LEGAL PROJECT

NAME : M . SWARNA
GEETHAM
COURSE : BA BL[HONS]
YEAR : I – YEAR
SEC : B – SEC
SUBJECT: LEGAL METHODS
TOPIC : CONTRIBUTION
ON JUSTICE OF
WEERAMANTRY
INTRODUCTION

“….for his lifetime of groundbreaking work to strengthen and expand the rule
of international law “.

“ Christopher weeramantry is a world –renowned legal scholar

and a former vice – president of the international court of justice , who has
played a crucial role in strengthening and expanding the rule of international law
.His work demonstrate how international law can be used to address current
global challenges such as the continued thread of nuclear weapons , the
protection of human rights and the environment “ .

The honourable justice sri lankabhimanya gregory christoper weeramantry

was born on 17 november 1926. He is an sri Lankan lawyer who was a judge of
the international court of justice (ICJ) from 1991 to 2000, serving as its vice-
president from 1997 to 2000. Weeramantry was a judge of the supreme court of
sri lanka from 1967 to 1972. He is currently an EMERITUS PROFESSOR at
MONASH UNIVERSITY .

EDUCATION :
Born 17 nov 1926 in Colombo,Ceylon , he was educated at the Royal college
Colombo. Where he was a senior perfect,editor of the Royal college magazine
,chairman senior literary association and won many class and school prizes as well
as the GOVERNOR’S SCHOLARSHIP, PRINCIPAL’S PRIZE and the EMPIRE ESSAY
PRIZE for 1943 awarded by the Royal Empire Society.

He gained a BA(HONS) from the newly established University of Ceylon and

went on to gain a LL.B and a LLD from the university of London .After completing
the law exam at the Colombo law college , he took oaths as an Advocate of the
supreme court of Ceylon in 1948 .

Christoper weeramantry in july 2007 became the vice president of the

International court of justice in office 1997-2000 . Judge of the International
court of justice in office 1991-2000 . puisne justice of the supreme court of
ceylon in office 1967 – 1972 .

CAREER :
Beginning his law practice in Colombo that went on till 1965, he was
appointed Commissioner of Assize , holding the post until 1967 when he was
called to the bench as a judge of the supreme court in 1972 and moved to
Australia where he became a barrister , carrying out a consultancy practice for
18 years till 1990 in victoria .

In 1991 , he was appointed as a judge of the Intertnational court of

justice in The Hauge, becoming its vice-president in 1997 . He presided as vice –
president over several imoportant cases before the court , including a case on
the illegality of the use and threatened use of nuclear weapons . From 2000 to
2002 he served the ICJ as an Ad hoc jugde .

Weeramantry serves on the legal and human rights advicory board

of the Genetic policy Institute ana the president of the International
Association of lawyers against nuclear arms . In addition C.G weramantry is a
councillor of the World Future Council , and the Honorary parton of the
Centre for International Sustainable Development Law (CISDL) .

He is currently Emeritus professor at Monash university , having

previously served as Sir Hayden Starke’s chair of law from 1972 to 1991. A
former lecture and examinerat the Colombo law college , he was a member of
the council of the education in Ceylon . judge weeramantry has also served as
a visiting professor at Harvard University (2000) , University of Hong Kong
(1989), University of F lorida (1984), University of Colombo
(1981),University of papua new guinea (1981),University of Stellenbosch
(1979) and University of Tokyo (1978) . He is an honorary member of
advisory committee of Enivronmental law institute and chairman of the
International council , Institute of sustainable development , McGill University
.
HONOUR AND AWARD :
Weeramantry is a recipient of the following honour and award :

 Sri lankabhimanya ,the highest Nation Honour of Sri Lanka (2007) .

 Right Livelihood Award (2007) .
 UNESCO prize for peace education (2006) .
 Honorary Member of the Order of Australia (AM), (2003) .
 Deshamanya title from the Government of Sri Lanka .

 Mohamed sahabdeen Award for International understanding in the SAARC

region (1993).

HONORARY DEGREES :
He has received several honorary degree ;

 University of London _ Doctor of laws ( honoris causa )

 University of Colombo _ Doctor of laws ( honoris causa )
 Monash University _ Doctor of laws ( honoris causa )
 National law school of India _ Doctor of laws ( honoris causa )

WEERAMANTRY’S MOST RECENT CAMPAING : A NEW WORLD

COURT JUDGEMENT
 In its 1996 judgements ,the International court of
justice ruled that nuclear weapons states have an obligation
under international law to continue and to conclude

negotiations leading to the abandonment of nuclear weapons .

