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A Brief History of the Theory of Evolution
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A Brief History of the Theory of Evolution:
Context, Concepts, Assumptions,
and Sexuality
Michael R. Kauth, PhD
SUMMARY. A brief history of evolutionary theory illustrates its long

development and sociopolitical context. Major theoretical concepts in
evolutionary theory are introduced that lay the groundwork for more de-
tailed discussion in later texts. Two incarnations of evolutionary the-
ory–sociobiology and evolutionary psychology–are described in some
detail. Criticisms of these ideas are reviewed and evaluated. Evolution-
ary psychology, with its emphasis on sexual selection theory, has proven
to be a rich approach, generating many new insights into human sex-
uality. doi:10.1300/J056v18n02_02 [Article copies available for a fee from The
Haworth Document Delivery Service: 1-800-HAWORTH. E-mail address:
<docdelivery@haworthpress.com> Website: <http://www.HaworthPress.com>
© 2006 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved.]
KEYWORDS. Darwin, evolution, adaptation, sexual attraction, theory,

heterosexual, homosexual
Michael R. Kauth is Clinical Psychologist, Southeast Louisiana Veterans Health

Care System, New Orleans, LA, and Assistant Professor, Department of Psychiatry &
Neurology, Tulane University School of Medicine.
Address correspondence to: (E-mail: michael.kauth@med.va.gov).
The author offers much thanks to Frank Muscarella for his instructive comments on
an earlier version of this text.
[Haworth co-indexing entry note]: “A Brief History of the Theory of Evolution: Context, Concepts, As-
sumptions, and Sexuality.” Kauth, Michael R. Co-published simultaneously in Journal of Psychology & Hu-
man Sexuality (The Haworth Press, Inc.) Vol. 18, No. 2/3, 2006, pp. 23-68; and: Handbook of the Evolution of
Human Sexuality (ed: Michael R. Kauth) The Haworth Press, Inc., 2006, pp. 23-68. Single or multiple copies
of this article are available for a fee from The Haworth Document Delivery Service [1-800-HAWORTH, 9:00
a.m. - 5:00 p.m. (EST). E-mail address: docdelivery@haworthpress.com].
Available online at http://jphs.haworthpress.com
© 2006 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1300/J056v18n02_02 23
24 HANDBOOK OF THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN SEXUALITY
Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution.
–Theodosius Dobzhansky, 1973
Why bother with history? The simple answer is that to fully under-
stand the present, one must look to the past. Science does not exist in a
vacuum, and a history of science without social context is lifeless. As I
will discuss, various social, economic, religious, and political notions
and values beginning prior to the nineteenth century and leading up to
the present have shaped evolutionary theory. As well, opposition to
evolutionary theory has resurfaced at regular intervals. We are currently
experiencing a period of strong opposition to evolutionary theory. Not
since the 1920s and 1930s has opposition to evolution from Christian
evangelicals been so pronounced, with confrontational, hostile attacks
designed to raise doubt about evolution and promote creationism. Not
surprisingly, opponents of evolution have also objected to the study and
teaching of human sexuality (sexology), often linking permissive sexu-
ality and homosexuality with the teaching of evolution. In addition,
some secular political groups and scientists have assailed evolutionary
theory for its presumed assumptions and implications about human na-
ture. It is my hope that an appreciation of the history of evolutionary
theory will help the reader anticipate, understand, and evaluate
opposition to it. For when the subject is the evolution of human
sexuality, critics often come from several directions.
Coincidentally, the birth of evolutionary theory just preceded the
birth of modern human sexuality: that is, the invention of the “hetero-
sexual” and “homosexual.” While evolution and human sexuality
crossed paths briefly in the early days, enthusiasm for an evolutionary
theory of human sexual attraction and behavior took nearly 100 years to
develop (Miller, 2000). New interest in the evolution of human sexual-
ity arose about the time that the first homosexual rights groups began
to form (Bullough, 1994; Terry, 1999) and preceded by a few years a
radical shift in American culture toward more open sexuality. This
cultural shift was fueled by feminism, the birth control pill, and in-
creased recreational drug use. Renewed scholarly interest in the study
of human sexuality can be traced to the enormous publicity (and noto-
riety) received by Alfred Kinsey’s two volumes on human sexual be-
havior in 1948 and 1953. In America for the last 50 years, both
evolution and sexology have been favorite targets of far-right secular
and religious conservatives in the so-called “Culture Wars” (Hunter,
1992).
Michael R. Kauth 25
A complete history of evolutionary theory is beyond the scope of this

text. (For a comprehensive history of the theory of evolution, see
Larson, 2004; for a history of modern sexology, see Bullough, 1994 and
Terry, 1999.) I will present a brief history of the development of evolu-
tionary theory, including its major concepts and assumptions, as well as
the theory’s relationship to sexology. I will discuss sexual selection the-
ory in some detail because it is central to Evolutionary Psychology
(EP). Many texts in this volume employ an EP approach. Assumptions
and criticisms of EP will be discussed, and I will conclude with brief
comments about the direction of future EP research.
DARWIN’S IDEA:
FROM NATURAL SELECTION
TO EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY
In the distant future I see open fields for far more important re-
searches. Psychology will be based on a new foundation, that of
the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by
gradation. Light will be thrown on the origin of man and his his-
tory.
–Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species, 1859
Prior to Darwin’s new idea, naturalists credited God with creating

new life and with the diversity of species, each perfectly suited to its en-
vironment. However, by the late eighteenth century, naturalists had be-
gun to interpret the emerging fossil record. They largely believed that
previous worlds, inhabited by animals different from ones in the pres-
ent, had existed but were each destroyed by some catastrophe (Larson,
2004). A succession of different species (all created by God) was
thought to have followed each geologic catastrophe.
In 1802, Jean Baptiste Pierre Antoine de Monet, chevalier de
Lamarck published a comprehensive theory of organic evolution, called
the “transmutation hypothesis” but popularly known as Larmarck-
ianism (Badcock, 2000). Larmarck believed that physical or internal
stimuli caused a “gelatinous” life fluid to accumulate in active parts of
the body and stimulate the growth of a new organ or feature there
(Larson, 2004). For example, as short-necked ancestors of the modern
giraffe stretched their necks toward out-of-reach leaves the life fluid
concentrated in their neck, and the neck grew longer. Lamarck proposed
that acquired characteristics, like the stretching giraffe’s neck, were

heritable and were passed on to succeeding generations. When suffi-
cient new characteristics accumulated, a new species emerged.
Lamarck further asserted that all organisms were progressing toward
greater complexity and perfection, with the highest level of progression
resulting in humankind. Alternative transmutation theories proposed
that parental traits were blended in offspring, resulting in an averaging
of traits (Larson, 2004). Darwin espoused a form of Larmarckianism
that he called pangenesis.
In the first half of the nineteenth century, Richard Owen recognized
the repetition of basic forms in the structure of various vertebrates (e.g.,
five-fingered bone appendages), which he called homologies (Larson,
2004). To Owen, these commonalities suggested that a rational Creator
employed an archetype from which different species were patterned. He
envisioned a branching developmental pattern of varied species from a
common ancestor. Darwin later employed Owen’s homologies and the
developmental branching idea (without the Creator) to support his
organic transmutation theory.
Darwin was also significantly influenced by Thomas Malthus’s Es-
say on the Principle of Population (Larson, 2004). Malthus had pur-
ported that populations are constrained by the availability of food.
Darwin saw in this argument that individuals of a species naturally dif-
fer and struggle for existence, competing with each other for food and
mates. He reasoned that weaker individuals would be eliminated from
the population, while the strong survived, being better suited to the en-
vironment, to pass on their heritable characteristics.
Against this backdrop, 22 year-old Charles Darwin embarked on a
five-year voyage in 1831 on the H.M.S. Beagle to the South Pacific and
southern coast of South America, as the expedition’s naturalist (Larson,
2004). At the Galápagos Islands, Darwin recognized the Galápagos ar-
chipelago as volcanic mountain tops, bleak and isolated, and noted that
animals on the islands were closely related to species in Chile, while an-
imals on the Cape Verde Islands were related to African species. Dar-
win also observed several varieties of Galápagos mockingbirds and
finches, varying primarily in size and shape of beaks, and hypothesized
that animals from the main land mass must have colonized the newly
formed islands and then became isolated. The isolated species subse-
quently evolved to fit the islands’ unique ecologies. Adaptation to eco-
logical niches and the struggle for existence were the keys for Darwin to
the origin of the species. He called his theory natural selection.
Michael R. Kauth 27
Natural and Sexual Selection
Darwin did not publish his ideas for another 20 years, and then only
after learning that Alfred Russel Wallace had made a similar discovery.
In 1858, as co-discoverers, Darwin and Wallace presented their ideas
about natural selection to the Linnaean Society,1 and one year later Dar-
win published On the Origin of Species By Means of Natural Selection,
eloquently describing the vast diversity of replicating species as a func-
tion of a natural physical process. He argued that over generations traits
are favored that enhance the organism’s survival and reproduction in a
particular environment better than alternatives. Small beneficial
changes accumulate and over time can produce large effects. He re-
ferred to traits that enhance an organism’s survival and reproduction as
adaptations (Darwin, 1859/1958). Darwin proposed two basic explana-
tions for the origin and diversity of species: natural selection and sexual
selection.
In natural selection, individuals who are best suited to the ecology
survive and transmit their heritable characteristics to their offspring.
Thus, evolutionary success means producing viable offspring within a
particular ecology. Darwin (1958) also realized that individuals in a
species vary in their expression of traits and that these variations are at
least partially inherited. Thus, trait differences among individuals allow
for differential reproductive success (leaving more viable offspring
than rivals). On the average, individuals with robust adaptational traits
will out-reproduce individuals with weaker versions of the traits, or
none at all. As individuals with the beneficial traits out-reproduce their
competitors, the traits spread throughout the population over many
generations.
Of course, organisms have many traits. Reproductive trade-offs en-
sure that variability of a given trait is maintained within the population.
Darwin reasoned that trait mutations spontaneously occur in the popula-
tion. Although most mutations are not beneficial and in fact impair the
organism’s survival and disappear with the individual (Badcock, 2000),
rare mutations may benefit survival and reproductive success. Over
time, mutations may significantly alter or split a species.
The environment (e.g., climate, food sources and availability, preda-
tors, parasites) “selects” the trait (Cosmides, Tooby, & Barkow, 1992).
This aspect of natural selection is often overlooked by critics who ac-
cuse evolutionists of genetic or biological determinism (see Rose &
Rose, 2000; criticism of EP is discussed below). Simply, particular
ecologies favor particular traits for survival. Those organisms that pos-
sess environmentally favored traits (or can develop them) flourish in the
ecology, while other organisms fail. If the trait is heritable, it can be
transmitted to offspring who go on to produce a more resilient, prolific
lineage. In short, natural selection is about reproductive success in a
given environment. Survival is only the means to reproductive success.
Darwin’s theory of natural selection gained steady followers and, by
the turn-of-the-century, it was the predominant explanation for evolu-
tion among biologists (Larson, 2004). The theory of sexual selection
had a different history. Darwin (1871/1981) expanded on his earlier
ideas about sexual selection in The Descent of Man and Selection in Re-
lation to Sex, viewing it as a major force in evolution, although he was
puzzled by why it worked (Miller, 2000). He proposed that sexual se-
lection explains how costly traits and subgroup differences (varieties)
persist in the population, such as sex and racial differences in humans.
Darwin saw that some highly favored traits, particularly in males, exact
a high cost to the organism by shortening survival through health conse-
quences or by increasing risk of predation. Sexually selected traits
broadly include sexual ornamentation (e.g., bright feathers, large ap-
pendages, large physical size) and ritual courtship displays (e.g., strut-
ting, erection of peacock’s tail) (Miller, 2000; Ridley, 1993). If
particular traits are preferred by one sex more than the other, dramatic
subpopulation differences within a species can result, such as bright
coloration in males but drab females, hulking males but smaller fe-
males. Darwin reasoned that these traits persist in the population be-
cause they confer a reproductive advantage to individuals. He
identified two independent forms of sexual selection: competition for
mates (intrasexual selection) and mate choice (intersexual selection
or sometimes, epigamic selection). For reasons discussed below, males
primarily compete for mates across species, although female-female
competition for mates does occur. Likewise, female mate choice is pre-
dominant across species, but males also make mate choices. In short,
what distinguishes sexual selection from natural selection is that sexual
selection is all about sex.
Naturalists in Victorian England understood that males attract fe-
males by ornamentation and courtship displays and compete with each
other for mates, but the idea of female choice conflicted with their no-
tion of passive females (Larson, 2004; Miller, 2000). Darwin (1981)
had compiled a great deal of evidence for female mate choice. However,
he was unsure why females choose and why males usually do not.
Miller (2000) has argued that sexual prudery as well as male bias among
scientists contributed to the marginalization of sexual selection for
Michael R. Kauth 29
nearly 100 years. But, times and thinking changed and, for the past 30
years, sexual selection theory has generated a number of insights into
human sexuality. Sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists have
employed sexual selection theory to explain why individuals are at-
tracted to certain features in a mate and to explain mating patterns, mate
monitoring, infidelity, and jealousy.
Intrasexual Selection
Darwin was unsure why sexual selection occurred. Robert Trivers

