Canons 10-13

1. ISIDRA VDA. DE VICTORIA v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

467 SCRA 78 (2005)

Every lawyer pledges to act with “candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

FACTS: The Supreme Court granted petitioner Mario Victoria (Victoria) an extended period to file the
petition, conditioned, however, on the timeliness of the filing of the Motion for Extension of Time to File
Petition for Review on Certiorari. It is a basic rule of remedial law that a motion for extension of time must
be filed before the expiration of the period sought to be extended. Where a motion for extension of time is
filed beyond the period of appeal, the same is of no effect since there would no longer be any period to
extend, and the judgment or order to be appealed from the will have become final and executory.

In the case at bar, an examination of the records reveals that the reglementary period to appeal had in fact
expired almost 10 months prior to the filing of Victoria’s motion for extension of time on April 10, 2001.
The Registry Return Receipt of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing the CA Certiorari
Petition shows that the same was received by counsel for Victoria’s agent on June 5, 2000. Hence, Victoria
had only until June 20, 2000 within which to file an appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration.

In the same Decision, the Court noted that Victoria, with the aid of his counsel, Atty. Abdul Basar (Atty.
Basar), made misleading statements in his Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on
Certiorari and in his subsequent Petitionrespecting the timeliness of his appeal and the status of the
Resolutions of the CA.

Consequently, the SC ordered Victoria and Atty. Basar, to show cause, within 10 days from receipt of the
Decision, why they should not be held in contempt of court and disciplinarily dealt with for violation
of Canon 10 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility.

ISSUES: Whether or not Atty. Basar can be held liable in contempt of court and for misconduct

HELD: As part of his or her oath, every lawyer pledges to act with ―candor, fairness and good faith to
the court.‖ Thus, a lawyer is honor bound to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and
nobility in the conduct of litigation and in his relations with his client, the opposing part and his counsel,
and the court before which he pleads his client’s cause.

Moreover, the Code of Professional Responsibility obligates lawyers to ―observe the rules of procedure
and not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.‖
It is, therefore, lamentable that Atty. Basar, by misrepresenting the timeliness of an appeal from a final
and executor Resolution of the Court of Appeals, chose to disregard the fundamental tenets of the legal
profession. In fact, from his explanation, he was well aware that the reglementary period for appeal from
the Decision of the RTC had already lapsed, but he nevertheless persisted in filing a petition for review on
certiorari.

2. Samar Mining Corporation vs Francisco Arnado

FACTS: In 1958, Rufino Abuyen won a labor case against Samar Mining Company. Abuyen was awarded
compensation plus hospitalization expenses for a disease he incurred while working for Samar Mining. The
decision was rendered by Pompeyo Tan, a labor lawyer duly appointed by Francisco Arnado, a regional
administrator of the Department of Labor. In 1961, Samar Mining’s lawyer, Atty. Benedicto Arcinas, filed
an action for certiorari before CFI Cebu contending that Tan has no authority or jurisdiction over said case
because he was a “mere labor lawyer” who had no authority to render the award being complained of. CFI
Cebu dismissed the petition of Arcinas.
Meanwhile, in the same year, the Supreme Court made a ruling in the case of Caltex v. Villanueva (L-
15658, August 21, 1961) that duly appointed hearing officers by regional administrators of the labor
department may issue awards. Notwithstanding this ruling, Arcinas still filed an appeal before the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal has merit.
HELD: No. It is obvious that the purpose of the filing is just to delay and prolong the litigation in the hope
of “draining the resources of the poorer party” “and of compelling it to submit out of sheer exhaustion.”
The conduct of Atty. Arcinas is hardly compatible with the duty of the Bar to assist in the Administration
of Justice, not to obstruct or defeat the same. The Supreme Court ordered Samar Mining and Atty. Arcinas
to shoulder the litigation costs of this case jointly and severally.

3. ATTY. IRENEO L. TORRES AND MRS. NATIVIDAD CELESTINO v. ATTY. JOSE

CONCEPCION JAVIER A.M. No. 5910 (2005)

Inclusion of derogatory statements actuated by his giving vent to ill-feelings stated in the pleading is not
covered by the absolute immunity or privileged communication.

FACTS: Atty. Ireneo L. Torres and Mrs. Natividad Celestino charged Atty. Jose Concepcion Javier for
malpractice, gross misconduct in office as an attorney and/or violation of the lawyer’s oath for
employing statements and remarks on his pleadings which are false, unsubstantiated, with malicious
imputation, abusive, offensive and improper with the character of an attorney as a quasi-judicial officer.

Atty. Javier professes that he was angry while he was preparing his pleadings considering that his wife
was included to the burglary exposed in the present case. Also, he invokes that those statements he made
are privileged communication, it forming part of a judicial proceeding.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Javier is administratively liable for the alleged offensivestatements he made
in his pleadings
HELD: It is well entrenched in Philippine jurisprudence that for reasons of public policy, utterances
made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings,petitions and motions, are
absolutely privileged so long as they are pertinent and relevant to the subject inquiry, however false or
malicious they may be. A matter, however, to which the privilege does not extend must be so palpably
wanting inrelation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its
irrelevancy or impropriety. That matter alleged in a pleading need not be in every case material to the
issues presented by the pleadings. It must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the
subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial.

Clearly, Atty. Javier’s primordial reason for the offensive remark stated in his pleadings was his
emotional reaction in view of the fact that herein Complainant was in a legal dispute with his wife. This
excuse cannot be sustained; that the Atty. Javier is representing his wife is not at all an excuse.

