The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought to
RULE 72 appeal the trial courts order by filing a Notice of Appeal.[3]
[G.R. No. 163604. May 6, 2005]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS (Twentieth Division), HON.
PRESIDING JUDGE FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, RTC-BR.
35 and APOLINARIA MALINAO JOMOC, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
In In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee
Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc, Apolinaria Malinao Jomoc, petitioner, the
Ormoc City, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, by Order of September 29,
1999,[1] granted the petition on the basis of the Commissioners Report[2] and
accordingly declared the absentee spouse, who had left his petitioner-wife
nine years earlier, presumptively dead.
In granting the petition, the trial judge, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona,
cited Article 41, par. 2 of the Family Code. Said article provides that for the
purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage during the subsistence of
a previous marriage where the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years, the spouse present must institute summary
proceedings for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee spouse,
without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse.
By Order of November 22, 1999s,[4] the trial court, noting that no
record of appeal was filed and served as required by and pursuant to Sec.
2(a), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the present case
being a special proceeding, disapproved the Notice of Appeal.
The Republics Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts order
of disapproval having been denied by Order of January 13, 2000,[5] it
filed a Petition for Certiorari[6] before the Court of Appeals, it
contending that the declaration of presumptive death of a person under
Article 41 of the Family Code is not a special proceeding or a case of
multiple or separate appeals requiring a record on appeal.
By Decision of May 5, 2004,[7] the Court of Appeals denied the
Republics petition on procedural and substantive grounds in this wise:
At the outset, it must be stressed that the petition is not sufficient in form.
It failed to attach to its petition a certified true copy of the assailed Order
dated January 13, 2000 [denying its Motion for Reconsideration of the
November 22, 1999 Order disapproving its Notice of Appeal]. Moreover,
the petition questioned the [trial courts] Order dated August 15, 1999,
which declared Clemente Jomoc presumptively dead, likewise for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, yet, not even a copy could be found in the records. On this
score alone, the petition should have been dismissed outright in
accordance with Sec. 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.
However, despite the procedural lapses, the Court resolves to delve
deeper into the substantive issue of the validity/nullity of the assailed
order.
The principal issue in this case is whether a petition for declaration of Guidelines to Implement BP Blg. 129 and Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the
the presumptive death of a person is in the nature of a special Rules of Court . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
proceeding. If it is, the period to appeal is 30 days and the party appealing
must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial court a record on The Republic (petitioner) insists that the declaration of presumptive
appeal to perfect its appeal. Otherwise, if the petition is an ordinary action, death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not a special proceeding
the period to appeal is 15 days from notice or decision or final order involving multiple or separate appeals where a record on appeal shall be
appealed from and the appeal is perfected by filing a notice of appeal filed and served in like manner.
(Section 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court).
Petitioner cites Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court which
enumerates the cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed and a record
As defined in Section 3(a), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, a civil action is one
on appeal is required for an appeal to be perfected. The petition for the
by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse not being included
the prevention of redress of a wrong while a special proceeding under
in the enumeration, petitioner contends that a mere notice of appeal
Section 3(c) of the same rule is defined as a remedy by which a party seeks
suffices.
to establish a status, a right or a particular fact (Heirs of Yaptinchay, et al. v.
Del Rosario, et al., G.R. No. 124320, March 2, 1999). By Resolution of December 15, 2004,[8] this Court, noting that copy
of the September 27, 2004 Resolution[9] requiring respondent to file her
Considering the aforementioned distinction, this Court finds that the instant comment on the petition was returned unserved with postmasters
petition is in the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary notation Party refused, Resolved to consider that copy deemed served
action. The petition merely seeks for a declaration by the trial court of the upon her.
presumptive death of absentee spouse Clemente Jomoc. It does not seek the
The pertinent provisions on the General Provisions on Special
enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
Proceedings, Part II of the Revised Rules of Court entitled SPECIAL
Neither does it involve a demand of right or a cause of action that can be
PROCEEDINGS, read:
enforced against any person.
RULE 72
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the subject Order dated January 13,
SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY
2000 denying OSGs Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated
OF GENERAL RULES
November 22, 1999 disapproving its Notice of Appeal was correctly
issued. The instant petition, being in the nature of a special
Section 1. Subject matter of special proceedings. Rules of special
proceeding, OSG should have filed, in addition to its Notice of Appeal, a
proceedings are provided for in the following:
record on appeal in accordance with Section 19 of the Interim Rules and
(a) Settlement of estate of deceased persons;
(b) Escheat;
(c) Guardianship and custody of children;
(d) Trustees;
(e) Adoption;
(f) Rescission and revocation of adoption;
(g) Hospitalization of insane persons;
(h) Habeas corpus;
(i) Change of name;
(j) Voluntary dissolution of corporations;
(k) Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of minor natural
children;
(l) Constitution of family home;
(m) Declaration of absence and death;
(n) Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. In the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable in special proceedings. (Underscoring supplied)
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code on presumption of death
provides:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not
the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except
for those of succession.
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Upon the other hand, Article 41 of the Family Code, upon which the
trial court anchored its grant of the petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse, provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of
the subsequent marriage, the prior spouses had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that
the absent spouses was already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose pf contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouses present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of a reappearance
of the absent spouse. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, on Modes of
Appeal, invoked by the trial court in disapproving petitioners Notice of
Appeal, provides:
Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. -
(a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases
decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a
copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be
required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or
separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases,
the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
xxx
By the trial courts citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is
gathered that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent spouse
declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her desire to contract a
valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that purpose is a summary
proceeding, following above-quoted Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code.
Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL
PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW, contains the following
provision, inter alia:
xxx
Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this
Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Codes requiring summary
court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious
manner without regard to technical rules. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
x x x,
there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is,
therefore, a summary proceeding under the Family Code, not a special
proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls for the
filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary ordinary proceeding,
the filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial courts order sufficed.
That the Family Code provision on repeal, Art. 254, provides as
follows:
Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I of
Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the
Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39,
40, 41 and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended, and all laws, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations rules and regulations, or parts
thereof, inconsistent therewith are hereby repealed,(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied),
seals the case in petitioners favor.
Finally, on the alleged procedural flaw in petitioners petition before
the appellate court. Petitioners failure to attach to his petition before the
appellate court a copy of the trial courts order denying its motion for
reconsideration of the disapproval of its Notice of Appeal is not
necessarily fatal, for the rules of procedure are not to be applied in a
technical sense. Given the issue raised before it by petitioner, what the
appellate court should have done was to direct petitioner to comply with
the rule.
As for petitioners failure to submit copy of the trial courts order
granting the petition for declaration of presumptive death, contrary to
the appellate courts observation that petitioner was also assailing it,
petitioners 8-page petition[10] filed in said court does not so reflect, it
merely having assailed the order disapproving the Notice of Appeal.
 WHEREFORE, the assailed May 5, 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be
REMANDED to it for appropriate action in light of the foregoing
discussion.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia,
JJ., concur.
PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL
ROSARIO – LETICIA DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL RESORIO –
MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO
FUENTES, ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and
EDUARDO DEL ROSARIO, respondent..
BUENA, J.:
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an
action for reconveyance annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters
relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly on
questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the
heirs?
Sought to be reversed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
is the decision1 of public respondent Court of Appeals, the decretal portion
of which declares:
"Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment appealed
from is reversed and set aside and another one entered annulling the
Deed of Sale executed by Graciano Del Rosario in favor of
defendant-appellee Patricia Natcher, and ordering the Register of Deeds
to Cancel TCT No. 186059 and reinstate TCT No. 107443 without
prejudice to the filing of a special proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of Graciano Del Rosario in a proper court. No costs.
"So ordered."
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered
owners of a parcel of land with an area of 9,322 square meters located in
Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11889. Upon the
death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children,
namely: Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered
into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate on 09 February 1954
adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real property subject of
TCT No. 11889. Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share
while each of the six children received 1/14 share of the said property.
Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT
No. 35980 was issued in the name of Graciano and the Six
children.1âwphi1.nêt
Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an
"Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver
of Rights" where they subdivided among themselves the parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 35980 into several lots. Graciano then donated to
his children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land
amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters
registered under Graciano's name, as covered by TCT No. 35988.
Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No. 35988 was further
subdivided into two separate lots where the first lot with a land area of 80.90
square meter was registered under TCT No. 107442 and the second lot with
a land area of 396.70 square meters was registered under TCT No. 107443.
Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot2 to a third person but retained
ownership over the second lot.3
On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher.
During their marriage, Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443
to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 1860594 was issued in the
latter's name. On 07 October 1985,Graciano died leaving his second wife
Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.
In a complaint5 filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 55, herein private respondents alleged that upon
Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of fraud,
misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it
appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 19876 in favor
herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the
issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly,
herein private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence
of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.
In her answer7 dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that
she was legally married to Graciano in 20 March 1980 and thus, under the
law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner
further alleged that during Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already distributed,
in advance, properties to his children, hence, herein private respondents may
not anymore claim against Graciano's estate or against herein petitioner's
property.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a
decision dated 26 January 1996 holding:8
"1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor
of Patricia Natcher is prohibited by law and thus a complete nullity.
There being no evidence that a separation of property was agreed upon
in the marriage settlements or that there has been decreed a judicial
separation of property between them, the spouses are prohibited from
entering (into) a contract of sale;
"2) The deed as sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as it
was equally prohibited by law under Article 133 of the New Civil Code;
"3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a
donation, it may however be regarded as an extension of advance
inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of the
deceased."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court's
decision ratiocinating, inter alia:
"It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and
legal distribution of the estate. The court a quo, trying an ordinary action
for reconveyance / annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction when
it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the
settlement of estate of a deceased person. XXX
"X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as
advance inheritance. What the court should have done was merely to
rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on advancement to
be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for that purpose. XXX"
Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle
through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and assails the
appellate court's decision "for being contrary to law and the facts of the
case."
We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant
petition.
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action
and special proceedings, in this wise:
"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are government by
the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a
special civil action.
"XXX
"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right or a particular fact."
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction
between an action and a special proceeding. An action is a formal demand
of one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or
by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite
established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an
application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a
particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are
required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings,
the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion."9
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law
expounds further:
"It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those
proceedings which are instituted and prosecuted according to the
ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity,
and that special proceedings include those proceedings which are not
ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted according to some
special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without
summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are
characteristics of ordinary actions. XXX A special proceeding must
therefore be in the nature of a distinct and independent proceeding for
particular relief, such as may be instituted independently of a pending
action, by petition or motion upon notice."10
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of
title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to
settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of
property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special
proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific
rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate
of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in
the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to
advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any
heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the
estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding
on the person raising the questions and on the heir.
While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless
clear that the same provision11contemplates a probate court when it speaks
of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings".
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general
jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the
issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner
Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and
annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to
thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the
RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate court
so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the
decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.
At this point, the appellate court's disquisition is elucidating:
"Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate of a
deceased, it must first settle the estate in a special proceeding instituted for
the purpose. In the case at hand, the court a quo determined the respective
legitimes of the plaintiffs-appellants and assigned the subject property
owned by the estate of the deceased to defendant-appellee without
observing the proper proceedings provided (for) by the Rules of Court.
From the aforecited discussions, it is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary
action cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding
because it is subject to specific prescribed rules. Thus, the court a quo erred
in regarding the subject property as an advance inheritance."12
In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our
pronouncement in Coca vs. Borromeo13 and Mendoza vs. Teh14 that
whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Regional Trial
Court (then Court of First Instance) in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue
but a mere question of procedure. In essence, it is procedural question
involving a mode of practice "which may be waived".15
Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private
respondents inasmuch as the six children of the decedent even assailed
the authority of the trail court, acting in its general jurisdiction, to rule
on this specific issue of advancement made by the decedent to
petitioner.
Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently
enunciated the long standing principle that although generally, a probate
court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the
interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by
the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the
probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.16
Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold:
"In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an
allegation seeking appointment as estate administratrix which does not
necessarily involve settlement of estate that would have invited the
exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a probate court.17 (emphasis
supplied)
Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due
to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be
taken first.18 The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by
deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property
owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to
collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the
legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only
thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the
legitimes.19
A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the
present case, reveals that the trial court failed to observe established rules of
procedure governing the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario.
This Court sees no cogent reason to sanction the non-observance of these
well-entrenched rules and hereby holds that under the prevailing
circumstances, a probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is
indeed the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as
well as other related matters involving the settlement of Graciano Del
Rosario's estate.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 16680 September 13, 1920
BROADWELL HAGANS, petitioner,
vs.
ADOLPH WISLIZENUS, Judge of First Instance of Cebu, ET
AL., respondents.
Block, Johnston & Greenbaum for petitioner.
The respondent judge in his own behalf.
No appearance for the other respondents.
JOHNSON, J.:
This is an original petition, presented in the Supreme Court, for writ of
certiorari. The facts alleged in the petition are admitted by a demurrer.
The only question presented is, whether or not a judge of the Court of
First Instance, in "special proceedings," is authorized under the law to
appoint assessors for the purpose of fixing the amount due to an
administrator or executor for his services and expenses in the care,
management, and settlement of the estate of a deceased person.
The respondent judge, in support of his demurrer, argues that the
provision of Act No. 190 permit him to appoint assessors in "special
proceedings," The petitioner contends that no authority in law exists for
the appointment of assessors in such proceedings.
The only provisions of law which authorize the appointment of assessors
are the following; (a) Section 57-62 of Act No. 190; (b) sections
153-161 of Act No. 190; (c) section 44 (a) of Act No. 267; (d) section
2477 of Act No. 2711; and (e) section 2 of Act No. 2369.
Said section 44 (a) of Act No. 267 and section 2477 of Act No. 2711
apply to the city of Manila only. Act No. 2369 provides for the
appointment of assessors in criminal cases only. Sections 57-62 of Act No.
190 provide for the appointment of assessors in the court of justice of the
peace. Therefore, the only provisions of law which could, by any possibility,
permit the appointment of assessors in "special proceedings" are sections
153-161 of Act No. 190.
Section 154 provides that "either party to an action may apply in writing to
the judge for assessors to sit in the trial. Upon the filing of such application,
the judge shall direct that assessors be provided, . . . ."
Is a "special proceeding," like the present, an "action"? If it is, then, the
court is expressly authorized by said section 154 to appoint assessors. But
we find, upon an examination of section 1 of Act No. 190, which gives us
an interpretation of the words used in said Act, that a distinction is made
between an "action" and a "special proceeding." Said section 1 provides that
an "action" means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, while "every other
remedy furnished by law is a 'special proceeding."
In view of the interpretation given to the words "action" and "special
proceeding" by the Legislature itself, we are driven to the conclusion that
there is a distinction between an "action" and a "special proceeding," and
that when the Legislature used the word "action" it did not mean "special
proceeding."
There is a marked distinction between an "action" and a "special proceeding.
"An action is a formal demand of one's legal rights in a court of justice in
the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of
applying legal remedies according to definite established rules.
(People vs. County Judge, 13 How. Pr. [N. Y.], 398.) The term "special
proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the
status or right of a party, or a particular fact. (Porter vs. Purdy, 29 N. Y., 106,
110; Chapin vs. Thompson, 20 Cal., 681.) Usually, in special
proceedings, no formal pleadings are required, unless the statute
expressly so provides. The remedy in special proceedings is generally
granted upon an application or motion. Illustrations of special
proceedings, in contradistinction to actions, may be given: Proceedings
for the appointment of an administrator, guardians, tutors; contest of
wills; to perpetuate testimony; to change the name of persons;
application for admission to the bar, etc., etc. (Bliss on Code Pleading,
3d ed., sec. 1.)
From all of the foregoing we are driven to the conclusion that in
proceedings like the present the judge of the Court of First Instance is
without authority to appoint assessors. Therefore, the demurrer is hereby
overruled and the prayer of the petition is hereby granted, and it is
hereby ordered and decreed that the order of the respondent judge
appointing the assessors described in the petition be and the same is
hereby annulled and set aside; and, without any finding as to costs, it is
so ordered.
Araullo, Malcolm, Avanceña, Moir and Villamor, JJ., concur.
 Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter,
Francisca Benedicto-Paulino.[1] At the time of his death, there were two
SECOND DIVISION pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first,
ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ G.R. No. 164108 Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then pending with the Regional Trial Court
SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as
FARMERS HOLDING Present: one of the plaintiffs therein. The second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then
CORPORATION, pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners
Petitioners, CARPIO MORALES, J.,* Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one
Acting Chairperson, of the plaintiffs therein.[2]
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR.,
On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,** and
the RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
BRION, JJ.
in her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of
THE HONORABLE COURT OF Court. The petition was raffled to Branch 21, presided by respondent
APPEALS, THE HONORABLE Promulgated: Judge Amor A. Reyes. Said petition acknowledged the value of the
AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge, assets of the decedent to be P5 Million, net of liabilities.[3] On 2 August
Regional Trial Court of Manila, May 8, 2009 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private respondent as
Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters
JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO, of administration in her favor.[4] In January 2001, private respondent
Respondents. submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband.[5] In the
List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent included
as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then
DECISION being litigated before the Bacolod City courts.[6] Private respondent
stated that the amounts of liability corresponding to the two cases
TINGA, J.: as P136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137 and P35,198,697.40 for
Civil Case No. 11178.[7] Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and appraisal
on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita report pertaining to the estate.[8]

On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a
Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela,[9] praying that they be
furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate
proceedings. Private respondent opposed the manifestation/motion,
disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of her husband. Even before the Manila RTC acted on the
manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that the
Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private respondent of the
required inventory of the decedents estate.[10] Petitioners also filed other
pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of
private respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the
inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and
inaccurate.
On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the
manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not interested
parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the
intestate proceedings.[11] After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court
of Appeals. The petition argued in general that petitioners had the right to
intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being
the defendant in the civil cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.
On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a
decision[12] dismissing the petition and declaring that the Manila RTC did
not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the
intestate proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to
intervene, according to the appellate court, is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. The Court of Appeals cited the fact that the
claims of petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent or
expectant, as these were still pending litigation in separate proceedings
before other courts.
Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower
courts erred in denying them the right to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto. Interestingly, the rules
of procedure they cite in support of their argument is not the rule on
intervention, but rather various other provisions of the Rules on Special
Proceedings.[13]
To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied
by the courts a quo. First, they prayed that they be henceforth furnished
copies of all processes and orders issued by the intestate court as well as
the pleadings filed by administratrix Benedicto with the said
court.[14] Second, they prayed that the intestate court set a deadline for
the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and
complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof, order the
inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to assist in
the appraisal of the fair market value of the same.[15] Third, petitioners
moved that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the
administrator of her verified annual account, and, upon submission
thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect thereto,
with due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation,
preservation and disposition of the estate.[16]
The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely
informed by the rule on intervention. We can readily agree with the
Court of Appeals on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor has a legal interest in the matter
in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x While the language
of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening
in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal
interest required of an intervenor must be actual and material, direct and
immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant.[17]
Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules
of Civil Procedure necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings.
The settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special
proceedings under the Rules of Court,[18] not the Rules on Civil Procedure.
Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that [i]n the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable to special proceedings.
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72,
intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a
decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of
intervention under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent
claims.
Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to
intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they
had sought then before the RTC, and also now before us, do not square with
their recognition as intervenors. In short, even if it were declared that
petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would
not necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs they had sought
before the RTC since the right to intervene is not one of those reliefs.
To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should
be, let us now turn our focus to the Rules on Special Proceedings.
In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle any
interested persons or any persons interested in the estate to participate in
varying capacities in the testate or intestate proceedings. Petitioners cite
these provisions before us, namely: (1) Section 1, Rule 79, which
recognizes the right of any person interested to oppose the issuance of
letters testamentary and to file a petition for administration; (2) Section
3, Rule 79, which mandates the giving of notice of hearing on the
petition for letters of administration to the known heirs, creditors, and to
any other persons believed to have interest in the estate; (3) Section 1,
Rule 76, which allows a person interested in the estate to petition for the
allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an individual
interested in the estate of the deceased to complain to the court of the
concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the decedent,
or of evidence of the decedents title or interest therein; (5) Section 10 of
Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the examination
and allowance of the Administrators account to persons interested; (6)
Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice to the
persons interested before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the
disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and (7)
Section 1, Rule 90, which allows any person interested in the estate to
petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the
decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for.
Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract,
whether express or implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if
contingent, under the aegis of the notice to creditors to be issued by the
court immediately after granting letters of administration and published by
the administrator immediately after the issuance of such notice.[19] However,
it appears that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose
from his actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal
Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of
claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule
86.[20] These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the
decedent and may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of
Benedicto, as represented by its administrator, was successfully impleaded
in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case[21] was already
pending review before this Court at the time of Benedictos death.
Evidently, the merits of petitioners claims against Benedicto are to be
settled in the civil cases where they were raised, and not in the intestate
proceedings. In the event the claims for damages of petitioners are granted,
they would have the right to enforce the judgment against the estate. Yet
until such time, to what extent may they be allowed to participate in the
intestate proceedings?
Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang
Chia,[22] and it does provide us with guidance on how to proceed. A brief
narration of the facts therein is in order. Dinglasan had filed an action for
reconveyance and damages against respondents, and during a hearing of the
case, learned that the same trial court was hearing the intestate proceedings
of Lee Liong to whom Dinglasan had sold the property years earlier.
Dinglasan thus amended his complaint to implead Ang Chia,
administrator of the estate of her late husband. He likewise filed a
verified claim-in-intervention, manifesting the pendency of the civil case,
praying that a co-administrator be appointed, the bond of the
administrator be increased, and that the intestate proceedings not be
closed until the civil case had been terminated. When the trial court
ordered the increase of the bond and took cognizance of the pending
civil case, the administrator moved to close the intestate proceedings, on
the ground that the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial
partition of the estate. The trial court refused to close the intestate
proceedings pending the termination of the civil case, and the Court
affirmed such action.
If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in
the intestate proceedings it was only pursuant to their
desire to protect their interests it appearing that the
property in litigation is involved in said proceedings
and in fact is the only property of the estate left
subject of administration and distribution; and the
court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case
because of the unavoidable fact that whatever is
determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect
and have a far reaching consequence in the
determination and distribution of the estate. In so
taking cognizance of civil case No. V-331 the court does
not assume general jurisdiction over the case but merely
makes of record its existence because of the close
interrelation of the two cases and cannot therefore be
branded as having acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
 Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding
in abeyance the closing of the intestate proceedings pending
determination of the separate civil action for the reason that
there is no rule or authority justifying the extension of
administration proceedings until after the separate action
pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated,
cannot be entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of
Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or
personal property from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon,
and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal, may be commenced against the
executor or administrator." What practical value would this
provision have if the action against the administrator cannot
be prosecuted to its termination simply because the heirs
desire to close the intestate proceedings without first taking
any step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule is but a
corollary to the ruling which declares that questions
concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of the
estate but claimed by another person should be determined in
a separate action and should be submitted to the court in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules would be
rendered nugatory if we are to hold that an intestate
proceedings can be closed by any time at the whim and
caprice of the heirs x x x[23] (Emphasis supplied) [Citations
omitted]
It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan
conformed to an action-in-intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure,
but we can partake of the spirit behind such pronouncement. Indeed, a few
years later, the Court, citing Dinglasan, stated: [t]he rulings of this court
have always been to the effect that in the special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person, persons not heirs,
intervening therein to protect their interests are allowed to do so to
protect the same, but not for a decision on their action.[24]
Petitioners interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests,
but they are viable interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules
of Special Proceedings allows not just creditors, but also any person
interested or persons interested in the estate various specified capacities
to protect their respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a
contingent claim based on a pending action for quasi-delict against a
decedent may be reasonably concerned that by the time judgment is
rendered in their favor, the estate of the decedent would have already
been distributed, or diminished to the extent that the judgment could no
longer be enforced against it.
In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not
provide a creditor or any person interested in the estate, the right to
participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but
instead provides for specific instances when such persons may
accordingly act in those proceedings, we deem that while there is no
general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be
allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not
explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is
necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there is no other
modality under the Rules by which such interests can be protected. It is
under this standard that we assess the three prayers sought by
petitioners.
The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and
orders issued in connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the
pleadings filed by the administrator of the estate. There is no questioning as
to the utility of such relief for the petitioners. They would be duly alerted of
the developments in the intestate proceedings, including the status of the
assets of the estate. Such a running account would allow them to pursue the
appropriate remedies should their interests be compromised, such as the
right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate court if property
of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed.
At the same time, the fact that petitioners interests remain inchoate and
contingent counterbalances their ability to participate in the intestate
proceedings. We are mindful of respondents submission that if the Court
were to entitle petitioners with service of all processes and pleadings of the
intestate court, then anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent
or otherwise, would have the right to be furnished such pleadings, no matter
how wanting of merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent that
would mandate the service of all court processes and pleadings to anybody
posing a claim to the estate, much less contingent claims, would unduly
complicate and burden the intestate proceedings, and would ultimately
offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly disposition of cases.
Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been
recognized by this Court, with respect to the petitioners herein, that
addresses the core concern of petitioners to be apprised of developments in
the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge Reyes,[25] the Court heard a
petition for mandamus filed by the same petitioners herein against the RTC
judge, praying that they be allowed access to the records of the intestate
proceedings, which the respondent judge had denied from them. Section 2
of Rule 135 came to fore, the provision stating that the records of every
court of justice shall be public records and shall be available for the
inspection of any interested person x x x. The Court ruled that
petitioners were interested persons entitled to access the court records in
the intestate proceedings. We said:
Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the
records tomonitor prompt compliance with the Rules
governing the preservation and proper disposition of the
assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of
the Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix
of an annual accountingappears legitimate, for, as the
plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money
against Roberto Benedicto, et al., they have an interest
over the outcome of the settlement of his estate. They are
in fact "interested persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the
Rules of Court x x x[26]
Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the
intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than
mandating the service of court processes and pleadings upon them. In
either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are
being preserved and disposed of in accordance with the rules will be
duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access the records, rather
than entitling them to the service of every court order or pleading no
matter how relevant to their individual claim, will be less cumbersome
on the intestate court, the administrator and the heirs of the decedent,
while providing a viable means by which the interests of the creditors in
the estate are preserved.
 Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings
do require notice to any or all interested parties the petitioners as interested
parties will be entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be
given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference
to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor
or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to
authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell,
mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90
regarding the hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the
estate residue. After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in her
submitted inventory, the existence of the pending cases filed by the
petitioners.
We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline
be set for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified
and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof: the
inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue be required to
assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same; and that the
intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administratrix of her
verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her
examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and
other parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the
estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.
Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true
inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased
within three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85
requires the administrator to render an account of his administration within
one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We
do not doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to
perform either duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still
contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the
administrator did delay in the performance of these duties in the context
of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and
available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent
claims against the estate.
Concerning complaints against the general competence of the
administrator, the proper remedy is to seek the removal of the
administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82. While the
provision is silent as to who may seek with the court the removal of the
administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor, even a contingent one,
would have the personality to seek such relief. After all, the interest of
the creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to
answer for the debt, and the general competence or good faith of the
administrator is necessary to fulfill such purpose.
All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is
correct. Nonetheless, as we have explained, petitioners should not be
deprived of their prerogatives under the Rules on Special Proceedings as
enunciated in this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification
that petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate of Roberto
Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and rights as provided for such
interested persons in the Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased
Persons under the Rules on Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER, G.R. No. 157912
Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER, REYES, JJ.
VICTORIA S. MEDINA-
Administratrix, Promulgated:
Respondent. December 13, 2007
x------------------------------------------------
x

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal
of the Order[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 (RTC)
dated January 15, 2003 and its Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.