(1972, 1985) postulated that the greater parental investment by females
represents a limiting resource that drives both male-male competition
for mates and female choosiness. Parental investment refers to the costs
(time, energy, and lost reproductive opportunities) associated with
gestating and raising offspring, which is more often borne by the fe-
male (Trivers, 1972). In many species in which females invest heavily
in offspring and males invest very little or not at all, or females are
scarce, males devote their energies to mating and competing for
mates, and female choice of mates is common (Geary, 1998). Because
their parental investment is higher, females have more at risk in choos-
ing a mate and so will delay choosing, require considerable courting,
and assess fitness indicators in potential mates (Miller, 2000; Symons,
1979). Fitness indicators are sexual ornaments or features that honestly
signal an individual’s health and genetic quality and, therefore, suggest
the individual’s reproductive fitness or ability (Miller, 2000; Zahavi,
1975). Because females are the limiting resource, males compete with
each other for access to mates; males may also interfere with the mating
activities of other males, produce elaborate displays to attract a female’s
attention, and attempt to control the mating activities of sexually recep-
tive females (Geary, 1998; Smuts, 1995; Symons, 1979). The male Sage
grouse, for instance, defends his territory against rival males and at-
tracts fertile females by strutting around his grounds, rhythmically in-
flating and deflating his chest sac, making an audible sound (Wilson,
1975/2000). Among Bighorn sheep, mature rams loudly crash their
heads together at full run in lengthy battles to win access to a fertile fe-
male; dominant, successful rams are usually older and have the largest
curled horns. In this case, female “choosing” may mean acquiescing to
mate with the last ram standing (i.e., the biggest and strongest). Given
unequal reproductive effort and unequal sexual opportunities, males in
general show greater variability in reproductive success than do females
across species: that is, some males produce many offspring, while other
males may not mate for a season, or ever. However, many females enjoy
an average reproductive success.
Intrasexual selection, or male-male competition for mates, is likely to
produce sexual weapons (e.g., horns, spurs, large claws, increased size)
to intimidate or fight rivals, as well as sexual ornaments (e.g., elaborate
tails, bright coloration, eliciting odors, behavioral displays) to attract
females. The sexual weapon is selected if it contributes to dominance
over rival males, since dominant males are more likely to mate and
produce abundant offspring than defeated males who may not mate
at all (Miller, 2000; Wilson, 2000). Over time a sexual weapon can
become more pronounced as the trait is favored in male-male compe-
tition and preferred by females as an honest indicator of fitness, con-
sistent with Fisher’s runaway selection (Fisher, 1930/1958). (For
more discussion on sexual selection theory and runaway selection, see
Sefcek, Brumbach, Vasquez, & Miller, this volume.)
Male-male competition for mates spawns a social hierarchy and fuels
intra-individual conflict in an effort to gain status. Individual and coali-
tion-based aggression is common among traditional human hunting and
foraging and agricultural societies, and coalition-based aggression is of-
ten associated with personal gain, including more resources, more
wives, and greater reproductive success (Geary, 1998). Even so, many
men are targets of aggression and are dominated by a few men. To re-
duce intrapersonal aggression and increase social status, men may ac-
quiesce when confronted by more dominant rivals, form alliances to
gain resources, defend against threats, and provision food with the ulti-
mate goal of gaining access to quality mates (de Waal, 2002; Symons,
1979; Tiger, 1969/1984).
The evolutionary history of male-male competitive aggression ac-
counts for men’s preferences for dominance-submission dynamics, in-
cluding a preference for social hierarchies and signs of status, power,
and control (Symons, 1979; Tiger, 1969/1984). As a result, men in gen-
eral should be sensitive to social status and symbols of rank; this may
account for the long existence of patriarchy, social classes, insignias as
status markers, and bragging among men. In addition, men should be
drawn to strong leaders and should enjoy male-male play-fighting (e.g.,
sports) (Buss, 1994/2003). Male-male competition may also explain the
formation of male alliances or coalitions, a preference for male compan-
ionship, and the desire for loyalty among buddies. Effective long-term
alliances are grounded in mutual obligation, trust, and probably some
degree of affection. Even so, men may form alliances opportunistically
and terminate quickly in pursuit of dominance (Symons, 1979). Finally,
Michael R. Kauth 31
male-male competition should promote good organizational skills,

risk-taking, strategic planning, verbal skills, persuasiveness, and judg-
ment, as well as intelligence and humor. Social dominance cannot be
achieved or maintained for long without such skills.
Although less frequent, female-female competition for mates tends
to occur in species that require a high level of parental investment, such
as humans, making the investing male partner a limiting resource as
well (Trivers, 1972). Similarly, female-female competition creates hier-
archies and fuels social tensions. Among nonhuman primates, female
alliances are usually only seen in species where the female remains in
her natal group, and then alliances are often based on kinship (e.g.,
mother-daughter) (Geary, 1998). Female coalitions are also formed to
defend against male aggression and in response to feeding disputes
(Smuts, 1987). However, among female-bonded species, the ranking
female tends to have higher reproductive success (Geary, 1998).
Among humans, female-female competition may take the form of sabo-
taging a rival, enhancing one’s own appearance, and engaging in behav-
ioral displays to elicit and maintain male sexual interest, especially in
the presence of rivals (Buss, 2003). In mating competition, women are
likely to derogate a competitor’s appearance or her sexual fidelity, en-
hance ones’ own appearance (e.g., makeup, sexy clothes, collagen in-
jections, breast implants) and convey devotion, flirt, play coy, and act
submissive or helpless. Although girls and young women form
alliances, these are often less stable and smaller than male alliances
(Savin-Williams, 1987).
Intersexual Selection
Given their larger reproductive investment, females must choose a

mate wisely (Miller, 2000). In addition to acquiescing to males who
have dominated their rivals, females may choose a mate based on his
sexual ornamentation, such as the peacock’s elaborate tail, the
Bighorn ram’s large horns, and the male gorilla’s massive size and dis-
play of dominance. These fitness indicators signal “good genes” or
good health (i.e., parasite resistance and immunocompetence). Meta-
bolically costly, robust traits such as physical symmetry and extrava-
gant sexual ornamentation are “honest” signals of health and genetic
quality because they are difficult to fake (Miller, 2000; Zahavi, 1975).
In experimental and field studies, high levels of sex hormones, particu-
larly testosterone, produce robust secondary sex characteristics but sup-
press immune response and increase susceptibility to parasites and
disease, especially in less fit males (Zuk, Johnsen, & Maclarty, 1995).
Parasite infestation lowers the quality of secondary sex characteristics
and lowers mating opportunities (female choice) (Folstad & Karter,
1992; Hamilton & Zuk, 1982; Zuk, Thornhill, & Ligon, 1990). Further,
high levels of testosterone are associated with behavioral and health
risks and a shortened life span (Geary, 2005). Thus, a male with robust
secondary sex characteristics–despite the parasite load in the environ-
ment and despite behavioral and health costs of high hormone levels–is
broadcasting his “good genes” and phenotypic condition (Zahavi,
1975).
In human males, sexually selected fitness indicators include mascu-
line, symmetrical features, such as broad shoulders, large chest, narrow
waist, large hands, taller than average height, and vigorous physical ac-
tivity (Buss, 2003; Miller, 2000; Symons, 1979). (For a more discussion
on fitness indicators and mate choice, see Sefcek et al., this volume.) In-
deed, women generally report a preference for handsome, masculine
men who are somewhat taller than average, athletic, and physically fit
(Barber, 1995; Thornhill & Gangestad, 1993; Thornhill, Gangestad, &
Comer, 1995).
Some preferred male traits do not directly benefit female reproduc-
tion. However, by intimidating or defeating rivals or by attracting
mates, the traits indirectly advantage reproductive fitness. Because sex-
ual selection is not a conscious process, the preferred traits in a mate are
simply perceived as “attractive” (Symons, 1979). If the “attractive”
male traits are heritable, then the female can count on her sons having
similar “sexy” traits. In a polygynous society (one male mates with
many females), a “sexy” son is advantaged over less attractive males, as
long as females continue to favor the trait. Further, the daughters can in-
herit their mother’s attraction to those traits, producing a positive feed-
back loop. Runaway selection will lead to the traits and to the
preference for those traits becoming more pronounced over time in the
population (Fisher, 1958).
Other preferred male traits may have no known benefit to female re-
productive success. Even so, if the trait is consistently preferred,
intersexual selection will drive it to become more pronounced but vari-
able in men. An example is the human penis (Miller, 2000). The flaccid
human penis is much larger and more visible than the penises of goril-
las, chimpanzees, orangutans, and bonobos; flaccid nonhuman primate
penises are typically thin and hidden. When erect, the silverback go-
rilla’s penis is less than two inches long, and the erect chimpanzee’s pe-
nis averages about three inches. However, the erect human penis
Michael R. Kauth 33
averages between four and eight inches (Men’s Health, 2006). Miller
(2000) has argued that the human penis was selected by hominin fe-
males for its tactile properties during copulation. In other words, during
sexual activity, size mattered to women (compared to a thin, small pe-
nis, like other primates). If this is indeed the case, Miller has suggested
that clitoral orgasm may be how ancestral women identified truly fit,
attentive, energetic male lovers.
Clearly, the human penis was not selected for visual appearance, or it
would be brightly colored or exquisitely ornate, rather than plain and
unadorned. “Sperm competition” is often cited as an explanation for the
larger human penis, but this is unlikely (Miller, 2000; Taylor, 1996).
Sperm competition refers to the amount of semen produced in order to
wash out or block a competitor’s semen (Baker & Bellis, 1995). Testicle
size is better correlated with sperm competition than penis size (Miller,
2000). For instance, silverback gorillas are vigilant guardians of their
harem and have very small testicles because sperm competition is low,
while chimpanzees are polygynous and males have comparatively large
testicles. Human males have testicles that are intermediate between go-
rillas and chimpanzees, suggesting that early men engaged in mild-to-
moderate polygynous mating and sperm competition. There is sugges-
tive but inconclusive evidence that the human penis evolved via
intrasexual selection as a threat or dominance display to other men, sim-
ilar to some nonhuman primates (Etcoff, 1999; Miller, 2000). When ap-
proached by an unknown animal, male vervet monkeys get an erection,
displaying their red and blue genitals, and make a threatening face. Al-
though I know of no human societies where men publicly display their
penis to threaten other men, it is possible. The pervasive phallic symbol-
ism in most human societies and male insecurity about their penis size
(at least among contemporary Western men), especially in situations
where comparison is likely (e.g., in the locker room), lend support for
the idea that a large human penis signaled dominance.
In addition to selecting for genetic quality and health (excluding
non-fitness traits such as penis size), women prefer men who have re-
sources to invest in them and their children and who are willing to in-
vest. (See Sefcek et al., this volume.) Older age, high social status,
social dominance, and alliances indicate resource potential (Kauth,
2000). Across 37 cultures, Buss and colleagues (Buss, 1989, 1998,
2005; Buss, Larsen, & Westen, 1996; Buss & Schmitt, 1993) have
found that in general women prefer men who are older, resourceful,
masculine, and emotionally committed to invest in a relationship and
family. In this context, emotional jealousy can be seen as a woman’s
sensitivity to her mate’s emotional investment in the relationship. When

