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Race, Social Contract Theory, and Social Darwinism: Government, Mill (1806-1873) Appeared To Affirm That The Indians Are
Race, Social Contract Theory, and Social Darwinism: Government, Mill (1806-1873) Appeared To Affirm That The Indians Are
Race and Orientalism
Edward Said’s critique of Orientalism reveals the biological determinism
of racial inequality in the figures of John Stuart Mill, John Locke, and
Charles Dickens, among others. Especially in On Liberty and Representative
Government, Mill (1806–1873) appeared to affirm that the Indians are
inferior with respect to civilization, compared to the British. He was an
Indian office functionary for several years in the East India Company.1
In Said’s study of Orientalism, a European mode of representation is
featured in its portrayal of the Orient into Western learning, Western con-
sciousness, and Western empire. His definition of Orientalism seems to be
political, because Orientalism is thought of as a product of certain political
forces and activities. “Orientalism is a school of interpretation whose
material happens to be the Orient, its civilizations, peoples, and localities.”2
In distinction from Said, however, I am concerned with uncovering
power relations between racism and colonialism that Said undermines in
his study of Orientalism. His study of Orientalism seems to be more
imbued with a style of literary interpretation than involved in colonial
power relations in the domains of politics, world economy, and the philo-
sophical discourse of racism.
In this chapter, I seek to trace historically and genealogically a colonial
discourse of race in Spanish colonialism and its civilizing mission. Then, it
is important to uncover a Christian character of primitive accumulation of
capital, while dealing with philosophical assumptions about racial theory
In the first leg, the slave ships sailed from a European port with a cargo
of manufactured goods (industrial commodities and weapons) to Africa.
In Africa, slave ships sold their cargo and a variety of goods (guns, ammu-
nitions, and other factory-made goods) to the African rulers for slaves. In
the second leg, ships sailed from Africa across the Atlantic Ocean to the
Americas and the Caribbean islands, where enslaved Africans were traded
on the plantations in exchange for a cargo of raw materials. In the third
leg, with the products of slave-labor plantations (cotton, sugar, coffee,
tobacco, molasses, and rum), the ships returned to their home, complet-
ing the triangle trade.10 The triangle trade had brought considerable
sources of wealth to Spain throughout the sixteenth century, and such
similar systems repeated themselves in British rule in India and China.
The wholesale transatlantic trade provided investment capital and
wealth for undergirding the industrialization of Western Europe.
According to Adam Smith, European trade and colonialism have done
nothing beneficial to the prosperity of colonies. Instead, it formed the
chimera project in hunting for gold and silver mines and the injustice of
coveting the possessions of a colony.11
In the first volume of Capital, Marx also observed European colonial-
ism in the conquest and exploitation of the periphery countries. “The
discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and
entombment in mines of aboriginal population, the beginning of the con-
quest and looting of East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the
commercial hunting of black-skins, signalized the rosy dawn of the era of
capitalist production.”12
In the discovery of America, plundering of Mexico and Peru occurred.
Through enslavement of Indians and Negroes and in the circumnaviga-
tion of Africa, a sea link with India, Indochina, China, and Japan was
established. It ended up enriching the life of the bourgeois in Western
Europe, completely transforming its economic course. This historical real-
ity can be called the commercial revolution, which created a world com-
modity market.13 It affirms the Christian character of primitive accumulation
of capital.
In later mission history within Protestantism, there is no doubt that the
consciousness of the superiority on the part of the privileged race perme-
ated in indigenous areas. As the standard model or normative authority, it
moved forward cultural imperialism in connection with political and eco-
nomic domination. Colonial regimes were racially organized through
imperialist distribution, in which religious institution and its discourse
32 P. S. CHUNG
and possessions. The state of nature has little to do with war or anarchy.