The undisputed facts are as follows.

The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and
thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims
against the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on October 7,
2002 a contingent claim for agent's commission due him amounting to
approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land
belonging to the estate, and the amount of P275,000.00, as reimbursement
for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of
negotiating the sale of said realties.
The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the
dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the
requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a certification against
non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation
why the money claim was not filed and served personally.
On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without
prejudice the money claim based on the grounds advanced by
respondent. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied per Omnibus
Order dated April 9, 2003.
Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising the
following questions:
(a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding
contain a certification against non-forum shopping, failing
which such claim should be dismissed?
(b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a
probate proceeding be dismissed for failing to pay the
docket fees at the time of its filing thereat?
(c) must a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding
be dismissed because of its failure to contain a written
explanation on the service and filing by registered
mail? [2]
Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a
probate proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non-forum
shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment
of docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72
of the Rules of Court provides that rules in ordinary actions are
applicable to special proceedings only in a suppletorymanner.
The Court gave due course to the petition for review
on certiorari although directly filed with this Court, pursuant to Section
2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.[3]
The petition is imbued with merit.
However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in
ordinary actions are only supplementary to rules in special proceedings
is not entirely correct.
Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In
the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for
 in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable
in special proceedings.
Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of
Court govern special proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions,
the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions
shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable.
The word practicable is defined as: possible to practice or perform;
capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished.[4] This means that
in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be
applied in special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so
would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of
Court does it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable
or merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of
Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and
initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and
filing, and the payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate
would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable
to special proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person as in the present case.
Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err in
dismissing petitioner's contingent money claim against respondent estate for
failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification against non-forum
shopping?
The Court rules in the affirmative.
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for
complaints and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling
that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an
initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding
was initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the
decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court,
after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons
having money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify
the court and the estate administrator of their respective money claims;
otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.[5]
Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a
motion for creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into
consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the
estate.In Arquiza v. Court of Appeals,[6] the Court explained thus:
x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new
litigation, but to bring a material but incidental
matter arising in the progress of the case in which the
motion is filed. A motion is not an independent right
or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the
progress of a cause. It relates to some question that is
collateral to the main object of the action and is
connected with and dependent upon the principal
remedy.[7] (Emphasis supplied)
A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the
settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent
since the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere
contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim,
not being an initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against
non-forum shopping.
On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of
Appeals,[8] that the trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money claim
(attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by a lawyer to
the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even
without payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall
constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the payment of such filing fees
within a reasonable time.[9] After all, the trial court had already assumed
jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the estate. Clearly, therefore,
non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not one of
the grounds for dismissing a money claim against the estate.
With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v. De
Guzman Vda. de Macatangay[10] is squarely in point. Therein, the Court held
thus:
In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court,
passing upon Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court,
held that a court has the discretion to consider a pleading or
paper as not filed if said rule is not complied with.
Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious
reasons. Plainly, such should expedite action or resolution
on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely,
minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if
service or filing is done by mail, considering the inefficiency
of the postal service. Likewise, personal service will do
away with the practice of some lawyers who, wanting to
appear clever, resort to the following less than ethical
practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch
opposing counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with
little or no time to prepare, for instance, responsive
pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice
from the post office that the registered mail containing
the pleading of or other paper from the adverse party may
be claimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming the
parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing
undue delay in the disposition of such pleading or other
papers.
If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this
innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring personal
service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13
then gives the court the discretion to consider a
pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of
service or filing were not resorted to and no written
explanation was made as to why personal service was
not done in the first place. The exercise of discretion
must, necessarily consider the practicability of personal
service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause
whenever practicable.
We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under
Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort
to other modes of service and filing, the
exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or
filing is practicable, in the light of the circumstances of
time, place and person, personal service or filing
is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not
practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must
then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why
personal service or filing was not practicable to begin
with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court
shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter
of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima
facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for
violation of Section 11. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of
personal service, exercised its discretion and liberally applied
Section 11 of Rule 13:
As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court]
requires, service and filing of pleadings must
be done personally whenever practicable. The
court notes that in the present case,
personal service would not be
practicable.Considering the distance
between the Court of Appeals
and Donsol, Sorsogon where the petition
was posted, clearly, service by registered
mail [sic] would have entailed considerable
time, effort and expense. A written
explanation why service was not done
personally might have been superfluous. In
any case, as the rule is so worded with the
use of may, signifying permissiveness, a
violation thereof gives the court discretion
whether or not to consider the paper as not
filed. While it is true that procedural
rules are necessary to secure an orderly
and speedy administration of
justice, rigid application of Section 11,
Rule 13 may be relaxed in this case in the
interest of substantial justice. (Emphasis
and italics supplied)
In the case at bar, the address of respondents counsel is
Lopez, Quezon, while petitioner
Sonias counsels is Lucena City. Lopez, Quezon is 83
kilometers away from Lucena City. Such distance makes
personal service impracticable. As in Musa v. Amor, a
written explanation why service was not done personally
might have been superfluous.
As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals, liberal
construction of a rule of procedure has been allowed
where, among other cases, the injustice to the adverse
party is not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed.[11] (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, petitioner holds office
in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for respondent and the
RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The
lower court should have taken judicial notice of the great distance
between said cities and realized that it is indeed not practicable to serve
and file the money claim personally. Thus, following Medina v. Court of
Appeals,[12] the failure of petitioner to submit a written explanation why
service has not been done personally, may be considered as superfluous and The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural
the RTC should have exercised its discretion under Section 11, Rule 13, not rule on the requirement of a written explanation for non-personal service,
to dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in the interest of substantial again in the interest of substantial justice.
justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the
The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6 dated January 15, 2003
estates of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to and April 9, 2003, respectively,
residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of are REVERSED and SETASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Iligan C
administration have been paid.[13] The ultimate purpose for the rule on ity, Branch 6, is hereby DIRECTED to give due course and take
money claims was further explained in Union Bank of the Phil. appropriate action on petitioner's money claim in accordance with Rule
v. Santibaez,[14] thus: 82 of the Rules of Court.
No pronouncement as to costs.
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in
the probate court is mandatory. As we held in the vintage SO ORDERED.
case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:

x x x This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the

estate of the deceased by informing the executor or MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to Associate Justice
examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper
one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design
of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the
deceased and the early delivery of the property to
the distributees, legatees, or heirs. The law strictly requires
the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims
against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs
of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and
distribute the residue.[15] (Emphasis supplied)
 ruled that petitioner has no right to intervene in the settlement of the
estate of Dr. Arturo de Santos. The cases were consolidated considering
that they involve the same parties and some of the issues raised are the
same.

The facts which gave rise to these two petitions are as follows:
RULE 73 On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of
Makati City, filed a petition for probate of his will[1] in the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4223. In
SECOND DIVISION his petition, Dr. De Santos alleged that he had no compulsory heirs; that
he had named in his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de
[G.R. No. 129505. January 31, 2000] Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will his properties with
an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner, vs. PACITA DE LOS REYES said will were in the custody of the named executrix, private respondent
PHILLIPS, respondent. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. A copy of the will [2] was annexed to the
petition for probate.
[G.R. No. 133359. January 31, 2000]
On February 16, 1996, Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati,
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Branch 61 issued an order granting the petition and allowing the will.
HON. FERNANDO V. GOROSPE, JR., in his Official Capacity as The order reads:
Presiding Judge of RTC-Makati, Branch 61, and PACITA PHILLIPS
as the alleged executrix of the alleged will of the late Dr. Arturo de On 03 August 1995, the Court issued an Order setting the
Santos, respondents. Scmis hearing of the petition on 12 September 1995, at 8:30
oclock in the morning, copies of which were served to
DECISION Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc. and Ms. Pacita de los
Reyes Phillips (Officers Return, dated 04 September
MENDOZA, J.: 1995 attached to the records). When the case was called
for hearing on the date set, no oppositor appeared nor any
These are petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of the written opposition was ever filed and on motion of
Thirteenth and the Special Eighth Divisions of the Court of Appeals which
petitioner, he was allowed to adduce his evidence in support
of the petition.
Petitioner personally appeared before this Court and was
placed on the witness stand and was directly examined by the
Court through "free wheeling" questions and answers to give
this Court a basis to determine the state of mind of the
petitioner when he executed the subject will. After the
examination, the Court is convinced that petitioner is of
sound and disposing mind and not acting on duress, menace
and undue influence or fraud, and that petitioner signed his
Last Will and Testament on his own free and voluntary will
and that he was neither forced nor influenced by any other
person in signing it. Mis sc
Furthermore, it appears from the petition and the evidence
adduced that petitioner in his lifetime, executed his Last Will
and Testament (Exhs. "A", "A-1", "A-2", "A-4", "A-5") at his
residence situated at 9 Bauhinia corner Intsia Streets, Forbes
Park, Makati City; said Last Will and Testament was signed
in the presence of his three (3) witnesses, namely, to wit: Dr.
Elpidio Valencia (Exhs. "A-6", "A-7", "A-8", "A-16",
"A-16-A"), Atty. Edward J. Berenguer (Exhs. "A-3",
"A-3-A", "A-9", "A-10", & "A-11"), and Atty. Victoria C.
delos Reyes (Exhs. "A-12", "A-13", "A-14", "A-17", &
"A-18"), who in turn, in the presence of the testator and in
the presence of each and all of the witnesses signed the said
Last Will and Testament and duly notarized before Notary
Public Anna Melissa L. Rosario (Exh. "A-15"); on the actual
execution of the Last Will and Testament, pictures were
taken (Exhs. "B" to "B-3").
Petitioner has no compulsory heirs and Arturo de Santos
Foundation, Inc., with address at No. 9 Bauhinia corner
Intsia Streets, Forbes Park, Makati City has been named
as sole legatee and devisee of petitioners properties, real
and personal, approximately valued at not less than P2
million, Ms. Pacita de los Reyes Phillips was designated
as executor and to serve as such without a bond.
From the foregoing facts, the Court finds that the
petitioner has substantially established the material
allegations contained in his petition. The Last Will and
Testament having been executed and attested as required
by law; that testator at the time of the execution of the
will was of sane mind and/or not mentally incapable to
make a Will; nor was it executed under duress or under
the influence of fear or threats; that it was in writing and
executed in the language known and understood by the
testator duly subscribed thereof and attested and
subscribed by three (3) credible witnesses in the presence
of the testator and of another; that the testator and all the
attesting witnesses signed the Last Will and Testament
freely and voluntarily and that the testator has intended
that the instrument should be his Will at the time of
affixing his signature thereto.
WHEREFORE, as prayed for by the petitioner (testator
himself) the petition for the allowance of the Last Will
and Testament of Arturo de Santos is hereby
APPROVED and ALLOWED.
Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on February 26,
1996.
On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for
intervention claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testators
sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and
nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of
the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the order
allowing the will and the issuance of letters of administration in his
name. Mis spped
On the other hand, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips, the
designated executrix of the will, filed a motion for the issuance of letters
testamentary with Branch 61. Later, however, private respondent moved to
withdraw her motion. This was granted, while petitioner was required to file
a memorandum of authorities in support of his claim that said court (Branch
61) still had jurisdiction to allow his intervention.[3]
Petitioner filed his memorandum of authorities on May 13, 1996. On the
other hand, private respondent, who earlier withdrew her motion for the
issuance of letters testamentary in Branch 61, refiled a petition for the same
purpose with the Regional Trial Court, Makati, which was docketed as Sp.
Proc. No. M-4343 and assigned to Branch 65.
Upon private respondents motion, Judge Salvador Abad Santos of Branch
65 issued an order, dated June 28, 1996, appointing her as special
administrator of Dr. De Santoss estate.
On July 29, 1996, petitioner sought to intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343
and to set aside the appointment of private respondent as special
administrator. He reiterated that he was the sole and full blooded nephew
and nearest of kin of the testator; that he came to know of the existence
of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 only by accident; that the probate proceedings
in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223 before Branch 61 of the same court was still
pending; that private respondent misdeclared the true worth of the
testators estate; that private respondent was not fit to be the special
administrator of the estate; and that petitioner should be given letters of
administration for the estate of Dr. De Santos.
On August 28, 1996, Judge Abad Santos ordered the transfer of Sp. Proc.
No. M-4343 to Branch 61, on the ground that "[it] is related to the case
before Judge Gorospe of RTC Branch 61 . . ."
It appears, however, that in Sp. Proc. No. M-4223, Judge Gorospe had
denied on August 26, 1996 petitioners motion for intervention.
Petitioner brought this matter to the Court of Appeals which, in a
decision[4] promulgated on February 13, 1998, upheld the denial of
petitioners motion for intervention.
Meanwhile, Judge Gorospe issued an order, dated September 4, 1996,
returning the records of Sp. Proc. No. M-4343 to Branch 65 on the
ground that there was a pending case involving the Estate of Decedent
Arturo de Santos pending before said court. The order reads: Spped
Acting on the ORDER dated 28 August 1996 of Branch
65, this Court, transferring this case to this Branch 61 on
the ground that this case is related with a case before this
Court, let this case be returned to Branch 65 with the
information that there is no related case involving the
ESTATE OF DECEDENT ARTURO DE SANTOS
pending before this Branch.
 There is, however, a case filed by ARTURO DE SANTOS,
as petitioner under Rule 76 of the Rules of Court for the
Allowance of his will during his lifetime docketed as SP.
PROC. NO. M-4223 which was already decided on 16
February 1996 and has become final.
It is noted on records of Case No. M-4223 that after it
became final, herein Petitioner Pacita de los Reyes Phillips
filed a MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF LETTERS
TESTAMENTARY, which was subsequently withdrawn
after this Court, during the hearing, already ruled that the
motion could not be admitted as the subject matter involves a
separate case under Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, and
movant withdrew her motion and filed this case (No. 4343).
Octavio de Santos Maloles [II] filed a MOTION FOR
INTERVENTION before Case No. M-4223 and this motion
was already DENIED in the order (Branch 61) of 26 August
1996 likewise for the same grounds that the matter is for a
separate case to be filed under Rule 78 of the Rules of Court
and cannot be included in this case filed under Rule 76 of the
Rules of Court.
It is further noted that it is a matter of policy that
consolidation of cases must be approved by the Presiding
Judges of the affected Branches.
Initially, in his decision dated September 23, 1996,[5] Judge Abad Santos
appeared firm in his position that " . . . it would be improper for (Branch 65)
to hear and resolve the petition (Sp. Proc. No. M-4343)," considering that
the probate proceedings were commenced with Branch 61. He thus ordered
the transfer of the records back to the latter branch. However, he later
recalled his decision and took cognizance of the case "to expedite the
proceedings." Thus, in his Order, dated October 21, 1996, he stated:
Considering the refusal of the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe,
Jr. of Branch 61 to continue hearing this case
notwithstanding the fact that said branch began the
probate proceedings of the estate of the deceased and
must therefore continue to exercise its jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all others, until the entire estate of the
testator had been partitioned and distributed as per Order
dated 23 September 1996, this branch (Regional Trial
Court Branch 65) shall take cognizance of the petition if
only to expedite the proceedings, and under the concept
that the Regional Trial Court of Makati City is but one
court. Jo spped
Furnish a copy of this order to the Office of the Chief
justice and the Office of the Court Administrator, of the
Supreme Court; the Hon. Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr.;
Pacita De Los Reyes Phillips, Petitioner; and Octavio de
Santos Maloles, Intervenor.
On November 4, 1996, Judge Abad Santos granted petitioners motion
for intervention. Private respondent moved for a reconsideration but her
motion was denied by the trial court. She then filed a petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which, on February 26, 1997,
rendered a decision[6] setting aside the trial courts order on the ground
that petitioner had not shown any right or interest to intervene in Sp.
Proc. No. M-4343.
Hence, these petitions which raise the following issues:
1. Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court -
Makati, Branch 61 has lost jurisdiction to proceed with the
probate proceedings upon its issuance of an order allowing
the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos
2. Whether or not the Honorable (Regional Trial Court -
Makati, Branch 65) acquired jurisdiction over the petition for
issuance of letters testamentary filed by (private) respondent.
3. Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late
Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a right to intervene and oppose the
petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by the
respondent.
4. Whether or not (private) respondent is guilty of forum
shopping in filing her petition for issuance of letters
testamentary with the Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch
65 knowing fully well that the probate proceedings involving
the same testate estate of the decedent is still pending with
the Regional Trial Court - Makati, Branch 61. Spped jo
First. Petitioner contends that the probate proceedings in Branch 61 of
RTC-Makati did not terminate upon the issuance of the order allowing the
will of Dr. De Santos. Citing the cases of Santiesteban v.
Santiesteban[7] and Tagle v. Manalo,[8] he argues that the proceedings must
continue until the estate is fully distributed to the lawful heirs, devisees, and
legatees of the testator, pursuant to Rule 73, 1 of the Rules of Court.
Consequently, petitioner contends that Branch 65 could not lawfully act
upon private respondents petition for issuance of letters testamentary.
The contention has no merit.
In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the
court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e.,
whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.[9]
Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the
testator, so much so that, after approving and allowing the will, the court
proceeds to issue letters testamentary and settle the estate of the testator.
The cases cited by petitioner are of such nature. In fact, in most
jurisdictions, courts cannot entertain a petition for probate of the will of
a living testator under the principle of ambulatory nature of wills.[10]
However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition
for probate of the will filed by the testator himself. It provides:
Civil Code, Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the
court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In
such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court
for the allowance of wills after the testators death shall
govern. Miso
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules
of Court as may be necessary for the allowance of wills
on petition of the testator.
 Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will,
either during the lifetime of the testator or after his death,
shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
Rule 76, 1 likewise provides:
Sec. 1 Who may petition for the allowance of will. - Any
executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other
person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the
death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to
have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession
or not, or is lost or destroyed.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition in the
court for the allowance of his will.
The rationale for allowing the probate of wills during the lifetime of testator
has been explained by the Code Commission thus:
Most of the cases that reach the courts involve either the
testamentary capacity of the testator or the formalities
adopted in the execution of wills. There are relatively few
cases concerning the intrinsic validity of testamentary
dispositions. It is far easier for the courts to determine the
mental condition of a testator during his lifetime than after
his death. Fraud, intimidation and undue influence are
minimized. Furthermore, if a will does not comply with the
requirements prescribed by law, the same may be corrected
at once. The probate during the testators life, therefore, will
lessen the number of contest upon wills. Once a will is
probated during the lifetime of the testator, the only
questions that may remain for the courts to decide after
the testators death will refer to the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary dispositions. It is possible, of course, that
even when the testator himself asks for the allowance of
the will, he may be acting under duress or undue
influence, but these are rare cases.
After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the
testator, it does not necessarily mean that he cannot alter
or revoke the same before his death. Should he make a
new will, it would also be allowable on his petition, and
if he should die before he has had a chance to present
such petition, the ordinary probate proceeding after the
testators death would be in order.[11]
Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16,
1996, there was nothing else for Branch 61 to do except to issue a
certificate of allowance of the will pursuant to Rule 73, 12 of the Rules
of Court. There is, therefore, no basis for the ruling of Judge Abad
Santos of Branch 65 of RTC-Makati that -Nex old
Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati having
begun the probate proceedings of the estate of the
deceased, it continues and shall continue to exercise said
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others. It should be
noted that probate proceedings do not cease upon the
allowance or disallowance of a will but continues up to
such time that the entire estate of the testator had been
partitioned and distributed.
 The fact that the will was allowed during the lifetime of the
testator meant merely that the partition and distribution of the
estate was to be suspended until the latters death. In other
words, the petitioner, instead of filing a new petition for the
issuance of letters testamentary, should have simply filed a
manifestation for the same purpose in the probate court.[12]
Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to intervene,
cites Rule 73, 1 which states:
Where estate of deceased persons settled. - If the decedent is
an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at
the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which
he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his
estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except
in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of actions for the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons. In Garcia Fule v. Court of
Appeals, it was held:[13]
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75,
Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location
of the state," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption
of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased
Persons. Venue and Processes." It could not have been
intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter,
because such legal provision is contained in a law of
procedure dealing merely with procedural matters.
Procedure is one thing, jurisdiction over the subject
matter is another. The power or authority of the court
over the subject matter "existed was fixed before
procedure in a given cause began." That power or
authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which
simply directs the manner in which the power or
authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are
cases though that if the power is not exercised
conformably with the provisions of the procedural law,
purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power
to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a
loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it
means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over
the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered
defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The
appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once
raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with
the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In
plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience
to the parties. Mani kx
Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of estates
with approximate value of over P100,000.00 (outside Metro Manila) or
P200,000.00 (in Metro Manila) belongs to the regional trial courts under
B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. The different branches comprising each court in
one judicial region do not possess jurisdictions independent of and
incompatible with each other.[14]
It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, 1 applies insofar as the venue of the
petition for probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is concerned, it does not bar
other branches of the same court from taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of the testator after his death. As held in the leading case
of Bacalso v. Ramolote:[15]
The various branches of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
under the Fourteenth Judicial District, are a coordinate and
co-equal courts, and the totality of which is only one Court of
First Instance. The jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in
the judges. And when a case is filed in one branch,
jurisdiction over the case does not attach to the branch or
judge alone, to the exclusion of the other branches. Trial may
be held or proceedings continue by and before another
branch or judge. It is for this reason that Section 57 of the
Judiciary Act expressly grants to the Secretary of Justice, the
administrative right or power to apportion the cases among
the different branches, both for the convenience of the parties
and for the coordination of the work by the different
branches of the same court. The apportionment and
distribution of cases does not involve a grant or limitation of
jurisdiction, the jurisdiction attaches and continues to be
vested in the Court of First Instance of the province, and the
trials may be held by any branch or judge of the court.
Necessarily, therefore, Branch 65 of the RTC of Makati City has
jurisdiction over Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.
Second. Petitioner claims the right to intervene in and oppose the
petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by private respondent.
He argues that, as the nearest next of kin and creditor of the testator, his
interest in the matter is material and direct. In ruling that petitioner has
no right to intervene in the proceedings before Branch 65 of
RTC-Makati City, the Court of Appeals held:
The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee
under the will of the decedent Arturo de Santos. Neither
is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As the only and
nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit
from the latter only in case of intestacy. Since the
decedent has left a will which has already been probated
and disposes of all his properties the private respondent
can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His interest in
the decedents estate is, therefore, not direct or
immediate. Maniks
His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one,
having been raised for the first time only in his reply to
the opposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as
the records show, not supported by evidence.
. . . . [T]he opposition must come from one with a direct
interest in the estate or the will, and the private
respondent has none. Moreover, the ground cited in the
private respondents opposition, that the petitioner has
deliberately misdeclared the truth worth and value of the
 estate, is not relevant to the question of her competency to
act as executor. Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court
requires only an allegation of the probable value and
character of the property of the estate. The true value can be
determined later on in the course of the settlement of the
estate.[16]
Rule 79, 1 provides:
Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary. Simultaneous
petition for administration. - Any person interested in a will
may state in writing the grounds why letters testamentary
should not issue to the persons named therein as executors, or
any of them, and the court, after hearing upon notice, shall
pass upon the sufficiency of such grounds. A petition may, at
the same time, be filed for letters of administration with the
will annexed.
Under this provision, it has been held that an "interested person" is one who
would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor, and whose interest is material and
direct, not merely incidental or contingent.[17]
Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be
considered an "heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary
succession that one who has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of
his entire estate by will. Thus, Art. 842 of the Civil Code provides:
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all
his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having
capacity to succeed. Manikan
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate
provided he does not contravene the provisions of this
Code with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.
Compulsory heirs are limited to the testators -
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to
their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and
ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and
descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children
by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287
of the Civil Code.[18]
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may
have been preterited in the testators will.
Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement proceedings
based on his allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased. Since the
testator instituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon
the Court to respect the desires of the testator. As we stated in Ozaeta v.
Pecson:[19]
 The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a
testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to dispose of his
property in the manner he wishes. It is natural that the
testator should desire to appoint one of his confidence, one
who can be trusted to carry out his wishes in the disposal of
his estate. The curtailment of this right may be considered a
curtailment of the right to dispose.
Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to
give bond may the court appoint other persons to administer the
estate.[20] None of these circumstances is present in this case.
Third. Petitioner contends that private respondent is guilty of forum
shopping when she filed the petition for issuance of letters testamentary (Sp.
Proc. No. M-4343) while the probate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. M-4223)
were still pending. According to petitioner, there is identity of parties, rights
asserted, and reliefs prayed for in the two actions which are founded on the
same facts, and a judgment in either will result in res judicata in the other.
This contention has no merit. As stated earlier, the petition for probate was
filed by Dr. De Santos, the testator, solely for the purpose of authenticating
his will. Upon the allowance of his will, the proceedings were
terminated. Oldmis o
On the other hand, the petition for issuance of letters testamentary was filed
by private respondent, as executor of the estate of Dr. De Santos, for the
purpose of securing authority from the Court to administer the estate and put
into effect the will of the testator. The estate settlement proceedings
commenced by the filing of the petition terminates upon the distribution and
delivery of the legacies and devises to the persons named in the will. Clearly,
there is no identity between the two petitions, nor was the latter filed
during the pendency of the former. There was, consequently, no forum
shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decisions of the Court
of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124715. January 24, 2000]
RUFINA LUY LIM petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AUTO
TRUCK TBA CORPORATION, SPEED DISTRIBUTING, INC.,
ACTIVE DISTRIBUTORS, ALLIANCE MARKETING
CORPORATION, ACTION COMPANY, INC. respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
May a corporation, in its universality, be the proper subject of and be
included in the inventory of the estate of a deceased person?
Petitioner disputes before us through the instant petition for review
on certiorari, the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 18
April 1996, in CA-GR SP No. 38617, which nullified and set aside the
orders dated 04 July 1995[2], 12 September 1995[3] and 15 September
1995[4] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, sitting as a
probate court.
Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of the late Pastor Y. Lim
whose estate is the subject of probate proceedings in Special Proceedings
Q-95-23334, entitled, "In Re: Intestate Estate of Pastor Y. Lim Rufina Luy
Lim, represented by George Luy, Petitioner".
Private respondents Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing
Corporation, Speed Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing, Inc. and Action
Company are corporations formed, organized and existing under Philippine
laws and which owned real properties covered under the Torrens system.
ordered that the properties covered by the same titles as
well as those properties by (sic) Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. 613494, 363123, 236236 and 263236 are
excluded from these proceedings.
SO ORDERED."
Subsequently, Rufina Luy Lim filed a verified amended petition[9] which
contained the following averments:
"3. The late Pastor Y. Lim personally owned during his
lifetime the following business entities, to wit:

On 11 June 1994, Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Herein petitioner, as Business Entity Address:
surviving spouse and duly represented by her nephew George Luy, filed on
17 March 1995, a joint petition[5] for the administration of the estate of XXXX
Pastor Y. Lim before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Alliance Marketing ,Inc. Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca
Private respondent corporations, whose properties were included in the
inventory of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, then filed a motion[6] for the lifting BF Homes,
of lis pendens and motion[7] for exclusion of certain properties from the
estate of the decedent. Paraaque,

In an order[8] dated 08 June 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Metro Manila.
Branch 93, sitting as a probate court, granted the private respondents twin
motions, in this wise: XXXX

"Wherefore, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby Speed Distributing Inc. 910 Barrio Niog,
ordered to lift, expunge or delete the annotation of lis
pendens on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 116716, Aguinaldo Highway,
116717, 116718, 116719 and 5182 and it is hereby further
Bacoor, Cavite. assets and equity were however, personally owned by the
late Pastor Y Lim. Hence the alleged stockholders and
XXXX officers appearing in the respective articles of
incorporation of the above business entities were mere
Auto Truck TBA Corp. 2251 Roosevelt Avenue, dummies of Pastor Y. Lim, and they were listed therein
only for purposes of registration with the Securities and
Quezon City. Exchange Commission.

XXXX "4. Pastor Lim, likewise, had Time, Savings and Current
Deposits with the following banks: (a) Metrobank, Grace
Active Distributors, Inc. Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca BF Park, Caloocan City and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City
Branches and (b) First Intestate Bank (formerly
Homes, Paraaque, Producers Bank), Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation and in other banks whose identities are yet to
Metro Manila. be determined.

XXXX "5. That the following real properties, although registered

in the name of the above entities, were actually acquired
Action Company 100 20th Avenue by Pastor Y. Lim during his marriage with petitioner, to
wit:
Murphy, Quezon City
Corporation Title Location
or
XXXX
92-D Mc-Arthur Highway
k. Auto Truck TCT No. 617726 Sto. Domingo
Valenzuela Bulacan.
TBA Corporation Cainta, Rizal
"3.1 Although the above business entities dealt and engaged
in business with the public as corporations, all their capital, q. Alliance Marketing TCT No. 27896 Prance,
 Metro Manila
Copies of the above-mentioned Transfer Certificate of Title
and/or Tax Declarations are hereto attached as Annexes "C"
to "W".
XXXX
"7. The aforementioned properties and/or real interests left
by the late Pastor Y. Lim, are all conjugal in nature, having
been acquired by him during the existence of his marriage
with petitioner.
"8. There are other real and personal properties owned by
Pastor Y. Lim which petitioner could not as yet identify.
Petitioner, however will submit to this Honorable Court the
identities thereof and the necessary documents covering the
same as soon as possible."
On 04 July 1995, the Regional Trial Court acting on petitioners motion
issued an order[10], thus:
"Wherefore, the order dated 08 June 1995 is hereby set aside
and the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed
to reinstate the annotation of lis pendens in case said
annotation had already been deleted and/or cancelled said
TCT Nos. 116716, 116717, 116718, 116719 and 51282.
Further more (sic), said properties covered by TCT Nos.
613494, 365123, 236256 and 236237 by virtue of the
petitioner are included in the instant petition.
SO ORDERED."
On 04 September 1995, the probate court appointed Rufina Lim as
special administrator[11] and Miguel Lim and Lawyer Donald Lee, as
co-special administrators of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, after which
letters of administration were accordingly issued.
In an order[12] dated 12 September 1995, the probate court denied anew
private respondents motion for exclusion, in this wise:
"The issue precisely raised by the petitioner in her
petition is whether the corporations are the mere alter
egos or instrumentalities of Pastor Lim, Otherwise (sic)
stated, the issue involves the piercing of the corporate
veil, a matter that is clearly within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court and not the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Thus, in the case of Cease vs. Court of
Appeals, 93 SCRA 483, the crucial issue decided by the
regular court was whether the corporation involved
therein was the mere extension of the decedent. After
finding in the affirmative, the Court ruled that the assets
of the corporation are also assets of the estate.
A reading of P.D. 902, the law relied upon by oppositors,
shows that the SECs exclusive (sic) applies only to
intra-corporate controversy. It is simply a suit to settle the
intestate estate of a deceased person who, during his
lifetime, acquired several properties and put up
corporations as his instrumentalities.
SO ORDERED."
On 15 September 1995, the probate court acting on an ex parte motion filed
by petitioner, issued an order[13] the dispositive portion of which reads:
"Wherefore, the parties and the following banks concerned
herein under enumerated are hereby ordered to comply
strictly with this order and to produce and submit to the
special administrators , through this Honorable Court within
(5) five days from receipt of this order their respective
records of the savings/current accounts/time deposits and
other deposits in the names of Pastor Lim and/or corporations
above-mentioned, showing all the transactions made or done
concerning savings /current accounts from January 1994 up
to their receipt of this court order.
XXX XXX XXX
SO ORDERED."
Private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari[14], with an
urgent prayer for a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, before
the Court of Appeals questioning the orders of the Regional Trial Court,
sitting as a probate court.
On 18 April 1996, the Court of Appeals, finding in favor of herein private
respondents, rendered the assailed decision[15], the decretal portion of which
declares:
"Wherefore, premises considered, the instant special civil
action for certiorari is hereby granted, The impugned orders
issued by respondent court on July 4,1995 and September 12,
1995 are hereby nullified and set aside. The impugned order
issued by respondent on September 15, 1995 is nullified
insofar as petitioner corporations" bank accounts and
records are concerned.
SO ORDERED."
Through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, herein
petitioner Rufina Luy Lim now comes before us with a lone assignment
of error[16]:
"The respondent Court of Appeals erred in reversing the
orders of the lower court which merely allowed the
preliminary or provisional inclusion of the private
respondents as part of the estate of the late deceased (sic)
Pastor Y. Lim with the respondent Court of Appeals
arrogating unto itself the power to repeal, to disobey or to
ignore the clear and explicit provisions of Rules 81,83,84
and 87 of the Rules of Court and thereby preventing the
petitioner, from performing her duty as special
administrator of the estate as expressly provided in the
said Rules."
Petitioners contentions tread on perilous grounds.
In the instant petition for review, petitioner prays that we affirm the
orders issued by the probate court which were subsequently set aside by
the Court of Appeals.
Yet, before we delve into the merits of the case, a review of the rules on
jurisdiction over probate proceedings is indeed in order.
The provisions of Republic Act 7691[17], which introduced amendments to
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, are pertinent:
"Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980", is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where
the gross value of the estate exceeds One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila,
where such gross value exceeds Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000);
xxx xxx xxx
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to
read as follows:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Civil
Cases.-Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil
actions and probate proceedings, testate
and intestate, including the grant of
provisional remedies in proper cases,
where the value of the personal property,
estate or amount of the demand does not
exceed One Hundred Thousand
Pesos(P100,000) or, in Metro Manila
where such personal property, estate or
amount of the demand does not exceed
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000),
exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses
and costs, the amount of which must be
specifically alleged, Provided, that interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorneys,
litigation expenses and costs shall be
included in the determination of the filing
fees, Provided further, that where there are
several claims or causes of actions
between the same or different parties,
embodied in the same complaint, the
amount of the demand shall be the totality
of the claims in all the causes of action,
irrespective of whether the causes of
action arose out of the same or different
transactions;
xxx xxx xxx"
Simply put, the determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over
matters of probate depends upon the gross value of the estate of the
decedent.
As to the power and authority of the probate court, petitioner relies heavily
on the principle that a probate court may pass upon title to certain
properties, albeit provisionally, for the purpose of determining whether a
certain property should or should not be included in the inventory.
In a litany of cases, We defined the parameters by which the court may
extend its probing arms in the determination of the question of title in
probate proceedings.
This Court, in PASTOR, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS,[18] held:
"X X X As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous
matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality.
Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should or should not be included in the inventory of
estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title
thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive,
and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to
resolve title."
We reiterated the rule in PEREIRA vs. COURT OF APPEALS[19]:
"X X X The function of resolving whether or not a certain
property should be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator is one
clearly within the competence of the probate court. However,
the courts determination is only provisional in character, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action which may be instituted by the parties."
Further, in MORALES vs. CFI OF CAVITE[20] citing CUIZON vs.
RAMOLETE[21], We made an exposition on the probate courts limited
jurisdiction:
"It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in
charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a
part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong
to outside parties. All that the said court could do as
regards said properties is to determine whether they
should or should not be included in the inventory or list
of properties to be administered by the administrator. If
there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the
parties, the administrator and the opposing parties have to
resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of
the conflicting claims of title because the probate court
cannot do so."
Again, in VALERA vs. INSERTO[22], We had occasion to elucidate,
through Mr. Justice Andres Narvasa[23]:
"Settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court), acting as a probate court, exercises
but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take
cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property
claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent,
unless the claimant and all other parties having legal
interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to
 the submission of the question to the probate court for
adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby
prejudiced, the reason for the exception being that the
question of whether or not a particular matter should be
resolved by the court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g.
probate, land registration, etc.), is in reality not a
jurisdictional but in essence of procedural one, involving a
mode of practice which may be waived. x x x
x x x. These considerations assume greater cogency where,
as here, the Torrens title is not in the decedents name but
in others, a situation on which this Court has already had
occasion to rule x x x."(emphasis Ours)
Petitioner, in the present case, argues that the parcels of land covered under
the Torrens system and registered in the name of private respondent
corporations should be included in the inventory of the estate of the
decedent Pastor Y. Lim, alleging that after all the determination by the
probate court of whether these properties should be included or not is
merely provisional in nature, thus, not conclusive and subject to a final
determination in a separate action brought for the purpose of adjudging once
and for all the issue of title.
Yet, under the peculiar circumstances, where the parcels of land are
registered in the name of private respondent corporations, the jurisprudence
pronounced in BOLISAY vs., ALCID[24] is of great essence and finds
applicability, thus:
"It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has
evidence purporting to support her claim of ownership, for,
on the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in their
favor, which under the law is endowed with
incontestability until after it has been set aside in the
manner indicated in the law itself, which, of course, does
not include, bringing up the matter as a mere incident in
special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
deceased persons. x x x"
"x x x. In regard to such incident of inclusion or
exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by Torrens
title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such
title should be given due weight, and in the absence of
strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder
thereof should be considered as the owner of the property
in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an
appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the
case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the
persons named in the title. x x x"
A perusal of the records would reveal that no strong compelling
evidence was ever presented by petitioner to bolster her bare assertions
as to the title of the deceased Pastor Y. Lim over the properties. Even so,
P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, " The Property Registration Decree",
proscribes collateral attack on Torrens Title, hence:
"xxx xxx xxx
Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.
 - A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack.
It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law."
In CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE, where similarly as in the case at bar, the
property subject of the controversy was duly registered under the Torrens
system, We categorically stated:
"x x x Having been apprised of the fact that the property in
question was in the possession of third parties and more
important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in
the name of such third parties, the respondent court should
have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and
excluded the property in question from the inventory of the
property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such
third persons of their possession and ownership of the
property. x x x"
Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the
late Pastor Y. Lim are in the possession of and are registered in the name of
private respondent corporations, which under the law possess a personality
separate and distinct from their stockholders, and in the absence of any
cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of
conclusiveness of said titles in favor of private respondents should stand
undisturbed.
Accordingly, the probate court was remiss in denying private respondents
motion for exclusion. While it may be true that the Regional Trial Court,
acting in a restricted capacity and exercising limited jurisdiction as a probate
court, is competent to issue orders involving inclusion or exclusion of
certain properties in the inventory of the estate of the decedent, and to
adjudge, albeit, provisionally the question of title over properties, it is
no less true that such authority conferred upon by law and reinforced by
jurisprudence, should be exercised judiciously, with due regard and
caution to the peculiar circumstances of each individual case.
Notwithstanding that the real properties were duly registered under the
Torrens system in the name of private respondents, and as such were to
be afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title, the probate court
obviously opted to shut its eyes to this gleamy fact and still proceeded to
issue the impugned orders.
By its denial of the motion for exclusion, the probate court in effect
acted in utter disregard of the presumption of conclusiveness of title in
favor of private respondents. Certainly, the probate court through such
brazen act transgressed the clear provisions of law and infringed settled
jurisprudence on this matter.
Moreover, petitioner urges that not only the properties of private
respondent corporations are properly part of the decedents estate but
also the private respondent corporations themselves. To rivet such
flimsy contention, petitioner cited that the late Pastor Y. Lim during his
lifetime, organized and wholly-owned the five corporations, which are
the private respondents in the instant case.[25] Petitioner thus attached as
Annexes "F"[26] and "G"[27] of the petition for review affidavits executed
by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao which among others, contained
averments that the incorporators of Uniwide Distributing, Inc. included
on the list had no actual participation in the organization and
incorporation of the said corporation. The affiants added that the persons
whose names appeared on the articles of incorporation of Uniwide
Distributing, Inc., as incorporators thereof, are mere dummies since they
have not actually contributed any amount to the capital stock of the
corporation and have been merely asked by the late Pastor Y. Lim to affix
their respective signatures thereon.
It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and
distinct from that of the persons composing it. It may not generally be held
liable for that of the persons composing it. It may not be held liable for the
personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities connected
with it.[28]
Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a
personality distinct and separate from its stockholders or members. In the
same vein, a corporation by legal fiction and convenience is an entity
shielded by a protective mantle and imbued by law with a character alien to
the persons comprising it.
Nonetheless, the shield is not at all times invincible. Thus, in FIRST
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL BANK vs. COURT OF APPEALS[29],
We enunciated:
"x x x When the fiction is urged as a means of perpetrating a
fraud or an illegal act or as a vehicle for the evasion of an
existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes, the
achievement or perfection of a monopoly or generally the
perpetration of knavery or crime, the veil with which the law
covers and isolates the corporation from the members or
stockholders who compose it will be lifted to allow for its
consideration merely as an aggregation of individuals. x x x"
Piercing the veil of corporate entity requires the court to see through the
protective shroud which exempts its stockholders from liabilities that
ordinarily, they could be subject to, or distinguishes one corporation
from a seemingly separate one, were it not for the existing corporate
fiction.[30]
The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil may be pierced
when a corporation is just but the alter ego of a person or of another
corporation. Where badges of fraud exist, where public convenience is
defeated; where a wrong is sought to be justified thereby, the corporate
fiction or the notion of legal entity should come to naught.[31]
Further, the test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of
piercing the veil of corporate fiction is as follows: 1) Control, not mere
majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not only
of finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the
transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had
at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own; (2) Such
control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong,
to perpetuate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or
dishonest and unjust act in contravention of plaintiffs legal right; and (3)
The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the
injury or unjust loss complained of. The absence of any of these
elements prevent "piercing the corporate veil".[32]
Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all
or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself a
sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate corporate
personalities.[33]
Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation,
the wrong-doing must be clearly and convincingly established. It cannot
be presumed.[34]
Granting arguendo that the Regional Trial Court in this case was not merely
acting in a limited capacity as a probate court, petitioner nonetheless failed
to adduce competent evidence that would have justified the court to impale
the veil of corporate fiction. Truly, the reliance reposed by petitioner on the
affidavits executed by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao is unavailing
considering that the aforementioned documents possess no weighty
probative value pursuant to the hearsay rule. Besides it is imperative for us
to stress that such affidavits are inadmissible in evidence inasmuch as the
affiants were not at all presented during the course of the proceedings in the
lower court. To put it differently, for this Court to uphold the admissibility
of said documents would be to relegate from Our duty to apply such basic
rule of evidence in a manner consistent with the law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant
petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the
Court of Appeals which nullified and set aside the orders issued by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, acting as a probate court, dated 04 July
1995 and 12 September 1995 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.

Our pronouncement in PEOPLE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. THIRD DIVISION
LEONIDAS[35] finds pertinence:

"Affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are
not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses
his own language in writing the affiants statements, which
may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one
writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the
opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this reason,
affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the
affiant themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify
thereon."
[G.R. No. 117733. September 5, 1997]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR., Regional Trial Court,
Branch 165, Pasig City; ROBERTO SWIFT; RODRIGO
DOMINGO; and SPECIAL MASTERS or Other Persons
Acting in Their Stead, respondents.

