Block B2015 Review Operations

TORTS & DAMAGES

Prof. Rommel J. Casis
1st Semester, AY 2012-2013





Notes
Unless otherwise indicated, all provisions of law mentioned or cited are from the New

Civil Code of the Philippines.

Only the relevant conceptual discussions in the cases assigned in the Conceptual Framework
section of the course outline were directly quoted in this reviewer. This is so since the
efforts to make a reviewer only commenced when the class started discussing the
Negligence section of the course outline. In any case, most of the cases assigned were
discussed in subsequent sections of the course. As such, for review of those cases, you

may refer to said sections.

As for the italicized cases in the course outline, direct quotations were made. Most of them

were also discussed in other parts of the outline anyway, so proceed accordingly.

Under res ipsa loquitur, the pertinent discussions in the cases were copied under the
corresponding headings. The reviewer entries made for the cases are placed after the

quotations from the cases.

The Prosser & Keeton citations are abbreviated and only appears in the conceptual
framework section of the reviewer. An attempt to fill in the citations in the syllabus. It
failed. Besides, the application of the principles enunciated therein in this jurisdiction is

questionable, as they were developed from and for common law jurisdiction.

The "Spouses" in all case titles were deleted. This has nothing to do with the Committee's

view of marriage, except, of course, Robert's. He plays with girls. You know that. Beware!

There are a lot of entries without the Notes field. This means that a lot of people did not fill

them up online.

The provisions always come first in each section. Remember, code is king. Next are
conceptual discussions in italicized cases. Finally, the cases, also known as your reviewer

entries, are laid out.

This reviewer was formatted in an iPad 2. And yes, it was not easy.

Good luck!

B2015 Academics Committee

October 2012
B2015 Review Operations TORT & QUASI-DELICT Torts & Damages

Conceptual Framework 1. A duty, or obligation, recognized by law, requiring the

person to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the

protection of others against unreasonable risks.

CONCEPT OF TORT 2. A failure on the person's part to conform to the
standard required: a breach of duty.

In Common Law

Etymology
3. A reasonably close causal connection between the
conduct and the resulting injury.
4. Actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of
The word is derived from the Latin "tortus" or another. [Prosser & Keeton]
"twisted." [Prosser & Keeton] Thus, the elements of an actionable conduct are: 1) duty,
"Tort" is found in the French language, and was at one 2) breach, 3) injury, and 4) proximate causation. [Garcia v.
time in common use in English as a general synonym for Salvador, 2007]

"wrong." [Ibid.]

Definition
To successfully prosecute an action anchored on torts,
three elements must be present, viz: (1) duty (2) breach (3)
injury and proximate causation. [Ocean Builders v. Cubacub,
Broadly speaking, a tort is a civil wrong, other than
breach of contract, for which the court will provide a
2011]

remedy in the form of an action for damages. [Ibid.] The Purpose of Tort Law
There remains a body of law which is directed toward the

In Philippine Law

Existence
Article 1902, OCC. Any person who by an act or omission
causes damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be
liable for the damage so done.
The law of torts, then, is concerned with the allocation of
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
compensation of individuals, rather than the public, for
losses which they have suffered within the scope of the
legally recognized interest generally, rather than one
interest only, where the law considers that compensation is
required. This is the law of torts.
losses arising out of human activities; and since these cover
a wide scope, so does this branch of the law. xxx The
purpose of the law of torts is to adjust these losses, and to
afford compensation for injuries sustained by one person as

called quasi-delict xxx.

the result of the conduct of another. [Prosser & Keeton]

CONCEPT OF QUASI-DELICT

Scope

Definition
Essentially, "tort" consists in the violation of a right given
or the omission of a duty imposed by law. Simply stated,
tort is a breach of a legal duty. [Naguiat v. NLRC, 1997]
ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex
A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as
the commission or omission of an act by one, without right,
whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly,
in person, property, or reputation. There are cases in which
it has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by
the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor,
and there are circumstances under which the motive of the
defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason
sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental
attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself,
would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence
of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive,
does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an
invasion of another's legal right; that is, liability in tort is
Historical Background
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual
looms clears and unmistakable.  This legal institution is of
Aquilia in the Roman Law.  In fact, in Spanish legal
terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa
aquiliana.  The Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of
the present fault or negligence under the Civil Code xxx.
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil
Code. According to Article 1089, one of the five sources of
obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa
extra-contractual xxx. Then Article 1093 provides that this
kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title
XVI of Book IV, meaning Articles 1902-1910. This portion of
the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the legal institution
of culpa aquiliana. [Barredo v. Garcia, 1942]

Nature
not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil Article 1089, OCC. Obligations arise from law, from

intent. [Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune, 2007]

Elements
contracts and quasi-contracts, and from acts and omissions
which are unlawful or in which any kind of fault or
negligence intervenes.
The traditional formula for the elements necessary to Article 1157. Obligations arise from:
such a cause of action may be stated briefly as follows: (1) Law;

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(2) Contracts; after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, "not
(3) Quasi-contracts; punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the concept
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in

(5) Quasi-delicts.

Governing Provisions
Article 1162. Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall
be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of
character or in violation of the penal law, whether
voluntary or negligent. [Elcano v. Hill, 1977]
Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence,"
covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or

this Book, and by special laws.

Definition
Article 1902, OCC. Any person who by an act or omission
causes damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be
liable for the damage so done.
law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
negligent. [Ibid.; Andamo v. IAC, 1990]
Article 2176 xxx is limited to negligent acts or omissions
and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict,
known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil
law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common
because it includes not only negligence, but intentional
criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false
imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the
Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission

called quasi-delict xxx. responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and
malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed

Scope by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions
are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. [Baksh v.
Intentional acts
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay

CA, 1993]

Damage to property
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no The concept of quasi-delict, as enunciated in Article 2176
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is of the Civil Code, is so broad that it includes not only injuries

called quasi-delict xxx.

As Manresa says the liability arising from extra-contractual

culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission
which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or
inattention, has caused damage to another. [Cangco v.
Manila Railroad, 1918]
property since "harm" is not limited to personal but also to
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon
a reading of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in
Garcia - that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil
Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of negligence
to persons but also damage to property. It makes no
distinction between "damage to persons" on the one hand
and "damage to property" on the other. Indeed, the word
"damage" is used in two concepts:  the "harm" done and
"reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to "harm"
it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and
property injuries. In fact, examples of quasi-delict in the law
itself include damage to property. [Cinco v. Canonoy, 1979]

and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would
reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not
so limited, but that in fact it actually extends to fault or
culpa.  This can be seen in the reference made therein to the
Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14,
1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a
negligent act.  Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain,
Elements
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called quasi-delict xxx.

All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:  (a)

in force here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that
obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions in
which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene
shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book
(which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the
underlined qualification, "not punishable by law", that
Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an undesirable
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of
the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must
respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between
the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages
incurred by the plaintiff. [Andamo v. IAC, 1990]

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TORT AND QUASI-DELICT

construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that
"killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth life" xxx. And so,
because Justice Bocobo was Chairman of the Code
Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil
Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted
Quasi-delict, as defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
(which is known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana,
culpa extra-contractual or cuasi delitos) is homologous but not
identical to tort under the common law, which includes not
only negligence, but also intentional criminal acts, such as

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assault and battery, false imprisonment, and deceit. [Coca- responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to

Cola Bottlers v. CA, 1993] 1910 of the Civil Code. [Ibid.]
[T]he Revised Penal Code in Article 365 punishes not only

TORT, QUASI-DELICT, AND DELICT

Distinctions
reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that
Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, according to the literal
A tort is not the same thing as a crime, although the two import of Article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution
sometimes have many features in common. The distinction of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and
between them lies in the interests affected and the remedy application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and
afforded by law. A crime is an offense against the public at damage to property through any degree of negligence –
large, for which the state, as the representative of the public, even the slightest – would have to be indemnified only
will bring proceedings in the form of a criminal through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime.
prosecution. [Prosser & Keeton] In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for
The civil action for a tort, on the other hand, is cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? [Ibid.]
commenced and maintained by the injured person, and its [B]ecause of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the
primary purpose is to compensate for the damage suffered, Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has
at the expense of the wrongdoer. [Ibid.] given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the
"culpa aquiliana" is a separate legal institution under the Civil character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana,
Code, with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that there has grown up a common practice to seek damages
is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a
[Barredo v. Garcia, 1942] crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by
Some of the differences xxx are: invoking Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. [Ibid.]
(1) That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi- Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that
delitos are only of private concern. culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which
(2) That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects may be punishable by law. [Andamo v. IAC, 1990]
the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of Stated otherwise, victims of negligence or their heirs have
indemnification, merely repairs the damage. a choice between an action to enforce the civil liability
(3) That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because arising from culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised
the former are punished only if there is a penal law clearly Penal Code, and an action for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana)
covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the Civil Code. If, as here, the
in which "any kind of fault or negligence intervenes."  action chosen is for quasi-delict, the plaintiff may hold the
However, it should be noted that not all violations of the employer liable for the negligent act of its employee, subject
penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in to the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a
contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, good father of the family. On the other hand, if the action
infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. [Ibid.] chosen is for culpa criminal, the plaintiff can hold the
[T]o find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of employer subsidiarily liable only upon proof of prior
guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil
case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the
conviction of its employee. [LG Foods v. Philadelfa, 2006]

defendant pay in damages. [Ibid.]

[T]o hold that there is only one way to make, defendant's
CULPA AQUILIANA AND CULPA CONTRACTUAL

liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust
his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to
compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and

Distinctions

cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is "such
a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more
expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct
responsibility of the defendant under Article 1903 of the
Source
Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-
contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual obligation has
its source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties
which civilized society imposes upon its members, or

Civil Code. [Ibid.]

Intersections
Specifically they show that there is a distinction between
civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by
the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence
under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the
same negligent act may produce either a civil liability
arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate
which arise from these relations, other than contractual, of
certain members of society to others, generally embraced in
the concept of status. The legal rights of each member of
society constitute the measure of the corresponding legal
duties, mainly negative in character, which the existence of
those rights imposes upon all other members of society. The
breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent
or to mere inattention, if productive of injury, gives rise to
an obligation to indemnify the injured party. The

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fundamental distinction between obligations of this
character and those which arise from contract, rests upon
the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the
wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates
the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the
vinculum exists independently of the breach of the
voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into
the contractual relation. [Cangco v. Manila Railroad, 1918]
Burden of proof
When the source of the obligation upon which plaintiff's
cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission, the
burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence
– if he does not his action fails. But when the facts averred
show a contractual undertaking by defendant for the
benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed
or refused to perform the contract, it is not necessary for
plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether the breach of
the contract is due to wilful fault or to negligence on the
part of the defendant, or of his servants or agents. Proof of
the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficient prima
facie to warrant a recovery. [Ibid.]
"As a general rule, it is logical that in case of extra-
contractual culpa, a suing creditor should assume the burden
of proof of its existence, xxx while on the contrary, in a case
of negligence which presupposes the existence of a
contractual obligation, if the creditor shows that it exists
and that it has been broken, it is not necessary for him to
prove the negligence." [Ibid.]
inattention on the part of the defendant. xxx [T]he practical
In such a situation [a contract exists], a default on, or
failure of compliance with, the obligation xxx gives rise to a
presumption of lack of care and corresponding liability on
the part of the contractual obligor the burden being on him
to establish otherwise. [FGU Insurance v. Sarmiento, 2002]
two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say,
Petitioner’s civil action against the driver can only be
based on culpa aquiliana, which, unlike culpa contractual,
would require the claimant for damages to prove
negligence or fault on the part of the defendant. [Ibid.]
Applicability of doctrine of proximate cause
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in
actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of
contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a
person where there is no relation between him and another
party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself.
But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create
the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to
regulate the relation thus created. [Calalas v. CA, 2000]
Defense of employer for negligence of employee
"From this article [Article 1903] two things are apparent:
(1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of
law that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in the selection of the servant or employee,
or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and
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(2) that that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de
jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows
necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of
the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised
the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieved from
liability." [Cangco v. Manila Railroad, 1918]
On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers
for the negligent acts or omissions of their servants or
agents, when such acts or omissions cause damages which
amount to the breach of a contract, is not based upon a
mere presumption of the master's negligence in their
selection or control, and proof of exercise of the utmost
diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the master
of his liability for the breach of his contract. [Ibid.]
Intersections
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called quasi-delict xxx.
[W]hether negligence occurs as an incident in the course
of the performance of a contractual undertaking or is itself
the source of an extra-contractual obligation, its essential
characteristics are identical. There is always an act or
omission productive of damage due to carelessness or
result is identical xxx. [Cangco v. Manila Railroad, 1918]
The field of non-contractual obligation is much more
broader than that of contractual obligation, comprising, as it
does, the whole extent of juridical human relations. These
the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract
does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such
person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor
may break the contract under such conditions that the same
act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have
constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation
had no contract existed between the parties. [Ibid.]
The definition of quasi-delict in Article 2176 expressly
excludes cases where there is a "preexisting contractual
relation between the parties." [Fores v. Miranda, 1959]
And this, because, although the relation of passenger and
carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature"
nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a
tort." [Air France v. Carrascoso, 1966]
The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule
that a quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a contract
that might thereby permit the application of applicable
principles on tort even where there is a pre-existing contract
between the plaintiff and the defendant. xxx The test
(whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the
breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where, without a
pre-existing contract between two parties, an act or
omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by
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itself, the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no
bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case.
[Far East Bank v. CA, 1995]
be one which creates a situation involving an unreasonable
A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising
from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual
obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound
by contract, whether express or implied. However, this
impression has not prevented this Court from determining
the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract.
xxx Air France is authority for the view that liability from
tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that
breaks the contract may be also a tort. [PSBA v. CA, 1992]
A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely
carelessly done from a lack of ordinary prudence and may
risk to another because of the expectable action of the other,
a third person, an animal, or a force of nature. A negligent
act is one from which an ordinary prudent person in the
actor's position, in the same or similar circumstances,
would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as
to cause him not to do the act or to do it in a more careful
manner. [Corinthian Gardens v. Tanjangco, 2008]

PNR v. Brunty, 2006 — A collision occurred between a

[A] pre-existing contractual relation between the parties
does not preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana xxx.
[Syquia v. CA, 1993]
with a blind curve ahead, when it hit the train. PNR was
[L]iability for tort may arise even under a contract, where
tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently,
when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would
have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual
liability had no contract existed between the parties, the
contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby
allowing the rules on tort to apply. [LRT v. Navidad, 2003]
defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that
The law on quasi-delict xxx is generally applicable when
there is no pre-existing contractual relationship between the
car and a PNR train at 12 AM causing the death of Brunty, a
passenger of the car. The car was overtaking another car,
found negligent.
Doctrine: Negligence is the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,
would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do. The test is, did the
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent
person would have used in the same situation? If not, the

parties. [Consolidated Bank v. CA, 2003] person is guilty of negligence. The law, in effect, adopts the
standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary

conduct of the discreet pater familias of the Roman law.

Notes: The negligence of PNR consists in the inadequate
Negligence safety precautions placed in the site. The extraordinary

diligence required of common carriers is not applicable in

this case since Brunty was not a passenger.

CONCEPT OF NEGLIGENCE

In Common Law
Negligence is a matter of risk – that is to say, of
recognizable danger of injury. It has been defined as
"conduct which involves an unreasonably great risk of
causing damage," or, more fully, conduct "which falls below
the standard established by law for the protection of others
against unreasonable risk of harm." "Negligence is conduct
PNR v. CA, 2007 — Amores was driving when he came to
a railroad crossing. He stopped before crossing then
proceeded. But just as he was at the intersection, a PNR
train turned up and collided with his car, killing him. There
was neither a signal nor a crossing bar at the intersection to
warn motorists and aside from the railroad track, the only
visible warning sign was a dilapidated "stop, look, and
listen" sign. No whistle blow was heard from the train

and not a state of mind." [Prosser & Keeton] before the collision. The SC held PNR liable, and that
Amores did everything, with absolute care and caution, to

In Philippine Law

Definition
Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists
in the omission of that diligence which is required by the
nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.
When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles
avoid the collission.
Doctrine: Negligence has been defined as ‘the failure to
observe for the protection of the interests of another person
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person
suffers injury.

Determining the diligence required

1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply. Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is in the omission of that diligence which is required by the
to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
a good father of a family shall be required. circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.
Article 2178. The provisions of Articles 1172 to 1174 are When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles

also applicable to a quasi-delict. 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.

