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Perceptions of ‘Public Opinion’ and ‘Public’ Opinion Expression

Article  in  International Journal for Quality in Health Care · March 2001

DOI: 10.1093/ijpor/13.1.25

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Dietram A. Scheufele William P. Eveland

University of Wisconsin–Madison The Ohio State University
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International Journal of Public Opinion Research Vol.  No.  –/ $.

PERCEPTIONS OF ‘PUBLIC OPINION’

AND ‘PUBLIC’ OPINION EXPRESSION

Dietram A. Scheufele and William P. Eveland Jr

ABSTRACT
A large number of studies have been devoted to the impact of perceptions of opinion
distributions on the expression of public opinion. In the present study we propose that
perceptions of opinion distributions have implications that go beyond influencing
individual issue stances, but rather influence respondents’ willingness to engage in
political activities. Specifically, we examine the link between opinion perceptions
and two dimensions of political participation: participatory behavior involving public
expression of opinion, and participatory behavior that does not involve the public
expression of a person’s opinion. Based on data collected as part of the  American
National Election Study, we examine the role that communication variables, group
membership, attitude strength, and perceptions of public opinion play in predicting
public and non-public forms of participation in the US. Implications for research in
the areas of political participation and public opinion expression are outlined.

The notion of deliberative democracy is based on the exchange of arguments

and opinions among citizens and therefore the articulation of individual opinions
in public (Tocqueville /). A number of theories have linked individual
level behaviors like opinion expression to macro-level factors like the perception
of opinion climates, that is, the perception of opinion distribution in a given
society (for an overview, see Glynn et al. ). Most prominently, the spiral
of silence theory (Noelle-Neumann ) assumes that perceptions of the
distribution of opinion on a given issue will influence individuals’ willingness
to express their opinions on these issues.
More recently, a number of scholars (e.g. Scheufele , Wyatt et al. )
have argued that the expression of opinion is a multidimensional construct. A
first distinction between types of opinion expression is the distinction between
deliberative political talk (Wyatt et al. ) versus opinion expression in hostile
public situations (Noelle-Neumann ). Similarly, research has distinguished
private talk about politics from public expression of opinion (Scheufele ).
A large proportion of this research, however, is devoted to the impact of
∗
This article was first submitted to IJPOR October , . The present version was received July ,
.
 World Association for Public Opinion Research 
      
perceptions of opinion distributions on the expression of public opinion. The
focus in these studies is the process of opinion formation and consensus building
in societies. In an election context this means that the key criterion variable is
the outcome of an election. In this study, however, we propose that perceptions
of opinion distributions have implications that go beyond influencing individual
issue stances or societal decision making. We argue that opinion climate
perceptions may influence the willingness to engage in various political activities
beyond the public expression of opinions. In other words, the perception of
majority and minority opinions might not only influence the interpersonal
expression and exchange of opinion, but it might also inhibit individual
engagement in democratic participation more generally. In this sense, our study
synthesizes two major areas of research: research on perceptions and expression
of public opinion, and research on various forms of participatory behavior.
In order to test our propositions in greater detail, we examine two dimensions
of political participation: participatory behavior involving public expression of
opinion and participatory behavior that does not involve the public expression
of a person’s opinion. Our research explores these two dimensions of participatory
behavior in greater detail. In a first step, we explicate the two dimensions. In
a second step, we compare predictors of the two forms of opinion expression
separately. Specifically, we focus on the role of group membership, attitude
strength, and perceptions of public opinion in predicting the articulation of
opinions in public and non-public settings. Finally, we discuss the implications
of our findings for research in the areas of political participation and public
opinion expression.

PUBLIC VERSUS NON-PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Before we examine the theoretical models predicting public and non-public
forms of participation in greater detail, it is necessary to explicate our criterion
variables and examine them on the basis of previous research in the areas of
participatory behavior and opinion expression.
A number of conceptualizations of the dimensional structure of political
participation have been offered by researchers over the years (e.g. Crotty ,
McLeod et al. , Milbrath and Goel , Nie and Verba , Rosenstone
and Hansen , Verba and Nie ; Verba et al. ). Rosenstone and
Hansen (), for example, offer a dichotomous approach, differentiating two
dimensions of participation. In their scheme, the first dimension is participation
in electoral politics. This includes voting as the ‘most common form of citizen
participation in America’ (Rosenstone and Hansen , p. ). The second
dimension, governmental politics, includes various forms of political action like
    
