official 1995 Census of Population as certified to by Tomas P.
Africa, Administrator of the National Statistics Office. ADSIaT
The petitioner, unfortunately, did not provide information about the actual population of
Cagayan de Oro City. However, we take judicial notice of the August 2007 census of the National
Statistics Office which shows that barangays comprising Cagayan de Oro's first district have a total
population of 254,644, while the second district has 299,322 residents. Undeniably, these figures
show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. 45 The Constitution, however, does not
require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of
representation. 46 In fact, for cities, all it asks is that "each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand shall have one representative", while ensuring representation for every
province regardless of the size of its population. To ensure quality representation through
commonality of interests and ease of access by the representative to the constituents, all that the
Constitution requires is that every legislative district should comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Thus, the Constitution leaves the local
government units as they are found and does not require their division, merger or transfer to satisfy the
numerical standard it imposes. Its requirements are satisfied despite some numerical disparity if the
units are contiguous, compact and adjacent as far as practicable.
The petitioner's contention that there is a resulting inequality in the division of Cagayan de
Oro City into two districts because the barangays in the first district are mostly rural barangays while
the second district is mostly urban, is largely unsubstantiated. But even if backed up by proper proof,
we cannot question the division on the basis of the difference in the barangays' levels of development
or developmental focus as these are not part of the constitutional standards for legislative
apportionment or reapportionment. What the components of the two districts of Cagayan de Oro would
be is a matter for the lawmakers to determine as a matter of policy. In the absence of any grave abuse
of discretion or violation of the established legal parameters, this Court cannot intrude into the wisdom
of these policies. 47
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. Costs against the
petitioner. THaCAI
SO ORDERED.
||| (Bagabuyo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 176970, [December 8, 2008], 593 PHIL 678-702)
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 207264. June 25, 2013.]
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J p:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order dated 7 June 2013 filed by petitioner Regina Ongsiako
Reyes, assailing the Resolutions dated 27 March 2013 and 14 May 2013 issued by public respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 13-053. The assailed Resolutions ordered the
cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner for the position of Representative of the lone district
of Marinduque.
On 31 October 2012, respondent Joseph Socorro Tan, a registered voter and resident of the
Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course
or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner on the ground that it contained material
misrepresentations, specifically: (1) that she is single when she is married to Congressman Herminaldo I.
Mandanas of Batangas; 1 (2) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque when she is a
resident of Bauan, Batangas which is the residence of her husband, and at the same time, when she is also
a resident of 135 J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa, Quezon City as admitted in the Directory of Congressional
Spouses of the House of Representatives; 2 (3) that her date of birth is 3 July 1964 when other documents
show that her birthdate is either 8 July 1959 or 3 July 1960; 3 (4) that she is not a permanent resident of
another country when she is a permanent resident or an immigrant 4 of the United States of America; 5 and
(5) that she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an American citizen. 6 TaSEHC
In her Answer, petitioner countered that, while she is publicly known to be the wife of
Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas (Congressman Mandanas), there is no valid and binding marriage
between them. According to petitioner, although her marriage with Congressman Mandanas was
solemnized in a religious rite, it did not comply with certain formal requirements prescribed by the Family
Code, rendering it void ab initio. 7 Consequently, petitioner argues that as she is not duty-bound to live with
Congressman Mandanas, then his residence cannot be attributed to her. 8 As to her date of birth, the
Certificate of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office shows that it was on 3 July 1964. 9 Lastly,
petitioner notes that the allegation that she is a permanent resident and/or a citizen of the United States of
America is not supported by evidence. 10
During the course of the proceedings, on 8 February 2013, respondent filed a "Manifestation with
Motion to Admit Newly Discovered Evidence and Amended List of Exhibits" 11 consisting of, among others:
(1) a copy of an article published on the internet on 8 January 2013 entitled "Seeking and Finding the Truth
about Regina O. Reyes" with an Affidavit of Identification and Authenticity of Document executed by its
author Eliseo J. Obligacion, which provides a database record of the Bureau of Immigration indicating that
petitioner is an American citizen and a holder of a U.S. passport; (2) a Certification of Travel Records of
petitioner, issued by Simeon Sanchez, Acting Chief, Verification and Certification Unit of the Bureau of
Immigration which indicates that petitioner used a U.S. Passport in her various travels abroad.
On 27 March 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution 12 cancelling petitioner's
COC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO
REYES is hereby CANCELLED. EHaCTA
The COMELEC First Division found that, contrary to the declarations that she made in her COC,
petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the requirements
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, namely: (1) to
take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; and (2) to make a personal and sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. In
addition, the COMELEC First Division ruled that she did not have the one-year residency requirement under
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. 13 Thus, she is ineligible to run for the position of
Representative for the lone district of Marinduque.
Not agreeing with the Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration 14 on 8 April 2013 claiming that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she has not
lost such status by simply obtaining and using an American passport. Additionally, petitioner surmised that
the COMELEC First Division relied on the fact of her marriage to an American citizen in concluding that she
is a naturalized American citizen. Petitioner averred, however, that such marriage only resulted into dual
citizenship, thus there is no need for her to fulfill the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225. Still, petitioner
attached an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship sworn to before a Notary Public on 24
September 2012. As to her alleged lack of the one-year residency requirement prescribed by the
Constitution, she averred that, as she never became a naturalized citizen, she never lost her domicile of
origin, which is Boac, Marinduque.
On 14 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc, promulgated a Resolution 15 denying petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
Four days thereafter or on 18 May 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013
Elections.
On 5 June 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality 16 declaring the 14 May
2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc final and executory, considering that more than twenty-one (21)
days have elapsed from the date of promulgation with no order issued by this Court restraining its
execution. 17
On same day, petitioner took her oath of office 18 before Feliciano R. Belmonte Jr., Speaker of
the House of Representatives.
Petitioner has yet to assume office, the term of which officially starts at noon of 30 June 2013.
In the present Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order, petitioner raises the following issues: 19
31) Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over Petitioner
who is a duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for
the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone
congressional district of Marinduque. aEIADT
 32) Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it took cognizance of
Respondent Tan's alleged "newly-discovered evidence" without the same having
been testified on and offered and admitted in evidence which became the basis
for its Resolution of the case without giving the petitioner the opportunity to
question and present controverting evidence, in violation of Petitioner's right to
due process of law.
33) Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared that Petitioner is not a
Filipino citizen and did not meet the residency requirement for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives.
34) Whether or not Respondent Commission on Elections committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, by enforcing
the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225, it imposed additional qualifications to the
qualifications of a Member of the House of Representatives as enumerated in
Section 6 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.
The petition must fail.
At the outset, it is observed that the issue of jurisdiction of respondent COMELEC vis-a-vis that of
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) appears to be a non-issue. Petitioner is taking an
inconsistent, if not confusing, stance for while she seeks remedy before this Court, she is asserting that it is
the HRET which has jurisdiction over her. Thus, she posits that the issue on her eligibility and qualifications
to be a Member of the House of Representatives is best discussed in another tribunal of competent
jurisdiction. It appears then that petitioner's recourse to this Court was made only in an attempt to enjoin the
COMELEC from implementing its final and executory judgment in SPA No. 13-053.
Nevertheless, we pay due regard to the petition, and consider each of the issues raised by
petitioner. The need to do so, and at once, was highlighted during the discussion En Banc on 25 June 2013
where and when it was emphasized that the term of office of the Members of the House of Representatives
begins on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly
proclaimed 20 because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET has the
exclusive jurisdiction to be the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications"
of the Members of the House of Representatives.
Contrary to petitioner's claim, however, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction for the following
reasons:
First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications, as well
as over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has
not averred that she has filed such action. HcTIDC
Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of
the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. . . .
As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, 21 the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who is
not a member of the House of Representatives, to wit:
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed
assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8,
1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress
beginsonly after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of
Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction
over the question. (Emphasis supplied.)
The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a Member of the House of
Representatives?
In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC, 22 citing Aggabao v. COMELEC 23 and Guerrero v.
COMELEC, 24 the Court ruled that:
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has
been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House
of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to
his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction
begins. (Emphasis supplied.) TaSEHD
This pronouncement was reiterated in the case of Limkaichong v. COMELEC, 25 wherein the
Court, referring to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC vis-a-vis the HRET, held that:
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.
(Emphasis supplied.)
This was again affirmed in Gonzalez v. COMELEC, 26 to wit:
After proclamation, taking of oath and assumption of office by
Gonzalez, jurisdiction over the matter of his qualifications, as well as questions
regarding the conduct of election and contested returns — were transferred to the
HRET as the constitutional body created to pass upon the same. (Emphasis
supplied.)
From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a
proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.
Indeed, in some cases, this Court has made the pronouncement that once a proclamation has
been made, COMELEC's jurisdiction is already lost and, thus, its jurisdiction over contests relating to
elections, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. However, it must be
noted that in these cases, the doctrinal pronouncement was made in the context of a proclaimed candidate
who had not only taken an oath of office, but who had also assumed office. DIETcC
For instance, in the case of Dimaporo v. COMELEC, 27 the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the
HRET against that of the COMELEC only after the candidate had been proclaimed, taken his oath of office
before the Speaker of the House, and assumed the duties of a Congressman on 26 September 2007, or
after the start of his term on 30 June 2007, to wit:
On October 8, 2007, private respondent Belmonte filed his comment in
which he brought to Our attention that on September 26, 2007, even before the
 issuance of the status quo ante order of the Court, he had already
been proclaimed by the PBOC as the duly elected Member of the House of
Representatives of the First Congressional District of Lanao del Norte. On that very
same day, he had taken his oath before Speaker of the House Jose de Venecia, Jr.
and assumed his dutiesaccordingly.
In light of this development, jurisdiction over this case has already been
transferred to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). (Emphasis
supplied.)
Apparently, the earlier cases were decided after the questioned candidate had already assumed
office, and hence, was already considered a Member of the House of Representatives, unlike in the present
case.
Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because,
primarily, she has not yet assumed office. To repeat what has earlier been said, the term of office of a
Member of the House of Representatives begins only "at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following
their election." 28 Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction.
In her attempt to comply with the second requirement, petitioner attached a purported Oath of
Office taken before Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 5 June 2013. However, this is not the oath of office
which confers membership to the House of Representatives. ATHCDa
Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House of Representatives provides:
Section 6. Oath or Affirmation of Members. — Members shall take their
oath or affirmation either collectively or individually before the Speaker in open
session.
Consequently, before there is a valid or official taking of the oath it must be made (1) before the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she made the oath
before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during plenary or in open session and,
thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of office was indeed complied with.
More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy — that before the
proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of the
issue of petitioner's lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14
May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioner's qualifications to
run for the position of Member of the House of Representative. We will inexcusably disregard this fact if we
accept the argument of the petitioner that the COMELEC was ousted of jurisdiction when she was
proclaimed, which was four days after the COMELEC En Banc decision. The Board of Canvasser which
proclaimed petitioner cannot by such act be allowed to render nugatory a decision of the COMELEC En
Banc which affirmed a decision of the COMELEC First Division.
Indeed, the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC First Division which was promulgated on 27
March 2013, and the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC En Bancwhich was promulgated on 14 May
2013, became final and executory on 19 May 2013 based on Section 3, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure which provides:SECIcT
Section 3. Decisions Final after five days. — Decisions in
pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of
candidacy, to declare nuisance candidate or to disqualify a candidate, and to
postpone or suspend elections shall become final and executory after the lapse of
five (5) days from their promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court.
To prevent the assailed Resolution dated 14 May 2013 from becoming final and executory,
petitioner should have availed herself of Section 1, Rule 37 29 of theCOMELEC Rules of Procedure or Rule
64 30 of the Rules of Court by filing a petition before this Court within the 5-day period, but she failed to do
so. She would file the present last hour petition on 10 June 2013. Hence, on 5 June 2013, respondent
COMELEC rightly issued a Certificate of Finality.
As to the issue of whether petitioner failed to prove her Filipino citizenship, as well as her
one-year residency in Marinduque, suffice it to say that the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of
discretion in finding her ineligible for the position of Member of the House of Representatives.
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance
of "newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted in
evidence. She assails the admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of
the Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a violation of her
right to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity to question and present controverting
evidence.
Her contentions are incorrect.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of
procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure "shall be liberally construed in order . . . to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission." In view of
the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are
summary in nature, then the "newly discovered evidence" was properly admitted by respondent
COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given every
opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan's petition was filed
up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5)
months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the opportunity given her.
Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given
the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC: 31 IDTHcA
The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not
necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard.
One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many
times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings. In
administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his
motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied)
As to the ruling that petitioner is ineligible to run for office on the ground of citizenship, the
COMELEC First Division, discoursed as follows:
". . . for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become
eligible for public office, the law requires that she must have accomplished the
following acts: (1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
before the Consul-General of the Philippine Consulate in the USA; and (2) make
a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath.
 In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondent complied with the
aforesaid requirements. Early on in the proceeding, respondent hammered on
petitioner's lack of proof regarding her American citizenship, contending that it is
petitioner's burden to present a case. She, however, specifically denied that she has
become either a permanent resident or naturalized citizen of the USA.
Due to petitioner's submission of newly-discovered evidence thru a
Manifestation dated February 7, 2013, however, establishing the fact
that respondent is a holder of an American passport which she continues to use until
June 30, 2012, petitioner was able to substantiate his allegations. The burden now
shifts to respondent to present substantial evidence to prove otherwise. This, the
respondent utterly failed to do, leading to the conclusion inevitable that respondent
falsely misrepresented in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless
and until she can establish that she had availed of the privileges of RA
9225 by becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen, and thereafter, made a
valid sworn renunciation of her American citizenship, she remains to be an
American citizen and is, therefore, ineligible to run for and hold any elective
public office in the Philippines." 32 (Emphasis supplied.) cAHIaE
Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's
COC, respondent submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US
passport, and that her status is that of a "balikbayan." At this point, the burden of proof shifted to petitioner,
imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost the same, or
that she has re-acquired such status in accordance with the provisions ofR.A. No. 9225. Aside from the
bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such
contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.
Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc, petitioner admitted
that she is a holder of a US passport, but she averred that she is only a dual Filipino-American citizen, thus
the requirements of R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to her. 33 Still, attached to the said motion is an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated 24 September 2012. 34 Petitioner explains that she attached
said Affidavit "if only to show her desire and zeal to serve the people and to comply with rules, even as a
superfluity." 35 We cannot, however, subscribe to petitioner's explanation. If petitioner executed said
Affidavit "if only to comply with the rules," then it is an admission that R.A. No. 9225 applies to her.
Petitioner cannot claim that she executed it to address the observations by the COMELEC as the assailed
Resolutions were promulgated only in 2013, while the Affidavit was executed in September 2012. HDTcEI
Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a footnote to her oath of office as Provincial
Administrator, to this effect: "This does not mean that Petitioner did not, prior to her taking her oath of office
as Provincial Administrator, take her oath of allegiance for purposes of re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino
status, which she reserves to present in the proper proceeding. The reference to the taking of oath of office
is in order to make reference to what is already part of the records and evidence in the present case and to
avoid injecting into the records evidence on matters of fact that was not previously passed upon by
Respondent COMELEC." 36 This statement raises a lot of questions — Did petitioner execute an oath of
allegiance for re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status? If she did, why did she not present it at the
earliest opportunity before the COMELEC? And is this an admission that she has indeed lost her
natural-born Filipino status?
To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A. No. 9225, petitioner
contends that, since she took her oath of allegiance in connection with her appointment as Provincial
Administrator of Marinduque, she is deemed to have reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is being presented for the first time before this
Court, as it was never raised before the COMELEC. For another, said oath of allegiance cannot be
considered compliance with Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 9225 as certain requirements have to be met as prescribed
by Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01, otherwise known as the Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship
under R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05-002 (Revised Rules) andAdministrative Order
No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of Immigration. Thus, petitioner's oath of office as Provincial
Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance with R.A. No. 9225.
These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt was clearly cast on petitioner's
citizenship. Petitioner, however, failed to clear such doubt.
As to the issue of residency, proceeding from the finding that petitioner has lost her natural-born
status, we quote with approval the ruling of the COMELEC First Division that petitioner cannot be
considered a resident of Marinduque:
"Thus, a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively
abandons his domicile of origin. Upon re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship
pursuant toRA 9225, he must still show that he chose to establish his
domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, and the period of his
residency shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice.
In this case, there is no showing whatsoever that [petitioner] had already
re-acquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that she
has regained her domicile in the Philippines. There being no proof that [petitioner]
had renounced her American citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her
domicile of choice in the USA.
The only proof presented by [petitioner] to show that she has met the
one-year residency requirement of the law and never abandoned her domicile of
origin in Boac, Marinduque is her claim that she served as Provincial Administrator
of the province from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011. But such fact alone is not
sufficient to prove her one-year residency. For, [petitioner] has never
regained her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American
citizen. No amount of her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that
she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA." 37 (Emphasis
supplied.) ESAHca
All in all, considering that the petition for denial and cancellation of the COC is summary in nature,
the COMELEC is given much discretion in the evaluation and admission of evidence pursuant to its
principal objective of determining of whether or not the COC should be cancelled. We held in Mastura v.
COMELEC: 38
The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed
by courts of justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial
evidence in support of such findings should be applied with greater force when it
concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to place the
COMELEC — created and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself —
on a level higher than statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad
powers to ascertain the true results of the election by means available to it. For the
attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound by the rules of evidence.
Time and again, We emphasize that the "grave abuse of discretion" which warrants this Court's
exercise of certiorari jurisdiction has a well-defined meaning. Guidance is found in Beluso v. Commission
on Elections 39 where the Court held:
 . . . A petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of
discretion is alleged and proved to exist. "Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule
65, has a specific meaning. It is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to
passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious
exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck
down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross. (Emphasis supplied.) SDIaCT

Here, this Court finds that petitioner failed to adequately and substantially show that grave abuse
of discretion exists.

Lastly, anent the proposition of petitioner that the act of the COMELEC in enforcing the provisions
of R.A. No. 9225, insofar as it adds to the qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives other
than those enumerated in the Constitution, is unconstitutional, We find the same meritless.

The COMELEC did not impose additional qualifications on candidates for the House of
Representatives who have acquired foreign citizenship. It merely applied the qualifications prescribed by
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that the candidate must be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and must have one-year residency prior to the date of elections. Such being the case, the
COMELEC did not err when it inquired into the compliance by petitioner of Sections 3 and 5 of R.A. No.
9225 to determine if she reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen. It simply applied the
constitutional provision and nothing more.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc affirming the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is upheld.