Nor is it unsocial condition; people are naturally drawn and bound
together with one another in terms of families and communities, in which
they acquire property and are involved in commerce. Out of the state of
nature, they enter into civil society to preserve lives, liberties, and estates
through the social contract (an act of consent). The idea of a state of
nature and a social contract was also pivotal in the political philosophy by
Hobbes.22 But Locke’s position runs counter to Hobbes’ notion of state
of nature, in which human life in the absence of political order and law
would be in an endless ‘war of all against all’ (bellum omnium con-
tra omnes).
To avoid this state of war, Hobbes suggests to establish civil society in
terms of a social contract and people subject themselves to an absolute
sovereign, Leviathan.23 The sovereign may well be arbitrary and tyranni-
cal, and Hobbes saw the absolute authority of government as the only
alternative to the terrifying anarchy of a state of nature. This position led
him to justify colonialism by just war.24
The long sixteenth century (1450–1640) saw the first formative stage
of the capitalist world economy, in which the British East India Company
started in the form of plunder and tribute from India. The English metal
industries expanded along with the Genoese-led financial expansion of the
late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The so-called Industrial
Revolution comprises the rapid expansion of English textiles and metal
industries, in keeping with the Dutch-led financial expansion of the eigh-
teenth century.25
The world economy system provides an environment for European
thinkers to advance their Eurocentric theory of colony and racial hierar-
chy, as seen in the tradition of the social contract theory. In Locke’s con-
ception of the social contract, he believed that individuals in a state of
nature would be bound morally by the Law of Nature. Individuals would
only agree to form a state that would provide them with the protection of
the lives, liberty, and property. Since natural rights were inalienable, the
rule of God superseded government authority. Its legitimacy comes from
the citizens’ delegation to the government (reserving the inalienable right
of self-preservation), together with elements of other rights of property.
He frames property rights around the rights of personality, and every
rational being is entitled to it. For the right of subsistence, it is significant
to feed the impoverished: our duty to the needy. The holding of property
entails a stewardship in such a way that private property is allowed for the
2 RACE, SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY, AND SOCIAL DARWINISM 35
common good. For making the substance available for all, the legislature
intervenes.26
Locke declared in the opening line of his First Treatise: “Slavery is so
vile and miserable an estate of man, and so directly opposite to the gener-
ous temper and courage of our nation; that ’tis hardly to be conceived,
that an Englishman, much less a gentleman, should plead for it.”27 In the
Second Treatise, Locke still maintains that the liberty of human being is to
be established by consent under government, while retaining “a standing
rule to live by, common to everyone of that society, and made by the leg-
islative power erected in it.”28
However, “Of Conquest” Locke regards the power of the conqueror in
a just war as that of having despotical rights over the captive: “he has an
absolute power over the lives of those, who by putting themselves in a
state of war, have forfeited them; but he has not thereby a right and title
to their possessions”29 (including the children of the conquered). The
conquered people have always a right to shake off the government of the
conquering, setting themselves from the usurpation or tyranny.30
What is at stake in Locke is his theory of consent, because nobody or
no government can have a right to obedience from those with no free
consent; it is true to the extent that “the conqueror in a just war has a right
to the estate, as well as power over the person of the conquered.”31
Therefore, the grants and promises of people in power are just mockery
and conspiracy on the parts of the conquered.32 What’s striking about
Locke’s argument is that the conqueror in a just cause has a despotical
right over the conquered, while he has no lawful title to dominion over
the conquered regarding their possession and children by way of
conquest.33
On the other hand, Locke justifies colonial exploitation, when it comes
to the unproductive ‘wastelands’ of the Native Americans. Locke argues
that a king of a large and fruitful territory in the rich land of Americas
“feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day labourer in England.”34 For
Locke, “God gave the world to men in common; but … it cannot be sup-
posed he meant it should always remain common and uncultivated. He
gave it to the use of the industrious and rational, (and labor was to be his
title to it) not to the fancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and
contentious.”35
In a nutshell, we are God’s property and lie in divine property right.