signing petitions, writing to a congressional representative or senator, or writing
a letter to a newspaper or magazine.
More recently, McLeod et al. () distinguished traditional and non-
traditional forms of participation. Traditional forms were defined as in-
stitutionalized activities such as voting and donating money. Non-traditional
participation was defined as participation in public deliberative forums and
included the willingness to express an opinion, even under an unfavorable
opinion climate.
It is not our purpose here to review the similarities and dissimilarities of all
these conceptualizations of political participation in detail, nor to argue that
some other conceptualization would offer a better fit to existing data. Instead,
we merely note that across the rather inconsistent findings reported in previous
research, two dimensions seem to be common to a number of the con-
ceptualizations: participation including communicatory processes or public
expression of opinions, and non-public forms of participation like voting. It is
this distinction that we focus on. We do not do this because we believe it to be
the only (or even best) way to structure forms of political participation in
general; instead, we believe that the distinction between public and non-public
forms of participation is the most salient for our purposes, which is examining
the impact of perceptions of public opinion on political participation. Specifically,
we are interested in the effect of perceived incongruity between one’s own
opinion and the opinion of others—that is, the perception that one’s views are
in the minority—on both public and non-public forms of political participation.

E  O
Similar to political participation, research on opinion expression and political
conversations has been plagued by considerable inconsistencies as far as con-
ceptual definitions are concerned. Relative agreement, however, exists with
respect to the distinction between an individual’s willingness to express opinions
publicly and his or her ability or motivation to discuss issues in private contexts.
MacKuen summarizes the two different modes of discussion nicely: ‘Should
one in public discourse be seeking the reward of self-expression and mutual
interaction, or ought one clam up and thus avoid embarrassing conflict?’
(MacKuen , p. ).
The individual’s tendency to remain silent when faced with an increasingly
unfavorable climate of opinion is a key assumption underlying Noelle-Neumann’s
() spiral of silence model. Noelle-Neumann assumes that successful social
systems ‘must have ways to institutionalize consensus’ (Csikszentmihalyi ,
p. ). Consequently, society threatens individuals with social isolation in order
to ensure these necessary levels of social cohesion (Noelle-Neumann ). At
      
the same time, individuals constantly scan their environment for present and
future distributions of public opinion ‘in order to see which opinions and
modes will win the approval of society and which will lead to their isolation’
(Noelle-Neumann , p. ). Public opinion, in this model, is defined as
opinions that can be expressed without risking sanctions or social isolation, or
opinions that have to be expressed in order to avoid isolation (Noelle-Neumann
). Citizens’ willingness to express their opinions publicly, therefore, is
‘heavily directed by a fear of isolation that makes . . . sanctions of denial of
sympathy, and so forth, very powerful forms of influence’ (Glynn and McLeod
, p. ).
Elaborating on the idea of public and private expression of opinions, Wyatt
et al. () suggest that a distinction should be made between a person’s
willingness to argue about controversial topics with others, and the frequency
with which a person discusses political issues in general. Using the Medicare
issue as an example, they found that the perception of an unfavorable local
opinion climate significantly decreased respondents’ willingness to argue about
this issue with non-like-minded others.
Similarly, Scheufele () distinguishes political talk (defined as exchange
of ideas and arguments with like-minded others) and the willingness to publicly
express opinions about political issues in potentially hostile settings. He found
political talk to be predicted by informational variables like media use and
factual knowledge of politics. People’s willingness to publicly express an opinion,
however, was most strongly related to the perception of a favorable opinion
climate and lower levels of fear of being isolated by others as a result of
expressing an unpopular opinion.
Eliasoph’s () ethnographic study of volunteer groups offers an interesting
approach to integrating research on political participation and public opinion
expression. She found a clear difference between volunteering and participating
in politics, on the one hand, and discussing politics with others—like-minded
or not—on the other. Eliasoph describes what she labels ‘political avoidance’
in discussions among volunteers as follows:
Volunteers’ political etiquette systematically silenced some types of ideas more
than others: democratic ideas, participatory ideas, ideas with long time horizons,
ambiguous or ambivalent ideas, ideas that would not lead to an immediate volunteer-
style solution: in short, any idea that demanded talk was avoided (Eliasoph ,
p. ).