SO ORDERED. SHECcD
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 207264. October 22, 2013.]
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J p:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Banc Resolution of 25 June 2013 which
stated that:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED,
finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. The
14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc affirming the 27 March 2013
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is upheld."
In her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner summarizes her submission, thus:
"81. Stated differently, the Petitioner . . . is not asking the Honorable Court
to make a determination as regards her qualifications, she is merely asking the
Honorable Court to affirm the jurisdiction of the HRET to solely and exclusively pass
upon such qualifications and to set aside the COMELEC Resolutions for having
denied Petitioner her right to due process and for unconstitutionally adding a
qualification not otherwise required by the constitution." 1 (as originally
underscored)cAEaSC
The first part of the summary refers to the issue raised in the petition, which is:
"31. Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over Petitioner
who is duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for
the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone
congressional district of Marinduque." 2
Tied up and neatened the propositions on the COMELEC-or-HRET jurisdiction go thus:
petitioner is a duly proclaimed winner and having taken her oath of office as member of the House of
Representatives, all questions regarding her qualifications are outside the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive jurisdiction.
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner's submission.
The crucial question is whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed on 18 May 2013. Differently
stated, was there basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013?
Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18
May 2013. Without the proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and without a
precedent oath of office, there can be no valid and effective assumption of office. AaIDCS
We have clearly stated in our Resolution of 25 June 2013 that:
"More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy —
that before the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En
Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner's lack of Filipino
citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013,
there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioner's
qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives. . . ."
As the point has obviously been missed by the petitioner who continues to argue on the
basis of her "due proclamation," the instant motion gives us the opportunity to highlight the undeniable
fact we here repeat that the proclamation which petitioner secured on 18 May 2013 was WITHOUT
ANY BASIS.
1. Four (4) days BEFORE the 18 May 2013 proclamation, or on 14 May 2013, the
COMELEC En Banc has already denied for lack of merit the petitioner's motion to reconsider the
decision of the COMELEC First Division that CANCELLED petitioner's certificate of
candidacy. SDIaCT
2. On 18 May 2013, there was already a standing and unquestioned cancellation of
petitioner's certificate of candidacy which cancellation is a definite bar to her proclamation. On 18 May
2003, that bar has not been removed, there was not even any attempt to remove it.
3. The COMELEC Rules indicate the manner by which the impediment to proclamation may
be removed. Rule 18, Section 13 (b) provides:
"(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the
Commission En Banc shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its
promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court."
Within that five (5) days, petitioner had the opportunity to go to the Supreme Court for a restraining
order that will remove the immediate effect of the En Banccancellation of her certificate of candidacy.
Within the five (5) days the Supreme Court may remove the barrier to, and thus allow, the
proclamation of petitioner. That did not happen. Petitioner did not move to have it happen. DHTCaI
It is error to argue that the five days should pass before the petitioner is barred from being
proclaimed. Petitioner lost in the COMELEC as respondent. Her certificate of candidacy has been
ordered cancelled. She could not be proclaimed because there was a final finding against her by the
COMELEC. 3 She needed a restraining order from the Supreme Court to avoid the final finding. After
the five days when the decision adverse to her became executory, the need for Supreme Court
intervention became even more imperative. She would have to base her recourse on the position that
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling her certificate of candidacy and that
a restraining order, which would allow her proclamation, will have to be based on irreparable injury and
demonstrated possibility of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC. In this case, before
and after the 18 May 2013 proclamation, there was not even an attempt at the legal remedy, clearly
available to her, to permit her proclamation. What petitioner did was to "take the law into her hands"
and secure a proclamation in complete disregard of the COMELEC En Banc decision that was final on
14 May 2013 and final and executory five days thereafter. cTIESD
4. There is a reason why no mention about notice was made in Section 13 (b) of Rule 18 in
the provision that the COMELEC En Banc or decision "[SHALL] become [FINAL AND EXECUTORY]
after five days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court." On its own the
COMELEC En Banc decision, unrestrained, moves from promulgation into becoming final and
executory. This is so because in Section 5 of Rule 18, it is stated:
 Section 5. Promulgation. — The promulgation of a decision or resolutions
of the Commission or a division shall be made on a date previously fixed, of which
notice shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally or by
registered mail or by telegram.
5. Apart from the presumed notice of the COMELEC En Banc decision on the very date of
its promulgation on 14 May 2013, petitioner admitted in her petition before us that she in fact received
a copy of the decision on 16 May 2013. 4 On that date, she had absolutely no reason why she would
disregard the available legal way to remove the restraint on her proclamation, and, more than that, to
in fact secure a proclamation two days thereafter. The utter disregard of a final COMELEC En
Banc decision and of the Rule stating that her proclamation at that point MUST be on permission by
the Supreme Court is even indicative of bad faith on the part of the petitioner.
6. The indicant is magnified by the fact that petitioner would use her tainted proclamation as
the very reason to support her argument that she could no longer be reached by the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC; and that it is the HRET that has exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of her qualifications
for office. SECATH
7. The suggestions of bad faith aside, petitioner is in error in the conclusion at which she
directs, as well as in her objective quite obvious from such conclusion. It is with her procured
proclamation that petitioner nullifies the COMELEC's decision, by Division and then En Banc, and
pre-empts any Supreme Court action on the COMELEC decision. In other words, petitioner repudiates
by her proclamation all administrative and judicial actions thereon, past and present. And by her
proclamation, she claims as acquired the congressional seat that she sought to be a candidate for. As
already shown, the reasons that lead to the impermissibility of the objective are clear. She cannot sit
as Member of the House of Representatives by virtue of a baseless proclamation knowingly taken,
with knowledge of the existing legal impediment.
8. Petitioner, therefore, is in error when she posits that at present it is the HRET which has
exclusive jurisdiction over her qualifications as a Member of the House of Representatives. That the
HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the House of Representatives is a written constitutional provision. It is, however
unavailable to petitioner because she is NOT a Member of the House at present. The COMELEC
never ordered her proclamation as the rightful winner in the election for such membership. 5 Indeed,
the action for cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy, the decision in which is the
indispensable determinant of the right of petitioner to proclamation, was correctly lodged in the
COMELEC, was completely and fully litigated in the COMELEC and was finally decided by the
COMELEC. On and after 14 May 2013, there was nothing left for the COMELEC to do to decide the
case. The decision sealed the proceedings in the COMELEC regarding petitioner's ineligibility as a
candidate for Representative of Marinduque. The decision erected the bar to petitioner's proclamation.
The bar remained when no restraining order was obtained by petitioner from the Supreme Court within
five days from 14 May 2013. IDaEHC
9. When petitioner finally went to the Supreme Court on 10 June 2013 questioning the
COMELEC First Division ruling and the 14 May 2013 COMELEC En Banc decision, her baseless
proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by that fact of promulgation alone become valid and legal. A
decision favorable to her by the Supreme Court regarding the decision of the COMELEC En Banc on
her certificate of candidacy was indispensably needed, not to legalize her proclamation on 18 May
2013 but to authorize a proclamation with the Supreme Court decision as basis.
10. The recourse taken on 25 June 2013 in the form of an original and special civil action for
a writ of Certiorari through Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is circumscribed by set rules and principles.
a) The special action before the COMELEC which was a Petition to Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy was a SUMMARY PROCEEDING or one "heard summarily." The nature of the
proceedings is best indicated by the COMELEC Rule on Special Actions, Rule 23, Section 4 of which
states that the Commission may designate any of its officials who are members of the Philippine Bar to
hear the case and to receive evidence. COMELEC Rule 17 further provides in Section 3 that when the
proceedings are authorized to be summary, in lieu of oral testimonies, the parties may, after due notice,
be required to submit their position paper together with affidavits, counter-affidavits and other
documentary evidence; . . . and that "[t]his provision shall likewise apply to cases where the hearing
and reception of evidence are delegated by the Commission or the Division to any of its officials . . . ."
b) The special and civil action of Certiorari is defined in the Rules of Court thus: EDaHAT
When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require.
The accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion is: a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
because of passion or hostility. 6
It is the category of the special action below providing the procedural leeway in the exercise
of the COMELEC summary jurisdiction over the case, in conjunction with the limits of the Supreme
Court's authority over the FINAL COMELEC ruling that is brought before it, that defines the way
petitioner's submission before the Court should be adjudicated. Thus further explained, the disposition
of 25 June 2013 is here repeated for affirmation:
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when
it took cognizance of "newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been
testified on and offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the admission of the
blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of the Certification from
the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a violation of her
right to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity to question
and present controverting evidence. DHTECc
Her contentions are incorrect.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere
to the technical rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2
of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally construed in order . . .
to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every
action and proceeding brought before the Commission." In view of the fact that the
proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are
summary in nature, then the "newly discovered evidence" was properly admitted by
respondent COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as
petitioner was given every opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC.
From 10 October 2012 when Tan's petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the
First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5) months to
adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the opportunity given
her.
 Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires
that the party be given the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case
ofSahali v. COMELEC:
The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not
necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right
to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also,
and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral
argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied;
administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its
strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be
heard on his motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied) SHTaID
As to the ruling that petitioner is ineligible to run for office on the ground of
citizenship, the COMELEC First Division, discoursed as follows:
". . . for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and
become eligible for public office, the law requires that she must have
accomplished the following acts: (1) take the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines before the Consul-General of the Philippine
Consulate in the USA; and (2) make apersonal and sworn renunciation
of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondent
complied with the aforesaid requirements. Early on in the proceeding,
respondent hammered on petitioner's lack of proof regarding her
American citizenship, contending that it is petitioner's burden to present a
case. She, however, specifically denied that she has become either a
permanent resident or naturalized citizen of the USA. ACcHIa
Due to petitioner's submission of newly-discovered evidence
thru a Manifestation dated February 7, 2013, however, establishing the
fact that respondent is a holder of an American passport which she
continues to use until June 30, 2012, petitioner was able to substantiate
his allegations. The burden now shifts to respondent to present
substantial evidence to prove otherwise. This, the respondent utterly
failed to do, leading to the conclusion inevitable that respondent falsely
misrepresented in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen. Unless and until she can establish that she had availed of the
privileges of RA 9225 by becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen,
and thereafter, made a valid sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship, she remains to be an American citizen and is, therefore,
ineligible to run for and hold any elective public office in the
Philippines." (Emphasis in the original.)
Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In moving for the
cancellation of petitioner's COC, respondent submitted records of the Bureau of
Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her status
is that of a "balikbayan." At this point, the burden of proof shifted to petitioner,
imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and
has not lost the same, or that she has re-acquired such status in accordance with
the provisions ofR.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare allegation that she is a
natural-born citizen, however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such
contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No.
9225 to her. SHCaDA
Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En
Banc, petitioner admitted that she is a holder of a US passport, but she averred that
she is only a dual Filipino-American citizen, thus the requirements of R.A. No.
9225 do not apply to her. Still, attached to the said motion is an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated 24 September 2012. Petitioner explains
that she attached said Affidavit "if only to show her desire and zeal to serve the
people and to comply with rules, even as a superfluity." We cannot, however,
subscribe to petitioner's explanation. If petitioner executed said Affidavit "if only to
comply with the rules," then it is an admission that R.A. No. 9225 applies to her.
Petitioner cannot claim that she executed it to address the observations by the
COMELEC as the assailed Resolutions were promulgated only in 2013, while the
Affidavit was executed in September 2012.
Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a footnote to her oath
of office as Provincial Administrator, to this effect: "This does not mean that
Petitioner did not, prior to her taking her oath of office as Provincial Administrator,
take her oath of allegiance for purposes of re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino
status, which she reserves to present in the proper proceeding. The reference to the
taking of oath of office is in order to make reference to what is already part of the
records and evidence in the present case and to avoid injecting into the records
evidence on matters of fact that was not previously passed upon by Respondent
COMELEC." This statement raises a lot of questions — Did petitioner execute an
oath of allegiance for re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status? If she did, why
did she not present it at the earliest opportunity before the COMELEC? And is this
an admission that she has indeed lost her natural-born Filipino status?
To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A.
No. 9225, petitioner contends that, since she took her oath of allegiance in
connection with her appointment as Provincial Administrator of Marinduque, she is
deemed to have reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is being presented for
the first time before this Court, as it was never raised before the COMELEC. For
another, said oath of allegiance cannot be considered compliance with Sec. 3 of R.A.
No. 9225 as certain requirements have to be met as prescribed by Memorandum
Circular No. AFF-04-01, otherwise known as the Rules Governing Philippine
Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05-002
(Revised Rules) andAdministrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by the
Bureau of Immigration. Thus, petitioner's oath of office as Provincial Administrator
cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance with R.A. No. 9225.
These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt was clearly cast
on petitioner's citizenship. Petitioner, however, failed to clear such doubt. 7
11. It may need pointing out that there is no conflict between the COMELEC and the HRET
insofar as the petitioner's being a Representative of Marinduque is concerned. The COMELEC covers
the matter of petitioner's certificate of candidacy, and its due course or its cancellation, which are the
pivotal conclusions that determines who can be legally proclaimed. The matter can go to the Supreme
Court but not as a continuation of the proceedings in the COMELEC, which has in fact ended, but on
 an original action before the Court grounded on more than mere error of judgment but on error of
jurisdiction for grave abuse of discretion. At and after the COMELEC En Banc decision, there is no
longer any certificate cancellation matter than can go to the HRET. In that sense, the HRET's
constitutional authority opens, over the qualification of its MEMBER, who becomes so only upon a duly
and legally based proclamation, the first and unavoidable step towards such membership. The HRET
jurisdiction over the qualification of the Member of the House of Representatives is original and
exclusive, and as such, proceeds de novounhampered by the proceedings in the COMELEC which,
as just stated has been terminated. The HRET proceedings is a regular, not summary, proceeding. It
will determine who should be the Member of the House. It must be made clear though, at the risk of
repetitiveness, that no hiatus occurs in the representation of Marinduque in the House because there
is such a representative who shall sit as the HRET proceedings are had till termination. Such
representative is the duly proclaimed winner resulting from the terminated case of cancellation of
certificate of candidacy of petitioner. The petitioner is not, cannot, be that representative. And this, all
in all, is the crux of the dispute between the parties: who shall sit in the House in representation of
Marinduque, while there is yet no HRET decision on the qualifications of the Member. cDECIA
12. As finale, and as explained in the discussion just done, no unwarranted haste can be
attributed, as the dissent does so, to the resolution of this petition promulgated on 25 June 2013. It was
not done to prevent the exercise by the HRET of its constitutional duty. Quite the contrary, the speedy
resolution of the petition was done to pave the way for the unimpeded performance by the HRET of its
constitutional role. The petitioner can very well invoke the authority of the HRET, but not as a sitting
member of the House of Representatives. 8
The inhibition of this ponente was moved for. The reason for the denial of the motion was
contained in a letter to the members of the Court on the understanding that the matter was internal to
the Court. The ponente now seeks the Courts approval to have the explanation published as it is now
appended to this Resolution.
The motion to withdraw petition filed AFTER the Court has acted thereon, is noted. It may
well be in order to remind petitioner that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the
parties, but continues until the case is terminated. 9 When petitioner filed her Petition
for Certiorari, jurisdiction vested in the Court and, in fact, the Court exercised such jurisdiction when it
acted on the petition. Such jurisdiction cannot be lost by the unilateral withdrawal of the petition by
petitioner. cDCSTA
More importantly, the Resolution dated 25 June 2013, being a valid court issuance,
undoubtedly has legal consequences. Petitioner cannot, by the mere expediency of withdrawing the
petition, negative and nullify the Court's Resolution and its legal effects. At this point, we counsel
petitioner against trifling with court processes. Having sought the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
petitioner cannot withdraw her petition to erase the ruling adverse to her interests. Obviously, she
cannot, as she designed below, subject to her predilections the supremacy of the law.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The dismissal of the petition is
affirmed. Entry of Judgment is ordered.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Reyes v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207264 (Resolution), [October 22, 2013], 720 PHIL
174-309)
 EN BANC Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 — Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher
Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher)
— in a petition for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition, 3 assails NBC Resolution No.
[G.R. No. 179271. April 21, 2009.] 07-60 4 promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial proclamation of parties,
organizations and coalitions that obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast under the
Party-List System. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-list
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in
TRANSPARENCY accordance with Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC 5 (Veterans).
(BANAT), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National
Board of Canvassers), respondent. Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of
the Veterans Freedom Party, filed a motion to intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.
The Facts
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE PROFESSIONALS, intervenor.
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives.
The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System. 6
AANGAT TAYO, intervenor. On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the
NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "[t]he Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, recently been quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement
INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS), intervenor. the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats". 7 There
were no intervenors in BANAT's petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on 19 July
2007. aTEACS
[G.R. No. 179295. April 21, 2009.] On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60.
NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections,
namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens' Battle Against Corruption
BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR TEACHER EMPOWERMENT THROUGH (CIBAC), Gabriela's Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC),
ACTION, COOPERATION AND HARMONY TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL),
REFORMS, INC., and Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC),
ABONO, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety below:
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National
Board of Canvassers, thru its Sub-Committee for Party-List, as of 03 July 2007, had
DECISION officially canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a total of fifteen million two
hundred eighty three thousand six hundred fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes under
the Party-List System of Representation, in connection with the National and
Local Elections conducted last 14 May 2007;
CARPIO, J p: WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of
the National Board of Canvassers reveals that the projected/maximum total
The Case party-list votes cannot go any higher than sixteen million seven hundred twenty
three thousand one hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes given the following
Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 — Barangay Association for National Advancement and statistical data:
Transparency (BANAT) — in a petition for certiorari and mandamus, 1assails the
Resolution 2 promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in NBC No. Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections
07-041 (PL). The COMELEC's resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the recommendation of
Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny the
petition of BANAT for being moot. BANAT filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC,
a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by theConstitution. i. Total party-list votes already canvassed/ 15,283,659

The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science Professionals tabulated
(ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc.
(Senior Citizens).
ii. Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/ 1,337,032 3 CIBAC 760,260

untabulated (i.e. canvass deferred) 4 GABRIELA 610,451

5 APEC 538,971

iii. Maximum party-list votes (based on 100% 102,430 6 A TEACHER 476,036

outcome) from areas not yet submitted for 7 AKBAYAN 470,872

canvass (Bogo, Cebu; Bais City; Pantar, 8 ALAGAD 423,076

Lanao del Norte; and Pagalungan, 9 BUTIL 405,052

Maguindanao) 10 COOP-NATCO 390,029

11 BATAS 386,361

Maximum Total Party-List Votes 16,723,121 12 ANAK PAWIS 376,036

13 ARC 338,194

WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) 14 ABONO 337,046
provides in part:

The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two

percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion
to their total number of votes: provided, finally, that each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of
party-list votes, the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold can be pegged at three
hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes;
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizen's Battle Against Corruption
(CIBAC) versus COMELEC, reiterated its ruling in Veterans Federation
Party versus COMELECadopting a formula for the additional seats of each party,
organization or coalition receiving more than the required two percent (2%) votes,
stating that the same shall be determined only after all party-list ballots have been
completely canvassed;
WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far
garnered at least three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two
(334,462)votes are as follows:
RANK PARTY/ORGANIZATION/ VOTES
COALITION RECEIVED
WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing
Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an URGENT PETITION FOR
CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION AND DISQUALIFICATION OF
PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has
been filed before the Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07-250, all the parties,
organizations and coalitions included in the aforementioned list are therefore
entitled to at least one seat under the party-list system of representation in the
meantime. SATDHE
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by
the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic
Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941, and other election laws, the Commission on Elections,
sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to
PARTIALLY PROCLAIM, subject to certain conditions set forth below, the following
parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List System:
1 Buhay Hayaan Yumabong BUHAY
2 Bayan Muna BAYAN MUNA
3 Citizens Battle Against Corruption CIBAC
4 Gabriela Women's Party GABRIELA
5 Association of Philippine Electric APEC

Cooperatives
1 BUHAY 1,163,218
6 Advocacy for Teacher A TEACHER
2 BAYAN MUNA 972,730
 Empowerment Through WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory
Committee of the National Board of Canvassers, the projected maximum total
Action, Cooperation and party-list votes, as of July 11, 2007, based on the votes actually canvassed, votes
canvassed but not included in Report No. 29, votes received but uncanvassed, and
Harmony Towards maximum votes expected for Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and that the
projected maximum total votes for the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations
Educational Reforms, Inc.
and coalition[s] are as follows:
7 Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party AKBAYAN
Party-List Projected total number of
8 Alagad ALAGAD votes

9 Luzon Farmers Party BUTIL

10 Cooperative-Natco Network Party COOP-NATCCO 1 BUHAY 1,178,747

11 Anak Pawis ANAKPAWIS 2 BAYAN MUNA 977,476

12 Alliance of Rural Concerns ARC 3 CIBAC 755,964

13 Abono ABONO 4 GABRIELA 621,718

5 APEC 622,489

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, 6 A TEACHER 492,369

organizations, or coalitions which may later on be established to have obtained at
7 AKBAYAN 462,674
least two percent (2%) of the total actual votes cast under the Party-List System.
8 ALAGAD 423,190
The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition
shall be determined pursuant to Veterans Federation 9 BUTIL 409,298
Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list
results. 10 COOP-NATCO 412,920
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing 11 ANAKPAWIS 370,165
Sambayanan (BATAS) is hereby deferred until final resolution of SPC No. 07-250, in
order not to render the proceedings therein moot and academic. 12 ARC 375,846

Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, 13 ABONO 340,151

organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in
abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.

Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan
copy thereof to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines. Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the highest number of votes among the thirteen (13)
qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, making it the "first party" in
SO ORDERED. 8 (Emphasis in the original) accordance with Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC, reiterated
in Citizen's Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC; acITSD
Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC
Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties. We WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating
quote from the COMELEC's interpretation of the Veterans formula as found in NBC Resolution No. under the party-list system of representation that have obtained one guaranteed (1)
07-72: seat may be entitled to an additional seat or seats based on the formula prescribed
WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en by the Supreme Court in Veterans;
banc as the National Board of Canvassers proclaimed thirteen (13) qualified parties, WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the "first party", the
organization[s] and coalitions based on the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold correct formula as expressed in Veterans, is:
of 334,462 votes from the projected maximum total number of party-list votes of
16,723,121, and were thus given one (1) guaranteed party-list seat each;
 Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of first Party List Percentage Additional
Seat
————————————— = party relative to total votes for

Total votes for party-list system party-list system

BAYAN MUNA 1.65 1

CIBAC 1.28 1
wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off) shall
entitle it to additional seats: GABRIELA 1.05 1

Proportion of votes received Additional seats APEC 1.05 1

by the first party A TEACHER 0.83 0

AKBAYAN 0.78 0

Equal to or at least 6% Two (2) additional ALAGAD 0.71 0

seats
BUTIL 0.69 0
Equal to or greater than 4% but lessthan 6% One (1) additional
seat COOP-NATCO 0.69 0

Less than 4% No additional seat ANAKPAWIS 0.62 0

ARC 0.63 0

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following ABONO 0.57 0
percentage:

1,178,747
NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the
————— = 0.07248 or 7.2% Constitution, Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos.
6646, 7166, 7941 and other elections laws, the Commission on Elections en
16,261,369 banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to proclaim the following parties, organizations or coalitions as entitled
to additional seats, to wit:
which entitles it to two (2) additional seats. Party List Additional Seats
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified
parties, organizations and coalitions, the correct formula as expressed
in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows: BUHAY 2

No. of votes of BAYAN MUNA 1

concerned party No. of additional CIBAC 1

Additional seats for = —————— x seats allocated to GABRIELA 1

a concerned party No. of votes of first party APEC 1

first party

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties,

organizations or coalitions which may later on be established to have obtained at
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows: least two per cent (2%) of the total votes cast under the party-list system to entitle
 them to one (1) guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate percentage of votes to entitle
them to one (1) additional seat.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties,
organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in
abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.
Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this
Resolution, furnishing a copy hereof to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED. 9
Acting on BANAT's petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3 August
2007, which reads as follows:
This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution filed by the Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT).
Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) party-list, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head,
National Board of Canvassers Legal Group submitted his comments/observations
and recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041 (PL)], which reads:
COMMENTS/OBSERVATIONS:
Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT), in its Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of
Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution prayed for the
following reliefs, to wit:
1. That the full number — twenty percent (20%) — of Party-List
representatives as mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution shall be proclaimed. CaDEAT
2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the
2% threshold votes, should be harmonized with Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitutionand with Section 12 of the same RA 7941 in that it should be
applicable only to the first party-list representative seats to be
allotted on the basis of their initial/first ranking.
3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and
4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of
seats corresponding to every 2% of the votes they received and the
additional seats shall be allocated in accordance with Section 12 of RA
7941, that is, in proportion to the percentage of votes obtained by each
party-list group in relation to the total nationwide votes cast in the party-list
election, after deducting the corresponding votes of those which were
allotted seats under the 2% threshold rule. In fine, the formula/procedure
prescribed in the "ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX "A"
of COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June 1996, shall be used for
[the] purpose of determining how many seats shall be proclaimed, which
party-list groups are entitled to representative seats and how many of
their nominees shall seat [sic].
5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11
of Republic Act No. 7941 and that the procedure in allocating seats for
party-list representative prescribed by Section 12 of RA 7941 shall be
followed.
RECOMMENDATION:
The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.
The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60
promulgated July 9, 2007 re "In the Matter of the Canvass of Votes and
Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and Coalitions
Participating Under the Party-List System During the May 14, 2007
National and Local Elections" resolved among others that the total
number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be
determined pursuant to the Veterans Federation
Party versus COMELECformula upon completion of the canvass of the
party-list results".
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve and adopt the recommendation
of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal Group, to DENY the herein petition
of BANAT for being moot and academic.
Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED. 10
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution
No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC,
to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60
because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No.
7941). On the same day, the COMELECdenied reconsideration during the proceedings of the
NBC. 11
Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007,
the COMELEC proclaimed three other party-list organizations as qualified parties entitled to one
guaranteed seat under the Party-List System: Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Philippines, Inc.
(AGAP), 12 Anak Mindanao (AMIN), 13 and An Waray. 14Per the certification 15 by COMELEC, the
following party-list organizations have been proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:
Party-List No. of Seat(s)
1.1 Buhay 3
1.2 Bayan Muna 2
1.3 CIBAC 2
1.4 Gabriela 2 1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in allocating
additional seats for the "First Party" violates the
1.5 APEC 2 principle of proportional representation under RA
7941.
1.6 A Teacher 1
2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional seats,
1.7 Akbayan 1 one for the "First Party" and another for the qualifying
parties, violates Section 11(b) ofRA 7941.
1.8 Alagad 1
3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule are
1.9 Butil 1
different from those required under RA 7941;
1.10 Coop-Natco [sic] 1
C.Violates the "Four Inviolable Parameters" of the Philippine party-list
1.11 Anak Pawis 1 system as provided for under the same case
of Veterans Federation Party, et al. v.COMELEC.
1.12 ARC 1
II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of
1.13 Abono 1 discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it implemented
the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list
1.14 AGAP 1 organizations, the same being merely in consonance with the ruling
in Veterans Federations Party, et al.v. COMELEC, the instant Petition is
1.15 AMIN 1 a justiciable case as the issues involved herein are constitutional in nature,
involving the correct interpretation and implementation of RA 7941, and
are of transcendental importance to our nation. 17
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases,
against which an Urgent Petition for Cancellation/Removal of Registration and Disqualification of we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:
Party-list Nominee (with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before
the COMELEC, was deferred pending final resolution of SPC No. 07-250. SaHIEA 1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
Issues
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section 3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? one seat constitutional?

2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional? 4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?

3. Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by the same Section 5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the
11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional? party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from
participating in the party-list elections? 18
4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated? 16
The Ruling of the Court
Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues in their
The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at
petition:
least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:
I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board of Canvassers,
First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total
jurisdiction when it promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60 to implement
membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the
the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list
party list;
organizations as said rule:
Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a
A. Violates the constitutional principle of proportional representation.
minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are
B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly: "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
 Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the
number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is,
one "qualifying" and two additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation — the additional seats which a
qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of
votes".19 ITSacC
However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term
"proportional representation", this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of
additional seats to party-list organizations.
Number of Party-List Representatives:
The Formula Mandated by the Constitution
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 5. (1)The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall
be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2)The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party-list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection
or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector.
The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — The party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the
members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the "House of Representatives shall
be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law". The
House of Representatives shall be composed of district representatives and party-list representatives.
The Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of the House of
Representatives.
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list
representatives to the total number of representatives. We compute the number of seats available to
party-list representatives from the number of legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate from
the first formula in Veterans,thus:
Number of seats available to Number of seats
available to
legislative districts x .20 = party-list representatives
————————————
.80
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list
representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the
Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives.
220
———— x .20 = 55
.80
After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of
representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list
representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.
Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:
The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold
and the Three-Seat Cap
All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved under
the Party-List System, as well as on the formula to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list
candidates garnering at least two-percent of the total party-list votes. However, there are numerous
interpretations of the provisions ofR.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of "additional seats" under the
Party-List System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule, 20 and Justice Vicente V. Mendoza's
dissent in Veterans presented Germany's Niemeyer formula 21 as an alternative.
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats for
party-list representatives. Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and
Section 12 of which provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — . . .
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, 22 the following
procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during
the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number
of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Section 12.Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List
Representatives. — The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties,
organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the
number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately
 according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or second percentage. There will be a first round of seat allocation, limited to using the whole integers as
coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. the equivalent of the number of seats allocated to the concerned party-list. After all the qualified parties
(Emphasis supplied) are given their seats, a second round of seat allocation is conducted. The fractions, or remainders,
from the whole integers are ranked from highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this
In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to allocate ranking are allocated until all the seats are filled up. 26
party-list representative seats.
We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list representatives.
The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11 (b) on the 2%
requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this procedure as follows: ASEIDH Section 11 (a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of
the total Members of the House of Representatives including those from the Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest
party-list groups as prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, Section based on the number of votes garnered during the elections. 27
11 (1st par.) of RA 7941 and Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996.
Rank Party Votes
Since there are 220 District Representatives in the 14th Congress, there shall be 55
Party-List Representatives. All seats shall have to be proclaimed. Garnered
(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two
per centum (2%) of the total party-list votes they obtained; provided, that no
party-list groups shall have more than three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941). 1 BUHAY 1,169,234
(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the 2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039
party-list groups under the immediately preceding paragraph and after deducting
from their total the votes corresponding to those seats, the remaining seats shall be 3 CIBAC 755,686
allotted proportionately to all the party-list groups which have not secured the
maximum three (3) seats under the 2% threshold rule, in accordance with Section 4 GABRIELA 621,171
12 of RA 7941. 23
5 APEC 619,657
Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT's first interpretation.
6 A TEACHER 490,379
The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is
declared unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list representatives by following Section 7 AKBAYAN 466,112
12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC:
8 ALAGAD 423,149
(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a
nationwide basis; 9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883

(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and, 10 BUTIL 409,160

(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of 11 BATAS 385,810
votes obtained by each party, organization or coalition as against the total
nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. 24 12 ARC 374,288

BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional percentage of 13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261
the votes received by each party as against the total nationwide party-list votes, and the other is "by
making the votes of a party-list with a median percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the 14 ABONO 339,990
allocation of seats". 25 Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT's second
15 AMIN 338,185
interpretation.
In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELEC's 16 AGAP 328,724
original 2-4-6 formula and the Veterans formula for systematically preventing all the party-list seats
17 AN WARAY 321,503
from being filled up. They claim that both formulas do not factor in the total number of seats allotted for
the entire Party-List System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but accept 18 YACAP 310,889
the 2% threshold. After determining the qualified parties, a second percentage is generated by dividing
the votes of a qualified party by the total votes of all qualified parties only. The number of seats 19 FPJPM 300,923
allocated to a qualified party is computed by multiplying the total party-list seats available with the
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 49 APOI 79,386

21 ABS 235,086 50 BP 78,541

22 KAKUSA 228,999 51 AHONBAYAN 78,424

23 KABATAAN 228,637 52 BIGKIS 77,327

24 ABA-AKO 218,818 53 PMAP 75,200

25 ALIF 217,822 54 AKAPIN 74,686

26 SENIOR CITIZENS 213,058 55 PBA 71,544

27 AT 197,872 56 GRECON 62,220

28 VFP 196,266 57 BTM 60,993

29 ANAD 188,521 58 A SMILE 58,717

30 BANAT 177,028 59 NELFFI 57,872

31 ANG KASANGGA 170,531 60 AKSA 57,012

32 BANTAY 169,801 61 BAGO 55,846

33 ABAKADA 166,747 62 BANDILA 54,751

34 1-UTAK 164,980 63 AHON 54,522

35 TUCP 162,647 64 ASAHAN MO 51,722

36 COCOFED 155,920 65 AGBIAG! 50,837

37 AGHAM 146,032 66 SPI 50,478

38 ANAK 141,817 67 BAHANDI 46,612

39 ABANSE! PINAY 130,356 68 ADD 45,624

40 PM 119,054 69 AMANG SCIAaT 43,062

41 AVE 110,769 70 ABAY PARAK 42,282

42 SUARA 110,732 71 BABAE KA 36,512

43 ASSALAM 110,440 72 SB 34,835

44 DIWA 107,021 73 ASAP 34,098

45 ANC 99,636 74 PEP 33,938

46 SANLAKAS 97,375 75 ABA ILONGGO 33,903

47 ABC 90,058 76 VENDORS 33,691

48 KALAHI 88,868 77 ADD-TRIBAL 32,896

 78 ALMANA 32,255 in %

79 AANGAT KA PILIPINO 29,130

80 AAPS 26,271
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33%

81 HAPI 25,781
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14%

82 AAWAS 22,946
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74%

83 SM 20,744
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89%

84 AG 16,916
5 APEC 619,657 3.88%

85 AGING PINOY 16,729

6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07%

86 APO 16,421
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92%

87 BIYAYANG BUKID 16,241

8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65%

88 ATS 14,161
9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57%

89 UMDJ 9,445
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57%

90 BUKLOD FILIPINA 8,915

11 BATAS 29 385,810 2.42%

91 LYPAD 8,471
12 ARC 374,288 2.35%

92 AA-KASOSYO 8,406
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32%

93 KASAPI 6,221
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13%

—————
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12%

TOTAL 15,950,900
16 AGAP IDTHcA 328,724 2.06%

=========
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02%

The first clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that "parties, organizations, andTotal
coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to one seat each". This clause guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table 2 below, we
use the first 20 party-list candidates for illustration purposes. The percentage of votes garnered by
18
each party is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the totalYACAP 310,889 1.95%
number of votes cast for all party-list candidates.
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89%
Table 2.The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage
of votes garnered over the total votes for the party-list. 28 20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54%

Party Votes Votes Guaranteed

Garnered Garnered over From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from the
Seat
total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or the
Total Votes two-percenters, are the party-list candidates that are "entitled to one seat each", or the guaranteed
seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats.
for Party-List,
 The second clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those garnering more the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat
than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seatsin proportion to their total allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the
number of votes". This is where petitioners' and intervenors' problem with the formula difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17
in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in proportion to their total number of votes" to be in guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the
proportion to the votes of the first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express language remaining available seats corresponds to a party's share in the remaining available seats. Second, we
of R.A. No. 7941. IATHaS assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely
distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally,
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the
we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is
two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of entitled. Thus:
Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold
makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when Table 3.Distribution of Available Party-List Seats
the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent
threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling Rank Party Votes Votes Guaranteed Additional (B) plus Applying
that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
Garnered Garnered Seat Seats (C), in the three
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast
for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one over whole seat
million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million
Total integers cap
votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the
two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to Votes for
60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of
parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied Party List,
party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
in %
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11 (b) ofR.A. No. 7941. The two percent (First (Second
threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or Round) Round)
group interests in the House of Representatives". 30
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A.
No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed: 1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A.
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the 2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during theelections.
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one 4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
guaranteed seat each.
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph
1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of 6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2 N.A.
votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2 N.A.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3)
seats. 8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included 9 31 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the
remaining available seats for allocation as "additional seats" are the maximum seats reserved under 10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a
11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 N.A.
provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of 12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2 N.A.
additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each
party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900,
 13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1 1 2 N.A. are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with sufficient number of votes for one whole
seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for each party, are shown in column (D). IcADSE
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 N.A.
Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A.
The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 N.A. parties to participate in the party-list elections. The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission clearly bear this out, thus:
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A.
MR. MONSOD.
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 N.A.
Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 N.A. party list system because we wanted to open up the political system to a
pluralistic society through a multiparty system. . . . We are for opening
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 N.A. up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be
there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a
21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 N.A. ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that
can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. . . . .
22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 N.A.
xxx xxx xxx
23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 N.A.
MR. MONSOD.
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.
Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to
25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A. political parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify for example
Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can they
26 SENIOR CITIZENS 213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 N.A. run under the party list concept or must they be under the district
legislation side of it only?
27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1 N.A.
MR. VILLACORTA.
28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1 N.A.
In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner
29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1 N.A.
mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of
30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1 N.A. Representatives.Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for
the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that
31 ANG KASANGGA 170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 N.A. we are allocating under the party list system.