Weeramantry is currently working on another cases to bring
back various aspects of these issues to the international court ,
including the violation by nuclear weapons state of their
obligation as set out by the court .
JUDGEMENT BY JUSTICE WEERA MANTRY IN CASE

BOSNIA & HERZIGOVINA VS SERBIA

APPLICATION OF GENOCIDE CONVENTION

THE ISSUE OF AUTOMATIC SUCCESSION TOTHE GENOCIDE

CONVENTION

1 agree with the majority of my colleagues that the Court does have
jurisdiction in this case. However, this case raises the important issue of
automatic succession to the Genocide Convention, which has not been
developed in the Court's Judgment. 1 believe it warrants consideration.
One of the principal concerns of the contemporary international legal
system is the protection of the human rights and dignity of every
individual. The question of succession to the Genocide Convention
raises one the most essential aspects of such protection. The topic
which 1 wish to address in this opinion is the continuing applicability of
the Convention to the populations to which it has applied. When a
convention so significant for the protection of human life has been
entered into by a State, and that State thereafter divides into two or
more successor States, what is the position of its subjects in the interim
period that elapses before the formal recognition of the successor
States, or before the new State's forma1 accession to treaties such as
the Convention? 1 think this situation should not be passed by without
attention, especially having regard to the fact that the foundations for a
consideration of this matter are to be found in the Court's Opinion in
the earlier case on genocide which came before it over forty years ago
(Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I. C. J. Reports 1951, p. 15).
Another reason calling for attention to this topic is the fact that the
international community is passing through a historical period, when,
throughout the world, the phenomenon is being experienced of the
splintering of States. This has occurred with particular intensity
especially after the end of the Cold War. It is vitally important that the
principle of protection of populations against human rights abuses and
atrocities should be strengthened in every manner available under
current legal principles; and the clarification of the law relating to State
succession to a humanitarian treaty so important as the Genocide
Convention is eminently such an area. Bosnia has contended that there
is automatic succession to this treaty, and Yugoslavia denies this
proposition. This problem leads into the intricate field of State
succession to treaties - a field in which there has been much difference
of juristic opinion, and in which many competing theories strive for
recognition.

INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE FOR RECOGNITION OF

PRINCIPLE OF AUTOMATIC SUCCESSION
In the discussions that took place at the United Nations Conference on
Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, this aspect of a need to
prevent a hiatus occurring in the process of succession of States
received emphasis from several States. The position was well
summarized by one delegate who, while pointing out that the "essence
of the problem was to strike a balance between continuity and the
freedom of choice which was the basis of the 'clean slate'
prin~iple"~st~at,e d that, in the case of multilateral treaties, the need
for continuity was pressing. He described as an "international vacuum"
the situation that could arise if this were not the case, and spoke of this
as "a lacuna inconvenient both to the newly independent State and to
the international ~omrnunity"~~. This question has also been
considered in some depth by the Commission on Human Rights and by
the Human Rights Committee. At its forty-ninth session, the
Commission on Human Rights adopted resolution 1993123 of 5 March
1993, entitled "Succession of States in respect of international human
rights treaties". This resolution encouraged successor States to confirm
officially that they continued to be bound by international obligations
under relevant human rights treaties.The special nature of human
rights treaties was further confirmed by theCommission in its resolution
1994116 of 25 February 1994, and the Commission, in that resolution,
reiterated its cal1 to successor States which had not yet done so to
confirm to appropriate depositories that they continued to be bound by
obligations under international human rights treaties.The Committee
on Human Rights, at its forty-seventh session (March-April 1993),
stated that al1 the people within the territory of a former State party to
the Covenant remained entitled to the guarantees under the Covenant.
It is worthy of note also that during the fifth meeting of persons
chairing the human rights treaty bodies, held from 19 to 23 September
1994: "The chairpersons emphasized, however, that they were of the
view that successor States were automatically bound by
obligationsunder international human rights instruments from the
respective date of independence and that observance of the obligations
should not depend on a declaration of confirmation made by the
Government of the successor State."25 The Ad Hoc Committee on
Genocide also made the important point that the crime of genocide
generally entails the complicity or direct involvement of
Governments2'j, and national courts are likely to be reluctant or
ineffective in adjudicating claims of State-sponsored genocideZ7 -
hence the importance of Article IX. Al1 of these views, though not
authoritative in themselves, serve to underline the principle here under
discussion. These are al1 committees with special experience of
handling problems in the human rights area, and the force of their
conviction of the necessity of such a rule emphasizeshow vital it is in
actual practice. If such should be the principle suggested, in regard to
human rights conventions such as the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, one canbe left in little doubt regarding its essentiality in regard
to conventions such as the Genocide Convention. A clarification of this
principle is one of the ways in which international law can respond to
the needs of international society. In the words of Jenks, written in the
context of State succession to treaties :