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If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is
to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of
a good father of a family shall be required.
Notes: Mere riding or stealing a ride on a hauling truck is
The diligence with which the law requires the individual
at all times to govern his conduct varies with the nature of
the situation in which he is placed and the importance of
the act which he is to perform. [Sicam v. Jorge, 2007]
attend to a scheduled laparoscopic operation scheduled by
Generally, the degree of care required is graduated
according to the danger a person or property attendant
upon the activity which the actor pursues or the
instrumentality which he uses. The greater the danger the
greater the degree of care required. What is ordinary under
extraordinary of conditions is dictated by those conditions;
extraordinary risk demands extraordinary care. Similarly,
the more imminent the danger, the higher the degree of
care. [Far Eastern Shipping v. CA, 1998]
DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE
A different, and older, approach has recognized distinct
"degrees" of negligence itself, which is to say degrees of
legal fault, corresponding to required "degrees" of care. xxx
It recognizes three "degrees" of negligence: slight neglige-
nce, which is failure to use great care; ordinary negligence,
which is failure to use ordinary care; and gross negligence,
which is failure to use even slight care. [Prosser & Keeton]
Amedo v. Rio, 1954 — Managuit was a seaman. While he
was on board the ship doing his job, he jumped into the
water to retrieve his 2-peso bill, which was blown by the
wind. He drowned. His mother was not allowed to recover
because in acting as such, he was grossly negligent.
car passed by too close that the horse turned its body
Doctrine: Gross negligence is defined to be the want of
even slight care and diligence. By gross negligence is meant
such entire want of care as to raise a presumption that the
person in fault is conscious of the probable consequences of
carelessness, and is indifferent, or worse, to the danger of
injury to person or property of others. It amounts to a
reckless disregard of the safety of person or property.
in a particular case is: Did the defendant in doing the
Notes: When the act is dangerous per se, doing it
constitutes gross negligence.
Marinduque Iron Mines v. WCC, 1956 — Mamador was
laborer. He boarded a company truck with others to go to
work. When it tried to overtake another truck, it turned
over and hit a coconut tree. Mamador died. Upon
complaint, the defense of the company was that Mamador
was notoriously negligent, for violating a company policy
prohibiting riding in hauling trucks, and was, thus, barred
from recovery. The SC cited Corpus Juris to the effect that
violation of a rule promulgated by a commission or board is
not negligence per se, much less that of a company policy. It
may, however, evidence negligence. Even granting that
there was negligence, it certainly was not notorious.
Doctrine: Notorious negligence is the same as gross
negligence, which implies a conscious indifference to
consequences, pursuing a course of conduct which would
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naturally and probably result in injury, or utter disregard of
consequences.
not negligence, ordinarily, because transportation by truck
is not dangerous per se.
Ilao-Oreta v. Ronquillo, 2007 — Dr. Ilao-Oreta failed to
the spouses Ronquillo, to determine the cause of the wife's
infertility. The wife already underwent pre-operation
procedures at that time. Dr. Ila-Oreta claimed that she was
in good faith, only failing to account the time difference
between the Philippines and Hawaii, where she had her
honeymoon. The SC ruled that her conduct was not grossly
negligent, since the operation was only exploratory. Her
"honeymoon excitement" was also considered.
Doctrine: Gross negligence is the want or absence of or
failure to exercise slight care or diligence or the entire
absence of care.
Notes: That she failed to consider the time difference was
probably a big lie, since the estimated time of arrival is
clearly shown in the ticket.
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
Importance of Standard
The Fictitious Person
Picart v. Smith, 1918 — An automobile hit a horseman,
who was on the wrong side of the road. The horseman
thought he did not have time to get to the other side. The
across, with its head toward the railing. Its limb was
broken, and its rider was thrown off and injured. The SC
found the automobile driver negligent, since a prudent man
should have foreseen the risk in his course and that he had
the last fair chance to avoid the harm.
Doctrine: The test to determine the existence of negligence
alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the
same situation? The law here in effect adopts the standard
suppose to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of
negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to
the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before
him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
Notes: The Picart test is the most cited test of negligence. It
introduced the use of the fictitious person. It has the
markings of common law but because it uses the concept of
the discreet paterfamilias, later enshrined in the Civil Code as
the good father of a family, it is now a civil law test.
Sicam v. Jorge, 2007 — Jorge pawned jewelry with
Agencia de R. C. Sicam. Armed men entered the pawnshop
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and took away cash and jewelry from the pawnshop vault.
Jorge demanded the return of the jewelry. The pawnshop
failed. The SC held Sicam liable for failing to employ
sufficient safeguards for the pawned goods. It held that
robbery, if negligence concurred, is not a fortuitous event.
Also, Article 2099 requires a creditor to take care of the thing
pledged with the diligence of a good father of a family.
brought in for repair. It turned out that the gun was loaded
Doctrine: The diligence with which the law requires the
individual at all times to govern his conduct varies with the
nature of the situation in which he is placed and the
importance of the act which he is to perform. Negligence,
therefore, is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do;
or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable
man would not do. It is want of care required by the
circumstances.
possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the
Notes: The fictitious person is not the standard. It is his
conduct.
Corinthian Gardens v. Tanjangco, 2008 — The Cuasos
built their house on a lot adjoining that owned by the
Tanjangcos. Their plan was approved by Corinthian
Gardens. It turned out, however, that the house built
encroached on the lot of the Tanjangcos. The SC found
Corinthian Gardens negligent for conducting only "table
inspections," when it should have conducted actual site
inspections, which could have prevented the encroachment.
after the negligence of the employee is established. Also,
Doctrine: A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be
merely carelessly done from a lack of ordinary prudence
and may be one which creates a situation involving an
unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable
action of the other, a third person, an animal, or a force of
nature. A negligent act is one from which an ordinary
prudent person in the actor's position, in the same or
similar circumstances, would foresee such an appreciable
risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the act or to
do it in a more careful manner.
damages. The defense of Manila Railroad is the entry to
Notes: The test cited in the case was the Picart test.
Special Circumstances
Heirs of Completo v. Albayda, 2010 — Albayda, Master
Sergeant in the Philippine Air Force, was at an intersection
riding his bike when he was hit by a taxi driven by
Completo. Albayda suffered injuries, including breaking his
knee. The SC found Completo negligent, since he was over-
speeding when he reached the intersection. Also, the bike
already had the right of way at the time of the incident.
applied here. Also, the standard applied differs from that
Doctrine: The bicycle occupies a legal position that is at
least equal to that of other vehicles lawfully on the highway,
and it is fortified by the fact that usually more will be
required of a motorist than a bicyclist in discharging his
duty of care to the other because of the physical advantages
the automobile has over the bicycle.
credit card slip. She died. The SC found Jarco Marketing
Notes: The witnesses for the same parties are of the same
number. It seems odd, therefore, to apply the test of
negligence when the facts are not settled by preponderance
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of evidence. Thus, it appears that the court sympathized
with Albayda, who was serving the government and was
left by his wife, supposedly because of his injuries.
Pacis v. Morales, 2010 — Morales owned a gun shop. An
employee of the shop allowed Pacis to inspect a gun
and when Pacis laid it down, it discharged a bullet, hitting
his head. He died. The SC found Morales, as the owner,
liable, since he failed to exercise the diligence required of a
good father of a family, much less that required of someone
dealing with dangerous weapons.
Doctrine: A higher degree of care is required of someone
who has in his possession or under his control an
instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as
dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in
duty to take exceptional precautions to prevent any injury
being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or
business which involve little or no risk, a business dealing
with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher
degree of care.
Notes: Two things may be considered negligent: the
keeping of a defective gun loaded and the storing a
defective gun in a drawer. It is strange, however, that the
negligence of the employee was not discussed, when the
presumption that the employer was negligent only arises
that the wound sustained was in the head appears to be a
factual anomaly.
Children
Taylor v. Manila Railroad, 1910 — David Taylor, 15 years
old, and Manuel, 12, obtained fulminating caps from the
compound of Manila Railroad. They experimented on them.
The experiment ended with a bang, literally. The explosion
caused injury to the right eye of Taylor. His father sued for
their compound was without its invitation. The SC held
that the absence of invitation cannot relieve Manila Railroad
from liability. However, it held that the proximate cause of
the injury was Taylor's negligence.
Doctrine: The personal circumstances of the child may be
considered in determining the existence of negligence on
his part.
Notes: The age-bracket regime, where certain age groups
are treated as incapable of negligent conduct, was not
objective standard of conduct generally applied to adults.
Jarco Marketing v. CA, 1999 — Zhieneth, 6 years old, was
pinned down by a gift-wrapping counter at a department
store, when her mother momentarily let her go to sign a
negligent, since it did not employ safety measures even
when it knew that the counter was unstable. That Zhieneth
was negligent, that she climbed the counter, is incredible.
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Doctrine: A conclusive presumption runs in favor of
children below 9 years old that they are incapable of
contributory negligence.
negligent for failing to use the skill that would have been
Notes: The 9-year mark was adopted from the Sangco's
discussion on the matter, citing the same age mark for
determining discernment in criminal law. This analogy,
however, is erroneous since discernment, in criminal law, is
used to determine the existence of criminal intent, which is
wildly different from negligence.
be liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and
Ylarde v. Aquino, 1988 — Ylarde, a 10-year old student,
and other fellow students were asked by Aquino, their
teacher, to help him in burying large blocks of stones.
Aquino left them for a while and told them not to touch
anything. After Aquino left, they played and Ylarde jumped
into the hole while one of them jumped on the stone,
causing it to slide into the hole. Ylarde was not able to get
out of the hole in time and died. The SC ruled that Aquino
was negligent in leaving his pupils in the dangerous site,
and that it was natural for said pupils to play. It disregarded
the claim that Ylarde was imprudent.
specially high degree," "the highest degree of care known to
Doctrine: The degree of care required to be exercised must
vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for
himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree of
care as an adult, but his conduct should be judged
according to the average conduct of persons of his age and
experience. The standard of conduct to which a child must
conform for his own protection is that degree of care
ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity,
discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or
similar circumstances.
Notes: The choice of standard of diligence for children
also depends on the facts and circumstances of the case.
given a prescription by his doctor friend for his eye. He
Experts
In general
Those who undertake any work calling for special skills
are required not only to exercise reasonable care in what
they do but also possess a standard minimum of special
knowledge and ability.
Doctrine: The profession of pharmacy demands care and
Every man who offers his services to another, and is
employed, assumes to exercise in the employment such
skills he possesses, with a reasonable degree of diligence. In
all these employments where peculiar skill is requisite, if
one offers his services he is understood as holding himself
out to the public as possessing the degree of skill commonly
possessed by others in the same employment, and if his
pretensions are unfounded he commits a species of fraud
on every man who employs him in reliance on his public
profession. [Far Eastern Shipping v. CA, 1998]
Culion v. Philippine Motors, 1930 — Culion contracted
Philippine Motors to convert the engine of his fishing vessel
to process crude oil instead of gasoline. When they tried to
test it, a backfire broke out. When it reached the carburetor,
the fire grew bigger. Apparently, the carburetor was soaked
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with oil from a leak from the tubing, which was improperly
fitted to the oil tank. The SC held Philippine Motor
exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline
engines on boats. Ordinarily, a backfire would not be
followed by a disaster.
Doctrine: When a person hold himself out as being
competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will
skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which
he attempts to do.
Pharmacists
US v. Pineda, 1918 — Santos bought medicine in Santiago
Pineda’s pharmacy for his sick horses. He was given the
wrong medicine. His horses died. The SC held him
criminally liable under The Pharmacy Law.
Doctrine: The profession of pharmacy is one demanding
care and skill. The responsibility of the druggist to use care
has been variously qualified as "ordinary care," "care of a
practical men." In other words, the care required must be
commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill
employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of
the business which the law demands. Caveat emptor does
not apply because the pharmacist and the customer are not
in equal footing in this kind of transaction.
Notes: Even when the mistake is not fatal, the pharmacist
will still be held liable if the rule laid down applied. Also,
caveat emptor may apply in cases of well-known medicine.
Mercury Drug v. De Leon, 2008 — Judge De Leon was
bought them from Mercury Drug but he was given drops
for the ears. When he applied the drops to his eyes, he felt
searing pain. Only then did he discover that he was given
the wrong medicine. Mercury Drug invoked the principle of
caveat emptor. The SC held Mercury Drug and its employee
liable for failing to exercise the highest degree of diligence
expected of them.
skill, and druggists must exercise care of a specially high
degree, the highest degree of care known to practical men. 
In other words, druggists must exercise the highest
practicable degree of prudence and vigilance, and the most
exact and reliable safeguards consistent  with  the 
reasonable conduct of the business, so that human life may
not constantly be exposed to the danger flowing from the
substitution of deadly poisons for harmless medicines.
Medical professionals
Cruz v. CA, 1997 — Dr. Cruz performed a hysterectomy
on Lydia Umali. The hospital was untidy, and during the
operation, the family had to obtain blood, oxygen supply,
and other articles necessary for the operation outside the
hospital. Lydia went into shock and her blood pressure
dropped. She was transferred to another hospital. Dr. Cruz
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was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide. The SC absolved Dr. Cruz. While the facts point
to the existence of reckless imprudence, it was not shown
that such imprudence caused the death of Lydia. Moral and
exemplary damages were, however, awarded.
Notes: The elements enumerated is the same as that for a
Doctrine: By accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents
that, having the needed training and skill possessed by
physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, he
will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of
his patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the same
level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor
would use to treat a condition under the same
circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice
that expert testimony is essential to establish not only the
standard of care of the profession but also that the
physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls below
such standard. Further, inasmuch as the causes of the
injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable
only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been
recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to
support the conclusion as to causation.
Professional Services v. Agana, 2007 — After her
hysterectomy operation at Medical City, Natividad found
out that two pieces of sponges were left inside her, which
has caused her pain for a long time. The SC held Dr. Ampil,
the surgeon who closed the incision, liable, ruling that
leaving foreign substances in the wound after the incision
has been closed in at the very least prima facie negligence. It
is inconsistent with due care, raising an inference of
negligence. It is even considered as negligence per se. Also,
when the operation was finished, it was found out that two
sponges were missing.
standard of care in a medical malpractice case is a matter
Doctrine: Once a physician undertakes the treatment and
care of a patient, the law imposes on him certain
obligations. To escape liability, he must possess that reason-
able degree of learning, skill and experience required by his
profession. At the same time, he must apply reasonable care
and diligence in the exercise of his skill and the application
of his knowledge, and exert his best judgment.
Cayao-Lasam v. Ramolete, 2008 — Dr. Cayao-Lasam
conducted a dilatation and curettage procedure (raspa) on
Ramolete. Almost a month after, she went back to the
hospital. A dead fetus was found in her womb. She
underwent operations, which rendered her incapable of
bering a child. The SC absolved Dr. Cayao-Lasam, since
there was no expert testimony presented to the effect that
she breached her professional duties, and Ramolete herself
failed to attend the follow-up check-ups after the operation,
which could have avoided the injury.
Doctrine: There are four elements involved in medical
negligence cases: duty, breach, injury and proximate
causation. A physician is duty-bound to use at least the
same level of care that any reasonably competent doctor
would use to treat a condition under the same
circumstances. Breach of this duty, whereby the patient is
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injured in body or in health, constitutes actionable
malpractice. As to this aspect of medical malpractice, the
determination of the reasonable level of care and the breach
thereof, expert testimony is essential.
tort. It, therefore, shares the same problem as that of tort,
that is, lack of statutory basis. The requirement of expert
testimony is understandable in this case.
Lucas v. Tuaño, 2009 — Lucas consulted Dr. Tuaño
regarding his "sore eyes." He was prescribed a medicine.
Not long after, however, his sore eyes turned into a viral
infection. Maxitrol was then prescribed. The infection
subsided. Upon discovery that Maxitrol increased the
chance of contracting glaucoma, he consulted Dr. Tuaño,
who brushed it aside. His right eye became blind because of
glaucoma. On consultation to another physician, Lucas was
informed that his condition would require long-term care.
The SC absolved Dr. Tuaño. It found that Lucas failed to
discharge the burden of proof by failing to present expert
testimony to establish the standard of care required, breach,
and proximate causation, which requires expert testimony.
Doctrine: Just like any other proceeding for damages, four
essential elements i.e., (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4)
proximate causation, must be established in medical
negligence cases. In accepting a case, the physician, for all
intents and purposes, represents that he has the needed
training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons
practicing in the same field; and that he will employ such
training, care, and skill in the treatment of the patient. This
standard level of care, skill and diligence is a matter best
addressed by expert medical testimony, because the
peculiarly within the knowledge of experts in the field.
Notes: The action was primarily based on Article 2176.
However, instead of using the three elements for quasi-
delict, the elements of the common-law tort was used.
Establishing and Defending
Claims of Negligence
PROVING NEGLIGENCE
In General
Section 1, Rule 131, Rules of Court. Burden of proof. – Burden
of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the
facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by
the amount of evidence required by law.
Presumptions
In motor vehicle mishaps
Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is
solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in
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the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, belief that in the absence of negligence it would not have
prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to
driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless have been under management and control of alleged
driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within wrongdoer. Under the doctrine of “res ipsa loquitur” the
the next preceding two months. happening of an injury permits an inference of negligence
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions where plaintiff produces substantial evidence that injury
of Article 2180 are applicable. was caused by an agency or instrumentality under
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is exclusive control and management of defendant, and that
presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any things would not happen if reasonable care had been used.

traffic regulation.

Possession of dangerous weapons or substance

Article 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negli-
gence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury
results from his possession of dangerous weapons or
substances, such as firearms and poison, except when the
possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation
[Layugan v. IAC, 1998, citing Black's Law Dictionary]
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed,
and while the mere happening of an accident or injury will
not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it
was due to negligence on defendant’s part, under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing
or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that
the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or

or business.

Common carriers
circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to
raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of
negligence on the part of the defendant, or some other
Article 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, person who is charged with negligence. [DM Consunji v.
destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same
is due to any of the following causes only:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural

CA, 2007, citing American Jurisprudence]

Justification. It is grounded in the superior logic of

disaster or calamity; ordinary human experience and on the basis of such
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international experience or common knowledge, negligence may be
or civil; deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself.
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or doctrine of common knowledge. [Ramos v. CA, 1999; Tan v.
in the containers; JAM Transit, 2009]
(5) Order or act of competent public authority. One of the theoretical basis for the doctrine is its
Article 1735. In all cases other than those mentioned in necessity, i.e., that necessary evidence is absent or not
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the preceding article, if the goods are available. xxx The doctrine is based in part upon the theory
lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the

diligence as required in Article 1733.

Res ipsa loquitur

Definition/statement of the rule. This doctrine is stated thus:
“Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under
the management of the defendant, and the accident is such
as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those
who have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.
[Layugan v. IAC, 1988; Batiquin v. CA, 1996]
should know the cause, for any explanation of care
Res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself). Rebuttable
presumption or inference that defendant was negligent,
which arises upon proof that instrumentality causing injury
was in defendant’s exclusive control, and that the accident
was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of
negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence whereby
negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from
mere fact that accident happened provided the character of
accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to a
plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled
to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the
proof of the happening of the accident in order to establish
negligence. The inference which the doctrine permits is
grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true
cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible
to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.
It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
furnishes a bridge by which a plaintiff, without knowledge
of the cause, reaches over to defendant who knows or
exercised by the defendant in respect of the matter of which
the plaintiff complains. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine,
another court has said, is a rule of necessity, in that it
proceeds on the theory that under the peculiar
circumstances in which the doctrine is applicable, it is
within the power of the defendant to show that there was
no negligence on his part, and direct proof of defendant’s
negligence is beyond plaintiff’s power. [DM Consunji v. CA,
2001, citing American Jurisprudence]

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Nature. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law but
merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience.
[Layugan v. IAC, 1988; Batiquin v. CA, 1996]
the rule, a plaintiff, in addition to proving injury or damage,
However, much has been said that res ipsa loquitur is not a
rule of substantive law and, as such, does not create or
constitute an independent or separate ground of liability.
Instead, it is considered as merely evidentiary or in the
nature of a procedural rule. It is regarded as a mode of
proof, or a mere procedural convenience. [Ramos v. CA,
1999; Professional Services v. Agana, 2007]
Effect. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence
is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that
prima facie negligence may be established without direct
proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence. [Layugan v. IAC, 1988; Batiquin v. CA, 1998]
management of the thing which caused the
The rule, when applicable to the facts and circumstances
of a particular case, is not intended to and does not
dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable
negligence on the part of the party charged. It merely
determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence
thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a
breach of the duty of due care. [Layugan v. IAC, 1988;
Batiquin v. CA, 1996]
knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the accident.
[I]t furnishes a substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of,
the burden of producing specific proof of negligence.
[Ramos v. CA, 1999; Tan v. JAM Transit, 2009]
As stated earlier, the defendant’s negligence is presumed
or inferred when the plaintiff establishes the requisites for
the application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes
out a prima facie case of all the elements, the burden then
shifts to defendant to explain. The presumption or inference
may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under
appropriate circumstances disputable presumption, such as
that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference.
It is not for the defendant to explain or prove its defense to
prevent the presumption or inference from arising.
Evidence by the defendant of say, due care, comes into play
only after the circumstances for the application of the
doctrine has been established. [DM Consunji v. CA, 2001]
Requisites. The doctrine can be invoked when and only
when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is
absent and not readily available. [Layugan v. IAC, 1988;
Batiquin v. CA, 1996]
loquitur has been applied when the circumstances attendant
Still, before resort to the doctrine may be allowed, the
following requisites must be satisfactorily shown: 1. The
accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of someone’s negligence; 2. It is caused by an
instrumentality within the exclusive control of the
defendant or defendants; and 3. The possibility of
contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff
responsible is eliminated. [Ramos v. CA, 1999; Tan v. JAM
Transit, 2009; Cantre v. Go, 2007; College Assurance v. Belfranlt
Development, 2007]
provides the proof of negligence. The reason is that the
In the above requisites, the fundamental element is the
“control of instrumentality” which caused the damage.
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Such element of control must be shown to be within the
dominion of the defendant. In order to have the benefit of
must show a situation where it is applicable, and must
establish that the essential elements of the doctrine were
present in a particular incident. [Ramos v. CA, 1999]
From the foregoing statements of the rule, the requisites
for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are: (1)
the occurrence of an injury; (2) the thing which caused the
injury was under the control and management of the
defendant; (3) the occurrence was such that in the ordinary
course of things, would not have happened if those who
had control or management used proper care; and (4) the
absence of explanation by the defendant. Of the foregoing
requisites, the most instrumental is the "control and
injury." [Professional Services v. Agana, 2007]
Accordingly, some court add to the three prerequisites for
the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the further
requirement that for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply, it
must appear that the injured party had no knowledge or
means of knowledge as to the cause of the accident, or that
the party to be charged with negligence has superior
[DM Consunji v. CA, 2001, citing American Jurisprudence]
Effect of direct evidence. Hence, it has generally been held
that the presumption of inference arising from the doctrine
cannot be availed of, or is overcome, where plaintiff has
knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the
specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury
complained of or where there is direct evidence as to the
precise cause of the accident and all the facts and
circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear.
Finally, once the actual cause of injury is established beyond
controversy, whether by the plaintiff or by the defendant,
no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes
inapplicable when the circumstances have been so
completely elucidated that no inference of defendant’s
liability can reasonably be made, whatever the source of the
evidence, as in this case. [Layugan v. IAC, 1988]
In medical negligence cases. Medical malpractice cases do
not escape the application of this doctrine. Thus, res ipsa
upon the harm are themselves of such a character as to
justify an inference of negligence as the cause of that harm.
[Ramos v. CA, 1999]
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied
upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done
a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard
medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical
testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself
general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies
only to such matters clearly within the domain of medical
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science, and not to matters that are within the common
knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone
familiar with the facts. Ordinarily, only physicians and
surgeons of skill and experience are competent to testify as
to whether a patient has been treated or operated upon with
a reasonable degree of skill and care. However, testimony as
to the statements and acts of physicians and surgeons,
external appearances, and manifest conditions which are
observable by any one may be given by non-expert
witnesses. Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is
applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician
negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient,
without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from
its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper
standard of care. xxx When the doctrine is appropriate, all
that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the
particular act or omission complained of and the injury
sustained while under the custody and management of the
defendant without need to produce expert medical
testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa
loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under
usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can
obtain redress for injury suffered by him. [Ibid.]
Layugan v. IAC, 1988 — A truck being repaired by
Layugan was parked at the side of the road. It was hit by an
oncoming truck. Layugan was pinned underneath the
truck, his left forearm and left leg injured. His leg had to be
amputated due to gangrene. The SC held that the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, used as a defense here, need not be
applied since there was direct evidence to prove the
negligence of the driver of the oncoming truck.
furnishes a substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the
Doctrine: It has generally been held that the presumption
of inference arising from the doctrine cannot be availed of,
or is overcome, where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies
or presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence
which is the cause of the injury complained of or where
there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of the
accident and all the facts and circumstances attendant on
the occurrence clearly appear.
treatment by Dr. Cantre for complications due to her
Notes: That the rule was invoked as a defense is strange,
since it is usually used to establish negligence.
Ramos v. CA, 1999 — For her cholecystectomy, the
surgeon for Ramos was late, and her anesthesiologist was
incompetent. Something went wrong during the intubation,
that her nailbeds became bluish. She had to be placed in a
trendelenburg position, so her brain can get enough
oxygen. A respiratory machine was rushed into the
operating room. For lack of oxygen in her brain, she went
into a comatose condition. In the action for damages, the SC
held that the damage sustained presents a case for the
application of res ipsa loquitur. Brain damage does not
normally occur in a gall bladder operation in the absence of
negligence. The anesthesia was under the exclusive control
of the doctors. The patient was unconscious, incapable of
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contributory negligence. The presumption of negligence
arose, and remained unrebutted.
Doctrine: The injury incurred by petitioner Erlinda does
not normally happen absent any negligence in the
administration of anesthesia and in the use of an
endotracheal tube. The instruments used in the
administration of anesthesia, including the endotracheal
tube, were all under the exclusive control of Dr. Gutierrez
and Dr. Hosaka. Thus the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor can
be applied in this case. Res ipsa could apply in medical
cases. In cases where it applies, expert testimony can be
dispensed with.
Notes: Expert testimony may be dispensed with when res
ipsa loquitur applies. There were proof of negligence in this
case. Nonetheless, the doctrine was still applied.
Tan v. JAM Transit, 2009 — Tan was the owner of a jitney
loaded with quail eggs and duck eggs. It was negotiating a
left turn when it collided with a JAM Transit bus. The jitney
turned turtle. Its driver and passenger were injured. The
eggs were destroyed. SC held the bus driver was negligent
for overtaking when there were double yellow center lines
on the road, which means overtaking is prohibited. Res ipsa
loquitur was held applicable, since the incident could not
have happened in the absence of negligence, the bus was
under the control of the driver, and the jitney driver was not
contributorily negligent.
Doctrine: Res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law
and does not constitute an independent or separate ground
for liability. Instead, it is considered as merely evidentiary, a
mode of proof, or a mere procedural convenience, since it
burden of producing a specific proof of negligence.
Notes: While the SC stated that the doctrine was
applicable, it still examined the evidence proving the
negligence of the bus driver. This means that the doctrine
was not necessary in resolving the case.
Cantre v. Go, 2007 — While unconscious during her
pregnancy, Go sustained a gaping wound near her armpit,
which appeared to be burns caused by contact with the
droplight in the operating room. The SC found Dr. Cantre
negligent. The wound was not an ordinary occurrence,
since it is far removed from the organs treated. The
instrument (droplight or blood pressure cuffs) which
caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the
physician. Go was incapable of contributory negligence
since she was unconscious.
Doctrine: In cases involving medical negligence, the
doctrine allows the mere existence of an injury to justify a
presumption of negligence on the part of the person who
controls the instrument causing the injury, provided that the
requisites concur [see Requisites above].
Notes: The requisites were matched with the facts of the
case to establish the proper application of res ipsa loquitur.
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Batiquin v. CA, 1996 — Dr. Batiquin performed a
caesarian operation on Villegas. Afterwards, she was found
to be feverish. When the patient submitted herself to
another surgery, she was found to have an ovarian cyst and
a piece of rubber material, which looked like a piece of a
rubber glove, embedded in her uterus. The elements of res
ipsa loquitur were held to be present here. The entire
operation was under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin.
The injury could not have occurred unless through
negligence. The resulting presumption was not rebutted.
Doctrine: When the doctrine applies, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant,
that the accident arose from want of ordinary care.
Professional Services v. Agana, 2007 — After her
hysterectomy operation at Medical City, Natividad Agana
found out that two pieces of sponges were left inside her,
which has caused her pain for a long time. Dr. Ampil, who
closed the incision, invoking res ipsa loquitur, blamed Dr.
Fuentes, who conducted the operation itself. The SC
absolved Dr. Fuentes, since he ceased to have control of the
thing which caused the injury, when Dr. Ampil took over.
On the contrary, Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon, liable
under the "captain of the ship" rule.
Doctrine: The most instrumental in the requisites [see
Requisites above] for the doctrine to apply is the control and
management of the thing which caused the injury.
DM Consunji v. CA, 2001 — Jose Juego, a construction
worker of DM Consunji, fell 14 floors to his death from a
building. He was working on top of a plywood flooring
when the bolts, which were merely inserted, connecting it
to a 5-ton chain block, loosened, causing the whole
assembly to fall. The SC found DM Consunji, who had
exclusive management of the construction site, liable. It
held that res ipsa loquitur applies, since no worker would fall
unless someone was negligent, and Juego was not
contributorily negligent.
Notes: The presence of warning signs could not have
Doctrine: As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which
recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established
without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific
proof of negligence.
Notes: The case mentioned that res ipsa loquitur is based on
common sense and necessity.
College Assurance v. Belfranlt, 2007 — Fire razed a
building owned by Belfranlt Development and leased to
College Assurance Plan. damages. It was caused by an
overheated coffee percolator in the store room leased to
College Assurance. College Assurance assailed the report of
the fireman to this effect. The SC held that even without
such report, res ipsa loquitur may be applied. The fire was
not an spontaneous occurrence. It originated from the store
room, in the possession and control of College Assurance.
Belfranlt Development had no hand in the incident, and it
has no means to find out for itself the cause of the fire.
which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
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Torts & Damages
Doctrine: When the doctrine applies, it may dispense with
the expert testimony to sustain an allegation of negligence.
The inference of negligence is not dispelled by mere denial.
Notes: The case illustrates clearly the element of control in
the requisites for the application of the doctrine. Also, only
College Assurance has the knowledge of, or at least it had
the best opportunity to ascertain, the cause of the fire.
DEFENSES AGAINST CHARGE OF NEGLIGENCE
Plaintiff’s negligence is proximate cause
Article 2179. Article 2179. When the plaintiff's own
negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages. xxx
Bernardo v. Legaspi, 1914 — There was a collision
between 2 automobiles. One sued for damages. The other
counterclaimed. Th SC held that both were negligent in
handling their automobiles, in such a character and extent
as to prevent either from recovering.
Doctrine: Where the plaintiff in a negligence action, by his
own carelessness contributes to the principal occurrence,
that is, to the accident, as one of the determining causes
thereof, he cannot recover.
PLDT v. CA, 1989 — The jeep driven by Esteban
suddenly swerved, hit a mound, and fell into an open
trench, which was an excavation undertaken by PLDT.
Esteban frequently drive through said street. The SC found
that Esteban was negligent, since he did not exercise
reasonable care and prudence, when he already knew of the
perils of the road. Also, there was insufficient evidence
proving the negligence of PLDT. Esteban cannot recover.
Doctrine: Negligence, which is not only contributory to
the injury but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the
accident, as one of its determining factors, precludes the
right to recover damages.
prevented the accident. The proximate cause would still be
the sudden swerving of the jeep. If the injury could have
been prevented by the warning signs, failure place them
may be the proximate cause.
Manila Electric v. Remoquillo, 1956 — Efren Magno was
repairing a media agua in his stepbrother's house. With a
galvanized iron sheet, he turned around. The sheet came in
contact with an electric wire, causing his death by
electrocution. Manila Electric was absolved. The SC found
that, while Manila Electric may have been negligent in
leaving the wires uninsulated, the proximate cause of the
death was Magno's sudden turning around and the close
proximity of the house to the electric wires, in violation of
the construction permit given.
Doctrine: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the
basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more
than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by
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between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the
injury, even though such injury would not have happened
but for such condition or occasion.
He is thus entitled only to half the amount of damages.
Notes: In relation to the discussion on experts, Magno
cannot be considered as such since his job was not for pay.
Contributory negligence of plaintiff
Article 2179. xxx But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the
injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff
may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded.
contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery. The
Article 2214. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence
of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may
recover.
NPC v. Heirs of Casionan, 2008 — Casionan and Jimenez
took bamboo poles, 14 and 18 feet, respectively, for pocket
mining and walked on the only trail that led to their
workplace. The trail had high-tension electrical lines
sagging and dangling to the ground. When Noble turned
left on a curve, his bamboo hit a wire which electrocuted
him. Noble died. His heirs sued NPC. The latter asked for
mitigation of its liability since Casionan was contributorily
negligent. The SC did not think so.
of the jeep was the proximate cause, Castillon was guilty of
Doctrine: Contributory negligence is conduct on the part
of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the
harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard which
he is required to conform for his own protection. It is an act
or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part
of the person injured which, concurring with the
defendant's negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury.
defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages
Notes: The definition of contributory negligence here
almost equated it to proximate cause.
Genobiagon v. CA, 1989 — An old woman was crossing
the street. She started to do so when a rig was approaching,
followed by another, driven by Genobiagon, which was
very fast as it was trying to overtake the first rig.
Genobiagon eventually bumped the old woman to her
death. Tried for homicide through reckless imprudence, he
claims that the reckless negligence of the woman was the
proximate cause. The SC rejected his defense.
with a blind curve ahead, when it hit the train. The SC
Doctrine: The defense of contributory negligence does not
apply in criminal cases committed through reckless
imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of
another to evade the effects of his own negligence
Doctrine: To hold a person as having contributed to his
Notes: Contributory negligence, which usually serves as a
defense in civil cases, is not applicable in criminal cases.
MH Rakes v. The Atlantic & Co., 1907 — Rakes was
transporting iron bars through a hand car. Rakes walked
beside the hand car, which was prohibited by the foreman.
When the iron bars slipped, and because of a depression in
the rails caused by a recent typhoon, his feet was injured
and amputated. The SC found that while he may not be
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aware of the defects in the rail, his disobedience, which
placed him in danger, contributed to some degree to the
injury "as a proximate, although not as its primary cause."
Doctrine: Where the claimant contributes to the principal
occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not
recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he
contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the
amount that the defendant responsible for the event should
pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent
for his own imprudence.
Notes: The court surveyed the common law rule of
reason for such rule is because of the difficulty in
measuring negligence and the extent to which it cause the
injury. The court, however, refused to apply it, ruling
instead that contributory negligence only reduces the
amount recoverable, a rule now in the Civil Code. The rule
was applied to actual damages in this case. Whether it may
be applied to other kinds of damages is not settled.
Lambert v. Heirs of Castillon, 2005 — After a bottle of
beer, Castillon was driving fast on a motorbike without
helmet, when the jeep he was tailgating made a sudden left
turn. He died. The SC held that, while the sudden left turn
contributory negligence. He is entitled only to half of the
damages (loss of earning capacity, death indemnity, moral).
Doctrine: The underlying precept on contributory negli-
gence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his
own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full
but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The
actually caused by his negligence. The determination of the
mitigation of the defendants liability varies depending on
the circumstances of each case.
Notes: The case cited MH Rakes v. The Atlantic as regards
the mitigation of damages without discussing the reason
behind the proportionate reduction.
PNR v. Brunty, 2006 — A collision occurred between a
car and a PNR train at 12 AM causing the death of Brunty, a
passenger of the car. The car was overtaking another car,
found the car driver contributorily negligent, but did not
mitigate the liability of PNR to Brunty. Her relationship
with the driver was not established.
injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that
brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or signs
of an impending danger to health and body. To prove
contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a
causal link, although not proximate, between the negligence
of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense,
negligence is contributory only when it contributes
proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its
occurrence.
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Notes: Causal link between negligence and injury is human will. The incident was either caused by the
included in the definition of contributory negligence. Also, negligence of the driver, or mechanical defects.
the negligence of the driver was external to the liability of Doctrine: The requisites of a caso fortuito are mentioned in