32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A. MR. MONSOD.

33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and
can also participate in the party list system?
34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A.
MR. VILLACORTA.
35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 N.A.
Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be
36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 N.A. fielding only sectoral candidates.

—— —— MR. MONSOD.

Total 17 55 May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?

==== ==== MR. VILLACORTA.

Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from
the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in
Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 this Constitution.
party-list representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats
MR. MONSOD.
Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that
he represents the farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA.
No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD.
But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan
dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO.
Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political
parties, particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to
participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are
also organized along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD.
What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate
because it is precisely the contention of political parties that they
represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented
in them. Would the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO.
Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang
political party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din
yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system.
Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve". Hindi ito reserve seat sa
marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din
ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. DAETHc
Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to
Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is
that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the
party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA.
No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition
alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list system.
MR. MONSOD.
Constitutional Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO.
The same.
MR. VILLACORTA.
Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. OPLE.
. . . In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and
mass organizations to seek common ground. For example, we have the
PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be able
to make common goals with mass organizations so that the very
leadership of these parties can be transformed through the participation
of mass organizations. And if this is true of the administration parties, this
will be true of others like the Partido ng Bayan which is now being formed.
There is no question that they will be attractive to many mass
organizations. In the opposition parties to which we belong, there will be a
stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so that with their
participation, the policies of such parties can be radically transformed
because this amendment will create conditions that will challenge both
the mass organizations and the political parties to come together. And the
party list system is certainly available, although it is open to all the parties.
It is understood that the parties will enter in the roll of the COMELEC the
names of representatives of mass organizations affiliated with them. So
that we may, in time, develop this excellent system that they have in
Europe where labor organizations and cooperatives, for example,
distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic Party and the
Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence there
has a transforming effect upon the philosophies and the leadership of
those parties.
It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO
always vote with the Democratic Party. But the businessmen, most of
them, always vote with the Republican Party, meaning that there is no
reason at all why political parties and mass organizations should not
combine, reenforce, influence and interact with each other so that the
very objectives that we set in this Constitution for sectoral representation
are achieved in a wider, more lasting, and more institutionalized way.
Therefore, I support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs
sectoral representation as a constitutional gift, but at the same time, it
challenges the sector to rise to the majesty of being elected
representatives later on through a party list system; and even beyond that,
to become actual political parties capable of contesting political power in
the wider constitutional arena for major political parties.
xxx xxx xxx 32 (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the
Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of
Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
 Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently
provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list
system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition
of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government
and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public
office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical
territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its
constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the
cities and provinces comprising the region. cDaEAS
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to
any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy
pertains to the special interests and concerns of their sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of
groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics,
employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional,
sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes.
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from dominating the
party-list elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of theConstitution clearly intended
the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the
members of the ConstitutionalCommission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in
the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. 33 In defining a "party"
that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party", R.A. No.
7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections.
Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the
intent of the ConstitutionalCommission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in
socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the
party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state
that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for
electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party
participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral
youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or
sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the
party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang
Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.
The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:
Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. — No person shall be nominated
as party-list representative unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the elections, able to read and write, bona
fidemember of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25)
years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five
(25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth
sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organization's nominee "wallow
in poverty, destitution and infirmity" 34 as there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough
that the nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, 35that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a
fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20%
allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. TheConstitution, in paragraph 1,
Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of
Representatives to Congress: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, . . . ." The 20% allocation of party-list
representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a
provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a
qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party
from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in
accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing
major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who
voted to continue disallowing major political parties from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is
unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of
the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July
2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of
additional party-list seats. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in
accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties are disallowed
from participating in party-list elections. This Decision is immediately executory. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. Nos. 179271 & 179295, [April 21, 2009], 604 PHIL 131-184)
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 177508. August 7, 2009.]
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND
TRANSPARENCY (BANAT) PARTY-LIST, represented by SALVADOR B.
BRITANICO,petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for prohibition 1 with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction 2 filed by petitioner Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party List (petitioner) assailing the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9369 (RA 9369) 3 and enjoining
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing the statute.
RA 9369 is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and House Bill No. 5352 passed by the
Senate on 7 December 2006 and the House of Representatives on 19 December 2006. On 23
January 2007, less than four months before the 14 May 2007 local elections, the President signed RA
9369. Two newspapers of general circulation, Malaya and Business Mirror, published RA 9369 on 26
January 2007. RA 9369 thus took effect on 10 February 2007.
On 7 May 2007, petitioner, a duly accredited multi-sectoral organization, filed this petition
for prohibition alleging that RA 9369 violated Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution. 4 Petitioner
also assails the constitutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 of RA 9369. According to petitioner,
these provisions are of questionable application and doubtful validity for failing to comply with the
provisions of the Constitution.
The COMELEC and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed their respective
Comments. At the outset, both maintain that RA 9369 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality, save
for the prayer of the COMELEC to declare Section 43 as unconstitutional.
The Assailed Provisions of RA 9369
Petitioner assails the following provisions of RA 9369:
1. Section 34 which provides:
SEC. 34. Sec. 26 of Republic Act No. 7166 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"SEC. 26. Official Watchers. — Every registered political
party or coalition of political parties, and every candidate
shall each be entitled to one watcher in every polling place
and canvassing center: Provided That, candidates for the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlunsod, or
Sangguniang Bayan belonging to the same slate or ticket
shall collectively be entitled to only one watcher.
"The dominant majority party and dominant minority party,
which the Commission shall determine in accordance with
law, shall each be entitled to one official watcher who shall
be paid a fixed per diem of four hundred pesos (400.00).
"There shall also * recognized six principal watchers,
representing the six accredited major political parties
excluding the dominant majority and minority parties, who
shall be designated by the Commission upon nomination of
the said parties. These political parties shall be determined
by the Commission upon notice and hearing on the basis of
the following circumstances: cACEHI
"(a) The established record of the said parties, coalition of
groups that now composed them, taking into account,
among other things, their showing in past elections;
"(b) The number of incumbent elective officials belonging to
them ninety (90) days before the date of election;
"(c) Their identifiable political organizations and strengths as
evidenced by their organized/chapters;
"(d) The ability to fill a complete slate of candidates from the
municipal level to the position of President; and
"(e) Other analogous circumstances that may determine
their relative organizations and strengths."
2. Section 37 which provides:
SEC. 37. Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166 is hereby amended to read
as follows:
"SEC. 30. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for
the Election of President and Vice President:
The Commission en banc as the National Board of
Canvassers for the election of senators: Determination of
Authenticity and Due Execution of Certificates of
Canvass. — Congress and theCommission en banc shall
determine the authenticity and due execution of the
certificate of canvass for president and vice president and
senators, respectively, as accomplished and transmitted to it
by the local boards of canvassers, on a showing that: (1)
each certificate of canvass was executed, signed and
thumbmarked by the chairman and members of the board of
canvassers and transmitted or caused to be transmitted to
Congress by them; (2) each certificate of canvass contains
the names of all of the candidates for president and vice
president or senator, as the case may be, and their
corresponding votes in words and their corresponding votes
 in words and in figures; (3) there exists no discrepancy in
other authentic copies of the certificates of canvass or any of
its supporting documents such as statement of votes by
city/municipality/by precinct or discrepancy in the votes of
any candidate in words and figures in the certificate; and (4)
there exists no discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in
words and figures in the certificates of canvass against the
aggregate number of votes appearing in the election returns
of precincts covered by the certificate of
canvass: Provided, That certified print copies of election
returns or certificates of canvass may be used for the
purpose of verifying the existence of the discrepancy.
"When the certificate of canvass, duly certified by the board
of canvassers of each province, city of district, appears to be
incomplete, the Senate President or the Chairman of
the Commission, as the case may be, shall require the board
of canvassers concerned to transmit by personal delivery,
the election returns form polling places that were not
included in the certificate of canvass and supporting
statements. Said election returns shall be submitted by
personal delivery within two (2) days from receipt of notice.
"When it appears that any certificate of canvass or
supporting statement of votes by city/municipality or by
precinct bears erasures or alteration which may cast doubt
as to the veracity of the number of votes stated herein and
may affect the result of the election, upon requested * of the
presidential, vice presidential or senatorial candidate
concerned or his party, Congress or the Commission en
banc, as the case may be shall, for the sole purpose of
verifying the actual number of votes cast for president, vice
president or senator, count the votes as they appear in the
copies of the election returns submitted to it.
"In case of any discrepancy, incompleteness, erasure or
alteration as mentioned above, the
procedure on pre-proclamation controversies shall be
adopted and applied as provided in Section 17, 18, 19 and
20.
"Any person who present in evidence a simulated copy of an
election return, certificate of canvass or statement of votes,
or a printed copy of an election return, certificate of canvass
or statement of votes bearing a simulated certification or a
simulated image, shall be guilty of an election offense shall
be penalized in accordance with Batas Pambansa Blg.
881." *
3. Section 38 which provides:
SEC. 38. Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166 is hereby amended to read
legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law. Those who petition the Court to declare a
as follows:
"SEC. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases in Elections for President,
Vice President, Senator, and Member of the House of
Representatives. — For purposes of the elections for
president, vice president, senator, and member of the House
of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be
allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or the
certificates of canvass, as the case may be, except as
provided for in Section 30 hereof. However, this does not
preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing
body motu proprio or upon written complaint of an interested
person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass
or election returns before it. DTAaCE
"Questions affecting the composition or proceedings of the
board of canvassers may be initiated in the board or directly
with the Commission in accordance with Section 19 hereof.
"Any objection on the election returns before the city or
municipal board of canvassers, or on the municipal
certificates of canvass before the provincial board of
canvassers or district board of canvassers in Metro Manila
Area, shall be specifically noticed in the minutes of the
respective proceedings."
4. Section 43 which provides:
SEC. 43. Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 is hereby amended to
read as follows:
"SEC. 265.Prosecution. — The Commission shall, through
its duly authorized legal officers, have the power, concurrent
with the other prosecuting arms of the government, to
conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses
punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same."
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
1. Whether RA 9369 violates Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution;
2. Whether Sections 37 and 38 violate Section 17, Article VI 5 and Paragraph 7,
Section 4, Article VII 6 of the Constitution;
3. Whether Section 43 violates Section 2 (6), Article IX-C of the Constitution; 7 and
4. Whether Section 34 violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution. 8
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
It is settled that every statute is presumed to be constitutional. 9 The presumption is that the
law unconstitutional must show that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not
merely a doubtful, speculative or argumentative one; otherwise, the petition must fail. 10
In this case, petitioner failed to justify why RA 9369 and the assailed provisions should be
declared unconstitutional.
RA 9369 does not violate Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution
Petitioner alleges that the title of RA 9369 is misleading because it speaks of poll
automation but contains substantial provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election returns.
Petitioner also alleges that Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 are neither embraced in the title nor germane
to the subject matter of RA 9369.
Both the COMELEC and the OSG maintain that the title of RA 9369 is broad enough to
encompass topics which deal not only with the automation process but with everything related to its
purpose encouraging a transparent, credible, fair, and accurate elections.
The constitutional requirement that "every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" has always been given a practical rather than
a technical construction. 11 The requirement is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough to include
subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. 12 The title of a law does
not have to be an index of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to
each other and may be inferred from the title. 13 Moreover, a title which declares a statute to be an act
to amend a specified code is sufficient and the precise nature of the amendatory act need not be
further stated. 14
RA 9369 is an amendatory act entitled "An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled
'An Act Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election System in the May
11, 1998 National or Local Elections and in Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exercises, to
Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and Accuracy of Elections, Amending for the
Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as Amended, Republic Act No. 7166 and Other Related Election
Laws, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes'". Clearly, the subject matter of RA
9369 covers the amendments to RA 8436, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (BP 881), 15Republic Act No.
7166 (RA 7166), 16 and other related election laws to achieve its purpose of promoting transparency,
credibility, fairness, and accuracy in theelections. The provisions of RA 9369 assailed by petitioner
deal with amendments to specific provisions of RA 7166 and BP 881, specifically: (1) Sections 34, 37
and 38 amend Sections 26, 30 and 15 of RA 7166, respectively; and (2) Section 43 of RA
9369 amends Section 265 of BP 881. Therefore, the assailed provisions are germane to the subject
matter of RA 9369 which is to amend RA 7166 and BP 881, among others. CTDAaE
Sections 37 and 38 do not violate Section 17, Article VI and Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII
of the Constitution
Petitioner argues that Sections 37 and 38 violate the Constitution by impairing the powers
of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). According to
petitioner, under the amended provisions, Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the
election of President and Vice President (Congress), and the COMELEC en banc as the National
Board of Canvassers (COMELEC en banc), for the election of Senators may now entertain
pre-proclamation cases in the election of the President, Vice President, and Senators. Petitioner
concludes that in entertaining pre-proclamation cases, Congress and the COMELEC en
banc undermine the independence and encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET.
The COMELEC maintains that the amendments introduced by Section 37 pertain only to
the adoption and application of the procedures on pre-proclamation controversies in case of any
discrepancy, incompleteness, erasure or alteration in the certificates of canvass.
The COMELEC adds that Section 37 does not provide that Congress and the COMELEC en
banc may now entertain pre-proclamation cases for national elective posts.
The OSG argues that the Constitution does not prohibit pre-proclamation cases involving
national elective posts. According to the OSG, only Section 15 of RA 7166 17 expressly disallows
pre-proclamation cases involving national elective posts but this provision was subsequently amended
by Section 38 of RA 9369.
In Pimentel III v. COMELEC, 18 we already discussed the implications of the amendments
introduced by Sections 37 and 38 to Sections 15 and 30 19 of RA 7166, respectively and we declared:
Indeed, this Court recognizes that by virtue of the amendments
introduced by Republic Act No. 9369 to Sections 15 and 30 of Republic Act No.
7166, pre-proclamation cases involving the authenticity and due execution of
certificates of canvass are now allowed in elections for President, Vice-President,
and Senators. The intention of Congress to treat a case falling under Section 30
of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, as a
pre-proclamation case is apparent in the fourth paragraph of the said provision
which adopts and applies to such a case the same procedure provided under
Sections 17, 18, 19 and 20 of Republic Act No. 7166 on pre-proclamation
controversies.
In sum, in [the] elections for President, Vice-President, Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives, the general rule is still that
pre-proclamation cases on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt,
custody and appreciation of election returns or certificates of canvass are still
prohibited. As with other general rules, there are recognized exceptions to the
prohibition, namely: (1) correction of manifest errors; (2) questions affecting the
composition or proceeding of the board of canvassers; and (3) determination of the
authenticity and due execution of certificates of canvass as provided in Section 30
of Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369. 20
In the present case, Congress and the COMELEC en banc do not encroach upon the
jurisdiction of the PET and the SET. There is no conflict of jurisdiction since the powers of Congress
and the COMELEC en banc, on one hand, and the PET and the SET, on the other, are
exercised on different occasions and for different purposes. The PET is the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President. The SET is the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the Senate.
The jurisdiction of the PET and the SET can only be invoked once the winning presidential, vice
presidential or senatorial candidates have been proclaimed. On the other hand, under Section 37,
Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall determine only the authenticity and due execution of the
certificates of canvass. Congress and the COMELEC en banc shall exercise this power before the
proclamation of the winning presidential, vice presidential, and senatorial candidates.
Section 43 does not violate Section 2 (6), Article IX-C of the Constitution
Both petitioner and the COMELEC argue that the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the
"exclusive power" to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election laws. Petitioner and
the COMELEC allege that Section 43 is unconstitutional because it gives the other prosecuting arms
of the government concurrent power with the COMELEC to investigate and prosecute election
offenses. 21
We do not agree with petitioner and the COMELEC that the Constitution gave
the COMELEC the "exclusive power" to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election laws.
 Section 2 (6), Article IX-C of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to
"investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or
omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices". This was an important innovation
introduced by the Constitution because this provision was not in
the 1935 22 or 1973 23 Constitutions. 24 The phrase "[w]here appropriate" leaves to the legislature
the power to determine the kind of election offenses that the COMELEC shall prosecute exclusively or
concurrently with other prosecuting arms of the government. EATCcI
The grant of the "exclusive power" to the COMELEC can be found in Section 265 of BP 881,
which provides:
Sec. 265. Prosecution. — The Commission shall, through its duly
authorized legal officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute
the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of
the government: Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission fails to
act on any complaint within four months from his filing, the complainant may file the
complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper
investigation and prosecution, if warranted. (Emphasis supplied)
This was also an innovation introduced by BP 881. The history of election laws shows that prior to BP
881, no such "exclusive power" was ever bestowed on theCOMELEC. 25
We also note that while Section 265 of BP 881 vests in the COMELEC the "exclusive
power" to conduct preliminary investigations and prosecute election offenses, it likewise authorizes
the COMELEC to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. In the
1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the authority of the COMELEC was subsequently qualified and
explained. 26 The 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
Rule 34 — Prosecution of Election Offenses
Sec. 1. Authority of the Commission to Prosecute Election Offenses. —
The Commission shall have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election laws and to
prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law. (Emphasis
supplied)
It is clear that the grant of the "exclusive power" to investigate and prosecute election
offenses to the COMELEC was not by virtue of the Constitution but by BP 881, a legislative
enactment. If the intention of the framers of the Constitution were to give the COMELEC the
"exclusive power" to investigate and prosecute election offenses, the framers would have expressly so
stated in the Constitution. They did not.
In People v. Basilla, 27 we acknowledged that without the assistance of provincial and city
fiscals and their assistants and staff members, and of the state prosecutors of the Department of
Justice, the prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of election offenses committed before or in
the course of nationwideelections would simply not be possible. 28 In COMELEC v. Español, 29 we
also stated that enfeebled by lack of funds and the magnitude of its workload, the COMELECdid not
have a sufficient number of legal officers to conduct such investigation and to prosecute such
cases. 30 The prompt investigation, prosecution, and disposition of election offenses constitute an
indispensable part of the task of securing free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections. 31 Thus, given the plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws, if
Congress passes a law amending Section 265 of BP 881, such law does not violate the Constitution.
Section 34 does not violate Section 10, Article III of the Constitution
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the provision which fixes the per diem of poll
watchers of the dominant majority and dominant minority parties at P400 on election day. Petitioner
argues that this violates the freedom of the parties to contract and their right to fix the terms and
conditions of the contract they see as fair, equitable and just. Petitioner adds that this is a purely
private contract using private funds which cannot be regulated by law.
The OSG argues that petitioner erroneously invoked the non-impairment clause because
this only applies to previously perfected contracts. In this case, there is no perfected contact and,
therefore, no obligation will be impaired.
Both the COMELEC and the OSG argue that the law is a proper exercise of police power
and it will prevail over a contract. According to the COMELEC, poll watching is not just an ordinary
contract but is an agreement with the solemn duty to ensure the sanctity of votes. The role of poll
watchers is vested with public interest which can be regulated by Congress in the exercise of its police
power. The OSG further argues that the assurance that the poll watchers will receive fair and equitable
compensation promotes the general welfare. The OSG also states that this was a reasonable
regulation considering that the dominant majority and minority parties will secure a copy of the election
returns and are given the right to assign poll watchers inside the polling precincts.
There is no violation of the non-impairment clause. First, the non-impairment clause is
limited in application to laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any
manner changing the intention of the parties. 32 There is impairment if a subsequent law changes the
terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or
withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties. 33
As observed by the OSG, there is no existing contract yet and, therefore, no enforceable
right or demandable obligation will be impaired. RA 9369 was enacted more than three months prior to
the 14 May 2007 elections. Hence, when the dominant majority and minority parties hired their
respective poll watchers for the 14 May 2007 elections, they were deemed to have incorporated in
their contracts all the provisions of RA 9369.
Second, it is settled that police power is superior to the non-impairment clause. 34 The
constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police power of
the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the
community. ETaHCD
Section 8 of COMELEC Resolution No. 1405 35 specifies the rights and duties of poll
watchers:
The watchers shall have the right to stay in the space reserved for them
inside the polling place. They shall have the right to witness and inform themselves
of the proceedings of the board; to take notes of what they may see or hear, to take
photographs of the proceedings and incidents, if any, during the counting of votes,
as well as the election returns, tally board and ballot boxes; to file a protest against
any irregularity or violation of law which they believe may have been committed by
the board or by any of its members or by any person; to obtain from the board a
certificate as to the filing of such protest and/or of the resolution thereon; to read the
ballots after they shall have been read by the chairman, as well as the election
returns after they shall have been completed and signed by the members of the
board without touching them, but they shall not speak to any member of the board,
or to any voter, or among themselves, in such a manner as would disturb the
proceedings of the board; and to be furnished, upon request, with a certificate of
votes for the candidates, duly signed and thumbmarked by the chairman and all the
members of the board of election inspectors.
Additionally, the poll watchers of the dominant majority and minority parties in a precinct shall, if [G.R. No. 203936. April 2, 2013.]
available, affix their signatures and thumbmarks on the election returns for that precinct. 36 The
dominant majority and minority parties shall also be given a copy of the certificates of canvass 37 and
election returns 38 through their respective poll watchers. Clearly, poll watchers play an important role AKSYON MAGSASAKA-PARTIDO TINIG NG MASA, represented by its
in the elections. President Michael Abas Kida, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN
BANC, respondent.
Moreover, while the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms, and
conditions as they may deem convenient, such stipulations should not be contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy. 39
[G.R. No. 203958. April 2, 2013.]
In Beltran v. Secretary of Health, 40 we said:
Furthermore, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKULONG NA WALANG SALA, INC.
all rights are subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations (KAKUSA), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be
subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the community may
require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate
[G.R. No. 203960. April 2, 2013.]
the necessity. 41 (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, assuming there were existing contracts, Section 34 would still be constitutional
1ST CONSUMERS ALLIANCE FOR RURAL ENERGY, INC.
because the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to promote the general
(1-CARE), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.
welfare of the people. We agree with the COMELEC that the role of poll watchers is invested with
public interest. In fact, even petitioner concedes that poll watchers not only guard the votes of their
respective candidates or political parties but also ensure that all the votes are properly counted.
Ultimately, poll watchers aid in fair and honest elections. Poll watchers help ensure that [G.R. No. 203976. April 2, 2013.]
the elections are transparent, credible, fair, and accurate. The regulation of the per diem of the poll
watchers of the dominant majority and minority parties promotes the general welfare of the community
and is a valid exercise of police power. ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC.
(ARARO), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 203981. April 2, 2013.]

[G.R. No. 203766. April 2, 2013.]

ASSOCIATION FOR RIGHTEOUSNESS ADVOCACY ON LEADERSHIP (ARAL)
PARTY-LIST, represented herein by Ms. Lourdes L. Agustin, the party's
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Secretary General, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Igot, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204002. April 2, 2013.]

[G.R. Nos. 203818-19. April 2, 2013.]

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL

AKO BICOL POLITICAL PARTY CONCERNS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
(AKB), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204094. April 2, 2013.]

[G.R. No. 203922. April 2, 2013.]

ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY

ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC), (ANAD), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
represented by its President Congressman Ponciano D.
Payuyo, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
 [G.R. No. 204100. April 2, 2013.] PASANG MASDA NATIONWIDE PARTY represented by its President Roberto
"Ka Obet" Martin, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondent.

1-BRO PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC., (1BRO-PGBI)

formerly PGBI, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN
[G.R. No. 204158. April 2, 2013.]
BANC, respondent.

ABROAD PARTY LIST, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

[G.R. No. 204122. April 2, 2013.] CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., COMMISSIONERS RENE V.
SARMIENTO, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN
ROBERT S. LIM, MARIA GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, LUCENITO TAGLE, AND
1 GUARDIANS NATIONALIST PHILIPPINES, INC., ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON THEIR BEHALF, respondents.
(1GANAP/GUARDIANS), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN
BANC composed of SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., Chairman, RENE V.
SARMIENTO, Commissioner, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, Commissioner,
[G.R. No. 204174. April 2, 2013.]
ARMANDO C. VELASCO, Commissioner, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, Commissioner,
and CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, Commissioner, respondents.
AANGAT TAYO PARTY LIST-PARTY, represented by its President Simeon T.
Silva, Jr., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC,respondent.
[G.R. No. 204125. April 2, 2013.]

[G.R. No. 204216. April 2, 2013.]

AGAPAY NG INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ALLIANCE, INC. (A-IPRA),
represented by its Secretary General, Ronald D.
Macaraig, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent. COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION,
INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204126. April 2, 2013.]

[G.R. No. 204220. April 2, 2013.]
KAAGAPAY NG NAGKAKAISANG AGILANG PILIPINONG MAGSASAKA (KAP),
formerly known as AKO AGILA NG NAGKAKAISANG MAGSASAKA (AKO ABANG LINGKOD
AGILA), represented by its Secretary General, Leo R. San PARTY-LIST, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN
Buenaventura, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. BANC, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204139. April 2, 2013.] [G.R. No. 204236. April 2, 2013.]

ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), represented by Atty. Berteni Cataluña FIRM 24-K ASSOCIATION,
Causing, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204141. April 2, 2013.] [G.R. No. 204238. April 2, 2013.]

BANTAY PARTY LIST, represented by Maria Evangelina F. Palparan, ALLIANCE OF BICOLNON PARTY
President, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. (ABP), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204153. April 2, 2013.] [G.R. No. 204239. April 2, 2013.]
GREEN FORCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF ACTION LEAGUE OF INDIGENOUS MASSES (ALIM) PARTY-LIST, represented
MOTHER EARTH herein by its President Fatani S. Abdul
(GREENFORCE), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondent. Malik, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204240. April 2, 2013.] [G.R. No. 204356. April 2, 2013.]

AGRI-AGRA NA REPORMA PARA SA MAGSASAKA NG PILIPINAS BUTIL FARMERS

MOVEMENT (AGRI), represented by its Secretary General, Michael Ryan A. PARTY, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Enriquez,petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204358. April 2, 2013.]

[G.R. No. 204263. April 2, 2013.]