"if Our legal system fails to respond to the widely felt and urgent needs
of a developing international society, both its authority as a legal
system and the prospect of developing a peaceful international order
will be gravely prejudiced"

28. Al1 of the foregoing reasons combine to create what seems to me

to be a principle of contemporary international law that there is
automaticState succession to so vital a human rights convention as the
Genocide Convention. Nowhere is the protection of the quintessential
human right- the right to life -more heavily concentrated than in that
Convention. tinually generates gaps in the most vital part of its
framework, which open up and close, depending on the break-up of the
old political authorities and the emergence of the new. The
international legal system cannot condone a principle by which the
subjects of these States live in a state of continuing uncertainty
regarding the most fundamental of their human rights protections.
Such a view would grievously tear the seamless fabric of international
human rights protections, endanger peace, and lead the law astray
from the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations, which al1
nations, new and old, are committed to pursue.
GABC`IKOVO – NYAGMAROS PROJECT
SEPARATE OPINION OF VICE-PRESIDENT WEERAMANTRY

INTRODUCTION

This case raises a rich array of environmentally related legal issues. A discussion of
some of them is essential to explain my reasons for voting as 1 have in this very
difficult decision. Three issues on which 1 wish to make some observations,
supplementary to those of the Court, are the role played by the principle of
sustainable development in balancing the competing demands of development
and environmental protection; the protection given to Hungary by what 1 would
describe as the principle of continuing environmental impact assessment; and the
appropriateness of the use of inter partes legal principles, such as estoppel, for
the resolution of problems with an erga omnes connotation such as
environmental damage.

THE CONCEPT OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Had the possibility of environmental harm been the only consideration to be

taken into account in this regard, the contentions of Hungary could well have
proved conclusive. Yet there are other factors to be taken into account - not the
least important of which is the developmental aspect, for the Gabëikovo scheme
is important to Slovakia from the point of view of development.The Court must
hold the balance even between the environmental considerations and the
developmental considerations raised by the respective Parties. The principle that
enables the Court to do so is the principle of sustainable development.The Court
has referred to it as a concept in paragraph 140 of its Judgment. However, 1
consider it to be more than a mere concept, but as a principle with normative
value which is crucial to the determination of this case. Without the benefits of its
insights, the issues involved in this case would have been difficult to resolve.Since
sustainable development is a principle fundamental to the determination of the
competing considerations in this case, and since, although it has attracted
attention only recently in the literature of international law, it is likely to play a
major role in determining important environmental disputes of the future, it calls
for consideration in some detail. Moreover, this is the first occasion on which it
has received attention in the jurisprudence of this Court. underlying juristic bases
- the right to development and the right to environmental protection - are
important principles of current international law.

In the present case we have, on the one hand, a scheme which, even in the
attenuated form in which it now remains, is important to the welfare of Slovakia
and its people, who have already strained their own resources and those of their
predecessor State to the extent of over two billion dollars to achieve these
benefits. Slovakia, in fact, argues that the environment would be improved
through the operation of the Project as it would help to stop erosion of the river
bed, and that the scheme would be an effective protection against floods.
Further, Slovakia has traditionally been short of electricity, and the power
generated would be important to its economic development. Moreover, if the
Project is halted in its tracks, vast structural works constructed at great expense,
even prior to the repudiation of the Treaty, would be idle and unproductive, and
would pose an economic and environmental problem in themselves. the other
hand, Hungary alleges that the Project produces, or is to produce, ecological
damage of many varieties, including harm to river bank fauna and flora, damage
to fish breeding, damage to surface water quality, eutrophication, damage to the
groundwater régime, agriculture, forestry and soil, deterioration of the quality of
drinking water reserves, and sedimentation. Hungary alleges that many of these
dangers have already occurred and more will manifest themselves, if the scheme
continues in operation. In the material placed before the Court, each of these
dangers is examined and explained in considerable detail. How does one handle
these considerations? Does one abandon the Project altogether for fear that the
latter consequences might emerge? Does one proceed with the scheme because
of the national benefits it brings, regardless of the suggested environmental
damage? Or does one steer a course between, with due regard to both
considerations, but ensuring always a continuing vigilance in respect of
environmental harm? It is clear that a principle must be followed which pays due
regard to both considerations. 1s there such a principle, and does it command
recognition in international law? 1 believe the answer to both questions is in the
affirmative. The principle is the principle of sustainable development and, in my
view, it is an integral part of modern international law. It is clearly of the utmost
importance, both in this case and more generally. 1 would observe, moreover,
that both Parties in this case agree on the isThus, Hungary states in its pleadings
that:

"Hungary and Slovakia agree that the principle of sustainable development, as

formulated in the Brundtland Report, the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 is
applicable to this dispute . . . International law in the field of sustainable
development is now sufficiently well established, and both Parties appear to
accept this." (Reply of Hungary, paras. 1.45 and 1.47.) Slovakia states that
"inherent in the concept of sustainable development is the principle that
developmental needs are to be taken into account in interpreting and applying
environmental obligations" (Counter-Memorial of Slovakia, para. 9.53; see also
paras. 9.54-9.59). Their disagreement seems to be not as to the existence of the
principle but, rather, as to the way in which it is to be applied to the facts of this
case (Reply of Hungary, para. 1.45). The problem of steering a course between
the needs of developmentand the necessity to protect the environment is a
problem alike of the law of development and of the law of the environment. Both
these vital and developing areas of law require, and indeed assume, the existence
of a principle which harmonizes both needs. To hold that no such principle exists
in the law is to hold that current law recognizes the juxtaposition of two principles
which could operate in collision with each other, without providing the necessary
basis of principlefor their reconciliation. The untenability of the supposition that
the law sanctions such a state of normative anarchy suffices to condemn a
hypothesis that leads to so unsatisfactory a result. Each principle cannot be given
free rein, regardless of the other. The law necessarily contains within itself the
principle of reconciliation. That principle is the principle of sustainable
development. case offers a unique opportunity for the application of that and 1
have thought it fit to make these observations on a few aspects which have
presented themselves for consideration in this case.principle, for it arises from a
Treaty which had development as its objective, and has been brought to a
standstill over arguments concerning environmental considerations.The people of
both Hungary and Slovakia are entitled to development for the furtherance of
their happiness and welfare. They are likewise entitled to the preservation of
their human right to the protection of their environment. Other cases raising
environmental questions have been considered by this Court in the context of
environmental pollution arising from such sources as nuclear explosions, which
are far removed from development projects. The present case thus focuses
attention, as no other case has done in the jurisprudence of this Court, on the
question of the harmonization of developmental and environmental concepts.

suitable opportunity, both to draw attention to the problem and to indicate

concern at the inadequacies of such inter partes rules as determining factors in
major environmental disputes.

1 stress this for the reason that inter partes adversarial procedures, eminently fair
and reasonable in a purely inter partes issue, may need reconsideration in the
future, if ever a case should arise of the imminence of serious or catastrophic
environmental danger, especially to parties other than the immediate litigants.
Indeed, the inadequacies of technical judicial rules of procedure for the decision
of scientific matters has for long been the subject of scholarly comment 8R. We
have entered an era of international law in which international law subserves not
only the interests of individual States, but looks beyond them and their parochial
concerns to the greater interests of humanity and planetary welfare. In
addressing such problems, which transcend the individual rights and obligations
of the litigating States, international law will need to look beyond procedural rules
fashioned for purely inter partes litigation. When we enter the arena of
obligations which operate erga omnes rather than inter partes, rules based on
individual fairness and procedural compliance may be inadequate. The great
ecological questions now surfacing will cal1 for thought upon this matter.
International environmental law will need to proceed beyond weighing the rights
and obligations of parties within a closed compartment of individual State self-
interest, unrelated to the global concerns of humanity as a whole. The present
case offers an opportunity for such reflection. Environmental law is one of the
most rapidly developing areas of international law As this vital branch of law
proceeds to develop, it will need al1 the insights available from the human
experience, crossing cultural anddisciplinary boundaries which have traditionally
hemmed in the disciplineof international law.