The idea of God’s ‘workmanship’ provides a basis for justifying colonial
exploitation, to the degree that those capable of cultivating America
36 P. S. CHUNG
fruitfully possess a better right to own it. The ‘laborious’ colonialists are
entitled to do that! Shouldn’t Locke have clarified that the relation
between the colonizer and the colonized was based upon universal con-
sent, rather than justifying colonial exploitation? Wasn’t it more appro-
priate that the idea of God’s workmanship should be explicated by
consent and social contract, even in the context of America?
All in all, Locke’s ambivalent position in the Two Treatises (1689) causes
confusion and controversy, accusing himself of recognizing Negro slavery,
as further seen in his co-authored document of the Fundamental
Constitutions of Carolina (1669), in which a hereditary aristocracy is
constructed.36
community. This is enacted by vote and law affecting every citizen equally.
“The law is a public, solemn act of the general will, and since everyone has
subjected himself to this will through the fundamental compact.”40
Rousseau’s notion of the general will, which is “the idea of the civil
state,”41 considers only the common interest in contrast to the will of all.
The logic of the general will for the common good, the principle of
political right, transforms the traditional concept of the common good
into popular sovereignty. Thus, every legitimate government is republican
as ruled by laws.42
The legislator who drafts the law even in terms of almost divine activity
plays a substantial role in constituting the republic. “The general will is the
continuing bond of the body politic,” and “the legislator is never allowed
… to act otherwise than by directing this same will by persuasion.”43
Rousseau distinguished political economy or public economy (called
government) from the supreme authority (called sovereignty). The body
politic is a moral being with a general will which tends toward the preser-
vation and welfare of the whole and of each part. The general will in favor
of the common good is “the source and supplement of all the laws.”44
Virtue or patriotism is based on the conformity of the private will to the
general will which makes virtue reign.45
In establishing the general will as the first principle of public economy,
Rousseau supports public economy in popular sovereignty to provide jus-
tice for all, “especially protecting the poor against the tyranny of the
rich.”46 As Rousseau emphasizes, “[i]t is, therefore, one of the govern-
ment’s most important tasks to prevent extreme inequality of wealth, not
by taking treasures away from those who possess them, but by removing
the means of accumulating them from everyone; nor by building poor-
house, but by protecting citizens from becoming poor.”47 The greediness
of private individuals for the size of profits must be prevented.
As long as agriculture is sacrificed to commerce and the tax-farmer is
made necessary by bad administration of the state revenues, finally venality
pushes to such excess: “reputation is measured in coin and the virtues
themselves are sold for money.” For Rousseau, “[t]hese are the most obvi-
ous causes of opulence and indigence, of the substitution of private inter-
est for the public interest, of the mutual hate of citizens, of their indifference
to the common cause, of the corruption of the people, and of the weaken-
ing of all the mechanisms of the government.”48
Rousseau regards such causes as the evils that a wise administration
should prevent along with good mores in terms of “respect for the laws,
38 P. S. CHUNG
a stupid, not virtuous, but peaceful animal—if someone did not harm
me—who was impelled by self-preservation and compassion. This position
runs counter to Aquinas’ tradition of an innate reason by which to under-
stand and obey natural law.
For Rousseau human beings at the outset are not political and social
animals. If the Greek antiquity emphasized the significance of political
order within which human beings becomes virtuous, Rousseau takes into
account the state of nature by stressing freedom. In the Social Contract,
political society must protect civil liberty which is a substitute for the natu-
ral liberty previously in the state of nature.55
But Hobbes imputed a number of qualities to natural man: foresight,
pride, and fear of violent death. Unlike Hobbes, Rousseau takes these
qualities to be the product of society. The principles of self-preservation
and compassion contrast with Hobbes’ “war of all against all.” The prin-
ciple of the latter was not true of the state of nature, in Rousseau’s view,
but it is the product of historical development. War of all and its effect led
to the foundation of civil society through social contract.