ALLIANCE OF ADVOCATES IN MINING ADVANCEMENT FOR NATIONAL

A BLESSED PARTY LIST A.K.A. BLESSED FEDERATION OF FARMERS AND PROGRESS (AAMA), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN
FISHERMEN INTERNATIONAL, BANC,respondent.
INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ONELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204359. April 2, 2013.]

[G.R. No. 204318. April 2, 2013.]

SOCIAL MOVEMENT FOR ACTIVE REFORM AND TRANSPARENCY (SMART),

UNITED MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS FOUNDATION (UNIMAD) represented by its Chairman, Carlito B.
PARTY-LIST, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. Cubelo, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204321. April 2, 2013.] [G.R. No. 204364. April 2, 2013.]

ANG AGRIKULTURA NATIN ISULONG (AANI), represented by its Secretary ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG-TAO, PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY,
General Jose C. Policarpio, HANAPBUHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO
Jr., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondent. BUHAY), petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S.
BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C.
VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA
[G.R. No. 204323. April 2, 2013.] CIELO M. PADACA, in their capacities as Commissioners
thereof, respondents.

BAYANI PARTYLIST as represented by Homer Bueno, Fitrylin Dalhani, Israel

de Castro, Dante Navarro and Guiling [G.R. No. 204367. April 2, 2013.]
Mamondiong, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO
S. BRILLANTES, JR., COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N.
TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. AKBAY KALUSUGAN INCORPORATION
LIM, and MARIA GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, respondents. (AKIN), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204341. April 2, 2013.] [G.R. No. 204370. April 2, 2013.]

AKO AN BISAYA (AAB), represented by its Secretary General, Rodolfo T.

Tuazon, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
 [G.R. No. 204374. April 2, 2013.] and Chairman, Francisco G. Datol,
Jr., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

BINHI-PARTIDO NG MGA MAGSASAKA PARA SA MGA

MAGSASAKA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN
[G.R. No. 204425. April 2, 2013.]
BANC, respondent.

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES,

[G.R. No. 204379. April 2, 2013.]
ALAGAD NG SINING (ASIN) represented by its President, Faye Maybelle
Lorenz, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANY OF ITS OFFICERS
AND AGENTS, ACTING FOR AND IN ITS BEHALF, INCLUDING THE CHAIR
AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION, respondents.
[G.R. No. 204426. April 2, 2013.]

[G.R. No. 204394. April 2, 2013.]

ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL ATHLETICS ENTREPRENEURS AND HOBBYISTS,
INC. (ALA-EH), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO
ASSOCIATION OF GUARD UTILITY HELPER, AIDER, RIDER, S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO
DRIVER/DOMESTIC HELPER, JANITOR, AGENT AND NANNY OF THE C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA.
PHILIPPINES, INC. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in their respective capacities
(GUARDJAN), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. as COMELEC Chairperson and Commissioners, respondents.

[G.R. No. 204402. April 2, 2013.] [G.R. No. 204428. April 2, 2013.]

KALIKASAN PARTY-LIST, represented by its President, Clemente G. Bautista, ANG GALING PINOY (AG), represented by its Secretary General, Bernardo R.
Jr., and Secretary General, Frances Q. Corella, Jr., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Quimpo, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.

[G.R. No. 204435. April 2, 2013.]

[G.R. No. 204408. April 2, 2013.]

1 ALLIANCE ADVOCATING AUTONOMY PARTY

PILIPINO ASSOCIATION FOR COUNTRY-URBAN POOR YOUTH (1AAAP), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.
ADVANCEMENT AND WELFARE
(PACYAW), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondent.
[G.R. No. 204436. April 2, 2013.]

[G.R. No. 204410. April 2, 2013.]

ABYAN ILONGGO PARTY (AI), represented by its Party President, Rolex T.
Suplico, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.
1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON
(1-UTAK), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 204455. April 2, 2013.]

[G.R. No. 204421. April 2, 2013.]

MANILA TEACHER SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION,
INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES,
INC. SENIOR CITIZEN PARTY-LIST, represented herein by its 1st nominee
 [G.R. No. 204484. April 2, 2013.] G.R. No. SPP No. Group Grounds for Denial

A.Via the COMELEC En Banc's automatic review of the COMELEC Division's resolutions approving
PARTIDO NG BAYAN ANG BIDA (PBB), represented by its Secretary General,
registration of groups/organizations
Roger M. Federazo, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondent.

Resolution dated 23 November 2012 8

[G.R. No. 204485. April 2, 2013.] The "artists" sector is not

1 204379 12-099 Alagad ng -
considered
ALLIANCE OF ORGANIZATIONS, NETWORKS AND ASSOCIATIONS OF THE marginalized and
PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALONA), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN (PLM) Sining (ASIN)
underrepresented;
BANC, respondent.
Failure to prove track
-
record; and
[G.R. No. 204486. April 2, 2013.]
Failure of the nominees
-
to qualify
1ST KABALIKAT NG BAYAN GINHAWANG SANGKATAUHAN (1ST
under RA 7941 and Ang
KABAGIS), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Bagong

Bayani.
[G.R. No. 204490. April 2, 2013.]
Resolution dated 27 November 2012 9

PILIPINAS PARA SA PINOY

(PPP), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, respondent.
A non-stock savings and
2 204455 12-041 Manila Teachers -
loan

association cannot be
DECISION (PLM) Savings and Loan
considered

Association, Inc.
CARPIO, J p:
(Manila Teachers)
marginalized and
underrepresented;
and

The Cases The first and second

-
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and nominees are
Prohibition 1 filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by
not teachers by
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013
profession.
party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or
cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations. Failure to show that its
3 204426 12-011 Association of -
members
This Court resolved to consolidate the 54 petitions in the Resolutions dated 13 November
2012, 2 20 November 2012, 3 27 November 2012, 4 4 December 2012, 511 December 2012, 6 and 19 belong to the
February 2013. 7 (PLM) Local Athletics
marginalized; and
The Facts Entrepreneurs
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution
Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to and Hobbyists, - Failure of the nominees
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
 to qualify. representatives;

Inc. (ALA-EH) Lack of track record in

-
representing
Resolution dated 27 November 2012 10
peasants and farmers;
Failure of the nominees and
4 204435 12-057 1 Alliance -
to qualify:
Nominees are neither
although registering as a -
(PLM) Advocating farmers nor
regional
peasants.
political party, two of the
Autonomy Party
nominees Resolution dated 4 December 2012 13

are not residents of the

(1AAAP)
region; and
Failure to show that the
7 204436 12-009 Abyan Ilonggo -
four of the five nominees party
do not
represents a
(PP), Party (AI)
belong to the marginalized and
marginalized and
underrepresented
12-165
underrepresented. sector, as the

Resolution dated 27 November 2012 11 Province of Iloilo has

(PLM)
district

representatives;
Failure of the group to
5 204367 12-104 Akbay -
show that its Untruthful statements in
-
the
nominees belong to the
(PL) Kalusugan
urban poor memorandum; and

(AKIN), Inc. sector. Withdrawal of three of its

-
five
Resolution dated 29 November 2012 12
nominees.

Resolution dated 4 December 2012 14

Failure to represent a
6 204370 12-011 Ako An Bisaya -
marginalized

sector of society, despite Failure to establish that

(PP) (AAB) 8 204485 12-175 Alliance of -
the the group can

formation of a sectoral represent 14 Networks

(PL) Organizations,
wing for the and sectors;

benefit of farmers of Associations of

Region 8;
The sectors of
the Philippines, -
- Constituency has district homeowners'
 associations, not
Inc. (ALONA)
entrepreneurs and
representative of the
(KALIKASAN)
cooperatives are not marginalized
marginalized
and underrepresented;
and underrepresented;
and There is no proof that
-
majority of
The nominees do not
- its members belong to
belong to the
the
marginalized and
underrepresented. marginalized and
underrepresented;

B.Via the COMELEC En Banc's review on motion for reconsideration of the COMELECDivision's The group represents
resolutions denying registration of groups and organizations -
sectors with

conflicting interests; and

Resolution dated 7 November 2012 15
The nominees do not
-
belong to the
Failure to prove track sector which the group
9 204139 12-127 Alab ng -
record as an claims to
(PL) Mamamahayag organization; represent.
(ALAM) Resolution dated 14 November 2012 17
Failure to show that the
-
group
Failure to prove
actually represents the 11 204394 12-145 Association of -
membership base
marginalized
(PL) Guard, Utility and track record;
and underrepresented;
and Helper, Aider,
Failure to establish that Failure to present
- Rider, Driver/ -
the group activities that

can represent all sectors sufficiently benefited its

it seeks to Domestic
intended

represent. Helper, constituency; and

Resolution dated 7 November 2012 16 The nominees do not
Janitor, Agent -
belong to any

of the sectors which the

The group reflects an and Nanny of the
10 204402 12-061 Kalikasan Party- - group seeks
advocacy for
Philippines, Inc. to represent.
(PP) List
the environment, and is
 (GUARDJAN) Retained registration
1203818- 12-154 AKO Bicol
and accreditation
Resolution dated 5 December 2012 18
as a political party, but
19(PLM) Political Party
denied
Failure to show that the participation in the May
12 204490 12-073 Pilipinas Para sa - 12-177 (AKB)
group 2013 party-list
represents a (PLM) elections
(PLM) Pinoy (PPP)
marginalized and
Failure to represent any
underrepresented -
marginalized
sector, as Region
and underrepresented
12 has district sector;
representatives; and
The Bicol region already
Failure to show a track -
- has
record of
representatives in
undertaking programs Congress; and
for the welfare
The nominees are not
of the sector the group -
marginalized
seeks to
and underrepresented.
represent.
Resolution dated 11 October 2012 25
In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012, 19 the COMELEC En Banc affirmed
the COMELEC Second Division's resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida's (PBB) registration and
accreditation as a political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in
the 13 May 2013 party-list elections because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and Cancelled registration
2 20376612-161 Atong Paglaum,
underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to apply for registration as a party-list group; and PBB failed to and
establish its track record as an organization that seeks to uplift the lives of the "marginalized and
underrepresented." 20 SDHCac (PLM) Inc. (Atong accreditation

These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA, ALAM, The nominees do not
Paglaum) -
KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court. belong to the
The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, 21 and excluded the names of these 13
sectors which the party
petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
represents;
Pursuant to paragraph 2 22 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled
and
summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations
of intent to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have continually complied with the The party failed to file its
requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC 23 (Ang Bagong -
Statement
Bayani). The COMELEC disqualified the following groups and organizations from participating in the 13
May 2013 party-list elections: of Contributions and
Expenditures
G.R. No. SPP No. Group Grounds for Denial
for the 2010 Elections.
Resolution dated 10 October 2012 24
Cancelled registration
3 20398112-187 Association for
and accreditation
 Failure to comply, and Failure to establish track
(PLM) Righteousness - -
for violation record; and

Advocacy on of election laws; Failure of the nominees

-
to qualify
Leadership
as representatives of the
The nominees do not youth and
(ARAL) -
represent the
young urban
sectors which the party professionals.
represents;
Resolution dated 16 October 2012 26
and

There is doubt that the

-
party is 6 20410012-196 1-Bro Philippine Cancelled registration

organized for religious Failure to define the

(PLM) Guardians -
purposes. sector it seeks to

Cancelled registration Brotherhood, represent; and

4 20400212-188 Alliance for
and
Inc. (1 BRO-
(PLM) Rural Concerns accreditation
The nominees do not
PGBI) -
Failure of the nominees belong to a
(ARC) -
to qualify;
marginalized and
and underrepresented

Failure of the party to sector.

-
prove that
7 20412212-223 1 Guardians Cancelled registration
majority of its members
belong to The party is a military
(PLM) Nationalist -
fraternity;
the sectors it seeks to
represent. Philippines, Inc.

Cancelled registration The sector of community

5 20431812-220 United (1GANAP/ -
and volunteer

(PLM) Movement accreditation workers is too broad to

GUARDIANS)
allow for
The sectors of drug
Against Drugs meaningful
counsellors and
representation; and
lecturers, veterans and
Foundation The nominees do not
the youth, -
appear to
(UNIMAD) are not marginalized and
belong to the sector of
underrepresented; community
 volunteer workers.
Cancelled registration
10 20392212-201 Association of
and
8 20426312-257 Blessed Cancelled registration
(PLM) Philippine accreditation
Three of the seven and
(PLM) Federation of -
nominees do Failure to represent a
Electric -
marginalized
not belong to the sector
Farmers and
of farmers and underrepresented
Cooperatives
sector; and
and fishermen, the
Fishermen
sector sought (APEC)

International, to be represented; and The nominees do not

-
belong to the
Inc. (A
sector that the party
None of the nominees claims to
BLESSED -
are registered
represent.
voters of Region XI, the
Party-List)
region Resolution dated 23 October 2012 29

sought to be
represented.
Cancelled registration
Resolution dated 16 October 2012 27 11 20417412-232 Aangat Tayo
and

(PLM) Party-List Party accreditation

9 20396012-260 1st Consumers Cancelled registration The incumbent

(AT) -
representative in
The sector of rural
(PLM) Alliance for -
energy consumers Congress failed to
author or
Rural Energy, is not marginalized and
sponsor bills that are
Inc. (1-CARE) underrepresented; beneficial to
The party's track record the sectors that the party
-
is related represents
to electric cooperatives (women, elderly, youth,
and not rural urban poor);
energy consumers; and and
The nominees do not The nominees do not
- -
belong to the belong to the
sector of rural energy marginalized sectors
consumers. that the party
Resolution dated 16 October 2012 28
 seeks to represent. The nominees do not
(AGRI) -
belong to the
Resolution dated 23 October 2012 30
sector of peasants and
farmers that
Cancelled registration the party seeks to
12 20397612-288 Alliance for
and represent;
(PLM) Rural and accreditation Only four nominees were
-
submitted
The interests of the
Agrarian -
peasant and to the COMELEC; and
urban poor sectors that Failure to show
Reconstruction, -
the party meaningful activities
Inc. (ARARO) represents differ; for its constituency.
The nominees do not 14 20393612-248 Aksyon Cancelled registration
-
belong to the
Failure to show that
sectors that the party (PLM) Magsasaka- -
majority of its
seeks to
members are
represent; Partido Tinig ng
marginalized and
Failure to show that Masa (AKMA- underrepresented;
-
three of the
PTM)
nominees are bona fide
party Failure to prove that four
-
of its nine
members; and
nominees actually
Lack of a Board belong to the
-
resolution to
farmers sector; and
participate in the
party-list elections. Failure to show that five
-
of its nine
Resolution dated 24 October 2012 31
nominees
work on uplifting the
lives
13 20424012-279 Agri-Agra na Cancelled registration
of the members of the
The party ceased to exist sector.
(PLM) Reporma Para sa -
for more
15 20412612-263 Kaagapay ng Cancelled registration
than a year immediately
Magsasaka ng
after the The Manifestation of
(PLM) Nagkakaisang -
Intent and
Pilipinas May 2010 elections;
Agilang Certificate of Nomination
Movement
 were not People)

signed by an appropriate Failure to prove that two

Pilipinong Association of -
officer of of its

Magsasaka the party; nominees actually

the Philippines,
belong to the
(KAP)
marginalized and
Failure to show track Inc. (BANTAY)
- underrepresented.
record for the
18 20440812-217 Pilipino Cancelled registration
farmers and peasants
sector; and Change of sector (from
(PLM) Association for -
urban poor
Failure to show that
-
nominees youth to urban poor)
Country — Urban
necessitates
actually belong to the
sector, or Poor Youth a new application;

that they have Advancement

undertaken meaningful
Failure to show track
and Welfare -
activities for the sector. record for

16 20436412-180 Adhikain at Cancelled registration (PACYAW) the marginalized and

Failure to show that underrepresented;

(PLM) Kilusan ng -
nominees
Failure to prove that
-
actually belong to the majority of its
Ordinaryong
sector, or
members and officers
that they have are from the
Tao Para sa
undertaken meaningful
urban poor sector; and
Lupa, Pabahay, activities for the sector.
The nominees are not
-
Hanapbuhay at members of the

Kaunlaran urban poor sector.

(AKO-BAHAY) 19 20415312-277 Pasang Masda Cancelled registration

17 20414112-229 The True Cancelled registration The party represents

(PLM) Nationwide -
drivers and
Failure to show that
(PLM) Marcos Loyalist -
majority of operators, who may
Party (PASANG
have conflicting
its members are
(for God,
marginalized MASDA) interests; and

and underrepresented; Nominees are either

Country and -
and operators or
 former operators. summary

20 20395812-015 Kapatiran ng Cancelled registration hearing;

Failure to prove that Failure to show track

(PLM) mga Nakulong - -
majority of record for the

its officers and members marginalized and

na Walang Sala,
belong to the underrepresented;

marginalized and and

Inc. (KAKUSA)
underrepresented;
The nominees did not
-
The incumbent appear to be
-
representative in
marginalized and
Congress failed to underrepresented.
author or sponsor
Resolution dated 7 November 2012 33
bills that are beneficial to
the sector

that the party represents Cancelled registration

22 20409412-185 Alliance for
(persons and

imprisoned without proof (PLM) Nationalism and accreditation

of guilt
Failure to represent an
Democracy -
beyond reasonable identifiable
doubt);
marginalized and
(ANAD)
Failure to show track underrepresented
-
record for the
sector;
marginalized and
underrepresented; Only three nominees
-
were submitted
and
to the COMELEC;
The nominees did not
- The nominees do not
appear to be -
belong to the
marginalized and
underrepresented. marginalized and
underrepresented;
Resolution dated 30 October 2012 32
and

Failure to submit its

-
Cancelled registration Statement of
21 20442812-256 Ang Galing
and
Contribution and
(PLM) Pinoy (AG) accreditation Expenditures for

- the 2007 Elections.

Failure to attend the
Resolution dated 7 November 2012 34 record requirement.

Cancelled registration
25 20434112-269 Action League
and
Cancelled registration
23 20423912-060 Green Force for
and (PLM) of Indigenous accreditation

(PLM) the Environment accreditation Failure to establish that

Masses (ALIM) -
its nominees
The party is an advocacy
Sons and -
group and are members of the
indigenous people
does not represent the
Daughters of
marginalized in the Mindanao and
Cordilleras
Mother Earth and underrepresented;
sector that the party
(GREENFORCE) seeks to
Failure to comply with represent;
-
the track
Only two of the party's
record requirement; and -
nominees
The nominees are not reside in the Mindanao
-
marginalized and
citizens. Cordilleras; and
Cancelled registration Three of the nominees
24 20423612-254 Firm 24-K -
and do not appear
(PLM) Association, Inc. accreditation to belong to the
marginalized.
The nominees do not
(FIRM 24-K) -
belong to the Resolution dated 7 November 2012 35

sector that the party

seeks to
26 20435812-204 Alliance of Cancelled registration
represent (urban poor
and peasants The sector it represents
(PLM) Advocates in -
is a
of the National Capital
Region); specifically defined
Mining
group which
Only two of its nominees
-
reside in may not be allowed
Advancement
registration
the National Capital
Region; and under the party-list
for National
system; and
Failure to comply with
-
the track Progress
 Failure to establish that are employed in the
(AAMA) -
the nominees construction

actually belong to the industry, the sector it

sector. claims to

Resolution dated 7 November 2012 36 represent.

Resolution dated 7 November 2012 38

27 20435912-272 Social Cancelled registration

The nominees are Cancelled registration

(PLM) Movement for - 29 20432312-210 Bayani Party
disqualified from and

representing the sectors (PLM) List (BAYANI) accreditation

Active Reform
that
Failure to prove a track
-
and Transparency the party represents; record of

(SMART) trying to uplift the

marginalized and
Failure to comply with
-
the track underrepresented sector
of
record requirement; and
professionals; and
There is doubt as to
-
whether majority One nominee was
-
declared
of its members are
marginalized and unqualified to represent
the sector
underrepresented.
of professionals.
Resolution dated 7 November 2012 37
Resolution dated 7 November 2012 39

Cancelled registration
28 20423812-173 Alliance of
and Cancelled registration
30 20432112-252 Ang Agrikultura
and
(PLM) Bicolnon Party accreditation
(PLM) Natin Isulong accreditation
Defective registration
(ABP) -
and Failure to establish a
(AANI) -
track record
accreditation dating back
to 2010; of enhancing the lives of
the
Failure to represent any
-
sector; and marginalized and
underrepresented
Failure to establish that
-
the nominees farmers which it claims
 to represent; agencies and is

and (COCOFED) not marginalized;

More than a majority of The party is assisted by

- -
the party's the

nominees do not belong government in various

to the projects; and

farmers sector. The nominees are not

-
members of
Resolution dated 7 November 2012 40
the marginalized sector
of coconut
Cancelled registration farmers and producers.
31 20412512-292 Agapay ng
and
Resolution dated 7 November 2012 42
(PLM) Indigenous accreditation

Failure to prove that its

Peoples Rights -
five nominees 33 20422012-238 Abang Lingkod Cancelled registration

are members of the Failure to establish a

Alliance, Inc. (PLM) Party-List -
indigenous track record of

(A-IPRA) people sector; continuously

(ABANG
representing the
Failure to prove that its
-
five nominees LINGKOD) peasant farmers sector;

actively participated in Failure to show that its

-
the members

undertakings of the actually belong to the

party; and peasant farmers

Failure to prove that its sector; and

-
five nominees
Failure to show that its
-
are bona fide members. nominees are

Resolution dated 7 November 2012 41 marginalized and

underrepresented,

have actively
Cancelled registration participated in programs
32 20421612-202 Philippine
and
for the advancement of
(PLM) Coconut accreditation farmers, and
The party is affiliated adhere to its advocacies.
Producers -
with private
Resolution dated 14 November 2012 43
Federation, Inc. and government
 Resolution dated 28 November 2012 45

Cancelled registration
34 20415812-158 Action
and
Cancelled registration
36 20435612-136 Butil Farmers
(PLM) Brotherhood for accreditation and

Failure to show that the (PLM) Party (BUTIL) accreditation

Active -
party is
Failure to establish that
-
actually able to the
Dreamers, Inc.
represent all of
agriculture and
the sectors it claims to cooperative sectors
(ABROAD)
represent;
are marginalized and
Failure to show a
- underrepresented; and
complete track

record of its activities The party's nominees

-
since its neither appear

registration; and to belong to the sectors

they seek to
The nominees are not
- represent, nor to have
part of any of
actively
the sectors which the
party seeks to participated in the
undertakings of
represent.
the party.
Resolution dated 28 November 2012 44
Resolution dated 3 December 2012 46

Cancelled registration
35 20437412-228 Binhi-Partido ng Cancelled registration
and 37 20448612-194 1st Kabalikat ng
and
(PLM) mga Magsasaka accreditation
(PLM) Bayan accreditation
The party receives
Para sa mga - Declaration of untruthful
assistance from Ginhawang -
statements;
the government through
Magsasaka Sangkatauhan
the

Department of Failure to exist for at

(BINHI) (1st KABAGIS) -
Agriculture; and least one year;

Failure to prove that the and

-
group is
None of its nominees
-
marginalized and belong to the
underrepresented.
labor, fisherfolk, and
 urban poor Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. This Decision governs only the 54
indigenous cultural consolidated petitions that were granted Status Quo Ante Orders, namely:
communities
G.R. No. SPP No. Group
sectors which it seeks to
represent. Resolution dated 13 November 2012

Resolution dated 4 December 2012 47 203818-19 12-154 (PLM) AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB)

12-177 (PLM)

38 20441012-198 1-United Cancelled accreditation 203981 12-187 (PLM) Association for Righteousness Advocacy

The party represents on Leadership (ARAL)

(PLM) Transport -
drivers and
204002 12-188 (PLM) Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC)
operators, who may
Koalisyon (1- 203922 12-201 (PLM) Association of Philippine Electric
have conflicting

UTAK) interests; and Cooperatives (APEC)

The party's nominees do 203960 12-260 (PLM) 1st Consumers Alliance for Rural
-
not belong
Energy, Inc. (1-CARE)
to any marginalized and
203936 12-248 (PLM) Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng
underrepresented
Masa (AKMA-PTM)
sector.
203958 12-015 (PLM) Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na Walang
Resolution dated 4 December 2012 48
Sala, Inc. (KAKUSA)

203976 12-288 (PLM) Alliance for Rural and Agrarian

39204421, 12-157 Coalition of Cancelled registration
Reconstruction, Inc. (ARARO)
The party violated
204425(PLM), Senior Citizens -
election laws Resolution dated 20 November 2012
because its nominees 204094 12-185 (PLM) Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy
12-191 in the
had a term-
(ANAD)
(PLM) Philippines, Inc. sharing agreement.
204125 12-292 (PLM) Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights
(SENIOR
Alliance, Inc. (A-IPRA)
CITIZENS)
204100 12-196 (PLM) 1-Bro Philippine Guardians Brotherhood,
These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI,
1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI, AKMA-PTM, KAP, Inc. (1BRO-PGBI)
AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA, AG, ANAD, GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K,
ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI, A-IPRA, COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI, Resolution dated 27 November 2012
BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS) were able to secure a mandatory injunction from this
Court, directing the COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official 204141 12-229 (PLM) The True Marcos Loyalist (for God,
ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections. CSAaDE
Country and People) Association of the
 Philippines, Inc. (BANTAY) and Daughters of Mother Earth

Agri-Agra na Reporma Para sa (GREENFORCE)

204240 12-279 (PLM)
Magsasaka
204321 12-252 (PLM) Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI)
ng Pilipinas Movement (AGRI)
204323 12-210 (PLM) Bayani Party List (BAYANI)
204216 12-202 (PLM) Philippine Coconut Producers Federation,
204341 12-269 (PLM) Action League of Indigenous Masses
Inc. (COCOFED)
(ALIM)
204158 12-158 (PLM) Action Brotherhood for Active Dreamer,
204358 12-204 (PLM) Alliance of Advocates in Mining
Inc. (ABROAD)
Advancement for National Progress
Resolutions dated 4 December 2012
(AAMA)
204122 12-223 (PLM) 1 Guardians Nationalist Philippines, Inc.
204359 12-272 (PLM) Social Movement for Active Reform
(1GANAP/GUARDIANS)
and Transparency (SMART)
203766 12-161 (PLM) Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum)
204356 12-136 (PLM) Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)
204318 12-220 (PLM) United Movement Against Drugs
Resolution dated 11 December 2012
Foundation (UNIMAD)
204402 12-061 (PL) Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN)
204263 12-257 (PLM) Blessed Federation of Farmers and
204394 12-145 (PL) Association of Guard, Utility Helper,
Fishermen International, Inc.
Aider, Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper,
(A BLESSED Party-List)
Janitor, Agent and Nanny of the
204174 12-232 (PLM) Aangat Tayo Party-List Party (AT)
Philippines, Inc. (GUARDJAN)
204126 12-263 (PLM) Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang Agilang
204408 12-217 (PLM) Pilipino Association for Country —
Pilipinong Magsasaka (KAP)
Urban Poor Youth Advancement
204364 12-180 (PLM) Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao
and Welfare (PACYAW)
Para sa Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at
204428 12-256 (PLM) Ang Galing Pinoy (AG)
Kaunlaran (AKO-BAHAY)
204490 12-073 (PLM) Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP)
204139 12-127 (PL) Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM)
204379 12-099 (PLM) Alagad ng Sining (ASIN)
204220 12-238 (PLM) Abang Lingkod Party-List (ABANG
204367 12-104 (PL) Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN)
LINGKOD)
204426 12-011 (PLM) Association of Local Athletics
204236 12-254 (PLM) Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-K)
Entrepreneurs and Hobbyists, Inc.
204238 12-173 (PLM) Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP)
(ALA-EH)
204239 12-060 (PLM) Green Force for the Environment Sons
204455 12-041 (PLM) Manila Teachers Savings and Loan
 Association, Inc. (Manila Teachers) present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system,
and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-listelections, under the new parameters prescribed in
204374 12-228 (PLM) Binhi-Partido ng mga Magsasaka Para this Decision.