choosing a marriage partner, women prefer men who are intelligent,
kind, and compassionate (Buss, 1989), as well as socially dominant and
successful (Buss, 2003; Irons, 1979). Social dominance may signal the
likelihood of protection from other men, as well as access to resources,
both of which will improve reproductive success. Consistent with this
hypothesis, children of socially successful men on the average experi-
ence greater psychological and physical health and longevity compared
to children of less successful men (Adler, Boyce, Chesney, Cohen,
Folkman, Kahn, & Syme, 1994; Geary, 2000).
Parents and kin are also involved in the choice of mate. In fact, in
many cultures, parents and adult relatives often select the mate or influ-
ence the mate choice of their children and kin (Trivers, 1971). Parents
and close relatives have a substantial resource and genetic stake in their
progeny and can ensure their own genetic survival by influencing their
progeny’s choice of mate (Trivers, 1974, 1985).
Male mate choice also occurs and is most likely in species where
males make a substantial parental investment, such as humans. For
men, parental investment is tied to paternity certainty, as much as pro-
ducing viable offspring. While women can be assured that they are a
child’s mother, men cannot be completely certain that they are the fa-
ther. In the context of paternity uncertainty, male sexual jealousy can be
seen as an attempt at mate guarding. As for male mate choice, studies
have found that men prefer particular genetic and fertility indicators in
women. For example, men generally have a sexual preference for beau-
tiful, young (early-to-mid 20s) women who are an average weight, with
a waist-to-hip ratio (WHR) of .70 (Buss, 1989; Buss & Shackelford,
1997; Singh, 1993); this WHR and body mass in young women signals
sufficient accumulation of fat and appropriate estrogen-to-testosterone
levels for a high likelihood of fertility. Studies have also shown that
men rate symmetrical women’s faces and breasts as highly attractive
(Grammer, Fink, Juette, Ronzal, & Thornhill, 2001; Manning, Scutt,
Whitehouse, & Leinster, 1997). Breast symmetry actually increases
during peak fertility in a woman’s cycle. Breast symmetry has also been
associated with fewer health problems, such as cancer, and a higher
probability of current marriage (Scutt, Manning, Whitehouse, Leinster,
& Massey, 1997). In one sample, 90% of women with symmetrical
breasts were married, but only about 50% of women with asymmetrical
breasts were married.
Given that milk production is not related to breast size (rather, to
mammary glands) and nonhuman female primates have flat breasts
Michael R. Kauth 35
even when producing milk, are large human female breasts a sexually
selected trait due to male choice? Probably so. It is likely that large,
symmetrical human breasts evolved as fitness indicators of fertility and
good health (Miller, 2000). As noted earlier, breast symmetry is associ-
ated with fertility (Grammer, Fink, Juette, Ronzal, & Thornhill, 2001;
Manning, Scutt, Whitehouse, & Leinster, 1997), which is easier to
judge when breasts are large and more visible. As well, fertility is asso-
ciated with youth, and a young woman’s breasts are high and firm,
while older women have lower, droopier breasts, features that are ac-
centuated if the breasts are large (Miller, 2000). Thus, it is likely that
larger (but variable) human breasts evolved via men’s choice for this
trait as an indicator of fitness and fertility. If breast size and shape were
not fitness indicators, these features would be more consistent in
women.
Misuse of Darwin’s Idea: Social Darwinism and Eugenics
Back to history. One of evolutionary theory’s darkest periods re-

sulted from a misinterpretation of Darwin’s idea. It is worth reviewing
these events, because the same misunderstanding and this particular his-
tory are often resurrected by opponents of evolutionary theory.
Herbert Spencer, a contemporary of Darwin’s, referred to natural se-
lection as “survival of the fittest,” although reproduction, not survival,
is the critical element of Darwinism (Badcock, 2000). In fact, survival
and reproduction are often in conflict. However, in the mid-to-late nine-
teenth century in class-conscious Industrial England, the idea of com-
petition to survive in business and in life–between individuals and
between groups–was part of the culture (Larson, 2004). Spencer and
others understood the “fittest” to mean wealthy, powerful, and educated
white men (Gould, 1981). Like Lamarck, Spencer viewed evolution as a
linear progression toward greater complexity and sophistication, culmi-
nating in humans. Thus, species could be arranged from least to most
complex (re: inferior to superior), and particular human subpopulations
(i.e., females and nonwhite races) were considered less evolved, primi-
tive, and even deserving of their lot (Gould, 1981). These ideas are
known as Social Darwinism, although Social Spencerism is more accu-
rate (Pinker, 2002). Darwin’s theory of natural selection was misunder-
stood to reinforce and justify current social inequities, rather than
describe how living organisms adapted to particular ecologies.
Eugenics–selective human breeding–was an extension of Social Dar-
winism (Larson, 2004; Pinker, 2002). Francis Galton, Darwin’s cousin,
coined this term and championed the idea that (Lamarckian) evolution
(toward superiority) could be sped up by encouraging attractive men
and women of good “fitness” to marry each other and produce children.
Galton’s so-called positive eugenics (“more children from the fit”)
stood in contrast to negative eugenics (“less children from the unfit”),
which was strongly influenced by social contagion and degeneracy
theories. In the early twentieth century, for example, birth control was
promoted in the United States as a means to reduce the number of chil-
dren from degenerate (re: nonwhite) races (Terry, 1999). Negative
eugenicists called for eliminating aid to the poor and mandatory sexual
sterilization of individuals who suffered from feeble-mindedness or
other hereditary disorders. By 1935, more than 60,000 persons had
been sexually sterilized in the United States, mostly in California
(Larson, 2004). In Germany, the idea of limiting the spread of heredi-
tary disease in the population by isolating or sterilizing affected indi-
viduals was particularly popular. Between 1933 and 1939, 300,000
Germans were sexually sterilized. After 1939, euthanasia programs re-
placed the sterilization programs. Contagion and degeneracy theories
and a peculiar version of social evolution supported Nazi ideology and
their extermination of millions of Jews, Gypsies, and gay men and lesbi-
ans (Larson, 2004; Oosterhuis, 1991). [In the 1990s, Serbian President
Slobodan Milosevic cited a similar eugenicist rationale for the “ethnic
cleansing” of more than 200,000 Bosnian Muslims (Milosevic to face,
2001).] The atrocities committed by Nazi eugenicists have been used
repeatedly to cast suspicion on the motives of evolutionists.
Expanding Darwin’s Idea:

Neo-Darwinism and the Rebirth of Sexual Selection
Even during the heyday of eugenics, several positive developments

led to greater adoption of evolutionary theory. In 1924, J. B. S. Haldane
applied rediscovered Mendelian genetics to evolutionary theory to ex-
plain adaptive changes in populations (Larson, 2004). He demonstrated
mathematically that genetic variations with even a slight reproductive
advantage could come to dominate in the population. In the 1930s, Ron-
ald Fisher demonstrated that the greater the benefit conferred by fa-
vored genes, the faster they spread in the population. Although Fisher
emphasized the role of sexual selection in evolution, this was largely ig-
nored until a second edition of his work was published in 1958 (Miller,
2000). Further, Sewall Wright introduced the concept of the “adaptive
landscape” to explain the diversification of species (Provine, 1986).
Michael R. Kauth 37
Confirming Darwin’s idea, Wright explained how over time, or due to

natural events, subpopulations become geographically isolated from the
main group and inbreeding and different environmental demands push
the isolated group to specialize to its new ecology, diversifying from the
main group (Larson, 2004).
By the late 1930s, Theodosius Dobzhansky had published the first
synthetic theory of evolution, melding modern genetics and Darwinian
principles and giving birth to neo-Darwinism (Dodson & Dodson,
1985; Larson, 2004). Neo-Darwinism held that ecological, physiologi-
cal, structural, and chance factors strongly influenced evolutionary
processes. Dobzhansky asserted that ecologies favored particular
features of an organism over others and that genetic and chromo-
somal mutations were the source of heritable variability. By the late
1940s, biologists and geneticists had largely adopted evolutionary the-
ory (Dodson & Dodson, 1985).
Another significant development occurred in the 1960s when Wil-
liam Hamilton (1964) explained how cooperation and altruism could
exist, given individual competition and the intense struggle for exis-
tence. He explained “from a gene’s point of view” how social behavior
of relatives ensures the continuation of their genes. According to Ham-
ilton’s theory of kin selection, an individual benefits by aiding close kin
who share some of their genes, if the number of genes in common ex-
ceeds those lost by the individual (Trivers, 1971, 1972). Consequently,
organisms should evolve inherited tendencies to aid their closest kin in
an effort to preserve their own genes. Kin selection helped to account
for the existence of sterile worker castes of insects that labor in the ser-
vice of relatives’ offspring, as well as kin-group cooperation, nepotism,
and self-sacrifice among humans (Badcock, 2000). Now, an organism’s
inclusive fitness comprised the individual’s overall genetic contribution
to the next generation, including one’s own children and those of close
relatives (Geary, 1998).
In Adaptation and Natural Selection, George Williams (1966)
breathed new life into sexual selection theory by placing it on par with
natural selection. He viewed sexual ornamentation as a product of
intrasexual and intersexual selection. Theorists such as Trivers began
incorporating this idea into their work. Trivers (1972, 1974), expanding
on the idea of parental investment, described family conflicts in terms
of competing genetic interests and argued that parents will parcel out
their limited resources among the children (e.g., “love each child
equally”) and strive to manipulate (e.g., by coercion, punishment,
forced choice) their children’s social and reproductive behavior in an
effort to maximize their own investment. Children will resist their par-
ents’ attempts to control and shape them (e.g., cry, resist, rebel), while
demanding more parental resources (e.g., by complaining, manipulat-
ing, throwing tantrums). Further, children compete with their siblings
for scarce parental resources by coercing, cheating, and fighting or by
manipulating a parent’s affection (Badcock, 2000; Pinker, 2002).
Trivers (1971, 1985) also developed the idea of reciprocal altruism
or reciprocity to explain cooperation between unrelated individuals.
Anthropological studies have long demonstrated that cooperative re-
lationships are common in human societies and facilitate survival,
even though altruism should bear a high cost for the helper. Trivers ar-
gued that if helping others entailed a social obligation to assist the
helper when needy, cooperation among unrelated individuals would be
favored. The relatively long period of parental care and long human
lifespan presents hundreds of thousands of opportunities to aide others
and be aided in times of need. Thus, reciprocity helps to account for
friendship and alliances, as well as sympathy, gratitude, and guilt.
Being reproductively selfish, some individuals will take advantage of
others’ generosity, without reciprocating. In fact, some cheating is
adaptive (Trivers, 1971, 1985). Given that cheating is a constant threat,
Trivers proposed that individuals evolved psychological mechanisms to
regulate their degree of cooperation and to detect cheating or deceit in
others. As cheating became more sophisticated to avoid detection,
cheater detecting became more pervasive. Indeed, very effective cheat-
ers might disguise their true motives even from themselves to mask
their awareness of intent. Thus, Trivers proposed that self-deception,
including biased perceptions, biased memories, and biased reasoning,
are major components of an evolved human psychology.
Darwin’s Idea Inspires Sociobiology and Evolutionary Psychology
Evolutionary psychology is one of four sciences that are bringing