Based on these observations, the notion of publicly expressing an opinion—

especially about controversial issues—is different from political activity or
participation. At the very least, Eliasoph () argues, the motivations under-
lying these two activities are distinct.
    
A  P  N-P P
In order to examine the motivations and resources that make it more or less
likely for citizens to engage in public and non-public acts of political participation,
we will address a set of central antecedents that have consistently been found
to be related to different forms of opinion expression or political participation.
Other predictor variables of less central importance—demographics and com-
munication variables—will be discussed briefly in the methods section.

Opinion Perceptions
Of central interest in this study is the impact of opinion perceptions on public
and non-public forms of participation. As outlined earlier, Noelle-Neumann’s
() spiral of silence theory is based on the assumption that perceptions of
opinion climates have a strong impact on individual willingness to express
controversial opinions. However, the idea that ‘most people talk about politics
within a favorable opinion climate—or to people with whom they largely
agree—is a given, even in studies not reliant on the spiral of silence’ (Wyatt et
al. , p. ).
Studies examining the link between congruency of individual and perceived
public opinion and respondents’ willingness to express their opinions have
produced inconsistent results (Scheufele and Moy , Scheufele ). Glynn,
Hayes and Shanahan’s () meta-analysis of over  empirical studies revealed
a small but significant effect of congruency perceptions on respondents’ will-
ingness to express their opinions publicly.
Individuals constantly scan their social environment for cues about the
distribution of public opinion on controversial issues. If they perceive their
own opinions to be in the majority or gaining momentum, they are more likely
to publicly express their opinions on controversial issues than if they perceive
themselves to be in the minority. In the long run, Noelle-Neumann ()
argues, this process will create the impression that the majority opinion is
stronger than it really is and therefore establish societal consensus on that issue
position. The assumption in the original spiral of silence theory (Noelle-
Neumann ) was that fear of isolation is the driving factor behind people’s
susceptibility to majority pressures and therefore behind the process of aggregate
changes in public opinion. The public element of opinion expression would
therefore be a necessary condition for the process to take place.
However, we argue that perceptions of majority opinions during election
campaigns may not only influence the public expression of opinion, as assumed
in the spiral of silence model, but may also influence willingness to engage in
various forms of non-public participation. Specifically, opinion climates not
only influence people’s willingness to express opinions in conversations, but
      
also their inclination to donate money or vote in the election. Differential
patterns of participation in politics more generally—as a result of perceptions
of opinion distribution—could influence campaign dynamics and potentially
the outcome of the election.
Applying a logic that parallels the reasoning of the spiral of silence model
for verbal opinion expression, we expect public forms of participation to be
influenced by perceptions of which candidate will ultimately win the election.
As argued earlier, the publicness of the participatory acts is crucial from the
perspective of the spiral of silence, since fear of isolation is assumed to be the
driving force behind this process. But for non-public forms of participation,
some other factor would have to mediate the influence of opinion incongruity,
such as feelings of apathy or a low efficacy. This would likely produce a weaker
effect than the fear of isolation that drives public participation, so presumably
any effects of opinion incongruity on non-public forms of participation would
probably be weaker than the effects on public participation.

Strength of Candidate Preference

Of course, there are factors that potentially counteract the impact of situational
factors like perceptions of majority opinion. Previous research (e.g. Horner et
al. ) has identified attitude strength or political extremity as a positive
influence on respondents’ willingness to express their opinions publicly. This
is consistent with the concept of hard cores put forth by Noelle-Neumann
(). She assumes that respondents who are more extreme in their beliefs or
hold their beliefs more strongly are less likely to be influenced by perceptions
of public opinion distribution or change. Having a strong candidate preference
may also increase non-public forms of participation. Thus, we expect that the
strength with which respondents hold certain attitudes or beliefs will be
positively related to the likelihood of engaging in public and non-public forms
of participation.