As to the order[36] of the lower court, dated 15 September 1995, the Court of DECISION
Appeals correctly observed that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93 acted
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
without jurisdiction in issuing said order; The probate court had no authority
to demand the production of bank accounts in the name of the private
respondent corporations.
 This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of After establishing the jurisdictional facts and concluding its
Court to reverse the 2 November 1994 Order [1] of the Regional Trial Court, presentation of evidence in the probate court, petitioner filed an Urgent
Branch 156, Pasig City (hereafter, probate court), in Special Proceedings No. Motion for Appointment of Special Administrator/s [7] citing the
10279 entitled In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of Ferdinand E. following grounds in support thereof:
Marcos/Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration. The assailed
order lifted the temporary restraining order issued on 25 October 1994, and (1) The probate court has failed to appoint an administrator of the estate
denied petitioner's (1) petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary since the filing of the petition.
injunction and (2) motion to cite Mr. Robert Swift, Atty. Rodrigo Domingo,
and other persons in contempt of court. (2) The US District Court of Hawaii awarded in favor of the claimants
the amount of US$1.2 Billion as exemplary damages against the estate
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines is the petitioner in Special
of Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Proceedings No. 10279. The petition, filed on 16 October 1992, alleged that
during his exile the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos executed his last will
(3) In its order of 19 November 1991 the said court granted a
and testament [2] in Hawaii, United States of America, with his wife Imelda
preliminary injunction against the estate to prevent any transfer,
Trinidad R. Marcos and son Ferdinand R. Marcos II as executors. Petitioner
encumbrance, conversion, or disposition of the funds and assets of the
justified its action in filing the petition by claiming neglect on the part of the
estate.
testators heirs to initiate testate proceedings and the need to protect the
interest of the Philippine government in assessing and collecting the taxes
(4) On the premise that no probate proceeding was pending anywhere,
due the estate. It moved that Mrs. Marcos and Ferdinand II be declared
said Court modified on 16 November 1992 its preliminary injunction to
incompetent as executors and prayed that letters of administration be issued
include certain Swiss Banks.
in favor of petitioners nominee.
Mrs. Imelda Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos II filed an Opposition/ (5) In July 1994, the plaintiffs in MDL No. 840 filed with the Hawaii
Comment on the petition. [3] District Court a motion to further modify the preliminary injunction to
identify the Republic of the Philippines as agent, representative, aide,
On 7 June 1993, petitioner sent a notice [4] of Commencement of
and abettor of the defendant Estate, notice of which was received by the
Probate Proceedings in Philippine Court to the United States (U.S.) District
Office of the Solicitor General on 25 July 1994.
Court of Hawaii, where a class action [5] docketed as MDL No. 840 was
previously filed against former President Marcos. [6] The action sought
(6) There was a need to preserve the estate, considering that it was the
damages against the latter for human rights violations he allegedly
subject of protracted litigation both here and abroad. Petitioner
committed during his authoritarian rule.
nominated Commissioner of Internal Revenue Liwayway
Vinzons-Chato as administrator of the estate.
 Ferdinand R. Marcos II opposed the motion claiming that the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue was not a suitable person to act as
administrator of the estate.
In its Order [8] of 9 September 1994, the probate court, per public
respondent Judge Villarama, granted the motion and appointed
Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato as Special Administrator of the
estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos. Citing Section 1 of Rule 73 of the Rules of
Court, the order also declared that upon the filing of the petition for probate
of the will, the probate court acquired jurisdiction over the estate to the
exclusion of all other courts; and that the U.S. District Court of Hawaii
cannot assert its jurisdiction over the assets of the estate and exclude the
jurisdiction already vested in [the probate court]. He directed that a copy of
the order be furnished the U.S. District Court of Hawaii through the
Department of Foreign Affairs.
On 24 October 1994, petitioner filed in the probate court a Petition for
the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction with
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order. [9] It alleged
that in the class action the U.S. District Court of Hawaii issued sometime in
October 1994 a Reference Order [10] appointing special masters for the
purpose of obtaining depositions in the Philippines on the following matters:
(1) whether the victims identified in the claim forms suffered torture,
summary execution, or disappearance; and (2) the extent of damages
sustained. The Reference Order prescribed the procedure, including the
availment of local court reporters and interpreters as might be
required. Petitioner asserted that the Reference Order impinged on the
exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court and disregarded the claim of the
Philippine government against the Marcos estate. It also contended that the
claim against the estate should be filed before the probate court and that the
Philippine government should be accorded first preference in the priority list
of the estates creditors.
On 25 October 1994, respondent Judge Villarama issued a
temporary restraining order [11] against the special masters and persons
acting in their stead, and set for hearing the petition for the preliminary
injunction. The sheriffs return [12] indicated that service of the order was
attempted upon the resident manager of New World Hotel, Makati City,
where Mr. Swift and the other special masters were billeted. However,
the sheriff was referred to the guest services manager, who refused to
accept a copy of the order.
Before the hearing on the preliminary injunction could take place,
petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion [13] to cite herein private
respondents, Mr. Robert Swift, Atty. Rodrigo Domingo, and other
concerned persons in contempt of court based on media reports that they
vowed to continue the taking of depositions notwithstanding the
issuance of a temporary restraining order. Petitioner also questioned the
legal practice in the Philippines of Mr. Swift, an American counsel who
had no special work permit and license to practice.
On 28 October 1994, respondent Judge Villarama issued an
order [14] directing private respondents to comment on petitioner's
motion and to show cause why they should not be cited for
contempt. The sheriffs return [15] confirmed that the order was served
upon Mr. Swift through the senior guest services officer of the New
World Hotel, Makati City, and personally upon Atty. Domingo at his
office.
In the meantime, the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood,
Integrity and Nationalism, Inc., (MABINI) filed in SP Proc. No. 10279 a
petition for leave to intervene as amicus curiae and pro se ex abundanti
cautela. [16] It noted the hostile, if not indifferent, attitude the Philippine
government continued to display towards its citizens whose human
rights were violated; and just when the victims had been vindicated by
the ruling of the U.S. Court District of Hawaii, it was the Philippine
government which would serve as an obstruction to their attainment of
justice by suppressing their freedom to express the ordeal they had
suffered.MABINI underscored that the taking of the depositions was a
compassionate remedy granted to the Filipino victims, who were spared the
burden of testifying in a foreign court.
Likewise, the Samahan ng Mga Ex-Detainees Laban sa Detensyon at
Para sa Amnestiya (SELDA), a human rights non-government organization,
filed its special appearance with motion to dissolve the temporary
restraining order and to deny writ of preliminary injunction. [17]
In his Opposition [18] Atty. Domingo asserted that the real motive of
petitioner was to prevent the human rights victims from recovering what
was due them and that it forgot or conveniently chose not to remember that
in February 1987, it asked the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to
allow the human rights suits against Marcos to proceed to trial. He also
contended that the motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
was grossly insufficient both in form and substance, since it was not verified
and was deficient and baseless.; and that petitioners reliance on Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. The words exclusive jurisdiction
found therein should be limited to proceedings concerning the probate of the
will and settlement of the estate of the decedent and should not include other
litigation for or against the estate. He argued that MDL No. 840 is an action
for recovery of damages arising out of the late President's tortuous violation
of international law. The action is totally unrelated to the probate
proceedings. He reasoned that the probate court is of limited jurisdiction and
that it can only exercise jurisdiction over the property of the estate in the
Philippines. Moreover, the probate court failed to acquire jurisdiction over
the special masters, since they were never properly summoned.
Anent petitioners motion to cite them in contempt of court, Atty.
Domingo alleged that said motion, which was litigious in nature, was a
useless scrap of paper for lack of the three-day notice for
hearing.Besides, the temporary restraining order could not be directed to
him because he was neither a special master nor a representative
thereof. He was a lawyer for the human rights claimants.
In his pleading [19] Mr. Swift joined Atty. Domingo in the latters
opposition and further alleged that the petition for preliminary injunction
became moot and academic, as the special masters voluntarily left the
country on 26 October 1994, without having been served a copy of the
temporary restraining order. He also raised the settled principle of
comity, which required the probate court to avoid interference in the
conduct of judicial proceedings in a foreign country; warned that
petitioner was courting danger in encouraging the probate court to
collaterally attack the jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court of Hawaii in
violation of said principle; and claimed that the temporary restraining
order could not be directed to him, since he was neither a special master
nor a representative thereof but a counsel of the human rights victims.
On 2 November 1994, public respondent Judge Villarama issued the
assailed Order [20] lifting the 25 October 1995 Temporary Restraining
Order and denying the motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction on the ground that petitioner has failed to show by convincing
proof the existence of a clear and positive right which should be
protected. The said order also denied, on equity considerations, the
motion to cite private respondents in contempt of court.
Petitioner no longer sought a reconsideration of the Order for the
following reasons: (a) such motion would serve no useful purpose
because it would raise the same points stated in the rejected motions; (b)
the error committed by respondent Judge was grave and patent as to
make the questioned order void; (c) the relief sought in this petition is
extremely urgent because the Special Masters or the persons acting in their
stead were taking the depositions in furtherance and in implementation of
the foreign courts directive; and (d) the issue raised is purely a question of
law. [21]
Instead, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari alleging that
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to consider that
the issuance and implementation of the reference order of the Hawaii court
violated the sovereignty of the Philippines and impinged on the exclusive
jurisdiction of the probate court.
In support thereof, petitioner invokes Section 1 of Rule 73 of the Rules
of Court, which provides in part as follows:
SEC. 1. Where estate of deceased person settled. xxx The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the decedent shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by
a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of
the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record.
It raises a contradiction in public respondent Judge Villaramas
actuation in that in his Order of 9 September 1994 he declared that the U.S.
District Court of Hawaii could not assert its jurisdiction over the assets of
the estate and exclude the jurisdiction vested in the probate court. Said
respondent was aware that the purpose of the reference order was to
determine the amount of compensatory damages to be charged against the
estate; however, he chose to ignore that it is the probate court which
exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the estate. He cannot, therefore, claim
that petitioner failed to prove a clear and positive right which should be
protected.
Anent the issue of contempt, petitioner argues that the following
documentary evidence presented before the probate court proved that
Messrs. Swift and Domingo and other concerned persons defied the
probate court's temporary restraining order: (1) Special Master Order No.
4 issued by the Supervising Special Master, which confirmed notice of
the probate court's temporary restraining order; and (2) letters [22] of Mr.
Swift to Mr. James Linn, American counsel of Mrs. Marcos (a)
indicating that the plaintiffs in MDL No. 840 would proceed with the
taking of the depositions on 27 October 1994 at the office of Atty.
Domingo and the New World Hotel, (b) giving notice that he would take
the depositions of some class members on 28 October 1994, and (c)
notifying the continuation of his taking of the depositions on 29 October
1994. These notwithstanding, respondent Judge denied petitioner's
motion to cite Messrs. Swift and Domingo and other concerned persons
in contempt of court due to equity considerations. The denial was tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.
In his comment filed on his behalf and as counsel for the other
private respondents, Atty. Domingo argues that the petition is moot and
academic and without merit. The act primarily sought to be restrained,
which was the taking of the depositions, was accomplished as of 27
November 1994; and the transcripts had been submitted to the U.S.
District Court of Hawaii. Furthermore, the probate court had no
jurisdiction to adjudicate matters which had no reference or bearing to
the probate, such as MDL No. 840. Besides, there was no law which
prohibited the taking of depositions in the Philippines for evidentiary
use in a pending case abroad. The estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos even
financed the taking of the depositions. Lastly, Atty. Domingo reiterated
that he could not be cited for contempt for not having been served a copy of
the temporary restraining order.
Mrs. Marcos subsequently filed a motion for leave to intervene and to
admit its petition in intervention, citing that petitioner failed to defend the
interest of the estate of her late husband. She claims that the proceeding
undertaken by the special masters by virtue of the reference order was a
continuation of the trial of MDL No. 840, considering that (1) a reference is
the trial and determination of questions arising in litigation by a person
appointed for that purpose by the court wherein the case is pending; [23] (2) a
special master is an officer of the appointing court; and (3) the applicable
law pertaining to a reference and a master is Section 53 of the U.S. Rules of
Civil Procedure for the District Courts. Public respondent Judge then erred
in considering the proceeding as one for deposition as a mode of
discovery. Accordingly, in denying the petition for injunction he abdicated
the jurisdiction of the probate court in favor of the U.S. District Court of
Hawaii; he even made a turn-about since earlier, in his 9 September 1994
Order, he ruled that the Hawaii Court could not assert jurisdiction over the
Marcos assets.
In a Comment submitted on 5 September 1995 in compliance with our
resolution, petitioner offered no objection to the intervention of Mrs.
Marcos.
On 4 December 1995, we required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda on why this petition should not be dismissed for having become
moot and academic considering that the taking of the depositions by the
special masters appointed pursuant to the Reference Order issued by the
District Court of Hawaii had been completed on 27 November 1994.
Petitioner filed its Memorandum urging us to decide this case on the
merits even if the act to be enjoined had already been consummated in view
of the transcendental importance of the issues involved: sovereignty of the
Philippines and the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court of the
Philippines. There is a compelling need to seek an incisive ruling from
the highest tribunal of the land to uphold the exclusive jurisdiction of the
probate court and to protect this nations sovereignty from foreign
transgressions and preserve the same as supreme and inviolable. To
buttress its plea, it cites Salonga v. Cruz Pano [24] where we resolved the
case on its merits even if the issue raised had become moot and
academic.
Private respondents in their memorandum, reiterate that the petition
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction lacked the
verification required under Section 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court. They likewise submit that aside from the undisputed fact that the
act sought to be enjoined had already been completed, the judgment in
MDL No. 840 became final on 27 January 1995 and that the estate of
Ferdinand E. Marcos was adjudged to pay close to US$2 billion in
damages.
We dismiss the petition not only on the ground of mootness which,
generally, would justify dismissal. [25] We dismiss it also for lack of
merit.
It is settled that where the ground invoked in a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is abuse of discretion
--as in this case -- the abuse must be grave as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility; or, it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. [26] This remedy then is
extraordinary, and its use is restricted to truly extraordinary cases. [27]
The pleadings of the parties in this case and the record of SP. Proc.
No. 10279 fail to show that respondent Judge Villarama had, as charged
by petitioner, committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition
for a writ of preliminary injunction against the special masters.
In the first place, the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction was
not verified. Section 4 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court is very explicit in its
requirement that a preliminary injunction may be granted only when the
complaint is verified. Absence of verification makes an application or
petition for preliminary injunction patently insufficient both in form and
substance. [28]
In the second place, even if we disregard the requirement of verification
or consider the adverse parties in estoppel from raising the issue when they
allowed the petitioner to present evidence on the petition, we find that
respondent Judge Villarama committed no error in holding that petitioner
failed to prove that it had a clear and positive right to be protected.
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction:
(a) That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part
of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the
acts complained of, or in the performance of an act or acts, either for a
limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission or continuance of some act complained of during
the litigation or the non-performance thereof would probably work injustice
to the plaintiff; or
(c) That the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring
or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiff's
rights respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.
Under this rule, a clear and positive right especially calling for
judicial protection must be shown. Injunction is not a remedy to protect
or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue to
protect a right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an
act which does not give rise to a cause of action. There must exist an
actual right. [29]
We fail to comprehend what clear and positive right petitioner has
which may be violated by the issuance and implementation of the
Reference Order by the District Court of Hawaii. Petitioner seeks to
establish such a right by claiming that since the probate court was the
first to take cognizance of the settlement of the Marcos estate then
pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, it exercises
jurisdiction thereon to the exclusion of all other courts; and that,
accordingly, the District Court of Hawaii cannot assert jurisdiction over
the assets of said estate. The argument is like a loose cannon ball way
off its target.
For one, petitioner is unable to distinguish between the exclusive
right on jurisdiction of the probate court and the right contemplated by
the law on injunction. For another, Section 1 of Rule 73 refers to courts
in the Philippines and simply means that once a special proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of a decedent is filed in one of such courts,
that court has exclusive jurisdiction over said estate and no other special
proceedings involving the same subject matter may be filed before any
other court. Since foreign courts are not contemplated in Section 1, in no
way then can it be validly maintained that the District Court of Hawaii
has encroached upon, or impinged on, the jurisdiction of the probate
court by the issuance of the Reference Order. The Reference Order
cannot be construed as concerning or affecting the Marcos estate within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court. The duties of the special
masters as defined in the Reference Order were to prepare written
findings for submission to the jury regarding (a) whether the victims Philippine Government now respectfully requests this Honorable Court
identified in the claim forms suffered torture, summary execution or to allow the present suits to proceed to trial.
disappearance, and (b) the extent of the damages sustained. No extravagant
imagination can lead us to a conclusion that such duties do not involve any As regards the denial of the motion to cite Messrs. Swift and
issue cognizable by the probate court. Domingo in contempt of court, we rule that the same was not tainted
with grave abuse of discretion. It must be recalled that they were not
Neither is there merit to the claim that the issuance and implementation
served a copy of the temporary restraining order which they allegedly
of the Reference Order violated the sovereignty of the Philippines.
defied.
It is noteworthy that petitioner was aware of the pendency of MDL No.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Order
840 of the District Court of Hawaii. In fact, it did not oppose the action; on
of 2 November 1992 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig
the contrary, it urged the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth District to
City, is AFFIRMED in toto.
allow the trial of the human rights litigation against the former
strongman. Petitioner even exhorted the human rights victims to pursue the SO ORDERED.
justice which has eluded them for many years. In its Amicus
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban
Curiae Brief [30] filed before the U.S. District Court of Hawaii, petitioner
JJ., concur.
declared:

The government of the Republic of the Philippines support of their

claims. Because the international law principles are clear and agreed upon
by all nations, this judicial action does not have the capacity of disrupting
foreign relations between the concerned countries. The Government of the
Republic of the Philippines can state without hesitation or reservation that
its foreign relations with the United States will not be adversely affected if
these human rights claims against Ferdinand Marcos are heard in U.S.
courts; and, in fact, relations may well be improved if Filipino citizens see
that justice is available in U.S. courts. The Philippine Government has
previously expressed its deep concern to the U.S. Government about the
need for a just solution to the present suits against ex-President
Marcos. See Opinion No. 34, s. 1986, Ministry of Justice, Republic of the G.R. No. 95574 August 16, 1991
Philippines, dated April 23, 1986, attached hereto as Exhibit A. The
HADJI WAHIDA MUSA, HADJI SALMA MUSA, RIZAL MUSA and
BASSER MUSA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COROCOY D. MOSON, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, Cotabato City and HADJI
JAHARA ABDURAHIM, respondents.
Randolph C. Parcasio for petitioners.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Questions of jurisdiction of the Shari'a District Court, and of venue, in an
intestate proceeding are herein raised.
Involved is the intestate estate of the late Jamiri Musa, a Muslim, who
passed away on 31 December 1987. He had six (6) wives, three (3) of whom
he later divorced, and twenty three (23) children. He had extensive real and
personal properties located in the provinces of Maguindanao, Davao del Sur
and Davao Oriental. Petitioners, Hadji WAHIDA Musa and Hadji SALMA
Musa, are among those he divorced, while private respondent Hadji Jalai a
ABDURAHIM is one of the three (3) surviving widows, RIZAL Musa and
BASSER Musa are two (2) of his sons.
On 7 July 1989, Respondent ABDURAHIM filed a "Joint Petition for the
Administration and Settlement of the Inestate Estate of the Late Jamiri Musa
and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership," before the Shari'a District Court,
Fifth Sharia's District, with station at Cotabato City (SDC Spec. Proceedings
No. 89-19) (the Intestate Case). That Court embraces the province of
Maguindanao within its jurisdiction but not the provinces of Davao del
Sur and Oriental.
The Petition averred that the decedent Jamiri Musa a resident of Linao,
Upi, Maguindanao, left various properties located in the provinces of
Maguindanao (184 hectares), Davao del Sur (61 hectares), and Davao
Oriental (207 hectares). Aside from the settlement of the vast estate, also
prayed for was the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets of the
decedent and ABDURAHIM and the segregation and turn-over to the
latter of her one-half (1/2) share.
Appearing as oppositors were: Petitioners WAHIDA and SALMA, the
divorced wives, who also claim to be widows of the deceased: RIZAL,
Putih Musa, and Erum Musa, children of WAHIDA with the decedent;
and BASSER, another son. They alleged that venues was improperly
said and that the properties of the decedent located outside Aguinaldo
were beyond the jurisdiction of the Shari'a District. Court, Fifth Shari'a
District.
Finding the Joint Petition to be sufficient in form and substance,
Respondent Judge issued the Order of Publication on 1 July 1989 and
initially set the case for hearing on 18 September 1989.
All interested parties were duly represented during the hearing on said
date where petitioners, through counsel, manifested their desire to have
the case amicably settled, Respondent Judo "in the interest of peace and
harmony among the heirs of the deceased Jamiri Musa," appointed the
following as Special Administrators: ABDURAHIM, for all properties
situated in Maguindanao; RIZAL. for all properties situated in Davao
Oriental; and BASSER. for all properties situated in Davao del Sul.
However, on 4 October 1989, ABDURAHIM, in her manifestation and
Motion to Cite for Contempt," accused BASSER, among others, of having
allegedly fired upon the house of her son in-law in Maguindanao on 21
September 1989.
Whereupon, on 13 October 1989, an "Opposition to Petition for
Administration and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership" was filed by
Petitioners, alleging that ABDURAHIM was never legally married to the
decedent and, as such, there was "nothing to support her claim" of having
had a conjugal partnership with the latter; and that venue was improperly
laid. Petitioners also asked that RIZAL be issued Letters of Administration
instead.
In her Reply, filed on 25 October 1989, ABDURAHIM averred that, her
marriage to the decedent was admitted by the latter in various Deeds of Sale
he had signed, which were presented as documentary evidence. Since there
was no amicable settlement reached, hearings on the Joint Petition were
conducted, commencing on 27 December 1989.
On 16 May 1990, Respondent Judge, issued an Order appointing
ABDURAHIM as Regular Administratrix upon the finding that she was
legally married to the decedent. Petitioners moved for reconsideration.
In the interim, Respondent Judge issued an Amended Order, dated 4 June
1990, incorporating the testimonies of the two (2) other witnesses presented
by Petitioners, which were omitted in the Order, dated 16 May 1990.
Otherwise, the appointment of ABDURAHIM as Regular Administratrix
was maintained.
On 10 August 1990, Petitioners filed a "Motion for Reconsideration With
Motion to Dismiss," raising once again, mainly the questions of venue and
of jurisdiction of the respondent Court over the real properties of the
decedent situated in the provinces of Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental.
Respondent Judge denied both Motions and upheld the Court's
jurisdiction in his Order, dated 22 August 1990. Hence, the elevation of
the instant Petition for Prohibition before this Court seeking to enjoin
respondent Judge Corocoy D. Moson, presiding over the Shari'a District
Court, Fifth Shari'a District, from further taking action on the "Joint
Petition ."
Petitioners take the position that Respondent Judge should have
dismissed the Intestate Case for lack of jurisdiction and for improper
venue. Private respondent maintains the contrary.
We rule against Petitioners.
Pres. Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, explicitly provides that exclusive
original jurisdiction, in matters of settlement of the estate of deceased
Muslims, belong to Shari'a District Courts. Thus:
Art. 143. Original Jurisdiction.—The Shari'a District Court shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the
estate of deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of
administration or appointment of administrators or executors regardless
of the nature or the aggregate value of the property. (Chapter 1, Title I,
Book IV, par. (b), (Emphasis supplied).
Since the disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of a deceased
Muslim is, in fact, involved herein, the Joint Petition was correctly filed
before the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District.
In invoking improper venue, however, petitioners call attention to the Rules
of Court mandating that:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled.—If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location his estate, shall not be contested
in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original
case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73).
(Emphasis supplied).
It is then claimed that since the residence of the decedent at the time of his
death was actually in Davao City, not Maguindanao, as averred by
ABDUHARIM, the proceeding is beyond the jurisdiction of the Shari'a
District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, and that venue is more properly laid in
Davao City before the Regional Trial Court since there are no Shari'a
District Courts therein.
At this juncture, it should be recalled that the residence of the deceased in an
estate proceeding is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter
but merely of venue. The law of jurisdiction confers upon Courts of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) jurisdiction over all probate cases
independently of the place of residence of the deceased (In the matter of
the intestate estate of Kaw Singco, 74 Phil. 239 [1943]).
To all appearances, the decedent was a resident of both Linao, Upi,
Maguindanao, and Davao City. In fact, in various Deeds of Sale
presented as evidence by the parties, the decedent alternately stated his
place of residence as either Linao, Upi,Maguindanao which is the
residence of ABDURAHIM, or Davao City, where Petitioners reside. As
this Court held in Uytengsu v. Republic, 95 Phil. 890 (1954), "a man can
have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he
may have numerous places of residence." Venue, therefore, ordinarily
could be at either place of the decedent's residence, i.e., Maguindanao or
Davao City, but for the provisions of the Muslim Code vesting exclusive
original jurisdiction, in matters of disposition and settlement of estates
of deceased Muslims, in Shari'a District Courts (supra).
But petitioners also contend that the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a
District, presided over by respondent Judge, has no territorial
jurisdiction over properties of the decedent situated in the provinces of
Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental, citing as statutory authority therefor
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, which provides:
Art. 138. Shari'a judicial districts.—Five special judicial districts, each
to have one Shari'a District Court presided over by one judge, are
constituted as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) The Fifth Shari'a District, the Provinces of Maguindanao, North
Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, and the City of Cotabato.
Indeed, Davao del Sur and Davao Oriental are not comprised within the
Fifth Shari'a District.1âwphi1 In fact, those provinces are outside the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao created by Republic Act No.
6734, its Organic Act. But as stated in that law, "the Shari'a District Court
and the Shari'a Circuit Courts created under existing laws shall continue to
function as provided therein." (Art. IX, Sec. 13).
Additionally, the same Organic Act explicitly provides;
(4) Except in cases of successional rights, the regular courts shall acquire
jurisdiction over controversies involving real property outside the area of
autonomy. (Art. IX, Section 17[4]). (Emphasis supplied)
Since the subject intestate proceeding concerns successional rights, coupled
with the fact that the decedent was also a resident of Linao, Upi,
Maguindanao, owning real estate property located in that province, venue
has been properly laid with the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District,
winch is vested with territorial jurisdiction over Maguindanao,
notwithstanding the location in different provinces of the other real proper-
ties of the decedent.
A contrary ruling would only result in multiplicity of suits, to the detriment
of the expeditious settlement of estate proceedings (See Ngo Bun Tiong v.
Sayo, 30 June 1988,163 SCRA 237 [1988]). Besides, the judgment that may
be rendered by the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District, may be
executed in other provinces where the rest of the real estate is situated.
When an action covers various parcels of land situated in different provinces,
venue may be laid in the Court of First Instance of any of said provinces,
and the judgment rendered therein may be executed in other provinces
where the rest of the real estate is situated (National Bank v. Barreto, 52
Phil. 818 [1929]; Monte Piedad v. Rodrigo, 56 Phil. 310 [1931]; El
Hogar Filipino v. Seva ,57 Phil. 573 [L-1932]; Bank of P.I. v. Green, 57
Phil. 712 [1932]).
The Rules of Court likewise provide that the Court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other Courts(Rule 73, sec. 1). There
should be no impediment to the application of said Rules as they apply
suppletorily to the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, there being nothing
inconsistent with the provisions of the latter statute (Article 187 of said
Code).
And while Rule 73 provides that "the jurisdiction assumed by a court, so
far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record," we have taken cognizance of
this Petition for Prohibition considering that the jurisdiction of a Shari'a
District Court, a relatively new Court in our judicial system, has been
challenged.
WHEREFORE, this Petition for Prohibition is DENIED, and the case
hereby REMANDED to the Shari'a District Court, Fifth Shari'a District,
for continuation of the intestate proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
 HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAÑO, Presiding Judge of Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII, and
PRECIOSA B. GARCIA, respondents.

Francisco Carreon for petitioners.

Augusto G. Gatmaytan for private respondents.

MARTIN, J.:

These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word
"resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring
to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased persons, means.
Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a special administrator is
sought to be reviewed.

G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A.
MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch
Vl, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B.
GARCIA and AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance
of Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a
petition for letters of administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C,
alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a
property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila,
leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in
other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the
same time, she moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On
even date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion.