In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language must be dignified and choice
of language is important in the preparation of pleadings. In the assertion of his client’s rights, a lawyer —
even one gifted with superior intellect — is enjoined to rein up his temper.

Thus, the inclusion of the derogatory statements by respondent was actuated by his giving vent to his ill-
feelings towards Atty. Torres, a purpose to which the mantle of absolute immunity does not extend.

4. Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001

FACTS: Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended
by R.A. No. 7659 substantially provides that any public officer who amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-
gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts in the aggregate amount or total
value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder. Petitioner
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, being prosecuted under the said Act, assailed its constitutionality, arguing inter
alia, that it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code;
and as such, a violation of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of plunder as defined in R.A. No. 7080 is a malum prohibitum.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that plunder is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent.
Moreover, the legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is
a malum in se. The predicate crimes in the case of plunder involve acts which are inherently immoral or
inherently wrong, and are committed “willfully, unlawfully and criminally” by the offender, alleging his
guilty knowledge. Thus, the crime of plunder is a malum in se.
 5. Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc. & Pfizer (Phil.), Inc. G.R. No. 167715, 17 November
2010

Facts: Pfizer is the registered owner of a patent pertaining to Sulbactam Ampicillin. It is marketed under
the brand name “Unasyn.” Sometime in January and February 2003, Pfizer discovered that Pharmawealth
submitted bids for the supply of Sulbactam Ampicillin to several hospitals without the Pfizer’s consent.
Pfizer then demanded that the hospitals cease and desist from accepting such bids. Pfizer also demanded
that Pharmawealth immediately withdraw its bids to supply Sulbactam Ampicillin. Pharmawealth and the
hospitals ignored the demands.

Pfizer then filed a complaint for patent infringement with a prayer for permanent injunction and forfeiture
of the infringing products. A preliminary injunction effective for 90 days was granted by the IPO’s
Bureau of Legal Affairs (IPO-BLA). Upon expiration, a motion for extension filed by Pfizer was denied.
Pfizer filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the denial.

While the case was pending in the CA, Pfizer filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati (RTC) a
complaint for infringement and unfair competition, with a prayer for injunction. The RTC issued a
temporary restraining order, and then a preliminary injunction.

Pharmawealth filed a motion to dismiss the case in the CA, on the ground of forum shopping.
Nevertheless, the CA issued a temporary restraining order. Pharmawealth again filed a motion to dismiss,
alleging that the patent, the main basis of the case, had already lapsed, thus making the case moot, and
that the CA had no jurisdiction to review the order of the IPO-BLA because this was granted to the
Director General. The CA denied all the motions. Pharmawealth filed a petition for review on Certiorari
with the Supreme Court.

Issues:

a) Can an injunctive relief be issued based on an action of patent infringement when the patent allegedly
infringed has already lapsed?
b) What tribunal has jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Director of Legal Affairs of the
Intellectual Property Office?
c) Is there forum shopping when a party files two actions with two seemingly different causes of action
and yet pray for the same relief?

Held:

a) No. The provision of R.A. 165, from which the Pfizer’s patent was based, clearly states that "[the]
patentee shall have the exclusive right to make, use and sell the patented machine, article or product, and
to use the patented process for the purpose of industry or commerce, throughout the territory of the
Philippines for the term of the patent; and such making, using, or selling by any person without the
authorization of the patentee constitutes infringement of the patent."

Clearly, the patentee’s exclusive rights exist only during the term of the patent. Since the patent was
registered on 16 July 1987, it expired, in accordance with the provisions of R.A. 165, after 17 years, or 16
July 2004. Thus, after 16 July 2004, Pfizer no longer possessed the exclusive right to make, use, and sell
the products covered by their patent. The CA was wrong in issuing a temporary restraining order after the
cut-off date.

b) According to IP Code, the Director General of the IPO exercises exclusive jurisdiction over decisions
of the IPO-BLA. The question in the CA concerns an interlocutory order, and not a decision. Since the IP
Code and the Rules and Regulations are bereft of any remedy regarding interlocutory orders of the IPO-
BLA, the only remedy available to Pfizer is to apply the Rules and Regulations suppletorily. Under the
Rules, a petition for certiorari to the CA is the proper remedy. This is consistent with the Rules of Court.
Thus, the CA had jurisdiction.

c) Yes. Forum shopping is defined as the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been
rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and possibly favorable) opinion in another forum (other than
by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari), or the institution of two (2) or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition.

The elements of forum shopping are: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties that represent the same
interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on
the same facts; (c) identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration. This instance meets these elements.

The parties are clearly identical. In both the complaints in the BLA-IPO and RTC, the rights allegedly
violated and the acts allegedly violative of such rights are identical, regardless of whether the patents on
which the complaints were based are different. In both cases, the ultimate objective of Pfizer was to ask
for damages and to permanently prevent Pharmawealth from selling the contested products. Relevantly,
the Supreme Court has decided that the filing of two actions with the same objective, as in this instance,
constitutes forum shopping.

Owing to the substantial identity of parties, reliefs and issues in the IPO and RTC cases, a decision in one
case will necessarily amount to res judicata in the other action.

6. Ilusorio vs. Bildner

GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000

FACTS:

Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at millions of
pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. He was
married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin
Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They separated from bed and board
in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio
Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City.

In 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in Antipolo
city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother overdose Potenciano which
caused the latter’s health to deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship
over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and
impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not return
to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA
petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging that the respondents refused her
demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.

HELD: A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the
rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such petition,
the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint
of liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or moral.

Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potenciano’s liberty that
would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and under medication does
not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his actions. With his
full mental capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free
choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy.

The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a
husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so
without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial
authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or
by any other process.