human nature back into the picture.
–Steven Pinker, 2002
In 1975, Harvard entomologist Edward O. Wilson published his

landmark book Sociobiology, attempting to connect evolutionary biol-
ogy to the social sciences and philosophy. The term sociobiology re-
ferred to the “study of the biological basis of all social behavior” (p. 4),
including the adaptations that benefit reproductive fitness. Wilson inte-
Michael R. Kauth 39
grated a large literature on animal behavior within the neo-Darwinist

framework of natural selection and, most controversially, applied the
same principles to human behavior, synthesizing the work of Williams,
Hamilton, Trivers, and others. He attempted to explain various human
behaviors, including social roles/identities, parent-child conflicts, war-
fare, xenophobia, and even homosexuality from an adaptationist per-
spective. Although the chapter on human behavior was the last one in
Wilson’s 575-page book, it was this chapter that enraged political, reli-
gious, and academic groups. (Criticism of the book and of sociobiology
is explored later). As a result, the word “sociobiology” became unpopu-
lar for a time (Larson, 2004; Pinker, 2002). Yet, the approach survived
and thrived within the evolutionary sciences (Alcock, 2001).
Hamilton and Trivers’ work on evolved psychological mechanisms
inspired a great deal of research that came to be called “Evolutionary
Psychology” (EP). Many consider EP an independent off-shoot of
sociobiology. While sociobiology has sought to determine the evolved
purpose for social behaviors of interest (Alcock, 2001), EP has investi-
gated the innate psychological mechanisms that evolved to solve adap-
tive problems of survival and mating in ancestral human hunters and
foragers. Leda Cosmides, John Tooby, and Jerome Barkow (1992) have
described EP as “simply psychology informed by . . . evolutionary biol-
ogy” (p. 3). Evolved psychological mechanisms are key features of a
universal human nature (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). As adaptations to
the Pleistocene Age, these mechanisms may no longer benefit reproduc-
tive success in the modern world. In fact, some evolved psychological
features may contribute to contemporary social problems and to pro-
found misunderstandings between the sexes.
Some evolutionary psychologists have studied nonsexual aspects of
human life [e.g., language and human nature (Pinker, 2002; Pinker &
Bloom, 1992), cognition and social exchange (Cosmides & Tooby,
1992)], viewing sexuality, even homosexuality, largely as social be-
havior (e.g., Hamilton, 1964; Trivers, 1974; see also Wilson, 1978; an
exception is Symons, 1979). However, many other evolutionary psy-
chologists have explored aspects of human sexuality, such as mating
behavior and infidelity, from an evolved psychological perspective.
Donald Symons (1979) in The Evolution of Human Sexuality applied a
psychological adaptationist approach to a broad range of sexual activi-
ties (e.g., sex differences, mate selection, marriage, female orgasm, sex-
ual jealousy) across a variety of human cultures. He argued that males
and females have different sexual natures, although the differences at
times are obscured by the “compromises” that heterosexuality and

moral beliefs impose.
While most evolutionary-minded scholars focus on conceptive
male-female sexual behavior (as the behavioral mechanism of
heritability), there has been growing interest recently among theorists
in exploring the role and possible adaptation of non-conceptive
sexualities, including bisexuality (Weinrich, 1987) and homosexuality
(Diamond and Muscarella, this volume), as well as lust and love
(Fisher, 1998), male coalitions (van der Dennen, 1995), pedophilia
(Feierman, 1990), sex offenses (Quinsey & Lalumière, 1995), sexual
jealousy (Buss, Larsen, & Westen, 1996), and sexual pleasure (Mercer,
this volume).
Assumptions
Elsewhere (Kauth, 2002, 2005) I have described implicit, at times

conflicting, conceptual assumptions underlying theories of human sex-
ual attraction, related concepts, and sex research methodologies. Im-
plicit assumptions are considered so basic that they are self-evident and
need no justification, making them difficult even to recognize. Unspo-
ken and unexamined assumptions contribute to confusion, idiosyncratic
use of terminology, acceptance of logical inconsistencies, biased meth-
odologies, and conclusions that largely reconfirm social beliefs. Unfor-
tunately, this problem is common in fields that enjoy multidisciplinary
participation, such as sex research (Kauth, 2002) and the evolutionary
sciences (Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske, & Wakefield, 1998).
Implicit assumptions are sometimes the source of criticism leveled
against evolutionary theory, which then are difficult to clarify because
they are not overt. Thus, to promote conceptual clarity and reduce con-
fusion in this text and this volume, I will describe assumptions underly-
ing evolutionary theory and specific to EP. Other writers have discussed
assumptions of evolutionary theory (see Buss, 2005; Cosmides &
Tooby, 1992; Cosmides, Tooby, & Barkow, 1992; Pinker, 2002;
Symons, 1979, 1992), so I will be brief. Assumptions of EP come from
the above sources, plus Badcock (2000) and Miller (2000). The
assumptions presented here are not exhaustive.
Evolutionary Theory
Evolution is slow and evolved traits are ancient. Selection of human

traits via individual survival and reproductive success takes many thou-
Michael R. Kauth 41
sands of generations; how many generations depends on the intensity

and persistence of selection pressures and the reproduction rate of the
organism. In the laboratory under intense (forced) environmental pres-
sures, fruit fly (Drosophilia) populations, which have high reproduction
rates (about two weeks), can show trait variation within 10 generations
(Wilson, 2000). However, under natural conditions, trait variation takes
much more time. Compared to fruit flies, humans are very slow repro-
ducers (one generation = about 20 years), and the universal traits of in-
terest for evolutionists (e.g., social and sexual strategies) are likely to
have developed 1-2 million years ago (50,000-100,000 generations).
Modern humans appeared very recently in evolutionary time, about
40,000 years ago (2,000 generations). While individual variation is on-
going and no doubt has occurred in the last 40,000 years, there is only a
low probability that a recent psychological trait has effectively spread
through the human population in so short a time. In other words, the
traits of interest for evolutionists are quite old.
Evolutionary theory (ultimate causation) explains the general case
or behavior on the average. Evolutionists are interested in why a trait
occurs in the population and in subpopulations (e.g., the sexes), all
else being equal. When the focus is the individual and how a trait oc-
curs, immediate environmental, developmental, and individual factors
(proximate causes) are more relevant. People may prefer proximate ex-
planations; they are accessible, familiar, and emotionally tangible,
while ultimate explanations, located in the distant past, are difficult to
conceptualize.
Proximate causes are not unimportant. For the evolutionary sci-
ences, the causes of interest are in the distant past. However, the ab-
sence of discussion about proximate causes does not diminish their
relevance. Evolutionary theory holds that an organism’s development is
a product of an ongoing interaction between biological and environ-
mental factors. By contrast, proximate theorists of human behavior
rarely discuss the relevance of evolved traits, as if the species had no
evolutionary history. Rarer still is anyone who criticizes these proxi-
mate theorists for their oversight!
Evolutionists explain traits that enhance reproductive success. Evo-
lutionists do not try to explain all traits or behaviors, only a subgroup of
traits–naturally selected adaptive traits that increase the likelihood of
successful reproduction and sexually selected traits that signal an or-
ganism’s fitness. Many human traits are not adaptations. They may be
by-products of adaptations or simply noise that makes no reproductive
contribution (e.g., preferring vanilla ice cream to chocolate). Within hu-
man sexuality, non-adaptations include same-sex sexual behavior

(however, see Muscarella, this volume), anal intercourse, fellatio, mas-
turbation, sexual fantasies, sexual role-playing, fetishism, pedophilia,
cross-dressing, transgenderism, celibacy, and asexuality.
Species-typical traits are products of evolution. A sure sign that a
trait evolved within a species is if all individuals possess it. Neverthe-
less, individual variation of the trait is expected.
Description is not advocacy; evolution promotes no message about
moral or proscriptive behavior. Nature is not moral, and evolutionary
theory takes no position on what “ought” to be. Those who view Nature
as good and moral commit the naturalistic fallacy. However, those who
see Nature as base and immoral commit the anti-naturalistic fallacy.
Neither Nature nor Science can offer moral proscriptions for how
humans should live.
Heritable traits are genetic and phenotypes are chosen, but genes are
selected. Phenotypes refer to the expression of a trait, based on the ge-
notype, environmental events, and developmental processes. Particular
ecologies favor particular phenotypes, although phenotypes are not
transmitted to offspring. Only genes are inherited.
Genes do not determine behavior. Genes are not rigid behavioral pro-
grams; people are not robots. Change the environment (the organism is
also a gene’s environment) and the trait changes.
The sexes differ. For millions of years, male and female hominins
have pursued different reproductive strategies, and the sexes effectively
evolved different psychologies and mating behaviors. Difference does
not imply inequity or inferiority.
Evolutionary Psychology
There is a universal human nature. Over millions of years of persis-

tent evolutionary pressures, hominins have evolved a common set of
mental, emotional, and behavioral processes. Similar natures permit hu-
mans to communicate with other humans, infer motives, predict actions,
anticipate needs, cooperate, empathize, manipulate, and love.
Evolved psychological mechanisms solve problems of survival and
reproductive success. As such, these mechanisms are specialized, con-
tent-dependent, motivational adaptations to aide individuals in looking
after their own (genetic) interests. Evolved psychological mechanisms
are borne out of millions of years of competing reproductive interests
and sexual strategizing. Thus, evolved psychological mechanisms are
integral to human sexuality.
Michael R. Kauth 43
Evolved psychological mechanisms are non-conscious. Selection of

traits by survival and expression of evolved traits does not require
awareness. Mating strategies are psychological mechanisms that are not
conscious. Cognitive, affective, and behavioral traits are genetically fa-
vored if they solve problems that result in greater reproductive success.
Decision-making is biased toward reproductive interests. Evolved
mechanisms will tend toward promoting reproductive success. Such bi-
ases do not, however, prohibit non-reproductive choices (e.g., celibacy,
masturbation) or self-sacrificing acts (e.g., altruistic suicide).
Preference for mate traits is experienced as attraction. Trait prefer-
ences are non-conscious and are experienced as attraction and desire.
Heritable, functional preferences for traits in a mate are transmitted to
offspring.
Products and Process of Evolutionary Analysis
There are essentially four products of an evolutionary analysis: adap-

tation, by-product, exaptation, and noise (Buss, Haselton, Shackelford,
Bleske, & Wakefield, 1998). As noted earlier, an adaptation is an
evolved trait that serves to promote an organism’s survival and repro-
ductive success. By-products are non-adaptive traits that are unintended
or accidental effects of an adaptation. By-products do not enhance re-
productive success, although they may benefit the individual in some
way. Among humans, arm-pits, the tailbone, the color of blood, and
mathematics are by-products of adaptations–fore limbs, a spine, hemo-
globin, and a large complex brain, respectively. In this volume, Dia-
mond and Vasey each argue that same-sex sexual behavior in humans is
a by-product of different adaptations; as such, same-sex sexual behav-
ior does not benefit reproductive success. Muscarella, however, argues
in this volume that male-male sexual behavior acquired a reproductive
benefit and, therefore, is an exaptation. An exaptation is a by-product
that has gained reproductive function over time, such as legs (formerly
fins), feathers for flight (formerly for insulation), and human language
(Gould & Vrba, 1982). Theorists disagree over whether language, for
example, is an adaptation or an exaptation (see Pinker & Bloom,
1992). Disagreements about the correct explanation for an adaptational
trait are common among evolutionists, because it is often difficult or
impossible to determine the exact sequence of events in a trait’s evolu-
tionary history. However, the critical point is establishing whether a
trait has an adaptive function. Even so, some scholars deplete numerous
printer ink cartridges arguing whether a trait is an adaptation or an
exaptation. Lastly, other traits may be random noise or non-adaptive

mutations generated by genetic variability.
An evolutionary functional analysis involves asking a series of engi-
neering questions to determine whether a trait is an adaptation or some-
thing else (Cosmides, Tooby & Barkow, 1992). Suppose that the
hypothesized adaptative trait is “dating.” The evolutionist asks: (1) What
possible behavioral events support the outcome of greater reproductive
success? Is dating one of them? What alternatives are there? (2) What
features of the ancestral world support the evolution of the proposed
adaptive trait? Were background conditions in the Pleistocene world
stable and sufficient enough to produce dating as a solution? Here it is
important to understand the features and pressures of the ancestral
world. (3) What are the essential features of the proposed adaptive trait
and how is it organized? How does dating gain information that bene-
fits reproductive success and how is that information used? (4) What
form does the proposed adaptive trait take? In other words, what does
dating look like in other cultures and in the modern world? And, (5) how
well does the hypothesized adaptive trait function under conditions par-
allel to ancestral ones? Does dating work like it should? Is dating a par-
simonious solution for problems associated with reproduction?
Together these questions form a strong heuristic procedure. Yet, ex-
planations in the distant past can be difficult or impossible to verify; al-
ternatives can be difficult to rule out. Supportive evidence is largely
correlative. Random assignment of evolutionary pressures on humans
is not possible. Therefore, scholars must rely on natural field experi-
ments and lab experiments that are abstracted versions of ancestral con-
ditions. These limitations are not specific to evolutionary theory. Such
procedural weaknesses are similar for many proximate theories whose
conclusions are difficult to confirm and alternatives are difficult to rule
out.
Criticism of Sociobiology and Evolutionary Psychology
Many charges leveled against EP have also been directed at

sociobiology. While evolutionary psychologists view their field as dis-
tinct from sociobiology, others, including Wilson, do not (Segerstråle,
2000). Paleontologist Stephen J. Gould, a frequent critic of socio-
biology, also lumps the two together. For this reason, I will discuss criti-
cism of sociobiology and EP (S/EP) together.
Segerstråle (2000) has interpreted the harsh criticism direct toward
S/EP as largely an argument about “different visions of science and dif-
Michael R. Kauth 45
ferent conceptions about the responsibility of scientists” (p. 1). She

noted that critics have often used arguments against S/EP as vehicles to
discuss their view of human nature, epistemology, what makes
“good” science, and the role of science in society. Perhaps for this
reason, critics of S/EP have primarily influenced those outside of evo-
lutionary biology (Larson, 2004; Pinker, 2002). In general, critics have
characterized S/EP as reductionistic, deterministic, story telling, lack-
ing moral responsibility, and “bad” science (Pinker, 2002; Segerstråle,
2000). Before reviewing each charge, additional context is important.
Initially, Wilson’s Sociobiology received favorable reviews. After a
positive review in the New York Review of Books, academics calling
themselves the Sociobiology Study Group widely circulated an invec-
tive titled “Against ‘Sociobiology,’” accusing Wilson of favoring rac-
ism, eugenics, Social Darwinism, war, genocide, and slavery and
suggesting that his science masked a dangerous conservative political
agenda (Pinker, 2002). Signatories of the letter included Wilson’s fel-
low Harvard colleagues, S. J. Gould and Richard Lewontin. Wilson re-
butted that his critics had completely distorted his statements, but few
academics bothered to check the Study Group’s charges and accepted
their allegations at face value (Segerstråle, 2000). Feminists, civil rights
advocates, religious leaders, and various scholars labeled Wilson a rac-
ist and sexist and claimed that he reduced human beings to choice-less
biological processes. Academics complained that he negated the role of
culture as a causal factor, ignoring important proximate causes (see
Pinker, 2002). Wilson accused his detractors, especially Gould and
Lewontin (both Marxists), of promoting their own political agenda
(Segerstråle, 2000). Years later, Gould confessed to manufacturing the
sociobiology controversy in order to gain an audience for his
anti-adaptationist views. He believed that by linking moral arguments
to sociobiology discussion about the underlying problems that he per-
ceived with adaptationism could be sped up.
In “The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Program”
(1979), Gould and Lewontin outlined the arguments that have been
raised against S/EP for 25 years. They railed against the naïve
adaptationism of sociobiologists for believing that every trait of every
organism was adaptive and perfectly suited to its environment–“each
trait plays its part and must be as it is” (reminiscent of Dr. Pangloss’ ex-
planation in Candide for why we have noses: to carry spectacles)–and
charged sociobiology with determinism, telling post hoc “just-so sto-
ries,” and misattributing evolutionary function to traits that emerged for
other reasons. Likewise, sociologist Hilary Rose and neurobiologist
Steven Rose (2000) have charged that “to evolutionary psychologists,

everything from children’s alleged dislike of spinach to our supposed
universal preferences for scenery including grassland and water derives
from this mythic human origin in the African savannah” (p. 2). Of
course, Wilson never claimed that every trait was adaptive, and while
some evolutionary psychologists have proposed hypotheses about the
evolution of taste and landscape preferences, I know of none who have
claimed that these hypotheses are yet supported.
Gould and Lewontin saw sociobiology as justifying the social status
quo (racism and sexism), denying free will, and denying moral respon-
sibility–not just personal responsibility but also the responsibility of
Science to lead positive changes in society (Gould, 1981, 1999;
Lewontin, Rose, & Kamin, 1984). The Roses (2000) had made similar
complaints about EP, citing the theory’s political “implications” to the
civil rights and feminist movements and personal offense at the idea that
“parental love is reducible to genetics” (p. 8). Richard Levins and
Lewontin (1985) offered a Marxist alternative to sociobiology–Dia-
lectical Biology–which claimed to challenge the bourgeois assump-
tions of Western science that purportedly emphasizes the individual
over the group and views parts (genes) as separate from wholes (or-
ganisms or the social group). They argued that bourgeois Western sci-
ence values stability, balance, and equilibrium (re: inequity, the status
quo), whereas a socialist science values fundamental change and social
equality (Segerstråle, 2000). Lewontin, Rose, and Kamin (1984) have
declared that their socialist science will create a more just society.
Although Wilson denied a political agenda in Sociobiology, he later
boldly asserted that the natural sciences can explain human nature and
should guide social policy (Wilson, 1998). He asserted that “all tangible
phenomena, from the birth of stars to the workings of social institutions,
are based on material processes that are ultimately reducible, however
long and tortuous the sequences, to the laws of physics” (p. 266). Critics
had long complained that S/EP proposed a “theory of everything”
(Nelkin, 2000). Now finally, Wilson seemed to offer just that.
Charges of Reductionism, Determinism, Post Hoc Story Telling,

and “Bad” Science
Coming from a geneticist (Lewontin) and a neurologist (S. Rose), alle-

gations that S/EP are reductionistic ring false. Nevertheless, Lewontin,
Rose, and Kamin (1984) have stated: “Sociobiology is a reductionist, bio-
logical determinist explanation of human existence. Its adherents claim,
Michael R. Kauth 47
first, that the details of present and past social arrangements are the in-
evitable manifestations of the specific actions of genes” (p. 236).
Dawkins (1985), in his review of their book, rejected this charge as “a
simple lie.” He added, “The myth of the ‘inevitability’ of genetic effects
has nothing whatever to do with sociobiology, and has everything to
do with Rose et al.’s paranoic and demonological theology of science”
(p. 59). S/EP have emphasized evolved traits and universal features be-
cause that is what they study. Sociobiologists and evolutionary psychol-
ogists know that they are discussing whole organisms with extensive
developmental histories and varied social relationships (e.g., Buss,
2003; Pinker & Bloom, 1992; Symons, 1979; Wilson, 2000).
Gould (1981) has complained that sociobiologists’ emphasis on hy-
pothetical genes “for” a trait reveals their genetic determinism, lament-
ing: “All biologists know that there is no gene ‘for’ aggression, any
more than for your lower-left wisdom teeth” (1981, p. 359). Gould
seems to imply that genes and environment are independent, when in
actuality, behavior is not simply cultural, and wisdom teeth are biologi-
cally determined (Ridley, 1993). The Roses (2000) have also fulmi-
nated against “biology-as-destiny” ideologies, taking pains to trace
their lineage from Aristotle’s patriarchal concept of human nature
through Nazi eugenics to S/EP’s presumed determinism. However,
sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists view development as an
ongoing interaction between the organism’s genes and everything else
that influences them (the environments). Change the gene or the envi-
ronment, and the outcome changes (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). Gould
(1981), for example, seems to suggest that biological, evolved mecha-
nisms are immutable, although environmental processes permit change
and choice (Pinker, 2002; Segerstråle, 2000).
Tooby and Cosmides (1992) have acknowledged that the form-to-
function approach–explaining why already known features came to be
as they are–runs the risk of post hoc explanation but noted that physi-
cists and geologists accept such risk when they investigate known phe-
nomena. “In science,” they pointed out, “this is usually called
‘explanation’” (p. 77). Further, an explanation is not post hoc if the the-
ory predicts a fact that was unknown. Evolutionary analyses have pre-
dicted thousands of discoveries that were later confirmed. Adaptational
hypotheses are testable, although sufficient evidence is often lacking to
know which explanation from a set of alternative explanations is correct
(Pinker & Bloom, 1992). Gould and Lewontin (1979) have argued that
many supposed adaptations identified by sociobiologists are really
non-adaptive by-products. Despite their shrill complaints, Pinker
(2002) has kindly interpreted the pair’s arguments as simply a call for
restraint and rigor in attributing adaptation.
Finally, charges that S/EP is “bad” science are largely related to dis-
agreements between political and philosophical ideologies (Gould,
1999; Levins & Lewontin, 1985; Lewontin, Rose & Kamin, 1984; Rose
& Rose, 2000). In particular, Gould, Lewontin, and the Roses have op-
posed description of natural processes that refute their worldview, de-
manding that science and nature conform to their political values.
Dawkins has stated that natural selection does not advocate anything,
declaring that Nature is a poor model for deriving values (cited in
Segerstråle, 2000).
Valid Criticisms
Gould’s caution in making adaptational attributions is well taken. Es-

pecially when addressing the media, evolutionary psychologists have of-
ten uncritically attributed function to a number of human traits and have
exaggerated the influence of ultimate causes (see Rose & Rose, 2000;
Segerstråle, 2000). Many human traits are not adaptations and, for a host
of proximal reasons, people engage in all sorts of behaviors that have no
reproductive function. Other evolutionary psychologists have made sen-
sational claims and employed misleading language (e.g., using the word
“rape” to describe coercive animal sexual behavior) perhaps for publicity
(Rose & Rose, 2000; Smith, Mulder, & Hill, 2001). Such actions invite
public criticism and make EP appear imprecise and outrageous.
A main source of imprecision in the evolutionary sciences is the partic-
ipation of multiple disciplines. For example, the evolutionary natural sci-
ences (biology, paleontology, geology) and S/EP have very different
points of view. There are also fundamental differences within the evolu-
tionary social sciences (anthropology, psychology, sociology, etc.). An-
thropologists Smith, Mulder, and Hill (2001) have noted, for instance,
key conceptual and methodological distinctions between EP, which uses
survey data and lab experiments to investigate psychological mecha-
nisms underlying human behavior, and human behavioral ecology, which
applies theory-based findings from non-human species and naturalistic
field data to explain adaptive human behavior. Smith, Mulder, and Hill
have labeled these two approaches: adaptation executers and fitness
maximizers. In general, the adaptation executers claim that fitness
maximizers naïvely confuse proximate with ultimate mechanisms and
fail to explain how environmental cues are contextually weighted in the
real world, while fitness maximizers argue that adaptation executors
Michael R. Kauth 49
have failed to explain how distinct cognitive modules are created

rather than co-opted and how these modules are integrated. The adap-
tation executors have not explained how humans make critical
trade-offs between different essential goals. Further, the fitness
maximizers question the validity of a single EEA construct, noting
that multiple environments existed and suggesting that the EEA bound-
ary encompasses recent agriculturalism and modern humans.
Smith, Mulder, and Hill (2001) have also called for greater specifica-
tion of testable evolutionary models and estimations of fitness costs/
benefits of traits to clarify what must be measured. They noted that as
the evolutionary sciences encompass more fields, theoretical and meth-
odological pluralities will multiply. While interdisciplinary evolution-
ary analyses have the potential for creative and innovative science,
without common concepts and methodologies, they risk fragmentation
and careless claims that will promote a public backlash.
In brief, despite harsh criticism, EP has emerged as a viable, produc-
tive strategy for investigating evolved psychological mechanisms.
Much criticism of EP appears to be related to political and philosophical
disagreements among scholars about human nature and the role of
science in society.
HUMAN SEXUALITY AND EVOLUTIONARY THEORY

As Darwin (1981) concentrated on explaining human origins, sexual
behavior, an implicit component of his theory, gained greater emphasis.
Conceptive sexual intercourse was the behavioral mechanism by which
heritable traits were transmitted to offspring, although it was not until
the rediscovery of Mendelian genetics that scientists understood how
sexual intercourse transmitted heritable information (Ridley, 1993).
The modern conception of sexuality and the language to discuss it origi-
nated in the late nineteenth century. Both human sexuality and “evolu-
tion” were closely linked until after World War II with the degradation
of eugenics. This link grew stronger again with the emergence of S/EP
and their emphasis on sexual behavior. Additionally, evolutionary the-
ory and human sexuality, including sex research, share common
opponents who wish to suppress them both.
Inventing Heterosexuality; The Birth of Modern Sexuality
Darwin, writing before the development of modern human sexuality,
before the invention of “heterosexuals” and “homosexuals” (Katz,
1995), gave a central role to organisms’ sexual behavior. One conse-

quence of this is that human conceptive sexual behavior became a legiti-
mate area of scientific study. Although Darwin did not discuss the
nature of male-female sexual attraction, his theory would suppose that it
is an adaptation and, thus, inherited.
Heterosexuality was born as counterpart to the concept of homosexu-
ality. In 1864, former Hanover lawyer and civil activist Karl Heinrich
Ulrich (1994) had begun publishing a series of books defending men
who love men. He contrasted these individuals with “true men” who
love women, whom he called Dioning, after the god Dione. Ulrich be-
lieved that the “love of women” was part of the male “germ” or essence,
meaning that attraction to women is a male trait. His ideas, but not his
terminology, influenced Richard von Krafft-Ebing and Karl Westphal,
who were writing about aberrant sexual behavior. In 1893, the word
“hetero-sexual” (meaning procreative erotic instinct) appeared in the
English translation of Krafft-Ebing’s Psychopathia Sexualis. Individu-
als could now be identified and defined by their sexual attractions and
sexual behavior.
In this context, Sigmund Freud (1905/1953) had begun referring to
male-female sexual relations as “normal sexuality” (meaning typical).
He viewed male-female sexuality as the ultimate outcome of psycho-
sexual development. His followers, however, adopted a stronger view,
taking “normal” to mean “natural.” Post-Freudian psychoanalysts saw
heterosexual attraction as biological and essential to psychological
health (Lewes, 1988), an idea that persists to this day.
Naming and Explaining Homosexuality
Western cultures have long recognized that some people engage

predominantly or exclusively in same-sex sexual behavior. Such indi-
viduals were sometimes identified by their particular attraction or be-
havior (Boswell, 1980; Katz, 1995; Norton, 1992, 1997; for a counter
view, Foucault, 1978). From the Middle Ages through the nineteenth
century, people with strong same-sex sexual interests (not just their be-
havior or sexual role) were variously referred to as a sodomite, pederast,
catamite, tribade, Ganymede, molly, bugger, queen, queer, and punk.
These labels were used to refer to sexual kinds of people (Stein, 1999).
Urbanization facilitated the aggregation of sexual kinds of people and
the formation of subcultures (Boswell, 1980). Norton (1992, 1997) has
argued that a male-male sexual subculture existed in England 200 years
Michael R. Kauth 51
before the invention of the term “homosexual” in the late nineteenth

century.
By the mid-nineteenth century, it was believed by some that mastur-
bation caused disease and insanity (Bullough, 1976). It was also thought
to be contagious. Both masturbation and male-male sexual behavior
were evidence of hereditary weakness and sickness from an unre-
strained sex drive. The solution was isolating deviants in asylums or
prisons. In Germany and in many other countries, sodomy was
criminalized. Ulrich fought against the criminalization of same-sex sex-
ual behavior on the grounds that it was natural for those individuals. In
his books, Ulrich (1994) proposed a new term for men who love men,
calling them Urnings, after the god Uranus. (Women who love women
were called Urninde.) Ulrich hypothesized that Urnings were born with
a male body but a female soul. By the time Darwin had published The
Descent of Man, Westphal and Karoly Maria Kertbeny had also pub-
lished works describing constitutionally same-sex oriented individuals
(Katz, 1995; Mondimore, 1996). Kertbeny, a German-Hungarian writer,
first used the words “homosexual” and “heterosexual” in an 1868 letter
to Ulrich. Shortly after, Westphal published an article about female-fe-
male sexual behavior as a form of mental illness. He used the phrase
“Die conträre Sexualempfindung” (contrary sexual feelings) to de-
scribe individuals who are attracted to the same-sex, which he viewed
as contrary to proper, procreative male-female attraction. Social Dar-
winists and eugenicists condemned non-conceptive sexual behaviors
such as masturbation and homosexuality (Katz, 1995; Larson, 2004).
Freud (1915/1987) did not condemn same-sex sexuality and even
made same-sex eroticism a central component of friendship. Like many
intellectuals at the time, Freud and his followers were greatly influenced
by evolutionary theory, particularly Lamarckianism (Sulloway, 1979;
DeBlock & Adriaens, 2004). In 1915, Freud proposed that male homo-
sexuality was an adaptive strategy emerging from sociality (DeBlock &
Adriaens, 2004). He saw homoerotic attraction as the raw material for
close male friendships. Freud postulated that “primal humans” had
formed a patriarchal tribe, dominated by one male (the father) who
maintained exclusive sexual rights to females in the group. The young
males (sons) did not like this arrangement and rebelled, for which they
were banished from the group and threatened with castration. Freud
(1915/1987) reasoned, “[T]he threatened sons avoided castration by
means of flight and, allied with one another. . . . This living together had
to bring social feelings to the fore and could have been built upon homo-
sexual sexual satisfaction. . . . It is very possible that the long-sought
hereditary disposition of homosexuality can be glimpsed in the inheritance

of this phase of the human condition” (p. 18). Even so, most of Freud’s
followers saw nothing adaptive about male homosexuality and strongly
denounced this idea after his death, resulting in a long history of
anti-homosexual sentiment in psychiatry (Lewes, 1988).
From the 1940s through the early 1970s, psychiatrists and psychol-
ogists spent a great deal of time explaining and trying to “cure” ho-
mosexuality. (For reviews of theories of homosexuality, see Kauth,
2000, 2006; Lewes, 1998; Wilson & Rahman, 2005.) However, in
1973, the American Psychiatric Association removed homosexuality
as a psychiatric diagnosis (Bayer, 1987). Psychoanalysts opposed to
de-pathologizing homosexuality (their clinical “bread-and-butter”) and
fundamentalist Christian therapists continued to treat same-sex attrac-
tion as a disorder, offering various “treatments” to convert them to het-
erosexuality (Besen, 2003). Conversion or reparative therapies purport
to change a homosexual orientation to a heterosexual orientation, typi-
cally through a combination of self-labeling as heterosexual, prayer, Bi-
ble study, rejection of gay friends and the gay “lifestyle,” suppression of
same-sex feelings, sports, heterosexual activity, and even marriage. Re-
cipients of conversion therapies are referred to as “ex-gays.”
Popular non-biological theories of homosexuality credited seduc-
tion, sexual abuse, dysfunctional family dynamics, and accidental con-
ditioning and reinforcement. Beginning in the 1970s, biological
theories of homosexuality again received attention, attributing causality
to genes (e.g., Xq28) or prenatal hormone exposure (e.g., low androgen
for males, high androgen for females). Evolutionists also became in-
creasingly interested in homosexuality in the last decades of the twenti-
eth century. (For a review, see Muscarella, this volume.) Hutchinson
(1959) has speculated that heterozygous alleles of genes “for” sexual at-
traction could be associated with an adaptive trait that contributes to
more robust offspring, such as greater “sexiness” or value as a mate.
Given different alleles for sexual attraction, genetic recombination
could result occasionally in homozygous alleles for the recessive trait of
exclusive same-sex sexual attraction. Wilson (2000) hypothesized that
the persistence of same-sex sexual behavior suggests that it is adaptive.
He reasoned that exclusive same-sex sexual behavior must benefit rela-
tives’ reproductive success by directing resources to their children. Kin
selection could then maintain inherited genes for same-sex attraction.
Wilson (1978) pointed to native American Indian berdaches (two-
spirited people) as potential evidence for this idea. However, there is
no direct evidence in contemporary cultures that same-sex oriented in-
Michael R. Kauth 53
dividuals disproportionately share their resources with relatives