sa mga Magsasaka (BINHI) The Party-List System

204370 12-011 (PP) Ako An Bisaya (AAB) The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put,
the party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in
204435 12-057 (PLM) 1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. 50 The voter elects two
representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and another for his or
Party (1AAAP) her party-list group or organization of choice. The 1987 Constitution provides: cCTESa
204486 12-194 (PLM) 1st Kabalikat ng Bayan Ginhawang Section 5, Article VI

Sangkatauhan (1st KABAGIS) (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
204410 12-198 (PLM) 1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK) from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
204421, 12-157 (PLM) Coalition of Senior Citizens in the
inhabitants, andon the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
204425 12-191 (PLM) Philippines, Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS) provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
204436 12-009 (PP), Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI)
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
12-165 (PLM) total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
204485 12-175 (PL) Alliance of Organizations, Networks allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection
or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
and Associations of the Philippines, Inc. women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector.
(ALONA)
Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C
204484 11-002 Partido ng Bayan ng Bida (PBB)
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition
Resolution dated 11 December 2012 shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in
this Constitution.
204153 12-277 (PLM) Pasang Masda Nationwide Party
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the
(PASANG MASDA)
party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards
of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they
The Issues shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.
We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013
party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation." 51 The constitutional
party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by
provisions on the party-list system should be read in light of the following discussion among its
cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations; and second, whether
framers: SEDaAH
the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections 49 (BANAT) should MR. MONSOD:
be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
....
The Court's Ruling
I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing
the party list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral
decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013
representation. Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid the
party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of
dilemma of choice of sectors and who constitute the members of the
national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the
sectors. In making the proposal on the party list system, we were made
decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the
aware of the problems precisely cited by Commissioner Bacani of which
sectors will have reserved seats. In effect, a sectoral representation in the
Assembly would mean that certain sectors would have reserved seats;
that they will choose among themselves who would sit in those reserved
seats. And then, we have the problem of which sector because as we will
notice in Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were the farmers,
fishermen, workers, students, professionals, business, military, academic,
ethnic and other similar groups. So these are the nine sectors that were
identified here as "sectoral representatives" to be represented in
this Commission. The problem we had in trying to approach sectoral
representation in the Assembly was whether to stop at these nine sectors
or include other sectors. And we went through the exercise in a caucus of
which sector should be included which went up to 14 sectors. And as we
all know, the longer we make our enumeration, the more limiting the law
become because when we make an enumeration we exclude those who
are not in the enumeration. Second, we had the problem of who comprise
the farmers. Let us just say the farmers and the laborers. These days,
there are many citizens who are called "hyphenated citizens." A doctor
may be a farmer; a lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is up to the
discretion of the person to say "I am a farmer" so he would be included in
that sector.
The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system of
sectoral representation in the Assembly, we are, in effect, giving some
people two votes and other people one vote. We sought to avoid these
problems by presenting a party list system. Under the party list system,
there are no reserved seats for sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers
can form a sectoral party or a sectoral organization that will then register
and present candidates of their party. How do the mechanics go?
Essentially, under the party list system, every voter has two votes, so
there is no discrimination. First, he will vote for the representative of his
legislative district. That is one vote. In that same ballot, he will be asked:
What party or organization or coalition do you wish to be represented in
the Assembly? And here will be attached a list of the parties,
organizations or coalitions that have been registered with
the COMELEC and are entitled to be put in that list. This can be a regional
party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional
party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he wants the
farmers' party to be represented in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for
any party. At the end of the day, the COMELEC will then tabulate the
votes that had been garnered by each party or each organization — one
does not have to be a political party and register in order to participate as
a party — and count the votes and from there derive the percentage of the
votes that had been cast in favor of a party, organization or
coalition. ScCIaA
When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that 50
of the 250 seats will be for the party list system. So, we have a limit of 30
percent of 50. That means that the maximum that any party can get out of
these 50 seats is 15. When the parties register they then submit a list of
15 names. They have to submit these names because these nominees
have to meet the minimum qualifications of a Member of the National
Assembly. At the end of the day, when the votes are tabulated, one gets
the percentages. Let us say, UNIDO gets 10 percent or 15 percent of the
votes; KMU gets 5 percent; a women's party gets 2 1/2 percent and
anybody who has at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote qualifies and the 50
seats are apportioned among all of these parties who get at least 2 1/2
percent of the vote.
What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a
constituency of, say, 500,000 nationwide gets a seat in the National
Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we allocate legislative
districts, we are saying that any district that has 200,000 votes gets a seat.
There is no reason why a group that has a national constituency, even if it
is a sectoral or special interest group, should not have a voice in the
National Assembly. It also means that, let us say, there are three or four
labor groups, they all register as a party or as a group. If each of them gets
only one percent or five of them get one percent, they are not entitled to
any representative. So, they will begin to think that if they really have a
common interest, they should band together, form a coalition and get five
percent of the vote and, therefore, have two seats in the Assembly. Those
are the dynamics of a party list system.
We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral
representation while at the same time making sure that those who really
have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance to
have a seat in the National Assembly. These sectors or these groups may
not have the constituency to win a seat on a legislative district basis. They
may not be able to win a seat on a district basis but surely, they will have
votes on a nationwide basis.
The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found
out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes
nationwide; have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were
always third place or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they have no
voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six
representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win individually in
legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and
objectives of the party list system. EcHaAC
BISHOP BACANI:
Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we speak now of
party list system though we refer to sectors, we would be referring to
sectoral party list rather than sectors and party list?
MR. MONSOD:
As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system, we do not
even have to mention sectors because the sectors would be included in
the party list system. They can be sectoral parties within the party list
system.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MONSOD.
 Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the MR. MONSOD.
party list system because we wanted to open up the political system to a
pluralistic society through a multiparty system. . . . We are for opening But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan
up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a
MR. TADEO.
ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that
can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political
system. . . . . CcAHEI parties, particularly minority political parties, are not prohibited to
participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are
xxx xxx xxx
also organized along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD.
MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to
What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate
political parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify for
because it is precisely the contention of political parties that they
example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political
represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented
parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must they be
in them. Would the Commissioner agree?
under the district legislation side of it only?
MR. TADEO.
MR. VILLACORTA.
Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang
In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner
political party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din
mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well as for the
yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system.
House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral
Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa
candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted,
marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din
of the seats that we are allocating under the party list system.
ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD.
MR. MONSOD.
In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates
Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to
and can also participate in the party list system?
Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is
MR. VILLACORTA. that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the
party list system? CDHaET
Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be
fielding only sectoral candidates. MR. VILLACORTA.

MR. MONSOD. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that
condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list
May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system.
system?
MR. MONSOD.
MR. VILLACORTA.
May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from
the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this MR. TADEO.
Constitution.
The same.
MR. MONSOD.
MR. VILLACORTA.
Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that
Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines. IcESaA
he represents the farmers, would he qualify? EaSCAH
MR. MONSOD:
MR. VILLACORTA.
Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay hindi
No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.
talagang labor leader or isang laborer? Halimbawa, abogado ito.
 MR. TADEO:
Iyong mechanics.
MR. MONSOD:
Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an inherent
problem of sectoral representation. My question is: Suppose UNIDO
fields a labor leader, would he qualify?
MR. TADEO:
The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a political
party is really organized along a specific sectoral line. If such is
verified or confirmed, the political party may submit a list of
individuals who are actually members of such sectors. The lists are
to be published to give individuals or organizations belonging to
such sector the chance to present evidence contradicting claims of
membership in the said sector or to question the claims of the
existence of such sectoral organizations or parties. This proceeding
shall be conducted by the COMELEC and shall be summary in
character. In other words, COMELEC decisions on this matter are
final and unappealable. 52 (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not
only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a
part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta,
political parties can participate in the party-list system "[F]or as long as they field candidates who
come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this
Constitution." 53 DTAaCE
In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to sectoral parties
in the House of Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve the party-list system exclusively to sectoral
parties. As clearly explained by Justice Jose C. Vitug in his Dissenting Opinion in Ang Bagong Bayani:
The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5,
subsection (2), of the 1987 Constitution took off from two staunch positions — the
first headed by Commissioner Villacorta, advocating that of the 20 per centum of the
total seats in Congress to be allocated to party-list representatives half were to be
reserved to appointees from the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The
proposal was opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod expressed the
difficulty in delimiting the sectors that needed representation. He was of the view
that reserving seats for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt
their development into full-pledged parties equipped with electoral machinery potent
enough to further the sectoral interests to be represented. The Villacorta
group, on the other hand, was apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and
less-moneyed sectoral groups in an electoral contest would be like placing babes in
the lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger and more established political parties
ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized this concern when it banned the
first five major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of
Representatives from participating in the party-list system for the first
party-list elections held in 1998 (and to be automatically lifted starting with the
2001 elections). The advocates for permanent seats for sectoral representatives
made an effort towards a compromise — that the party-list system be open only to
underrepresented and marginalized sectors. This proposal was further whittled
down by allocating only half of the seats under the party-list system to candidates
from the sectors which would garner the required number of votes. The majority was
unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal for permanent seats, and in the
alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups, was
voted down. The only concession the Villacorta group was able to muster was an
assurance of reserved seats for selected sectors for three consecutive terms after
the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by which time they would be expected to
gather and solidify their electoral base and brace themselves in the multi-party
electoral contest with the more veteran political groups.54 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted.
Instead, the reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the first three consecutive
terms. 55 There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected
the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly
intended the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties.
The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect
to win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number
of votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list system will be the
entry point to membership in the House of Representatives for both these non-traditional parties that could
not compete in legislative district elections. TaDSHC
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list system
both sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution,
which states:
Section 5.(1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not
more that two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall
be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a party-list system
of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." The commas after the words
"national[,]" and "regional[,]" separate national and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the framers of
the 1987 Constitution intended national and regional parties to be at the same time sectoral, they would
have stated "national and regional sectoral parties." They did not, precisely because it was never their
intention to make the party-list system exclusively sectoral.
What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5 (1), could not be any
clearer: the party-list system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only
one of the three groups. The text of Section 5 (1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and
regional parties are separate from sectoral parties.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or
organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and
regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional
parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular
sector.
 Moreover, Section 5 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three
consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats allocated
to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the party-list system is
not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons. ASETHC
First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be
open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is
exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented." Second, the
reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first "three consecutive
terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end
of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for
any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5 (1)
and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for
sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the
party-list system prescribed in the Constitution, provides:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. — (a) The party-list system is a
mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof registered with
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of
a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form
part does not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens
advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general
conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing
their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical
territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its
constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the
cities and provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector.
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of
groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics,
employment, interests or concerns. DCIEac
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional,
sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a sectoral
party or a coalition of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3 (c) of R.A.
No. 7941 further provides that a "political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an
ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government." On the other
hand, Section 3 (d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to
the special interest and concerns of their sector." R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a
political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the
party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial
fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based
and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in the electoral
process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list system is to
prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To
exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the
clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. aHcACT
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different
from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any
particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must
represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of
citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and
policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
and professionals." 56 The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily "marginalized and
underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are not by definition "marginalized and underrepresented," not
even the elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth may
"lack well-defined political constituencies," and can thus organize themselves into sectoral parties in
advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their respective sectors.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not
require national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to
refuse or cancel the registration of parties or organizations after due notice and hearing.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. —
The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested
party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association
organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
 (4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political
party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or
members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating
to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in
the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered. TcEaAS
None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation of the "marginalized
and underrepresented."
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in
Section 2 on Declaration of Policy. 57 Section 2 seeks "to promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives through the party-list system," which will enable
Filipinos belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties,
and who lack well-defined political constituencies," to become members of the House of
Representatives. While the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to "marginalized
and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties," the specific implementing provisions of R.A. No.
7941 do not define or require that the sectors, organizations or parties must be "marginalized and
underrepresented."On the contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are
"marginalized and underrepresented" would lead to absurdities.
How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 with its
specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the
matter?
The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in
Section 5 that are, by their nature, economically "marginalized and underrepresented." These
sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the
sectoral party must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees of the
sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the
sector represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not mean one
must "wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the
middle class. More specifically, the economically "marginalized and underrepresented" are those who fall in
the low income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board. 58 TAaCED
The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the
elderly, women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and underrepresented" will allow small
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack "well-defined political constituencies" a chance to win
seats in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are
economically at the margins of society, will give the "marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to
likewise win seats in the House of Representatives.
This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a
multi-party system where those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in economic and ideological
status, will have the opportunity to send their own members to the House of Representatives. This
interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent, eliminating the need for relatively
well-off party-list representatives to masquerade as "wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity," even as
they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections. Major
political parties cannot participate in the party-list electionssince they neither lack "well-defined political
constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the national or
regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily those that do not belong to major
political parties. This automatically reserves the national and regional parties under the party-list system
to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them the opportunity to have members in the
House of Representatives.
To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the accreditation of
parties under the party-list system, that "while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941
and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory
policy of enabling 'Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors . . . to be
elected to the House of Representatives.'" However, the requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani, in its second
guideline, that "the political party . . . must represent the marginalized and underrepresented," automatically
disqualified major political parties from participating in the party-list system. This inherent
inconsistency in Ang Bagong Bayani has been compounded by the COMELEC's refusal to register
sectoral wings officially organized by major political parties. BANAT merely formalized the prevailing
practice when it expressly prohibited major political parties from participating in the party-list system,
even through their sectoral wings. STECDc
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political parties on the
basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress" from
participating in the May 1988 party-list elections. 59 Thus, major political parties can participate
in subsequent party-listelections since the prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988
party-list elections. However, major political parties should participate in party-listelections only
through their sectoral wings. The participation of major political parties through their sectoral
wings, a majority of whose members are "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in
"well-defined political constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies" as members of the
House of Representatives.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in
party-list elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies." The
participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be geared towards the entry, as members
of the House of Representatives, of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack
well-defined political constituencies," giving them a voice in law-making. Thus, to participate in
party-list elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections must
organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing,
that can register under the party-list system.
Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or
program of government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector represented.
The sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major political party through a
coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides that "component parties or
organizations of a coalition may participate independently (in party-listelections) provided the coalition of
which they form part does not participate in the party-list system."
 Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision
prescribes a special qualification only for the nominee from the youth sector.
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. — No person shall be
nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less
than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and
write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent
for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. aSTAcH
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five
(25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth
sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.
A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she seeks to
represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fideparty-list nominee one must either
belong to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector.
In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying those who desire to
participate in the party-list system:
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in
Section 5 of RA 7941. . . .
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA
7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply
with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors . . . to be elected to the House of
Representatives." . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Third, . . . the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list
system. . . . . cSCADE
xxx xxx xxx
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section
6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or
association, organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government,
foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether
directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly
through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations
relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2)
preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in
the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which
it has registered."
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project
organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its
nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows: TCcIaA
"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. — No
person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless
he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered
voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less
than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the
party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at
least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be
twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of
the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of
thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the
expiration of his term."
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must
represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its
nominees. . . . .
Eighth, . . . the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole. (Emphasis supplied)
In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling further.
In BANAT, the majority officially excluded major political parties from participating in
party-list elections, 60 abandoning even the lip-service that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 that major political parties can participate in party-list elections. TEacSA
The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can participate in the
party-list system through their sectoral wings. The minority expressed that "[e]xcluding the major political
parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the
Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and
judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of
the Constitution and the law." 61 The experimentations in socio-political engineering have only resulted in
confusion and absurdity in the party-list system. Such experimentations, in clear contravention of the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, must now come to an end.
We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying
petitioners. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELECcould not have committed grave abuse of
discretion. However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, we must now impose and mandate
the party-list systemactually envisioned and authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
In BANAT, this Court devised a new formula in the allocation of party-list seats, reversing
the COMELEC's allocation which followed the then prevailing formula in Ang Bagong Bayani.
In BANAT, however, the Court did not declare that the COMELECcommitted grave abuse of discretion.
Similarly, even as we acknowledge here that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, we
declare that it would not be in accord with the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria
in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT in determining who are qualified to participate in the coming 13 May
2013 party-list elections. For this purpose, we suspend our rule 62 that a party may appeal to this
Court from decisions or orders of theCOMELEC only if the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion.
Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may participate
in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following
parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties
or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not
need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under
the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative
district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields
candidates in legislative district elections can participate in
party-list electionsonly through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a
coalition. cdtai
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and
underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies"
include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized
and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the
members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The
nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack
"well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must bebona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if
some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least
one nominee who remains qualified. THESAD
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did
not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized
and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by
the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do
not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to
the sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy
for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do
not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its
nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed
above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the
1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from
engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained.
Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be
remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13
May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.
WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have been
granted Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction to include the names of petitioners in the
printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections only for determination whether petitioners
are qualified to register under the party-list system under the parameters prescribed in this Decision but
they shall not participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections. The 41 petitions, which have been granted
mandatory injunctions to include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to
the Commission on Electionsfor determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the
party-list system and to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the parameters prescribed
in this Decision. The Commission on Elections may conduct summary evidentiary hearings for this purpose.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 203766, 203818-19, 203922 & etc., [April 2,
2013], 707 PHIL 454-753)
 EN BANC On March 16, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc accredited SENIOR CITIZENS as a party-list
organization in a Resolution 6 issued on even date in SPP No. 06-026 (PL).

[G.R. Nos. 206844-45. July 23, 2013.] SENIOR CITIZENS participated in the May 14, 2007 elections. However, the organization failed
to get the required two percent (2%) of the total votes cast. 7Thereafter, SENIOR CITIZENS was granted
leave to intervene in the case of Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, (BANAT) v. Commission onElections. 8 In accordance with the procedure set forth in BANAT for the
INC. [SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-LIST], represented herein by its Chairperson allocation of additional seats under the party-list system, SENIOR CITIZENS was allocated one seat in
and First Nominee, FRANCISCO G. DATOL, Congress. Rep. Arquiza, then the organization's first nominee, served as a member of the
Jr., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. House of Representatives.

Subsequently, SENIOR CITIZENS was allowed to participate in the May 10, 2010 elections.
[G.R. No. 206982. July 23, 2013.] On May 5, 2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an agreement, entitled Irrevocable
Covenant, the relevant terms of which we quote:
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, IRREVOCABLE COVENANT
INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS), represented by its President and Incumbent
Representative in the House of Representatives, ATTY. GODOFREDO V. KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENT
ARQUIZA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
We, in representation of our respective personal capacity, hereby
covenant and agree as follows: cASEDC

ARTICLE I
DECISION
PARTIES AND PERSONS

1. ATTY. GODOFREDO V. ARQUIZA, of legal age, married, Filipino, and residing

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p: at 1881 C.M. Recto Avenue, Sampaloc, Manila, and representing
the Senior CitizensParty-list in my capacity as President with our General
Headquarters at Room 404 West Trade Center, 132 West Avenue,
The present petitions were filed by the two rival factions within the same party-list organization, hereinafter referred to as the FIRST PARTY;
the Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Phil., Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS) that are now praying
for essentially the same reliefs from this Court. 2. ATTY. DAVID L. KHO, of legal age, married, Filipino, and residing at 35 Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City, hereinafter referred to as the SECOND PARTY;
One group is headed by Godofredo V. Arquiza (Rep. Arquiza), the organization's incumbent
representative in the House of Representatives. This group shall be hereinafter referred to as the Arquiza 3. FRANCISCO G. DATOL, JR., of legal age, married, Filipino, and residing at
Group. The other group is led by Francisco G. Datol, Jr., the organization's erstwhile third nominee. This North Olympus Blk., 3, Lot 15 Ph4 Grieg St., Novaliches, Quezon City,
group shall be hereinafter referred to as the Datol Group. hereinafter referred to as the THIRD PARTY; DTEcSa
G.R. Nos. 206844-45 is the Extremely Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With Prayer for the 4. REMEDIOS D. ARQUIZA, of legal age, married, Filipino, and residing at 1881
Forthwith Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order [TRO] C.M. Recto Avenue, Sampaloc, Manila, hereinafter referred to as the
and/or Status Quo Ante Order [SQAO]) 1 filed in the name of SENIOR CITIZENS by Francisco G. Datol, Jr. FOURTH PARTY;
For brevity, we shall refer to this petition as the Datol Group's petition.
5. LINDA GADDI DAVID, of legal age, married, Filipino, and residing at 150 Don
G.R. No. 206982 is the Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With Application for a Temporary Francisco, St. Francis Vil., San Fernando, Pampanga
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) 2 filed on behalfof SENIOR CITIZENS by Rep. City (sic) hereinafter referred to as the FIFTH PARTY;
Arquiza. We shall refer to this as the Arquiza Group's petition. acAESC
xxx xxx xxx
The above petitions were filed pursuant to Rule 64 3 in relation to Rule 65 4 of the Rules of
Court, both assailing the Omnibus Resolution 5 dated May 10, ARTICLE III
2013 ofthe Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 THE LIST OF CANDIDATES
(PLM). Said Resolution disqualified SENIOR CITIZENS from participating in the May 13,
2013 elections and ordered the cancellation of its registration and accreditation as a party-list organization. We agree that official candidates of the SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-LIST
and in the following order shall be:
THE ANTECEDENTS
 Name CTC No. Issued at Issued on No. 3 nominee = 1 1/2 years All beginning July 1, 2010

SHARING OF RIGHTS
BENEFITS AND PRIVILEGES
1. Godofredo V. Arquiza S.C.I.D.#2615256 Manila 04-02-04
That serving incumbent Congress Representative in the event one or
2. David L. Kho 16836192 Quezon City 03-15-09 more is elected and qualified shall observe proper sharing of certain benefits by
virtue of his position as such, to include among others, appointment of persons in
3. Francisco G. Datol, Jr. 27633197 Quezon City 02-10-10 his office, projects which may redound to the benefits and privileges that may be
possible under the law.
4. Remedios D. Arquiza S.C.I.D.#50696 Quezon City 01-02-07
The above mentioned parties shall oversee the implementation of this
5. Linda Gaddi David CCI2009 12306699 Pampanga 01-04-10
COVENANT.
ARTICLE IV
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have set their hands this
SHARING OF POWER [MAY 05 2010] in [QUEZON CITY].

The Nominees agreed and pledged on their legal and personal honor and
interest as well as the legal privileges and rights of the respective party-list offices,
under the following circumstances and events: CDScaT
(Signed) (Signed)
ELECTION RESULTS
————————————————— —————————————————
Where only ONE (1) candidate qualifies and is proclaimed, then No. 1
shall assume the Office of Party-list Representative in CONGRESS from July 1, Godofredo V. Arquiza David L. Kho
2010 to June 30, 2012 and shall relinquish his seat in Congress by the proper and
legal acts and No. 2 shall assume said seat from July 1, 2012 to June 30, 2013; S.C.I.D. #2615256 Iss. at Manila CTC#16836192 Iss. at
In the event TWO (2) candidates qualify and are proclaimed, then, No. 1 on 04-02-04 Quezon City on 03-15-09
shall serve for three (3) years, and No. 2 and No. 3 will each serve for one-and-a-half
years.

In the event THREE (3) candidates qualify and are proclaimed, then No. 1
shall serve for three years; No. 2 will serve for two (2) years and afterwards shall
relinquish the second seat to No. 4 nominee, who will then serve for one (1) year; No. (Signed) (Signed)
3 will occupy the third seat for two (2) years and afterwards shall relinquish said
seat on the third year to Nominee 5, who will serve for the remaining one (1) ————————————————— —————————————————
year. ISCaTE
Francisco G. Datol, Jr. Remedios D. Arquiza
In Fine:
CTC#16836192 Iss. at S.C.I.D.#50696 Iss. at
If only one (1) seat is won If three (3) seats are won:
Quezon City on 03-15-09 Quezon City on 01-02-07
No. 1 nominee = 2 years No. 1 nominee = 3 years

No. 2 nominee = 1 year No. 2 nominee = 2 years

No. 3 nominee = 2 years

(Signed)
If two (2) seats are won No. 4 nominee = 1 year
—————————————————
No. 1 nominee = 3 years No. 5 nominee = 1 year
Linda Gaddi David
No. 2 nominee = 1 1/2 years
CTC#CCI2009 12306699 Iss. at
San Fernando, Pampanga on 01-04-10 9 (Signed)
Rep. David L. Kho
After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS ranked second among all Party-list Congressman
the party-list candidates and was allocated two seats in the House ofRepresentatives. The first seat was
occupied by its first nominee, Rep. Arquiza, while the second was given to its second nominee, David L. Copy furnished:
Kho (Rep. Kho). HCaDIS The Board of Trustees
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. 16
The split among the ranks of SENIOR CITIZENS came about not long after. According to the
Datol Group's petition, the members of SENIOR CITIZENS held a national convention on November 27, According to the Datol Group, Rep. Kho submitted to them a letter dated December 31, 2011,
2010 in order to address "the unfulfilled commitment of [Rep. Arquiza] to his constituents." 10 Further, a notifying them of his resignation in this wise: TIDcEH
new set of officers and members of the Board of Trustees of the organization were allegedly elected during
the said convention. SENIOR CITIZENS' third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., was supposedly elected as December 31, 2011
the organization's Chairman. Thereafter, on November 30, 2010, in an opposite turn of events, Datol was
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF
expelled from SENIOR CITIZENS by the Board of Trustees that were allied with Rep. Arquiza. 11
SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILS., INC.
Thenceforth, the two factions of SENIOR CITIZENS had been engaged in a bitter rivalry as both Rm. 405, 4th Floor, WTC Building
groups, with their own sets of officers, claimed leadership of the organization. 132 West Avenue, Quezon City

The Resignation of Rep. Kho Gentlemen/Ladies:

On December 14, 2011, Rep. Arquiza informed the office of COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. It is with deepest regret that I inform this esteemed organization of my
Brillantes, Jr. in a letter 12 dated December 8, 2011 that the second nominee of SENIOR CITIZENS, Rep. decision to resign as the party-list nominee for the House of Representatives this
Kho, had tendered his resignation, which was to take effect on December 31, 2011. The fourth nominee, 15th Congress for personal reason already conveyed to you. DcCEHI
Remedios D. Arquiza, was to assume the vacant position in view of the previous expulsion from the
organization of the third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr. Thank you for the opportunity to serve the Senior Citizens of our dear
country.
The letter of Rep. Arquiza was also accompanied by a petition 13 dated December 14, 2011 in
the name of SENIOR CITIZENS. The petition prayed that the "confirmation and approval of the Very truly yours,
replacement of Congressman David L. Kho, in the person of the fourth nominee, Remedios D. Arquiza, due
(Signed)
to the expulsion of the third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., be issued immediately in order to pave the
DAVID L. KHO 17
way of her assumption into the office." 14 Before the COMELEC, the petition was docketed as E.M. No.
12-040. AEIHaS In the interim, during the pendency of E.M. No. 12-040, COMELEC Resolution No.
9366 18 was promulgated on February 21, 2012. Pertinently, Section 7 of Rule 4 thereof provided that:
Attached to the petition was the resignation letter 15 of Rep. Kho, which was addressed to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives. The letter stated thus: SEC. 7. Term sharing of nominees. — Filling of vacancy as a
result of term sharing agreement among nominees of winning party-list
THE HONORABLE SPEAKER
groups/organizations shall not be allowed.
House of Representatives
Congress On March 12, 2012, the Board of Trustees of SENIOR CITIZENS that were allied with Rep.
Republic of the Philippines Arquiza issued Board Resolution No. 003-2012, which pertinently stated thus:
Quezon City
BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 003-2012
Sir: Series of 2012
I am hereby tendering my irrevocable resignation as A RESOLUTION RECALLING THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE BOARD IN
Representative of the Senior Citizens Party-list in the House of Representatives, RESOLUTION NO. 11-0012 OF THE RESIGNATION OF CONGRESSMAN
effective December 31, 2011 in the event that only two (2) seats are won by our DAVID L. KHO AND ALLOWING HIM TO CONTINUE REPRESENTING
party-list group; and will resign on June 30, 2012 in case three seats are won. THE SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-LIST IN THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ALLOWING HIM TO CONTINUE HIS TERM
As a consequence thereof, the Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the
AND IMPOSING CERTAIN CONDITIONS ON HIM TO BE PERFORMED WITH
Philippines, Inc. shall nominate my successor pursuant to law and Rules on the
THE COALITION;
matter.
WHEREAS, the second nominee, Congressman David L. Kho, tendered his
Please accept my esteem and respect.
resignation as representative of the Senior Citizens Party-list effective December
Truly yours, 31, 2011, . . .;
 WHEREAS, the said resignation was accepted by the Board of Trustees in a
resolution signed unanimously, in view of the nature of his resignation, and in
view of his determination to resign and return to private life, . . .; IAaCST
WHEREAS, after much deliberation and consultation, the said nominee changed
his mind and requested the Board of Trustees to reconsider the acceptance, for
he also reconsidered his resignation, and requested to continue his term;
WHEREAS, in consideration of all factors affecting the party-list and in
view of the forthcoming elections, the Board opted to reconsider the acceptance,
recall the same, and allow Cong. David L. Kho to continue his term;
WHEREAS, the Coalition, in recalling the acceptance of the Board, is however
imposing certain conditions on Cong. Kho to be performed;
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED to
recall the acceptance of the resignation of Congressman David L. Kho in
view of his request and change of mind, hence allow him to continue his term
subject to conditions stated above. 19
Thereafter, on April 18, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc conducted
hearing on SENIOR CITIZENS' petition in E.M. No. 12-040. At the hearing, the counsel
for SENIORCITIZENS (Arquiza Group) admitted that Rep. Kho's tender of resignation was made pursuant
to the agreement entered into by the organization's nominees. 20 However, said counsel also stated that
the Board of Trustees of the organization reconsidered the acceptance of Rep. Kho's resignation and the
latter was, instead, to complete his term. 21 Also, from the transcript of the hearing, it appears that the
Arquiza Group previously manifested that it was withdrawing its petition, but the same was opposed by the
Datol Group and was not acted upon by the COMELEC. 22
On June 27, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution 23 in E.M. No. 12-040,
dismissing the petition of the SENIOR CITIZENS (Arquiza Group). The pertinent portions of the Resolution
stated, thus: DSETac
First, resignation of Kho,
pursuant to the party nominees'
term-sharing agreement, cannot
be recognized and be given effect
so as to create a vacancy in the
list and change the order of the
nominees.
Under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7941, the withdrawal in writing of the
nominee of his nomination is one of the three (3) exemptions to the rule that "[n]o
change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the
same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC." While we can consider the
resignation of Rep. Kho as akin to the withdrawal of his own nomination, we are
constrained however NOT to recognize such resignation but only in so far as to
change the order of petitioner's nominees as submitted to the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that it is an admitted fact that the resignation of Rep. Kho
was made by virtue of a prior agreement of the parties, we resolve and hereby
rule that we cannot recognize such arrangement and accordingly we cannot
approve the movement in the order of nominees for being contrary to public
policy. The term of office of public officials cannot be made subject to any
agreement of private parties. Public office is not a commodity that can be shared,
apportioned or be made subject of any private agreement. Public office is vested
with public interest that should not be reined by individual interest. CaESTA
In fact, to formalize the policy of disallowing term sharing agreements
among party list nominees, the Commission recently promulgated Resolution No.
9366, which provides:
"SEC. 7. Term sharing of nominees. — Filling of vacancy as
a result of term sharing agreement among nominees of winning
party-list groups/organizations shall not be allowed."
Considering all these, we find the term sharing agreement by the
nominees of the Senior Citizen's Party-List null and void. Any action committed by
the parties in pursuit of such term-sharing arrangement — including the
resignation of Congressman David Kho — cannot be recognized and be given
effect. Thus, in so far as thisCommission is concerned, no vacancy was created by
the resignation of Rep. Kho and there can be no change in the list and
order of nominees of the petitioner party-list.
a
Second, the expulsion of Datol —
even if proven true — has no effect
in the list and in the order of
nominees, thus Remedios Arquiza
(the fourth nominee) cannot be
elevated as the third nominee.
xxx xxx xxx
It must be noted that the list and order of nominees, after submission to
this Commission, is meant to be permanent. The legislature in crafting Republic
Act No. 7941 clearly deprived the party-list organization of the right to change its
nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list is submitted to
the COMELEC, except for three (3) enumerated instances such as when: (a) the
nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the
nominee becomes incapacitated.DIHETS
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, even if the expulsion of Datol in the petitioner party-list were true,
the list and order of nominees of the Senior Citizen's party-list remains the same in
so far as we are concerned as it does not fall under one of the three grounds
mentioned above. Neither does it have an automatic effect on the organization's
representative in the House of Representatives, for once a party-list nominee is
"elected" into office and becomes a member of the House, he is treated similarly
and equally with the regular district representatives. As such, they can only be
expelled or suspended upon the concurrence of the two-thirds of all its Members
and never by mere expulsion of a party-list organization.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, there being no vacancy in the list of nominees of the
petitioner organization, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The list and order of nominees of petitioner hereby remains the same as it was
 submitted to us there being no legally recognizable ground to cause any changes
thereat. 24(Citation omitted.)
The Datol Group filed A Very Urgent Motion for Reconsideration 25 of the above resolution, but
the same remained unresolved.
The Review of SENIOR CITIZENS' Registration
Meanwhile, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed their respective Manifestations of Intent
to Participate in the Party-list System of Representation in the May 13, 2013 Elections under the
name of SENIOR CITIZENS. 26 The Manifestation of the Datol Group was docketed as SPP No. 12-157
(PLM), while that of the Arquiza Group was docketed as SPP No. 12-191 (PLM).
On August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513, 27 which, inter alia, set for
summary evidentiary hearings by the COMELEC En Banc the review of the registration of existing
party-list organizations, which have filed their Manifestations of Intent to Participate in the Party-list
System of Representation in the May 13, 2013 Elections. EHcaDT
The two factions of SENIOR CITIZENS appeared before the COMELEC En Banc on August 24,
2012 and they both submitted their respective evidence, which established their continuing compliance with
the requirements of accreditation as a party-list organization. 28
On December 4, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution 29 in SPP Nos. 12-157
(PLM) and 12-191 (PLM). By a vote of 4-3, the COMELEC En Banc ordered the cancellation of the
registration of SENIOR CITIZENS. The resolution explained that:
It shall be recalled that on June 27, 2012, this Commission promulgated
its resolution in a petition that involved SENIOR CITIZENS titled "In Re: Petition for
Confirmation of Replacement of Resigned Party-List Nominee" and docketed as
EM No. 12-040. In the process of resolving the issues of said case,
this Commissionfound that SENIOR CITIZENS nominees specifically nominees
David L. Kho and Francisco G. Datol, Jr. have entered into a term-sharing
agreement. . . . .
Nominee David Kho's term as party-list congressman is three (3) years
which starts on June 30, 2010 and to end on June 30, 2013 as directed no less than
by theConstitution of the Philippines. Section 7, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution states:
"Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall
be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise
provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election."
But following the term-sharing agreement entered into
by SENIOR CITIZENS, David Kho's term starts on June 30, 2010 and
ends on December 31, 2011, the dateof effectivity of Kho's resignation. By
virtue of the term-sharing agreement, the term of Kho as member of the
House of Representatives is cut short to one year and six months which is merely
half of [the] three-year term. This is totally opposed to the prescription of the
Constitution on the term of a Member of the House ofRepresentatives. Hence,
when confronted with this issue on term sharing done by SENIOR CITIZENS,
this Commission made a categorical pronouncement that such term-sharing
agreement must be rejected. TASCDI
xxx xxx xxx
From the foregoing, SENIOR CITIZENS failed to comply with Section 7,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 7, Rule 4 of Comelec Resolution
No. 9366. This failure is a ground for cancellation of registration under Section
6 of Republic Act No. 7941 which states:
"Section 6. [Refusal] and/or Cancellation of Registration. —
The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified [complaint] of any
interested party, [refuse] or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization
or coalition on any of the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations
relating to elections;
xxx xxx xxx"
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to CANCEL the
registration of Coalition of Associations of SeniorCitizens in the Philippines
(SENIOR CITIZENS) under the Party-List System of Representation. EcDSTI
The rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS challenged the above resolution before this Court by
filing their respective petitions for certiorari. The petition filed by the Datol Group was docketed as G.R. No.
204421, while the petition of the Arquiza Group was docketed as G.R. No. 204425. On December 11, 2012,
the Court initially granted status quo ante orders on said petitions, directing the COMELEC to include the
name of SENIOR CITIZENS in the printing of official ballots for the May 13, 2013 party-list elections.
Eventually, both petitions were consolidated with the petition in Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on
Elections, which was docketed as G.R. No. 203766.
On April 2, 2013, the Court promulgated its Decision in Atong Paglaum, which ordered the
remand to the COMELEC of the petitions that have been granted mandatory injunctions to include the
names of the petitioners in the printing of ballots. Following the parameters set forth in the Court's Decision,
the COMELEC was to determine whether said petitioners, which included the two
factions of SENIOR CITIZENS, were qualified to register under the party-list system and to participate in
the May 13, 2013 elections. For this purpose, the Court stated that the COMELEC may conduct summary
evidentiary hearings.
Thereafter, on May 10, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc rendered the assailed Omnibus
Resolution in SPP Nos. 12-157 (PLM) and 12-191 (PLM), ruling in this wise:
Guided by these six new parameters [enunciated by the Court in Atong
Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections], as well as the provisions of the
Constitution,Republic Act No. 7941 ("R.A. No. 7941") or the Party-List System Act,
and other pertinent election laws, and after a careful and exhaustive
reevaluation of the documents submitted by the petitioners per their compliance
with Resolution No. 9513 ("Res. No. 9513"), the Commission En
Banc RESOLVES as follows:
I.SPP Nos. 12-157 (PLM) & 12-191 (PLM) — SENIOR CITIZENS
 To DENY the Manifestations of Intent to Participate, and to CANCEL the A. To DENY the Manifestations of Intent to Participate, and CANCEL the
registration and accreditation, of petitioner Senior Citizens, for violating laws, rules, registration and accreditation, of the following parties, groups, or organizations:
and regulations relating to elections pursuant to Section 6 (5) of R.A. No.
7941. SIaHDA (1) SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) & SPP No. 12-191 (PLM)
— Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc.;
The Commission En Banc finds no cogent reason to reverse its earlier
finding in the Resolution for SPP Nos. 12-157 (PLM) & 12-191 (PLM) xxx xxx xxx
promulgated on 04 December 2012, in relation to the Resolution for E.M. No.
Accordingly, the foregoing shall be REMOVED from the
12-040 promulgated on 27 June 2012. The sole ground for which the
registry of party-list groups and organizations of the Commission, and shall NOT
petitioner Senior Citizens was disqualified was because of the term-sharing
BE ALLOWED toPARTICIPATE as a candidate for the Party-List
agreement between its nominees, which the Commission En Banc found to be
System of Representation for the 13 May 2013 Elections and
contrary to public policy. It will be noted that this ground is independent of the six
subsequent elections thereafter. 30 (Citations omitted.)
parameters in Atong Paglaum, and there is nothing in the doctrine enunciated in
that case which will absolve the petitionerSenior Citizen of what, to On May 13, 2013, the elections proceeded. Despite the earlier declaration of its
the Commission En Banc, is a clear bastardization of the term of office fixed by disqualification, SENIOR CITIZENS still obtained 677,642 votes.
Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution as implemented by Section 14 of R.A. No.
7941, which expressly provides that Members of the House of Representatives, Questioning the cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS' registration and its disqualification to
including party-list representatives, shall be elected for a term ofthree years. participate in the May 13, 2013 elections, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed the instant petitions.
A term, in the legal sense, is a fixed and definite period of time during which an
officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right, a fixed interval after which On May 15, 2013, the Datol Group filed a Very 2 Urgent Motion to Reiterate
the several incumbents succeed one another. Thus, service of the term is for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order, 31 alleging that
the entire period; it cannot be broken down to accommodate those who are the COMELEC had ordered the stoppage of the counting of votes of the disqualified party-list groups. The
not entitled to hold the office. Datol Group urged the Court to issue a TRO and/or a status quo ante order during the pendency of its
petition. EcHaAC
That the term-sharing agreement was made in 2010, while the
expression of the policy prohibiting it was promulgated only in 2012 via Section 7, Meanwhile, on May 24, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution, 32 which
Rule 4 ofResolution No. 9366 ("Res. No. 9366"), is of no moment. As it was in 2010 considered as final and executory its May 10, 2013 Resolution that cancelled the
as it is now, as it was in 1987 when the Constitution was ratified and as it was in registration of SENIOR CITIZENS. On even date, the COMELEC En Banc, sitting as the National
1995 whenR.A. No. 7941 was enacted into law, the agreement was and is contrary Board of Canvassers (NBOC), promulgated NBOC Resolution No. 0006-13,33 proclaiming fourteen (14)
to public policy because it subjects a Constitutionally-ordained fixed term to party-list organizations as initial winners in the party-list elections of May 13, 2013.
hold public elective office to contractual bargaining and negotiation, and treats
The Arquiza Group filed on May 27, 2013 a Supplement to the "Very Urgent Petition
the same as though it were nothing more than a contractual clause, an object in the
for Certiorari," 34 also reiterating its application for a TRO and a writ ofpreliminary injunction.
ordinary course of the commerce of men. To accept this defense will not only open
the floodgates to unscrupulous individuals, but more importantly it will render inutile On May 28, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued NBOC Resolution No. 0008-13, 35 which
Section 16 of R.A. No. 7941 which prescribes the procedure to be taken to fill a partially proclaimed the winning party-list organizations that filled up a total of fifty-three (53) out of the
vacancy in the available seats for a party-list group or organization. For this mistake, available fifty-eight (58) seats for party-list organizations.
the petitioner Senior Citizens cannot hide behind the veil of corporate fiction
because the corporate veil can be pierced if necessary to achieve the On May 29, 2013, the Chief Justice issued a TRO, 36 which ordered the COMELEC to submit a
ends of justice or equity, such as when it is used to defeat public convenience, Comment on the instant petitions and to cease and desist from further proclaiming the winners from among
justify wrong, or protect fraud. It further cannot invoke the prohibition in the the party-list candidates in the May 13, 2013 elections.
enactment of ex post facto laws under Section 22, Article III of the
Constitution because the guarantee only the retrospectivity of penal laws and On June 3, 2013, the Datol Group filed a Most Urgent Motion for Issuance of an Order Directing
definitely, Reso. No. 9366 is not penal in character. EacHSA Respondent to Proclaim Petitioner Pendente Lite. 37

From the foregoing, the cancellation of the registration and In a Resolution 38 dated June 5, 2013, the Court issued an order, which directed
accreditation of the petitioner Senior Citizens is therefore in order, and the COMELEC to refrain from implementing the assailed Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 in SPP
consequently, the twoManifestations of Intent to Participate filed with No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM), insofar as SENIOR CITIZENS was concerned and to
the Commission should be denied. observe the status quo ante before the issuance of the assailed COMELEC resolution. The Court likewise
ordered the COMELEC to reserve the seat(s) intended for SENIOR CITIZENS, in accordance with the
xxx xxx xxx number of votes it garnered in the May 13, 2013 Elections. The Court, however, directed the COMELEC to
hold in abeyance the proclamation insofar as SENIOR CITIZENSis concerned until the instant petitions are
WHEREFORE, the Commission En Banc RESOLVES: decided. The Most Urgent Motion for Issuance of an Order Directing Respondent to Proclaim
Petitioner Pendente Lite filed by the Datol Group was denied for lack of merit. cSTCDA
 On June 7, 2013, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a (1) The Comelec En Banc Resolution of May 10, 2013 was issued
Comment 39 on the instant petitions. In a Resolution 40 dated June 10, 2013, the Court required the pursuant to the directive of the Supreme Court in Atong
parties to submit their respective memoranda. On June 19, 2013, the Arquiza Group filed its Reply 41 to the Paglaum. Therefore, theSUBSIDIARY ISSUES arising
Comment of the COMELEC. Subsequently, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed their separate therefrom are: cADaIH
memoranda. 42 On the other hand, the OSG manifested 43 that it was adopting its Comment as its
memorandum in the instant case. a. Are there guidelines prescribed in Atong Paglaum to be
followed by respondent Comelec in determining
THE ISSUES which party-list groups are qualified to participate in
party-list elections?
The Datol Group's memorandum raised the following issues for our consideration:
b. If there are these guidelines to be followed, were
IV. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
these adhered to [by] respondent Comelec?
4.1
(2) Is the ground — the Term-Sharing
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE Agreement between Senior Citizens nominees — a legal
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR ground to cancel Senior Citizens' Certificate ofRegistration
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ADDED ANOTHER GROUND ?
(VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY) FOR
4.2. Whether or not COMELEC EN BANC RESOLUTION of MAY 24, 2013 is
CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION OF A PARTY-LIST GROUP AS
invalid for being contrary to law and having been issued without or in
PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 6, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7941.
excess ofjurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to
4.2 lack of jurisdiction?

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE (1) The SUBSIDIARY ISSUES are:
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
a. Is the factual basis thereof valid?
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT CANCELLED PETITIONER'S
CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION/ACCREDITATION WITHOUT DUE b. Has the Comelec En Banc Resolution of May 20, 2013, in
PROCESS OF LAW. aTEHIC fact, become final and executory?
4.3 4.3. Whether or not NATIONAL BOARD of CANVASSERS' (NBOC)
RESOLUTION No. 0006-13 of MAY 24, 2013 is invalid for being
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE
contrary to law and having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT PETITIONER
VIOLATED PUBLIC POLICY ON TERM SHARING. (1) The SUBSIDIARY ISSUES are:
4.4 a. Is the factual basis thereof valid? EaTCSA
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE b. Is the total of the party-list votes cast which
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR was made as the basis thereof correct?
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE AUTOMATIC REVIEW
BY THE EN BANC OF THE REGISTRATION/ACCREDITATION GRANTED BY c. Has the Justice Carpio Formula prescribed
ITS DIVISION, NOTWITHSTANDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION in Banat vs. Comelec been followed?
THAT THE EN BANC CAN ONLY REVIEW
DECISIONS OF THE DIVISION UPON FILING OF A MOTION FOR 4.4. Whether or not NBOC RESOLUTION No. 0008-13 of MAY 28,
RECONSIDERATION. 44 (Citation omitted.) 2013 is invalid for being contrary to law and having been issued without
or in excess ofjurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to
Upon the other hand, the memorandum of the Arquiza Group brought forward the following lack of jurisdiction?
arguments:
(1) The SUBSIDIARY ISSUES are identical with those of Issue No. 4.3,
4.1. Whether or not COMELEC EN BANC RESOLUTION of MAY 10, namely:
2013 is invalid for being contrary to law and having been issued without
or in excess ofjurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to a. Is the factual basis thereof valid?
lack of jurisdiction?
 b. Is the total of the party-list votes cast which (2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
was made as the basis thereof correct?
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
c. Has the Justice Carpio Formula prescribed
in Banat vs. Comelec been followed? (4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political
party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or
4.5. What is the cardinal rule in interpreting members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
laws/rules on qualifications and disqualifications of the candidates
after the election where they have received the winning (5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating
number of votes? cHATSI to elections;

4.6. May the COMELEC En Banc Resolutions of May 10 and 24, 2013 and NBOC
Resolutions of May 24 and 28, 2013 be annulled and set aside? 45
THE COURT'S RULING
After reviewing the parties' pleadings, as well as the various resolutions attached thereto, we find
merit in the petitioners' contentions.
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in
the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.