In the Second Discourse, Rousseau writes: “If we follow the progress of
inequality in these different revolutions, we shall find that the establish-
ment of the law and of the right property was the first stage; the institution
of the magistracy [i.e. governments] the second; the third and last was the
changing of legitimate power into arbitrary power.”56
However, if man is born free, it implies that there is no legitimate gov-
ernment existing. In the name of human beings in chains, every existing
society is to be rejected for the sake of human nature of goodness and
freedom. To the extent that the history of society passes through a stage
of legitimate government under law, it terminates in the most extreme
inequality. Such a situation is compared to “a war of all against all.” Thus
Rousseau supports an overthrowing of an illegitimate and despotic gov-
ernment, calling for a right to revolution. Hereditary monarchy has no
rational sanction. The basic consistency between the Social Contract and
the Second Discourse can be shown in this regard.57
However, Rousseau is highly skeptical of revolutions and the violence
that attends them in light of the protection of the public order and respect
to the laws. This position has little to do with politics of terror by
Maximilien Robespierre. Social Contract does not imply the execution of
the general will through the Reign of Terror; rather, it supports civil free-
dom and the proprietorship of everything under the law. Moral freedom is
added to the acquisition of the civil state.58
40 P. S. CHUNG
Thus for Rousseau, “the right of each private individual to his own
goods is always subordinate to the community’s right to all, without which
there would be neither solidarity in the social bond nor real force in the
exercise of sovereignty.”64
An act of sovereignty is not an order given by a superior to an inferior.
Nor is it given by a master to a slave. But it is the legitimate convention,
“because it has the social contract as a basis” in the sense of “each to all
and all to each.”65
“On Slavery” Rousseau argues that force does not produce right. The
right of the strongest in the state of nature has degenerated into a state of
war and such a right cannot produce legitimate obligation which is ratio-
nally binding by conscience. “Might does not make right.”66 Likewise,
slavery cannot be natural nor a legitimate convention, “since no man has
any natural authority.”67 For Rousseau “only conventions” are “the basis
of all legitimate authority among men.”68 “To renounce one’s freedom is
to renounce one’s status as a man, the rights of humanity, and even its
duties.”69 Stipulating absolute authority and unlimited obedience are
contradictory.
Given this, Rousseau takes issue with Grotius’ position which derives
another origin of slavery from war. The victor has the right to kill the van-
quished who can buy back the life at the expense of freedom. Against this
argument, Rousseau maintains that such right to kill the vanquished does
not result from the state of war, because the latter arises only from propri-
etary relations, the relationship between things, or between state and
state. With respect to the right of conquest, the law of the strongest can-
not establish the right to enslave the vanquished people if war does not
grant the right for the conqueror to kill them. Rousseau insists that “a
man enslaved in war or a conquered people is in no way obligated toward
his master, except to obey for as long as he is forced to do so.”70
In contrast to the Greek notion of slavery and the modern concept of
representatives, Rousseau’s republic in the social contract excludes the sys-
tem of servitude in which the citizens no longer have either freedom or
will. The general will of the state makes all members citizens and free.71 As
Rousseau writes, “a man enslaved in war or a conquered people is in no
way obligated toward his master. … Thus, from every vantage point, the
right of slavery is null, not merely because it is illegitimate, but because it
is absurd and meaningless. These words slavery and right are contradic-
tory; they are mutually exclusive.”72
42 P. S. CHUNG
The most dangerous aspect of these evolutionist doctrines is that they com-
bined the inheritance concept with the insistence on personal achievement
and individual character which had been so important for the self-respect of
the nineteenth-century middle class. This middle class wanted scientists who
could prove that the great men, not the aristocrats, were the true represen-
tatives of the nation, in whom the ‘genius of the race’ was personified.