Group Membership
Finally, membership in voluntary groups has been identified as a key predictor
of various forms of participatory behavior in a number of studies (Moy and
Scheufele ; Verba et al. ). We therefore expect group membership to
be related to both public and non-public forms of participation. For two reasons,
however, it can be expected that membership in voluntary associations and
groups should be more strongly related to public than to non-public forms of
participation. First, it is safe to assume that people self-select into voluntary
associations and groups based on the socioeconomic characteristics of other
group members (e.g. Mutz and Mondak ). Consequently, discussions in
    
these groups are mostly with politically like-minded others. These ties, of
course, are also more likely to involve shared interest and activities that provide
the foundation for civic recruitment. Voluntary associations therefore serve as
important networks of recruitment (Verba et al. ) for activities that involve
the expression of potentially unpopular opinions. Second, membership in
voluntary groups and associations provides citizens with the necessary skills to
engage in public forms of political participation, such as verbal ability (Verba
et al. ) or other communication skills.
Interactions among Antecedent Variables
The impact of these antecedent variables on public and non-public forms of
participation are unlikely to be simple. Rather, it can be expected that certain
antecedents interact in their impact on public and non-public forms of par-
ticipation. Specifically, the final two groups of antecedents described above—
strength of beliefs and group membership—are expected to moderate the
relationship between opinion perceptions and public forms of participation.
Evidence suggests that people with more firmly held beliefs are also less
susceptible to perceptions of opinion environments (Lasorsa ). Therefore
the relationship between opinion congruency and public forms of participation
can be expected to be lower for respondents who hold stronger candidate
preferences than for respondents who hold only weak candidate preferences. A
graph of the predicted interaction between strength of candidate preference
and opinion incongruity is presented in Figure .
Group membership is expected to have a similar effect. Voluntary groups or
associations serve as reference groups (Shibutani ), potentially shielding
individuals from the impact of perceptions of larger hostile opinion environments
through homogeneous interpersonal associations. In short, members of groups
do not feel alone with their opinions and, as a result, perceptions of a larger
incongruent opinion environment should have less of an impact on their
willingness to engage in public forms of participation. This is consistent with
Oshagan’s () findings for opinion expression more generally. His study
showed that when reference group and societal majority opinions are made
equally salient, the former becomes a more important influence on people’s
willingness to express an opinion. A graph of the predicted interaction between
group membership and opinion incongruity is presented in Figure .

METHODS
S
Data for this study came from the  American National Election Study
pre-election and post-election surveys. The fieldwork for the pre-election survey
      

F  Predicted interaction between strength of candidate preference and opinion

incongruity

F  Predicted interaction between group membership and opinion incongruity

    
took place between September ,  and November , . The post-election
survey was conducted between November  and December , . The study
population included all United States citizens of voting age on or before election
day, November , . The sample was based on a multi-stage area probability
sampling technique, with respondents being randomly selected within house-
holds in the final stage.1
Items from both the pre-election and post-election surveys were used in the
present analysis. The panel design allowed us to incorporate independent
variables from the pre-election survey and our primary dependent variables,
public and non-public forms of participation, from the post-election survey.
This time order strengthens our ability to make causal inferences compared to
cross-sectional data, though clearly threats to the validity of our causal inferences
still exist in this panel design. Unfortunately, two of our independent variables
were measured only in the post-election survey, so while the panel design helps
our causal claims in some cases, it does not necessarily help them in others.

M
Four demographic variables—gender, age, education, and family income—were
included as controls in our analyses. Each of these variables was used in its
original form except for family income, which was recoded from its original
ordinal version to a more interval format (i.e. categories at the lower end of the
scale were collapsed so that each increment in the scale represented a $,
increase in income, except for the highest income levels, which were initially
measured in $, increments).
In addition to the demographic variables, two communication variables—
campaign attention and general interpersonal discussion—were included because
of their expected relationships with public and non-public participation. Cam-
paign attention was measured during the pre-election survey and was created
by summing responses to questions regarding the respondent’s attention to the
campaign in newspapers and on television (r= .). This variable measures
exposure to information about the campaign, including but not limited to
representations of the climate of public opinion. Frequency of interpersonal
discussion was measured during the post-election survey as the frequency with
1
About three-fourths of the sample were previously interviewed in , while the remainder were first
interviewed in the  survey. For the pre-election component of the survey, the response rate was 
percent. As would be expected, it was higher among panel respondents ( percent) than among respondents
who were interviewed for the first time ( percent). Attrition from pre-election to post-election interviewing
was about  percent. Again, retention rates were higher for panel respondents ( percent) than for
cross-section respondents ( percent). The pre-election survey included over , interviews and the
post-election survey included over , interviews. Our sample size varied slightly depending on the analysis
(due to item-nonresponse and panel attrition), but was just slightly less than , respondents for most
analyses.
      
