STUDENT: NGUYEN THI HUONG GIANG

STUDENT ID: 18110033

CLASS: MBA03

MANAGERIAL ECONOMIC’S ASSIGMENT

TOPIC: COLLEGE ADMISSIONS AND THE STABILITY OF MARRIAGE

After reading this paper, I have learned about useful and interesting of this theory
that I can apply to my life, especially in finding partner to marriage.
The stable marriage problem as a collaborative game theory model, cooperation
parties to maximize global benefits.
This algorithm can solve the traditional economic problem "supply meet demand"
but does not need a "price" mechanism. For example, the supply side (universities) will
have a stable relationship with the demand side (the new student wants to study at
university) without a mechanism of buying/selling prices.
This algorithm works on a common notion about the stability of the system and the
pure cognitive ability of participants in the bridge system (candidates). Candidates are
assumed to have good reason, know what they want and their chosen behavior (schools
selection) follows reason. Candidates will select universities which they prefer and be
selected by universities, changing their choices, until they have the best results. The
situation when the competitor continues to change school choices, but does not make them
better, is called stable.
Stable matching status will be achieved "when all candidates enter the highest
possible university". At that time, the supply (universities) meets the demand (candidates)
in a stable state.
Deferred-Acceptance Algorithm proposed by David Gale and Lloyd Shapley to
solve the stable marriage problem. Deferred-Acceptance Algorithm is a simple set of rules
that go directly to stable matching in certain conditions. There are two ways to design

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algorithms: supply side (universities) actively choose (candidates); or on the demand side
(candidates) actively submit applications (to schools they want to study).