Human rights are not a fixed, but a fluctuating quantity. … As you go up,
the number of rights increases, but the number who possess them dimin-
ishes. As you go down the line, the rights are diminished, but the individuals
are multiplied. … Before slavery can be charged with doing him injustice, it
must be shown that the minimum which falls to his lot at the bottom of the
line is out of proportion to his capacity and culture.88
been bound for a thousand years.” (Rev. 20:3). Chiliasm, which is pro-
claimed as the third age of the Spirit (Joachim of Fiore), provides leverage
in undergirding a shift from historical faith in the church to the general
faith in reason. All human beings should recognize the Truth itself, with-
out the mediation of the church. Secularization implies the realization of
the millenarist end-time hopes, which can be seen in the beginning of
modern times (for instance, in the Jewish messianism of Shabbetai Tzvi, in
the Puritan apocalypse, and in early German pietism). The modern times
which is termed ‘new time’ (Neu-Zeit) in Germany means the end-time of
history, or the third age of the Spirit within us in Joachim’s fashion.
This chiliasm in Kant’s philosophical system implies a cosmopolitan
vision in the perfect civil union of the human race based on a league of
nations which is to ensure perpetual peace. This idea is connected with the
declarations on human rights and the policy of the United Nations. In his
question “What can I hope for?” Kant sees modernity as a hoped for future
which becomes a new paradigm of transcendence for that which tran-
scends the limitation of history in terms of Enlightenment project and the
unfettered progress.92
This millenarianism-oriented modernity is biblically appropriated or
misused in ways that when Christ comes, the European saints will reign
with him for a thousand years. They will judge the nations and this Empire
of Christ will be the last, golden age of humanity before the end of the
world. Then a new heaven and a new earth will come (Rev. 20:4).
This millennialist modernity has produced the victims of modernity in
its underside of history, in other words, the sub-modernity. An apocalyptic
underside is an outcome of millennialist faith in unhindered progress of
human reason, science, and technology.
As Lessing and Kant were writing the Enlightenment treatises, hun-
dreds of thousands of black African slaves were being sold to America
through the transatlantic trade. The slave trade destroyed the cultures and
kingdoms of West Africa and established the monocultures which deter-
mined the native economies in Central and South America as the supplier
of raw materials in terms of internal division of labor between center and
periphery. Slavery and racism have become essential features in shaping
the modern times of European development. The colonized and exploited
periphery countries are being turned into superfluous backwoods and
their people into surplus people.93
Cornel West conceptualizes tragicomic hope for deep democracy and
the lens of race becomes central in his attempt to expand America’s demo-
2 RACE, SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY, AND SOCIAL DARWINISM 49
Notes
1. Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Random House, 1979), 14.
2. Ibid., 203.
3. McCarthy, Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development, 1.
4. Cited in David Chidester, Christianity: A Global History (New York:
Harper San Francisco, 2000), 353.
5. Ibid., 354–5.
6. Cited in Chidester, Christianity, 356.
7. Bartolomé de Las Casas, The Devastation of the Indies: A Brief Account,
trans. Herma Briffault (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press,
1992), 8–9.
8. It is unfortunate that Hardt and Negri accused Las Casas of being not so
far removed from the Inquisition. Their argument is wrongly assumed.
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2000), 116.
9. Cited in Moltmann, God for a Secular Society, 8.
10. Andre G. Frank, Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment (New
York: Monthly Review, 1979), 14–7.
11. Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (New York: Bantam, 2003), 722, 747,
760.
12. Karl Marx, Capital, I: A Critique of Political Economy, trans. Ben Fowkes
(London: Penguin, 1990), 823.
13. Ernest Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory 1, trans. Brian Pearce (New
York and London: 1968), 106.
14. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Henry Reeve (A
Penn State Electronic Classics Series Publication, 2002), 366.
15. Franz Fanon, Black Skin and White Masks, trans. Charles Lam Markmann
(London: Pluto Press, 1986), 189.
16. Ibid., ix.
17. Ibid., xiii.
18. Ibid., 18.
19. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Mark Goldie (London:
J.M. Dent; Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle, 1993), xxxv.
20. Ibid., xxv.
21. Ibid., 117.
22. Ibid., xxiii.
23. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (New York: Dutton, 1950), 105.
24. Ibid., 216.
25. Giovani Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the
Origins of Our Times (London: Verso, 1994), 209–10.
26. Locke, Two Treatises of Government, xI–xIi.
52 P. S. CHUNG
27. Ibid., 5.
28. Ibid., 126.
29. Ibid., 208.
30. Ibid., 213.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., 214.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., 135.
35. Ibid., 131.
36. Locke in the later revision of the Constitutions did not alter the slavery
article. He was a shareholder in the Royal African Company charted in
1672, which sought to monopolize the English slave trade. McCarthy,
Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development, 167.
37. J.J. Rousseau, The First and Second Discourses, ed. Roger D. Masters and
trans. Roger D. and Judith R. Masters (New York: St Martin’s Press,
1964). The full title is Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of
Inequality Among Men, which was written for another prize competition
of the Academy of Dijon.
38. Book I, ch. vi. Rousseau, On the Social Contract with Geneva Manuscript
and Political Economy, eds. Roger D. Master, trans. Judith R. Masters
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978).
39. Book I, ch. vi.
40. “Geneva Manuscript,” in ibid., 189.
41. Ibid., 168.
42. Book II, ch. vi.
43. “Geneva Manuscript,” in On the Social Contract, 182. Rousseau values
the great soul of the legislator as the true miracle and takes John Calvin
as the great legislator, who was involved in drawing up of the edicts in the
Republic of Geneva. This does Calvin as much honor as his theological
masterpiece of Institutes. Book II, ch. Vii. footnote.
44. “Discourse on Political Economy,” in On the Social Contract, 216.
45. Ibid., 217.
46. Ibid., 221.
47. Ibid., 221–2.
48. Ibid., 222.
49. Ibid. A just and wise economy, according to Rousseau, needs to over-
come the difficulty “in the cruel alternative of letting the State perish or
attacking the sacred right of property which is its mainstay.” Ibid., 226.
50. Ibid., 225.
51. C. B. Macpherson, The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy (Oxford:
Oxford University Press. 1979), 16.
2 RACE, SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY, AND SOCIAL DARWINISM 53
52. Rousseau, Emile, or On Education, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic
Books, [1762] 1979), 194.
53. Robespierre finds recourse to the right of insurrection from Social
Contract, but the Jacobin campaign of mass executions seems much more
in line with Marquis de Sade (1740–1814). The sadistic misogyny of
Revolution is based on violence and fear. “The well-being of the other
never is the aim of the Sadean subject. On the contrary, he is animated by
an unmitigated devotion to the propagation of evil–crimes, murders, ven-
geance.” Robespierre, ed. George Rude (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,
1967), 135.
54. Rousseau, On the Social Contract, 7.
55. Book I, ch. vi–viii. Rousseau, The First and Second Discourses, 21. 24.
56. Ibid., 172.
57. Emile Durkheim, Montesquieu and Rousseau (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1960), 135.
58. Book I, ch. ix.
59. “Geneva Manuscript,” in On the Social Contract, 167.
60. Iring Fetscher clarifies Rousseau’s idea of legislature in contrast to a
notion of totalitarianism. Iring Fetscher, Rousseaus politische Philosophie:
Zur Geschichte des demokratischen Freiheitsbegriffs (Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1975), 147.
61. “Geneva Manuscript,” in ibid., 191. The Latin phrase suum cuique relates
to an old Greek principle of justice in Plato’s Republic. Justice becomes
possible when everyone minds his/her own business, according to his/
her abilities and capabilities. It should refrain from meddling in others’
affairs (4. 433a). Also, everyone should receive his/her own (rights), not
be deprived of his/her own (property). This concept implies distributive
justice which can be developed toward justice as fairness.
62. Book III, iv.
63. For Rousseau, however, “Athens was not in fact a democracy, but a highly
tyrannical aristocracy, governed by learned men and orators.” “Political
Economy,” in On the Social Contract, 213.