which individuals talked with their neighbors. This is a general measure that
includes any type of discussion instead of specifically referring to political
discussion. It is meant to serve as a contextual variable indicating opportunity
for interpersonal communication.
Strength of candidate preference was measured during the pre-election survey.
It was indicated by the respondent’s claim that his or her preference for the
chosen presidential candidate was ‘strong’. This was asked separately for those
who said they expected to vote as well as those who said they would not vote,
but responses from both voters and non-voters were combined in our measure.
Group membership is a summary variable (from the post-election survey) of
the total number of groups that discuss politics in which the respondent was a
member. This measure represents the group support network that an individual
has available specifically for political discussion.
Opinion incongruity was measured indirectly using questions asked during
the pre-election survey, and separate measures are available for both state and
national incongruity. Respondents were asked which candidate they thought
would win the presidency as well as which candidate would carry their state.
Responses to these questions were compared to the respondent’s claim of whom
he or she would vote for in the election (for both those who said they did not
plan to vote as well as those who did plan to vote). Incongruity at the state
level was operationalized as believing that the person for whom the respondent
would cast a vote would not carry his or her state, which indicates that the
respondent perceived him or herself to be a member of a minority in the state.
Incongruity at the national level was operationalized as believing that the person
for whom the respondent would cast a vote would not win the presidency,
indicating the respondent perceived him- or herself as a minority member in
the country. It is important to note, of course, that this operationalization of
incongruity was indirect. In other words, it did not require respondents to
assess their own position relative to the overall climate. Rather, it was calculated
post-hoc based on a respondent’s assessment of his or her own opinion and of
the opinion climate, and these questions were separated in the survey instrument
by over  items.
Two forms of political participation were measured during the post-election
survey. Public participation was measured as an additive index of four traditional
political participation items that require publicly communicating one’s opinion:
() trying to persuade someone to vote for or against a given party or candidate;
() displaying a campaign button, sign, or bumper sticker; () attending a
meeting, speech, or rally for a candidate; and () working for a party or
candidate. These four items comprised a reliable index (
=.) of opinion
expression that is, by definition, public in nature. Non-public participation was
computed as an additive index (
=.) of three other traditional political
    
participation items: () voting in the presidential campaign; () contributing
money to a candidate; and () contributing money to a political party. These
three items are forms of political participation that do not require any immediate
public expression of opinion because they generally take place in private.

A S
Our hypotheses are best tested using moderated multiple regression to examine
both the main and interactive effects of our independent variables on our
criterion measures. The use of standardized regression coefficients allowed us
to interpret more easily the relative strength of the different predictors in our
model given the different and generally ‘unnatural’ scales upon which most of
our measures were based. All independent variables involved in interactions
were standardized before computation of the product term in order to reduce
multicollinearity (see Eveland , for details on the use of moderated multiple
regression). We examined predictors of both public and non-public participation,
adding opinion incongruity at both the state and national levels (in separate
equations) and interactions with opinion incongruity to the mix of predictors
used for public and non-public participation (Tables –).

RESULTS
O  P F  P

State-Level
Demographics played only a minimal role in public forms of participation at
the state level (Table ). When no other variables were entered into the equation,
men, those with more education, and those with more family income were more
likely to express political opinions publicly. However, after the other variables
were entered into the equation, all of these relationships were reduced to
non-significance.
By contrast, our communication and theoretical variables played a more
substantial role in public forms of participation at the state level, accounting
for approximately  percent of variance in the dependent variable after the
influence of demographics was removed. Those with high levels of attention to
the campaign, strong candidate preferences, and memberships in many groups
that discussed politics were more likely to engage in this form of opinion
expression. In addition, the overall frequency of interpersonal discussion and
perceptions of opinion incongruity at the state level also played some role.
Interpersonal discussion was a significant positive predictor when controlling
      
only demographics, but opinion incongruity was not significant at this level of
control. However, when all of the theoretical variables were entered into the
equation simultaneously, along with the demographic controls, the beta for
interpersonal discussion was reduced to non-significance while the beta for
opinion incongruity increased to become significant and positive. This indicates
that state-level minority perceptions actually encouraged individuals to express
their opinions publicly. However, this apparent suppression of the relationship
between opinion incongruity and public participation suggests that opinion
incongruity was interacting with at least one other variable in the equation.
Examination of the interaction terms in the final block of the equation
provides support for this interpretation. Although opinion incongruity did not
interact with group membership, it did interact with strength of candidate
preference, such that those with strong candidate preferences were more likely
than those with weak candidate preferences to express their opinions publicly
when perceiving their opinions to be in the minority in their state. Thus,
comparing this finding to the predicted interaction as presented in Figure ,
instead of the slope of the lines going down from left to right as predicted, the
slopes calculated from the data go up from left to right. Specifically, incongruity
seems to increase public participation only among those who are strong in their
preferences; it has no effect among those with weak preferences.

