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Chinese nuclear forces, 2018

Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris

To cite this article: Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris (2018) Chinese nuclear forces, 2018,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 74:4, 289-295, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2018.1486620

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BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS
2018, VOL. 74, NO. 4, 289–295
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2018.1486620

NUCLEAR NOTEBOOK

Chinese nuclear forces, 2018

Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear China; nuclear weapons;
Information Project with the Federation of American Scientists, and Robert S. Norris, a senior ICBM; SLBM; SSBN; H-6
fellow with the FAS. The Nuclear Notebook column has been published in the Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists since 1987. This issue’s column examines China’s nuclear arsenal, which includes
about 280 warheads for delivery by ballistic missiles and bombers. This stockpile is likely to grow
further over the next decade.

China is continuing the nuclear weapons moderniza-
tion program it initiated in the 1980s, fielding more
types and greater numbers of nuclear weapons than
before. Since our previous Nuclear Notebook on
China in July 2016, the country has continued fielding
a new version of an existing nuclear medium-range
mobile ballistic missile, a new dual-capable intermedi-
ate-range mobile ballistic missile, and an improved
road-mobile launcher for an existing intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM). It has also continued develop-
ment of a road-mobile ICBM, and might be developing
an air-launched dual-capable ballistic missile.
Although there is no sign that the Chinese govern-
ment has officially diverted from its traditional nuclear
policy – a pledge not to use nuclear weapons first, not
to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries
or in nuclear-weapon-free zones, and to maintain only
a minimum deterrent designed to ensure a survivable
second-strike capability – its modernization program is
adding significant new capabilities. These qualitative
improvements may in turn influence Chinese nuclear
policy and strategy.
We estimate that China has a stockpile of approxi-
mately 280 nuclear warheads for delivery by 120 to 130
land-based ballistic missiles, 48 sea-based ballistic mis-
siles, and bombers (see Table 1). This stockpile is likely
to grow further over the next decade as additional
nuclear-capable missiles become operational.
Moreover, in response to the US deployment of missile
defense systems in the Pacific, China has equipped
some (or all) of its silo-based ICBMs with multiple
warheads. Although most missiles only carry one war-
head each, future ICBMs appear capable of using mul-
tiple independently targetable reentry vehicles
(MIRVs.) While many non-official sources attribute
very high numbers of warheads to MIRVed missiles
(for example, 10 warheads per DF-41), we believe the
purpose of the MIRV program is to ensure penetration
of US missile defenses, rather than to increase the
counterforce capability of the Chinese missile force.
We therefore estimate that the MIRVed missiles are
assigned a low number of warheads (perhaps three
each), and that most of the missile payload capability
is intended for decoys and penetration aids. As the
United States and to a lesser degree Russia strengthen
their missile defenses, China will likely further modify
its nuclear posture to ensure the credibility of its strike
force. This dynamic could potentially further increase
the size of the Chinese nuclear warhead inventory.
Although there are rumors that China might have
placed warheads on some of its missiles to increase their
readiness, we have not seen official sources confirming
this. Some Chinese military officials have advocated for
increasing the readiness of China’s nuclear missiles
(Kulacki 2016), and Admiral Philip Davidson, the
expected nominee to head the US Pacific Command,
told Congress in April 2018 that the “[Chinese People’s
Liberation Army] Rocket Forces maintain a high degree
of combat readiness” (Davidson 2018). High readiness
can be achieved without necessarily loading nuclear war-
heads onto the missiles, and Davidson may have been
referring to the portion of the Rocket Force operating
conventional missiles. China is thought to store most of
its warheads in its central storage facility in the Qinling
mountain range, and to a lesser degree at smaller regional
storage facilities.1
China’s land-based ballistic missile forces are orga-
nized under the PLA Rocket Force and PLA Strategic

CONTACT Hans M. Kristensen hkristensen@fas.org

© 2018 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
290 H. M. KRISTENSEN AND R. S. NORRIS

Table 1. Chinese nuclear forces, 2018.

Number of Range Warhead x yielda Number of
Type NATO designation launchers Year deployed (kilometers) (kilotons) warheads
Land-based ballistic missiles
sDF-4 CSS-3 ~5 1980 5,500+ 1 x 3,300 ~10
DF-5A CSS-4 Mod 2 ~10 1981 13,000+ 1 x 4,000–5,000 ~10
DF-5B CSS-4 Mod 3 ~10 2015 ~13,000 3 x 200–300 ~30
DF-15 CSS-6 ? 1990 600 1x? ?b
DF-21 CSS-5 Mods 2, 6 ~40 1991, 2000, 2,150 1 x 200–300 ~80c
2016
DF-26 ? 16 (2017) 4,000+ 1 x 200–300 16
DF-31 CSS-10 Mod 1 ~8 2006 7,000+ 1 x 200–300 ~8
DF-31A CSS-10 Mod 2 ~32 2007 11,000+ 1 x 200–300 ~32
DF-31AGd (CSS-10 Mod 3?) (16) (2017) ? (1 x ?) ?
DF-41 CSS-X-20 n.a. ? ? n.a. n.a.
Subtotal: ~121 ~186e
Submarine-launched ballistic
missilesf
JL-2 CSS-N-14 48 (2016) 7,000+ 1 x 200–300 48
Aircraft
H-6g B-6 (~20) 1965 3,100+ 1 x bomb (~20)
(1 x ALBM) 0
Fightersh ? ? ? n.a 1 x bomb ?
Cruise Missilesi
Total ~254 (280)j
a
The Chinese nuclear testing program demonstrated a wide range of warhead yields. While older and less accurate missiles were equipped with megaton-
yield warheads, new and more accurate missiles carry warheads with much lower yields, possibly in the low hundreds of kilotons. It is possible that some
warheads have even lower yield options.
b
The CIA concluded in 1993 that China “almost certainly” had developed a warhead for the DF-15, but it is unclear whether the capability was fielded.
c
This table only counts nuclear versions DF-21 (CSS-5 Mod 1) and DF-21A (CSS-5 Mod 2), each of which has fewer than 50 launchers deployed. The
conventional DF-21C and DF-21D are not counted.
d
The US designation for the DF-31AG (sometime called DF-31B) is not known. Nor is it clear if the DF-31AG TEL is simply an improved launcher for the
existing DF-31A ICBM or carries a new missile. Rumors about MIRV capability have not been confirmed.
e
The missile and warhead inventory may be larger than the number of launchers, some of which can be reused to fire additional missiles.
f
The former JL-1 SLBM and its warheads are thought to have been retired and dismantled.
g
Bombers were used to conduct at least 12 of China’s nuclear test explosions between 1965 and 1979. Gravity bomb models are displayed in museums, and
China is apparently developing a possible nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic missile for the H-6. Although they do not have an active nuclear mission,
we estimate that a small number of the bombers may have a secondary nuclear capability. Aircraft range is equivalent to combat radius, which for some
H-6 bombers can be extended with air refueling.
h
A fighter-bomber was used in a nuclear test in 1972 and models of tactical gravity bombs are exhibited at Chinese museums, but it is not clear whether a
tactical bomb capability has been fielded.
i
US military publications have from time to time attributed nuclear capability to various Chinese cruise missiles, an air-launched cruise missile being the most
consistent candidate.
j
The number in parentheses includes nearly 30 warheads produced for additional DF-26s and the DF-41, for a total stockpile of approximately 280 warheads.

Support Force. The Rocket Force is responsible for main-
taining conventional and nuclear weapons and the “abil-
ity to deter and strike across the entire defense area.” It
was established in 2016 to “enhance nuclear deterrence
and counter-strike capacity” with medium- and long-
range precision strike ability (Xinhua 2016).
Importantly, the Rocket Force will be responsible for all
strategic missiles, including those on navy submarines.
The Chinese defense ministry said the reorganization did
not mean a major change in its nuclear policy, which
would continue to be based on its no-first-use pledge and
defensive nuclear strategy (Global Times 2016).
Land-based ballistic missiles
China is continuing the modernization of its land-based
nuclear-capable missile force. Overall, we estimate that it
possesses approximately 120 nuclear-capable land-based
missiles that can carry 186 nuclear warheads. The force is
slowly increasing in both number and variety.
Over the past three years, China has fielded three
road-mobile nuclear-capable versions: a new modifica-
tion of the existing DF-21 (CSS-5) medium-range bal-
listic missile (MRBM), designated the CSS-5 Mod 6 by
the US military; a new IRBM known as the DF-26; and
a new ICBM launcher, the DF-31AG. China has also
made some of its silo-based DF-5 ICBMs capable of
carrying multiple warheads, and is working on com-
pleting development of the road-mobile DF-41, which
is also capable of carrying multiple warheads.
The modernization, which began in the 1980s, is part
of a transition from older, transportable, liquid-fuel,
slow-launching missiles to longer-range, road-mobile,
solid-fuel, quicker-launching missiles. The nuclear com-
mand and control systems needed to operate the missiles

are also being modernized. The end result will be a land-
based missile force better able to survive US (or Russian)
surprise attacks.
The National Air and Space Intelligence Center
(NASIC), part of the US Air Force, says that “China
continues to have the most active and diverse ballistic
missile development program in the world” (US Air
Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center 2017,
3). Most of that program is made up of conventional
short-range missiles. The nuclear portion of China’s
missile force is significantly smaller than the nuclear
missile arsenal of either Russia or the United States.
Most of China’s nuclear missiles are medium- and
intermediate-range, with launchers for ICBMs num-
bering between 50 and 75. The size of the ICBM
force has remained relatively stable over the past five
years but appears to be increasing again. The number
of missiles for the ICBM launchers is higher because
some types have one or two extra reloads per launcher.
The US Defense Department says there are 75 to 100
ICBMs available for the 50 to 75 launchers (US Defense
Department 2017, 95). The extra 25 reloads are thought
to be for the old DF-4s and potentially some of the
DF-31s.
Seventeen years ago, the US intelligence commu-
nity estimated that by 2015, China would have 75 to
100 warheads on ICBMs, primarily targeted at the
United States (CIA 2001, 3). This prediction did not
come to pass. Of China’s 50 to 75 ICBM launchers,
about 50 – capable of carrying about 70 warheads in
total – can target the continental United States
today.2 NASIC predicted in 2017 that the “number
of Chinese ICBM nuclear warheads capable of reach-
ing the United States could expand to well over 100
within the next 5 years” (NASIC 2017, 3). The United
States is a much bigger area than the “continental”
United States, and the 2017 projection appears to
include any ICBM that can hit any part of the coun-
try including Alaska, Hawaii, and possibly even the
territory of Guam. For the 2017 projection to come
true, China would have to MIRV all of its remaining
silo-based DF-5s and field a dozen MIRVed new
DF-41s.
The remaining liquid-fuel DF-3A (CSS-2) medium-
range missiles now appear to have been retired and the
last liquid-fuel mobile ICBM – the DF-4 (CSS-3) – is
down to a single brigade and will likely be retired in the
near future as well.
China’s 20 silo-based ICBMs include the DF-5A
(CSS-4 Mod 2) – a liquid-fueled, two-stage, ICBM
with a range in excess of 13,000 kilometers.3 The ori-
ginal DF-5 was fielded in the early 1980s. The second
deployed version of the DF-5 is the DF-5B (CSS-4 Mod
BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 291
3), which has been upgraded to carry MIRVs. It is
possible that China plans to equip all of its DF-5s
with MIRVs.
China’s primary regional nuclear missile is the two-
stage, solid-fuel, road-mobile DF-21A (CSS-5 Mod 2),
a medium-range ballistic missile with a range of about
2,150 km. Since 2016, China has been fielding a new
version, possibly known as DF-21E (CSS-5 Mod 6). We
estimate that China has approximately 40 launchers for
the nuclear DF-21, each of which has at least one
reload. China has also deployed two conventional ver-
sions of the DF-21, the DF-21C (CSS-4 Mod 4) land-
attack missile and the DF-21D (CSS-5 Mod 5) anti-ship
missile.
For the past decade, the focus of China’s ICBM
modernization has been the DF-31 (CSS-10 Mod 1)
and a longer-range version known as the DF-31A
(CSS-10 Mod 2). The DF-31, which was first deployed
in 2006 but now appears to have fewer than 10 launch-
ers assigned, is a three-stage, road-mobile missile that
is transported in a 15-meter canister on a six-axle
transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). The DF-31 has a
range of more than 7,000 km, but cannot reach the
continental United States. It is presumed to have taken
over much of the regional targeting (of Russia, India,
and Guam) previously done by the DF-4. The reasons
for the DF-31’s apparently slow introduction are
unclear.
The DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2) – a solid-fueled, three-
stage, road-mobile ICBM – is an extended-range ver-
sion of the DF-31, designed to reach targets in most of
the continental United States. China appears to con-
tinue to field additional DF-31As. We estimate that the
country deploys about 32 DF-31A ICBMs in four
brigades.
During a parade in 2017 celebrating the 90th anni-
versary of the People’s Liberation Army, China dis-
played the improved launcher known as the DF-
31AG. Rumors quickly emerged that it was for a new
ICBM, possibly even one with MIRV. But it remains to
be seen if it will carry the same missile as the DF-31A
launcher or a new version. The NASIC and Defense
Department 2017 reports did not mention the DF-
31AG.
Perhaps the biggest recent nuclear missile develop-
ment for China has been fielding the new DF-26 inter-
mediate-range road-mobile missile. First displayed
during a parade in 2016 and again in 2017, one or
two brigades now appear to have been equipped with
the DF-26. Like the existing DF-4 and DF-31 ICBMs,
the 4,000-km range DF-26 is capable of targeting
important US bases in Guam. Unlike the DF-4 and
DF-31, however, the DF-26 is thought to be dual-
292 H. M. KRISTENSEN AND R. S. NORRIS
capable, and so could also be used to target Guam or
aircraft carriers with conventional warheads.
China is still working on completing development of
the long-awaited DF-41 ICBM. The US Defense
Department says this missile is capable of carrying
MIRVs (US Defense Department 2017, 31), and
rumors have spread in the news media that the DF-
41 can carry six to 10 warheads (Gertz 2016.) As is
likely the case with the DF-5B, though, the number of
warheads the DF-41 carries might be significantly less,
perhaps three, and the additional payload capability
focused on decoys and penetration aids to overcome
the US ballistic missile defense system. If development
is successful, the DF-41 will likely replace the DF-5.
Land-based short-range ballistic missiles
All of China’s short-range ballistic missiles are conven-
tional with possibly one exception: the DF-15 (CSS-6).
After reporting that the nuclear test China conducted
on 16 August 1990, may have been “related to devel-
opment of a warhead for a Chinese short-range ballistic
missile” (CIA 1990, 1), the CIA concluded three years
later “that China will begin to field nuclear-armed CSS-
X-6’s next year.” The 1993 memorandum went on,
“China almost certainly has already developed the war-
head for this system. Testing might be needed for
formal weaponization or for additional warhead
options” (CIA 1993, 5). Despite the apparent nuclear
capability China developed at that time, it is unclear
whether it ever completed and fielded a nuclear war-
head for the DF-15. China might have developed the
capability as a possible option for future warhead min-
iaturization efforts.
Submarines and sea-based ballistic missiles
China currently operates a fleet of four Jin-class (Type
094) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines
(SSBNs). All are based at the Longposan naval base
near Yulin on Hainan Island.
Each Jin SSBN is designed to carry up to 12 JL-2s
(CSS-N-14), a submarine-launched ballistic missile
(SLBM) that is a modified version of the DF-31. Each
JL-2 is equipped with a single warhead (and, possibly,
penetration aids). The JL-2 has not been flight-tested to
its full range but is thought to have a range of 7,000-
plus km. A 2015 Pentagon report estimated its range is
7,400 km (US Defense Department 2015, 9), and a
2016 Pentagon report put the range at 7,200 km (US
Defense Department 2016, 26). The 2017 NASIC
report sets the range at 7,000-plus km (US Air Force,
National Air and Space Intelligence Center 2017, 33).
That would be sufficient to target Alaska, Guam,
Hawaii, Russia, and India from waters near China –
but unless the submarine carrying the weapon sailed
significantly eastward, it could not target the continen-
tal United States.
We are uncertain how many SSBNs China plans to
build. The US Office of Naval Intelligence predicted more
than a decade ago that China might build five Jin-class
SSBNs (Kristensen 2007). The 2015 Pentagon report
agreed with that projection, saying “up to five may enter
service” before China begins work on a next-generation
SSBN (US Defense Department 2015, 9), and the US
Director of National Intelligence stated in 2018 that
China “might produce additional JIN-class nuclear-pow-
ered ballistic missile submarines” (Coats 2018, 7).
Although the Jin-class is more advanced than
China’s first experimental SSBN – the single and now
inoperable Xia (Type 092) – it is still a very noisy
design (Kristensen 2009b). It seems more likely that
China will end production after five boats and turn its
efforts to develop and produce a better third-genera-
tion (Type 096) SSBN over the next decade. The next
SSBN is expected to carry a new missile, the JL-3.
It remains uncertain whether Jin submarines have
ever sailed on deterrent patrols with nuclear weapons
on board. US Chief of Naval Operations Vice Admiral
Joseph Mulloy said in early 2015 that one Chinese
SSBN had gone on a 95-day patrol (Osborne 2015).
In late 2015, STRATCOM Commander Admiral Cecil
Haney said Chinese SSBNs had been at sea, and that he
didn’t know if they had nukes on board but had to
assume they did (Gertz 2015). In early 2016, the head
of the US Defense Intelligence Agency said the Chinese
navy “deployed the JIN-class nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarine in 2015” on an extended patrol far
from Chinese waters (Stewart 2016, 12).
These statements indicate that although one of the
Jin submarines apparently sailed on an extended voy-
age in 2015, it is not clear that it carried nuclear war-
heads, or whether it was conducting a formal deterrent
patrol. The voyage might have been a first step towards
developing the capability to conduct deterrent patrols
in the future.
To achieve that capability, the Chinese SSBN fleet will
face several doctrinal, technical, and operational con-
straints. Although Chinese missile forces frequently prac-
tice the procedures required to load warheads onto
missiles, China’s Central Military Commission has long
resisted handing out nuclear warheads to the armed
services to deploy on missiles under normal circum-
stances. Giving custody of nuclear warheads to deployed
submarines during peacetime would constitute a signifi-
cant change of Chinese policy. Moreover, before doing

Figure 1. The JL-2 has insufficient range to target the continental United States from Chinese waters.
so, the Central Military Commission and China’s navy
would first have to build up experience to operate an
SSBN force during realistic military operations, which
would require development of improved command-and-
control technologies and procedures.
The SSBNs would also need a destination. Even if
China deployed nuclear-armed SSBNs to sea in a crisis,
where would they sail? For a JL-2 to be able to strike
targets in the continental United States, a Jin SSBN
would have to sail across the East China Sea and well
into the Pacific Ocean, through dangerous choke
points where it would draw attention and be vulnerable
to hostile antisubmarine warfare (see Figure 1).
China’s main concern is making sure that its mini-
mum nuclear deterrent would survive a first strike, and
for that reason it spends considerable resources on
modernizing and hiding its land-based missiles. This
frankly makes its submarine program puzzling, for it
seems much riskier for China to deploy nuclear weap-
ons at sea, where submarines can be sunk by adver-
saries, than to hide the nuclear weapons deep inside
China’s vast landmass (Kristensen 2014).
Bombers
We have estimated for years that Chinese H-6 bombers
don’t have a primary nuclear mission and that it might
even be dormant. The Pentagon appeared to reaffirm
this in 2017 when it said that the “[People’s Liberation
Army Air Force does not currently have a nuclear
mission” (US Defense Department 2017, 61), the first
time in recent memory that the Pentagon has made
such an assessment public.
However, while the H-6 bombers do not have a current
nuclear mission, some of them may still be nuclear capable.
BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 293
Aircraft, including the H-6, were used to deliver at least 12
of the nuclear weapons that China detonated in its nuclear
testing program between 1965 and 1979. A Defense
Intelligence Agency brief in 1984 estimated China had
about 165 nuclear bombs for aircraft, although the agency
also said “we are unable to identify associated airfield
storage sites” (US Defense Intelligence Agency 1984,
3–4). By the end of the 1980s, the agency reduced the
estimate to 75 bombs, but said H-6 (Tu-16) and H-5 (Tu-
28) medium-range bombers and A-5 fighter-bombers
were “all capable of delivering nuclear weapons” (US
Defense Intelligence Agency 1989, 3). Furthermore, var-
ious Chinese military museums display a variety of what
are said to be strategic and tactical nuclear bombs
(GlobalSecurity.org [n.d.]). We estimate the stockpile
might include a small inventory – perhaps up to 20 –
gravity bombs for aircraft.
The strategic role of the bomber force appears to be
increasing. The PLA Air Force was assigned a “strategic
deterrence” mission in 2012, which includes long-range
strikes with conventional cruise missiles. Moreover, the
Defense Intelligence Agency reported in 2016 that China
was developing two air-launched ballistic missiles for the
H-6 bomber, “one of which might include a nuclear pay-
load” (Stewart 2016, 10). This appears to involve yet
another modification of the H-6 bomber known as the
H-6N carrying an air-launched version of the DF-21 med-
ium-range ballistic missile (Rogoway 2017), designated by
the US intelligence community as CH-AS-X-13 (Panda
2018).
Chinese officials announced in 2016 that China is devel-
oping a new long-range bomber that US officials expect will
have a nuclear mission (Coats 2018; 7; US Defense
Department 2017; 61). The new bomber might become
operational by the mid- or late-2020s. If the new bomber
294 H. M. KRISTENSEN AND R. S. NORRIS
gets a nuclear mission, China would have developed a
“triad” of nuclear delivery systems similar to (but smaller
than) those of the United States and Russia.
Cruise missiles
From time to time, various US military publications
assert somewhat ambivalently that one or more of
China’s cruise missiles might have a nuclear capability.
The CIA concluded in 1995 that a Chinese test
scheduled for that year “may include warhead testing
for . . . a cruise missile” (CIA 1995). And in 2013, a US
Air Force Global Strike command briefing listed the
CJ-20 air-launched land-attack cruise missile carried
by the H-6K as possibly dual-capable (Kristensen
2013).
Likewise, in 2009 NASIC described the DH-10
ground-launched cruise missile as “conventional or
nuclear,” but in 2017 designated it and all other
Chinese air-launched land-attack cruise missiles “con-
ventional” (US Air Force, National Air and Space
Intelligence Center 2017, 37). Even so, a nuclear moder-
nization fact sheet published by the Pentagon in connec-
tion with the release of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review
claimed that China possessed both air-launched and sea-
launched nuclear cruise missiles (US Defense
Department 2018). It did not identify them.
Although China might have developed warhead
designs for potential use in cruise missiles, these con-
flicting statements should be evaluated with caution.
Notes
1. Nuclear weapons are stored in central facilities under the
control of the Central Military Commission. Should China
come under nuclear threat, the weapons would be released
to the Second Artillery Corps to enable missile brigades to
go on alert and prepare to retaliate. For a description of the
Chinese alerting concept, see Kristensen (2009a). For more
on warhead storage in China, see Stokes (2010). For an
overview of PLA Rocket Force structure and organization,
see Stokes (2018).
2. The “continental United States,” as used here, includes
only the lower 48 states. US states and territories outside
of the continental United States include Alaska, Hawaii,
Guam, American Samoa, and many tiny Pacific islands.
3. One kilometer equals 0.62 miles.
Disclosure statement
This research was carried out with grants from the John D.
and Katherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the New Lands
Foundation, and the Ploughshares Fund.
Notes on contributors
Hans M. Kristensen is the director of the Nuclear
Information Project with the Federation of American
Scientists in Washington, DC. His work focuses on research-
ing and writing about the status of nuclear weapons and the
policies that direct them. Kristensen is a co-author of the
world nuclear forces overview in the SIPRI Yearbook (Oxford
University Press) and a frequent adviser to the news media
on nuclear weapons policy and operations. He has coau-
thored Nuclear Notebook since 2001. Inquiries should be
directed to FAS, 1725 DeSales Street NW, Sixth Floor,
Washington, DC, 20036 USA; +1 (202) 546–3300.
Robert S. Norris is a senior fellow with the Federation of
American Scientists in Washington, DC. A former senior
research associate with the Natural Resources Defense
Council, his principal areas of expertise include writing and
research on all aspects of the nuclear weapons programs of
the United States, the Soviet Union and Russia, the United
Kingdom, France, and China, as well as India, Pakistan, and
Israel. He is the author of Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie
R. Groves, the Manhattan Project’s Indispensible Man
(Steerforth) and co-author of Making the Russian Bomb:
From Stalin to Yeltsin (Westview). He co-authored or con-
tributed to the chapter on nuclear weapons in the 1985–2000
editions of the SIPRI Yearbook (Oxford University Press) and
has co-authored Nuclear Notebook since 1987.
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