PNR to Brunty. As such, it does not mitigate such liability. Lasam v. Smith [see Three-step analysis above]. When the
cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not

Fortuitous event independent of the human will,  that is, negligence of the
defendant concurred, the defense does not apply.

Definition Notes: In case mechanical defects caused the injury, the
carrier is liable if such defects can be discovered by

Defense and exceptions exercising the degree of care required. It may, however,
recover from the manufacturer. Also, while blowing-out of a

Elements newly bought tire may constitute fortuitous event, it was
not so in this case since there were indications of concurrent
Three-step analysis
Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the
law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or

negligence on the part of the driver.

Southeastern College v. CA, 1998 — A typhoon blew the

when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption roof of Southeastern College away. It landed on the house of
of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events the Dimaanos, damaging it. On suit for damages, the SC
which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, ruled that typhoon is a fortuitous event, and that the

were inevitable.

Based on the provision and on the lecture, the three-step

College was not negligent. If the roofing were not firmly
anchored, it could not have withstood previous typhoons.
Doctrine: In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a
test for determining the existence of fortuitous event, which person from liability, it is necessary that he be free from any
exempts from liability, is: previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the
First: Is the event a fortuitous event? As defined, loss may have been occasioned. When the effect is found to
fortuitous events are those which "could not be foreseen, or be partly the result of the participation of man – whether it
which, though foreseen, were inevitable." be from active intervention, or neglect, or failure to act – the
Second: Is it within the exceptions in Article 1174? If yes, whole occurrence is hereby humanized, and removed from
the defense cannot apply. The exceptions are when the the rules applicable to fortuitous events.
liability for fortuitous event is: Notes: The case traced the history of fortuitous event from
(1) specified by law; Partidas. It also cited Tolentino, stating the fortuitous events
(2) when it is declared by stipulation; or
(3) required by the nature of the obligation.
Third: Are the elements present? The elements, as laid

may be produced by by nature or by act of man.

Sicam v. Jorge, 2007 — Jorge pawned jewelry with

down in Lasam v. Smith, are: Agencia de R. C. Sicam. Armed men entered the pawnshop
(1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occur- and took away cash and jewelry from the pawnshop vault.
rence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his Jorge demanded the return of the jewelry. The pawnshop
obligation, must be independent of the human will; failed. The SC held Sicam liable for failing to employ
(2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which cons- sufficient safeguards for the pawned goods. It held that
titutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be robbery, if negligence concurred, is not a fortuitous event.
impossible to avoid. Doctrine: An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a
(3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible
for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; adverse consequences of such a loss. One's negligence may
(4) The debtor must be free from any participation in the have concurred with an act of God in producing damage
aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. and injury to another; nonetheless, showing that the
Note: The elements, while lacking in statutory basis, are immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was

applied by the court anyway.

Juntilla v. Fontanar, 1985 — The right rear tire of the

a fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability.

Plaintiff’s assumption of risk/volenti non fit injuria

jeepney, where Juntilla was a passenger, exploded causing
the vehicle to turn turtle. Juntilla, who was sitting at the
front seat, was thrown out of the vehicle. He suffered
injuries and his Omega watch was lost. On his complaint
for breach of contract of carriage with damages, the SC
ruled that the defense of fortuitous event was not present
since the cause of the event was not independent of the
Afialda v. Hisole, 1949 — A caretaker of carabaos was
gored by a carabao. He later died as a consequence of his
injuries. In an action based on Article 1905 against the
owner, the SC held that being injured by the animal under
his care was one of the risks of the occupation which the
caretaker voluntarily assumed and for which he must take
the consequences. It held that Article 1905 does not apply.

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Doctrine: Article 1905 names the possessor or user of the
animal as the person liable for "any damages it may cause,"
since he has the custody and is in a position to prevent it
from causing damage.
said provisions still exists.
Notes: The caretaker voluntarily and knowingly assumed
the inherent risk when he agreed to be employed as such.
Ilocos Norte Electric v. CA, 1989 — After a typhoon, early
in the morning, Nana Belen ventured into the waist-deep
flood to look after the merchandise that might have been
damaged in her store. While wading through the flood, she
suddenly screamed and quickly sank. On that spot, an
electric wire was seen dangling from a post, moving in a
snake-like fashion. In the complaint, the electric company
raised the defense of volenti non fit injuria. The SC held that
it is inapplicable, since Nana Belen was impelled to brave
the subsiding typhoon to see to it that her goods were not
flooded. At that time, she was at a place where she had a
right to be, to protect her source of livelihood.
through with the purchases. It was a natural and
Doctrine: A person is excused from the force of the rule
when (1) an emergency is found to exist or if the life or
property of another is in peril, or (2) when he seeks to
rescue his endangered property.
Calalas v. CA, 2000 — Sunga sat in an extension seat in a
jeepney. An Isuzu truck bumped the jeepney, injuring
Sunga. The jeepney owner sued the truck driver and owner,
based on quasi-delict. They were held liable. Sunga filed a
case for breach of contract against the jeep owner, with the
truck owner as third party defendant. The SC held Calalas
liable. It said that taking an "extension seat" did not amount
to an implied assumption of risk.
Article 1146. The following actions must be instituted
Doctrine: The contention that taking an "extension seat"
amounted to an implied assumption of risk is akin to
arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the
tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely
because those passengers assumed a greater risk of
drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry.
Nikko Hotel v. Reyes, 2005 — Amay Bisaya was invited
by a friend for several years to a private party in the hotel.
He claimed that he was told by the executive secretary, in a
loud voice and with the other guests able to hear, to leave
for he was not invited. Upon his complaint based on the
human relations provision, the hotel invoked volenti non fit
injuria. The SC held the doctrine does not apply, since the
action was based on Articles 19 and 21. Nonetheless, it
found that the narration of Amang Bisaya incredible. It
believed the testimony of the executive secretary, that he
was asked to leave in a discreet manner, and that since
intent to injure was not proven. Hence, no liability attaches
under Articles 19 and 21.
created, (2) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect
Doctrine: The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (to which a
person assents is not esteemed in law as injury) refers to
self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury, which
precludes the recovery of damages by one who has
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even
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if he is not negligent in doing so. It does not apply in an
action based on Articles 19 and 21, since even if the risk of
injury is assumed, the obligation to treat others fairly under
Notes: Compare with Pantaleon v. American Express as to
the applicability of the doctrine when the action is based on
Articles 19 and 21.
Pantaleon v. American Express, 2010 — While on a
European tour, Pantaleon and his family attempted to
purchase diamond pieces at Coster Diamond House using
their American Express. This they did 10 minutes before
their tour group had to leave for Amsterdam. The
purchases were approved by American Express only after
45 minutes. The trip to Amsterdam had to be cancelled. The
tour group became annoyed and irritated with them. Upon
his complaint, the SC ruled that Pantaleon knew that the
group will be irritated with him, when he decided to push
foreseeable consequence of his action. Thus, the doctrine of
volenti non fit injuria was wholly applicable.
Doctrine: The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria refers to
self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which
precludes the recovery of damages by one who has
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even
if he is not negligent in doing so.
Notes: In Nikko Hotel v. Reyes, the doctrine was held
inapplicable. In this case, presumably based on the Human
Relations provisions also, it was applied.
Prescription
within four years:
(1) Upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff;
(2) Upon a quasi-delict.
Kramer v. CA, 1989 — Kramer's fishing boat collided with
an inter-island vessel of Trans-Asia Shipping Lines. Upon
protests of both parties before the Board of Marine Inquiry,
an investigation was conducted. More than 4 years after the
incident, the BMI concluded that the negligence of Tran-
Asia's employees caused the collision. Almost 4 years
passed when Kramer sued for damages based on quasi-
delict. The SC held that the action is barred by prescription,
to be reckoned from when the cause of action accrued. The
aggrieved party need not wait for the determination of an
administrative body.
Doctrine: The prescriptive period begins from the day the
quasi-delict is committed. The right of action accrues when
the following concurs: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
such right, and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff.
Notes: In cases where more than 2 vessels are involved,
the decision of BMI might be needed, since determination
of negligence is technical and more difficult.
B2015 Review Operations TORT & QUASI-DELICT
The Cause
was credited to one Florencio Amador, the account
corresponding to the wrong account number. The checks
DIFFERENT CATEGORIES
Proximate Cause
Bataclan v. Medina, 1957 — One of the front tires of a
passenger bus bursted. It zigzagged, fell into a canal, and
turned turtle. While the driver and the passengers were
getting out of the bus, people living in the area arrived,
with torches, to help. The torches, however, ignited the gas,
which was leaking from the bus, killing the passengers,
who were stuck in the bus. The SC held that the bus
company liable for the death of the passengers.
that in Bataclan v. Medina in that, in this case, the element of
Doctrine: Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred. More comprehensively,
it is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom.
Mercury Drug v. Baking, 2007 — Instead of a medicine for
blood sugar, Mercury Drug's saleslady gave Baking a potent
sleeping tablet. He took it for 3 consecutive days, he fell
asleep while driving. He figured in a vehicular accident.
The SC held that the proximate cause of the accident was
the negligence of the saleslady, since it would not have
happened if the correct medicine was given.
the process, the bridle on the horse’s mouth loosened.
Doctrine: Proximate cause is any cause that produces
injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would
not have occurred otherwise. It is determined from the facts
of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic,
common sense, policy, and precedent.
led to his death. The SC held that the stopping of the rig by
Notes: There is a possibility that there was contributory
negligence, since a considerable amount of time has lapsed
since the sale of the medicine. In any case, proximate cause
is usually confused with the standard of care. Proximate
causation should emphasize the connection between
negligence and the injury. The case, however, only focused
on the degree of care required.
Pilipinas Bank v. CA, 1994 — To cover the checks he
issued, Florencio Reyes asked PCIB to withdraw from his
account there and deposit it to his account at Pilipinas Bank.
In the deposit slip, the account number was wrong, but the
depositor's name was Florencio Reyes. The bookkeeper of
Pilipinas Bank did not notice the surname, so the deposit
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were dishonored. The SC held that the proximate cause was
the negligence of Pilipinas Bank's bookkeeper.
Doctrine: Proximate cause is any cause which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the result complained of and
without which would not have occurred and from which it
ought to have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated by a
person of ordinary care that the injury complained of or
some similar injury, would result therefrom as a natural and
probable cause.
Notes: The definition of proximate cause is different from
foreseeability was added.
Concurrent Cause
Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent
and each is an efficient cause without which the injury
would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to
all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against
any or all of the responsible persons although under the
circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them
was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the
injured person was not the same. No actor's negligence
ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not
exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is
responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his
acts were the sole cause of the injury. [Far Eastern Shipping v.
CA, 1998]
Remote Cause
Gabeto v. Araneta, 1921 — Ilano and Gayetano was on
board Pagnaya’s carromata, Agaton Araneta laid hands on
the reins to stop the horse, claiming that he called the
carromata first. Pagnaya pulled the reins from Araneta. In
Pagnaya had to pull over the horse near the curb to fix it.
The horse became disturbed, moved forward, bumping a
telephone box, which crashed. Frightened, the horse ran at
full speed. Ilano was able to get out of the carromata, but
Gayetano was was left inside. He sustained injuries which
Araneta was not the proximate cause, since an appreciable
amount of time lapsed until the horse ran. It was too remote
from the accident to be considered as such proximate cause.
Doctrine: The chronology of the events may be considered
to determine the proximate cause. A cause too remote from
the accident cannot be considered a proximate cause.
Intervening
Phoenix Construction v. IAC, 1987 — From a cocktail
party where he had a shot or two of liquor, Dionisio drove
his car home. His headlights then suddenly failed. When
they went back on, a truck, owned by Phoenix Construction
was parked askew, such that it blocked oncoming traffic.
Dionisio swerved but it was too late. He suffered injuries
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and nervous breakdown. The SC held that, while Dionisio result of other active forces which have gone before. The
was guilty of contributory negligence, one which was not defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a
an efficient intervening cause, the immediate and proximate "condition;" but the act may be culpable because of the
cause was the truck driver's negligence in parking. danger of fire.  When a spark ignites the gasoline, the
Doctrine: If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire as
human experience, is reasonably to be anticipated, or one the spark; and since that is the very risk which the
which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the defendant has created, the defendant will not escape
particular circumstances, the defendant may be negligent, responsibility.  Even the lapse of a considerable time during
among other reasons, because of failure to guard against it; which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily
or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason. affect liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may
Notes: In other words, if the purported intervening cause still be liable to another who falls into it a month afterward. 
is a foreseeable risk or is closely related to the original risk, "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the

then there is no efficient intervening cause. decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely
discredited.  So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer

TESTS IN DETERMINING PROXIMATE CAUSE to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the
defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety,

But for/sine qua non and some new force intervenes.  But even in such cases, it is
not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is

Substantial factor important, but the nature of the risk and the character of the
intervening cause. [Phoenix Construction v. IAC, 1987, citing
Mixed considerations
There is no exact mathematical formula to determine
Prosser & Keeton]

proximate cause. It is based upon mixed considerations of

logic, common sense, policy and precedent. Plaintiff must,
however, establish a sufficient link between the act or

Last Clear Chance

Definition
omission and the damage or injury. That link must not be The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both
remote or far-fetched; otherwise, no liability will attach. The parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is
damage or injury must be a natural and probable result of appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is

the act or omission. [Dy Teban v. Ching, 2008]

Sufficient link
Dy Teban v. Ching, 2008 — A prime mover suffered a tire
blowout at around midnight, causing it to be parked askew,
occupying a substantial portion of the highway. It did not
have any early warning device. At dawn, while it was dark,
a passenger bus collided with a van in an attempt to swerve
to avoid the parked prime mover. The SC found that the
skewed parking of the prime mover was the proximate
cause of the accident. Its driver was negligent in failing to
prevent or minimize the risk to oncoming motorists.
to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed
Doctrine: Plaintiff must, however, establish a sufficient
link between the act or omission and the damage or injury.
That link must not be remote or far-fetched; otherwise, no
liability will attach. The damage or injury must be a natural
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused
the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid
the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss.
Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff
does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by
the supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the
last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the
exercise of due diligence. [Consolidated Bank v. CA, 2003]
This doctrine, in essence, states that where both parties
are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably
later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible
to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity
to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is
chargeable with the consequences thereof. xxx [T]he rule
would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person

and probable result of the act or omission.