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner, A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8,
vs. 1973, contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition
for letters of administration has been served upon all persons interested in
the estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in the proceedings for
the appointment of a regular administrator as the surviving spouse of
Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment of a special
administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G.
Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed that she be appointed special
administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and as regular
administratrix after due hearing.
While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court,
Preciosa B. Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove Virginia G.
Fule as special administratrix alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground
raised in the motion for reconsideration of May 8, 1973 that her
appointment was obtained through erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete
misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has adverse interest against the
estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable as administratrix and as
officer of the court.
In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of
administration filed by Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First Instance of
Calamba, Laguna, was published on May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in
the Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation in Southern
Luzon.
On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for
the Appointment of Regular Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule. This
supplemental petition modified the original petition in four aspects: (1) the
allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased Amado G. Garcia, he was
elected as Constitutional Delegate for the First District of Laguna and his
last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the deletion of the
names of Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of
Amado G. Garcia; (3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was
simply listed as heir in the original petition, is the surviving spouse of
Amado G. Garcia and that she has expressly renounced her preferential
right to the administration of the estate in favor of Virginia G. Fule; and
(4) that Virginia G. Fule be appointed as the regular administratrix. The
admission of this supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa B.
Garcia for the reason, among others, that it attempts to confer
jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Laguna, of which the court
was not possessed at the beginning because the original petition was
deficient.
On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original
and supplemental petitions for letters of administration, raising the
issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the
estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as
special administratrix.
An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973,
praying for authority to take possession of properties of the decedent
allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as to secure cash advances
from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association,
Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion, calling attention to the
limitation made by Judge Malvar on the power of the special
administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of the personal and real
properties making up the state of the deceased."
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order,
received by Preciosa B. Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying the
motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the order of May 2, 1973,
appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting the
supplementation petition of May 18,1973.
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition,
because (1) jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest has
not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3)
Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she is not entitled to inherit from
the deceased Amado G. Garcia.
On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to
substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, reasoning that the said
Virginia G. Fule admitted before before the court that she is a full-blooded
sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with
whom the deceased Amado G. Garcia has no relation.
Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one,
to enjoin the special administratrix from taking possession of properties in
the hands of third persons which have not been determined as belonging to
Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the special administratrix for acting
outside her authority and against the interest of the estate; and still another,
filed in behalf of the minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for
want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue.
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus
motion of Virgina G. Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B.
Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the powers
of the special administratrix are those provided for in Section 2, Rule 80 of
the Rules of Court, 1subject only to the previous qualification made by the
court that the administration of the properties subject of the marketing
agreement with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association should remain with the latter; and that the special administratrix
had already been authorized in a previous order of August 20, 1973 to
take custody and possession of all papers and certificates of title and
personal effects of the decedent with the Canlubang Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the
Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., was
ordered to deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her
name without any qualifying words like "married to Amado Garcia"
does not appear. Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled
that the issue of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of
July 2, 1973, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the
appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental petition,
the failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original petition for letters
of administration in the place of residence of the decedent at the time of
his death was cured. Judge Malvar further held that Preciosa B. Garcia
had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her
objections thereto by praying to be appointed as special and regular
administratrix of the estate.
An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27,
1973 to clarify or reconsider the foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in
view of previous court order limiting the authority of the special
administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also
asked for the resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack of
cause of action, and also that filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia.
Resolution of her motions to substitute and remove the special
administratrix was likewise prayed for.
On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the
first, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motions to substitute and remove the
special administratrix, and the second, holding that the power allowed
the special administratrix enables her to conduct and submit an inventory of
the assets of the estate.
On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the
foregoing orders of November 28, 1973 and December 19, 1973, insofar as
they sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised by her: (a) legal standing
(cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d)
appointment, qualification and removal of special administratrix; and (e)
delivery to the special administratrix of checks and papers and effects in the
office of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association,
Inc.
On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying
Preciosa B. Garcia's motion for reconsideration of January 7, 1974. On July
19, 1974, Judge Malvar issued the other three questioned orders: one,
directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish Virginia G. Fule, as special
administratrix, copy of the statement of accounts and final liquidation of
sugar pool, as well as to deliver to her the corresponding amount due the
estate; another, directing Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule
two motor vehicles presumably belonging to the estate; and another,
directing Ramon Mercado to deliver to the court all certificates of title in his
possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified with the
word "single" or "married to Amado Garcia."
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C)
before Judge Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule presented the death certificate of
Amado G. Garcia showing that his residence at the time of his death was
Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented the residence
certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three months before his
death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that
Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his
death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention
for the first district of Laguna.
On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia
commenced a special action for certiorari and/or prohibition and
preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar
in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in the
alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of that court, viz., one
dated March 27, 1974, denying their motion for reconsideration of the
order denying their motion to dismiss the criminal and supplemental
petitions on the issue, among others, of jurisdiction, and the three others,
all dated July 19, 1974, directing the delivery of certain properties to the
special administratrix, Virginia G. Fule, and to the court.
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling
the proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the
Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia
G. Fule forthwith elevated the matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The
case was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.
However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the
Court of Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1,
1975 a petition for letters of administration before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No.
Q-19738, over the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On
February 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her
appointment as special administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente G.
Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as special
administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and
assumed the office.
For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge
Ericta of the pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the
Court of First Instance of Laguna, and the annulment of the proceedings
therein by the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975. She manifested,
however, her willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should the
decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the proceedings before the Court
of First Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become final,
it being the subject of a motion for reconsideration.
On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings
before his court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court of the final
outcome of the case pending before the Court of Appeals. This
notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December 11, 1975, an
"Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations."
On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to
Question Venue and Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in the
previous special appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling attention that the
decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration had been appealed to this Court; that the parties had already
filed their respective briefs; and that the case is still pending before the
Court.
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge
Ericta, issued an order granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for
Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the payments were for the
benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt on the validity of
the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna.
A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January
12,1976.
On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670,
a petition for certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul the
proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani Cruz
Paño from further acting in the case. A restraining order was issued on
February 9, 1976.
We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari
in G.R. No. L-42670 for the reasons and considerations hereinafter
stated.
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and
if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of
any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of
the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so
far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to
letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of
Court demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the
existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege
all the necessary facts, such as death, the name and last residence of the
decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this
is relied upon, and the right of the person who seeks administration, as next
of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the
intestate and his last residence within the country are foundation facts upon
which all subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest,
and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his
death, and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court
to grant letters of administration. 3
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1),
specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as
the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased
Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It could not have been intended to define
the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is
contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters.
Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The
power or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed and was
fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is
not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in
which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are
cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the
provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it
loses the power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a
loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court
may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may
thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it.
The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a
strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of
convenience to the parties. 5
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First
Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of
residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of numerous Courts
of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however, purposedly
fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. A fortiori,
the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of
will, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an
element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive
of venue. And it is upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court
properly considers the province where the estate of a deceased person
shall be settled as "venue." 6
2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides"
mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at
the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term
"resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from
"legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms
"residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the
light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. 7 In the application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature —
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or
place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. 9Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's
domicile. 10 No particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary. 11
3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B.
Garcia on the residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his
death. In her original petition for letters of administration before the Court
of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely stated
"(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba,
Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal
properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of venue. For her,
the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of the deceased Amado
G. Garcia. To say that as "property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also
resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the
contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death certificate
presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court and in other
papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue,
Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended petition,
Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place of
residence was at Calamba, Laguna."
On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased
Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon
City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove
the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. 12 As it is, the
death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence
by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that
his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel
Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the deceased's residence
certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death; the
Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971
turning over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the
Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the
Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring part of his interest
in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and
certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show
in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at
Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue
for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was
improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna.
Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to improper venue is
subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states:
"When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is
deemed waived." In the case before Us the Court of Appeals had reason
to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her
objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court of First
Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to
alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while
insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the
proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.
4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as
special administratrix is another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia
claims preference to the appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of
Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary
or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or
disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take
possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions
causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators
appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator was only
proper when the allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The
new Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment and such
appointment is now allowed when there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree
among themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special
administrator or not lies in the probate court. 15 That, however, is no
authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and
dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that
discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. There
is no reason why the same fundamental and legal principles governing the
choice of a regular administrator should not be taken into account in the
appointment of a special administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the judge to
consider the order of preference in the appointment of a regular
administrator in appointing a special administrator. After all, the
consideration that overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial
interest of the appointee in the estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law, the
widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive
property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For
such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in administering
the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. The good or bad
administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked
ownership of a property. 18
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the
widow of the late Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia
maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever with Amado
G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable
of any successional rights. 19 On this point, We rule that Preciosa B.
Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special
administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the issuance of such
appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular
administrator is appointed, 20 the appointing court does not determine
who are entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but who is entitled
to the administration. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in
the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on the
relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of
distribution. 21The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient
reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G.
Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated
therein that he is married to Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate of
candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for
the First District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein
the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. 23 Faced with these
documents and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the
surviving spouse of the late Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio. 24
5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs.
Court of Appeals, 25 this Court under its supervisory authority over all
inferior courts may properly decree that venue in the instant case was
properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the
interest of justice and avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City
court's exercise of jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Amado G. Garcia and the appointment of special
administratrix over the latter's estate be approved and authorized and the
Court of First Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from continuing with the
case and instead be required to transfer all the records thereof to the Court
of First Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings.

6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975,
granting the "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed
by Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, subject matter of G.R. No.
L-42670, and ordering the Canlubang Sugar Estate to deliver to her as G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013
special administratrix the sum of P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of
estate obligations is hereby upheld. AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and
MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia vs.
Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L-40502 and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby denied, MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES
with costs against petitioner. ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.

SO ORDERED. DECISION

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur. PEREZ, J.:

Muñoz Palma, J., took no part. This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court, primarily assailing the 28 November 2008
Decision rendered by the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 88589,1the decretal portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED.

The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2005, and the Order dated March
24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Piñas City are
AFFIRMED in toto.2

The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of
Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s
common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein
petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married.
Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria
Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented
by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.3 In
her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the
natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her
parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal
capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of
Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having
been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one
Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise,
among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her
Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition,
it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth ₱2,040,000.00 and
personal properties worth ₱2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of
Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her
appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia,
together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the
letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The
petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a
resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death.
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,7 the
petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should have been filed in
Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of
improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and
legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of
Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The
lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las
Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that
Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive
of the RTC decision reads:
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any
disqualification or incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of
administration over the estate of the decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore,
be issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by
this Court of a bond in the amount of ₱100,000.00 to be posted by her.9
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28
November 2008 Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court
of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes
lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence
at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from
1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld
the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of
Las Piñas City. The petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied
by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.
 The Issues
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals
Decision and Resolution on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND
THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION
WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF LAS PIÑAS;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED
TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT
ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE
PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.12
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the
province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional
Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed
by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent,
or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or
when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis
supplied).
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides,"
like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules –
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature –
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.13Even where the
statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence
and not domicile in the technical sense.14 Some cases make a distinction
between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same
meaning as the term "inhabitant."15In other words, "resides" should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual
or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.16 It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.17 Venue for
ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the
same meaning.18 As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue
provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or
place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.19
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be
faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement
of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from
the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting
Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for
the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on
the entry in Eliseo’s Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac
where they insist his estate should be settled. While the recitals in death
certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at the time of
his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts. Both
the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with
Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the
time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in
1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against
Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that
their marriage is void for being bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to the extent
of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders
untenable petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in
Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports
petitioners’ submission that the lower courts’ findings arose from an
erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of the
trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be
conclusive and binding upon this Court.21
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals
erred in declaring Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void
marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the
source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of
the parties to the marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was
the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Niñal v.
Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court,
in no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent
after the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from
voidable marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the
lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the
parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes.
Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage.24
It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has
taken place and it cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested
party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without
prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties
to the marriage.25
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose
successional rights would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to
Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death
of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an
action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an
issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory
heir,26 has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the
void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said
marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia,
we now proceed to determine whether or not the decedent’s marriage to
Amelia is void for being bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous
marriage between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no
less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and
signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in
Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent evidence of
marriage and the certification from the National Archive that no information
relative to the said marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of
the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage
was celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of
marriage can no longer be found in the National Archive, given the interval
of time, is not completely remote. Consequently, in the absence of any
showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and
Eliseo’s marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the
latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention that
Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of
Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred
persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin,
or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such
surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin,
or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the
death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one
or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for
Letters of Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition
for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and
must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and
residences of the creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate; JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
administration.

An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited

in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such
as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to
those whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are entitled to
share in the estate as distributees.28

In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by

the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With
the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her
filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the
administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway
this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the
right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good
grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law,
is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are
satisfied.29 Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one
of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested THIRD DIVISION
party within the purview of the law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of EDGAR SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 133743
merit. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Petitioner,
Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in toto. Present:
- versus - Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15,
Callejo, Sr., and 1998 Resolution[4] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of
Respondent. Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of
the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
x ---------------------------------------------------- x marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17,
1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar,
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 134029 Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased
Petitioner, Felicisimo.
- versus -
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee
Promulgated:
Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15,
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS
alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Respondent. February 6, 2007 Divorce[5] before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December
x 14, 1973.[6]

DECISION On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the
February 4, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995[2] and January
31, 1996[3] Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer,
Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A.[7] He had no children with respondent but
lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his
death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December
17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration[8] before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708
which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the
time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New
Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedents surviving heirs
are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son
by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal
and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does
not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership
assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of
Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss[9] on the grounds
of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed
that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in
the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence
prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal
personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo
since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry
Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined
her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal[10] of the petition. On February
28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order[11]denying the two motions to
dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed
on March 5, 1994 her opposition[12] thereto. She submitted documentary
evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his
public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house
in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought
sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce
issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove
that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been
dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to
marry her by virtue of paragraph 2,[13] Article 26 of the Family Code and
the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[14]
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis,
separately filed motions for reconsideration from the Order denying
their motions to dismiss.[15] They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of
the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate
respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would
impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256[16] of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his
first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge
Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order[17] denying
the motions for reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the
decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that venue
was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was
deemed moot and academic[18] because then Acting Presiding Judge
Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the
resolution of said motion.
 Mila filed a motion for inhibition[19] against Judge Tensuan
on November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for
reconsideration[20] from the Order denying their motion for reconsideration
arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order[21] granting
the motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by
Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
[22]
On April 24, 1995, the trial court required the parties to submit
their respective position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal
capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar
manifested[23] that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his
previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and
Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14,[24] and June 20,[25] 1995,
respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for
letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was
the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence,
the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not
in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to
file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with
Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of
absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not
valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino
citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot
be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of
Felicisimos legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration[26] and for the
disqualification[27] of Judge Arcangel but said motions were denied.[28]
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and
set aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision
dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12,
1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October
24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case
is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.[29]
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Rules of Court, the term place of residence of the decedent, for purposes
of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal,
actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a
person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that
although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he
actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of
administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal
capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the
Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[30] and Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera.[31] It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and
Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute
divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State
of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was
capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus
With the well-known rule express mandate of
paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the
reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227,
there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view
sweeping statement of Judge Arc[h]angel, that Article 26, par.
2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our
state against divorce in any form whatsoever. Indeed, courts
cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts should
do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the
law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the
Foreigner on December 14, 1992,[32] the Filipino
divorcee, shall x x x have capacity to remarry under
Philippine laws. For this reason, the marriage between the
deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as a
bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the
petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the judicial
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x
x x[33]
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions
reconsideration[34] which were denied by the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant
petition for review on certiorari.[35] Rodolfo later filed a manifestation
and motion to adopt the said petition which was granted.[36]
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist
that the venue of the subject petition for letters of administration was
improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a
resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings
in Nuval v. Guray[37] and Romualdez v.
[38]
RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, residence is synonymous with domicile
which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one
intends to return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at
any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the
petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to Felicisimo
was void and bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence
of the latters marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2,
Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair
vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such,
respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence,
she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid,
for and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition
for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
 Under Section 1,[39] Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for
letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the
Regional Trial Court of the province in which he resides at the time of his
death. In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals,[40] we laid down the
doctrinal rule for determining the residence as contradistinguished from
domicile of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement
of his estate:
[T]he term resides connotes ex vi termini actual residence as
distinguished from legal residence or domicile. This term
resides, like the terms residing and residence, is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of
the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application
of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute
uses the word domicile still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases
make a distinction between the terms residence and domicile
but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
inhabitant. In other words, resides should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal,
actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence
or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place
and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal
residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence
must be more than temporary.[41] (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that residence, for purposes
of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is
synonymous with domicile. The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are
inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election
cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between residence for
purposes of election laws and residence for purposes of fixing the venue
of actions. In election cases, residence and domicile are treated as
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when
absent, one has the intention of returning.[42] However, for purposes of
fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the residence of a person is his
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of
abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.[43] Hence, it
is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and
domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo
was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also
maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the
time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of
Absolute Sale[44] dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased
purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing
statements[45] from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General
Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address
of Felicisimo at 100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa. Respondent also presented proof of membership of the
deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association[46] and Ayala Country
Club, Inc.,[47] letter-envelopes[48] from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceaseds
children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceaseds calling
cards[49] stating that his home/city address is at 100 San Juanico, Ayala
Alabang Village, Muntinlupa while his office/provincial address is in
Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of
Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of
his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration
was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court[50] which has territorial
jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on
December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and
the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated
in MakatiCity as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3.[51] Thus,
the subject petition was validly filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the
petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of
whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly
remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to
Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code
took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not
retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26,
par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us
to rule in the affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[52] involved a marriage
between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was
subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the
latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the
alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal
partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the
validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in
the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,
799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of
divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
competent jurisdiction are to change the
existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both
from the bond. The marriage tie, when
thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind
either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the
law. When the law provides, in the nature
of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not
marry again, that party, as well as the
 other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of
the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent
is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over
the alleged conjugal property.[53]
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled
that she should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further,
she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It
held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that,
under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil
Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue
to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.[54] (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera[55] where
the Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the
said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing
the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that the
severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former
spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or
cast obloquy on the other.[56]
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals,[57] the Court stated that
where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling
in Van Dorn applies.[58] Although decided on December 22, 1998, the
divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code
provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of
limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The
ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties
in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a
necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained
abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino
cited Van Dorn stating that if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign
divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.[59] In Garcia v. Recio,[60] the Court likewise cited the
aforementioned case in relation to Article 26.[61]
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III,[62] the historical
background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the
Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino
signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known
as the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988.
Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37,
and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the
original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise
signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the
Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26.
As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside
the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code
deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article
26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of
the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to
the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces
its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held
therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the
alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to
remarry under Philippine law.[63] (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a
situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article
26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through
judicial precedent.
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering
its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no
possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable.[64] Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment
between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the
society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the
other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien
spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in
this case.

[65] [66]
Petitioners cite Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code in stating
that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are
concerned. However, in light of this Courts rulings in the cases discussed
above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.[67] In Alonzo v. Intermediate
Appellate Court,[68] the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by
its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first
concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions
the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should
never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as
this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable
part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives
of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not
independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and
justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure,
there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem
arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its
peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound,
because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just
the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do
instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that
justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and
must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded,
yielding like robots to the literal command without regard
to its cause and consequence. Courts are apt to err by
sticking too closely to the words of a law, so we are
warned, by Justice Holmes again, where these words
import a policy that goes beyond them.
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined
justice as the constant and perpetual wish to render every
one his due. That wish continues to motivate this Court
when it assesses the facts and the law in every case
brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential
ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants,
we interpret the law in a way that will render justice,
presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to
begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice.[69]
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce
decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed
Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving
spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to
prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the
U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio,[70] the Court laid down the specific guidelines
for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of
its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and
25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by
a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.[71]
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly
solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the
Marriage Certificate and the annotated text[72] of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in
accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and
proved.[73]
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry
respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal
personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she
may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that
were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6,[74] Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of
administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the
decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of
administration. A petition for letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person and must show, as
far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An interested person has been defined as one who would be
benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against
the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct,
and not merely indirect or contingent.[75]
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested
person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of
their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by
petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimos
capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was
validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be
considered as a co-owner under Article 144[76] of the Civil Code. This
provision governs the property relations between parties who live
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their
marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their
wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a
co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through
their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the
union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed
equal, unless the contrary is proven.[77]
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the
divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of
the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code
by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as
husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry.[78] In Saguid v. Court of
Appeals,[79] we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of
property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148
governs.[80] The Court described the property regime under this provision as
follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property
governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live
together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired
during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of
the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their
contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to
be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez,
which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties
acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an
adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is
essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests
upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the
nature of the case, asserts an affirmative
issue. Contentions must be proved by competent
evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the
partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
opponents defense. x x x[81]
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity
to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from
her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under
Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order
of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners motion to dismiss
and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners motion for
reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the
trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
 On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters
of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 99, over the estate of his parents, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. Q-91-8507.[1]Pending the appointment of a regular
administrator, Perico moved that he be appointed as special
administrator. He alleged that his brother, Rodolfo, was gradually
dissipating the assets of the estate. More particularly, Rodolfo was
receiving rentals from real properties without rendering any accounting,
and forcibly opening vaults belonging to their deceased parents and
disposing of the cash and valuables therein.
Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of
improper venue.[2] He argued that the deceased spouses did not reside in
Quezon City either during their lifetime or at the time of their
deaths. The decedents actual residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga,
[G.R. No. 128314. May 29, 2002] where his late mother used to run and operate a bakery. As the health of
his parents deteriorated due to old age, they stayed in Rodolfos
residence at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City, solely for the purpose
of obtaining medical treatment and hospitalization. Rodolfo submitted
RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
documentary evidence previously executed by the decedents, consisting
PERICO V. JAO, respondents.
of income tax returns, voters affidavits, statements of assets and
liabilities, real estate tax payments, motor vehicle registration and
DECISION passports, all indicating that their permanent residence was in Angeles
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: City, Pampanga.
In his opposition,[3] Perico countered that their deceased parents
Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao actually resided in Rodolfos house in Quezon City at the time of their
Tayag and Andrea V. Jao, who died intestate in 1988 and 1989, deaths. As a matter of fact, it was conclusively declared in their death
respectively. The decedents left real estate, cash, shares of stock and other certificates that their last residence before they died was at 61 Scout
personal properties. Gandia Street, Quezon City.[4] Rodolfo himself even supplied the entry
appearing on the death certificate of their mother, Andrea, and affixed
his own signature on the said document.
 Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave the information regarding
the decedents residence on the death certificates in good faith and through
honest mistake. He gave his residence only as reference, considering that
their parents were treated in their late years at the Medical City General
Hospital in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Their stay in his house was merely
transitory, in the same way that they were taken at different times for the
same purpose to Pericos residence at Legaspi Towers in Roxas
Boulevard. The death certificates could not, therefore, be deemed
conclusive evidence of the decedents residence in light of the other
documents showing otherwise.[5]
The court required the parties to submit their respective nominees for
the position.[6] Both failed to comply, whereupon the trial court ordered that
the petition be archived.[7]
Subsequently, Perico moved that the intestate proceedings be
revived.[8] After the parties submitted the names of their respective
nominees, the trial court designated Justice Carlos L. Sundiam as special
administrator of the estate of Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea Jao.[9]
On April 6, 1994, the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Rodolfo was
denied, to wit:
A mere perusal of the death certificates of the spouses issued separately in
1988 and 1989, respectively, confirm the fact that Quezon City was the last
place of residence of the decedents. Surprisingly, the entries appearing on
the death certificate of Andrea V. Jao were supplied by movant, Rodolfo V.
Jao, whose signature appears in said document. Movant, therefore, cannot
disown his own representation by taking an inconsistent position other than
his own admission. xxx xxx xxx.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, this court
DENIES for lack of merit movants motion to dismiss.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Rodolfo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35908. On December 11, 1996,
the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion of the
court a quo having been shown, the petition for certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED. The questioned order of the respondent Judge is
affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Rodolfos motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of
Appeals in the assailed resolution dated February 17, 1997.[12] Hence,
this petition for review, anchored on the following grounds:
I
RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND
IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE APPLICABLE
DECISION ALREADY RENDERED BY THIS HONORABLE
COURT.
II
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE RULING OF
THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF EUSEBIO VS.
EUSEBIO, 100 PHILS. 593, WHICH CLEARLY INTERPRETED WHAT
IS MEANT BY RESIDENCE IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 OF THE RULES
OF COURT.
III
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PHYSICAL
PRESENCE IN A PLACE AT THE TIME OF DEATH IS
DETERMINATIVE OF DECEDENTS RESIDENCE RATHER THAN
THE INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR
PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANOTHER PLACE.
IV
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING BY ANALOGY THE
RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 2 OF RULE 4 FOR THE
PURPOSE OF SERVING SUMMONS TO A DEFENDANT IN A
PERSONAL ACTION TO THE RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN SEC.
1 OF RULE 73 FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING VENUE IN
THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED.
V
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE
ENTRY OF PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE
RESPECTIVE DEATH CERTIFICATES OF THE DECEDENTS
RATHER THAN THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THE
CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR
PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.
VI
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE
OF ESTOPPEL AS AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH CAN NOT BE
MORE PERSUASIVE THAN THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE
DECEDENTS THEMSELVES TO ESTABLISH PERMANENT
RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.
VII
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE THE CLEAR ABUSE OF
DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT IN
INSISTING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF SP. PROCEEDING NO.
Q-91-8507.[13]
The main issue before us is: where should the settlement
proceedings be had --- in Pampanga, where the decedents had their
permanent residence, or in Quezon City, where they actually stayed
before their demise?
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Where estate of deceased persons be settled. If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or
an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted,
and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in
which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he
had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the be said that Eusebio changed his residence because, strictly speaking,
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not his physical presence in Quezon City was just temporary.
be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in
In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have
the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
transferred to petitioners Quezon City residence. Petitioner failed to
(underscoring ours)
sufficiently refute respondents assertion that their elderly parents stayed
in his house for some three to four years before they died in the late
Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or
1980s.
letters of administration granted in the proper court located in the province
where the decedent resides at the time of his death. Furthermore, the decedents respective death certificates state that
they were both residents of Quezon City at the time of their
Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio,
demise. Significantly, it was petitioner himself who filled up his late
et al.,[14] where we held that the situs of settlement proceedings shall be the
mothers death certificate. To our mind, this unqualifiedly shows that at
place where the decedent had his permanent residence or domicile at the
that time, at least, petitioner recognized his deceased mothers residence
time of death. In determining residence at the time of death, the following
to be Quezon City. Moreover, petitioner failed to contest the entry in
factors must be considered, namely, the decedent had: (a) capacity to choose
Ignacios death certificate, accomplished a year earlier by respondent.
and freedom of choice; (b) physical presence at the place chosen; and (c)
intention to stay therein permanently.[15] While it appears that the decedents The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in
in this case chose to be physically present in Quezon City for medical evidence, were thus properly considered and presumed to be correct by
convenience, petitioner avers that they never adopted Quezon City as their the court a quo. We agree with the appellate courts observation that
permanent residence. since the death certificates were accomplished even before petitioner
and respondent quarreled over their inheritance, they may be relied upon
The contention lacks merit.
to reflect the true situation at the time of their parents death.
The facts in Eusebio were different from those in the case at bar. The
The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents
decedent therein, Andres Eusebio, passed away while in the process of
residence at the time of death, over the numerous documentary
transferring his personal belongings to a house in Quezon City. He was then
evidence presented by petitioner. To be sure, the documents presented
suffering from a heart ailment and was advised by his doctor/son to
by petitioner pertained not toresidence at the time of death, as
purchase a Quezon City residence, which was nearer to his doctor. While he
required by the Rules of Court, but to permanent residence or
was able to acquire a house in Quezon City, Eusebio died even before he
domicile. In Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals,[16] we held:
could move therein. In said case, we ruled that Eusebio retained his
domicile --- and hence, residence --- in San Fernando, Pampanga. It cannot
xxx xxx xxx the term resides connotes ex vi termini actual residence as
distinguished from legal residence or domicile. This term resides, like
the terms residing and residence, is elastic and should be interpreted in the
light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73
of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
domicile still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms residence
and domicile but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term inhabitant. In other
words, resides should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or
place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile
requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones
domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary.[17]
Both the settlement court and the Court of Appeals found that the
decedents have been living with petitioner at the time of their deaths and for
some time prior thereto. We find this conclusion to be substantiated by the
evidence on record. A close perusal of the challenged decision shows that,
contrary to petitioners assertion, the court below considered not only the
decedents physical presence in Quezon City, but also other factors
indicating that the decedents stay therein was more than temporary. In the
absence of any substantial showing that the lower courts factual findings
stemmed from an erroneous apprehension of the evidence presented, the
same must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.
Petitioner strains to differentiate between the venue provisions
found in Rule 4, Section 2,[18] on ordinary civil actions, and Rule 73,
Section 1, which applies specifically to settlement proceedings. He
argues that while venue in the former understandably refers to actual
physical residence for the purpose of serving summons, it is the
permanent residence of the decedent which is significant in Rule 73,
Section 1. Petitioner insists that venue for the settlement of estates can
only refer to permanent residence or domicile because it is the place
where the records of the properties are kept and where most of the
decedents properties are located.
Petitioners argument fails to persuade.
It does not necessarily follow that the records of a persons
properties are kept in the place where he permanently resides. Neither
can it be presumed that a persons properties can be found mostly in the
place where he establishes his domicile. It may be that he has his
domicile in a place different from that where he keeps his records, or
where he maintains extensive personal and business interests. No
generalizations can thus be formulated on the matter, as the question of
where to keep records or retain properties is entirely dependent upon an
individuals choice and peculiarities.
At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he
differentiates between venue in ordinary civil actions and venue in
special proceedings. In Raymond v. Court of Appeals[19] and Bejer v.
Court of Appeals,[20] we ruled that venue for ordinary civil actions and
that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus
defined, residence, in the context of venue provisions, means nothing
more than a persons actual residence or place of abode, provided he
resides therein with continuity and consistency.[21] All told, the lower
court and the Court of Appeals correctly held that venue for the
settlement of the decedents intestate estate was properly laid in the Quezon x
City court. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED, and
the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35908 is
DECISION
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. ABAD, J.:
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez,
JJ., concur.
This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will executed
abroad by a foreigner although it has not been probated in its place of
execution.
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE G.R. No. 169144
PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL
OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH
PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT
OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, The Facts and the Case
On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who
MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and became a naturalized United States (U.S.) citizen, died single and
BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS, childless. In the last will and testament she executed inCalifornia, she
Petitioners, Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson, designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of
- versus - NACHURA, her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.
ABAD,
MENDOZA, and On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto),
SERENO,* JJ.
another brother of Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
ERNESTO PALAGANAS,
Respondent. Promulgated: Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Rupertas will and for his
appointment as special administrator of her estate.[1] On October 15,
January 26, 2011 2003, however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and
Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the
petition on the ground that Rupertas will should not be probated in
the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin
added that, assuming Rupertas will could be probated in the Philippines, it is
invalid nonetheless for having been executed under duress and without the
testators full understanding of the consequences of such act. Ernesto, they
claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of the estate.
Meantime, since Rupertas foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio,
were on separate occasions in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent
Ernesto filed a motion with the RTC for leave to take their deposition,
which it granted. On April, 13, 2004 the RTC directed the parties to submit
their memorandum on the issue of whether or not Rupertas U.S. will may be
probated in and allowed by a court in the Philippines.
On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order:[2] (a) admitting to probate
Rupertas last will; (b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special
administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in
the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.
Aggrieved by the RTCs order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA),[3] arguing that an unprobated will
executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first
time in the Philippines.
On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision,[4] affirming the assailed
order of the RTC,[5] holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate
of the will, subject to respondent Ernestos submission of the
authenticated copies of the documents specified in the order and his
posting of required bond. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of
the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and allowance of the
will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in
the Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is different from
reprobate, which refers to a will already probated and allowed
abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or
procedures. Unsatisfied with the decision, Manuel and Benjamin came
to this Court.
The Issue Presented
The key issue presented in this case is whether or not a will executed by
a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not
been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was
executed.
The Courts Ruling
Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by
foreigners abroad must first be probated and allowed in the country of
its execution before it can be probated here. This, they claim, ensures
prior compliance with the legal formalities of the country of its
execution. They insist that local courts can only allow probate of such wills
if the proponent proves that: (a) the testator has been admitted for probate in
such foreign country, (b) the will has been admitted to probate there under
its laws, (c) the probate court has jurisdiction over the proceedings, (d) the
law on probate procedure in that foreign country and proof of compliance
with the same, and (e) the legal requirements for the valid execution of a
will.
But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners
abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the
countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our
jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who
is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according
to the formalities observed in his country.[6]
In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC
of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the
settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the
executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person
interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator,
petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the
same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will
must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts;
(b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees
of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the
property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are
prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name
of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of
death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the
province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the estate he left in such province.[7] The rules do not
require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated
in the country of its execution.
In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and
allowed by the court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin
obviously have in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before
admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already
probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate
where the will is presented for the first time before a competent
court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of
Court. Contrary to petitioners stance, since this latter rule applies only to
reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In
reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the
foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be
established.
Besides, petitioners stand is fraught with impractically. If the instituted heirs
do not have the means to go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good
as depriving them outright of their inheritance, since our law requires that
no will shall pass either real or personal property unless the will has been
proved and allowed by the proper court.[8]