(Bobrow & Bailey, 2001; Rahman & Hull, 2004). Symons (1979) be-
lieved that exclusive same-sex sexual behavior was caused by hormonal
error and was reproductively “maladaptive.” (Typical hormone expo-
sure, he assumed, resulted in exclusive male-female attraction.) He in-
ferred that same-sex oriented persons are “uncompromised” by the
reproductive strategies of the other sex: thus, gay men, for instance,
should exhibit pure male sexual traits, unrestrained by compromise with
females for sexual access. Other theorists have suggested that exclusive
same-sex attraction is a by-product of some adaptation (e.g., Buss,
Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske, & Wakefield, 1998; McKnight, 1997).
Several recent theorists (Kauth, 2000; Muscarella, 2000; Ross &
Wells, 2000) have speculated that exclusive male-male sexual behavior
is related to eroticism in hierarchical male alliances, although the idea
that erotic/sexual behavior facilitated the formation and endurance of
adaptive male-male coalitions is not new (e.g., Tiger, 1984; van der
Dennen, 1995). (Kauth postulated a similar mechanism for female alli-
ances.) A trait for homoerotic male bonding would be preserved in the
population if women chose men who had close male alliances and the
social advantages and resources that alliances permit.
Bisexuality?
Freud used the term bisexual to mean physical and psychical

hermaphroditism (Angelides, 2001). He did not believe that adults could
be attracted to both sexes. Freud’s successors believed this even more
strongly. Bergler (1962), for example, declared: “BISEXUALITY–a
state that has no existence beyond the word itself–is an out-and-out fraud,
involuntarily maintained by some naïve homosexuals, and voluntarily
perpetrated by some who are not so naïve” (p. 80). Psychoanalysts were
not the only ones to deny attraction to both sexes, although they contrib-
uted substantially to this belief, reflecting the increasing notion that sex-
ual attraction comes in only two forms (Katz, 1995; Lewes, 1988).
Recently, Rieger, Chivers, and Bailey (2005) published a study imply-
ing that bisexual men may be “lying” about their dual attraction (see
Carey, 2005). The study found that bisexual men report sexual attrac-
tion to both sexes but show a genital arousal pattern similar to gay men.
This study was widely interpreted by the press (and encouraged by the
study’s authors) as discrediting the idea that bisexual men exist (e.g.,
Carey, 2005; “Do Bisexual Men Really Exist?,” 2005), even though a
number of bisexual men in the study clearly responded sexually to both

men and women.
Consequently, for the better part of the past 100 years, sex research-
ers and evolutionists have examined exclusive same-sex sexual orienta-
tion in contrast to exclusive other-sex sexual orientation, implying a
dichotomy (Kauth, 2002, 2005). Western culture’s bias toward binary
concepts (Money, 1988) may make it difficult for scientists and the gen-
eral public to recognize varied sexual orientations. Bisexuality is fre-
quently the “elephant in the living room” that everyone ignores–as if
varied attractions have nothing to do with human sexuality. Anthropol-
ogists and historians have long reported that sexual behavior is often not
exclusive in many human cultures (e.g., Cantarella, 1994; Greenberg,
1988; Gregersen, 1994/1996). Some sex researchers (e.g., Diamond,
this volume; Klein, 1978; Klein, Sepekoff, & Wolf, 1985; Rust, 2000;
Weinberg, Williams, & Pryor, 1988) have recognized this fact. Increas-
ing scholarship on bisexuality, a scientific journal devoted to the topic
(Journal of Bisexuality beginning in 2000), and media interest have be-
gun to raise awareness about dual attractions among researchers and the
public. Some theorists have hypothesized that reproductively success-
ful individuals are essentially “bisexual”–that is, capable of attraction to
both sexes (e.g., Kauth, 2000; Muscarella, 2000; Ross & Wells, 2000;
Weinrich, 1987). As long as same-sex behavior and relationships do not
preclude or interfere with other-sex conceptive relationships, bisexual-
ity poses no reproductive disadvantage. However, because researchers
often do not view attraction to both sexes as a true sexual orientation,
these claims have not been investigated.
Opponents of Darwinism and Sexology
Evolution and the study of human sexuality are linked by common

opponents: right-wing social and religious conservatives, primarily
Christian evangelicals, sometimes called the New Right. In the United
States, far right conservatives have included the non-religious, as well
as the strongly religious of various faiths, but largely Protestant evan-
gelicals (Irvine, 2002). Fundamentalist Christian factions began splin-
tering from moderate mainstream denominations in the early twentieth
century, rallying around opposition to teaching evolution in public
schools (Larson, 2004). They called for teaching creationism as science.
Evangelicals credit the teaching of evolution in public schools for the
secularization and sexualization of American culture, including the
promotion of abortion and homosexuality (Deckman, 2004). Later, in
Michael R. Kauth 55
the 1960s, evangelicals opposed “comprehensive” sex education in

schools, claiming that it promoted premarital sexual activity, use of
birth control, and homosexuality. In general, far right conservatives and
evangelicals tend to believe that openness about sexuality promotes im-
morality, disease, and abortion; therefore, sexuality and talk about sex-
uality should be restricted. An effective tactic of ultra-conservatives has
been to influence local School Board decisions regarding the content of
science textbooks and sex education courses (Deckman, 2004). For
more than two decades now, evangelicals have controlled the (nega-
tive) language of public discourse about sex education and evolution.
Paradoxically, this has often resulted in Christian evangelicals making
titillating, provocative public references to disapproved sexual behav-
iors.
The Monkey Trial and Science Textbooks
In 1874, Princeton theologian Charles Hodge called evolution “in-

consistent with the Scriptures” and declared that Darwin’s “denial of
design in nature is virtually the denial of God” (cited in Larson, 2004,
p. 204). Since that time, Christian conservatives have steadily attacked
evolution. The Roman Catholic Church is an exception; the Catholic
Church has acknowledged evolution as fact, while viewing the soul as
unique to humans and unobservable to science (cited in Pinker, 2002,
p. 186). Toward the later part of the nineteenth century, science and
Christian beliefs began to be disentangled due in part to Darwin’s ideas
but also because of a host of new scientific and technological develop-
ments in medicine (Pasteur discovered that microbes carry disease, dis-
covery of antibiotics), engineering (electric motor, automobile,
telephone, light bulb, radio, flying machine, assembly line), astronomy
(first galaxies outside our solar system observed), and philosophy (so-
cialism and communism). Western colonialism, capitalism, industrial-
ization, and urbanization also contributed to a new secular zeitgeist.
In America in the 1920s, militant conservative Protestants–called
“fundamentalists”–emerged (later came Pentecostals) and demanded
that Christian values and beliefs be supported publicly (Larson, 2004).
These groups held to literal interpretations of the Bible and Biblical in-
errancy. By this time, public understanding of evolutionary theory
about human origins had been condensed to the belief that humans de-
scended from apes. To fundamentalists, Darwinism was blasphemous
and yet taught in schools at taxpayer expense. They insisted that schools
teach Creationism–that God created all things, including humans, about
6,000 years ago. Fundamentalists mounted a national campaign to re-

move evolution from public schools with William Jennings Bryan was
the movement’s spokesperson. By 1923, two states (Oklahoma and
Florida) had passed laws respectively prohibiting the purchase of text-
books on evolution and teaching evolutionary theory. Two years later,
Tennessee made it a misdemeanor for a public school teacher to teach
evolution. Proponents of the bill argued that students should not be
forced to learn ideas that invalidate their religious beliefs; besides, they
added, most parents did not believe in the theory of evolution and did
not want it taught to their children (Larson, 2004). Opponents declared
that no one’s religious belief should set the standard for science
education in public schools.
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) offered to defend any-
one who was willing to challenge the law in court, and East Tennessee
science teacher, John Scopes, accepted the offer. The eight-day trial
was a huge national media event, with Bryan and Clarence Darrow as
celebrity representatives for opposing legal teams. Theatrically,
Darrow grilled Bryan on the stand, leading him to concede that he inter-
preted the Bible and that his opposition to teaching evolution was based
on religious beliefs (Larson, 2004). Scopes was convicted (later over-
turned by the Tennessee Supreme Court), but the real outcome of the
trial was that evolutionists and anti-evolutionists gained public atten-
tion for their views. Afterward, some states banned or restricted the
teaching of evolution but, for the most part, fundamentalist opposition
quieted down until the 1960s.
The centennial of Origin of Species generated enormous scientific
and public attention (Larson, 2004), which by coincidence fell on the
heels of the 1957 Soviet launch of Sputnik (Our 50th, 2005). Critics
were complaining that the United States had fallen behind in science
and technology and had lost the “space race.” By 1958, the Biological
Sciences Curriculum Study (BSCS) was funded to promote science in
public education, including biology, with state-of-the-art textbooks.
Federally funded evolution texts began appearing in public schools in
1963, and BSCS science texts were soon standard in most schools.
Christian evangelicals again called for a ban on teaching of evolution or
require equal time for Creationism (Larson, 2004). Their efforts were
derailed temporarily by the 1968 U.S. Supreme Court (Epperson v. Ar-
kansas) decision striking down an Arkansas state law that made it un-
lawful for a teacher in any state-supported school or university to teach
or to use a textbook that teaches evolution. Mississippi had a similar
law.
Michael R. Kauth 57
Evangelicals changed tactics; they began to pressure School Boards

to discredit evolution and to insert creationism in the curriculum. Three
recent examples illustrate this strategy. In 2002, the Georgia Cobb
County Board of Education required that anti-evolution stickers be
placed in biology textbooks (Judge: Evolution, 2005). The stickers
called evolution “a theory, not a fact.” A District Judge ordered the
stickers’ removal. The case is currently under appeal. From 1999 to
2005, the Kansas Board of Education altered state science standards
three times to raise doubts about the theory of evolution (Kansas school,
2005). In the last version, drafted by Intelligent Design advocates, the
Board redefined science to include the study of non-natural explana-
tions for phenomena. Lastly, in 2004, the Dover Area School Board in
Pennsylvania required that students hear the statement that Darwin’s
theory is “not a fact” and referred them to an Intelligent Design book, Of
Pandas and People (Court Rejects, 2005). The next year, a District
Judge stopped the practice and ruled that Intelligent Design cannot be
mentioned in biology classes in Dover public schools. The judge casti-
gated anti-evolution school board members for lying about their
religious motives to promote Intelligent Design.
Intelligent Design
Popularized by Michael Behe (1996), William Dembski (1999), and

Phillip Johnson (1991), Intelligent Design (ID) holds that life is too
complex and well-suited to this world to be reduced to the actions of
genes: thus, life could not have evolved by natural selection, and a supe-
rior intelligence must have created life (Larson, 2004). ID offers no al-
ternative to evolution, other than divine intervention. Behe, Dembski,
and Johnson have presented flawed biological explanations and cred-
ited every phenomenon unexplained by evolutionists to design. ID dif-
fers somewhat from creation science (or scientific creationism)–the
pursuit of scientific evidence to support the Biblical version of creation.
Creation science was founded in the early 1960s by Southern Baptist
Henry Morris and Grace Brethren John Whitcomb Jr. (Larson, 2004).
The objective of both ID and creationism is to seed doubt about the va-
lidity of evolution by suggesting a lack of scientific consensus about
evolution, pointing to inexplicable “gaps” in the evidentiary record, and
portraying ID and creation science as alternatives in a scientific “de-
bate” (Frank, 2005). President George W. Bush, a conservative and
Christian, opined that ID should be taught in schools alongside evolu-
tion (Kansas school, 2005), and many Americans seem to agree (Public
Divided, 2005). In Europe, however, the theory of evolution has faced

little opposition.
The Anti-Science, Anti-Sex Education, Anti-Gay “Culture Wars”
Irvine (2002) has noted that opposition to sex education in public

schools is part of long-standing efforts to enforce sexual morality
through control of sexual discourse. Further, she argued that this issue
helped to bridge traditional conservatives and the New (Christian)
Right. The so-called “Culture Wars” of the 1980s were instigated by the
New Right, initially attacking multiculturalism, feminism, school
prayer, and homosexuality. Other key issues were soon added to the
mix, including affirmative action, welfare reform, pornography, abor-
tion, public funding for the arts, sexual content and violence on televi-
sion, gays in the military, gay marriage, AIDS education, media bias,
“activist” judges, stem-cell research, and the right to die. Lately, the
New Right has attacked comprehensive sex education courses that in-
clude information about birth control, safer sex, abortion, and homosex-
uality, in favor of abstinence-only, limited information programs
(Deckman, 2004). A 2000 poll found that the vast majority of Ameri-
cans actually wanted more sex education hours for their children on
more “sensitive topics” (cited in Irvine, 2002), although the devil is in
the details. Attitudes about sexuality, especially in relation to adoles-
cent sexuality, are complicated and fluid. Opponents of sex education
have successfully employed volatile, polarizing speech and frightening
images to evoke strong negative reactions among parents and to
shut-down constructive discussion (Irvine, 2002).
In the late 1990s, the culture wars became decidedly anti-Science
with the emergence of ID and the success of several school boards in at-
taching disclaimers to evolution (e.g., Behe, 1996; Dembski, 1999;
Frank, 2005; Kansas school, 2005). Evangelicals have connected a host
of social “evils” to the teaching of evolution, all resulting from the re-
jection of God and the absence of Biblical values. These evils have in-
cluded feminism, open sexuality, premarital sex, abortion, adultery,
pedophilia, homosexuality, rape, infanticide, euthanasia, racism, com-
munism, and Nazism (Irvine, 2002; e.g., H. Morris, n.d; J. Morris, n.d.;
Johnson, 1991). Evangelical web sites frequently cite the promotion of
homosexuality as a primary consequence of teaching evolution. Both
evolution and sexology are intimately linked in the minds of their oppo-
nents. Where opposition to one exists, opposition to the other is not far
behind.
Michael R. Kauth 59
Evolutionary Psychology in the Future
Despite the dark description of anti-evolutionists’ efforts, the future

for evolutionary theory is not dark. Social movements (and their politi-
cal power) wax and wane. Further, conservative Christian activists have
a history of overreaching mainstream opinion and creating a backlash
(Deckman, 2004). The odds are that evolution, not creationism or ID,
will win the culture wars.
Already, evolutionary psychologists have begun to discover that par-
ticular childhood experiences and conditions predict particular person-
ality types and particular sexual strategies in adult populations. (See
Sefcek et al., this volume.) These discoveries may explain in part why
individuals find themselves looking for sexual partners who treat them
poorly and end up in dysfunctional relationships. It is important to de-
termine whether this pattern is universal, but only cross cultural studies
will bear this out. (See Schmitt, this volume, as an example of a cross
cultural study examining evolutionary theory.) Current and future find-
ings in evolutionary psychology must be tested across different age and
ethnic groups and across cultures.
EP research may also discover that particular parental personality
types (or mating strategies) complement each other, leading to healthier
and more reproductively successful children, even though a lengthy
mateship is not required for reproductive success. Such discoveries also
have implications for sociologists and clinical psychologists. Although
evolved psychological mechanisms predict population tendencies and
not individual behavior, such findings may aid individuals in recogniz-
ing and breaking their own dysfunctional, unhappy romantic patterns.
Evolved traits are not unyielding biological laws.
Advertisers have already discovered how to evoke evolved human
mechanisms to persuade people to buy products–persuading women
that they will look younger, thinner, healthier, and more alluring and
convincing men that they are more masculine and dominant. An evo-
lutionary analysis of these mechanisms and their triggers may help
consumers learn how to resist the pull of emotional advertising. Evolu-
tionists and clinicians might also look to literature, mythology, and reli-
gion to identify primal fears, motivations, ambitions, perceptions, and
reactions. A better understanding of unpleasant aspects of our human
nature may lead to ways to challenge and modify them.
Evolutionary psychologists will continue to explore the possible ben-
efits of non-exclusive heterosexual orientation and the potential func-
tion of same-sex erotic relationships. Muscarella’s (2005) study of the
personal and reproductive benefits of a hypothetical same-sex sexual

relationship suggests one clever way of testing such hypotheses. Such
findings have the potential to place friendships and same-sex groups in
a very different light.
However, as already noted, future success in the evolutionary sci-
ences is likely to depend on the extent that scientists can develop a com-
mon conceptual language and more standardized methodologies. The
evolutionary sciences are not alone in this. Similarly, sex researchers
need to develop consensus definitions and standardize measures of sex-
ual phenomena. Basic questions such as how best to conceptualize and
assess sexual orientation still plague sex research. Single measures of
sexual orientation (e.g., genital arousal) are not sufficient and naïve.
Sexual orientation is not an erection or vaginal lubrication. As well, sex-
ologists must recognize that conformity to Western heterosexist culture
does not necessarily reflect a sexual orientation, and data drawn only
from Western cultures may have more to say about the culture than
about human sexuality. Only cross-cultural studies will reveal universal
human traits. The synergistic blending of evolutionary psychology/
sexology is still new and the limits are yet unknown.
CONCLUSION
This brief history has described the social and political context of
evolutionary theory, particularly with regard to human sexuality. Many
different disciplines are now engaged in evolutionary analyses, each
with their own assumptions, concepts, methodologies, and language.
Sociobiology’s attempt to encompass other disciplines erupted into
hostile attacks that largely failed to incite a scholarly discussion about
knowledge, human nature, moral truth, and the role of science in soci-
ety. However, EP has proven to be a robust approach for explaining
evolved sexual psychologies.
FURTHER READINGS
Buss, D. M. (2005). Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Darwin, C. (1871/1981). The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex. Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Geary, D. C. (1998). Male, Female: The Evolution of Human Sex Differences. Wash-
ington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Michael R. Kauth 61
Larson, E. J. (2004). Evolution: The Remarkable History of a Scientific Theory. New

York: Modern Library.
Wilson, E. O. (1975/2000). Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press.
NOTES
1. Darwin formulated his ideas about natural selection and sexual selection during
and immediately after his voyage on the Beagle but kept his ideas largely a secret for
about two decades while refining his argument (Larson, 2004). He worried about the
effect his theory would have on the religious beliefs of others, particularly his Christian
wife. In 1858, fellow naturalist Wallace asked Darwin to review his manuscript, de-
scribing the principles of natural selection (Badcock, 2000; Larson, 2004). Wallace
had independently discovered natural selection. While Wallace emphasized the pres-
sure of ecological forces, Darwin stressed individual competition as a driving force for
evolution.
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A Brief History of the Theory of Evolution

Article in Journal of Psychology & Human Sexuality · January 2006

Veterans Sexual Health View project

LGBT Veterans View project

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

SUMMARY. A brief history of evolutionary theory illustrates its long

KEYWORDS. Darwin, evolution, adaptation, sexual attraction, theory,

Michael R. Kauth is Clinical Psychologist, Southeast Louisiana Veterans Health

Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution.

–Theodosius Dobzhansky, 1973

A complete history of evolutionary theory is beyond the scope of this

–Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species, 1859

Prior to Darwin’s new idea, naturalists credited God with creating

that acquired characteristics, like the stretching giraffe’s neck, were

Natural and Sexual Selection

Darwin was unsure why sexual selection occurred. Robert Trivers

male-male competition should promote good organizational skills,

Given their larger reproductive investment, females must choose a

sensitivity to her mate’s emotional investment in the relationship. When

Misuse of Darwin’s Idea: Social Darwinism and Eugenics

Back to history. One of evolutionary theory’s darkest periods re-

Expanding Darwin’s Idea:

Even during the heyday of eugenics, several positive developments

Confirming Darwin’s idea, Wright explained how over time, or due to

Darwin’s Idea Inspires Sociobiology and Evolutionary Psychology

Evolutionary psychology is one of four sciences that are bringing

–Steven Pinker, 2002

In 1975, Harvard entomologist Edward O. Wilson published his

grated a large literature on animal behavior within the neo-Darwinist

times are obscured by the “compromises” that heterosexuality and

Elsewhere (Kauth, 2002, 2005) I have described implicit, at times

Evolution is slow and evolved traits are ancient. Selection of human

sands of generations; how many generations depends on the intensity

man sexuality, non-adaptations include same-sex sexual behavior

There is a universal human nature. Over millions of years of persis-

Evolved psychological mechanisms are non-conscious. Selection of

Products and Process of Evolutionary Analysis

There are essentially four products of an evolutionary analysis: adap-

exaptation. Lastly, other traits may be random noise or non-adaptive

Criticism of Sociobiology and Evolutionary Psychology

Many charges leveled against EP have also been directed at

ferent conceptions about the responsibility of scientists” (p. 1). She

Steven Rose (2000) have charged that “to evolutionary psychologists,

Charges of Reductionism, Determinism, Post Hoc Story Telling,

Coming from a geneticist (Lewontin) and a neurologist (S. Rose), alle-

Gould’s caution in making adaptational attributions is well taken. Es-

have failed to explain how distinct cognitive modules are created

HUMAN SEXUALITY AND EVOLUTIONARY THEORY

1995), gave a central role to organisms’ sexual behavior. One conse-

Naming and Explaining Homosexuality

Western cultures have long recognized that some people engage

before the invention of the term “homosexual” in the late nineteenth

hereditary disposition of homosexuality can be glimpsed in the inheritance

dividuals disproportionately share their resources with relatives

Freud used the term bisexual to mean physical and psychical

number of bisexual men in the study clearly responded sexually to both

Opponents of Darwinism and Sexology

Evolution and the study of human sexuality are linked by common

the 1960s, evangelicals opposed “comprehensive” sex education in

The Monkey Trial and Science Textbooks

In 1874, Princeton theologian Charles Hodge called evolution “in-

6,000 years ago. Fundamentalists mounted a national campaign to re-