Cause versus Condition

Cause and Condition. Many courts have sought to
distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and the
existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated.  If the
defendant has created only a passive static condition which
made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be
liable.  But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the
sense of necessary antecedents which have played an
important part in producing the result, it is quite impossible
to distinguish between active forces and passive situations,
particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the
does not preclude the recovery of damages for the
supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability
sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance,
could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of
due diligence. [Phil Bank of Commerce v. CA, 1997]
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not
free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence
in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we
have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and
in such case the problem always is to discover which agent
is immediately and directly responsible. xxx Under these
circumstances the law is that the person who has the last
fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so

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is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to
the prior negligence of the other party. [Picart v. Smith, 1918]
Application
Picart v. Smith, 1918 — An automobile hit a horseman,
who was on the wrong side of the road. The horseman
thought he did not have time to get to the other side. The
car passed by too close that the horse turned its body
across, with its head toward the railing. Its limb was
broken, and its rider was thrown off and injured. The SC
found the automobile driver negligent, since a prudent man
should have foreseen the risk in his course and that he had
the last fair chance to avoid the harm.
Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the
Doctrine: The person who has the last fair chance to avoid
the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with
the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence
of the other party.
Bustamante v. CA, 1991 — Seven passengers of a bus
were thrown out and died when it collided with a gravel
and sand truck. Before the collision, about 30 meters away,
the bus driver saw the front wheels of the truck wiggling
and was heading toward his lane. Believing that the truck
driver was merely joking, he sped up to overtake a tractor
in an inclined part of the road. While overtaking, the
collision happened. The heirs of the victims filed for
damages. The SC held that the doctrine of last clear chance
does not apply, since the case was not between the owners
and drivers between colliding vehicles.
Notes: The case affirmed the applicability of the doctrine
Doctrine: The doctrine cannot be extended into the field of
joint tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them
should be held liable to the injured person by reason of his
discovery of the latter's peril, and it cannot be invoked as
between defendants concurrently negligent. As against
third persons, a negligent actor cannot defend by pleading
that another had negligently failed to take action which
could have avoided the injury.
since its driver was not aware of the impending peril. As
Notes: The case defined the doctrine both in terms of its
effect on recovery and as a test to establish liability, that is,
to determine proximate cause. However, part of the
definition provided does not help at all in determining
proximate cause since it even includes cases where it is
impossible to determine whose negligence caused the
occurrence. In other words, it seems to include those cases
where proximate cause cannot be determined at all.
Phoenix Construction v. IAC, 1987 — From a cocktail
party where he had a shot or two of liquor, Dionisio drove
his car home. His headlights then suddenly failed. When
they went back on, a truck, owned by Phoenix Construction
was parked askew, such that it blocked oncoming traffic.
Dionisio swerved but it was too late. He suffered injuries
and nervous breakdown. One of the defense of Phoenix
Construction is that Dionisio had the last clear chance to
avoid the injury. The SC held that the doctrine does not
apply, since there is no general concept of last clear chance
that may be extracted from its common law matrix and
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utilized as a general rule in a civil law jurisdiction. It held
that the determination of proximate cause is not merely an
exercise of chronology.
Doctrine: The last clear chance doctrine of the common
law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith
but it is a matter for debate whether, or to what extent, it
has found its way into the Civil Code. The historical function
of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the
harshness of the common law doctrine of contributory
negligence as an absolute bar to recovery of damages by a
plaintiff who was also negligent, even if relatively minor
compared to the wrongful act or omission of the defendant.
common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a
jurisdiction where contributory negligence is not an
absolute bar to recovery under Article 2179.
Glan People's Lumber v. IAC, 1989 — Calibo was driving
a jeep, with others riding, when it collided with a cargo
truck near a bridge, leading to Calibo's death. When a
complaint for damages was filed, the SC found that the
drivers had a full view of each other at 150 meters, and the
truck stopped at 30 meters. Calibo had the last clear chance
to avoid the accident, which he failed to seize. The truck
driver is thus not liable.
Doctrine: The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as
valid and complete a defense to accident liability today as it
did when invoked and applied in Picart v. Smith, 1918.
of last clear chance in this jurisdiction.
Pantranco v. Baesa, 1989 — A Pantranco bus encroached
on the opposite lane causing its collision with a jeepney.
Pantranco raised the defense that the jeepney had the last
clear chance. It then claimed that it must be exonerated
from liability. The SC ruled that the jeepney is not liable,
such, the defense of last clear chance does not apply. The
jeepney expected that the bus would return to its lane.
Doctrine: For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary
to show that the person who allegedly had the last
opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence
of the peril or should, with exercise of due care, have been
aware of it.  One cannot be expected to avoid an accident or
injury if he does not know or could not have known the
existence of the peril.
Engada v. CA, 2003 — A pick-up, driven by Engada,
encroached upon the lane of a Tamaraw jeep, headed
towards a head-on collision with it. When Tamaraw jeep
swerved to the left to avoid the pick-up, it also returned to
its lane. The vehicles collided. In the criminal complaint
against criminal case for simple imprudence resulting in
physical injuries and damage to property, Engada invoked
the doctrine of last clear chance. The SC held that there was
no clear chance to speak of, since the pick-up was fast
approaching. It applied the emergency rule instead.
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Doctrine: The doctrine states that a person who has the
last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident,
notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is
considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of
the accident. The chance must be clear, such that there is
time and opportunity to ponder the situation.
Notes: This case applied the doctrine to a criminal case.
PNR v. Brunty, 2006 — A collision occurred between a
car and a PNR train at 12 AM causing the death of Brunty, a
passenger of the car. The car was overtaking another car,
with a blind curve ahead, when it hit the train. PNR was
found negligent. The SC held that the doctrine is
inapplicable.
chance to avoid the injury, and failing to verify the identity
Doctrine: The antecedent negligence of plaintiff does not
preclude him from recovering damages caused by the
supervening negligence of defendant, who had the last fair
chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of
due diligence. The doctrine does not apply when the
proximate cause has already been established.
Lapanday Corp. v. Angala, 2007 — Lapanday's crewcab
bumped a pick-up on its rear, causing damage to said
vehicle. Upon complaint, the SC held that both vehicles
were at fault: the crewcab was speeding and the pick-up
was on the wrong lane when it tried to make a U-turn. Both
being negligent, the doctrine applies. The crewcab, which
was the rear vehicle, had the last clear chance of avoiding
the collision.
Doctrine: The doctrine of last clear chance states that
where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one
is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused
the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid
the loss but failed to do so is chargeable with the loss.
Phil Bank of Commerce v. CA, 1997 — Romeo, President
of RMC, entrusted funds to his secretary, Irene, to be
deposited in RMC’s account in Philippine Bank of
Commerce. Irene, however, deposited said funds to her
husband's account. It was only after more than a year that
Romeo found the scheme out. When he sued the bank for
damages, the SC found that, while he was negligent, the
bank had the last clear chance in averting the injury. It
ordered payment of 40% of the actual damages by the bank.
Doctrine: The doctrine, also called "supervening
negligence" or "discovered peril," states that where both
parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should
be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear
Article 2180. The obligations imposed in Article 2176 is
opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do
so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. Stated
differently, the rule would also mean that an antecedent
negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of
damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense
against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the
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last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by
the exercise of due diligence.
Notes: The negligence of Romeo constituted in his not
checking the bank statements issued to him regularly by the
bank, which led to the increase of his injury.
Canlas v. CA, 2000 — Supposedly to raise capital for a
business, Canlas delivered to Manosca the titles of lots he
owned. Manosca, with the help of impostors pretending to
be Canlas and his wife, was able to get a long from Asian
Savings Bank, secured by a mortgage over the lots. When
the lots were foreclosed, Canlas sued to annul the
mortgage. The SC ruled that the bank, having the last clear
of the supposed owners, must suffer the loss.
Doctrine: The doctrine is to the effect that where both
parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or
where it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the
one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the
consequences arising therefrom. Stated differently, the rule
is that the antecedent negligence of a person does not
preclude recovery of damages caused by the supervening
negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance to
prevent the impending harm by exercise of due diligence.
Consolidated Bank v. CA, 2003 — The passbook of LC
Diaz was given to another by the teller of Consolidated
Bank. Soon after, an unauthorized withdrawal was made.
When LC Diaz sued to recover the amount withdrawn, the
lower courts applied the doctrine of last clear chance and
found the bank liable. The SC, after holding that the cause
of action arose from culpa contractual, ruled that the doctrine
does not apply in cases of breach of contract.
Doctrine: In a case of culpa contractual, neither the
contributory negligence of a plaintiff nor his last clear
chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate a defendant from
liability. Such contributory negligence or last clear chance
merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages.
Notes: In culpa contractual, the principle on proximate
cause does not apply. As such, the doctrine, as a means to
establish such proximate cause, also does not apply.
Persons Vicariously Liable
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damages.
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PERSONS EXERCISING PARENTAL AUTHORITY Notes: The discussion of the court seems to focus on the
Article 2180. xxx The father and, in case of his death or negligence of the parents themselves, not on the negligence
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages of their son, for which they are vicariously liable. As such, it
caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and

is Article 2176, not Article 2180, which should apply.

Tamargo v. CA, 1992 — Adelberto shot Jennifer Tamargo

live in their company. xxx with an air rifle which led to her death. After the incident,
Article 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his Adelberto's adoption was finalized. In any case, a case for
dependents or employees may recover from the latter what damages was filed against his natural parents, who claimed
he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. that, since adoption retroacts to the filing of the petition, the
Article 216, Family Code. In default of parents or a judicial- proper party to be sued are the adoptive parents. The SC
ly appointed guardian, the following persons shall exercise held that the natural parents are still liable, since they had
substitute parental authority over the child in the order the actual control and custody at the time of the
indicated: commission of the act.
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214; Doctrine: The retroactive effect may be given effect to
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of permit the accrual of some benefit in favor of the child, but
age, unless unfit or disqualified; and not to burden the adoptive parents with liability for a
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of tortious act, which they could not have foreseen or
age, unless unfit or disqualified. prevented. It is inconsistent with the philosophical and
Whenever the appointment of a judicial guardian over policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability.
the property of the child becomes necessary, the same order Notes: What is important is who has actual custody and
of preference shall be observed.
Article 217, Family Code. In case of foundlings, abandoned,
neglected or abused children and other children similarly

control of the minor at the time of the act was committed.

situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in summary TEACHERS AND SCHOOLS

judicial proceedings to heads of children's homes, Article 2180. xxx Lastly, teachers or head of establish-
orphanages and similar institutions duly accredited by the ments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages cause
proper government agency. by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they
Article 221, Family Code. Parents and other persons remain in their custody. xxx
exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the Article 218, Family Code. The school, its administrators
injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution
their unemancipated children living in their company and engaged in child care shall have special parental authority
under their parental authority subject to appropriate and responsibility over the minor child while under their
defenses provided by law. supervision, instruction or custody.

Parents Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized
activities whether inside or outside the premises of the

Guardians

Others
Libi v. IAC, 1992 — Wendell and Julie Ann were
sweethearts. When they broke up and Wendell wanted to
reconcile, Julie Ann refused. Wendell resorted to threats.
They were found dead, each with a single gunshot from the
same gun. Julie Ann's parents believed that Wendell killed
their daughter. When a case based on Article 2180 was filed
against Wendell's parents, the SC found that they were
gravely remiss in their duties, in the safekeeping of the gun
and in being unaware of the affairs of their son, who turned
out to be a narcotics agent. Whether Wendell committed a
quasi-delict or crime, the parents are still liable.
articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil
Doctrine: The diligence of a good father of a family
required by law in a parent and child relationship consists,
to a large extent, of the instruction and supervision of the
school, entity or institution.
Article 219, Family Code. Those given the authority and
responsibility under the preceding Article shall be princip-
ally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or
omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents,
judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute
parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily
liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the
preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they
exercised the proper diligence required under the particular
circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding
Code on quasi-delicts.

Palisoc v. Brillantes, 1971 — Dominador Palisoc and

child. The civil liability imposed on parents for the quasi- Virgilio Daffon were classmates at the Manila Technical
delicts of their minor children in Article 2180 is primary. The Institute. One afternoon during recess, in the laboratory
liability of parents for felonies committed by their minor room, Daffon and another classmate were working on a
children is also primary. machine, while Palisoc was looking on at them. Daffon

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remarked that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. An
exchange of blows ensued, until Palisoc stumbled on an
engine block, causing him to fall with his face downward.
He became pale and fainted. He died. The SC held the
school officers solidarily liable with Daffon.
Family Code provisions, the SC found that, since there was
Doctrine: The rationale for the liability of the school is
that, so long as the student remains in the custody of the
school hears and teachers, they stand, to a certain extent, as
to the student, in loco parentis and are called upon to
exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of said
child. The requirement is not that the student lived and
boarded with his teacher or school officials, but that he
remains in their custody, that protective and supervisory
custody which the school and its heads exercise over
students, again including recess time.
Amadora v. CA, 1988 — Amadora, 17, was shot by his
classmate Daffon, 3 days before graduation day, at the
school auditorium. Amadora was at the school, an academic
institution, to submit a physics report. Daffon was
convicted of homicide. On complaint for damages, the SC
absolved the school officials and teachers, for failure to
prove negligence on their part. On the contrary, school
regulations to maintain discipline were enforced.
Doctrine: Article 2180 applies to all schools, academic as
well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather
than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the
tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in
charge of such student, following the first part of the
provision. This responsibility applies as long as it can be
shown that the student is in the school premises in
pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise
of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a
legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school
authorities over the student continues.
dependents or employees may recover from the latter what
Notes: Unlike the parent who will be liable only for his
minor child, the teacher is answerable for torts of his
students regardless of the student’s age. Also, the case treats
the custody broadly, but it is settled when it starts or ends.
Salvosa v. IAC, 1988 — Abon was a student and an
employee of the armory of the school's RTC. One night, he
shot a commerce student within school premises, using an
unlicensed gun from the armory. He was convicted of
homicide. In the case for damages, the SC absolved the
school, since Abon was no longer under its custody when
the incident happened. It held that he was not in recess,
since he was no longer in attendance in the school at that
time. He was already dismissed.
action or inaction; but rather, the result varies with each
Doctrine: The mere fact of being enrolled or being in the
premises of a school without more does not constitute
"attending school" or being in the "protective and
supervisory custody" of the school, as contemplated in
Article 2180.
principle of bonus pater familias as in ours. Whether the fault
Notes: The case mitigates the sweeping scope of custody
in Amadora v. CA. The case effectively states that the school
is not liable for tortious acts of the student after dismissal.
the presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of
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St. Mary's Academy v. Carpitanos, 2002 — During an
enrollment drive, a student, 15, drove the jeep carrying the
students. The steering wheel was detached. The jeep turned
turtle. A student died. In the case for damages based on the
no proof that the proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of the school, it cannot be held liable.
Doctrine: If the person under custody is a minor, those
exercising special parental authority are principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or
omissions of the minor while under their custody. However,
there must be a finding that the act or omission considered
as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused. It
must have a causal connection to the accident.
Notes: The Family Code provisions on vicarious liability of
those with special parental authority over a minor child are
of the same nature as that in Article 2180. In this case,
however, they were applied as if they were similar to Article
2176, such that proximate causation needs to be proven,
rather than presumed.
OWNERS/MANAGERS OF ESTABLISHMENTS/EMPLOYERS
When Applicable
Article 2180. xxx The owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages cause by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry. xxx
Article 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his
he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.
xxx [The] terms ["employers" and "owners and managers
of an establishment or enterprise"] do not include the
manager of a corporation.  It may be gathered from the
context of Article 2180 that the term "manager" ("director" in
the Spanish version) is used in the sense of "employer". [Phil
Rabbit v. Phil American, 1975]
No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will
furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a
given moment, an employee is engaged in his employer's
business in the operation of a motor vehicle, so as to fix
liability upon the employer because of the employee’s
state of facts.
xxx The foregoing principles and jurisprudence [from
American Jurisprudence] are applicable in our jurisdiction
albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, not on the
or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer
as in American law or jurisprudence, or merely gives rise to
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the employer as in ours, it is indispensable that the on resolving whether the employee was acting within the
employee was acting in his employer’s business or within

the scope of his assigned task. [Castilex v. Vasquez, 1999]
scope of his assigned tasks.

NPC v. CA, 1998 — A dump truck, owned by NPC and

Jayme v. Apostol, 2008 — Facts: A pick-up, driven by an
employee of the Municipality of Koronadal, was on its way
to the airport, with the mayor on board, hit Jayme, sending
him 50 meters away from the point of impact. The SC held
that the mayor cannot be held liable, since he was not the
employer. He was merely a passenger and a fellow
employee. Likewise, Koronadal is immune from suit.
liable under Article 2180.
Doctrine: To sustain claims against employers for the acts
of their employees, the following requisites must be
established: (1) that the employee was chosen by the
employer personally or through another, (2) that the service
to be rendered in accordance with orders which the
employer has the authority to give at all times, and (3) that
the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by
reason of the functions entrusted to him.
employer is determined by the Civil Code, it relied on Labor
Notes: The four-fold test in determining the existence of
driven by an employee supplied by PHESCO, figured in a
collision with a Tamaraw jeep. On suit for damages, NPC
disclaimed liability claiming that the driver was not its
employee. PHESCO claimed that it was merely a recruiter.
The SC found that PHESCO was merely a labor-only
contractor, and, as such, NPC is the direct employer. It is
Doctrine: In an action for recovery of damages as a result
of quasi-delict committed by an employee supplied by a
labor-only contractor, the Civil Code is the applicable law,
not the Labor Code.
Notes: Article 2180 is problematic in that there is no test
provided to determine the existence of employment
relationship. While the case stated that the liability of the
Code provisions on labor-only contracting to determine the

an employment relationship was applied in this case.

Filamer v. IAC, 1990 — Funtecha was a student and a

existence of employment relationship.

Castilex Corp. v. Vasquez, 1999 — At dawn, Vasquez was

janitor at Filamer Christian Institute. One evening, he was driving his motorcycle at a rotonda when Abad, manager of
allowed by the school's driver to drive a school jeep. He Castilex Industrial Corporation, with a company pickup,
struck Kapunan. In the independent civil action, the SC driving against the flow of traffic, collided with him.
held that there was no employment relationship between Vasquez died. In the action for damages, the SC absolve the
Funtecha and the school, since, as a working student, he company from liability, ruling that Abad was not acting
was not included in the payroll, and, even assuming that within the scope of the functions entrusted to him when the
there was such relationship, he was not acting within the incident happened. As such, its burden to prove that it was
scope of his supposed employment at the time of the diligent did not arise.
incident. He should bear the full brunt of his negligence. Doctrine: Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the
Doctrine: The liability of the employer only arises when employer is engaged in a business or industry, are covered
the negligence of the employee occurred while the so long as they were acting within the scope of their
employee is acting within the scope of his employment. assigned task, even though committed neither in the service
Notes: The decision relied heavily on a provision of the of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions.
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code to the effect that there is Notes: Circumstances surrounding the incident were
no employment relationship between a school and its considered to determine whether Abad was acting within

working student. his assigned tasks at the time of the incident. These include
the fact that the area was a "lively place," and a woman
Filamer v. IAC, 1992 — On reconsideration, the SC held
that there was an employment relationship between
Funtecha and the school, and that, since driving the jeep to

shouting "daddy, daddy," when Abad was only 29.

Valenzuela v. CA, 1996 — Valenzuela was driving her car

the house of the school president after driving students to so early in the morning when she had a flat tire. She was
their homes was for the benefit of the school, it is liable pointing at the tools to a man who volunteered to held her,
under Article 2180 as an employer. when she was hit by Li, assistant manager of Alexander
Doctrine: The clause "within the scope of their assigned Commercial and drunk at that time. Valenzuela's leg had to
tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of be amputated. In the suit to recover damages, the company
an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in was held solidarily liable, since there was no proof that it
furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the made the necessary steps, evidencing diligence in
account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the entrusting the company car to Li, such as determining his
injury or damage. driving proficiency and history.
Notes: The Implementing Rules were not applied this time. Doctrine: The basis of the liability of the employer is not
It was held that its provisions are not decisive in a civil suit respondeat superior, but that of bonus pater familias, for failing
for damages against a working student and a school. to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the
However, the decision did not delve on how to determine selection and supervision of employees. In providing for a
the existence of employment relationship, focusing instead company car for business use, a company owes a