Notably, the assailed RTC order of June 17, 2004 is nothing more than an
initial ruling that the court can take cognizance of the petition for probate of
Rupertas will and that, in the meantime, it was designating Ernesto as
special administrator of the estate. The parties have yet to present evidence
of the due execution of the will, i.e. the testators state of mind at the time of
the execution and compliance with the formalities required of wills by the
laws of California. This explains the trial courts directive for Ernesto to
submit the duly authenticated copy of Rupertas will and the certified copies
of the Laws of Succession and Probate of Will of California.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court
of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV 83564 dated July 29, 2005.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
 x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, G.R. No. 177099
Petitioner, DECISION

- versus - NACHURA, J.:

SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP, Before us are the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari of
TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE SANTOS, petitioners Sebastian G. Agtarap (Sebastian)[1] and Eduardo G. Agtarap
and ABELARDO DAGORO, (Eduardo),[2] assailing the Decision dated November 21, 2006[3] and the
Respondents. Resolution dated March 27, 2007[4] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 73916.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
The antecedent facts and proceedings
SEBASTIAN G. AGTARAP,
Petitioner, G.R. No. 177192 On September 15, 1994, Eduardo filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 114, Pasay City, a verified petition for the judicial
Present:
settlement of the estate of his deceased father Joaquin Agtarap
- versus - CARPIO, J., (Joaquin). It was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 94-4055.
Chairperson,
NACHURA, The petition alleged that Joaquin died intestate on November 21,
PERALTA, 1964 in Pasay City without any known debts or obligations. During his
ABAD, and lifetime, Joaquin contracted two marriages, first with Lucia Garcia
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, JOSEPH MENDOZA, JJ. (Lucia),[5] and second with Caridad Garcia (Caridad). Lucia died on
AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER April 24, 1924. Joaquin and Lucia had three childrenJesus (died without
DE SANTOS, and ABELARDO DAGORO, Promulgated: issue), Milagros, and Jose (survived by three children, namely,
Respondents. Gloria,[6] Joseph, and Teresa[7]). Joaquin married Caridad on February 9,
June 8, 2011 1926. They also had three childrenEduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes
(survived by her daughter Cecile). At the time of his death, Joaquin left
two parcels of land with improvements in Pasay City, covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 873-(38254) and
874-(38255). Joseph, a grandson of Joaquin, had been leasing and
improving the said realties and had been appropriating for
himself P26,000.00 per month since April 1994.
Eduardo further alleged that there was an imperative need to appoint
him as special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate
assets and their civil fruits, pending the appointment of a regular
administrator. In addition, he prayed that an order be issued (a) confirming
and declaring the named compulsory heirs of Joaquin who would be entitled
to participate in the estate; (b) apportioning and allocating unto the named
heirs their aliquot shares in the estate in accordance with law; and (c)
entitling the distributees the right to receive and enter into possession those
parts of the estate individually awarded to them.
On September 26, 1994, the RTC issued an order setting the petition
for initial hearing and directing Eduardo to cause its publication.
On December 28, 1994, Sebastian filed his comment, generally
admitting the allegations in the petition, and conceding to the appointment
of Eduardo as special administrator.
Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their answer/opposition. They
alleged that the two subject lots belong to the conjugal partnership of
Joaquin with Lucia, and that, upon Lucias death in April 1924, they became
the pro indiviso owners of the subject properties. They said that their
residence was built with the exclusive money of their late father Jose, and
the expenses of the extensions to the house were shouldered by Gloria and
Teresa, while the restaurant (Manongs Restaurant) was built with the
exclusive money of Joseph and his business partner. They opposed the
appointment of Eduardo as administrator on the following grounds: (1)
he is not physically and mentally fit to do so; (2) his interest in the lots is
minimal; and (3) he does not possess the desire to earn. They claimed
that the best interests of the estate dictate that Joseph be appointed as
special or regular administrator.
On February 16, 1995, the RTC issued a resolution appointing
Eduardo as regular administrator of Joaquins estate. Consequently, it
issued him letters of administration.
On September 16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed an answer in
intervention, alleging that Mercedes is survived not only by her daughter
Cecile, but also by him as her husband. He also averred that there is a
need to appoint a special administrator to the estate, but claimed that
Eduardo is not the person best qualified for the task.
After the parties were given the opportunity to be heard and to
submit their respective proposed projects of partition, the RTC, on
October 23, 2000, issued an Order of Partition,[8] with the following
disposition
In the light of the filing by the heirs of their
respective proposed projects of partition and the payment
of inheritance taxes due the estate as early as 1965, and
there being no claim in Court against the estate of the
deceased, the estate of JOAQUIN AGTARAP is now
consequently ripe for distribution among the heirs minus
the surviving spouse Caridad Garcia who died on August
25, 1999.
 Considering that the bulk of the estate property were TCT NO. LOT NO. AREA/SQ.M. ZONAL
acquired during the existence of the second marriage as VALUE AMOUNT
shown by TCT No. (38254) and TCT No. (38255) which 38254 745-B-1 1,335 sq. m. P5,000.00 P6,675,000.00
showed on its face that decedent was married to Caridad 38255 745-B-2 1,331 sq. m. P5,000.00 P6,655,000.00
Garcia, which fact oppositors failed to contradict by evidence TOTAL-----------------------------------------------------------
other than their negative allegations, the greater part of the --P13,330,000.00
estate is perforce accounted by the second marriage and the
compulsory heirs thereunder. II BUILDINGS AND IMPROVEMENTS:

The Administrator, Eduardo Agtarap rendered a true BUILDING I (Lot # 745-B-1)

and just accounting of his administration from his date of ------------------------------ P350,000.00
assumption up to the year ending December 31, 1996 per BUILDING II (Lot # 745-B-2)
Financial and Accounting Report dated June 2, 1997 which ----------------------------- 320,000.00
was approved by the Court. The accounting report included Building Improvements
the income earned and received for the period and the -------------------------------------- 97,500.00
expenses incurred in the administration, sustenance and Restaurant
allowance of the widow. In accordance with said Financial ------------------------------------------------------ 80,000.00
and Accounting Report which was duly approved by this TOTAL
Court in its Resolution dated July 28, 1998 the deceased --------------------------------------------------------- P847,500.
JOAQUIN AGTARAP left real properties consisting of the 00
following:
TOTAL NET WORTH
I LAND: ----------------------------------------- P14,177,500.00

Two lots and two buildings with one garage quarter located WHEREFORE, the net assets of the estate of the late
at #3030 Agtarap St., Pasay City, covered by Transfer JOAQUIN AGTARAP with a total value
Certificate of Title Nos. 38254 and 38255 and registered with of P14,177,500.00, together with whatever interest from
the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City, Metro Manila, described bank deposits and all other incomes or increments thereof
as follows: accruing after the Accounting Report of December 31,
1996, after deducting therefrom the compensation of the
administrator and other expenses allowed by the Court, are 1) GLORIA (deceased) represented by Walter de
hereby ordered distributed as follows: Santos
- P295,364.57
TOTAL ESTATE P14,177,500.00 2) JOSEPH AGTARAP - P295,364.57
CARIDAD AGTARAP of the estate as her conjugal 3) TERESA AGTARAP - P295,364.57
share P7,088,750.00, the other half of P7,088,750.00 to be 4) PRISCILLA AGTARAP - P295,364.57
divided among the compulsory heirs as follows:
Hence, Priscilla Agtarap will inherit P295,364.57.
1) JOSE (deceased) - P1,181,548.30
2) MILAGROS (deceased) - P1,181,548.30 Adding their share from Milagros Agtarap, the following
3) MERCEDES (deceased) - P1,181,548.30 heirs of the first marriage stand to receive the total
4) SEBASTIAN - P1,181,548.30 amount of:
5) EDUARDO - P1,181,548.30
6) CARIDAD - P1,181,548.30 HEIRS OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE:

The share of Milagros Agtarap as compulsory heir in the 1) JOSEPH AGTARAP - P236,291.66 share from
amount of P1,181,548.30 and who died in 1996 will go to Milagros Agtarap
Teresa Agtarap and Joseph Agtarap, Walter de Santos and P295,364.57 as compulsory heir of
half brothers Eduardo and Sebastian Agtarap in equal P531,656.23 Jose Agtarap
proportions.
2) TERESA AGTARAP - P236,291.66 share from
TERESA AGTARAP - P236,291.66 Milagros Agtarap
JOSEPH AGTARAP - P236,291.66 P295,364.57 as compulsory heir of
WALTER DE SANTOS - P236,291.66 P531,656.23 Jose Agtarap
SEBASTIAN AGTARAP - P236,291.66
EDUARDO AGTARAP - P236,291.66 3) WALTER DE SANTOS - P236,291.66 share from
Milagros Agtarap
Jose Agtarap died in 1967. His compulsory heirs are as P295,364.57 as compulsory heir of
follows: P531,656.23 Jose Agtarap

COMPULSORY HEIRS: HEIRS OF THE SECOND MARRIAGE:


a) CARIDAD AGTARAP - died on August 25, 1999
P7,088,750.00 - as conjugal share
P1,181,458.30 - as compulsory heir
Total of P8,270,208.30
b) SEBASTIAN AGTARAP - P1,181,458.38 as compulsory heir
P 236,291.66 share from Milagros
c) EDUARDO AGTARAP - P1,181,458.38 as compulsory heir
P 236,291.66 share from Milagros
d) MERCEDES - as represented by Abelardo Dagoro as the
surviving spouse of a compulsory heir
P1,181,458.38
REMAINING HEIRS OF CARIDAD AGTARAP:
1) SEBASTIAN AGTARAP
2) EDUARDO AGTARAP
MERCEDES AGTARAP (Predeceased Caridad Agtarap)
In sum, Sebastian Agtarap and Eduardo Agtarap stand to
inherit:
SEBASTIAN P4,135,104.10 share from Caridad Garcia
P1,181,458.30 as compulsory heir
P 236,291.66 share from Milagros
P5,522,854.06
EDUARDO P4,135,104.10 share from Caridad Garcia
P1,181,458.30 as compulsory heir
P 236,291.66 share from Milagros
P5,522,854.06
SO ORDERED.[9]
Eduardo, Sebastian, and oppositors Joseph and Teresa filed their
respective motions for reconsideration.
On August 27, 2001, the RTC issued a resolution[10] denying the
motions for reconsideration of Eduardo and Sebastian, and granting that
of Joseph and Teresa. It also declared that the real estate properties
belonged to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia. It also
directed the modification of the October 23, 2000 Order of Partition to
reflect the correct sharing of the heirs.However, before the RTC could
issue a new order of partition, Eduardo and Sebastian both appealed to
the CA.
On November 21, 2006, the CA rendered its Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
appeals are DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed
Resolution dated August 27, 2001 is AFFIRMED and
pursuant thereto, the subject properties (Lot No. 745-B-1
[TCT No. 38254] and Lot No. 745-B-2 [TCT No. 38255])
and the estate of the late Joaquin Agtarap are hereby
partitioned as follows:
 The two (2) properties, together with their Santos and her
improvements, embraced by TCT No. 38254 and TCT No. daughter Samantha),
38255, respectively, are first to be distributed among the Joseph Agtarap and
following: Teresa Agtarap, (in
representation of
Lucia Mendietta - of the property. But since she is Milagros brother
deceased, her share Jose Agtarap) and
shall be inherited by 1/8 each shall be
Joaquin, Jesus, inherited by
Milagros and Jose in Mercedes
equal shares. (represented by her
husband Abelardo
Joaquin Agtarap - of the property and of the other Dagoro and her
half of the property daughter Cecile),
which pertains to Lucia Sebastian Eduardo,
Mendiettas share. all surnamed
Agtarap.
Jesus Agtarap - of Lucia Mendiettas share. But since
he is already deceased Jose Agtarap - of Lucia Mendiettas share. But
(and died without issue), since he died in
his inheritance shall, in 1967, his
turn, be acquired by inheritance shall be
Joaquin Agtarap. acquired by his wife
Priscilla, and
Milagros Agtarap - of Lucia Mendiettas share. But children Gloria
since she died in 1996 (represented by her
without issue, 5/8 of husband Walter de
her inheritance shall be Santos and her
inherited by Gloria daughter Samantha),
(represented by her Joseph Agtarap and
husband Walter de
 Teresa in equal shares. Agtarap, (in
representation of
Then, Joaquin Agtaraps estate, comprising three-fourths (3/4) Milagros brother
of the subject properties and its improvements, shall be Jose Agtarap) and
distributed as follows: 1/8 each shall be
inherited by
Caridad Garcia - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died Mercedes
in 1999, her share shall (represented by her
be inherited by her husband Abelardo
children namely Dagoro and her
Mercedes Agtarap daughter Cecile),
(represented by her Sebastian and
husband Abelardo Eduardo, all
Dagoro and her surnamed Agtarap.
daughter Cecilia),
Sebastian Agtarap and Jose Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since he died
Eduardo Agtarap in in 1967, his
their own right, inheritance shall be
dividing the inheritance acquired by his wife
in equal shares. Priscilla, and
children Gloria
Milagros Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since she (represented by her
died in 1996 without husband Walter de
issue, 5/8 of her Santos and her
inheritance shall be daughter Samantha),
inherited by Gloria Joseph Agtarap and
(represented by her Teresa Agtarap in
husband Walter de equal shares.
Santos and her daughter
Samantha), Joseph Mercedes Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since
Agtarap and Teresa she died in 1984,
 her inheritance shall be 3. The Court of Appeals erred in allowing
acquired by her violation of the law and in not applying the doctrines of
husband Abelardo collateral attack, estoppel, and res judicata.[13]
Dagoro and her
daughter Cecile in G.R. No. 177099
equal shares.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER TWELFTH
Sebastian Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. DIVISION) DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION
OVER THE ESTATE OF MILAGROS G. AGTARAP
Eduardo Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. AND ERRED IN DISTRIBUTING HER
INHERITANCE FROM THE ESTATE OF JOAQUIN
SO ORDERED.[11] AGTARAP NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE
OF HER LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT IN
Aggrieved, Sebastian and Eduardo filed their respective motions for VIOLATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENCE
reconsideration. OF TESTATE PROCEEDINGS OVER INTESTATE
PROCEEDINGS.
In its Resolution dated March 27, 2007, the CA denied both
motions. Hence, these petitions ascribing to the appellate court the II.
following errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER TWELFTH
G.R. No. 177192 DIVISION) ERRED IN DISMISSING THE DECISION
APPEALED FROM FOR LACK OF MERIT AND IN
1. The Court of Appeals erred in not considering the AFFIRMING THE ASSAILED RESOLUTION DATED
aforementioned important facts[12] which alter its Decision; AUGUST 27, 2001 OF THE LOWER
COURT HOLDING THAT THE PARCELS OF LAND
2. The Court of Appeals erred in not considering the COVERED BY TCT NO. 38254 AND TCT (NO.) 38255
necessity of hearing the issue of legitimacy of respondents as OF THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF
heirs; PASAY BELONG TO THE CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP OF JOAQUIN AGTARAP MARRIED
TO LUCIA GARCIA MENDIETTA
NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR REGISTRATION
 UNDER THEIR EXISTING CERTIFICATES OF TITLE
AS REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF JOAQUIN
AGTARAP, CASADO CON CARIDAD GARCIA. UNDER
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE, THE PROBATE COURT
HAS NO POWER TO DETERMINE THE OWNERSHIP
OF THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THESE
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE WHICH SHOULD BE
RESOLVED IN AN APPROPRIATE SEPARATE ACTION
FOR A TORRENS TITLE UNDER THE LAW IS
ENDOWED WITH INCONTESTABILITY UNTIL IT HAS
BEEN SET ASIDE IN THE MANNER INDICATED IN
THE LAW ITSELF.[14]
As regards his first and second assignments of error, Sebastian
contends that Joseph and Teresa failed to establish by competent evidence
that they are the legitimate heirs of their father Jose, and thus of their
grandfather Joaquin. He draws attention to the certificate of title (TCT No.
8026) they submitted, stating that the wife of their father Jose is
Presentacion Garcia, while they claim that their mother is Priscilla. He avers
that the marriage contracts proffered by Joseph and Teresa do not qualify as
the best evidence of Joses marriage with Priscilla, inasmuch as they were
not authenticated and formally offered in evidence. Sebastian also
asseverates that he actually questioned the legitimacy of Joseph and Teresa
as heirs of Joaquin in his motion to exclude them as heirs, and in his reply to
their opposition to the said motion. He further claims that the failure of
Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de Santos to oppose his motion to exclude
them as heirs had the effect of admitting the allegations therein. He points
out that his motion was denied by the RTC without a hearing.
With respect to his third assigned error, Sebastian maintains that
the certificates of title of real estate properties subject of the controversy
are in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia, and as
such are conclusive proof of their ownership thereof, and thus, they are
not subject to collateral attack, but should be threshed out in a separate
proceeding for that purpose. He likewise argues that estoppel applies
against the children of the first marriage, since none of them registered
any objection to the issuance of the TCTs in the name of Caridad and
Joaquin only. He avers that the estate must have already been settled in
light of the payment of the estate and inheritance tax by Milagros,
Joseph, and Teresa, resulting to the issuance of TCT No. 8925 in
Milagros name and of TCT No. 8026 in the names of Milagros and
Jose. He also alleges that res judicata is applicable as the court order
directing the deletion of the name of Lucia, and replacing it with the
name of Caridad, in the TCTs had long become final and executory.
In his own petition, with respect to his first assignment of error,
Eduardo alleges that the CA erroneously settled, together with the
settlement of the estate of Joaquin, the estates of Lucia, Jesus, Jose,
Mercedes, Gloria, and Milagros, in contravention of the principle of
settling only one estate in one proceeding. He particularly questions the
distribution of the estate of Milagros in the intestate proceedings despite
the fact that a proceeding was conducted in another court for the probate
of the will of Milagros, bequeathing all to Eduardo whatever share that
she would receive from Joaquins estate. He states that this violated the
rule on precedence of testate over intestate proceedings.
Anent his second assignment of error, Eduardo contends that the
CA gravely erred when it affirmed that the bulk of the realties subject of
this case belong to the first marriage of Joaquin to Lucia, notwithstanding
that the certificates of title were registered in the name of Joaquin
Agtarap casado con (married to) Caridad Garcia. According to him, the
RTC, acting as an intestate court with limited jurisdiction, was not vested
with the power and authority to determine questions of ownership, which
properly belongs to another court with general jurisdiction.
The Courts Ruling
As to Sebastians and Eduardos common issue on the ownership of the
subject real properties, we hold that the RTC, as an intestate court, had
jurisdiction to resolve the same.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate
or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of
the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not
extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings.[15] The patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely
exercises special and limited jurisdiction.[16] As held in several cases,[17] a
probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or
intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a
part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by
virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to
that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do as
regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be
included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is,
then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to
an ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a
final determination of the conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by
expediency and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an
intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion
from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to the final
determination of ownership in a separate action.[18] Second, if the
interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on
ownership.[19] Verily, its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or
collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the
inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.[20]
We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case
considering that the parties are all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of
third parties will be impaired by the resolution of the ownership
issue. More importantly, the determination of whether the subject
properties are conjugal is but collateral to the probate courts jurisdiction
to settle the estate of Joaquin.
It should be remembered that when Eduardo filed his verified
petition for judicial settlement of Joaquins estate, he alleged that the
subject properties were owned by Joaquin and Caridad since the TCTs
state that the lots were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap,
married to Caridad Garcia. He also admitted in his petition that Joaquin,
prior to contracting marriage with Caridad, contracted a first marriage with
Lucia. Oppositors to the petition, Joseph and Teresa, however, were able to
present proof before the RTC that TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 were derived
from a mother title, TCT No. 5239, dated March 17, 1920, in the name
of FRANCISCO VICTOR BARNES Y JOAQUIN AGTARAP, el primero
casado con Emilia Muscat, y el Segundo con Lucia Garcia
Mendietta(FRANCISCO VICTOR BARNES y JOAQUIN AGTARAP, the
first married to Emilia Muscat, and the second married to Lucia Garcia
Mendietta).[21] When TCT No. 5239 was divided between Francisco Barnes
and Joaquin Agtarap, TCT No. 10864, in the name of Joaquin Agtarap,
married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta, was issued for a parcel of land,
identified as Lot No. 745 of the Cadastral Survey of Pasay, Cadastral Case
No. 23, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 1368, consisting of 8,872 square
meters. This same lot was covered by TCT No. 5577 (32184)[22] issued on
April 23, 1937, also in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Lucia
Garcia Mendietta.
The findings of the RTC and the CA show that Lucia died on April
24, 1924, and subsequently, on February 9, 1926, Joaquin married
Caridad. It is worthy to note that TCT No. 5577 (32184) contained an
annotation, which reads
Ap-4966 NOTA: Se ha enmendado el presente certificado de
titulo, tal como aparece, tanchando las palabras con Lucia
Garcia Mendiet[t]a y poniendo en su lugar, entre lineas y en
tinta encarnada, las palabras en segundas nupcias con
Caridad Garcia, en complimiento de un orden de fecha 28 de
abril de 1937, dictada por el Hon. Sixto de la Costa, juez del
Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Rizal, en el expediente
cadastal No. 23, G.L.R.O. Cad. Record No. 1368; copia
de cual orden has sido presentada con el No.
4966 del Libro Diario, Tomo 6.0 y, archivada en el
Legajo T-No. 32184.
Pasig, Rizal, a 29 abril de 1937.[23]
Thus, per the order dated April 28, 1937 of Hon. Sixto de la Costa,
presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the phrase con
Lucia Garcia Mendiet[t]a was crossed out and replaced by en segundas
nuptias con Caridad Garcia, referring to the second marriage of Joaquin
to Caridad. It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that prior to the replacement
of Caridads name in TCT No. 32184, Lucia, upon her demise, already
left, as her estate, one-half (1/2) conjugal share in TCT No.
32184. Lucias share in the property covered by the said TCT was carried
over to the properties covered by the certificates of title derivative of
TCT No. 32184, now TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255. And as found by both
the RTC and the CA, Lucia was survived by her compulsory heirs
Joaquin, Jesus, Milagros, and Jose.
Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides that when the
marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or the wife, the
community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated,
and the debts thereof paid; in the testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse, and if both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership
shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either. Thus,
the RTC had jurisdiction to determine whether the properties are
conjugal as it had to liquidate the conjugal partnership to determine the
estate of the decedent. In fact, should Joseph and Teresa institute a
settlement proceeding for the intestate estate of Lucia, the same should
be consolidated with the settlement proceedings of Joaquin, being Lucias
spouse.[24]Accordingly, the CA correctly distributed the estate of Lucia, with
respect to the properties covered by TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 subject of
this case, to her compulsory heirs.
Therefore, in light of the foregoing evidence, as correctly found by the RTC
and the CA, the claim of Sebastian and Eduardo that TCT Nos. 38254 and
38255 conclusively show that the owners of the properties covered therein
were Joaquin and Caridad by virtue of the registration in the name of
Joaquin Agtarap casado con (married to) Caridad Garcia, deserves scant
consideration. This cannot be said to be a collateral attack on the said
TCTs. Indeed, simple possession of a certificate of title is not necessarily
conclusive of a holders true ownership of property.[25] A certificate of title
under the Torrens system aims to protect dominion; it cannot be used as an
instrument for the deprivation of ownership.[26] Thus, the fact that the
properties were registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to
Caridad Garcia, is not sufficient proof that the properties were acquired
during the spouses coverture.[27] The phrase married to Caridad Garcia in the
TCTs is merely descriptive of the civil status of Joaquin as the registered
owner, and does not necessarily prove that the realties are their conjugal
properties.[28]
Neither can Sebastians claim that Joaquins estate could have already been
settled in 1965 after the payment of the inheritance tax be upheld. Payment
of the inheritance tax, per se, does not settle the estate of a deceased
person. As provided in Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue
made. -- When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of
administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance
tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law,
have been paid, the court, on the application of the
executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the
estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the
residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same,
naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each
is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover
their respective shares from the executor or administrator,
or any other person having the same in his possession. If
there is a controversy before the court as to who are the
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive share to which each person is entitled under
the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment
of the obligations above mentioned has been made or
provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give
a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for
the payment of said obligations within such time as the
court directs.
Thus, an estate is settled and distributed among the heirs only after the
payment of the debts of the estate, funeral charges, expenses of
administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax. The records
of these cases do not show that these were complied with in 1965.
As regards the issue raised by Sebastian on the legitimacy of Joseph and
Teresa, suffice it to say that both the RTC and the CA found them to be
the legitimate children of Jose. The RTC found that Sebastian did not
present clear and convincing evidence to support his averments in his
motion to exclude them as heirs of Joaquin, aside from his negative
allegations. The RTC also noted the fact of Joseph and Teresa being the
children of Jose was never questioned by Sebastian and Eduardo, and the
latter two even admitted this in their petitions, as well as in the stipulation of
facts in the August 21, 1995 hearing.[29] Furthermore, the CA affirmed this
finding of fact in its November 21, 2006 Decision.[30]
Also, Sebastians insistence that Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de Santos are
not heirs to the estate of Joaquin cannot be sustained. Per its October 23,
2000 Order of Partition, the RTC found that Gloria Agtarap de Santos died
on May 4, 1995, and was later substituted in the proceedings below by her
husband Walter de Santos. Gloria begot a daughter with Walter de Santos,
Georgina Samantha de Santos. The RTC likewise noted that, on September
16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed a motion for leave of court to intervene,
alleging that he is the surviving spouse of Mercedes Agtarap and the father
of Cecilia Agtarap Dagoro, and his answer in intervention. The RTC later
granted the motion, thereby admitting his answer on October 18,
1995.[31] The CA also noted that, during the hearing of the motion to
intervene on October 18, 1995, Sebastian and Eduardo did not interpose any
objection when the intervention was submitted to the RTC for resolution.[32]
Indeed, this Court is not a trier of facts, and there appears no
compelling reason to hold that both courts erred in ruling that Joseph,
Teresa, Walter de Santos, and Abelardo Dagoro rightfully participated in the
estate of Joaquin. It was incumbent upon Sebastian to present competent
evidence to refute his and Eduardos admissions that Joseph and Teresa were
heirs of Jose, and thus rightful heirs of Joaquin, and to timely object to the
participation of Walter de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro. Unfortunately,
Sebastian failed to do so. Nevertheless, Walter de Santos and Abelardo
Dagoro had the right to participate in the estate in representation of the
Joaquins compulsory heirs, Gloria and Mercedes, respectively.[33]
This Court also differs from Eduardos asseveration that the CA
erred in settling, together with Joaquins estate, the respective estates of
Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and Gloria. A perusal of the November 21,
2006 CA Decision would readily show that the disposition of the
properties related only to the settlement of the estate of
Joaquin. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, as cited
above, the RTC was specifically granted jurisdiction to determine who
are the lawful heirs of Joaquin, as well as their respective shares after
the payment of the obligations of the estate, as enumerated in the said
provision. The inclusion of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and Gloria in
the distribution of the shares was merely a necessary consequence of the
settlement of Joaquins estate, they being his legal heirs.
However, we agree with Eduardos position that the CA erred in
distributing Joaquins estate pertinent to the share allotted in favor of
Milagros. Eduardo was able to show that a separate proceeding was
instituted for the probate of the will allegedly executed by Milagros
before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City.[34] While there has been no
showing that the alleged will of Milagros, bequeathing all of her share
from Joaquins estate in favor of Eduardo, has already been probated and
approved, prudence dictates that this Court refrain from distributing
Milagros share in Joaquins estate.
It is also worthy to mention that Sebastian died on January 15, 2010, per
his Certificate of Death.[35] He is survived by his wife Teresita B.
Agtarap (Teresita) and his children Joaquin Julian B. Agtarap (Joaquin
Julian) and Ana Ma. Agtarap Panlilio (Ana Ma.).
Henceforth, in light of the foregoing, the assailed November 21, 2006
Decision and the March 27, 2007 Resolution of the CA should be affirmed
with modifications such that the share of Milagros shall not yet be
distributed until after the final determination of the probate of her purported
will, and that Sebastian shall be represented by his compulsory heirs.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177192 is DENIED for lack of
merit, while the petition in G.R. No. 177099 is PARTIALLY
GRANTED, such that the Decision dated November 21, 2006 and the
Resolution dated March 27, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: that the share
awarded in favor of Milagros Agtarap shall not be distributed until the final
determination of the probate of her will, and that petitioner Sebastian G.
Agtarap, in view of his demise on January 15, 2010, shall be represented by
his wife Teresita B. Agtarap and his children Joaquin Julian B. Agtarap and
Ana Ma. Agtarap Panlilio.
These cases are hereby remanded to the Regional Trial Court, Branch
114, Pasay City, for further proceedings in the settlement of the estate of
Joaquin Agtarap. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
*****
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 134100. September 29, 2000]
PURITA ALIPIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ROMEO G. JARING, represented by his Attorney-In-Fact
RAMON G. JARING, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
The question for decision in this case is whether a creditor can sue
the surviving spouse for the collection of a debt which is owed by the
conjugal partnership of gains, or whether such claim must be filed in
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent. The trial
court and the Court of Appeals ruled in the affirmative. We reverse.
The facts are as follows:
Respondent Romeo Jaring[1] was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare
fishpond in Barito, Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan. The lease was for a
period of five years ending on September 12, 1990. On June 19, 1987,
he subleased the fishpond, for the remaining period of his lease, to the
spouses Placido and Purita Alipio and the spouses Bienvenido and
Remedios Manuel. The stipulated amount of rent was P485,600.00,
payable in two installments of P300,000.00 and P185,600.00, with the
second installment falling due on June 30, 1989. Each of the four
sublessees signed the contract.
 The first installment was duly paid, but of the second installment, the case.[3] The Manuel spouses failed to file their answer. For this reason,
sublessees only satisfied a portion thereof, leaving an unpaid balance they were declared in default.
of P50,600.00. Despite due demand, the sublessees failed to comply with
On February 26, 1991, the lower court rendered judgment after trial,
their obligation, so that, on October 13, 1989, private respondent sued the
ordering petitioner and the Manuel spouses to pay private respondent the
Alipio and Manuel spouses for the collection of the said amount before the
unpaid balance of P50,600.00 plus attorney's fees in the amount
Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Dinalupihan, Bataan. In the alternative, he
of P10,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
prayed for the rescission of the sublease contract should the defendants fail
to pay the balance. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the
trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss. In its
Petitioner Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that
decision[4] rendered on July 10, 1997, the appellate court dismissed her
her husband, Placido Alipio, had passed away on December 1, 1988.[2] She
appeal. It held:
based her action on Rule 3, 21 of the 1964 Rules of Court which then
provided that "when the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest
The rule that an action for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon
thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First
must be dismissed when the defendant dies before final judgment in the
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially
regional trial court, does not apply where there are other defendants
provided in these rules." This provision has been amended so that now Rule
against whom the action should be maintained. This is the teaching
3, 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
of Climaco v. Siy Uy, wherein the Supreme Court held:
When the action is for the recovery of money arising from contract, express
Upon the facts alleged in the complaint, it is clear that Climaco had a
or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the
cause of action against the persons named as defendants therein. It was,
court in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not
however, a cause of action for the recovery of damages, that is, a sum of
be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final
money, and the corresponding action is, unfortunately, one that does not
judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be
survive upon the death of the defendant, in accordance with the
enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting
provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
claims against the estate of a deceased person.
xxxxxxxxx
The trial court denied petitioner's motion on the ground that since
petitioner was herself a party to the sublease contract, she could be
However, the deceased Siy Uy was not the only defendant, Manuel Co
independently impleaded in the suit together with the Manuel spouses and
was also named defendant in the complaint. Obviously, therefore, the
that the death of her husband merely resulted in his exclusion from the
order appealed from is erroneous insofar as it dismissed the case against
Co. (Underlining added)
Moreover, it is noted that all the defendants, including the deceased, were
signatories to the contract of sub-lease. The remaining defendants cannot
avoid the action by claiming that the death of one of the parties to the
contract has totally extinguished their obligation as held in Imperial
Insurance, Inc. v. David:
We find no merit in this appeal. Under the law and well settled
jurisprudence, when the obligation is a solidary one, the creditor may bring
his action in toto against any of the debtors obligated in solidum. Thus, if
husband and wife bound themselves jointly and severally, in case of his
death, her liability is independent of and separate from her husband's; she
may be sued for the whole debt and it would be error to hold that the claim
against her as well as the claim against her husband should be made in the
decedent's estate. (Agcaoili vs. Vda. de Agcaoili, 90 Phil. 97).[5]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied on June
4, 1998.[6] Hence this petition based on the following assignment of errors:
A. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN APPLYING CLIMACO v. SIY UY,
19 SCRA 858, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE
PETITIONER WAS NOT SEEKING THE DISMISSAL OF
THE CASE AGAINST REMAINING DEFENDANTS BUT
ONLY WITH RESPECT TO THE CLAIM FOR PAYMENT
AGAINST HER AND HER HUSBAND WHICH SHOULD BE
PROSECUTED AS A MONEY CLAIM.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN APPLYING IMPERIAL INSURANCE INC. v.
DAVID, 133 SCRA 317, WHICH IS NOT APPLICABLE
BECAUSE THE SPOUSES IN THIS CASE DID NOT BIND
THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY IN FAVOR
OF RESPONDENT JARING.[7]
The petition is meritorious. We hold that a creditor cannot sue the
surviving spouse of a decedent in an ordinary proceeding for the
collection of a sum of money chargeable against the conjugal
partnership and that the proper remedy is for him to file a claim in the
settlement of estate of the decedent.
First. Petitioner's husband died on December 1, 1988, more than
ten months before private respondent filed the collection suit in the trial
court on October 13, 1989. This case thus falls outside of the ambit of
Rule 3, 21 which deals with dismissals of collection suits because of the
death of the defendant during the pendency of the case and the
subsequent procedure to be undertaken by the plaintiff, i.e., the filing of
claim in the proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate. As
already noted, Rule 3, 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure now
provides that the case will be allowed to continue until entry of final
judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein will
then be enforced in the manner especially provided in the Rules for
prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. The issue to
be resolved is whether private respondent can, in the first place, file this
case against petitioner.
Petitioner and her late husband, together with the Manuel spouses,
signed the sublease contract binding themselves to pay the amount of
stipulated rent. Under the law, the Alipios' obligation (and also that of
the Manuels) is one which is chargeable against their conjugal
partnership. Under Art. 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal
partnership is liable for
All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same
purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership. [8]
When petitioner's husband died, their conjugal partnership was
automatically dissolved[9] and debts chargeable against it are to be paid in
the settlement of estate proceedings in accordance with Rule 73, 2 which
states:
Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. When the marriage is
dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall
be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in
the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses
have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or
intestate proceedings of either.
As held in Calma v. Taedo,[10] after the death of either of the spouses,
no complaint for the collection of indebtedness chargeable against the
conjugal partnership can be brought against the surviving spouse.Instead,
the claim must be made in the proceedings for the liquidation and settlement
of the conjugal property. The reason for this is that upon the death of one
spouse, the powers of administration of the surviving spouse ceases and is
passed to the administrator appointed by the court having jurisdiction over
the settlement of estate proceedings.[11] Indeed, the surviving spouse is not
even a de facto administrator such that conveyances made by him of any
property belonging to the partnership prior to the liquidation of the mass of
conjugal partnership property is void.[12]
The ruling in Calma v. Taedo was reaffirmed in the recent case
of Ventura v. Militante.[13] In that case, the surviving wife was sued in an
amended complaint for a sum of money based on an obligation allegedly
contracted by her and her late husband. The defendant, who had earlier
moved to dismiss the case, opposed the admission of the amended
complaint on the ground that the death of her husband terminated their
conjugal partnership and that the plaintiff's claim, which was chargeable
against the partnership, should be made in the proceedings for the
settlement of his estate. The trial court nevertheless admitted the
complaint and ruled, as the Court of Appeals did in this case, that since
the defendant was also a party to the obligation, the death of her
husband did not preclude the plaintiff from filing an ordinary collection
suit against her. On appeal, the Court reversed, holding that
as correctly argued by petitioner, the conjugal partnership terminates
upon the death of either spouse. . . . Where a complaint is brought
against the surviving spouse for the recovery of an indebtedness
chargeable against said conjugal [partnership], any judgment obtained
thereby is void. The proper action should be in the form of a claim to be
filed in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse.
In many cases as in the instant one, even after the death of one of the
spouses, there is no liquidation of the conjugal partnership. This does
not mean, however, that the conjugal partnership continues. And private
respondent cannot be said to have no remedy. Under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of
the Revised Rules of Court, he may apply in court for letters of
administration in his capacity as a principal creditor of the deceased . . .
if after thirty (30) days from his death, petitioner failed to apply for
administration or request that administration be granted to some other
person.[14]
The cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals in support of its
ruling, namely, Climaco v. Siy Uy[15] and Imperial Insurance, Inc. v.
David,[16] are based on different sets of facts. In Climaco, the defendants,
Carlos Siy Uy and Manuel Co, were sued for damages for malicious his claim against the Alipios with those against the Manuels considering
prosecution. Thus, apart from the fact the claim was not against any that, aside from petitioner's lack of authority to represent their conjugal
conjugal partnership, it was one which does not survive the death of estate, the inventory of the Alipios' conjugal property is necessary before
defendant Uy, which merely resulted in the dismissal of the case as to him any claim chargeable against it can be paid. Needless to say, such power
but not as to the remaining defendant Manuel Co. exclusively pertains to the court having jurisdiction over the settlement
of the decedent's estate and not to any other court.
With regard to the case of Imperial, the spouses therein jointly and
severally executed an indemnity agreement which became the basis of a Second. The trial court ordered petitioner and the Manuel spouses
collection suit filed against the wife after her husband had died. For this to pay private respondent the unpaid balance of the agreed rent in the
reason, the Court ruled that since the spouses' liability was solidary, the amount of P50,600.00 without specifying whether the amount is to be
surviving spouse could be independently sued in an ordinary action for the paid by them jointly or solidarily. In connection with this, Art. 1207 of
enforcement of the entire obligation. the Civil Code provides:
It must be noted that for marriages governed by the rules of conjugal
The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors in
partnership of gains, an obligation entered into by the husband and wife is
one and the same obligation does not imply that each one of the former
chargeable against their conjugal partnership and it is the partnership which
has a right to demand, or that each one of the latter is bound to render,
is primarily bound for its repayment.[17] Thus, when the spouses are sued for
entire compliance with the prestations. There is a solidary liability only
the enforcement of an obligation entered into by them, they are being
when the obligation expressly so estates, or when the law or the nature
impleaded in their capacity as representatives of the conjugal partnership
of the obligation requires solidarity.
and not as independent debtors such that the concept of joint or solidary
liability, as between them, does not apply. But even assuming the contrary
Indeed, if from the law or the nature or the wording of the obligation the
to be true, the nature of the obligation involved in this case, as will be
contrary does not appear, an obligation is presumed to be only joint, i.e.,
discussed later, is not solidary but rather merely joint, making Imperial still
the debt is divided into as many equal shares as there are debtors, each
inapplicable to this case.
debt being considered distinct from one another.[20]
From the foregoing, it is clear that private respondent cannot maintain
Private respondent does not cite any provision of law which
the present suit against petitioner. Rather, his remedy is to file a claim
provides that when there are two or more lessees, or in this case,
against the Alipios in the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
sublessees, the latter's obligation to pay the rent is solidary. To be
petitioner's husband or, if none has been commenced, he can file a petition
sure, should the lessees or sublessees refuse to vacate the leased
either for the issuance of letters of administration[18] or for the allowance of
property after the expiration of the lease period and despite due demands
will,[19] depending on whether petitioner's husband died intestate or
by the lessor, they can be held jointly and severally liable to pay for the
testate. Private respondent cannot short-circuit this procedure by lumping
use of the property. The basis of their solidary liability is not the
contract of lease or sublease but the fact that they have become joint
tortfeasors.[21] In the case at bar, there is no allegation that the sublessees
refused to vacate the fishpond after the expiration of the term of the
sublease. Indeed, the unpaid balance sought to be collected by private
respondent in his collection suit became due on June 30, 1989, long before
the sublease expired on September 12, 1990.
Neither does petitioner contend that it is the nature of lease that when
there are more than two lessees or sublessees their liability is solidary. On
the other hand, the pertinent portion of the contract involved in this case
reads:[22]
2. That the total lease rental for the sub-leased fishpond for the entire period
of three (3) years and two (2) months is FOUR HUNDRED EIGHT-FIVE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (P485,600.00) PESOS, including all the
improvements, prawns, milkfishes, crabs and related species thereon as well
all fishing equipment, paraphernalia and accessories. The said amount shall
be paid to the Sub-Lessor by the Sub-Lessees in the following manner, to
wit:
A. Three hundred thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos upon signing this contract;
and
B. One Hundred Eight-Five Thousand Six-Hundred (P185,6000.00) Pesos
to be paid on June 30, 1989.
Clearly, the liability of the sublessees is merely joint. Since the
obligation of the Manuel and Alipio spouses is chargeable against their
respective conjugal partnerships, the unpaid balance of P50,600.00 should
be divided into two so that each couple is liable to pay the amount
of P25,300.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Bienvenido Manuel
and Remedios Manuel are ordered to pay the amount of P25,300.00, the
attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00 and the costs of the suit.The
complaint against petitioner is dismissed without prejudice to the filing
of a claim by private respondent in the proceedings for the settlement of
estate of Placido Alipio for the collection of the share of the Alipio
spouses in the unpaid balance of the rent in the amount of P25,300.00.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 117417. September 21, 2000]
MILAGROS A. CORTES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and MENANDRO A. RESELVA, respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a reversal of the
decision dated September 9, 1994 of the Court of Appeals [1] in C.A.-G.R.
SP. No. 33826;
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GIVEN DUE
COURSE and the assailed order of October 18, 1993, issued by the
respondent court in Special Proceeding No. 90-54955 is hereby SET
ASIDE and declared NULL and VOID. With costs against the private
respondent."[2]
and the reinstatement of the order of the probate court, thus:
"WHEREFORE, Menandro Reselva and all those acting for or through him,
is/are ordered to vacate forthwith the house and lot of the estate situated in
173 Ilaw St., Balut, Tondo, Manila, and to deliver to the executrix Milagros
R. Cortes the possession thereof as well as the owner's duplicate certificate
of the title thereof."[3]
The following facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are undisputed:
"Herein petitioner Menandro A. Reselva, private respondent (petitioner in
this petition) Milagros R. Cortes, and Florante Reselva are brothers and
sister and children - heirs of the late spouses Teodoro T. Reselva and
Lucrecia Aguirre Reselva, who died on April 11, 1989 and May 13, 1987,
respectively. During their lifetime, they acquired a property particularly a
house and lot consisting of 100 square meters, more or less, with address at
173 Ilaw St., Balut, Tondo, Manila. As can be gleaned from the records,
Lucrecia Aguirre Reselva died ahead of Teodoro T. Reselva. The latter
executed a holographic will which was probated in this case on July 31,
1991, with Milagros R. Cortes, as the appointed Executrix. After having
been appointed and qualified as Executrix, she filed a motion before
respondent probate court praying that Menandro A. Reselva, the occupant of
the property, be ordered to vacate the property at No. 173 Ilaw St., Balut,
Tondo, Manila and turn over to said Executrix the possession thereof
(Annex 'D'). This is the motion which the respondent court granted in the
assailed order of October 18, 1993."[4]
In the Appellate Court, the Regional Trial Court's order was set
aside for having been issued beyond the latter's limited jurisdiction as a
probate court.[5]
The long standing rule is that probate courts, or those in charge of
proceedings whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine
title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and which are claimed
to belong to outside parties.[6] Stated otherwise, "claims for title to, or
right of possession of, personal or real property, made by the heirs
themselves, by title adverse to that of the deceased, or made by third
persons, cannot be entertained by the (probate) court."[7]
In the present case, however, private respondent Menandro A.
Reselva, who refused to vacate the house and lot being eyed as part of
the estate of the late Teodoro T. Reselva, cannot be considered an
"outside party" for he is one of the three compulsory heirs of the former.
As such, he is very much involved in the settlement of Teodoro's
estate.[8] By way of exception to the above-mentioned rule, "when the
parties are all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to
the probate court the question of title to property."[9] Here, the probate
court is competent to decide the question of ownership. More so, when
the opposing parties belong to the poor stratum of society and a separate
action would be most expensive and inexpedient.[10]
In addition, Menandro's claim is not at all adverse to, or in conflict
with that of, the decedent since the former's theory merely advances
co-ownership with the latter.[11] In the same way, when the controversy
is whether the property in issue belongs to the conjugal partnership or
exclusively to the decedent, the same is properly within the jurisdiction
of the probate court, which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal
partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to
be distributed among the heirs.[12]
 More importantly, the case at bar falls squarely under Rule 73, Section
2 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:
"RULE 73
"SEC. 2. Where estate upon dissolution of marriage. - When the marriage is
dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall
be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in
the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses
have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or
intestate proceedings of either."
Hence, in the 1991 case of Vita vs. Montanano we ruled:
"(I)t is not necessary to file a separate proceeding in court for the proper
disposition of the estate of Isidra Montanano. Under Rule 73, Section 2 of
the Rules of Court, if both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall
be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either. In the present
case, therefore, the conjugal partnership of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto
Vita should be liquidated in the testate proceedings of the latter."[13]
Consequently, this case before us should be returned to the probate
court for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Teodoro and Lucrecia
Reselva prior to the settlement of the estate of Teodoro.
WHEREFORE, without reinstating the assailed order of the trial court,
the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 9, 1994 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 33826 is hereby SET ASIDE and the case REMANDED to
the court of origin for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 77660 July 28, 1988
ELADIO DILLENA petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and AURORA CARREON, respondents.
Mario A. Batongbacal for petitioner.
Oscar A. Inocentes & Associates for respondent Aurora Carreon.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated
NOVEMBER 14, 1986 of the respondent Court of Appeals which
dismissed the petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 08404) filed by
herein petitioner Eladio Dillena to nullify the orders dated August 10,
1984, September 13, 1984 and October 28, 1985 of the RTC, Branch 84,
Quezon City, sitting as a probate court in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19378. The
said orders annulled the sale of fishponds under administration, executed
by private respondent Aurora Carreon, as administratrix of the estate
under administration in favor of petitioner, for the reason that said sale
was made without authority from and/or approval of the probate court.
The facts of this case as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
Spouses Dolores Sebastian and Rufino Carreon died on March 7, 1974
and August 21, 1974, in Quezon City and Manila, respectively, leaving
an adopted daughter Aurora Carreon, private respondent herein. On
October 21, 1974, Fausta Carreon Herrera, sister of the deceased Rufino
Carreon instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-19378 entitled "In the Matter of the
Intestate Estate of the Deceased Spouses Rufino B. Carreon and Dolores
Sebastian — Petition for Letters of Administration" before the then CFI,
Branch XXXI, Quezon City. On November 7, 1974, the said court
appointed Fausta Carreon Herrera as Special Administratrix only for the
purpose of receiving and collecting all sums of money due and payable to
the estate, in addition to the powers and duties provided for under Section 2,
Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.
On October 3, 1975, private respondent executed an Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate of the deceased spouses, adjudicating to herself all
the real properties of the said spouses.
On October 14, 1975, private respondent filed a motion to revoke the letters
of administration issued to Fausta Carreon Herrera. Accordingly, the lower
court, on March 31, 1976, granted the motion and allowed private
respondent to administer the properties of the estate. Thereafter, private
respondent acted as administratrix of the estate although it was only on June
27, 1980 that the appointment of private respondent was formalized and she
was granted letters of administration on July 1, 1980.
Meanwhile, on November 8, 1978, private respondent, while being the
administratrix of the estate, executed an extrajudicial adjudication of the
three (3) fishpond properties of the deceased spouses in Hagonoy, Bulacan.
By virtue of said extrajudicial adjudication, Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 140243, 140244 and 140245 in the names of the deceased spouses
were cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificates of Title were issued
in the name of private respondent.
On November 13, 1978, private respondent sold in favor of petitioner the
three fishponds in question without the knowledge and approval of the
probate court. Prior to the sale, petitioner had been leasing these
fishponds for several years. As a result of the sale, transfer certificates of
title over the said properties were issued in favor of petitioner.
Aside from the aforesaid sale, petitioner previously sold real properties
of the estate to Luisa S. Rodriguez on July 19, 1977 and to the Starlight
Industrial Co., Inc. on December 7, 1977. Both sales were likewise
made without the approval of the probate court. The said court, having
learned of the aforesaid transfers of the real properties without its
approval, issued an order dated September 22, 1981 requiring the three
vendees to appear on October 23, 1981 and to explain why the deeds of
sale, as well as the transfer certificates of title issued as a consequence
thereof, should not be cancelled for having been executed without court
approval.
The aforesaid vendees were duly furnished with copies of the order
dated September 22, 1981. Only Starlight Industries, Co., Inc. appeared
on October 23, 1981. Again, the vendees were required to submit their
respective explanations and the hearing on the incident was re-set to
November 11, 1981. Petitioner was again duly served with a copy of
said order.
At the scheduled hearing, Starlight Industries Co., Inc. submitted an
explanation, thus, the sale in its favor was approved and confirmed by
the probate court. However, vendees Luisa S. Rodriguez and petitioner
Eladio Dillena neither appeared at the scheduled hearing nor submitted
their explanations as to why the sales in their favor should not be
cancelled for having been executed without court approval.
On August 10, 1984, acting on the claim of Atty. Eugenio Balatbat for
attorney's fees on account of his legal services rendered to private
respondent and to the estate, the probate court approved the payment of said
fees to be paid out of the properties of the estate. The same was ordered
annotated as a lien on the transfer certificates of title of the real properties of
the estate, including those properties transferred by private respondent
without court approval.
On September 13, 1984, the lower court, on motion of Atty. Balatbat for a
definitive ruling as to the validity of the sale made by administratrix-private
respondent to Luisa S. Rodriguez and petitioner, declared that the transfers
in favor of the aforesaid vendees are null and void and without force and
effect for having been made without court authority and approval. Petitioner
was served with a copy of the said order on December 13, 1984.
On July 25, 1985, or after seven (7) months from the time the order of
September 13, 1984 was received by petitioner, the latter filed a petition
before the probate court in the same Sp. Proc No. Q-19378 by way of
special appearance alleging that said court, in view of its limited jurisdiction
as a probate court, has no power to annul the sale of the fishponds in
question; that the orders annulling the sale are void because he is not a party
to Sp. Proc. No. Q-19378; that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the
res, which are located in Bulacan province.
After hearing the petition and the opposition therein, the lower court, on
October 28, 1985, denied the petition and ordered petitioner to return
physical possession of the fishponds to private respondent. Petitioner sought
reconsideration of the aforesaid order which was denied.
On February 20, 1986, a petition for certiorari was instituted by petitioner
before the respondent Court of Appeals and as earlier mentioned, the said
court, on November 14, 1986, dismissed the petition. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied on March 2, 1987; hence, this petition.
In the present petition, petitioner sets forth as issues the following: 1)
that the Court of Appeals in upholding the order of the trial court,
deprived him of his property without due process of law because he was
not a proper party in the court a quo; 2) that the Court of Appeals
violated the rule that the jurisdiction of a court, when acting in the
settlement of the estate, is limited and cannot encroach upon questions
of ownership; and 3) that the nullification and revocation of the transfer
certificates of title were brought about by the dictate of the probate court
to annotate an attorney's lien thereon, an order which is discordant with
law and jurisprudence.
After a careful examination of the entire record of the case, We find the
instant Petition devoid of merit.
Anent the first issue, petitioner postulates that he was deprived of the
questioned fishponds without due process; and that not being an original
party before the probate court, he was not summoned thereto.
We are not persuaded. The probate court in its order dated September 22,
1981 issued in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction (Sec. 3, Rule 730,
required petitioner to appear before it on October 23, 1 981 to explain
why the deed of sale in favor of petitioner, as well as the transfer
certificates of title issued as a consequence thereof should not be
cancelled for having been executed without authority from and approval
of the court. Petitioner, despite receipt of the aforesaid order, failed to
appear on the scheduled date. However, the probate court still gave him
fifteen (15) days to submit the required explanation and the case was
re-set to November 11, 1981. But then again, petitioner, despite receipt
of the second notice requiring his appearance, chose not to appear and
totally ignored the order of the probate court to submit the explanation.
One who was given full opportunity to present his evidence and who
failed to do so cannot complain that he was denied due process when the
court rendered its decision (Ganadin vs. Ramos, 99 SCRA 613).
As found out by the Court of Appeals, petitioner was afforded every
opportunity to present his explanation but he repeatedly failed to appear on
the two scheduled hearings for the purpose. As said in Municipality of Daet
vs. Hidalgo Enterprises, 138 SCRA 265, and re-echoed in Divine Word
High School vs. NLRC, 143 SCRA 346, there is no denial of due process
where petitioner was afforded an opportunity to present his case.
Moreover, petitioner, on July 25, 1985, filed a petition before the probate
court, by way of special appearance, precisely questioning the power of the
said court to declare null and void the sale of the fishponds involved herein.
As has been stated, the lower court after hearing the petition and the
opposition thereto denied the same.
Clearly, petitioner was given full opportunity to present his case. Thus, We
give no credence to petitioner's assertion that he was denied due process of
law.
On the second issue, petitioner asseverates that the probate court, in view of
its limited jurisdiction, cannot declare as null and void, the sale of the
questioned properties.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the questioned properties
(fishponds) were included in the inventory of properties of the estate
submitted by then administratrix Fausta Carreon Herrera on November 14,
1974. Private respondent was appointed as administratrix of the estate on
March 31, 1976 in lieu of Fausta Carreon Herrera. On November 13, 1978,
the questioned deed of sale of the fishponds was executed between
petitioner and private respondent without notice to and approval of the
probate court. Even after the said sale, administratrix Aurora Carreon
still included the three fishponds as among the real properties of the
estate in her inventory submitted on August 13, 1981. In fact, as stated
by the Court of Appeals, petitioner, at the time of the sale of the
fishponds in question, knew that the same were part of the estate under
administration. Said the Court of Appeals:
Moreover, Dillena himself had knowledge that the fishponds are
included in the inventory of properties in the estate of the deceased
spouses and that they are under special proceedings, hence, no singular
act of Aurora Carreon could bind these fishponds more so as Dillena had
been leasing these fishponds for years. (Court of Appeals Decision, p.
7).
The evidence shows that when the questioned properties were sold
without court approval by private respondent to petitioner, the same
were under administration. The subject properties therefore are under
the jurisdiction of the probate court which according to our settled
jurisprudence has the authority to approve any disposition regarding
properties under administration.
An administratrix of an estate already subject of a special proceeding
pending before the probate court cannot enjoy blanket authority to
dispose of real properties as she pleases. More emphatic is the
declaration We made in Estate of Olave vs. Reyes (123 SCRA 767)
wherein We stated that when the estate of the deceased person is already
the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot
enter into any transaction involving it without prior approval of the
probate court.
Only recently, in Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (149 SCRA
174), We held that the sale of an immovable property belonging to an estate
of a decedent, in a special proceeding, needs court approval, thus:
Although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale of an
immovable property belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a special
proceeding, should be made with the approval of the court, this authority is
necessarily included in its capacity as a probate court.
This pronouncement finds support in the previous case of Dolores Vda. de
Gil vs. Agustin Cancio (14 SCRA 797) wherein We emphasized that it is
within the jurisdiction of a probate court to approve the sale of properties of
a deceased person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication.
Consequently, it is error to say that this matter should be threshed out in a
separate action.
It being settled that property under administration needs the approval of the
probate court before it can be disposed of, any unauthorized disposition
does not bind the estate and is null and void. As early as 1921 in the case of
Godoy vs. Orellano (42 Phil. 347), We laid down the rule that a sale by an
administrator of property of the deceased, which is not authorized by the
probate court is null and void and title does not pass to the purchaser.
There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare null and void
the disposition of the property under administration, made by private
respondent, the same having been effected without authority from the said
court. It is the probate court that has the power to authorize and/or approve
the sale (Sections 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is said court that can
declare it null and void for as long as the proceedings had not been closed or
terminated. To uphold petitioner's contention that the probate court cannot
annul the unauthorized sale, would render meaningless the power pertaining
to the said court. Sales of properties under administration which do not
comply with the requisites under sections 4 and 7 of Rule 89 are null
and void (Bonaga vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755).
On the third issue, petitioner questions the order of the probate court
allowing the annotation of an attorney's lien on the transfer certificate of
title of the estate subject of the special proceedings. Again, the issue
raised does not deserve any consideration because it is already settled
that the application to fix attorney's fees may be made before and passed
upon by the probate court in the same proceedings where attorney's
services were rendered (Palanca vs. Pecson, et al., 94 Phil. 419).
Finally, it may not be amiss to point out that the order dated September
13, 1984 of the probate court nullifying the deed of sale between
petitioner and private respondent was received by the former on
December 17, 1984. However, petitioner did not appeal from said order
to the appellate court. Instead, on July 25, 1985 or about seven (7)
months thereafter, petitioner filed a petition before the probate court
questioning the power of the said court to nullify the deed of sale which
petition was likewise denied on October 25, 1985.
In view thereof, the order dated September 13, 1984, nullifying the deed
of sale had long become final and executory for failure of petitioner to
appeal therefrom within the reglementary period. On this score alone,
the petition for certiorari which was belatedly filed by petitioner before
the Court of Appeals on February 20, 1986 should have been dismissed
outright because the remedy of certiorari does not lie where appeal has
been lost. certiorari cannot take the place of an appeal (Santos, Jr. vs.
Court of Appeals, 152 SCRA 378; De la Cruz vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 134 SCRA 417; Santiago vs. Castro, 128 SCRA 545).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the assailed decision is
hereby AFFIRMED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac dated November 12, 2007
THIRD DIVISION dismissing petitioner Angelita Valdezs petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of her husband, Sofio Polborosa (Sofio).
ANGELITA VALDEZ, G.R. No. 180863
Petitioner, The facts of the case are as follows:
Present:
Petitioner married Sofio on January 11, 1971 in Pateros, Rizal.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, On December 13, 1971, petitioner gave birth to the spouses only child,
Chairperson, Nancy. According to petitioner, she and Sofio argued constantly because
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO, the latter was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March
VELASCO, JR., 1972, Sofio left their conjugal dwelling. Petitioner and their child waited
NACHURA, and for him to return but, finally, in May 1972, petitioner decided to go back
PERALTA, JJ.
to her parents home in Bancay 1st, Camiling, Tarlac. Three years passed
without any word from Sofio. In October 1975, Sofio showed up at
Promulgated:
Bancay 1st. He and petitioner talked for several hours and they agreed to
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. September 8, 2009 separate. They executed a document to that effect.[1] That was the last
time petitioner saw him. After that, petitioner didnt hear any news of
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x Sofio, his whereabouts or even if he was alive or not.[2]

Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married

DECISION Virgilio Reyes on June 20, 1985.[3] Subsequently, however, Virgilios
application for naturalization filed with the United States Department of
NACHURA, J.: Homeland Security was denied because petitioners marriage to Sofio
was subsisting.[4] Hence, on March 29, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition
before the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac seeking the declaration of presumptive
death of Sofio.
The RTC rendered its Decision[5] on November 12, 2007, dismissing
the Petition for lack of merit. The RTC held that Angelita was not able to
prove the well-grounded belief that her husband Sofio Polborosa was
already dead. It said that under Article 41 of the Family Code, the present
spouse is burdened to prove that her spouse has been absent and that she has
a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the
present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. This belief, the RTC
said, must be the result of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and
efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse.
The RTC found that, by petitioners own admission, she did not try to
find her husband anymore in light of their mutual agreement to live
separately. Likewise, petitioners daughter testified that her mother
prevented her from looking for her father. The RTC also said there is a
strong possibility that Sofio is still alive, considering that he would have
been only 61 years old by then, and people who have reached their 60s have
not become increasingly low in health and spirits, and, even assuming as
true petitioners testimony that Sofio was a chain smoker and a drunkard,
there is no evidence that he continues to drink and smoke until now.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.[6] She argued that it is
the Civil Code that applies in this case and not the Family Code since
petitioners marriage to Sofio was celebrated on January 11, 1971, long
before the Family Code took effect. Petitioner further argued that she had
acquired a vested right under the provisions of the Civil Code and the
stricter provisions of the Family Code should not be applied against her
because Title XIV of the Civil Code, where Articles 384 and 390 on
declaration of absence and presumption of death, respectively, can be
found, was not expressly repealed by the Family Code. To apply the
stricter provisions of the Family Code will impair the rights petitioner
had acquired under the Civil Code.
The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution
dated December 10, 2007.[7]
Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking the reversal of
the RTC Decision and Motion for Reconsideration.
In its Manifestation and Motion,[8] the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) recommended that the Court set aside the assailed RTC
Decision and grant the Petition to declare Sofio presumptively dead. The
OSG argues that the requirement of well-founded belief under Article 41
of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case. It said that
petitioner could not be expected to comply with this requirement
because it was not yet in existence during her marriage to Virgilio Reyes
in 1985. The OSG further argues that before the effectivity of the Family
Code, petitioner already acquired a vested right as to the validity of her
marriage to Virgilio Reyes based on the presumed death of Sofio under
the Civil Code. This vested right and the presumption of Sofios death,
the OSG posits, could not be affected by the obligations created under
the Family Code.[9]
Next, the OSG contends that Article 390 of the Civil Code was
not repealed by Article 41 of the Family Code.[10] Title XIV of the Civil
Code, the OSG said, was not one of those expressly repealed by the Family
Code. Moreover, Article 256 of the Family Code provides that its provisions
shall not be retroactively applied if they will prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights.[11]
The RTC Decision, insofar as it dismissed the Petition, is affirmed.
However, we must state that we are denying the Petition on grounds
different from those cited in the RTC Decision.
Initially, we discuss a procedural issue. Under the Rules of Court, a
party may directly appeal to this Court from a decision of the trial court only
on pure questions of law. A question of law lies, on one hand, when the
Sofio and Virgilio on January 11, 1971 and June 20, 1985, respectively,
doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts; on
were both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil Code.
the other hand, a question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises
as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Here, the facts are not
disputed; the controversy merely relates to the correct application of the law
or jurisprudence to the undisputed facts.[12]
The RTC erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code and holding
that petitioner needed to prove a well-founded belief that Sofio was already
dead. The RTC applied Article 41 of the Family Code, to wit:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and
the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of
only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage
under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code
for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse.
It is readily apparent, however, that the marriages of petitioner to
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is Article 83:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any
person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such
person with any person other than such first spouse shall
be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee
being alive, of if the absentee, though he has been absent
for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead
 and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is
presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The
marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases
until declared null and void by a competent court.
Article 390 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being
unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be
presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of
succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the
purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten
years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years,
an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his
succession may be opened.
The Court, on several occasions, had interpreted the above-quoted
provision in this wise:
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary
to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee.
The declaration of absence made in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable
the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration
of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil
marriage, however, the law only requires that the former
spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does
not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such
former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the
spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration
of the marriage.[13]
Further, the Court explained that presumption of death cannot be the
subject of court proceedings independent of the settlement of the
absentees estate.
In re Szatraw[14] is instructive. In that case, petitioner contracted
marriage with a Polish national in 1937. They lived together as husband
and wife for three years. Sometime in 1940, the husband, on the pretext
of visiting some friends, left the conjugal abode with their child and
never returned. After inquiring from friends, petitioner found that her
husband went to Shanghai, China. However, friends who came
from Shanghai told her that the husband was not seen there. In 1948,
petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her
husband arguing that since the latter had been absent for more than
seven years and she had not heard any news from him and about her
child, she believes that he is dead. In deciding the case, the Court said:
The petition is not for the settlement of the estate
of Nicolai Szatraw, because it does not appear that he
possessed property brought to the marriage and because
he had acquired no property during his married life with
the petitioner. The rule invoked by the latter is merely
one of evidence which permits the court to presume that a
person is dead after the fact that such person had been
unheard from in seven years had been established. This
presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case,
either in an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried
or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent
court. Independently of such an action or special
proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be invoked,
nor can it be made the subject of an action or special
proceeding. In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor
is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner against her
absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final
determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of
a particular fact (Hagans v. Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880), for the
petition does not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's
husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be
presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven
years. If there is any pretense at securing a declaration that
the petitioner's husband is dead, such a pretension cannot be
granted because it is unauthorized. The petition is for a
declaration that the petitioner's husband is presumptively
dead. But this declaration, even if judicially made, would not
improve the petitioner's situation, because such a
presumption is already established by law. A judicial
pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory,
would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still
disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the
subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is
the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon
which a competent court has to pass. The latter must
decide finally the controversy between the parties, or
determine finally the right or status of a party or establish
finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights and
obligations arise or may arise; and once such controversy
is decided by a final judgment, or such right or status
determined, or such particular fact established, by a final
decree, then the judgment on the subject of the
controversy, or the decree upon the right or status of a
party or upon the existence of a particular fact,
becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral attack,
except in a few rare instances especially provided by law.
It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a
person is presumptively dead, because he had been
unheard from in seven years, being a
presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary
proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become
final. Proof of actual death of the person presumed dead
because he had been unheard from in seven years, would
have to be made in another proceeding to have such
particular fact finally determined. If a judicial decree
declaring a person presumptively dead, because he had
not been heard from in seven years, cannot become final
and executory even after the lapse of the reglementary
period within which an appeal may be taken, for such
presumption is still disputable and remains subject to
contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is
useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the
petitioner.[15]
In Lukban v. Republic,[16] petitioner Lourdes G. Lukban
contracted marriage with Francisco Chuidian on December 10, 1933. A
few days later, on December 27, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent
quarrel. She did not hear from him after that day. Her diligent search,
inquiries from his parents and friends, and search in his last known address,
proved futile. Believing her husband was already dead since he had been
absent for more than twenty years, petitioner filed a petition in 1956 for a
declaration that she is a widow of her husband who is presumed to be dead
and has no legal impediment to contract a subsequent marriage. On the other
hand, the antecedents in Gue v. Republic[17] are similar to Szatraw. On
January 5, 1946, Angelina Gues husband left Manila where they were
residing and went to Shanghai, China. From that day on, he had not been
heard of, had not written to her, nor in anyway communicated with her as to
his whereabouts. Despite her efforts and diligence, she failed to locate him.
After 11 years, she asked the court for a declaration of the presumption of
death of Willian Gue, pursuant to the provisions of Article 390 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
In both cases, the Court reiterated its ruling in Szatraw. It held that a
petition for judicial declaration that petitioner's husband is presumed to be
dead cannot be entertained because it is not authorized by law.[18]
From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that, under the Civil Code, the
presumption of death is established by law[19] and no court declaration is
needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to have taken
place by the seventh year of absence,[20] Sofio is to be presumed dead
starting October 1982.
Consequently, at the time of petitioners marriage to Virgilio, there
existed no impediment to petitioners capacity to marry, and the marriage is
valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.
Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof
of well-founded belief is not required. Petitioner could not have been
expected to comply with this requirement since the Family Code was not
yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. The enactment of the
Family Code in 1988 does not change this conclusion. The Family Code
itself states:
Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar
as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code
requiring petitioner to exhibit well-founded belief will, ultimately, result
in the invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at the time it
was celebrated. Such a situation would be untenable and would go
against the objectives that the Family Code wishes to achieve.
In sum, we hold that the Petition must be dismissed since no decree on
the presumption of Sofios death can be granted under the Civil Code, the
same presumption having arisen by operation of law. However, we
declare that petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio at the time their
marriage was celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, the said marriage is
legal and valid.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition
is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice