G.

R NO L-19650 September 29, 1966

CALTEX Philippines Inc., petitioner vs Enrico Palomar, respondent

FACTS:
In 1960, Caltex (Philippines) Inc. laid the groundwork for a promotional scheme to drum up patronage for
its oil products which is Caltex Hooded Pump Contest. It calls for participants to estimate the actual
number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex Station will dispense during a specific period. Those
who can only join are all motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers. No fee or consideration is required
to be paid, no purchase of Caltex products required to be made. Entry forms are to be made available
upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can will be provided for the deposit of accomplished
entry status. Caltex foreseen its need of mailing services to publicize the event which led it to make
arrangements with the postal authorities to clear the contest in advance for mailing. Citing sections 1954
(a), 1982 and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code, Acting Postmaster General declined Caltex’s
request for it falls within the purview of the Anti-Lottery Provision of the Postal Law.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief.

2. Whether or not the proposed “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” violates the postal law.

RULING:

By express mandate of section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court, declaratory relief is available to any
person whose rights are affected by a statute to determine any question of construction or validity arising
under the statute and for a declaration of his rights thereunder. With the petitioner’s insistent assertion
of its claim to use the mail for its proposed contest and consequent denial by the appellant of the privilege
demanded, undoubtedly spawned a live controversy. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justiciable
controversy when, as the case at bar, it was translated into a positive claim of right which is actually
contested.

Lottery as defined extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes. It has three essential elements
namely; 1. Consideration 2. Prize 3. Chance. According to the Supreme Court, Caltex’s contest is more of
a gratuitous distribution than a lottery because it doesn’t require that any fee be paid, any merchandise
be bought, or any services be rendered. Even the term gift enterprise cannot be contested for there is no
sale that will serve as an inducement to the purchase because the contest is open to all whether or not
they but the petitioner’s products. In the end, the Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner may not be
denied of the mails for the purpose thereof.
G.R NO L-26100 February 28, 1969

CITY OF BAGUIO et al, petitioners vs Hon. Pio R. Marcos et al, respondents

FACTS:

On July 25, 1961, the Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of Baguio instituted the reopening of
the cadastral proceedings under Republic Act 931. It is not disputed that the land here involved was
amongst those declared public lands by final decision rendered in that case on November 13, 1922.
Respondent Belong Lutes petitioned the cadastral court to reopen said Civil Reservation Case No. 1 as to
the parcel of land he claims and prayed that the land be registered in his name. On December 18, 1961,
private petitioners registered opposition to the reopening. The petitioners questioned the cadastral
court's jurisdiction over the petition to reopen.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the reopening petition was filed outside the 40-year period preceding the approval of
Republic Act 931.

RULING:

Yes. The cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened were instituted on April 12, 1912. Final decision
was rendered on November 13, 1922. Lutes filed the petition to reopen on July 25, 1961. It will be noted
that the title of R.A. 931 authorizes "the filing in the proper court, under certain conditions, of certain
claims of title to parcels of land that have been declared public land, by virtue of judicial decisions
rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act. The body of the statute, however,
in its Section 1, speaks of parcels of land that "have been, or are about to be declared land of the public
domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of
this Act." There thus appears to be a seeming inconsistency between title and body. The court says that
lingual imperfections in the drafting of a statute should never be permitted to hamstring judicial search
for legislative intent, which can otherwise be discovered. Republic Act 931, claims of title that may be filed
thereunder embrace those parcels of land that have been declared public land "by virtue of judicial
decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." Therefore, by that
statute, the July 25, 1961 petition of respondent Belong Lutes to reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1,
GLRO Record No. 211 of the cadastral court of Baguio, the decision on which was rendered on November
13, 1922, comes within the 40-year period.
G.R NO L-10520 February 28, 1957

Lorenzo M. Tanada and Diosdado Macapagal, petitioners vs Mariano Jesus Cuenco, Francisco A.
Delgado et al, respondents

FACTS:
Petitioner Lorenzo M. Tañada is a member of the Senate of the Philippines, and President of the Citizens
Party, whereas petitioner Diosdado Macapagal, a member of the House of Representatives of the
Philippines, was one of the official candidates of the Liberal Party for the Senate. The Senate, upon
nomination of Senator Cipriano Primicias, on behalf of the Nacionalista Party, chose Senators Laurel,
Lopez and Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Upon nomination of Senator Primicias
on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate, the Senate choose respondents Cuenco and Delgado
as members of the same Electoral Tribunal. Respondents allege that the constitutional mandate to the
effect that "each Electoral Tribunal shall be compose of nine (9) members," six (6) of whom "shall be
members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be", is mandatory;

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution is mandatory.

HELD:
No. The flaw in the position taken in said opinion and by respondent herein is that, while, it relies upon
the compulsory nature of the word "shall". The language of a statute, however mandatory in form, may
be deemed directory whenever legislative purpose can best be carried out by such construction, and the
legislative intent does not require a mandatory construction; The adoption of section 11 of Article VI of
the Constitution, reveals clearly that its framers intended to prevent the majority party from controlling
the Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the
majority and the minority parties therein, with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are members of
said Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power. Senators Cuenco and Delgado, having been elected
by the Committee on Rules of the Senate and not by the party having the second largest votes in the
Senate for which Senator Tañada has the exclusive right, have not been duly elected as Members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal.

G.R NO L-14526 March 31, 1965

ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION et al, petitioners vs THE CITY OF CEBU et al, respondents

FACTS:
Ordinance No. 207 was purportedly enacted by the Municipal Board on August 14, 1956 and approved by
the City Mayor on the following August 27 where plaintiffs were made to pa wharfage charges under
protest since September 1, 1956 and on May 8, 1957. The plaintiffs filed an action in the Court of First
Instance of Manila to have the said void, its enforcement enjoined in so far as the wharves, docks and
ordinance declared other landing places belonging to the National Government were concerned, and all
the amounts thus far collected by defendants refunded to them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the City of Cebu, under its charter, may provide by ordinance for the collection of
wharfage from vessels that dock at the public wharves of piers located in said city but owned by the
National Government.
HELD:
No. The right to collect the wharfage belongs to the National Government. It is unreasonable to conclude
that the legislature, simply because it employed the term "public wharves" in section 17 (w) of the charter
of the City of Cebu, thereby authorized the latter to collect wharfage irrespective of the ownership of the
wharves involved. The National Government did not surrender such ownership to the city; and there is no
justifiable ground to read into the statute an intention to burden shipowners, such as appellants, with the
obligation of paying twice for the same purpose. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a
consideration of the statute as a whole and not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is
a cardinal rule of statutory construction. For taken in the abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey
a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is
considered with those with which it is associated. Thus an apparently general provision may have a limited
application if viewed together with other provisions. Hence, Ordinance No. 207 of the City of Cebu is
declared null and void, and appellees are ordered to refund to appellants all amounts collected
thereunder and to refrain from making such collection.

G.R NO L-6355-56 August 31, 1953

PASTOR M. ENDENCIA AND FERNANDO JUGO, petitioners vs SATURNINO DAVID, respondent

Facts:
Saturnino David, as a Collector of Internal Revenue collected income taxes from Justices Endencia and
Jugo, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court respectively.
The lower court held that under the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, the collection of
income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their
compensation and therefore was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the
refund of said taxes. Respondent, through the Solicitor General contended that the collection was done
pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act 590 which Congress enacted to authorize and legalize the collection
of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers, if not to counteract the ruling on the Perfecto Case.
Issue: Whether the Legislature may lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public
official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and
decided otherwise.
Held:
The Legislature cannot lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official,
specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided
otherwise. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of
the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. The Legislature under our form
of government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them.
Allowing the legislature to interpret the law would bring confusion and instability in judicial processes and
court decisions. This authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the
courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the
meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide
whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and
has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional. Therefore, the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto
vs. Meer to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution
thereof and so violates the Constitution, is reiterated. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, affirming
the ruling in Perferto v. Meer and holding the interpretation and application of laws belong to the
Judiciary.

G.R NO. 129783 December 22, 1997

MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, petitioner vs HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and JOSE T.

FACTS:

Petitioner Marcelino Libanan and private respondent Jose Ramirez were among the lone congressional
seat of Eastern Samar in the May 1995 election. After the canvass of returns was made, the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Eastern Samar proclaimed respondent Ramirez to have been duly eleted
Representative of the District. Consequently, Petitioner Libanan filed an election protest before the HRET
claiming, among other things, the May 1995 elections in Eastern Samar were marred by massive electoral
irregularities. Libanan then prayed that HRET should issue an order to annul the election and proclamation
of Ramirez and thereafter so proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District
of Eastern Samar. Petitioner claims that some of the ballots are spurious for the do not possess the
signature of the BEI chairman despite them having COMELEC’s watermark.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the absence of the signature
of the Chairman of BEI in the ballots did not render the ballots spurious.

RULING:

No ballot was found spurious in this case. For a ballot to be rejected for being spurious, the ballot must
not have any of the following authenticating marks, a) the COMELEC watermark; b) the signatures or initial
of the BEI Chairman at the back of the ballot; and c) red and blue fibers. IN the present case, all the ballots
examined by the Tribunal had COMELEC watermarks. While section 24 of RA 7166 provides that failure to
authenticate the ballot shall constitute an election offense, there s nothing in the said law which provides
that ballot shall not authenticated shall be considered invalid. What is clearly provided in the law is the
sanction imposable upon an erring Chairman of the BEI, and not the disenfranchisement of the voter. It is
quite clear, in the opinion of the Court, that no grave abuse of discretion has been committed be
respondent HRET in its issuance of the assailed decision and resolution. Thus, the instant petition is
dismissed.

G.R NO 158253 March 2, 2007

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES et al, petitioners vs CARLITO LACAP, respondent

FACTS:

District Engineer of Pampanga issued and duly published an invitation to bid. Respondent, doing business
under the name and style Carwin Construction and Construction Supply, was pre-qualified together with
two other contractors. Since the respondent submitted the lowest bid, he was awarded the contract for
the concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare. District Engineer conducted final inspection and found it 100%
completed in accordance with their approved plans and specifications. Respondent sought to collect
payment for the project but the District Auditor of COA disapproved the final release of funds on the
ground that the contractor’s license of respondent had expired at the time of the execution of the
contract.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Carwin Construction should be paid for works accomplished despite an expired
contractor’s license at the time the contracts were executed.

RULING:

The RTC held that petitioner must be required to pay the contract price since it has accepted the
completed project and enjoyed the benefits thereof; to hold otherwise would be to overrun the long
standing and consistent pronouncement against enriching oneself at the expense of another. The Court
of Appeal affirmed the RTC’s decision with modification in that the interest shall only be 6% per annum.
Before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the means afforded him
by administrative processes corollary to this is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. On Section 35 of RA
4566, any contractor who failed to secure a license first shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor and shall
pay a fine of not less than 500php but not more than five thousand pesos. Respondent should be paid for
the projects he completed thus the decision of CA is affirmed.

G.R NO. L-30061 February 27, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, respondent

FACTS:

The accused admitted that he was in possession of revolver and the ammunition without requisite license
of permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an
appointment as Confidential Agent from the Provincial Commander (PC) and the said appointments
expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question. Petitioner
contended before the court that in view of his abovementioned appointments, he was entitled to acquittal
base don the Supreme Court’s decision n People v Macarandang and People v Lucero.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent should be acquitted on the basis of the Supreme Court’s rulings in People
vs Macarandang and People vs Lucero or in the view of the complete reversal of Macarandang and Lucero
doctrine in Mapa.

RULING:

Decision of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean,
and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the NCC “Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system.” The settled rule is supported by the legal maxim
“legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet” which means the interpretation placed upon the written law by a
competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the
jurisprudence of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in
question and when he was arraigned by the trial court. The doctrine was reversed in Mapa but the new
doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old
doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. Respondent appointed as Secret Agent as Confidential Agent and
Secret Agent and authorized to possess firearm pursuant to prevailing doctrine in Macarandang and
Lucero under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the
absence of a license and permit therefor, respondent must be absolved. Certainly, respondent must not
be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not be punishable. Thus, judgement
appealed is hereby reverse and the respondent is acquitted.