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responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial
or other employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited
use of a company issued car are able to use the company
issue capably and responsibly.
Professional Services v. Agana, 2007 — After her
hysterectomy operation at Medical City, Natividad Agana
found out that two pieces of sponges were left inside her,
which has caused her pain for a long time. The SC held Dr.
Ampil, the surgeon who closed the incision, liable, ruling
that leaving foreign substances in the wound after the
incision has been closed in at the very least prima facie
negligence. It is inconsistent with due care, raising an
inference of negligence. Some authorities even consider it
negligence per se. Professional Services, owner of Medical
City, was held solidarily liable as an employer of Dr. Ampil.
The SC also cited the principle of apparent authority or
agency by estoppel and doctrine of corporate negligence to
sustain the hospital's liability.
diligence in supervising his employees.
Doctrine: The nature of the relationship between the
hospital and the physicians, whether consultants only or
otherwise, is immaterial. For the purposes of apportioning
responsibility in cases of medical negligence, an employer-
employee relationship exists between them.
must present adequate and convincing proof that he
Notes: The case surveyed the US rules, stating that, at
first, hospitals were exempt from the application of
respondeat superior, since physicians were considered as
independent contractors. However, due to the increase in
the role of hospitals in regulating medical care, the
exception was abolished. Ramos v. CA is the basis for ruling
that the nature of the relationship is inconsequential in our
Philippine jurisdiction.
Professional Services v. Agana, 2008 — On motion for
reconsideration, the SC upheld its earlier ruling. While the
disposition of Ramos v. CA was reconsidered, since the
hospital did not exercise control over the physician, its
earlier doctrine still stands.
driving. But no disciplinary action was taken against him.
Doctrine: For the purpose of allocating responsibility in
medical negligence cases, an employer-employee
relationship exists between hospitals and their consultants.
Professional Services v. Agana, 2010 — On second
motion for reconsideration, the SC, "after gathering its
thoughts," not on the basis of the principle of respondeat
superior (supposedly referring to Article 2180) anymore, for
lack of evidence showing an employment relationship, but
under ostensible agency for the negligence of Dr. Ampil,
and, pro hac vice, under the principle of corporate negligence
for its failure to perform its duties as a hospital.
Notes: From the level of proof required, it appears that
Doctrine: The control test is still employed to determine
the existence of an employer-employee relationship
between hospital and doctor.
Notes: The reference to respondeat superior is absolutely
wrong. Under Article 2180, a separate negligence is
presumed on the part of the employer, hence, there is only a
presumption of negligence, which may be disputed by
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proof to the contrary. Under the common law doctrine of
respondeat superior, the employer is automatically consider-
ed negligent upon finding of negligence of the employee.
Presumption of Negligence
Rebuttal of Presumption
Lampesa v. De Vera, 2008 — De Vera boarded a jeepney
to Baguio. It allowed a truck, then driven by Copsiyat and
owned by Lampesa, to pass. However, when the jeepney
moved forward, the truck moved backwards, hitting the
jeep. De Vera lost a finger. The SC held that, upon
determination that the negligence of Copsiyat was the
proximate cause of the accident, Lampesa, as the employer,
was presumed negligent. It found that the presumption was
not rebutted. That Copsiyat showed his driver's license
when he applied for the job is inadequate. An employer is
bound to do more. He must also show that he exercised
Doctrine: Once negligence on the part of the employee is
established, a presumption instantly arises that the
employer was negligent in the selection and/or supervision
of said employee. To rebut this presumption, the employer
exercised care and diligence in the selection and
supervision of his employees.
Mercury Drug v. Huang, 2007 — Stephen Huang was
paralyzed as a result of a collision between his car and a
truck, owned by Mercury Drug. Mercury Drug claimed that
it was diligence in its hiring procedure and in the
supervision of its employee. The SC found that the truck
driver only took the underwent the procedure when he
applied as a delivery man, not as such driver. Also, the tests
conducted were limited. In any case, diligence in the
supervision and discipline of employees was not proven.
The driver's license was confiscated at the time for reckless
Doctrine: To be relieved of liability, the employer should
show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family, both in the selection of the employee and in the
supervision of the performance of his duties. For selection,
the employer is required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience, and service records. For
supervision, the employer should formulate standard
operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and
impose disciplinary measures for their breach. To establish
compliance with these requirements, employers must
submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
rebutting the presumption of negligence on the part of the
employer is difficult to dispute.
STATE
Article 2180. xxx The State is responsible in like manner
when it acts through a special agent; but not when the
damage has been caused by the official to whom the task
B2015 Review Operations TORT & QUASI-DELICT
done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in
Article 2176 shall be applicable. xxx
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations
are suable because their charters grant them the competence
to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not
liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of
governmental functions and can only be held answerable
only if it can be shown that they were acting in proprietary
capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State
merely gives the claimant the right to show that the
defendant was not acting in governmental capacity when
the injury was committed or that the case comes under the
exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant
cannot recover. [Jayme v. Apostol, 2008, citing San Fernando,
La Union v. Firme]
Merritt v. Government, 1916 — Merritt was riding a
motorcycle when he was hit by an ambulance of Philippine
General Hospital. His skull was fractured and his leg
broken. A legislation was passed waiving immunity from
suit of the government. In the case filed under the Old Civil
Code, the SC held that, since the ambulance driver is not a
special agent, the government is not liable.
Doctrine: The responsibility of the state is limited by
Article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special
agent, one who receives a definite and fixed order or
commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office
if he is a special official, so that in representation of the state
and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the
trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any
executive agent who is an employee of the active
administration and who on his own responsibility performs
the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to
his office and which are regulated by law.
Notes: The government cannot be presumed negligent. In
fact, regularity in its performance of duties is presumed.
Rosete v. Auditor General, 1948 — The employees of the
Emergency Control Administration stored gasoline in a
warehouse, close to Rosete's building, contrary to city
ordinances of Manila. When a person lit his cigarette 5
meters from the gas drum, a fire broke out, damaging
Rosete's property. The SC held that the government is not
responsible, since there was no showing that whatever
negligence may be imputed was done by a special agent.
Doctrine: The responsibility of the state is limited to that
which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered
by a definite order or commission to perform some act or
charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the
claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions
imputable to a public official charged with some
administrative or technical office who can be held to the
proper responsibility.
Fontanilla v. Maliaman, 1989 — Pickup owned and
operated by National Irrigation Administration bumped
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Fontanilla. The SC held that held that NIA, an agency with
its own juridical personality, and performing proprietary
functions, is liable as an ordinary employer.
Doctrine: The liability of the state has two aspects: (1) its
public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the
tortious acts of special agents only, and (2) its private or
business aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises)
where it becomes liable as an ordinary employer.
Notes: Private individuals may be agents if they are hired
for special governmental task.
Fontanilla v. Maliaman, 1991 — The SC denied the
motion for reconsideration, concluding that NIA is a
government agency with a juridical personality separate
and distinct from the government.  It is not a mere agency
of the government but a corporate body performing
proprietary functions.  Therefore, it may be held liable for
the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver.
Doctrine: A government agency, in contracting to provide
water supply, acts under its proprietary power and not
under legislative, public or governmental powers.
Persons Specifically Liable
POSSESSORS OR USERS OF ANIMALS
Article 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may
make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it
may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This
responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should
come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who
has suffered the damage.
Vestil v. IAC, 1989 — A 3-year old child was bitten by a
dog, while playing at the house of Vicente Miranda, now
deceased, and father of Vestil. The child died of broncho-
pneumonia, a complication of rabies. On suit for damages,
Vestil's defense was that she was not the owner. The SC
held her liable, since he was the possessor of the animal.
She also had possession over the house, as she collected
rents from its boarders.
Doctrine: For liability under Article 2183, what must be
determined is the possession of the animal, regardless of the
ownership.
OWNERS OF MOTOR VEHICLES
Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is
solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in
the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence,
prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a
driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless
driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within
the next preceding two months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions
of Article 2180 are applicable.
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Chapman v. Underwood, 1914 — Chapman was standing
beside a car he hailed when a car, with Underwood, as the
owner, on board and driven by his chauffeur, coming from
the opposite direction, turned a bit to the opposite lane to
avoid the oncoming traffic. The car hit Chapman. The SC
absolved Underwood since it did not appear that, from the
time the car took the wrong side of the road to the
commission of the injury, sufficient time intervened to give
Underwood an opportunity to correct the act of his driver.
either control or supervision is exercised over the defective
Doctrine: An owner who sits in his automobile and
permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by
the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a
reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that
the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for
such acts. On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act
of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable
opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a
person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the
automobile, although present therein at the time the act was
committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally,
therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the
presence of the owner for such a length of time that the
owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver's act his own.
Caedo v. Yu Khe Thai, 1968 — Caedo, with his family,
was driving his car, when, from the opposite direction, Yu
Khe Thai's cadillac, with his driver, tried to overtake a
carretela in front, despite Caedo's car on the opposite lane
noticeable at a short distance. The cadillac caught the rear
bumper of the carretela, was not able to recover, and
collided with Caedo's car. The SC held that no negligence
can be imputed to Yu Khe Thai, since his driver has been
employed for many years without traffic violations, the car
was running at a reasonable speed, and the time element
was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu
Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver.
partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary
Doctrine: Under Article 2184, if the causative factor was
the driver's negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was
present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented
the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. The basis for
the liability is the relationship of pater familias.
taken care of with due diligence, and the inflammation of
Notes: The test of whether there was negligence is
subjective, since car owners precisely obtain the services of
drivers because they are not as proficient in the activity.
Also, different standards apply across the board, depending
on the circumstances of the owner and the case.
PROVINCES, CITIES, MUNICIPALITIES
Article 2189. Provinces, cities, and municipalities shall be
liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by,
any person by reason of the defective condition of roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works
under their control or supervision.
Guilatco v. Dagupan City, 1989 — Guilatco fell into a
manhole on a sidewalk in a provincial road. Her right leg
was fractured. In the case for damages, the SC held the city
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liable, since the supervision and maintenance of manhole
was the duty of the city engineer. It held that the exemption
of the city from liability of the city in its charter is not
applicable, since Article 2189 governs liability arising from
defective streets, public buildings, and other public works.
Doctrine: Under Article 2189, it is not necessary for the
defective road or street to belong to the province, city, or
municipality for liability to attach. It only requires that
road or street.
Notes: Article 2189 was not treated as a quasi-delict in this
case, but more like strict liability, such that liability attaches
when the requisites provided concur, and proximate
causation is not an issue.
Quezon City v. Dacara, 2005 — Dacara's car rammed into
a pile of street diggings. He sustained injuries and his car
damaged. In the suit for damages against the city, the pile of
earth., the SC held that the the city was negligent for failing
to install even a single warning device at the area under
renovation. They city was held liable under Article 2189.
Doctrine:  Local governments and their employees are
responsible not only for the maintenance of roads and
streets, but also for the safety of the public. They must
therefore secure construction areas with adequate
precautionary measures.
Notes:  If the doctrine in this case would be strictly
observed, then local governments would face countless
suits concerning every accident cause by improper
maintenance of roads and streets.
PROPRIETORS OF BUILDINGS
Article 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is
responsible for the damages resulting from its total or
repairs.
Article 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for dam-
ages caused:
(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been
explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe
and adequate place;
(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons
or property;
(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or
lanes, if not cause by force majeure;
(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers, or deposits
of infectious matter, constructed without precautions
suitable to the place.
Article 2192. If the damages referred to in the two preced-
ing articles should be the result of any defect in the
construction mentioned in Article 1723, the third person
suffering damages may proceed only against the engineer
or architect or contractor in accordance with said article,
within the period therein fixed.
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ENGINEER/ARCHITECT OF COLLAPSED BUILDING
which the accident took place. Risks to which all persons
Article 1723. The engineer of architect who drew up the
plans and specifications for a building is liable for damages
if within fifteen years from the completion of the structure,
the same should collapse by reason of a defect in those
plans and specifications, or due to the defects in the ground.
The contractor is likewise responsible for the damages if the
edifice falls, within the same period, on account of the
defects in the construction or the use of materials of inferior
quality furnished by him, or due to any violation of the
terms of the contract. If the engineer or architect supervises
the construction, he shall be solidarily liable with the
contractor.
enterprises and other employers, which, by virtue of
Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not
imply waiver of any of the causes of action by reason of any
defect mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
operating a business or engaged in a particular industry or
The action must be brought within ten years following
the collapse of the building.
HEAD OF FAMILY FOR THINGS THROWN/FALLING
Article 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building
or a part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by
things thrown of falling from the same.
OWNERS OF ENTERPRISES/OTHER EMPLOYERS
Article 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers
are obliged to pay compensation for the death of or injuries
to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other employees
even though the event may have been purely accidental or
entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if the death or personal
injury arose out of and in the course of the employment.
The employer is also liable for compensation if the
employee contracts any illness or disease cause by such
employment or as the result of the nature of the
employment. If the mishap was due to the employee's own
notorious negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness, the
employer shall not be liable for compensation. When the
employee's lack of due care contributed to his death, or
injury, the compensation shall be equitably reduced.
c) the time it was put into circulation.
Article 1712. If the death or injury is due to the negligence
of a fellow-worker, the latter and the employer shall be
solidarily liable for compensation. If a fellow-worker's
intentional or malicious act is the only cause of the death or
injury, the employer shall not be answerable, unless it
should be shown that the latter did not exercise due
diligence in the selection or supervision of the plaintiff's
fellow-worker.
c) that the consumer or third party is solely at fault.
Afable v. Singer Sewing Machine, 1933 — One Sunday,
Madlangbayan, a collector for the Singer Sewing Machine
Company, was on his way home from making collections in
his bicycle, when he was ran over, to his death, by a truck.
In the suit by his heirs under Act 3428, the SC held that the
death did not arise out of or in the course of his
employment as collector.
safety the consumer may rightfully expect of it, taking the
Doctrine: "Arising out of" refers to the origin or cause of
the accident, and is descriptive of its character. "In the
course of" refers to the time, place, and circumstances under
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similarly situated are equally exposed and not traceable in
some special degree to the particular employment are
excluded.
Alarcon v. Alarcon, 1961 — Alarcon hired Urzino and
Generoso to dig a well on his land. On the second day of
work, Urzino died while being lowered into the hole,
supposedly to dig deeper. An obnoxious odor and hot air
caused his asphyxia. In the suit based on Article 1711, the SC
absolved Alarcon, since he does not own any enterprise.
Doctrine: Article 1711 applies only to owners of
ejusdem generis, refers to persons who belong to a class
analogous to "owners of enterprises," such as those
trade, requiring its managers to contract the services of
laborers, workers, or employees.
MANUFACTURERS/PRODUCERS
Article 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs,
drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for
death or injuries cause by any noxious or harmful
substances used, although no contractual relation exists
between them and the consumers.
Article 97, Consumer Act. Liability for the Defective Products.
Any Filipino or foreign manufacturer, producer, and any
importer, shall be liable for redress, independently of fault,
for damages caused to consumers by defects resulting from
design, manufacturer, construction, assembly and erection
formulas and handling and making up, presentation or
packing of their products, as well as for the insufficient or
inadequate information on the use and hazards thereof.
A product is defective when it does not offer the safety
rightfully expected of it, taking relevant circumstances into
consideration, including but not limited to:
a) presentation of product;
b) use and hazards reasonably expected of it;
A product is not considered defective because another
better quality product has been placed in the market.
The manufacturer, builder, producer or importer shall not
be held liable when its evidences:
a) that it did not place the product on the market;
b) that although it did place the product on the market
such product has no defect;
Article 99. Liability Defective Services. The service supplier
is liable for redress, independently of fault, for damages
caused to consumers by defects relating to the rendering of
the services, as well as for insufficient or inadequate
information on the fruition and hazards thereof.
The service is defective when it does not provide the
relevant circumstances into consideration, including but not
limited to:
a) manner in which it is provided.
B2015 Review Operations TORT & QUASI-DELICT
b) the result of hazards which may reasonably be expect-
ed of it;
was dissolved and So Pek Giok already dead, his grandson,
c) the time when it was provided.
So Ping Bun, continued to occupy them. This even when
A service is not considered defective because of the use or
introduction of new techniques. The supplier of the services
shall not be held liable when it is proven:
occupation for some time. When TEC demanded that he
a) that there is no defect in the service rendered;
vacate the properties, he immediately contracted with
b) that the consumer or third party is solely at fault.
DCCSI for lease of the properties. When TEC sued to nullify
Article 106. Prohibition in Contractual Stipulation. The
stipulation in a contract of a clause preventing, exonerating
or reducing the obligation to indemnify for damages
effected, as provided for in this and in preceding Articles, is
hereby prohibited, if there is more than one person
responsible for the cause of the damage, they shall be jointly
liable for the redress established in the pertinent provisions
of this Act. However, if the damage is caused by a
component or part incorporated in the product or service,
its manufacturer, builder or importer and the person who
incorporated the component or part are jointly liable.
party cannot be a malicious interferer. Where the alleged
Section 5, RA 9803. Liability for Damages from Donated Food.
A person, whether natural or juridical, shall not be subject
to civil or criminal liability arising from the nature, age,
packaging, or condition of apparently wholesome food that
a person donates in good faith for charitable purposes. This
shall not apply, however, to an injury or death of an
ultimate beneficiary of the donated food that results from
an act or omission of a person constituting gross negligence
or intentional misconduct.
PERSONS WHO INTERFERE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS
Article 1314. Any third person who induces another to
violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other
contracting party.
Gilchrist v. Cuddy, 1915 — Gilchrist contracted with
Cuddy, to exhibit the latter's Zigomar film. Gilchrist already
paid. Few days before showing, Cuddy returned the
payment to Gilchrist, informing him that he made other
arrangements for the film with Espejo and Zaldarriaga.
Espejo knew that the film was already contracted when he
engaged with Cuddy. In the case for specific performance,
an injunction was issued for Espejo and Zaldarriaga to
refrain from exhibiting the film. They counterclaimed for
damages for wrongful issuance of the injunction. The SC
dismissed the counterclaim, ruling that the issuance was
justified, since Gilchrist faced an immediate prospect of
diminished profits. It added to the justification that motive
for profit does not relieve from liability in interference.
the original plan due to one's persuasion. The case also
Doctrine: That the only motive for interference with the
contract was a desire to make a profit, without malice
beyond that, does not relieve them of the legal liability for
interfering with that contract and causing its breach.
distributor of a shipping company is Brisbane. After
Notes: The liability for the interference, however, was not
discussed, since the case was about the counterclaim.
So Ping Bun v. CA, 1999 — THT, through its managing
partner, So Pek Giok, leased DCCSI's property. The lease
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expired but THT still occupied the properties. When THT
another company TEC, already leased the properties from
DCCSI. So Ping Bun was allowed to continue his
So Ping Bun's contracts and for damages, the SC absolved
So Ping Bun since no deliberate wrongful motives of malice
were imputed on him.
Doctrine: The elements of tort interference are: (1)
existence of a valid contract, (2) knowledge on the part of
the third person of the existence of contract, and (3)
interference of the third person is without legal justification
or excuse. Where there was no malice in the interference of
a contract, and the impulse behind one’s conduct lies in a
proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives, a
interferer is financially interested, and such interest
motivates his conduct, it cannot be said that he is an
officious or malicious intermeddler.
Notes: The case had the wrong interpretation of Gilchrist v.
Cuddy. Also, the extent of the interest of the interferer is
irrelevant in determining whether it was malicious or not.
Lagon v. CA, 2005 — Lagon purchased 2 parcels of land.
A few months after, Lapuz filed a complaint alleging that he
had been leasing the properties, built a building, and sub-
leased it to others, and that Lagon had been collecting
rentals from his sub-lessees. He claimed that Lagon induced
the sellers to sell the property to him, in violation of his
leasehold rights. The SC held that the requisites of
interference with contractual relations were not all present.
The case is one of damnum absque injuria. Lagon was merely
advancing his financial or economic interests.
Doctrine: Article 1314 provides that any third person who
induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for
damages to the other contracting party. "Induce" refers to
situations where a person causes another to choose one
course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation. The tort
recognized in the provision is known as interference with
contractual relations. The interference is penalized because
it violates the property rights of a party in a contract to reap
the benefits that should result therefrom. The requisites of
the tort are those laid out in So Ping Bun v. CA.
Notes: There is inducement when there is deviation from
misinterpreted Gilchrist v. Cuddy.
Go v. Cordero, 2010 — Cordero was an exclusive
incurring travel expenses and closing his first deal with a
Cordero, he found out that the latter was directly dealing
with the shipping company for the second transaction,
cutting off his commissions. Worse, his lawyers also
connived with the client and the shipping company to take
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him out of the picture. He sued them all for conspiring in
violating his exclusive distributorship in bad faith and
wanton disregard of his rights. The SC held that the
existence of the contract and knowledge by the alleged
interferers was not disputed. As to the legal justification, it
found that while the motive was to reduce the price of the
transaction, the bounds of permissible financial interest was
transgressed, since Go already incurred expenses in closing
the deal, and the lawyers still demanded their cut from him,
despite going behind his back in procuring another deal.
becomes a State witness;
Doctrine: The elements of tort interference are: (1)
existence of a valid contract, (2) knowledge on the part of
the third person of the existence of a contract, and (3)
interference of the third person is without legal justification.
As to the third element, to sustain a case for tortuous
interference, the defendant must have acted with malice or
must have been driven by purely impure reasons to injure
the plaintiff.
offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an
Notes: Without So Ping Bun v. CA and Lagon v. CA, this
would have been a case for tortious interference. The SC
had to rely in Article 19, to uphold its ruling that there was
tortious interference. All of this when Article 1314 does not
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and the cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness
against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt or
from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to
make such confession, except when the person confessing
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual
punishments, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in
accordance with a statute which has not been judicially
declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or
not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal
entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and
for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be
instituted) and may be proved by preponderance of

in itself require malice. evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary

damages may also be adjudicated.

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable
Independent Civil Action from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a

VIOLATION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

MHP Garments v. CA, 1994 — The Boy Scouts of the

Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private Philippines awarded an exclusive franchise to MHP to
individual, who directly and indirectly obstructs, defeats, distribute its official uniforms, as well as the authority to
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the undertake or cause to be undertaken the prosecution in
following rights and liberties of another person shall be court of all illegal sources of such uniforms. It instigated the
liable to the latter for damages: seizing of such items, with the help of police authorities but
(1) Freedom of religion; without warrant. In the case for damages, the SC held that
(2) Freedom of speech; the seizure was illegal. MHP, as a private individual, can
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a period- also be held liable under Article 32.
ical publication; Doctrine: Under Article 32, the wrong may be civil or
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention; criminal. Malice or bad faith is not necessary. Otherwise, it
(5) Freedom of suffrage; would defeat the main purpose of the provision, which is
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due the effective protection of individual rights. Good faith is
process of law; not a defense. Also, the provision makes liable an officer or
(7) The right to a just compensation when private prop- a person directly or indirectly responsible for the violation
erty is taken for public use; of the rights.
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws; Notes: The determination of whether rights have been
(9) The right to be secured in one's person, house, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;

violated employs tests in constitutional and criminal law.

Silahis v. Soluta, 2006 — The hotel officers and guards, in

(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence; barong tagalog, searched the union office without warrant
(12) The right to become a member of associations or so- and allegedly found a plastic bag of marijuana. A case
cieties for the purposes not contrary to law; against the union officers and members were filed for
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to peti- violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was dismissed, since
tion the Government for redress of grievances; the evidence was inadmissible. In the complaint for
(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in malicious prosecution and illegal search against the hotel,
any form; the SC held that the search stinks of illegality. The hotel had
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail; ample time to obtain a warrant, but it did not. They

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orchestrated an illegal search for which they are liable,
under Article 32.
Doctrine: The basis of the action is Article 32 of the Civil
Code. It may be invoked against a private individual who
violated a constitutional right of another. It speaks of a
public officer or a person directly or indirectly responsible
for such violation. It is not the actor alone who must answer
for the damages/injury caused to the aggrieved party. It is
not even necessary that the defendant under this article
should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it
would defeat its main purpose, which is the effective
protection of individual rights. It suffices that there is a
violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff.
'fraud' and 'physical injuries.' Defamation and fraud are
As constitutional rights occupy a lofty position in every
civilized and democratic community and not infrequently
susceptible to abuse, their violation, whether constituting a
penal offense or not, by both public officers and private
individuals, must be guarded against. That is why it is not
even necessary that the defendant should have acted with
malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main
purpose. It suffices that there is a violation of the
constitutional right of the plaintiff. 
the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the
Notes: While the hotel owned the union office, the union
officers and members, who were its legal occupants, are
entitled to the rights against illegal search.
Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune, 2007 — Vinzons-Chato, as
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, reclassified Champion,
Hope, and More, from locally manufactured cigarettes
bearing foreign brand, increasing its ad valorem tax. Fortune,
the manufacturer, moved for reconsideration of the
reclassification but was denied. However, the SC eventually
invalidated it. When Fortune sued for damages, Vinzons-
Chato moved to dismiss on the ground that there was not
allegation of bad faith. The SC, applying Article 32, instead
of Section 38 of the Administrative Code, which required bad
faith, held that no allegation of bad faith was necessary.
the offense committed is that of physical injuries, or
Doctrine: It is not necessary that the defendant, under
Article 32, should have acted with malice or bad faith.
Otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the
effective protection of individual rights. It suffices that there
is a violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff.
Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune, 2008 — When the case was
referred to the SC en banc, the court distinguished between
duty owing to the public collectively and duty owing to
particular individuals. In the former, the remedy is political,
except when the individual suffers a particular or special
injury. In the latter, the individual may sue when he suffers
an injury on account of the officer's improper performance
or non-performance of his duty. In this case, the duty
involved is one owed to the public in general. No particular
injury was proven.
Doctrine: An individual can never be suffered to sue for
an injury which, technically, is one to the public only; he
must show a wrong which he specially suffers, and damage
alone does not constitute a wrong. A contrary precept will
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lead to a deluge of suits, for if one man might have an
action, all men might have the like.
DEFAMATION, FRAUD, AND PHYSICAL INJURIES
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
The article in question uses the words 'defamation',
used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific
provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as
means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms
defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart to
them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines,
but in their generic sense.  With this apparent circumstance
in mind, it is evident that the terms 'physical injuries' could
not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in
Code Commission would have used terms in the same
article – some in their general and another in its technical
sense.  In other words, the term 'physical injuries' should be
understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical
injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general
terms.  In any case the Code Commission recommended
that the civil action for physical injuries be similar to the
civil action for assault and battery in American Law, and
this recommendation must have been accepted by the
Legislature when it approved the article intact as
recommended.  If the intent has been to establish a civil
action for the bodily harm received by the complainant
similar to the civil action for assault and battery, as the
Code Commission states, the civil action should lie whether
frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death.
[Madeja v. Caro, 1983, citing Carandang v. Santiago]
Can Article 33 above cited be made applicable to an
employer in a civil action for subsidiary liability? The
answer to this question is undoubtedly in the negative.
What this Article 33 authorizes is an action against the
employee on his primary civil liability. It cannot apply to an
action against the employer to enforce his subsidiary civil
liability as stated above, because, such liability arise only
after conviction of the employee in the criminal case. Any
action brought against him before the conviction of his
employee is premature. [Joaquin v. Aniceto, 1964]
Despite being defined in the Revised Penal Code, libel can
also be instituted as a purely civil action, the cause of action
for which is provided by Article 33. It adopts the elements of
criminal libel. [Yuchengco v. Manila Chronicle, 2009]
Arafiles v. Phil Journalists, 2004 — A complaint based on
Article 33, for damages was filed by Arafiles, Director of the
National Institute for Atmospheric Science against Morales
B2015 Review Operations TORT & QUASI-DELICT
of People’s Tonight, who wrote an article based on the
interview he made with a complainant, who charged
Arafiles of forcible abduction with rape and forcible
abduction with attempted rape, and on the police blotter
report. Arafiles claimed that the article was grossly
malicious and overly sensationalized. The SC held that the
article, viewed as a whole, sufficiently informs the reader
that the narration is based on the account of the victim.
since more than 4 years had lapsed since the death.
Doctrine: Article 33 contemplates a civil action for the
recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to the purely
criminal aspect of the case. A civil action for libel under the
provision shall be instituted and prosecuted to final
judgment and proved by preponderance of evidence
separately from and entirely independent of the institution,
pendency or result of the criminal action because it is
governed by the provisions of the Civil Code and not by the
Revised Penal Code.
separate civil action was reserved. After Paje's conviction by
Notes: There is no malicious sensationalization of facts in
a published article when the sources come from an official
public document, such as police blotter, and from the
interview made with the victim.
MVRS v. Islamic Council, 2003 — MVRS published in its
tabloid an article stating that the Muslims do not eat pigs
because they are consider them as gods. Islamic Da'wah
Council sued for damages, based on Article 33, representing
not only Muslims in the Philippines, but the entire Muslim
world. The SC held that the article does not relate to the
Council or to any individual in particular. It found that it
was not directly referred or alluded to. This element of
identifiability was lacking, owing to the size of the group.
heirs filed a criminal complaint for homicide through
Doctrine: Declarations made about a large class of people
cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or
identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically
pointing or alluding to a particular member of a class, no
member of such class has a right of action without at all
impairing the equally demanding right of free speech and
expression, as well as of the press.
Doctrine: Article 33 assumes a defamation, fraud, or
Notes: Defamation has to be a negative comment. This
case makes defamation of larger groups difficult.
Heirs of Simon v. Chan, 2011 — Chan, aside from filing a
criminal case for violation of BP 22, sued for collection of
the amount of the checks, claiming that the action is
independent of the criminal case, based on Article 33. The
SC held that the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
applies retroactively, provides that the civil liability in BP 22
can only be enforced in the criminal case, since a separate
civil action for violations of said law is prohibited. Article 33
may be availed of in estafa, but not in this case.
Doctrine: The criminal action for violation of BP 22 is
deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil
action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately
is allowed or recognized.
Dulay's wife was dismissed on the ground that the liability
Notes: It appears that the rule-making powers of the SC
here limited the remedies that may be availed of under the
Civil Code, to enforce civil liability.
independently of the criminal proceeding.
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Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola, 1965 — A truck, owned by Pepsi,
collided with the private vehicle, driven by Capuno, who,
together with his 2 passengers, died. The truck driver was
charged with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
An action for damages was also filed, but the SC held that
such claim, based on Article 33, has already prescribed,
Doctrine: The term "physical injuries" in Article 33
includes bodily injuries causing death.
Corpus v. Paje, 1969 — An accident between a Victory
Liner bus, driven by Paje, and a jeepney, driven by Marcia.
Marcia died and 2 other persons were injured. Paje was
charged with homicide and double serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence. The right to institute a
the trial court, he appealed to the CA. Meanwhile, the
action for damages was filed. The CA then acquitted Paje,
with the finding that the reckless imprudence charged
against him did not exist, as collision was pure accident. He
moved to dismiss the action for damages, citing his
acquittal. The SC held that the acquittal barred the action.
Doctrine: Criminal negligence or reckless imprudence is
not one of the crimes mentioned in Article 33, which
authorizes the institution of an independent civil action,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal case and
shall be proved by preponderance of evidence.
Bonite v. Zosa, 1988 — Bonite was hit by a truck. His
reckless imprudence. It was dismissed, on the ground that
guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. The heirs
then filed a case for damages. The SC held that the filing of
the case was proper, under Article 29 and 2176. Article 33
was not applicable, since criminal negligence is not among
the crimes stated therein.
physical injuries intentionally committed, not through
criminal negligence.
Jervoso v. People, 1983 — Jervoso was convicted of
homicide. He was also adjudged to indemnify the family of
the deceased, despite the fact that there was a reservation to
file a separate civil action. The SC held that, since there was
a reservation, the award of damages was erroneous.
Doctrine: The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 is used
in a generic sense.  It includes consummated, frustrated, or
attempted homicide.
Dulay v. CA, 1995 — Torzuela, a security guard of
Safeguard shot Dulay to death, using his service gun. A case
for homicide was filed. The separate action for damages by
sought to be enforced arose from a crime. The SC ruled that
the action was based on Articles 2176 and 33. It may proceed
B2015 Review Operations TORT & QUASI-DELICT
Doctrine: The term "physical injuries" under Article 33
includes bodily injuries causing death. It is not the crime of
physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It
includes not only physical injuries but also consummated,
frustrated, and attempted homicide. Prior conviction is
unnecessary, since the civil action can proceed
independently of the criminal action.
NEGLECT OF DUTY
Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal police
force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any
person in case of danger to life or property, such peace
officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or
municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The
civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any
criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence
shall suffice to support such action.
CATCH-ALL INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION
Article 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a
criminal offense, charges another with the same, for which
no independent civil action is granted in this Code or any
special law, but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable
grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, or the
prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal
proceedings, the complainant may bring a civil action for
damages against the alleged offender. Such civil action may
be supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the
defendant's motion, the court may require the plaintiff to
file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the
complaint should be found to be malicious.
Doctrine: Article 19, known to contain what is commonly
If during the pendency of the civil action, an information
should be presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil
action shall be suspended until the termination of the
criminal proceedings.
These standards are the following: to act with justice, to
Human Relations Torts
ABUSE OF RIGHTS
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Velayo v. Shell Company, 1956 — Shell Philippines was
among the creditors of the Commercial Airlines (CALI),
who was about to file for insolvency. To avoid such
insolvency proceedings, CALI met its creditors to discuss
liquidation. Fitzgerald represented Shell, and was made a
member of the committee to supervise the liquidation.
However, upon knowledge that a plane of CALI was in the
US, Shell assigned its rights to Shell America, allowing it to
attach said plane. The insolvency proceeding was then
instituted. The administrator of CALI's assets filed a case
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for damages against Shell Philippines. The SC awarded
damages based on Article 19, as implemented by Article 21.
Doctrine: It may be said that Article 19 only contains
declarations of principles. While such statement may be is
essentially correct, it is implemented by Article 21. With this
rule, the legislator vouchsafed adequate legal remedy for
untold numbers of moral wrong, impossible for human
foresight to provide for specifically in statutes.
Notes: Based on this case, an action based solely on Article
19 cannot prosper, since it is not self-executory.
Globe Mackay v. CA, 1989 — Tobias was accused of his
boss, Globe Mackay General Manager Hendry of being
privy to various fictitious purchases and fraudulent
transactions in the company. He was forced to take a leave.
The police investigators, however, cleared him from
liability. Despite this, Globe Mackay lodged 6 criminal
complaints against him. Finding himself with no work,
Tobias sought employment at another company. Hendry, at
his own behest, wrote that company stating that Tobias was
dismissed for dishonesty. The SC ruled that imputation of
guilt without basis, the pattern of harassment during the
investigations, the writing of letter to a prospective
employer, and the filing of the criminal complaints,
transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 in relation to Article 21. The right of the employer
to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the
manner in which the right is exercised and the effects
flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then
the employer is liable for damages.
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise
of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties.
give everyone his due, and to observe honesty and good
faith. However, while it lays down a rule of conduct, it does
not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action
for damages under either Articles 20 or 21 would be proper.
Notes: There is no rigid test in determining whether there
is an abuse of right. The specific circumstances of each case
is considered.
Albenson v. CA, 1993 — Albenson Enterprises delivered
mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries. Checks were
issued as payment. They were dishonored. Albenson traced
the origin of the check to one Eugenio S. Baltao. Thus,
Albenson demanded from him, but he denied. A complaint
for violation of BP 22 was filed but was dismissed. It was
found out that the person who issued the checks was his
son, with the same name. Baltao then filed for damages for
malicious prosecution, but the SC found that there was no
abuse of right, since Albenson only filed the complaint after
it made inquiries. Baltao did not inform Albenson that the
checks were issued by his son. He instead waited in
ambush to sue for damages.
B2015 Review Operations TORT & QUASI-DELICT
Doctrine: The elements of an abuse of right under Article
19 are: (1) there is a legal right or duty, (2) which is
exercised in bad faith, (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing
or injuring another. Article 19 and 21 requires that the act be
intentional. There is no hard and fast rule which can be
applied to determine whether or not the principle of abuse
of rights may be invoked. Whether or not the principle of
abuse of rights has been violated depends on the
circumstances of each case.
is always presumed, held that bad faith was not proven.
Notes: Elements (2) and (3) are quite the same. Also, the
requirement of that prejudicing or injuring another be the
sole intent is problematic. As long as one can point to
another motivation, the requisite is no longer present.
Amonoy v. Gutierrez, 2001 — A mortgage over lots was
executed to secure the payment of Amonoy, as counsel for
the heirs of Cantolos. Since the settlement of the estate took
too long, however, Amonoy filed for the judicial foreclosure
of the mortgage. The heirs opposed, so they were ordered to
pay, or else the lots will be auctioned. They failed to pay
and the the mortgage was foreclosed. Amonoy caused the
demolition of the structures in the lots, despite a TRO
issued by the SC. When the heirs sought to annul the
foreclosure, the SC found that Amonoy, by proceeding with
the demolition despite the TRO, abused his rights. Worse, it
was an invalid exercise of a suspended right.
Light still filed a complaint for theft against Diaz, but was
Doctrine: The exercise of a right ends when the right
disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially
to the prejudice of others. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible.
UE v. Jader, 2000 — Jader was a law student at the
University of the East. He took a removal examination for
one subject, but the grade was released late. In the
meantime, he was allowed to graduate. He was reviewing
for the bar examination when he learned that he failed the
removal exam. On suit for damages, the SC held that UE is
under a contractual obligation to promptly inform the
student of his status in the school and the remedies he may
avail of. Failure to do so constituted bad faith, which makes
it liable for damages under Article 19, more so since Jader
was allowed to graduate and after he had prepared to the
bar examinations.
their tour group had to leave for Amsterdam. The
Doctrine: Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of
torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to provide specifically in statutory law. In civilized
society, men must be able to assume that others will do
them no intended injury – that others will commit no
internal aggressions upon them, that their fellowmen, when
they act affirmatively will do so with due care which the
ordinary understanding and moral sense of the community
exacts and that those with whom they deal in the general
course of society will act in good faith.
invoking Article 21, is not settled.
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Notes: If the elements stated in Albenson v. CA were
applied here, the action would have not prospered.
Barons Marketing v. CA, 1998 — Barons had an unpaid
account with Phelps. It requested to settle the amount
through payment by installments, but instead Phelps filed a
collection suit. Barons now contends that Phelps abused its
right to collect payment, but the SC, holding that good faith
Also, it found that Phelps was driven by legitimate reasons
in rejecting the offer. It held that the case is a mere exercise
of rights, not an abuse thereof.
Doctrine: To constitute an abuse of rights under Article 19,
the defendant must have acted with bad faith or intent to
prejudice the plaintiff. In practice, courts, in the sound
exercise of their discretion, will have to determine all the
facts and circumstances when the exercise of a right is
unjust, or when there has been an abuse of right.
Notes: This case is different from Velayo v. Shell since there
was no prior understanding that no suit will be filed.
Diaz v. Davao Light, 2007 — A dispute regarding
electrical connection, where Diaz unilaterally installed a
meter and Davao Light caused its disconnection, was
settled by a compromise agreement. In any case, Davao
dismissed for lack of probable cause. When Diaz claimed
for damages, the SC held that the case was of a damnum
absque injuria, since it was his acts which resulted to the
filing of the complaint, and that the sole intent to prejudice
was not proven in evidence.
Doctrine: The elements of abuse of rights are the
following: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty, (b)
which is exercised in bad faith, and (c) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another. Good faith refers to the
state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the
individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain
from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous
advantage of another. It is presumed and he who alleges
bad faith has the duty to prove the same.
Pantaleon v. American Express, 2009 — While on a
European tour, Pantaleon and his family attempted to
purchase diamond pieces at Coster Diamond House using
their American Express. This they did 10 minutes before
purchases were approved by American Express only after
45 minutes. The trip to Amsterdam had to be cancelled. The
tour group became annoyed and irritated with them. Upon
his complaint, the SC ruled that American Express had not
duty to act upon the purchases within a specific period of
time. As such, there was not breach of duty. Also, it had the
right to review and either approve or disapprove of the
purchases. While it is bound by the principle of abuse of
rights, no bad faith was shown on its part.
Notes: Whether or not Article 19 can stand alone, without
B2015 Review Operations TORT & QUASI-DELICT
ILLEGAL ACTS
the origin of the check to one Eugenio S. Baltao. Thus,
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the
latter for the damage.
Article 20 does not distinguish. The act may be done
either willfully or negligently. [Albenson v. CA, 1993]
Garcia v. Salvador, 2007 — Salvador, who was then a
trainee, was required by her employer to undergo medical
tests as a prerequisite for regular employment. Garcia, a
medical technologist, conducted the test. The result showed
that she was positive for hepatitis. She did not qualify for
regularization. Subsequent tests, however, revealed that she
was negative for the disease. She was rehired. In her
complaint for damages, the SC awarded damages based on
Article 20, for the actionable conduct of Garcia. The testing
center was not supervised by a licensed physician, the test
was administered without supervision of a pathologist, and
the result was released directly to Salvador, without
authorization from a pathologist, all in violation of law
regulating clinical laboratories.
be based on Articles 19, 20, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, and 2219 (8).
Doctrine: Article 20 provides the legal basis for the award
of damages to a party who suffers damage whenever one
commits an act in violation of some legal provision. This
was incorporated by the Code Commission to provide relief
to a person who suffers damage because another has
violated some legal provision.
ACTS CONTRA BONUS MORES
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
Velayo v. Shell Company, 1956 — Shell Philippines was
among the creditors of the Commercial Airlines (CALI),
who was about to file for insolvency. To avoid such
insolvency proceedings, CALI met its creditors to discuss
liquidation. Fitzgerald represented Shell, and was made a
member of the committee to supervise the liquidation.
However, upon knowledge that a plane of CALI was in the
US, Shell assigned its rights to Shell America, allowing it to
attach said plane. The insolvency proceeding was then
instituted. The administrator of CALI's assets filed a case
for damages against Shell Philippines. The SC awarded
damages based on Article 19, as implemented by Article 21.
give rise to damages.
Doctrine: The legislators, in providing for Article 21,
vouchsafed adequate legal remedy for untold numbers of
moral wrongs, which is impossible for human foresight to
provide for specifically in the statutes, such that a wrong or
injury, contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy,
should be compensated by damages.
Albenson v. CA, 1993 — Albenson Enterprises delivered
mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries. Checks were
issued as payment. They were dishonored. Albenson traced
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Albenson demanded from him, but he denied. A complaint
for violation of BP 22 was filed but was dismissed. It was
found out that the person who issued the checks was his
son, with the same name. Baltao then filed for damages for
malicious prosecution, but the SC found that there was no
abuse of right, since Albenson only filed the complaint after
it made inquiries. Baltao did not inform Albenson that the
checks were issued by his son. He instead waited in
ambush to sue for damages.
Doctrine: Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, with
the following elements: (1) there is an act which is legal, (2)
but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order,
or public policy, (3) and it is done with intent to injure. The
act must be intentional. As for malicious prosecution, there
must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a
sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it
was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that
his charges were false and groundless. The mere act of
submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not
make one liable for malicious prosecution. The action may
Three (3) elements must be present in such cases: (1) the fact
of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant
was himself the prosecutor, and that the action was finally
terminated with an acquittal, (2) that in bringing the action,
the prosecutor acted without probable cause, (3) the
prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice.
Wassmer v. Velez, 1964 — Only 2 days before their
scheduled wedding, Velez left a note for Wassmer stating
that the wedding had to be postponed due to the
disapproval of his mother. The next day, he sent a telegram
stating that the wedding would push through. After such
telegram, however, he neither appeared nor was he heard
from again. In the suit for damages, the SC held that, while
a breach of promise to marry is not actionable, the case is
not of mere breach of promise to marry. To formally set a
wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity,
only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good
customs, for which Velez must be held answerable for
damages, under Article 21.
Doctrine: A breach of promise to marry is not actionable,
but the manner in which it is done (if contrary to law,
morals, good customs, or public policy, under NCC 21) may
Notes: What was probably considered in the case is not
the breach itself, but the manner by which it was done and
its effects.
Tanjanco v. CA, 1966 — Claiming that she consented to
his pleas for carnal knowledge in consideration of his
promise to marry, only to be broken, Santos sued Tanjanco
for damages. The SC found that there was no seduction in
the case, am essential feature in the illustration of Article 21,
by the Code Commission. It is the essence of the injury.
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Santos maintained intimate secual relations with Tanjanco
for a whole year, with repeated acts of intercourse. This is
incompatible with the idea of seduction.
only at this time when Que sent back the strollers. The case
Doctrine: The essential feature is seduction, that in law is
more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise
of marriage. It connotes essentially the idea of deceit,
enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the
part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded.
demand, and that the strollers were not returned
Notes: The decision seems to imply that the length of time
that the relationship has persisted is the factor considered in
determining whether there was seduction or not.
Baksh v. CA, 1993 — Baksh, an Iranian exchange medical
student, courted and promised to marry Gonzales, a
waitress. Baksh went with her to her hometown to ask for
the consent of her parents, who agreed. They then lived
together in his apartment. Marilou was a virgin before the
relationship. Baksh was able to deflower her. When Marilou
demanded marriage, Baksh claimed that he was already
married. She sued for damages under Article 21. The SC
held that, since Gonzales surrendered her virginity because
of moral seduction, Baksh is liable under Article 21.
Notes: The case illustrates the fact that probable cause in
Doctrine: Where a man's promise to marry is the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman
and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto
him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no
intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a
subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her
to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act,
could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21,
not because of such promise to marry but because of the
fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her
honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is
essential that such injury should have been committed in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
Pe v. Pe, 1962 — As an adopted son of Lolita's relative,
they grew close together, learning the rosary. They fell in
love. Lolita's parents forbade her from seeing Alfonso, but
the relationship continued. Soon after, Lolita disappeared.
Her parents and siblings sued Alfonso, who turned out to
be already married, based on Article 21. The SC found that
the circumstances cannot but show that he, through
ingenious scheme and trickery, seduced Lolita. He has
committed injury to the family in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs, and public policy.
prosper, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the fact of the
Doctrine:  The injury under Article 21, aside from that
sustained by the seduced person, also includes that upon
the reputation of the family. Also, the circumstances
surrounding the incident may be considered to determine
whether there was seduction.
the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice,
Notes:  The award of damages was made just because
Alfonso was married at the time.
Que v. IAC, 1989 — Nicolas ordered a stop payment for
the checks he gave to Que in payment of the canvass
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strollers delivered. He claimed that the goods were
defective. Que instituted a BP 22 case against him. It was
was dismissed by the city fiscal. Nicolas then filed for
damages arising from malicious prosecution. The SC ruled
that Que acted with probable cause, considering that the
checks were dishonored and were not funded despite
immediately. As such, Que had reason to believe that
Nicolas intended to deceive him from the start.
Doctrine: To constitute malicious prosecution, there must
be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister
design to vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated
deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges
were false and groundless.  The mere act of submitting a
case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one
liable for malicious prosecution. Also, dismissal of the
criminal complaint by the fiscal's office did not create a
cause of action because the proceedings therein did not
involve an exhaustive examination of the elements of
malicious prosecution.
criminal procedure is not the same as probable cause as an
element in malicious prosecution. Also, its existence is
determined not on the level of the prosecutor, but on the
part of the person, who instituted the case alleged to be
malicious.
Drilon v. CA, 1997 — Responding to a letter requesting
investigation of the failed coup attempt in December of
1989. The preliminary investigation led to the filing of an
information for rebellion with murder and frustrated
murder against, among others, Adaza. Upon such filing,
Adaza sued Drilon and the prosecutors for damages,
claiming that they were engaged in a deliberate, willful and
malicious experimentation by filing the charges, when they
were fully aware that there were no such crimes. The SC
held that the suit stated no cause of action, since the
criminal has not been terminated. Also, there was a finding
of probable cause, which also signifies the absence of
malice. As to the Hernandez ruling, ruling that rebellion
cannot be complexed, it was held that such doubtful
question of law may be the basis of good faith.
Doctrine: The statutory basis for a civil action for damages
for malicious prosecution are found in Articles 19, 20, 21, 26,
29, 32, 33, 35, 2217 and 2219(8). In order for such suit to
prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was
himself the prosecutor and that the action finally
terminated with an acquittal, (2) that in bringing the action,
the prosecutor acted without probable cause, and (3) that
that is by improper or sinister motive.
Magbanua v. Junsay, 2007 — Magbanua, a househelper,
was impleaded as an accused in a robbery case filed by her
employer, Junsay. When she was acquitted, she filed for
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damages against Junsay for malicious prosecution. The SC
held that there was probable cause in filing the criminal
complaint against her, as she admitted her participation.
That her admission was later declared inadmissible does
not detract from that fact. Also, there was no proof that the
filing of the complaint was impelled by legal malice.
relieved from duty to carry out the instructions of his
Doctrine:  Malicious prosecution is an action for damages
brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil
suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted
maliciously and without probable cause, after the
termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding
in favor of the defendant. Thus, for a malicious prosecution
suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove that: (1) the
prosecution did occur, and the defendant was himself the
prosecutor or that he instigated its commencement, (2) the
criminal action finally ended with an acquittal, (3) in
bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable
cause, and (4) the prosecution was impelled by legal malice,
an improper or a sinister motive. The gravamen of
malicious prosecution is not the filing of a complaint based
on the wrong provision of law, but the deliberate initiation
of an action with the knowledge that the charges were false
and groundless.
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity,
Notes:  The malicious prosecution includes civil and
administrative proceedings.
Grand Union Supermarket v. Espino, 1979 — Espino
forgot to pay for a cylindrical rattail. He offered to pay, but
he was instead paraded to the the back of the supermarket
to fill up an incident report. He was dubbed a shoplifter by
the guards. When he was about to pay for the rattail, his
money was taken, supposedly to be given to guards who
apprehend those who steal from the supermarket. Many
people witnessed the incident. In his complaint for damages
based on Article 21, the SC found that the manner in which
he was detained, interrogated, fined, and threatened, in the
presence of many people, rendered the supermarket liable
for damages under Articles 19 and 21. It was contrary to
morals, good customs, and public policy.
of Aramil, representing it as belonging to Arcadio. Aramil
Doctrine:  Everyone must respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and others
(Article 26). One must act with justice, give everyone his
due and observe honesty and good faith (Article 19).
Carpio v. Valmonte, 2004 — Valmonte was the
coordinator in the wedding. Carpio was an aunt of the
bride. She accused Valmonte of stealing her diamond
jewelry. She also caused the searching of her personal
belongings. Valmonte, when the police arrived, was bodily
searches, interrogated, and trailed. She filed for damages
against Carpio. The SC held that Carpio's accusation was
uncalled for and without proof, and by any standard of law,
impermissible and contrary to morals and good customs, in
violation of Article 19 in relation to Article 21.
Doctrine: Complementing Article 19, Articles 20 and 21
provide the legal bedrock for the award of damages to a
party who suffers damage whenever one commits an act in
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violation of some legal provision, or an act which though
not constituting a transgression of positive law, nevertheless
violates certain rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved.
Quisaba v. Sta. Ines, Inc., 1974 — When Quisaba was
employer, which he has refused to do previously since it is
beyond his tasks, he filed a complaint for illegal
termination. He did not pray for reinstatement or
backwages. A motion to dismiss was filed on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. The SC held that the case is intrinsically
concerned with a civil, not labor, dispute. It has to do with
an alleged violation of Quisaba's rights as a member of
society, and does not involve an existing employee-
employer relation, properly cognizable by regular courts.
Doctrine:  The right of an employer to dismiss an
employee should not be confused with the manner in which
the right was exercised and the effects flowing therefrom.
Dismissal, done anti-socially or oppressively, is in violation
of Article 1701 and Article 21.
VIOLATION OF HUMAN DIGNITY
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and
other persons. The following and similar acts, though they
may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause
of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family
relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his
friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another in account of his
religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical
defect, or other personal condition.
St. Louis Realty v. CA, 1984 — St. Louis Realty caused to
be published an advertisement which displayed the house
noticed the mistake. Accordingly, he wrote to St. Louis
telling them that he did not permit the publication of the
advertisement. Claiming that the advertisement not only
amounted to transgressions of his private property but also
damaging to his prestige in the medical profession, he sued
for damages based on Article 21, in relation to Article 2219.
The SC found that, because of the advertisement, Aramil's
private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed, and
he suffered diminution of income. It held that St. Louis was
grossly negligent.
Doctrine:  Prying into the privacy of another's residence,
meddling with or disturbing the private life or family
relations of another and similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, produces a cause of action for
damages, prevention and other relief.
Gregorio v. CA, 2009 — Sansio Philippines instituted a BP
22 case against Gregorio. A wrong address was stated in the
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complaint, such that Gregorio was not able to controvert the

allegations against her. She was arrested. It turned out,
however, that she did not issue the said checks. The
criminal case was dismissed. She sued for damages. Sansio
moved to dismiss, claiming that the case was for malicious
prosecution, and it does not allege bad faith. The SC held
that the basis for the action was Article 2176 in relation to
Article 26, and that no allegation of bad faith was necessary.
Doctrine: Article 26 grants a cause of action for damages,
prevention, and other relief in cases of breach, though not
necessarily constituting a criminal offense, of: (1) right to
personal dignity; (2) right to personal security; (3) right to
family relations; (4) right to social intercourse; (5) right to

privacy; and (6) right to peace of mind.

Guanio v. Makati Shangri-la, 2011 — Spouses Guanio
booked at the Shangri-la Hotel for their wedding reception.
However, at the reception, the catering director and the
sales manager did not show up, the service of dinner was
delayed, certain items in the published menu were
unavailable, the waiters were rude, among other
disappointments. When they sued for breach of contract,
the SC held that it was the Guanios who breached the
contract since they did not inform Shangri-la of the change
in expected number of guests. In any case, Shangri-la could
have done better. Nominal damages were thus awarded,
under considerations of equity.

Doctrine: Every person is entitled to respect of his dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind.
DERELICTION OF DUTY
Article 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss
because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects,
without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an
action for damages and other relief against the latter,
without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action

that may be taken.
UNFAIR COMPETITION
Article 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial
or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force,
intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust,
oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right

of action by the person who thereby suffers damage.







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Doctrine: The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses

Concept of Damages

IMPORTANCE AND DEFINITION
does not give rise to a right to recover damages.  To warrant
the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of
action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and
Damages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation, damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without
recompense, or satisfaction for an injury sustained, or as damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a
otherwise expressed, the pecuniary consequences which the cause of action, since damages are merely part of the
law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.
some right. [People v. Ballesteros, 1998]
There is a material distinction between damages and
injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage
Notes: There has to be damnum et injuria for recovery.

is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for
the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without
injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not
the result of a violation of a legal duty.  These situations are
often called damnum absque injuria. [Custodio v. CA, 1996]
In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the
injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such
LAW ON DAMAGES
Article 2195. The provisions of this Title shall be
respectively applicable to all obligations mentioned in
Article 1157.
Article 2198. The principles of the general law on
damages are hereby adopted insofar as they are not
inconsistent with this Code.

TYPES OF DAMAGES
injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant Article 2197. Damages may be:
owed to the plaintiff, a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff (1) Actual or compensatory;
and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The (2) Moral;
underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the (3) Nominal;
premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of (4) Temperate or moderate;
law.  Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and (5) Liquidated; or
the imposition of liability for that breach before damages
may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there (6) Exemplary or corrective.

should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered

some pain and suffering. [Ibid.]
WHEN ALLOWED
Actual or Compensatory Damages
Article 2195. The provisions of this Title shall be
respectively applicable to all obligations mentioned in
Article 1157.

DEFINITION/PURPOSE
Article 2196. The rules under this Title are without Articles 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation,
prejudice to special provisions on damages formulated one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
elsewhere in this Code. Compensation for workmen and pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
other employees in case of death, injury or illness is compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory
regulated by special laws. Rules governing damages laid
down in other laws shall be observe insofar as they are not
in conflict with this Code.

damages.

[A]ctual or compensatory damages are those damages

Article 2198. The principles of the general law on which the injured party is entitled to recover for the wrong
damages are hereby adopted insofar as they are not done and injuries received when none were intended. 

inconsistent with this Code.

Custodio v. CA, 1996 — The Custodios and the Santoses

Pertaining as they do to such injuries or losses that are
actually sustained and susceptible of measurement, they are
intended to put the injured party in the position in which he
fenced their properties, effectively closing the access of the
tenants of the Mabasas to the public highway. The Santoses
was before he was injured. [Oceaneering v. Barreto, 2011]

reasoned out that their daughter was dragged by a bicycle

driven by a son of one of the tenants and that their footwear
PROOF REQUIRED

were lost. Also, when the tenants were drunk, they bang the
doors and windows of the Santoses. In any case, upon the
application of the Mabasas, they were granted easement

Pleading and Proof of Actual Damage

Nature of Loss and Proof

and damages. The SC, however, deleted the award of Oceaneering v. Barreto, 2011 — Oceaneering Contractors
damages, ruling that there was no legal injury since the contracted with Barreto to use the latter's barge to transport
owners had the right to fence their properties, and the construction materials. The barge capsized, when the cargo
Mabasas had no right to the easement, prior to the grant. shifted to one side, breaking the barriers and creating holes

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through which water entered. When Barreto sued,
Oceaneering counterclaimed for the value of the cargo. The
SC only awarded a part, proven by vouchers and receipts.
Article 2204. In crimes, the damages to be adjudicated
Doctrine: Under Article 2199, there must be pleading and
proof of actual damages suffered for the same to be
recovered. In addition to the fact that the amount of loss
must be capable of proof, it must also be actually proven
with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof or the best evidence obtainable. The
burden of proof of the damage suffered is, consequently,
imposed on the party claiming the same. Corollary to the
principle that a claim for actual damages cannot be
predicated on flimsy, remote, speculative, and insubstantial
proof, courts are, likewise, required to state the factual
bases of the award.
when it bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the
LOSS COVERED
In General
Article 2200. Indemnification for damages shall
comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also
that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain.
PNOC Shipping v. CA, 1998 — A fishing vessel was hit by
a tanker. In the case for damages, for the value of the hull,
equipment, and cargo, as well as unrealized profits and lost
business opportunities, the owner of the fishing vessel
presented price quotations to prove the claim. The SC held
that, since the price quotations were ordinary private
writings, the persons who signed them should have been
presented as witnesses. Failing to do so, the quotations are
hearsay evidence. Nonetheless, nominal damages, in the
amount of P2M, should be awarded.
injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory
Doctrine: In actions based on torts or quasi-delicts, actual
damages include all the natural and probable consequences
of the act or omission complained of. There are two kinds of
actual or compensatory damages: one is the loss of what a
person already possesses (daño emergente), and the other is
the failure to receive as a benefit that which would have
pertained to him (lucro cesante).
In Contracts and Quasi-Contracts
Article 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the
damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is
liable shall be those that are the natural and probable
consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the
parties have foreseen or could have reasonable foreseen at
the time the obligation was constituted.
(80 - Age at the time of death), as adopted from the
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the
obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be
reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the
obligation.
In Crimes and Quasi-Delict
Article 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendants
shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and
probable consequences of the act or omission complained
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of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen
or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.
may be respectively increased or lessened according to the
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
Earning Capacity and Business Standing
Article 2205. Damages may be recovered:
(1) For loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of
temporary or permanent personal injury;
(2) For injury to the plaintiff's business standing or
commercial credit.
Gatchalian v. Delim, 1991 — Gatchalian boarded a bus,
road, went off the road, turned turtle, and fell into a ditch.
Among the passengers injured was Gatchalian, who filed
for damages based on breach of contract. She claimed that
the accident left her with a conspicuous white scar on her
forehead, causing her mental suffering and diminishing her
facial beauty, thereby depriving her of employment
opportunities. She was supposed to meet a district schools
supervisor at that time. The SC held that the claim for
unrealized revenue cannot be sustained, since she was not
assured of the job as substitute teacher at that time. She
was, however, awarded actual damages of P15,000 for
plastic surgery.
Doctrine: Damages cannot be awarded on the basis of
conjecture. To claim for loss of employment, such
employment must not be episodic and contingent. Also,
person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her
body; if that integrity is violated or diminished, actual
damages are due and assessable.
Candano Shipping v. Sugata-on, 2007 — Sugata-on went
missing when the vessel in which he worked sank. His wife
sought indemnity for his death, based on Article 1171. The
SC, instead of using the principles in the Labor Code, ruled
that the remedy under Article 1171 is distinct from those
under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and that the
remedies are damages provided in the Civil Code. It ruled
that only actual damages (unearned income) are warranted
since the death was due to fortuitous event.
Doctrine: The formula is: Net Earning Capacity = Life
Expectancy x (Gross Annual Income - Reasonable and
Necessary Living Expenses), where Life Expectancy = 2/3 x
American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial of
Combined Experience Table of Mortality. The Net Earnings is
that which he would have used to support his dependents.
The Expenses is computed at 50% of the Income, absent
proof that it constituted a smaller percentage.
Death by Crime or Quasi-Delict
Article 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by
a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least Three thousand
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pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. These awards are mandatory without need
circumstances. In addition: of allegation and evidence other than the death of the
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the
earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall
be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in

victim owing to the fact of the commission of the crime.

Philippine Hawk v. Lee, 2010 — A motorcycle driven by

every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the Tan, with his wife, when it was hit by a bus, killing Tan. In
deceased on account of permanent physical disability not the complaint based on quasi-delict, the wife alleged that her
caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the husband made P1M operating a gasoline station, and
time of his death; P36,000 a year, for their copra business. The SC, based on
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according the Certificate of Creditable Income Tax, showing that Tan
to the provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is not an had earned a gross income of P950,988 for 1990, for the
heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate gasoline station, determined that his net earning capacity
or intestate succession, may demand support from the was P1M. To determine his net earnings, 80% was deducted
person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five from the income, as expenses for operation of the business.
years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court; Then, 50% of the remaining income was deducted as his
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants reasonable expenses. Civil indemnity of P50,000 was also
and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral awarded, based on Article 2206.
damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the Doctrine: The indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the

deceased.

People v. Buban, 2007 — Buban shot Imperial to death in

the latter's hut. He was found guilty for murder, qualified
by treachery. In view of RA 9346, however, the death
penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua. Civil indemnity
of P75,000 and moral damages of P50,000, for the violent
death, were awarded.
self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage
Doctrine: Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the
heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the
deceased is provided for by Article 2206. Compensation of
this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings, but for loss
of capacity to earn money. As a rule, documentary evidence
should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages
for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages
for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the
absence of documentary evidence when: (1) the deceased is
under current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may
be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work no

commission of the crime. documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is
employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the
People v. Apacible, 2010 — Arman killed Arnold, while
the latter was sleeping, with his 8-month old child at his
side. He was convicted of murder, with the penalty of

minimum wage under current labor laws.

In Rape Cases
reclusion perpetua. A civil indemnity of P50,000 was People v. Astrologo, 2007 — Astrologo raped her
awarded. On appeal, it was increased to P75,000. The SC daughter. He was convicted as such for simple rape,
reduced it to P50,000. sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay P75,000
Doctrine: The award of P75,000 as civil indemnity lies (civil indemnity) and P75,000 (moral damages). The SC
only in cases where the proper imposable penalty is death. reduced both to P50,000, since the crime was simple rape. It
Notes: While reclusion perpetua was imposed in People v. awarded P25,000 as exemplary damages, to deter fathers
Buban, the proper imposable penalty is death, had it not from sexually abusing their own daughters.
been for the prohibition for its imposition. In this case, the Doctrine: Civil indemnity, which is actually in the nature
penalty was reclusion perpetua all the way. As such, it may be of actual or compensatory damages, is mandatory upon the
inferred that even if reclusion perpetua was imposed, when finding of the fact of rape. The case law also requires
the proper imposable penalty is death, the indemnity is automatic award of moral damages to a rape victim without

P75,000. If not, then P50,000. need of proof because from the nature of the crime, it can be
assumed that she has suffered moral injuries entitling her to
Crisostomo v. People, 2010 — A cashier was shot to death
by armed men, when they robbed money from a gasoline
station. Three armed arrived at a gasoline station in on

such award, separate and distinct from civil indemnity.

board a motorcycle in San Miguel, Bulacan. Two went to the
cashier. One of the armed men was convicted of robbery
with homicide, with a penalty of reclusion perpetua, a civil
indemnity of P75,000. The civil indemnity was reduced by
the SC to P50,000 but added P50,000 as moral damages.
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled
Doctrine: In robbery with homicide, civil indemnity and
moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 each is granted
automatically in the absence of any qualifying aggravating
ATTORNEY'S FEES
Article 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot
be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages may be awarded;
the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his interest;

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(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the property. The Brioneses were ordered to pay, among others,
plaintiff; attorney's fees. The SC held that attorney's fees cannot be
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceed- awarded, since they were not specifically prayed for. It held
ing against the plaintiff; that a general prayer for other reliefs is insufficient.
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad Doctrine: Attorney's fees and expenses of litigation are
faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just recoverable only in the concept of actual damages, not as
and demandable claim; moral damages nor judicial costs, and must be specifically
(6) In actions for legal support; prayed for. They are not to be awarded every time a party
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney's fees
helpers, laborers and skilled workers; under Article 2208 demands factual, legal, and equitable
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensa- justification; its basis cannot be left to speculation or
tion and employer's liability laws; conjecture. Where granted, the court must explicitly state in
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability aris- the body of the decision, and not only in the dispositive
ing from crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and

portion thereof, the legal reason for the award.

Bank of America v. Phil. Racing Club, 2009 — PRCI's

equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation signatories in its bank account pre-signed checks, since they
should be recovered. were going out of the country. However, the checks, while
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation irregular, were encashed by a John Doe. PRCI sued for the

must be reasonable.

Quirante v. IAC, 1989 — Quirante, lawyer for the now

deceased Casasola, filed a motion for confirmation of his
attorney's fees, claiming that they agreed, as confirmed by
the heirs, that he will receive P30,000 and half of what will
be collected. The heirs opposed. The SC held that the claim
is premature, since litigation is still pending. It also held
that the attorney's fees claimed are not the same as that in
Article 2208.
fees may not be awarded unless there is sufficient showing
Doctrine: The claim for attorney's fees may be asserted
either in the very action in which the services in question
have been rendered, or in a separate action. Attorney's fees
amount of the checks. The SC held that the irregularities on
the face of the checks should have prompted the bank to
inquire. It distributed the actual damages. It did not grant
attorney's fees either.
Doctrine: Article 2208 requires factual, legal, and equitable
justification for the award. An adverse decision does not
automatically justify an award of attorney's fees to the
winning party. Even when a claimant is compelled to
litigate or to incur expenses to protect his rights, attorney's
of bad faith.

Andrada v. Pilhino Sales Corp., 2011 — Instead of

under Article 2208 is an award in favor of the litigant, not of pursuing the counter-attachment bond, Pilhino opted for a
his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the writ of execution over the trucks of the Andradas. It turned
judgment creditor who may enforce the judgment for out, however, that the cars were already sold to Moises

attorney's fees by execution.

Meralco v. Ramoy, 2008 — The electrical connection of

Andrada. Pilhino sued to annul the sale. Moises filed a
counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees, arguing that
the sale was valid, since it was already released from the
Ramoy, et al., were disconnected, allegedly because they attachment when it was made. The SC held that Pilhino
were illegally occupying the property of NPC. It turned out acted in bad faith in suing him. The claim for attorney's fees
however that they were outside said property. In the case under Article 2208(4), claiming that the civil case filed was
for damages and attorney's fees, the SC held that, while clearly unfounded, is not meritorious, since bad faith was
Meralco failed to exercise the required diligence, it cannot not shown.
be considered as having acted in bad faith. Thus, exemplary Doctrine: Award of attorney's fees is the exception rather
damages cannot be awarded. As such, attorney's fees than the rule. The power of a court to award attorney's fees
cannot also be awarded, under Article 2208. under Article 2208 demands factual, legal, and equitable
Doctrine: In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees justification; its basis cannot be left to speculation and
cannot be recovered except in cases under Article 2208. conjecture. The general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be
Notes: From the way it was stated, it seems that an award recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no
of exemplary damages is required in every case for premium should be placed on the right to litigate.

attorney's fees to be awarded. Notes: The decision required bad faith for Article 2208(4)
to apply. Whether the same bad faith is required in other
Briones v. Macabagdal, 2010 — The Brioneses, after
obtaining the necessary building permit and the approval of
Vergon, from which they bought their lot, constructed their

items in the provision is not settled.

INTEREST
house. It turned out that the lot they built on was that Article 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a
bought by the Macabagdals, who then sued to recover the sum of money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the

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indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the
contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon,
and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is
six per cent per annum.
Article 2210. Interest may, in the discretion of the court, be
allowed upon damages awarded for breach of contract.
that the latter may decide, within 6 months, whether she
Article 2211. In crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as a part
of the damages may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the
discretion of the court.
loan, which will not bear interest for the first 6 months, but
Article 2212. Interest due shall earn legal interest from the
time it is judicially demanded, although the obligation may
be silent on this point.
that the compounded interest should only be for the second
Article 2213. Interest cannot be recovered upon
unliquidated claims and damages, except when the
demand can be established with reasonable certainty.
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law,
contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is
breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages.
The provisions under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil
Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable
damages.
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the
concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of
interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as
follows:
be returned. Soriamont also failed to pay the rentals. Sprint
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the
payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of
money, the interest due should be that which may have
been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due
shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially
demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest
shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e.,
from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to
the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or
forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the
amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the
discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No
interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims
or damages except when or until the demand can be
established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where
the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the
interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made
judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when
such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the
time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run
only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at
which time the quantification of damages may be deemed
to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for
the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the
amount finally adjudged.
laborers ac compensation. When the loan matured,
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of
money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal
interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such
finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being
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deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of
credit. [Eastern Shipping Lines v. CA, 1994]
Frias v. San Diego-Sison, 2007 — Frias and Sandiego-
Sison entered into a MOA over a house and lot, providing
would buy the property or not. Should she decide not to
buy, the payment, amounting to P3M, will be considered a
a compounded interest will be imposed for the next 6
months. San Diego-Sison decided not to buy. Frias claimed
six months, and not beyond. The SC ruled otherwise. It said
that the stipulation was made with the reasonable
expectation that the amount would be paid within 6
months. Failing to pay within said period, the interest rate
should continue until actual payment. Otherwise, it would
constitute unjust enrichment.
Doctrine: The payment of interest constitutes the price of
the use of money and thus, until the principal sum due is
returned to the creditor, regular interest continues to accrue
since the debtor continues to use such principal amount.
Soriamont v. Sprint, 2009 — Sprint leased 2 chassis units
to Soriamont. They were withdrawn from Sprint, never to
thus sued for collection. The SC imposed a 6% interest on
the rentals and the interest charges, since it does not
constitute a loan or forbearance of credit, to be increased to
12% after the decision has become final, at which time the
award is equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
Doctrine: Under Article 2209, when an obligation not
constituting a loan or forbearance of money is breached,
then an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be
annum. The interim period from the finality of the
judgment awarding a monetary claim until payment thereof
is deemed to be equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
Notes: Interest is paid in the concept of damages when (1)
the obligation is payment of a sum of money, (2) the debtor
is in delay, and (3) there is no contrary stipulation. The
interest rate that applies in that agreed upon by the parties.
Otherwise, the legal rate of 6% applies.
Pan Pacific v. Equitable, 2010 — Equitable engaged the
services of Pan Pacific for air conditioning works. An
escalation clause was stipulated in the contract. Eventually,
Pan Pacific faced financial difficulties in meeting the
increased prices of labor and inputs for the project. This is
in part by the failure of Equitable to pay on time. Equitable
extended a loan to Pan Pacific, but given directly to the
Equitable asked that it be offset with its contractual
obligations. Pan Pacific asked for rescission of the loan and
demanded payment from Equitable. The SC ruled that
Equitable should pay, and the interest rate should be that
stipulated in the promissory notes, that is, 18%.
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Doctrine: Under Article 2209, the appropriate measure for
damages in case of delay in discharging an obligation
consisting of the payment of a sum of money is the
payment of penalty interest at the rate agreed upon in the
contract of the parties. In the absence of a stipulation of a
particular rate of penalty interest, payment of additional
interest at a rate equal to the regular monetary interest
becomes due and payable. Finally, if no regular interest had
been agreed upon by the contracting parties, then the
damages payable will consist of payment of legal interest
which is 6%, or in the case of loans or forbearances of
money, 12% per annum. It is only when the parties to a
contract have failed to fix the rate of interest or when such
amount is unwarranted that the Court will apply the 12%
In the case of moral damages, recovery is more an
exception rather than the rule. Moral damages are not
punitive in nature but are designed to compensate and
alleviate the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar harm unjustly
caused to a person. In order that an award of moral
damages can be aptly justified, the claimant must be able to
satisfactorily prove that he has suffered such damages and
that the injury causing it has sprung from any of the cases
listed in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code. Then, too,
the damages must be shown to be the proximate result of a
wrongful act or omission. [BF Metal v. Lomotan, 2008]
Moral damages are not punitive in nature but are

interest per annum on a loan or forbearance of money.

DUTY TO MINIMIZE
Article 2203. The party suffering loss or injury must
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to
minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in
designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused to a
person. Although incapable of pecuniary computation,
moral damages, nevertheless, must somehow be

question.

MITIGATION OF DAMAGES
proportional to and in approximation of the suffering

inflicted. [Expertravel v. CA, 1999]

Article 2214. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence Kierulf v. CA, 1997 — A Pantranco bus bumped an Isuzu
of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may pickup, leaving the pick-up driver and its passenger,
recover. Kierulf, injured. In the suit for damages, the Kierulf spouses
Article 2215. In contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi- asked for moral damages on the ground of loss of conjugal
delicts, the court may equitably mitigate the damages under fellowship and impairment of sexual life, due to the
circumstances other than the case referred to in the disfigurement of Kierulf. The SC, however, found that
preceding article, as in the following instances: Kierulf's husband did not testify as to the claimed effect on
(1) That the plaintiff himself has contravened the terms of their marital consortium. As such, moral damages cannot be
the contract; awarded. Also, the social and financial standing of Kierulf
(2) That the plaintiff derived some benefit as a result of cannot be considered since prior to the accident, she was
the contract; not subjected to any contemptuous conduct, despite
(3) In cases where exemplary damages are to be awarded, knowledge of her standing on the part of the offender. For
that the defendant acted upon the advice of counsel; her physical sufferings, mental anguish, fright, serious
(4) That the loss would have resulted in any event; anxiety and wounded feelings, however, award of moral
(5) That since the filing of the action, the defendant has damages, in the amount of P400,000, is proper.

done his best to lessen the plaintiff's loss or injury. Doctrine: Moral damages are awarded to enable the
injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements

that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has

undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action. Its
Moral Damages award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the
spiritual status quo ante.

PURPOSE
Notes: The decision implies that moral damages may be
recovered for loss of marital consortium, provided that
proof is presented. As to what sort of proof must be
Moral damages are in the category of an award designed
to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and
not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. The award is not

presented is questionable.

Sulpicio Lines v. Curso, 2010 — The siblings of a

meant to enrich the complainant at the expense of the
defendant, but to enable the injured party to obtain means,
diversion, or amusements that will serve to obviate the
moral suffering he has undergone.  It is aimed at the
restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual
status quo ante, and should be proportionate to the suffering
inflicted. [ABS-CBN v. CA, 1999]
death of the deceased.
physician who boarded a vessel, which eventually sank,
claimed for compensatory and moral damages. The SC held
that, as a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in
breach of contract, unless there is fraud or bad faith, and
that Article 2206(3) did not mention brothers and sisters as
among those who recover moral damages by reason of the

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Doctrine: The purpose of moral damages is indemnity or Doctrine: Proof of mental anguish or emotional distress is
reparation, to enable the injured party to obtain the means,
diversions, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the
moral suffering he has undergone by reason of the tragic

required for recovery of moral damages.

Arcona v. CA, 2002 — Arcona was charged for killing

event. The conditions for such award are: (1) a clearly
substantiated injury, whether physical, mental, or
psychological, (2) a factually established culpable act or
omission, and (3) such wrongful act or omission is the
proximate cause of the injury sustained, and (4) the award
Ong, through stabbing, and slight physical injuries for
beating Talanquines with a bamboo. He was convicted of
the first, and was ordered to pay moral damages amounting
to P10,000. The SC increased it to P50,000.
Doctrine: Violent death invariably and necessarily brings

is based on Article 2219. about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the
victim’s family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow,

WHEN RECOVERABLE

Moral Suffering as Proximate Result

Article 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered
if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful
torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the
victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or
brutal killing not only steals from the family of the deceased
his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection
and support, but often leaves them with the gnawing
feeling that an injustice has been done to them. For this
reason, moral damages must be awarded even in the
absence of any allegation and proof of emotional suffering.

act or omission.