SENIOR CITIZENS' Right to Due Process

First, we shall dispose of the procedural issue. In their petitions, the two rival
groups of SENIOR CITIZENS are actually one in asserting that the organization's disqualification and
cancellation of its registration and accreditation were effected in violation of its right to due process.
The Arquiza Group argues that no notice and hearing were given to SENIOR CITIZENS for the
cancellation of its registration on account of the term-sharing agreement of its nominees. The Arquiza
Group maintains that SENIOR CITIZENS was summoned only to a single hearing date in the
afternoon of August 24, 2012 and the COMELEC's review therein focused on the group's programs,
accomplishments, and other related matters. The Arquiza Group asserts that SENIOR CITIZENS was not
advised, before or during the hearing, that the issue of the term-sharing agreement would constitute a basis
for the review of its registration and accreditation. SHADEC
Likewise, the Datol Group faults the COMELEC for cancelling the registration and
accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS without giving the latter the opportunity to show that it complied with
the parameters laid down in Atong Paglaum. The Arquiza Group confirms that after the
promulgation of Atong Paglaum, the COMELECconducted summary hearings in executive sessions,
without informing SENIOR CITIZENS. The Arquiza Group says that it filed a "Very Urgent Motion to Set
Case for Hearing or to Be Included in the Hearing Set on Thursday, May 9, 2013," but its counsel found
that SENIOR CITIZENS was not included in the hearings wherein other party-list groups were heard by
the COMELEC. The Arquiza Group subsequently filed on May 10, 2013 a "2nd Very Urgent Motion to Set
Case for Public Hearing," but the same was also not acted upon. The Arquiza Group alleges that it only
found out after the elections that the assailed May 10, 2013 Omnibus Resolution was issued and the
Arquiza Group was not actually served a copy thereof.
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7941 46 provides for the procedure relative to the review of the
registration of party-list organizations, to wit:
SEC. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. —
The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested
party, refuse or cancel,after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following
grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization
or association organized for religious purposes;
Unquestionably, the twin requirements of due notice and hearing are indispensable before
the COMELEC may properly order the cancellation of the registration and accreditation of a party-list
organization. In connection with this, the Court lengthily discussed in Mendoza v. Commission on
Elections 47 the conceptof due process as applied to the COMELEC. We emphasized therein
that: IHSTDE
The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC, as
an administrative or quasi-judicial tribunal, are those outlined in the seminal
case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, quoted below:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes
the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof. . . . .
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case
and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide
right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is
a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion, but the evidence must be "substantial." "Substantial evidence is more
than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must
act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision.
 (7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
These are now commonly referred to as cardinal primary rights in
administrative proceedings. aTSEcA
The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive
rights of a party at hearing stage of the proceedings. The essence of this
aspect of due process, we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity
to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all
instances essential; in the case of COMELEC, Rule 17 of its Rules of Procedure
defines the requirements for a hearing and these serve as the standards in the
determination ofthe presence or denial of due process.
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang
Tibay requirements are reinforcements of the right to a hearing and are the
inviolable rights applicable at the deliberative stage, as the decision-maker
decides on the evidence presented during the hearing. These standards set forth
the guiding considerations in deliberating on the case and are the material and
substantial components of decision-making. Briefly, the tribunal must consider the
totality of the evidence presented which must all be found in the records of the case
(i.e., those presented or submitted by the parties); the conclusion, reached by the
decision-maker himself and not by a subordinate, must be based on substantial
evidence.
Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of the
decision of a quasi-judicial body, further complements the hearing and
decision-making due process rights and is similar in substance to the constitutional
requirement that a decision of a court must state distinctly the facts and the law
upon which it is based. As a component of the rule of fairness that underlies due
process, this is the "duty to give reason" to enable the affected person to understand
how the rule offairness has been administered in his case, to expose the reason to
public scrutiny and criticism, and to ensure that the decision will be thought through
by the decision-maker. (Emphases ours, citations omitted.) THAICD
In the instant case, the review of the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS was made pursuant
to COMELEC Resolution No. 9513 through a summary evidentiary hearing carried out on August 24, 2012
in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM). In this hearing, both the Arquiza Group and the
Datol Group were indeed given the opportunity to adduce evidence as to their continuing compliance with
the requirements for party-list accreditation. Nevertheless, the due process violation was committed when
they were not apprised of the fact that the term-sharing agreement entered into by the
nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS in 2010 would be a material consideration in the evaluation of the
organization's qualifications as a party-list group for the May 13, 2013 elections. As it were, both
factions of SENIOR CITIZENS were not able to answer this issue squarely. In other words, they were
deprived of the opportunity to adequately explain their side regarding the term-sharing agreement and/or to
adduce evidence, accordingly, in support of their position.
In its Comment 48 to the petitions, the COMELEC countered that petitioners were actually given
the opportunity to present their side on the issue of the term-sharing agreement during the hearing on April
18, 2012. 49 Said hearing was allegedly conducted to determine petitioners' continuing compliance for
accreditation as a party-list organization.
The Court is not persuaded. It is true that during the April 18, 2012 hearing, the rival
groups of SENIOR CITIZENS admitted to the existence of the term-sharing agreement. Contrary to the
claim of COMELEC, however, said hearing was conducted for purposes of discussing the petition of the
Arquiza Group in E.M. No. 12-040. To recall, said petition asked for the confirmation of the
replacement of Rep. Kho, who had tendered his resignation effective on December 31, 2011. More
specifically, the transcript of the hearing reveals that the focus thereof was on the petition filed by the
Arquiza group and its subsequent manifestation, praying that the group be allowed to withdraw its petition.
Also, during the hearing, COMELEC Chairman Brillantes did admonish the rival
factions of SENIOR CITIZENS about their conflicts and warned them about the complications brought
about by their term-sharing agreement. However, E.M. No. 12-040 was not a proceeding regarding the
qualifications ofSENIOR CITIZENS as a party-list group and the issue of whether the term-sharing
agreement may be a ground for disqualification was neither raised nor resolved in that case. Chairman
Brillantes's remonstration was not sufficient as to constitute a fair warning that the term-sharing agreement
would be considered as a ground for the cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS' registration and
accreditation. DSHTaC
Furthermore, after the promulgation of Atong Paglaum, which remanded, among other cases,
the disqualification cases involving SENIOR CITIZENS, said organization should have still been afforded
the opportunity to be heard on the matter of the term-sharing agreement, either through a hearing or
through written memoranda. This was the proper recourse considering that the COMELEC was about to
arrive at a final determination as to the qualification of SENIOR CITIZENS. Instead, the COMELEC issued
the May 10, 2013 Omnibus Resolution in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) without
conducting any further proceedings thereon after its receipt of our Decision in Atong Paglaum.
The Prohibition on Term-sharing
The second issue both raised by the petitioners herein constitute the threshold legal issue of the
instant cases: whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Omnibus Resolution, disqualifying and cancelling the
registration and accreditation ofSENIOR CITIZENS solely on account of its purported violation of the
prohibition against term-sharing.
The Datol Group argues that the public policy prohibiting term-sharing was provided for under
Section 7, Rule 4 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366, which was promulgated only on February 21, 2012.
Hence, the resolution should not be made to apply retroactively to the case of SENIOR CITIZENS as
nothing therein provides for its retroactive effect. When the term-sharing agreement was executed in 2010,
the same was not yet expressly proscribed by any law or resolution.
Furthermore, the Datol Group points out that the mere execution of the Irrevocable Covenant
between the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS for the 2010 electionsshould not have been a ground for the
cancellation of the organization's registration and accreditation because the nominees never actually
implemented the agreement.
In like manner, the Arquiza Group vehemently stresses that no term-sharing actually transpired
between the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS. It explained that whatever prior arrangements were made by
the nominees on the term-sharing agreement, the same did not materialize given that the
resignation of Rep. Kho was disapproved by the Board of Trustees and the
members of SENIOR CITIZENS. IcaHCS
Still, granting for the sake of argument that the term-sharing agreement was actually
implemented, the Arquiza Group points out that SENIOR CITIZENS still cannot be held to have violated
Section 7 of Resolution No. 9366. The term-sharing agreement was entered into in 2010 or two years prior
to the promulgation of said resolution on February 21, 2012. Likewise, assuming that the resolution can be
applied retroactively, the Arquiza Group contends that the same cannot affect SENIORCITIZENS at it
already earned a vested right in 2010 as party-list organization.
Article 4 of the Civil Code states that "[l]aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary
is provided." As held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Reyes, 50 "[t]he general rule is that statutes
are prospective. However, statutes that are remedial, or that do not create new or take away vested rights,
do not fall under the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes." We also reiterated in Lintag
and Arrastia v. National Power Corporation 51 that:
It is a well-entrenched principle that statutes, including administrative
rules and regulations, operate prospectively unless the legislative intent to the
contrary is manifest by express terms or by necessary implication because the
retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become
vested. This is basedon the Latin maxim: Lex prospicit non respicit (the law looks
forward, not backward). (Citations omitted.)
True, COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 does not provide that it shall have retroactive effect.
Nonetheless, the Court cannot subscribe to the argument of the Arquiza Group
that SENIOR CITIZENS already earned a vested right to its registration as a party-list
organization. HcTIDC
Montesclaros v. Commission on Elections 52 teaches that "[a] public office is not a property
right. As the Constitution expressly states, a '[P]ublic office is a public trust.' No one has a vested right to
any public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office." Under Section 2 (5),
Article IX-C of theConstitution, the COMELEC is entrusted with the function to "[r]egister, after sufficient
publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must
present their platform or program of government." In fulfilling this function, the COMELEC is duty-bound to
review the grant of registration to parties, organizations, or coalitions already registered in order to ensure
the latter's continuous adherence to the requirements prescribed by law and the relevant rulings of this
Court relative to their qualifications and eligibility to participate in party-list elections.
The Arquiza Group cannot, therefore, object to the retroactive application of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9366 on the ground of the impairment of SENIOR CITIZENS' vested right.
Be that as it may, even if COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 expressly provided for its retroactive
application, the Court finds that the COMELEC En Banc indeed erred in cancelling the registration and
accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS.
The reason for this is that the ground invoked by the COMELEC En Banc, i.e., the term-sharing
agreement among the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS, was not implemented. This fact was manifested by
the Arquiza Group even during the April 18, 2012 hearing conducted by the COMELEC En Banc in E.M. No.
12-040 wherein the Arquiza Group manifested that it was withdrawing its petition for confirmation and
approval of Rep. Kho's replacement. Thereafter, in its Resolution dated June 27, 2012 in E.M. No. 12-040,
the COMELEC En Banc itself refused to recognize the term-sharing agreement and the
tender of resignation of Rep. Kho. The COMELEC even declared that no vacancy was created despite the
execution of the said agreement. Subsequently, there was also no indication that the
nominees of SENIOR CITIZENSstill tried to implement, much less succeeded in implementing, the
term-sharing agreement. Before this Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group insist on this
factof non-implementation of the agreement. Thus, for all intents and purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold
his seat and served his term as a member of the House ofRepresentatives, in accordance with COMELEC
Resolution No. 9366 and the COMELEC En Banc ruling in E.M. No. 12-040. Curiously, the COMELEC is
silent on this point.TIADCc
Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto, it
appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had been unfairly and arbitrarily penalized by
the COMELEC En Banc. Verily, how can there be disobedience on the part of SENIOR CITIZENS when its
nominees, in fact, desisted from carrying out their agreement? Hence, there was no violation of an election
law, rule, or regulation to speak of. Clearly then, the disqualification of SENIORCITIZENS and the
cancellation of its registration and accreditation have no legal leg to stand on.
In sum, the due process violations committed in this case and the lack of a legal ground to
disqualify the SENIOR CITIZENS spell out a finding of grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the COMELEC En Banc. We are, thus, left with no choice but to strike
down the assailed Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191
(PLM).
In light of the foregoing discussion, the Court finds no need to discuss the other issues raised by
the petitioners. In particular, the dispute between the rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS, not being an
issue raised here, should be threshed out in separate proceedings before the proper tribunal having
jurisdiction thereon.
Having established that the COMELEC En Banc erred in ordering the
disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS and the cancellation of its registration and accreditation, said
organization is entitled to be proclaimed as one of the winning party-list organizations in the recently
concluded May 13, 2013 elections. HcSDIE
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby rules that:
(1) The Extremely Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With Prayer for the Forthwith
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order [TRO] and/or Status Quo Ante Order [SQAO]) in G.R. Nos.
206844-45 and the Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With Application
for a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) in
G.R. No. 206982 are GRANTED;
(2) The Omnibus Resolution dated May 10,
2013 of the Commission on Elections En Banc in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM)
and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) isREVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar
as Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. is
concerned; and
(3) The Commission on Elections En
Banc is ORDERED to PROCLAIM the Coalition of Associations of Senio
r Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. as one of the winning party-list
organizations during the May 13, 2013 elections with the number of seats
it may be entitled to based on the total number of votes it garnered during
the said elections.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Phils., Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos.
206844-45 & 206982, [July 23, 2013], 714 PHIL 606-640)
 EN BANC The proclamation of Alay Buhay on October 2, 2012 as a winning party-list signified that it had
only a few months to serve in the House of Representatives. Moreover, the term of office of the winning
party-lists in the May 2010 national elections had in all practicality ended with the May 13,
[G.R. No. 203673. September 17, 2013.] 2013 elections and the proclamation of new party-list winners. The three (3)-year term of sitting
representatives of the 15th Congress officially ended on June 30, 2013. This Court has previously held that
the expiration of the challenged term of office renders the corresponding Petition moot and
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, academic. 9 Therefore, any ruling on the issues raised by Senior Citizens would be of no useful value. 10
INC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ALAY BUHAY
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION, INC., respondents. Second, Senior Citizens is not the proper party to institute this case. It is not the real party in
interest.

A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
NOTICE suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. 11 Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides that
every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest, unless otherwise
authorized by law or by the Rules.

Senior Citizens admitted that there is a "party internal squabble" 12 between factions of the party.
Sirs/Mesdames : One faction is headed by the proclaimed first nominee, Representative Godofredo Arquiza, while the other
faction is headed by Mr. Francisco G. Datol, Jr. The present petition was filed by Plutarco E. Vasquez who
Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated September 17, 2013, which belongs to the faction headed by Mr. Datol, Jr. 13
reads as follows:
Petitioner Vasquez's faction allegedly committed fraud by falsifying a board resolution amending
"G.R. No. 203673 (Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, the Articles of Incorporation and by trying to change the name ofthe party-list group in contravention of the
Inc. v. Commission on Elections and Alay Buhay Community Development Foundation, Inc.) — We rules and law. 14 The Records of the Commission on Elections 15 and Securities and
decide a Petition 1 that was filed by the Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines Exchange Commission, 16 which resolved issues between the Senior Citizens factions, convinced this
(Senior Citizens) questioning the Commission on Elections En Banc's authority to issue Resolution Court that serious doubts exist on whether Senior Citizens, as represented by Mr. Vasquez, is the proper
12-0859. 2 Resolution 12-0859 proclaimed respondent Alay Buhay Community Development Foundation, party to file this Petition. HSaCcE
Inc. (Alay Buhay) as a winning party-list group entitled to one seat in Congress. Senior Citizens claims it is
the one entitled to the seat left vacant by disqualified party-list, Alliance for Barangay Concerns. 3 Senior Citizens failed to establish that it is a recognized
representative of the Senior Citizens party-list registered with the Commission on Elections that won the
First, the end of the May 2013 elections rendered this Petition moot and academic. AcTHCE two seats in the 2010 party-list elections. Consequently, it failed to show it has a direct, substantial, and
material interest in the case. 17
"A moot and academic case ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that any declaration thereon would be of no practical value." 4 Thus, in the absence of actual Thus, this Court resolves to DISMISS the Petition." (Sereno, C.J. and Villarama, Jr., J., on leave;
justiciable controversies or disputes, this Court generally opts to refrain from deciding moot issues or to Peralta and Bersamin, JJ., on official leave.) (50)
dismiss petitions on this ground. 5 This was discussed in Republic Telecommunications Holdings, Inc. v.
Santiago: 6
Very truly yours,
The rule is well-settled that for a court to exercise its
power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy — one which
involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or (SGD.) ENRIQUE E. VIDAL
based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a Clerk of Court
court of justice. Where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no
justiciable controversy, and an adjudication thereon would be of no practical use or
value as courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly
interest, however intellectually challenging. 7 ||| (Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Phils., Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
203673, [September 17, 2013])
The rule of mootness allows exceptions: (1) when there is grave violation of the Constitution; (2)
when the case involves a situation of exceptional character and isof paramount public interest; (3) when the
constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar, and
the public; and (4) when the case is capable of repetition, yet evading review. 8 None of these exceptions
are present in this case. ATHCDa
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 205505. September 29, 2015.]
ATTY. ISIDRO Q. LICO, RAFAEL A. PUENTESPINA, PROCULO T. SARMEN,
AMELITO L. REVUELTA, WILLIAM C. YBANEZ, SILVERIO J. SANCHEZ,
GLORIA G. FUTALAN, HILARIO DE GUZMAN, EUGENE M. PABUALAN,
RODOLFO E. PEREZ, HIPOLITO R. QUILLAN, MARIO ARENAS, TIRSO C.
BUENAVENTURA, LYDIA B. TUBELLA, REYNALDO C. GOLO & JONATHAN
DEQUINA IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES, AND AS LEGITIMATE
MEMBERS AND OFFICERS OF ADHIKAING TINATAGUYOD NG
KOOPERATIBA (ATING KOOP PARTY LIST), petitioners, vs. THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC AND THE SELF-STYLED SHAM
ATING KOOP PARTYLIST REPRESENTED BY AMPARO T.
RIMAS, respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, C. J p:
The pivotal and interrelated issues before Us in this case involve the seemingly elementary
matter of the Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) jurisdiction over the expulsion of a sitting
party-list representative: from the House of Representatives, on the one hand; and from his party-list
organization, on the other.
The instant case involves two rival factions of the same party-list organization, the
Adhikaing Tinataguyod ng Kooperatiba (Ating Koop). One group is headed by petitioner Atty. Isidro Q.
Lico (the Lico Group), who represents the organization in the House of Representatives, and the other
group by Amparo T. Rimas (respondents herein, or the Rimas Group).
THE CASE
Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 1 in relation to Rule 65, 2 seeking to
annul the Resolutions in E.M. No. 12-039 dated 18 July 2012 and 31 January 2013 of the COMELEC.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization which was registered on 16 November
2009 under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, also known as the Party-List System Act (Party-List
Law). TAIaHE
Under Ating Koop's Constitution and By-Laws, its highest policymaking body is the National
Convention. The Central Committee, however, takes over when the National Convention is not in
session. 3
On 30 November 2009, Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the
Party-List System of Representation for the 10 May 2010 Elections. 4 On 6 March 2010, it filed with
the COMELEC the list of its nominees, with petitioner Lico as first nominee and Roberto Mascariña as
second nominee.
On 8 December 2010, COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning party-list
groups. 5 Based on the procedure provided in BANAT Party-List v. COMELEC, 6 Ating Koop earned
a seat in the House of Representatives. Petitioner Lico subsequently took his oath of office on 9
December 2010 before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, 7 and thereafter
assumed office.
Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning party-list organizations, or on
9 June 2010, Ating Koop issued Central Committee Resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a
term-sharing agreement signed by its nominees. 8 Under the agreement, petitioner Lico was to serve
as Party-list Representative for the first year of the three-year term. 9
On 14 May 2011, Ating Koop held its Second National Convention, during which it
introduced amendments to its Constitution and By-laws. Among the salient changes was the
composition of the Central Committee, 10 which would still be composed of 15 representatives but
with five each coming from Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao (5-5-5 equal representation). 11 The
amendments likewise mandated the holding of an election of Central Committee members within six
months after the Second National Convention. 12
In effect, the amendments cut short the three-year term of the incumbent members (referred
to hereafter as the Interim Central Committee) of the Central Committee. 13 The Interim Central
Committee was dominated by members of the Rimas Group.
On 5 December 2011, or almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed office, the
Interim Central Committee expelled him from Ating Koop for disloyalty.14 Apart from allegations of
malversation and graft and corruption, the Committee cited petitioner Lico's refusal to honor the
term-sharing agreement as factual basis for disloyalty and as cause for his expulsion under Ating
Koop's Amended Constitution and By-laws. 15
On 8 December 2011, Congressman Lico filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Interim
Central Committee, 16 which subsequently denied the same in a Resolution dated 29 December
2011. 17
While petitioner Lico's Motion for Reconsideration was pending, the Lico Group held a
special meeting in Cebu City (the Cebu meeting) on 19 December 2011. At the said meeting, new
members of the Central Committee, as well as a new set of officers, were elected. 18 The election was
purportedly held for the purpose of implementing the 5-5-5 equal representation amendment made
during the Second National Convention. 19
On 21 January 2012, the Rimas Group held a Special National Convention in Parañaque
City 20 (the Parañaque convention), at which a new Central Committee and a new set of officers were
constituted. 21 Members of the Rimas Group won the election and occupied all the corresponding
seats.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMELEC
SECOND DIVISION
On 16 March 2012, the Rimas Group, claiming to represent Ating Koop, filed with
COMELEC a Petition against petitioner Lico docketed as E.M. No. 12-039. 22The said Petition, which
was subsequently raffled to the Second Division, prayed that petitioner Lico be ordered to vacate the
office of Ating Koop in the House of Representatives, and for the succession of the second nominee,
Roberto Mascariña as Ating Koop's representative in the House.
The Rimas Group thereafter filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC on 14 May 2012,
this time impleading not only petitioner Lico but the entire Lico Group. The Amended Petition also
prayed that the COMELEC nullify the election conducted at the Cebu meeting and recognize the
Parañaque convention.
 In both the Petition and the Amended Petition, the Rimas Group alleged that Ating Koop had
expelled Congressman Lico for acts inimical to the party-list group, such as malversation, graft and
corruption, and that he had "boldly displayed his recalcitrance to honor party commitment to be upright
and consistently honest, thus violating basic principles of the Ating Koop." 23 The Amended Petition
stated further that the Cebu meeting held by the Lico Group violated notice and quorum
requirements. 24
In a Resolution dated 18 July 2012, 25 the COMELEC Second Division upheld the
expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop and declared Mascariña as the duly qualified nominee of
the party-list group. 26 The Second Division characterized the issue of the validity of the expulsion of
petitioner Lico from Ating Koop as an intra-party leadership dispute, which it could resolve as an
incident of its power to register political parties. 27
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMELEC
EN BANC
Consequently, the Lico Group filed a Motion for Reconsideration from the Second Division's
Resolution, which the COMELEC En Banc denied on 31 January 2013. The dispositive portion of its
Resolution reads: cDHAES
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (En
Banc) RESOLVES, as it hereby RESOLVED, to:
a. DISMISS the instant Petition to Expel Respondent Atty.
Isidro Q. Lico in the House of Representatives and to
Sanction the Immediate Succession of the Second Nominee
of ATING KOOP Party List, Mr. Roberto C. Mascariña as its
Party Representative, for lack of jurisdiction;
b. UPHOLD the Expulsion of Respondent Atty. Isidro Lico
from ATING KOOP Party-list Group; [and]
c. UPHOLD the ATING KOOP Party-list Group represented
by its President, Amparo T. Rimas, as the legitimate
Party-list Group accredited by the Commission on Elections,
to the exclusion of respondents Atty. Isidro Q. Lico, Rafael A.
Puentespina, Proculo T. Sarmen, Amelito L. Revuelta,
William C. Ybañez, Silverio J. Sanchez, Gloria G. Futalan,
Hilario De Guzman, Eugene M. Pabualan, Rodolfo E. Perez,
Hipolito R. Quillan, Mario Arenas, Tirso C. Buenaventura,
Lydia B. Tubella, and Jonathan Dequina. 28
In arriving at its Resolution, the COMELEC En Banc held that it had no jurisdiction to expel
Congressman Lico from the House of Representatives, considering that his expulsion from Ating Koop
affected his qualifications as member of the House, and therefore it was the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that had jurisdiction over the Petition.
At the same time, the COMELEC upheld the validity of petitioner Lico's expulsion from Ating
Koop, explaining that when the Interim Central Committee ousted him from Ating Koop, the said
Committee's members remained in hold-over capacity even after their terms had expired; 29 and that
the COMELEC was not in a position to substitute its judgment for that of Ating Koop with respect to the
cause of the expulsion. 30
Finally, the COMELEC En Banc recognized the Rimas Group as the legitimate
representative of Ating Koop considering that: 1) it found nothing in the records to show that the Lico
Group made a valid call for the special election of Central Committee members as required under the
Amended Constitution and By-Laws; 31 2) there is nothing on record indicating that a minimum of 100
attended the Cebu meeting; 32 and 3) the Parañaque convention was in accordance with Ating Koop's
Amended Constitution and By-Laws. 33
Hence, this Petition: the Lico Group now comes before Us, praying for a review of the
COMELEC Resolutions.
THE COURT'S RULING
On the COMELEC's jurisdiction over
the expulsion of a Member of the
House of Representatives from his
party-list organization
We find that while the COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petition to expel petitioner Lico
from the House of Representatives for being beyond its jurisdiction, it nevertheless proceeded to rule
upon the validity of his expulsion from Ating Koop — a matter beyond its purview.
The COMELEC notably characterized the Petition for expulsion of petitioner Lico from the
House of Representatives and for the succession of the second nominee as party-list representative
as a disqualification case. For this reason, the COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction,
insofar as it relates to the question of unseating petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution 34 endows the HRET with jurisdiction to
resolve questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list
representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon proclamation of the
winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as member of the House of
Representatives. 35 In this case, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group;
petitioner Lico took his oath; and he assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the
HRET, and not the COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
What We find to be without legal basis, however, is the action of the COMELEC in upholding
the validity of the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop, despite its own ruling that the HRET has
jurisdiction over the disqualification issue. These findings already touch upon the qualification
requiring a party-list nominee to be a bona fide member of the party-list group sought to be
represented.
The COMELEC justified its Resolution on the merits of the expulsion, by relying on the rule
that it can decide intra-party matters as an incident of its constitutionally granted powers and functions.
It cited Lokin v. COMELEC, where We held that when the resolution of an intra-party controversy is
necessary or incidental to the performance of the constitutionally-granted functions of the COMELEC,
the latter can step in and exercise jurisdiction over the intra-party matter. 36The Lokin case, however,
involved nominees and not incumbent members of Congress. In the present case, the fact that
petitioner Lico was a member of Congress at the time of his expulsion from Ating Koop removes the
matter from the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
The rules on intra-party matters and on the jurisdiction of the HRET are not parallel
concepts that do not intersect. Rather, the operation of the rule on intra-party matters is circumscribed
by Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and jurisprudence on the jurisdiction of electoral
tribunals. The jurisdiction of the HRET is exclusive. It is given full authority to hear and decide the
cases on any matter touching on the validity of the title of the proclaimed winner. 37 ASEcHI
In the present case, the Petition for petitioner Lico's expulsion from the House of
Representatives is anchored on his expulsion from Ating Koop, which necessarily affects his title as
member of Congress. A party-list nominee must have been, among others, a bona fide member of the
party or organization for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election. 38 Needless to
say, bona fide membership in the party-list group is a continuing qualification. We have ruled that
qualifications for public office, whether elective or not, are continuing requirements. They must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election, or of assumption of office, but during the
officer's entire tenure. 39
This is not the first time that this Court has passed upon the issue of HRET jurisdiction over
the requirements for bona fide membership in a party-list organization. In Abayon v. HRET, 40 it was
argued that the petitioners did not belong to the marginalized and under-represented sectors that they
should represent; as such, they could not be properly considered bona fide members of their
respective party-list organizations. The Court held that it was for the HRET to interpret the meaning of
the requirement of bona fide membership in a party-list organization. It reasoned that under Section
17, Article VI of the Constitution, the HRET is thesole judge of all contests when it comes to
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. 41
Consequently, the COMELEC failed to recognize that the issue on the validity of petitioner
Lico's expulsion from Ating Koop is integral to the issue of his qualifications to sit in Congress. This is
not merely an error of law but an error of jurisdiction correctible by a writ of certiorari; 42 the
COMELEC should not have encroached into the expulsion issue, as it was outside its authority to do
so.
Distinguished from Reyes v.
COMELEC
Our ruling here must be distinguished from Regina Ongsiako Reyes v. Commission on
Elections. 43 In that case, We upheld the disqualification by the COMELEC of petitioner Reyes, even
as she was already proclaimed winner in the elections at the time she filed her petition with the High
Court. In doing so, We rejected the argument that the case fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
HRET.
In Reyes, the petitioner was proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013 Elections, and took her
oath of office before the Speaker of the House of Representatives. However, the Court ruled on her
qualifications since she was not yet a member of the House of Representatives: petitioner Reyes had
yet to assume office, the term of which would officially start at noon of 30 June 2013, when she filed a
Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction
and/or Status Quo Ante Order dated 7 June 2013 assailing the Resolutions ordering the cancellation
of her Certificate of Candidacy. In the present case, all three requirements of proclamation, oath of
office, and assumption of office were satisfied.
Moreover, in Reyes, the COMELEC En Banc Resolution disqualifying petitioner on grounds
of lack of Filipino citizenship and residency had become final and executory when petitioner elevated it
to this Court. 44 It should be mentioned that when petitioner Reyes filed her petition with the Court, the
COMELEC En Banc had, as early as 5 June 2013, already issued a Certificate of Finality over its 14
May 2013 Resolution disqualifying her. Therefore, there was no longer any pending case on the
qualifications of petitioner Reyes to speak of. Here, the question of whether petitioner Lico remains a
member of the House of Representatives in view of his expulsion from Ating Koop is a subsisting
issue.
Finally, in Reyes, We found the question of jurisdiction of the HRET to be a non-issue, since
the recourse of the petitioner to the Court appeared to be a mere attempt to prevent the COMELEC
from implementing a final and executory judgment. We said that the petitioner therein took an
inconsistent, if not confusing, stance, considering that she sought remedy before the Court, and yet
asserted that it is the HRET which had jurisdiction over the case. 45 In this case, the question on the
validity of petitioner Lico's expulsion from Ating Koop is a genuine issue that falls within the jurisdiction
of the HRET, as it unmistakably affects his qualifications as party-list representative.
On which group legitimately
represents Ating Koop
We now pass upon the question of which, between the two contending groups, is the
legitimate leadership of Ating Koop.
At the outset, We reject the Lico Group's argument that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to
decide which of the feuding groups is to be recognized, and that it is the Regional Trial Court which
has jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies. Indeed, the COMELEC's jurisdiction to settle the
struggle for leadership within the party is well established. This power to rule upon questions of party
identity and leadership is exercised by the COMELEC as an incident of its enforcement powers. 46
That being said, We find the COMELEC to have committed grave abuse of discretion in
declaring the Rimas Group as the legitimate set of Ating Koop officers for the simple reason that the
amendments to the Constitution and By-laws of Ating Koop were not registered with the
COMELEC. Hence, neither of the elections held during the Cebu meeting and the Parañaque
conference pursuant to the said amendments, were valid. ITAaHc
Both the Lico Group and the Rimas Group indeed assert that their respective elections were
conducted pursuant to the amendment introduced in the Second National Convention held on 14 May
2011. In particular, Section 1 of Article VI of Ating Koop's By-laws called for the conduct of an election
of Central Committee members within six months after the Second National Convention. 47
There is no showing, however, that the amendments were actually filed with the COMELEC.
A party-list organization owes its existence to the State and the latter's approval must be
obtained through its agent, the COMELEC. In the 2013 case of Dayao v. COMELEC, 48 We declared
that it is the State, acting through the COMELEC, that breathes life to a party-list organization. The
implication, therefore, is that the State, through the COMELEC, is a party to the principal contracts
entered into by the party-list organization and its members — the Constitution and By-laws — such
that any amendment to these contracts would constitute a novation requiring the consent of all the
parties involved. An amendment to the by-laws of a party-list organization should become effective
only upon approval by the COMELEC.
Such a prerequisite is analogous to the requirement of filing of the amended by-laws and
subsequent conformity thereto of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under corporation
law. Under the Corporation Code, an amendment to a by-law provision must be filed with the SEC.
The amendment shall be effective only upon the issuance by the SEC of a certification that it is not
inconsistent with the Corporation Code. 49
There being no showing that the amendments on the by-laws of Ating Koop were filed with
and subsequently approved by the COMELEC, any election conducted pursuant thereto may not be
considered valid. Without such requisite proof, neither the Lico Group nor the Rimas Group can claim
to be the legitimate set of officers of Ating Koop.
Even assuming arguendo that the amendment calling for a special election were effective,
this Court still cannot declare any of the feuding groups as the legitimate set of officers considering
that the respective sets of evidence presented were evenly balanced. With respect to the Lico Group's
Cebu meeting, the COMELEC correctly found — and the records bear out — that the notices sent
were deficient and that there was no sufficient proof of quorum. Hence, the Cebu meeting was held to
be invalid. On the other hand, the COMELEC failed to appreciate the fact that the Parañaque
convention suffered from the same infirmity: the records of the said convention, consisting merely of
the Minutes thereof, likewise fail to establish due notice and a quorum. 50
Accordingly, as neither group can sufficiently lay claim to legitimacy, the equipoise doctrine
comes into play. This rule provides that when the evidence in an issue of fact is in equipoise, that is,
when the respective sets of evidence of both parties are evenly balanced, the party having the burden ||| (Lico v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205505, [September 29, 2015])
of proof fails in that issue. Since neither party succeeds in making out a case, neither side prevails.
The courts are left with no other option but to leave them as they are. The consequence, therefore, is
the dismissal of the complaint/petition. 51
The Rimas Group, being the petitioner before the COMELEC, had the burden of proving
that it is the petitioner, and not the Lico Group, that is the legitimate group. As the evidence of both
parties are in equipoise, the Rimas Group failed to discharge its burden. The COMELEC should have
dismissed the petition of the Rimas Group insofar as it sought to be declared the legitimate group
representing Ating Koop.
Yet, the COMELEC held that the Parañaque convention "appeared to be in conformity" with
Ating Koop's Amended Constitution and By-Laws. 52 It should be stressed that the COMELEC did not
even substantiate this conclusion. 53
The Court ordinarily refrains from reviewing the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of
the evidence. 54 But when the COMELEC's assessment of the evidence is so grossly unreasonable
that it turns into an error of jurisdiction, the Court is compelled to intervene and correct the error. 55

As seen in the above discussions, neither of the parties was able to establish its legitimacy.
The evaluation of the evidence by the COMELEC in deciding the issue of which group legitimately
represents Ating Koop was therefore grossly unreasonable, which amounts to a jurisdictional error
that may be remedied bycertiorari under Rule 65.
The final, and most important question to be addressed is: if neither of the two groups is the
legitimate leadership of Ating Koop, then who is?
We find such legitimate leadership to be the Interim Central Committee, whose members
remain as such in a hold-over capacity.
In Señeres v. COMELEC, 56 the validity of the Certificate of Nomination filed by Buhay
Party-List through its President, Roger Robles, was questioned on the ground that his term had
expired at the time it was filed. The Court applied by analogy the default rule in corporation law to the
effect that officers and directors of a corporation hold over after the expiration of their terms until such
time as their successors are elected or appointed. 57 Señeres ruled that the hold-over principle
applies in the absence of a provision in the constitution or by-laws of the party-list organization
prohibiting its application.
In the present case, We have gone through the Constitution and By-laws of Ating Koop and
We do not see any provision forbidding, either expressly or impliedly, the application of the hold-over
rule. Thus, in accordance with corporation law, the existing Interim Central Committee is still a
legitimate entity with full authority to bind the corporation and to carry out powers despite the lapse of
the term of its members on 14 November 2011, since no successors had been validly elected at the
time, or since. CHTAIc
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The COMELEC En
Banc Resolution dated 31 January 2013 and the COMELEC Second Division Resolution dated 18
July 2012 in E.M. No. 12-039 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE insofar as it declares valid the
expulsion of Congressman Lico from Ating Koop and it upholds the ATING KOOP Party-list Group
represented by its President, Amparo T. Rimas, as the legitimate Party-list Group.
A new one is entered DECLARING that the legitimate Central Committee and set of officers
legitimately representing Ating Koop are the Interim Central Committee and set of officers prior to the
split of Ating Koop.
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 206952. October 22, 2013.]
ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST
(ABANG LINGKOD), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed
by Abang Lingkod Party-List (ABANG LINGKOD) assailing the Resolution 1 dated May 10, 2013 issued by
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPP No. 12-238 (PLM), which, inter alia, affirmed
the cancellation ofABANG LINGKOD's registration as a party-list group.
The Facts
ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of peasant farmers and
fisherfolks, and was registered under the party-list system onDecember 22, 2009. It participated in the May
2010 elections, but failed to obtain the number of votes needed for a seat in the House of Representatives.
On May 31, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD manifested before the COMELEC its intent to participate in
the May 2013 elections. On August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issuedResolution No. 9513, 2 which, inter
alia, required previously registered party-list groups that have filed their respective Manifestations of
Intent to undergo summary evidentiary hearing for purposes of determining their continuing compliance
with the requirements under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 3 and the guidelines set forth inAng Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC. 4
Accordingly, on August 9, 2012, the COMELEC issued a Resolution, which set the summary
evidentiary hearing of previously registered party-list groups. TheCOMELEC scheduled three (3) dates —
August 17, 31 and September 3, 2012 — for the summary hearing of ABANG LINGKOD's Manifestation of
Intent, to enable it to show proof of its continuing qualification under the party-list system. ESHcTD
On August 16, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD, in compliance with the COMELEC's August 9, 2012
Resolution, filed with the COMELEC pertinent documents to prove its continuing compliance with the
requirements under R.A. No. 7941.
After due proceedings, the COMELEC En Banc, in a Resolution dated November 7, 2012,
cancelled ABANG LINGKOD's registration as a party-list group. TheCOMELEC En Banc pointed out
that ABANG LINGKOD failed to establish its track record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and
underrepresented; that it merely offered photographs of some alleged activities it conducted after the May
2010 elections. The COMELEC En Banc further opined that ABANG LINGKOD failed to show that its
nominees are themselves marginalized and underrepresented or that they have been involved in activities
aimed at improving the plight of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors it claims to represent.
ABANG LINGKOD then filed with this Court a petition 5 for certiorari, alleging that
the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling its registration under the party-list system. The
said petition was consolidated with the separate petitions filed by fifty-one (51) other party-list groups whose
registration were cancelled or who were denied registration under the party-list system. The said party-list
groups, including ABANG LINGKOD, were able to obtain status quo ante orders from this Court.
On April 2, 2013, the Court, in Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, 6 laid down
new parameters to be observed by the COMELEC in screening parties, organizations or associations
seeking registration and/or accreditation under the party-list system, viz.:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties
or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not
need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under
the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative
district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields
candidates in legislative district elections can participate in
party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a
coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and
underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies"
include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth. acCDSH
5. A majority of the members of the sectoral parties or organizations that represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
"well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they
represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" or that represent
those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong
to their respective sectors, or must have a track record or advocacy for
their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if
some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least
one nominee who remains qualified.
Thus, the Court remanded to the COMELEC the cases of previously registered party-list groups,
including that of ABANG LINGKOD, to determine whether they are qualified under the party-list system
pursuant to the new parameters laid down by the Court and, in the affirmative, be allowed to participate in
the May 2013 party-listelections.
On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued the herein assailed Resolution, 7 which, inter
alia, affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration under the party-list system.
The COMELEC issued the Resolution dated May 10, 2013 sans any summary evidentiary hearing, citing
the proximity of the May 13, 2013 elections as the reason therefor.
In maintaining the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration, the COMELEC held that:
The Commission maintains its position in the previous en banc ruling
cancelling the registration of ABANG LINGKOD. To reiterate, it is not enough that
the party-list organization claim representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented because representation is easy to claim and to feign. It is but
reasonable to require from groups and organizations consistent participation and
advocacy in the sector it seeks to represent, and not just seasonal and "sporadic"
programs which are unrelated to its sector.
ABANG LINGKOD submitted pictures showing a seminar held on 10 July
2010, Medical Mission on 11 November 2010, Disaster Management
Training on 21 October 2011, Book-giving on 28 June 2011, and Medical
Mission on 1 December 2011.
And as if to insult the Commission, the photographs submitted appear to
have been edited to show in the banners that ABANG LINGKOD participated in the
activities. ABANG LINGKOD's name and logo was superimposed on some banners
to feign participation in the activities (Joint Medical Mission, Book-giving).
Under the party-list System Act, a group's registration may be cancelled
for declaring unlawful statements in its petition. Photoshopping images to establish
a fact that did not occur is tantamount to declaring unlawful statements. It is on this
ground that the Commission cancels ABANG LINGKOD's registration. 8
On May 12, 2013, ABANG LINGKOD sought a reconsideration of the COMELEC's Resolution
dated May 10, 2013. However, on May 15, 2013, ABANG LINGKODwithdrew the motion for
reconsideration it filed with the COMELEC and, instead, instituted the instant petition 9 with this Court,
alleging that there may not be enough time for the COMELEC to pass upon the merits of its motion for
reconsideration considering that the election returns were already being canvassed and consolidated by
the COMELEC.
In support of the instant petition, ABANG LINGKOD claims that the COMELEC gravely abused
its discretion when it affirmed the cancellation of its registration sansa summary evidentiary hearing for that
purpose, asserting that the COMELEC should have allowed it to present evidence to prove its qualification
as a party-list group pursuant to Atong Paglaum. It claims that there was no valid justification for
the COMELEC to cancel its registration considering that it complied with the six-point parameters in
screening party-list groups laid down in Atong Paglaum. DaTISc
On the other hand, the COMELEC avers that the instant petition should be dismissed for utter
lack of merit. It asserts that ABANG LINGKOD was not denied due process when the COMELEC affirmed
the cancellation of its registration since it was given every reasonable opportunity to be heard.
The COMELEC further claims that it did not abuse its discretion when it cancelled ABANG LINGKOD's
registration on the ground that it failed to establish a track record in representing the marginalized and
underrepresented. Further, the COMELEC alleges that its finding of facts may not be passed upon by this
Court as the same is supported by substantial evidence.
The Issues
In sum, the issues presented for the Court's resolution are the
following: first, whether ABANG LINGKOD was denied due process when the COMELEC affirmed the
cancellation of its registration under the party-list system sans any summary evidentiary hearing;
and second, whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling ABANG LINGKOD's
registration under the party-list system.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
First Issue: Due Process
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or as applied to administrative
or quasi-judicial proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or
hearing. 10
In the instant case, while the petitioner laments that it was denied due process, the Court finds
that the COMELEC had afforded ABANG LINGKOD sufficient opportunity to present evidence establishing
its qualification as a party-list group. It was notified through Resolution No. 9513 that its registration was to
be reviewed by the COMELEC. That ABANG LINGKOD was able to file its Manifestation of Intent and
other pertinent documents to prove its continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A. No. 7941,
which the COMELEC set for summary hearing on three separate dates, belies its claim that it was denied
due process.
There was no necessity for the COMELEC to conduct further summary evidentiary hearing to
assess the qualification of ABANG LINGKOD pursuant to Atong
Paglaum. ABANG LINGKOD's Manifestation of Intent and all the evidence adduced by it to establish its
qualification as a party-list group are already in the possession of the COMELEC. Thus, conducting further
summary evidentiary hearing for the sole purpose of determining ABANG LINGKOD's qualification under
the party-list system pursuant to Atong Paglaum would just be a superfluity.
Contrary to ABANG LINGKOD's claim, the Court, in Atong Paglaum, did not categorically require
the COMELEC to conduct a summary evidentiary hearing for the purpose of determining the qualifications
of the petitioners therein pursuant to the new parameters for screening party-list groups. The dispositive
portion of Atong Paglaum reads: CcaASE
WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13
petitions, which have been granted Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory
injunction to include the names of the petitioners in the printing of ballots, are
remanded to the Commission on Elections only for determination whether
petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system under the parameters
prescribed in this Decision but they shall not participate in the 13 May 2013
party-list elections. The 41 petitions, which have been granted mandatory
injunctions to include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are
remanded to the Commission onElections for determination whether
petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system and to
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-listelections under the parameters
prescribed in this Decision. The Commission on Elections may conduct
summary evidentiary hearings for this purpose. This Decision is immediately
executory.
 SO ORDERED. 11 (Emphasis ours)
Thus, the cases of previously registered party-list groups, including ABANG LINGKOD, were
remanded to the COMELEC so that it may reassess, based on the evidence already submitted by the
former, whether they are qualified to participate in the party-list system pursuant to the new parameters laid
down in Atong Paglaum. The Court did not require the COMELEC to conduct a hearing de novo in
reassessing the qualifications of said party-list groups. Nevertheless, the Court gave the COMELEC the
option to conduct further summary evidentiary hearing should it deem appropriate to do so.
The records also disclose that ABANG LINGKOD was able to file with the COMELEC a motion
for reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 10, 2013, negating its claim that it was denied due process.
As it has been held, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given a
chance to be heard onhis motion for reconsideration. 12
Second Issue: Cancellation of
ABANG LINGKOD's Registration
However, after a careful perusal of the factual antecedents of this case, pinned against the new
parameters in screening party-list groups laid down in Atong Paglaum, the Court finds that
the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling the registration of ABANG LINGKOD under the
party-list system.
The COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration on the ground that
it declared untruthful statement in its bid for accreditation as a party-list group in the May 2013 elections,
pointing out that it deliberately submitted digitally altered photographs of activities to make it appear that it
had a track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented.
Essentially, ABANG LINGKOD's registration was cancelled on the ground that it failed to adduce evidence
showing its track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented.
The flaw in the COMELEC's disposition lies in the fact that it insists on requiring party-list groups
to present evidence showing that they have a track record in representing the marginalized and
underrepresented.
Track record is a record of past performance often taken as an indicator of likely future
performance. 13 As a requirement imposed by Ang Bagong Bayani for groups intending to participate in
the party-list elections, track record pertains to the actual activities undertaken by groups to uplift
the cause of the sector/s, which they represent. ScCDET
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 however provides:
Sec. 5. Registration. — Any organized group of persons may register as
a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with
the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified
by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as
a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution,by-laws, platform or program
of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall
include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals. (Emphasis ours)
R.A. No. 7941 did not require groups intending to register under the party-list system to submit
proof of their track record as a group. The track record requirement was only imposed in Ang Bagong
Bayani where the Court held that national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations seeking
registration under the party-list system must prove through their, inter alia, track record that they truly
represent the marginalized and underrepresented, thus:
. . . In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following
guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its
work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent
the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA
7941. In other words, it must show — through its constitution,articles of
incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record —
that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented
sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has
chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors. (Emphasis ours)
Track record is not the same as the submission or presentation of "constitution,by-laws,
platform of government, list of officers, coalition agreement, and other relevant information as may
be required by the COMELEC," which are but mere pieces of documentary evidence intended to
establish that the group exists and is a going concern. The said documentary evidence presents an abstract
of the ideals that national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations seek to achieve.
This is not merely a matter of semantics; the delineation of what constitutes a track record has
certain consequences in a group's bid for registration under the party-list system. Under Section 5 of R.A.
No. 7941, groups intending to register under the party-list system are not required to submit evidence of
their track record; they are merely required to attach to their verified petitions their "constitution,by-laws,
platform of government, list of officers, coalition agreement, and other relevant information as may be
required by the COMELEC."
In Atong Paglaum, the Court has modified to a great extent the jurisprudential doctrines on who
may register under the party-list system and the representation of the marginalized and underrepresented.
For purposes of registration under the party-list system, national or regional parties or organizations
need not represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector; that representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented is only required of sectoral organizationsthat represent the sectors
stated under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 that are, by their nature, economically marginalized and
underrepresented.
There was no mention that sectoral organizations intending to participate in the
party-list elections are still required to present a track record, viz.: ETHaDC
. . . In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and
subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following
parameters:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized
and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It
is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and
underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors
that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth. (Emphasis ours)
 Contrary to the COMELEC's claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD,
are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e., proof of activities that they have
undertaken to further the cause of the sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that
the ideals represented by the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the sector/s,
which they represent.
If at all, evidence showing a track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors is only required from nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized
and underrepresented who do not factually belong to the sector represented by their party or organization.
Dissenting, my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Leonen, however, maintains that parties or
organizations intending to register under the party-list system are still required to present a track record
notwithstanding the Court's pronouncement in Atong Paglaum; that the track record that would have to be
presented would only differ as to the nature of their group/organization. He opines that sectoral
organizations must prove their links with the marginalized and underrepresented while national or regional
parties or organizations must show that they have been existing as a bona fide organization.
To submit to the dissent's insistence on varying track records, which are required of those
intending to register under the party-list system, depending on the nature of their group, would result into
an absurd and unjust situation. Under the "varying track record requirement," sectoral organizations
must present evidence showing their track record in representing the marginalized and
underrepresented, i.e., actual activities conducted by them to further uplift the cause of the sector/s they
represent. On the other hand, national and regional parties or organizations need only prove that they exist
as bona fide organizations which, as the dissent suggests, may be done through the submission of
their constitution,by-laws, platform of government, list of officers, coalition agreement, and other relevant
information required by the COMELEC.
However, submission of a group's constitution,by-laws, platform of government, list of officers,
coalition agreement, and other relevant information required by the COMELEC, as explained earlier, is not
synonymous with the track record requirement. In such case, only sectoral organizations would be required
to present a track record (actual activities conducted by them to further the cause of the marginalized and
underrepresented); while national and regional organizations need not present their track record as they
are only required to submit documentary evidence showing that they are bona fide organizations. caHIAS
There is no logic in treating sectoral organizations differently from national and regional parties or
organizations as regards their bid for registration under the party-list system. The "varying track record
requirement" suggested by the dissent would unnecessarily put a premium on groups intending to
register as national and regional parties or organizations as against those intending to register as
sectoral organizations. The imposition of an additional burden on sectoral organizations, i.e., submission
of their track record, would be plainly unjust as it effectively deters the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors from organizing themselves under the party-list system.
Likewise, that there was no explicit reversal of the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani in Atong
Paglaum does not mean that groups intending to register under the party-list system are still required to
submit a track record. The track record of groups intending to register under the party-list system was
required under the first guideline of Ang Bagong Bayani for a very specific purpose — to show that the
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations that would be allowed to participate in the
party-list elections are truly representative of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. It was
necessary then to require groups seeking registration under the party-list system since representation of
the marginalized and underrepresented, as understood in the context of Ang Bagong Bayani, is easy to
claim and feign.
There exists no reason to further require groups seeking registration under the party-list system
to submit evidence showing their track record. Pursuant to Atong Paglaum, not all groups are required to
represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors and, accordingly, there is no longer any incentive
in merely feigning representation of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
In the case of sectoral organizations, although they are still required to represent the
marginalized and underrepresented, they are likewise not required to show a track record since there would
be no reason for them to feign representation of the marginalized and underrepresented as they can just
register as a national or regional party or organization. Thus, the Court, in Atong Paglaum, stated that, for
purposes of registration under the party-list system, it is enough that the principal advocacy of sectoral
organizations pertains to the sector/s they represent.
There is thus no basis in law and established jurisprudence to insist that groups seeking
registration under the party-list system still comply with the track record requirement. Indeed, nowhere
in R.A. No. 7941 is it mandated that groups seeking registration thereunder must submit evidence to show
their track record as a group.
The dissent likewise suggests that the deceit committed by ABANG LINGKOD goes into its
qualification as a party-list group since it seriously puts in question the existence of ABANG LINGKOD as a
group per se and the genuineness of its representation of the farmers and fisherfolk.
It must be stressed that the COMELEC cancelled ABANG LINGKOD's registration solely on the
ground of the lack of its track record — that it falsely represented, by submitting digitally altered
photographs of its supposed activities, that it had a track record in representing the marginalized and
underrepresented. The existence ofABANG LINGKOD as a party-list group per se and the
genuineness of its representation of the farmers and fisherfolks were never raised in the
proceedings before the COMELEC. It would thus be the height of injustice if the Court, in
this certiorari action, would scrutinize the legitimacy of ABANG LINGKOD as a party-list group and the
genuineness of its representation of the farmers and fisherfolk, and affirm the cancellation of its registration,
when the issue is limited only to the track record of ABANG LINGKOD.
Moreover, ABANG LINGKOD had been previously registered as a party-list group, as in fact it
participated in the May 2010 party-list elections, and it was able to obtain a sufficient number of votes in the
May 2013 party-list elections to obtain a seat in the House of Representatives. These are circumstances,
which clearly indicate that ABANG LINGKOD is indeed a legitimate party-list group.
ABANG LINGKOD, notwithstanding the cancellation of its registration three days prior to the May
13, 2013 elections, was able to obtain a total of 260,215 votes out of the 26,722,131 votes that were
cast for the party-list, 14 thus entitling it to a seat in the House of Representatives. This is indicative of the
fact that a considerable portion of the electorate considers ABANG LINGKOD as truly representative of
peasant farmers and fisherfolk.
Anent the photographs submitted by ABANG LINGKOD, these only show book-giving and
medical missions, which are activities it conducted. Suffice it to state, however, that said activities do not
specifically or directly pertain to the interest or advocacy espoused by ABANG LINGKOD. As such, the
misrepresentation committed by ABANG LINGKOD with regard to said activities would not necessarily
militate against its representation of the farmers and fisherfolk.
Lest it be misunderstood, the Court does not condone the deceit perpetrated
by ABANG LINGKOD in connection with its bid for continued registration under the party-list system.
That ABANG LINGKOD, to establish its track record, submitted photographs that were edited to make it
appear that it conducted activities aimed at ameliorating the plight of the sectors it represents is a factual
finding by the COMELEC, which the Court, considering that it is supported by substantial evidence, will not
disturb. The Court does not tolerate ABANG LINGKOD's resort to chicanery and its shabby treatment of the
requirements for registration under the party-list system.
Nevertheless, considering that track record is no longer a requirement, a group's
misrepresentation as to its track record cannot be used as a ground to deny or cancel its registration — it is
no longer material to its qualification under the party-list system. In this case, ABANG LINGKOD's
submission of digitally altered photographs cannot be considered material to its qualification as a party-list
group. Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941, in part, reads:
Sec. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration.
— The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of any interested
party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
Declaration of an untruthful statement in a petition for registration, or in any other document
pertinent to the registration and/or accreditation under the party-list system, as a ground for the refusal or
cancellation of registration under Section 6 (6) of R.A. No. 7941, is akin to material misrepresentation in the
certificate of candidacy filed by an individual candidate under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Both provisions disallow prospective candidates from participating in an election for declaring false
statements in their eligibility requirements. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code reads: DHITSc
Sec. 78. A verified petition seeking to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that
any material misrepresentation contained therein as required under Section 74
hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after
due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
Elucidating on what constitutes material misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the Court, in Lluz v.Commission on Elections, 15 explained
that:
From these two cases several conclusions follow. First, a
misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy is material when it refers to a
qualification for elective office and affects the candidate's
eligibility. . . . Third, a misrepresentation of a non-material fact, or a
non-material misrepresentation, is not a ground to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. In other words, for a
candidate's certificate of candidacy to be denied due course or canceled by
the COMELEC, the fact misrepresented must pertain to a qualification for the
office sought by the candidate. 16 (Emphasis ours)
In Velasco v. Commission on Elections, 17 the Court further clarified that a false
representation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, in order to be a ground to deny due course
or cancel a certificate of candidacy, must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. Thus:
The false representation that [Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code] mention must necessarily pertain to a material fact, not to a mere
innocuous mistake. This is emphasized by the consequences of any material falsity:
a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, cannot
serve; in both cases, he or she can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws.
Obviously, these facts are those that refer to a candidate's qualification for elective
office, such as his or her citizenship and residence. The candidate's status as a
registered voter similarly falls under this classification as it is a requirement that, by
law (the Local Government Code), must be reflected in the COC. The reason for this
is obvious: the candidate, if he or she wins, will work for and represent the local
government under which he is running.
Separately from the requirement of materiality, a false
representation under Section 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible." In other words, it must be made with the intention to deceive the
electorate as to the would-be candidate's qualifications for public
office. 18 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)
Similarly, a declaration of an untruthful statement in a petition for registration under Section 6 (6)
of R.A. No. 7941, in order to be a ground for the refusal and/or cancellation of registration under the
party-list system, must pertain to the qualification of the party, organization or coalition under the party-list
system. In order to justify the cancellation or refusal of registration of a group, there must be a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact, which would otherwise render the group disqualified from
participating in the party-list elections.
The digitally altered photographs of activities submitted by ABANG LINGKOD to prove its
continuing qualification under R.A. No. 7941 only pertain to its track record, which, as already discussed, is
no longer a requirement under the new parameters laid down in Atong Paglaum. Simply put, they do not
affect the qualification of ABANG LINGKOD as a party-list group and, hence, could not be used as
a ground to cancel its registration under the party-list system.
Further, the Court notes that the COMELEC, in its Resolution dated November 7, 2012, asserted
that ABANG LINGKOD failed to adduce evidence that would show the track record of its five nominees,
composed of a non-government organization worker, an employee and three farmers, in uplifting the cause
of the sector that the group represents. The COMELEC opined that the failure of ABANG LINGKOD to
present a track record of its nominees justified the cancellation of its registration as a party-list group.
The Court does not agree. Assuming arguendo that the nominees of ABANG LINGKOD, as
opined by the COMELEC, indeed do not have track records showing their participation in activities aimed at
improving the conditions of the sector that the group represents, the same would not affect the registration
of ABANG LINGKOD as a party-list group.
To stress, in Atong Paglaum, the Court pointed out that "[t]he nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the 'marginalized and underrepresented,' or that represent those who lack
'well-defined political constituencies,' either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a
track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. Stated otherwise, the nominee of a party-list
groups may either be: first, one who actually belongs to the sector which the party-list group represents, in
which case the track record requirement does not apply; or second, one who does not actually belong to the
sector which the party-list group represents but has a track record showing the nominee's active
participation in activities aimed at uplifting the cause of the sector which the group represents."
In the case under consideration, three of the five nominees of ABANG LINGKOD are farmers
and, thus, are not required to present a track record showing their active participation in activities aimed to
promote the sector which ABANG LINGKOD represents, i.e., peasant farmers and fisherfolk. That two
of ABANG LINGKOD's nominees do not actually belong to the sector it represents is immaterial and would
not result in the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration as a party-list group. This is clear from the
sixth parameter laid down by the Court in Atong Paglaum, which states that "[n]ational, regional and
sectoral organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided
that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified." At the very least, ABANG LINGKOD has three
(3) qualified nominees, being farmers by occupation.

Indeed, the disqualification of one or some of the nominees of a party-list group should not
automatically result in the disqualification of the group. Otherwise it would accord the nominees the same
significance, which the law holds for the party-list groups; it is still the fact that the party-list group satisfied
the qualifications of the law that is material to consider. The disqualification of the nominees must simply be
regarded as failure to qualify for an office or position. It should not, in any way, blemish the qualifications of
the party-list group itself with defect. The party-list group must be treated as separate and distinct from its
nominees such that qualifications of the latter must not be considered part and parcel of the qualifications of
the former.

In sum, that ABANG LINGKOD's registration must be cancelled due to its misrepresentation is a
conclusion derived from a simplistic reading of the provisions ofR.A. No. 7941 and the import of the Court's
disposition in Atong Paglaum. Not every misrepresentation committed by national, regional, and sectoral
groups or organizations would merit the denial or cancellation of their registration under the party-list
system. The misrepresentation must relate to their qualification as a party-list group. In this regard,
the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it insisted on requiring ABANG LINGKOD to prove its
track record notwithstanding that a group's track record is no longer required pursuant to the Court's
pronouncement in Atong Paglaum. EDIHSC

Likewise, upholding the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration, notwithstanding that it

was able to obtain sufficient number of votes for a legislative seat, would serve no purpose other than to
subvert the will of the electorate who voted to give ABANG LINGKOD the privilege to represent them in the
House of Representatives.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is

hereby GRANTED. The Resolution dated May 10, 2013 issued by the Commission onElections in SPP
Case No. 12-238 (PLM), insofar as it affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration and
disallowed it to participate in the May 13, 2013elections is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The Commission on Elections is hereby ORDERED to PROCLAIM ABANG LINGKOD as one

of the winning party-list groups during the May 13, 2013 elections with the number of seats it may be
entitled to based on the total number of votes it garnered during the said elections.

SO ORDERED.

||| (Abang Lingkod Party List v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206952, [October 22, 2013], 720 PHIL
120-166)