National-Level
Given that the regression equations for the state and national opinion incongruity
measures varied only by this single measure, it is no surprise that the patterns
in Table  are very similar to those in Table . Indeed, the only real difference
in this analysis compared to the analysis with opinion incongruity at the state
level is that opinion incongruity at the national level was unrelated to public
forms of participation, and that this relationship did not vary by group
membership or strength of candidate preference (i.e. the interaction was
non-significant). Being in the minority at the national level has no impact on
one’s willingness to engage in public forms of participation.

O  N-P F  P

State-Level
As we might expect given the indicators that make up the non-public forms of
participation variable, demographics play a large role in determining non-public
forms of participation (Table ). Older, more educated, and wealthier respondents
were much more likely to engage in non-public forms of participation. Overall,
demographics were able to account for over  percent of the variance in
non-public forms of participation.
    
T  OLS regression predicting public forms of participation (state-level)
Model a Model b

Block : Demographic controls

Female gender –.∗ –.
Age . –.
Education .∗∗ .
Family income .∗∗ .
Adjusted R percent .∗∗ –
Block : Communication and theoretical variables
Campaign attention .∗∗ .∗∗
Frequency of interpersonal discussion .∗∗ .
Strength of candidate preference .∗∗ .∗∗
Opinion incongruity (state) –. .∗
Group membership .∗∗ .∗∗
Adjusted R percent – .∗∗
Block : Interactions
Incongruity×Strength of candidate preference – .∗
Incongruity×Group membership – .
Final model adjusted R percent – .∗∗
Coefficients are standardized OLS regression coefficients controlling Block .
a

Coefficients are standardized OLS regression coefficients controlling Blocks  and .

b

Despite the large impact of demographics, our communication and theoretical

variables still made a strong contribution to the prediction of non-public forms
of participation. As with public forms of participation, those with high levels
of campaign attention, high levels of general interpersonal discussion, strong
candidate preferences, and a large number of political group memberships were
more likely to express their political opinions in non-public settings. Opinion
incongruity at the state level was the only theoretical variable that was not
significantly related to non-public forms of participation. State-level incongruity
also did not interact with either strength of candidate preference or group
membership.

National-Level
Patterns of prediction of non-public forms of participation in the equation using
national-level opinion incongruity perceptions (Table ) were similar to the
equation for state-level opinion incongruity except for the role of opinion
incongruity. Whereas state-level opinion incongruity was unrelated to non-public
forms of participation, national-level opinion incongruity perceptions sig-
nificantly reduced non-public forms of participation. However, the significant
      
T  OLS regression predicting public forms of participation (national
level)
Model a Model b

Block : Demographic controls

Female gender –.∗ –.
Age . –.
Education .∗∗ .
Family income .∗∗ .
Adjusted R percent .∗∗ –
Block : Communication and theoretical variables
Campaign attention .∗∗ .∗∗
Frequency of interpersonal discussion .∗∗ .
Strength of candidate preference .∗∗ .∗∗
Opinion incongruity (national) –. .∗
Group membership .∗∗ .∗∗
Adjusted R percent – .∗∗
Block : Interactions
Incongruity – Strength of candidate preference – .
Incongruity – Group membership – .
Final model adjusted R percent – .∗∗

Coefficients are standardized OLS regression coefficients controlling Block .

a

Coefficients are standardized OLS regression coefficients controlling Blocks  and .

b

positive interaction between group memberships and national opinion in-

congruity indicates that the negative relationship between national opinion
incongruity and non-public forms of participation appears only among those
with few group memberships; among those who have many political group
memberships incongruity may slightly increase participation. This significant
interaction suggests that having an interpersonal support network of group
memberships can mitigate the negative effects of feeling like a minority member
on the expression of one’s opinion in a non-public manner. Comparing our
findings to the predicted interaction in Figure , the results generally supported
the prediction for the form of the interaction; however, the interaction was
significant for non-public but not for public forms of participation.