64. “Geneva Manuscript,” in On the Social Contract, 167.
65. Ibid., 176.
66. Book I, ch. IV. 49.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid., 50.
70. Book I, ch. iv.
71. Book IV, ch. iii.
72. Book I, ch. iv.
54 P. S. CHUNG
73. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, trans. Neville H. Smith (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1995), 151.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid., 153.
76. Ibid., 153–4.
77. John Rawls’ (1921–2002) theory of justice stands in accord with the
tradition of social contract in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. Drawing upon
the veil of ignorance, he suggests that this original position explains his
definition of ‘justice as fairness,’ which is to be founded in constitutional
democracy. The social conditions are essential for the adequate develop-
ment of their two moral powers: justice and the good. The principle of
justice is applied to the basic structure of society in the exercise of citi-
zens’ sense of justice. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), rev. ed.
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1999), xii. 11. 118–23.
78. Darwin adopted this term in the fifth edition of Origin (1869). Despite
his rejection of teleological readings of evolution, Darwin is accused of
joining the mainstream of social Darwinism. McCarthy, Race, Empire,
and the Idea of Human Development, 77.
79. Eric J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, 1789–1848 (New York: Vintage
Books, 1996), 29.
80. The term laissez-faire, the product of the Enlightenment, refers to the
way to unleash human potential through the restoration of a natural sys-
tem without the restrictions of government. It would come along with
the invisible hand by Adam Smith (1723–1790), who sees economy as a
natural system and the market as an organic part of that system. But
Smith never used the term.
81. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire: An Economic History of Britain since
1750 (Letchworth: The Garden City Press, 1968), 21.
82. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans.
Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1995), 137.
83. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Cleveland and New York:
The World Publishing Company, 1958), 178.
84. Ibid., 180. In this respect, Arendt maintains that Carlyle’s ideas on the
genius and hero worship emphasize the innate greatness of the individual
character independent of his social environment. It became really more
effective weapons of a ‘social reformer’ than the doctrines of the British
Imperialism.
85. John Edwards Richards, The Historical Birth of the Presbyterian Church in
America (Liberty Press, Liberty Hill, South Carolina, 1987). This book
is a history of the Presbyterian Church in America (PCA), which includes
many churches which were members of the PCCSA.
2 RACE, SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY, AND SOCIAL DARWINISM 55
86. Eleven Southern states in which slavery was legal wanted to leave the
United States, and they formed the Confederate States of America. It is
called the Confederacy against the Union which refers to the US govern-
ment, and the states where slavery was illegal are sometimes called the
North supporting the Union of the Government.
87. McCarthy, Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development, 107.
88. Cited in David Snoke, “The Southern Presbyterian Church and Racism,”
3. https://www.cityreformed.org/uploads/4/4/0/9/44096805/rac-
ism.pdf.
89. McCarthy, Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development, 107.
90. Cornel West, Democracy Matters: Winning the Fight against Imperialism
(New York: Penguin, 2005), 50–1.
91. The poem ‘The White Man’s Burden’ was widely reprinted in American
Newspapers, calling for arms. Hannah Arendt writes against the imperialist
character of Kipling. “The fact that the ‘White Man’s burden’ is either
hypocrisy or racism has not prevented a few of the best Englishmen from
shouldering the burden in earnest and making themselves the tragic and
quixotic fools of imperialism.” Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 209.
92. Moltmann, God for a Secular Society, 10–11.
93. Ibid., 13.
94. West, Democracy Matters, 15.
95. Ibid., 16, 20.
96. Helmut Gollwitzer, “Why Black Theology?,” Union Seminary Quarterly
Review 31, no. 1 (1975), 42.
97. Ibid., 44.
98. Golliwtzer, Befreiung zur Solidarität. Einführung in die Evangelische
Theologie (Munich: Chr. Kaiser, 1984), 197.
99. Ibid., 199.
100. Ibid., 200.
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