Specific Cases
Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries
In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict, (a) when an act or
omission causes physical injuries, or (b) where the
Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the defendant is guilty of intentional tort, moral damages may
following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

aptly be recovered. [BF Metal v. Lomotan]

Rape
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts; People v. Lizano, 2007 — The victim, 11, was raped by
(4) Adultery or concubinage; her uncle on 3 occasions. He was convicted for one count. A
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; civil indemnity and moral damages, P50,000 each, was
(6) Illegal search; awarded.
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; Doctrine: Civil indemnity is automatically imposed,
(8) Malicious prosecution; without need of proof other than the fact of commission of
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309; the rape. The same is true with moral damages, since it is
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, assumed that a rape victim had suffered moral injuries
29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or
abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover

entitling her to such award.

Malicious prosecution
moral damages. Expertravel v. CA, 1999 — Expertravel sued Lo for
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brother and payment of plane tickets and damages. It turned out,
sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this however, that Lo already paid. Moral damages were
article, in the order named. awarded to Lo for P30,000. The SC deleted the award,
Article 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal stating that institution of a clearly unfounded civil suit may
ground for awarding moral damages if the court should justify award of attorney's fees, but has almost invariably
find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly been held not to be a ground for an award of moral
due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where damages. This is so as not to impose a penalty on the right

the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

Criminal offense resulting in physical injuries

People v. Pirame, 200 — Pirame and Teodorico were
convicted of murder, for striking Torrenueva in the
forehead with an iron pipe and piece of wood to his death.
There were sentenced to reclusion perpetua, with, among
others, P50,000 for both moral and exemplary damages. The
SC deleted this award, ruling that there was no basis for the
moral damages, since the widow did not testify on her
suffering meriting the award.
to litigate. Otherwise, moral damages must be awarded
every time to a prevailing defendant, who suffered the
same anguish as anyone who is haled in court.
Doctrine: The requisites for an award of moral damages
are thus: (1) an clearly sustained injury, whether physical,
mental or psychological, (2) a factually established culpable
act or omission, (3) the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained,
and (4) the award of damages is predicated on any of the
cases stated in Article 2219.

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Industrial Insurance v. Bondad, 2000 — A DM Transit bus
bumped the rear of a packed passenger jeepney. The
passengers were injured. The bus then swerved to the left
and collided with a car, driven by Grace Morales, who also
sustained injuries. The vehicles were damaged. Morales and
Industrial Insurance filed a complaint between the bus
driver and the jeepney driver. The SC held that the case
against the jeepney driver was filed recklessly and without
basis. Industrial Insurance acted in wanton disregard of
obvious facts. It was in bad faith, compelling the jeepney
driver to litigate. Moral damages are in order.
Doctrine: In any case, to sustain such award, it must be
shown that (1) the claimant suffered injury, and (2) such
injury sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219
and 2220. Bad faith or ill motive is necessary. Allegation of
mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social
humiliation, and the like as a result of the acts of the other
party is not enough. Also, the right to litigate must not be
penalized, but it must be exercised in good faith.
Doctrine: Moral damages cannot be granted to a
Notes: The requisite of bad faith was added to Article
2219(8), on malicious prosecution.
Willful injury to property
Regala v. Carin, 2011 — Carin sued Regala, claiming to
have suffered from the construction conducted by the latter
in his property. Earlier, Regala asked Carin's consent for
extending his residence. Regala, however, intended to build
a second floor to his house. Carin claimed that dust and dirt
from the construction fell on his property, and that the
laborers entered his property without his authority. The SC
did not award moral damages, since Carin failed to
establish that his injury was the proximate result of Regala's
act or omission, and that Regala was in the lawful exercise
of his property rights. He was in good faith.
moral damages, as it cannot experience physical suffering
Doctrine: Under Article 2220, the damage caused to the
property must have been inflicted maliciously or willfully,
for moral damages to be recovered.
Breach of contract in bad faith
Under the provisions of this law, in culpa contractual or
breach of contract, moral damages may be recovered when
the defendant acted in bad faith or was guilty of gross
negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton disregard
of his contractual obligation and, exceptionally, when the
act of breach of contract itself is constitutive of tort resulting
in physical injuries. By special rule in Article 1764, in
relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code, moral damages
may also be awarded in case the death of a passenger
results from a breach of carriage. [Expertravel v. CA, 1999]
Triple Eight v. NLRC, 1998 — Osdana was hired as waiter
in Saudi Arabia. When she got sick, she was not paid. Soon
after, she was not allowed to work. Her sickness persisted,
due to harsh working conditions. Then she was dismissed,
supposedly in the ground of illness, without separation pay
and salary for the period when she was not allowed to
DAMAGES Torts & Damages
work. In her complaint for monetary benefits and damages,
the SC awarded moral and exemplary damages of P30,000.
Doctrine: Moral damages are recoverable where the
dismissal was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted
an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.
Notes: The decision did not specify which acts were
attended with bad faith or fraud, so as to merit award of
moral damages.
Juridical Persons
ABS-CBN v. CA, 1999. — ABS-CBN, claiming that it had a
perfected contract for the airing rights of certain movies,
filed for specific performance, and obtained an injunction
for their showing by RBS. The SC ruled that there was no
perfected contract. The claim of RBS for moral damages,
however, cannot be granted, on the ground that it is a
juridical person.
corporation because, being an artificial person and having
existence only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no
emotions, no senses. It cannot experience physical suffering
and mental anguish, which can be experienced only by one
having a nervous system.
Republic v. Tuvera, 2007 — The PCGG filed a complaint
for restitution and damages against Marcos and the
Tuveras, alleging that Juan Tuvera, as the then Presidential
Executive Assistant, abused his position to obtain a logging
concession in favor of the company, the shares of which are
substantially owned by his son. The SC did not award
moral damages.
Doctrine: A juridical person is generally not entitled to
or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety,
mental anguish, or moral shock. Thus, under Article 2217,
they are not so entitled. They may, however, avail of moral
damages under the analogous cases listed in Article 2219.
Notes: It was stated that juridical persons may claim
under Article 2219(7), since it does not distinguish between
juridical and natural persons. However, all the items in the
provision do not make such distinction.
FACTORS CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING AMOUNT
The established guideline in awarding moral damages
takes into consideration several factors, some of which are
the social and financial standing of the injured parties and
their wounded moral feelings and personal pride. [Kierulf v.
CA, 1997]
The social and financial standing of a claimant of moral
damages may be considered in awarding moral damages
only if he or she was subjected to contemptuous conduct
despite the offender's knowledge of his or her social and
financial standing.[Ibid.]
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Lopez v. Pan American, 1966 — Due to the wrongful
cancellation of the reservations by an employee of Pan
American, Lopez, then senator, and his family were
constrained to take tourist accommodations in their flight to
San Francisco. The SC, in awarding moral damages,
considered the position of Lopez as senator and former
vice-president. He was awarded P100,000. His wife and his
daughter and son-in-law, were awarded P50,000, P25,000,
and P25,000, respectively, on the ground that they shared in
the the prestige, and, therefore, the humiliation, of Lopez.
therein. In any case, nominal and temperate damages may
Doctrine: Moral damages are recoverable in breach of
contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad
faith. In this case, the social humiliation, wounded feelings,
serious anxiety and mental anguish were proximate results
of the breach in bad faith. It may not be humiliating to
travel as tourist passengers, but it is humiliating to be
compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is rightfully
expected from contractual undertaking.
actual damages are not proven. Nominal damages are
Notes: Whether or not political should be considered is
problematic.
Valenzuela v. CA, 1996 — Valenzuela was driving her car
so early in the morning when she had a flat tire. She was
pointing at the tools to a man who volunteered to held her,
when she was hit by Li, assistant manager of Alexander
Commercial and drunk at that time. Valenzuela's leg had to
be amputated. In the suit to recover damages, the SC,
considering the nature of the damage and the
consequences, such that she would have to undergo
adjustment of her prosthetics, replacement, rehabilitation
and therapy, awarded P1M as moral damages.
Doctrine: While moral damages are not intended to enrich
the plaintiff at the expense of a defendant, the award should
nonetheless be commensurate to the suffering inflicted.
replacement. In the suit for breach of contract, the SC held
none in the case. Nonetheless, it awarded nominal damages
Nominal Damages
(P10,000), on the ground that making a lame excuse that the
NATURE AND PURPOSE
Article 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order
that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
Robes-Francisco Realty v. CFI, 1978 — Millan was able
to pay a lot she bought on installment. When she demanded
that the same be registered to her, she found out that it was
mortgaged to PNB. The SC, finding that Millan did not
present evidence of actual damage to her, awarded nominal
damages in the amount of P10,000, since the delay of Robes-
Francisco Realty, amounting to non-performance of the
obligation, is apparent.
disappointments. When they sued for breach of contract,
Doctrine: Nominal damages are not intended for
indemnification of loss suffered but for the vindication or
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recognition of a right violated and invaded. They are
recoverable where some injury has been done but the
amount was not proven. Its assessment is left to the
discretion of the court according to the circumstances.
Gonzales v. People, 2007 — Gonzales burned down the
building, where he was a tenant, with her aunt. He was
convicted of arson. The SC found that there was no proof
provided to show the value of the building or the properties
be awarded.
Doctrine: The assessment of nominal damages is left to
the discretion of the court according to the circumstances of
the case. Generally, they are small sums fixed by the court
without regard to the extent of the harm done. However, it
is also a substantial claim, if based on a violation of a legal
right. In such cases, the law presumes damage although
damages in name only and not in fact, and are allowed, not
as an equivalent of the wrong inflicted, but simply in
recognition of the existence of a technical injury.
Notes: The dispositive portion did not contain an award
for nominal damages.
WHEN AWARDED
Article 2222. The court may award nominal damages in
every obligation arising from any source of enumerated in
Article 1157, or in every case where any property right has
been invaded.
Francisco v. Ferrer, 2001 — The cake ordered for the
wedding did not arrive on time. It turned out that the order
slip was lost. A cake from the country club was bought as
that, since the action was based on contractual breach, fraud
or bad faith must be present. It then held that there was
cake was delayed, when there was none shows the
insensitivity, inadvertence, or inattention to a customer's
anxiety and need of the hour.
Doctrine: Nominal damages are recoverable where a legal
right is technically violated and must be vindicated against
an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any
kind or where there has been a breach of contract and no
substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been
or can be shown.
Guanio v. Makati Shangri-la, 2011 — Spouses Guanio
booked at the Shangri-la Hotel for their wedding reception.
However, at the reception, the catering director and the
sales manager did not show up, the service of dinner was
delayed, certain items in the published menu were
unavailable, the waiters were rude, among other
the SC held that it was the Guanios who breached the
contract since they did not inform Shangri-la of the change
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in expected number of guests. In any case, Shangri-la could pecuniary loss incurred and proved, up to the time of trial;
have done better. Nominal damages (P50,000) were thus and one which would meet pecuniary loss certain to be
awarded, under considerations of equity. suffered but which could not, from the nature of the case, be
Doctrine: Nominal damages may be awarded for the made with certainty. In other words, temperate damages
discomfiture the claimants were subjected to. Every person can and should be awarded on top of actual or
is entitled to respect of his dignity, personality, privacy and compensatory damages in instances where the injury is
peace of mind. chronic and continuing. And because of the unique nature
Notes: The case was not clear as to the basis of the award, of such cases, no incompatibility arises when both actual
whether it was equity, or Article 26. In any case, the amount and temperate damages are provided for. The reason is that

of nominal damages depends on the circumstances.

People v. Marquez, 2011 — Marquez was convicted of

these damages cover two distinct phases.
As it would not be equitable - and certainly not in the
best interests of the administration of justice - for the victim
kidnapping and failure to return a minor. She took in such cases to constantly come before the courts and
Merano's baby only to be returned 6 months after. The SC invoke their aid in seeking adjustments to the
awarded nominal damages to the mother, in recognition compensatory damages previously awarded - temperate
and vindication of her right as a parent, which was violated damages are appropriate. The amount given as temperate
and invaded. damages, though to a certain extent speculative, should
Doctrine: The violation of the right as a parent may be the take into account the cost of proper care. [Ramos v. CA, 1999]
basis of award of nominal damages. Temperate or moderate damages avail when the court
Notes: It appears the court does not require that a specific finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
right be violated for nominal damages to be awarded. Also, amount can not from the nature of the case, be proved with
the qualification in Pentosa v. CA, that nominal damages certainty. The textual language might betray an intent that
should be commensurate to the injuries sustained, is wrong, temperate damages do not avail when the case, by its
precisely because nominal damages are not intended to nature, is susceptible to proof of pecuniary loss xxx. Still,

indemnify for the injury caused.

EFFECT OF AWARD
jurisprudence applying Article 2224 is clear that temperate
damages may be awarded even in instances where
pecuniary loss could theoretically have been proved with
Article 2223. The adjudication of nominal damages shall
preclude further contest upon the right involved and all
accessory questions, as between the parties to the suit, or

certainty. [Republic v. Tuvera, 2007]

Pleno v. CA, 1988 — Pleno's delivery van was hit in the

their respective heirs and assigns. rear by a cargo truck, causing it to move faster, hitting a
truck parked on the shoulder of the highway. His legs were

crushed in the wreckage, and his head suffered extensive

injuries. He was awarded, among others, temperate
Temperate Damages
damages (P200,000). The SC upheld the award, in lieu of

WHEN RECOVERABLE
loss of earning capacity, since the income was not proven.
Doctrine: Temperate damages are included within the
context of compensatory damages, where, from the nature
Article 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be
more than nominal but less than compensatory damages,
may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary
loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the

offered, although the court is convinced that there is loss.

Tan v. OMC Carriers, 2011 — A truck with a trailer,

nature of the case, be provided with certainty. owned by OMC Carriers, suddenly lost its brakes. The
Article 2225. Temperate damages must be reasonable und- driver jumped out leaving it ramming into the house and

er the circumstances.

Our rules on actual or compensatory damages generally

assume that at the time of litigation, the injury suffered as a
consequence of an act of negligence has been completed
and that the cost can be liquidated. However, these
provisions neglect to take into account those situations, as
in this case, where the resulting injury might be continuing
and possible future complications directly arising from the
injury, while certain to occur, are difficult to predict.
Temperate damages may, however, be awarded. The
In these cases, the amount of damages which should be
awarded, if they are to adequately and correctly respond to
the injury caused, should be one which compensates for
tailoring shop of the Tans. The husband was instantly
killed. The trial court, applying res ipsa loquitur, held OMC
and the driver liable, awarding, inter alia, P355,895 as actual
damages and P500,000 as loss of earning capacity. The SC
held that the claim for actual damages, for the damage on
the house, tailoring shop, and equipment inside, cannot be
upheld, since there were not receipts submitted to proved
their monetary value. The same is true with loss of earning
capacity since documentary evidence were not presented.
photographs prove that there was loss, and the earning
capacity of the husband was never disputed. P200,000 and
P300,000, respectively, are proper.

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Doctrine: Absent competent proof on the actual damages
suffered, a party still has the option of claiming temperate
damages, where, from the nature of the case, definite proof
of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced, although the court is
convinced that there is pecuniary loss.
pursuant to Article 1229, as echoed in Article 2227.
FACTORS IN DETERMINING AMOUNT
Serrano v. People, 2010 — Galang was stabbed by
Giovanni in a rumble. Giovanni was convicted of frustrated
homicide, and ordered to pay P15,000 (medical expenses).
The SC convicted of attempted homicide. As to the civil
liability, the SC awarded P25,000 as temperate damages.
are iniquitous or unconscionable.
Doctrine: If the actual damages, proven by receipts during
the trial, amount to less than P25,000.00, the victim shall be
entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00,
in lieu of actual damages.  The award of temperate damages
is based on Article 2224, which states that temperate or
moderate damages may be recovered when the court finds
that some pecuniary loss was suffered but its amount
cannot be proven with certainty.
People v. Murcia, 2010 — Murcia burned down the
house, where he occupied one room. In the process, he
stabbed two women. One died in the fire. The other lived to
die another day. One of the cases filed was for destructive
arson, for which he was convicted and ordered to pay
P250,000 for the house, and P10,000 as actual damages and
P10,000 as temperate damages (both presumably for funeral
expenses). The SC held that the temperate damages should
be increased to P25,000, and the actual damages deleted, in
line with People v. Villanueva, that when the actual damages
proven by receipts are less than P25,000, temperate
damages of P25,000 should be awarded in its place. Also,
since the value of the house, was not proven, temperate
damages (P200,000) may be awarded.
Doctrine: Temperate damages, under Article 2224, may be
recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss
has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of
the case, be proven with certainty.
PURPOSE
Liquidated Damages
DEFINITION
Article 2226. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon
by the parties to a contract, to be paid in case of breach
thereof.
Pentacapital Investment v. Mahinay, 2010 — A suit for a
sum of money (P1.9M) was filed by Pentacapital Investment
against Mahinay. In the promissory notes, an interest rate of
25% on the principal obligation was imposed. Also, a
penalty charge of 3% per month (36% per annum) was
stipulated. The SC held that the 25% interest was excessive
and, thus, void. It was reduced to 12%. The SC also held
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that, while penal clauses are valid, the rate imposed here is
unconscionable. It was reduced to 12% per annum.
Doctrine: Courts are empowered to reduce such stipulated
damages if the same are iniquitous or unconscionable,
Notes: Regardless of how stipulated damages are called,
they are still liquidated damages.
DETERMINING AMOUNT
Article 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an
indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they
Article 2228. When the breach of the contract committed
by the defendant is not the one contemplated by the parties
in agreeing upon the liquidated damages, the law shall
determine the measure of damages, and not the stipulation.
Titan Construction v. Uni-Field, 2007 — When Titan
Construction failed to pay for the construction supplies in
bought on credit from Uni-Field, the latter sued for
collection with damages. The receipts of the transactions
provided that an interest rate of 24% on overdue accounts
will be imposed. Also, in case of suit, liquidated damages of
25% of the outstanding obligation, and 25% of the total
claim, among others, will be paid to Titan. The SC reduced
the attorney's fees to 25% of the principal obligation, as it is
exorbitant. Besides, it serves the same purpose as liquidated
damages, as penalty for breach of contract.
Doctrine: Articles 1229 and 2227 empower the courts to
reduce the penalty if it is iniquitous or unconscionable. The
determination of whether the penalty is iniquitous or
unconscionable is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court and depends on several factors such as the type,
extent, and purpose of the penalty, the nature of the
obligation, the mode of breach and its consequences.
Exemplary or Corrective Damages
Article 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are
imposed, by way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.
The imposition of exemplary damages is a means by
which the State, through its judicial arm, can send the clear
and unequivocal signal best expressed in the pithy but
immutable phrase, never again. [Republic v. Tuvera, 2007]
WHEN IMPOSED
In General
Article 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are
imposed, by way of example or correction for the public
B2015 Review Operations
good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.
tances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines
Article 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as
a matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they
should b e adjudicated.
Article 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages
need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is
entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages
before the court may consider the question whether or not
exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated
damages have been agreed upon, although no proof of loss
is necessary in order that such liquidated damages may be
recovered, nevertheless, before the court may consider the
question of granting exemplary damages in addition to the
liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he would
be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages
were it not for the stipulation for liquidated damages.
Doctrine: Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages,
Article 2235. A stipulation whereby exemplary damages
are renounced in advance shall be null and void.
Under Article 2234 of the Civil Code, a showing that the
plaintiff is entitled to temperate damages allows for the
award of exemplary damages. Even as exemplary damages
cannot be recovered as a matter of right, the courts are
empowered to decide whether or not they should be
adjudicated. Ill-gotten wealth cases are hornbook
demonstrations where damages by way of example or
correction for the public good should be awarded. [Republic
v. Tuvera, 2007]
PNB v. CA, 1996 — The payment for Tan's land, in an
expropriation proceeding, was paid by PNB to another
person. He demanded payment, but was refused. PNB was
ordered to pay the amount and P5,000 as exemplary
damages. The SC deleted the award for exemplary
damages, since there is no evidence that PNB acted in bad
faith, and there was no award of compensatory damages.
the rights of a private offended party that have become
Doctrine: The requirements for exemplary damages to be
awarded are: (1) they may be imposed by way of example
in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the
claimant’s right to them has been established, (2) they
cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination
depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that
may be awarded to the claimant, (3) the act must be
accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent,
oppressive or malevolent manner.
qualified rape, with death penalty, P50,000 as civil
Notes: Article 2229 mentions that exemplary damages may
be awarded in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, or
compensatory damages. The case only mentions
compensatory. Also, the requisite that the act must have
been in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent
manner is one for contracts and quasi-contracts, under
Article 2232.
In Crimes
Article 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a
part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime
DAMAGES Torts & Damages
was committed with one or more aggravating circums-
and shall be paid to the offended party.
People v. Dalisay, 2009 — The victim, 16 years old, was
raped by the live-in partner of her mother. The offender was
convicted of qualified rape, with reclusion perpetua, P50,000
as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages, and P25,000
as exemplary damages. The SC convicted of simple rape,
since minority and relationship were not alleged in the
information. While Article 2230, in relation to the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, does not allow exemplary
damages without the qualifying circumstance alleged in the
information, Article 2229 may be the basis of the award in
this case, so as not to defeat the policy of exemplary
damages. P30,000 is proper.
can be awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating
circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case
show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the
offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes
an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded,
Article 2229, lays down the very basis of the award.
People v. Diunsay-Jalandoni, 2007 — Jalandoni raped a
21-year old, with a mental age of a 4-year old. He was
convicted of qualified rape, with P50,000 as civil indemnity,
and P50,000 as moral damages. The SC convicted of simple
rape only, since knowledge of the mental disability of the
victim was not sufficiently alleged in the information,
which only indicated that the victim was a retardate. The
civil liability is still P50,000. While the crime was committed
before the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the SC
exemplary damages of P25,000 anyway.
Doctrine: However, the retroactive application of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure cannot adversely affect
vested where the offense was committed prior to the
effectivity of said rules.  Thus, aggravating circumstances
not alleged in the information but proved during the trial
may be appreciated for the limited purpose of determining
appellant's liability for exemplary damages.
People v. Dadulla, 2011 — A father raped his daughter
once, and tried to do so again. He was convicted of
indemnity and P20,000 as moral damages, and attempted
rape, with P20,000 as moral damages. The information did
not allege the qualifying circumstance, and crimes were
committed before the effectivity of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, but it was applied retroactively, since it
was favorable to the accused, by the SC, thereby convicting
of simple rape. Also, the attempted rape was reduced to
acts of lasciviousness. Failure to allege does not affect the
civil liability. Pursuant to Article 2230, exemplary damages
of P30,000 for rape and P10,000 for acts of lasciviousness
must be imposed.
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Doctrine: Although an aggravating circumstance not

specifically alleged in the information cannot be
appreciated to increase the criminal liability of the accused,
the established presence  of  one  or  two  aggravating 
circumstances  of  any kind or nature entitles the offended
party to exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the Civil
Code because the requirement of specificity in the
information affected only the criminal liability of the

accused, not his civil liability.

In Quasi-Delicts
Article 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be

granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.

In Contracts and Quasi-Contracts

Article 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court
may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner.

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