DISCUSSION
This study dealt with perceptions of public opinion during the  US
presidential election campaign and the potential impact that these perceptions
have on public and non-public forms of participation. The concern underlying
this research is that opinion climates might not only have an impact on individual
    
T  OLS regression predicting non-public forms of participation (state-
level)
Model a Model b

Block : Demographic controls

Female gender –. .
Age .∗∗ .∗∗
Education .∗∗ .∗∗
Family income .∗∗ .∗∗
Adjusted R percent .∗∗ –
Block : Communication and theoretical variables
Campaign attention .∗∗ .∗∗
Frequency of interpersonal discussion .∗∗ .∗∗
Strength of candidate preference .∗∗ .∗∗
Opinion incongruity (state) –. –.
Group membership .∗∗ .∗
Adjusted R percent – .∗∗
Block : Interactions
Incongruity – Strength of candidate preference – .
Incongruity – Group membership – .
Final model adjusted R percent – .∗∗

Coefficients are standardized OLS regression coefficients controlling Block .

a

Coefficients are standardized OLS regression coefficients controlling Blocks  and .

b

opinion expression—as hypothesized in the spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann

)—but also on political action in a broader sense. The question is: Does
the perception of being in the minority promote political apathy? Our findings
examining public and non-public forms of participation as criterion variables
showed interesting patterns of prediction, particularly for the perceived in-
congruity variable. However, we will briefly summarize our findings for the
other theoretical and communication variables first.
Campaign attention and interpersonal discussion are positively related to both
forms of participation at about the same level. For public forms of participation,
interpersonal discussion does not have a significant impact once other variables—
including group membership—are controlled. Since respondents who are in-
volved in a larger number of groups are also more likely to engage in public
forms of participation, overall frequency of interpersonal discussion plays a
weaker role in predicting this form of participation. Most likely, discussion with
potentially more like-minded others in these groups has a stronger effect on
public forms of participation than does general discussion with neighbors.
Similarly, the strength with which respondents held a preference for a specific
candidate was positively related to public and non-public forms of participation.
      
T  OLS regression predicting non-public forms of participation (national
level)
Model a Model b

Block : Demographic controls

Female gender –. .
Age .∗∗ .∗∗
Education .∗∗ .∗∗
Family income .∗∗ .∗∗
Adjusted R percent .∗∗ –
Block : Communication and theoretical variables
Campaign attention .∗∗ .∗∗
Frequency of interpersonal discussion .∗∗ .∗∗
Strength of candidate preference .∗∗ .∗∗
Opinion incongruity (national) –.∗∗ –.∗∗
Group membership .∗∗ .∗
Adjusted R percent – .∗∗
Block : Interactions
Incongruity – Strength of candidate preference – .
Incongruity – Group membership – .∗∗
Final model adjusted R percent – .∗∗

Coefficients are standardized OLS regression coefficients controlling Block .

a

Coefficients are standardized OLS regression coefficients controlling Blocks  and .

b

More strongly held beliefs, in other words, are equally important for promoting
public and non-public forms of participation.
As we just outlined, group membership has a strong impact on public forms
of participation that holds after controls. For non-public forms of participation,
the effects are somewhat weaker but still significant. It is very likely that, for
public forms of participation, group membership serves two functions: first, it
provides the necessary verbal and interpersonal skills to engage in public forms
of participation; second, groups serve as important networks of recruitment.
While the latter function is also important for non-public forms of participation,
the former is expected to play a lesser role, explaining the somewhat weaker
effects of group membership on non-public participation.

T R  P O I  P

P
Our findings indicate that perceptions of a hostile opinion environment did not
have a significant impact on participation for two of the four models after
demographic controls. However, for the two models in which it did demonstrate
    
some impact, the findings were somewhat counter-intuitive. Specifically, per-
ceived incongruity at the state level actually increased public participation
(counter to our expectations), but at the same time perceived national incongruity
decreased non-public participation. We would have expected that public forms
of participation would be more likely to be reduced by minority perceptions
than would non-public participation.
These findings were qualified by interactions with other variables in the
model, however. Our findings suggest that group membership can serve as an
important moderator of the relationship between perceptions of being in the
minority with one’s opinion and non-public forms of participation. Specifically,
respondents who were involved in a larger number of political groups showed
less susceptibility to national opinion climates when it came to engaging in
non-public forms of participation. Similarly, strength of candidate preference
can increase the likelihood that one will engage in public forms of participation
at the state level when perceiving one’s views to be in the minority.
These findings add to the recent evidence that perceived opinion incongruity
can have varied effects on both public and non-public participation, and that
these effects may depend on other variables. For instance, Wyatt et al. ()
found that respondents who perceived the local opinion climate to be in their
favor engaged less frequently in general interpersonal discussion of politics with
others, a public form of participation. This makes some sense if we consider
that these respondents see their own opinion as the majority opinion already.
There is no pragmatic need for them to engage in discussion with others or
talk about these issues further.
Mutz () provides some evidence from the  presidential primary
races that non-public forms of opinion expression may be influenced—both
positively and negatively—by perceptions of dwindling public support, and that
these effects depend on the strength of candidate support. Making assumptions
about which candidates would have highly committed versus weakly committed
support (e.g., Jackson, Gore, and Robertson with highly committed support,
Dukakis, Gephardt, Kemp, and Dole with weakly committed support), she
found that those who financially support candidates but are only weakly
committed to them may react to news of declining public support for their
favored candidate by withdrawing financial support in order to ‘cut their losses’.
By contrast, those who financially support a candidate to whom they are deeply
or ideologically committed tend to respond to news of declining support for
their candidate by increasing contributions. An analogy to a sinking ship might
be appropriate—those who have some form of ownership of a vessel would
likely work harder to save it as the amount of water pouring in increased, while
those with no investment in the ship would quickly abandon it when water
began to come over the gunwales.
      
These recent findings, in conjunction with those reported in this paper,
suggest that the reality of the impact of perceptions of opinion incongruity
on participation—both public and private—is not straightforward and easily
understood. The role of perceptions of public opinion in political participation
can vary across contexts, forms of participation, and individuals. More spe-
cifically, perceived opinion incongruity can impact both public and non-public
participation behaviors, sometimes in opposite directions. And, just as im-
portantly, other factors such as strength of opinion and group membership are
likely to moderate these impacts so that they are not generalizable to all members
of the population.

I
Overall, our results show that opinion perceptions can have both pro-social and
anti-social effects on political participation. The effects, however, emerged only
for parts of our sample. That is, respondents who lacked the necessary social
networks (i.e. were not involved in a large number of groups) or respondents
who did not hold strong preferences for any given candidate were more likely
to respond to the influence of a hostile opinion climate.
These findings have implications both normatively and for future research
in the area of political participation. Normatively, the fact that perceptions of
opinion climates have potentially inhibiting effects on political participation
should be of concern, even if these influences are only modest or only hold for
specific subgroups of the electorate. Perceiving oneself to be in the minority
has previously been found to be detrimental to people’s willingness to express
controversial opinions in public (Noelle-Neumann, ). Our findings suggest
that—at least for some groups of respondents—perceptions of hostile en-
vironments might also have negative effects on their willingness to engage in
other political activities. Perceptions of a hostile opinion climate, in other words,
can promote voter apathy, but it can also in some cases produce political
activism.
These contingencies with respect to the impact of opinion perceptions on
public and non-public forms of participation have important implications for
research on political participation. Variables like opinion perceptions, group
membership, media use, or interpersonal discussion might not only be important
for political participation because of their respective individual impact, but also
because of their interactive influence on public and non-public participation.
In other words, some of these variables have an influence on political participation
that will only emerge if it is examined for different subgroups of society.
    
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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES
Dietram A. Scheufele (Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison, ) is Assistant
Professor in the Department of Communication at Cornell University. His current
research interests lie in the areas of political communication, civic participation, and
public opinion.
William P. Eveland, Jr (Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison, ) is Assistant
Professor in the School of Journalism and Communication at The Ohio State University.
His research focuses on the impact of mass media on knowledge and perceptions, with
special attention to the roles of motivation and information processing.
Address correspondence to Dietram Scheufele, Department of Communication, Cornell
University,  Kennedy Hall, Ithaca, NY , Email: dietram.scheufele@cornell.edu.

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