De Asis vs.

CA

GR No. 127578, February 15, 1999

FACTS:

Vircel Andres as legal guardian of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed an action in 1988 for maintenance and
support against the alleged father Manuel De Asis who failed to provide support and maintenance
despite repeated demands. Vircel later on withdrew the complaint in 1989 for the reason that Manuel
denied paternity of the said minor and due to such denial, it seems useless to pursue the said action.
They mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the complaint with the condition that Manuel will not
pursue his counter claim. However in 1995, Vircel filed a similar complaint against the alleged father,
this time as the minor’s legal guardian/mother. Manuel interposed maxim of res judicata for the
dismissal of the case. He maintained that since the obligation to give support is based on existence of
paternity between the child and putative parent, lack thereof negates the right to claim support.

ISSUE: WON the minor is barred from action for support.

HELD:

The right to give support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person. The original
agreement between the parties to dismiss the initial complaint was in the nature of a compromise
regarding future support which is prohibited by law. With respect to Manuel’s contention for the lack of
filial relationship between him and the child and agreement of Vircel in not pursuing the original claim,
the Court held that existence of lack thereof of any filial relationship between parties was not a matter
which the parties must decide but should be decided by the Court itself. While it is true that in order to
claim support, filiation or paternity must be first shown between the parties, but the presence or lack
thereof must be judicially established and declaration is vested in the Court. It cannot be left to the will
or agreement of the parties. Hence, the first dismissal cannot bar the filing of another action asking for
the same relief (no force and effect). Furthermore, the defense of res judicata claimed by Manuel was
untenable since future support cannot be the subject of any compromise or waiver.

urt said that the trial court should not havecompletely disregarded the expenses incurred by respondent
consisting of the purchaseand maintenance of the two cars, payment of tuition fees, travel expenses,
and thecredit card purchases involving groceries, dry goods and books, which certainly inuredto the
benefit not only of the two children, but their mother (petitioner) as well, and thusordered the
deduction of the amount of PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total supportin arrears of Danilo to his
wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two children. It also noted thelack of contribution from the petitioner in
the joint obligation of spouses to support their children. Petitioner appealed.ISSUEW/N the CA erred in
deducting said amount from the current total support in arrearsDECISIONThe SC declared that the
petition is PARTLY GRANTED.

As a matter of law, theamount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship is
generallyobliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to
the needs of the recipient. Such support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,
clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, inkeeping with the financial capacity of the
family. The general rule is to the effect thatwhen a father is required by a divorce decree to pay to the
mother money for thesupport of their dependent children and the unpaid and accrued installments
become judgments in her favor, he cannot, as a matter of law, claim credit on account of payments
voluntarily made directly to the children. Here, the CA should not haveallowed all the expenses incurred
by respondent to be credited against the accruedsupport pendente lite. The amounts already extended
to the two (2) children, being a commendable act of the petitioner, should be continue by him
considering the vast financial resources at his disposal.

Dempsey v. RTC

164 SCRA 384

Facts:

Janalita Rapada cohabited with JoelDempsey without the benefit of marriage andChristine Marie was
born. The child receivesmonthly support from him in the sum of $150.Janalita seeks for the accused to
declareChristina Marie as his dependent and after his American citizenship. Dempsey freely
andvoluntarily and spontaneously entered a plea of guilty to the offenses charged against himwhich was
abandonment and failure to provideadequate support for the child though he hadthe means to do so.
Municipal Trial Court foundhim to be guilty. He appealed for the penalty of imprisonment be changed
into a fine and not tobe acquitted. RTC reversed the earlier decision.

Relevant issue #1:WON Christina is entitled to the rightsarising from the parental responsibility ofher
father, she being an illegitimate child.Held: Yes.

Illegitimate children have rights of the same nature as legitimate and adoptedchildren. This is
enunciated in Art. 3 of PD 603which provides that all children shall be entitledto the rights herein set
forth without distinctionas to legitimacy or illegitimacy, sex, socialstatus, religion, political antecedents,
and other factors.

Relevant issue#2:WON as part of the civil liability, theaccused is required to recognize Christinaas his
natural.Held: No.

The recognition of a child by her father is provided for in the NCC and now inthe FC. In this criminal
prosecution, where theaccused pleaded guilty to criminal charges andthe issue of recognition was not
specificallyand fully heard and tried, the trial courtcommitted error when it ordered recognition of a
natural child as part of the civil liability in thecriminal case
Spouses Moises and Brigida Palisoc vs Antonio Brillantes

In March 1966, while Dominador Palisoc (16 years old) was watching Virgilio Daffon and Desiderio Cruz
work on a machine in their laboratory class in the Manila Technical Institute (a school of arts and
trades), Daffon scolded Palisoc for just standing around like a foreman. This caused Palisoc to slightly
slap the face of Daffon and a fistfight ensued between the two. Daffon delivered blows that eventually
killed Palisoc. The parents of Palisoc sued Daffon, the school president (Teodosio Valenton), the
instructor (Santiago Quibulue), and the owner (Antonio Brillantes). The basis of the suit against
Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes was Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

The lower court, as well as the CA, ruled that only Daffon is liable for damages and that Valenton,
Quibulue, and Brillantes are not liable because under Article 2180, they are only liable “so long as they
[the students] remain in their custody.” And that this means, as per Mercado vs Court of Appeals, that
teachers or heads of establishments are only liable for the tortious acts of their students if the students
are living and boarding with the teacher or other officials of the school – which Daffon was not.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in the Mercado Case still applies.

HELD: No. The SC abandoned the ruling in the Mercado Case as well as the ruling in the Exconde Case as
they adopted Justice JBL Reyes’ dissenting opinion in the latter case. Valenton and Quibulue as president
and teacher-in-charge of the school must be held jointly and severally liable for the quasi-delict of
Daffon. The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the students could have been avoided,
had said defendants but complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities
of the students in the school premises to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of
fellow students or other parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of
such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by “(proving) that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.” In the light of the factual
findings of the lower court’s decision, said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability.
The SC reiterated that there is nothing in the law which prescribes that a student must be living and
boarding with his teacher or in the school before heads and teachers of the school may be held liable for
the tortious acts of their students.

Amadora vs. CA

GR No. L47745, April 15, 1988

FACTS:
Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit by a gun by Pablito Daffon
resulting to the former’s death. Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence. The
victim’s parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action for damages against Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos, its rectors, high school principal, dean of boys, the physics teacher together with Daffon and
2 other students. Complaints against the students were dropped. Respondent Court absolved the
defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebu’s decision for the following reasons: 1. Since the school
was an academic institution of learning and not a school of arts and trades 2. That students were not in
the custody of the school since the semester has already ended 3. There was no clear identification of
the fatal gun, and 4. In any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence through enforcement of
the school regulations in maintaining discipline. Petitioners on othe other hand claimed their son was
under school custody because he went to school to comply with a requirement for graduation
(submission of Physics reports).

ISSUE: WON Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable.

HELD:

The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the school notwithstanding
classes had formally ended when the incident happened. It was immaterial if he was in the school
auditorium to finish his physics requirement. What was important is that he was there for a legitimate
purpose. On the other hand, the rector, high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable
because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision. Each was exercising only a
general authority over the students and not direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed
in-charge of particular classes.

In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held liable considering that he
had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and later returned to him without taking
disciplinary action or reporting the matter to the higher authorities. Though it was clear negligence on
his part, no proof was shown to necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident.

Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision because only the teacher
of the head of school of arts and trade is made responsible for the damage caused by the student.
Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the respondents were held liable for the injury inflicted with
Alfredo resulting to his death.
St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpetanos

Facts: Defendant-appellant St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the
school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where
prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part
of the campaigning group.

Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a
Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School,
Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school.
Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin
Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. The parents of Sherwin filed a
case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner,
Vivencio Villanueva and St. Mary’s Academy before the RTC of Dipolog City and claimed for damages.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner St. Mary’s Academy is liable for damages for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos.

HELD:

CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code where it
was pointed that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive and not having a teacher accompany
the minor students in the jeep. However, for them to be held liable, the act or omission to be
considered negligent must be the proximate cause of the injury caused thus, negligence needs to have a
causal connection to the accident. It must be direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by any
efficient intervening causes. The parents of the victim failed to show such negligence on the part of the
petitioner. The spouses Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the
reckless driving of James but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Futhermore,
there was no evidence that petitioner allowed the minor to drive the jeep of Villanueva. The mechanical
defect was an event over which the school has no control hence they may not be held liable for the
death resulting from such accident.

The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible
to the public or to 3rd persons for injuries caused while it is being driven on the road. It is not the
school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death
of Sherwin. Case was remanded to the trial court for determination of the liability of the defendants
excluding herein petitioner.
CABANAS vs PILAPIL

G.R. No. L-25843 July 25, 1974 MELCHORA CABANAS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO PILAPIL,
defendant-appellant.

FACTS: The insured, Florentino Pilapil had a child, Millian Pilapil, with a married woman, the plaintiff,
Melchora Cabanas. She was ten years old at the time the complaint was filed on October 10, 1964. The
defendant, Francisco Pilapil, is the brother of the deceased. The deceased insured himself and instituted
as beneficiary, his child, with his brother to act as trustee during her minority. Upon his death, the
proceeds were paid to him. Hence this complaint by the mother, with whom the child is living, seeking
the delivery of such sum. She filed the bond required by the Civil Code. Defendant would justify his claim
to the retention of the amount in question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy.

Issue: WON the mother is the rightful trustee for the minor beneficiary

Held: on Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code. The former provides: "The father, or in his absence the
mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. The
property which the unemancipated child has acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by
any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under
whom he is under parental authority and whose company he lives.

With the added circumstance that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any evidence
of lack of maternal care, the decision arrived at can stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. It is further
fortified by the assumption, both logical and natural, that infidelity to the trust imposed by the deceased
is much less in the case of a mother than in the case of an uncle

Since about 1976, minors Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were lovers. In December 1978, Julie Ann
decided to break up with Wendell because the latter has violent tendencies. Julie Ann refused to give
Wendell his second chance. On January 14, 1979, both minors were found dead inside Julie Ann’s house.
Both were only 18 years of age (age of majority that time was 21).

Apparently, Wendell used his father’s gun to kill Julie Ann and then later he committed suicide.
The parents of Julie Ann (Felipe and Shirley Gotiong) then filed a civil case for recovery of damages
based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the parents of Wendell (Cresencio and Amelia Libi).

ISSUE: Whether or not the parents of Wendell are civilly liable?

HELD: Yes. It was determined from the evidence adduced that the Libis had been negligent in
safekeeping their gun. Wendell gained access to the gun in 1978 and the Libis did not know that their
son had possession of said gun. They only found out about it when the shooting happened. Further, they
were not even aware that their son is a drug informant of the local Constabulary (police force at that
time). Clearly, the parents were negligent and were not acting with the diligence required by law (that of
a good father of a family) in making sure that their minor children shall not cause damages against other
persons.

What is the nature of their liability?

In this case, the Supreme Court also clarified that the nature of the liability of parents in cases like this is
not merely subsidiary. Their liability is primary. This is whether or not what the damage caused by their
minor child arose from quasi-delict or from a criminal act. This is also the reason why parents can avoid
liability if they will be able to show that they have acted with the diligence required by law because if
their liability is merely subsidiary, they can never pose the defense of diligence of a good father of a
family.

Lindain v CA Digest

Facts:

Plaintiffs as minors, owned a parel of registered land which their mother (Dolores) as guardian, sold for
P2,000.00 under a deed of absolute sale to the spouses Apolonia and Federico. The latter knew that the
sale was without judicial approval but still proceeded with the transaction. The plaintiffs now contend
that the sale is null and void as it was without the court's approval. The Regional trial Court ruled that
the sale is indeed null and void, while upon appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) confirmed the sale as valid
and dismissed the complaint. Hence this petition.

Issue: Does the sale by a guardian of a minor's property require judicial approval?

YES.
Under Art. 320 (NCC), a parent acting merely as a legal administrator of the property of his minor
children does not have the power to dispose of or alienate the property of the said child without judicial
approval. And under Rule 84 (Code of Civil Procedure), the powers and duties of the widow as legal
administrator of her minor children's property are merely powers of possession and management.
Hence, the power to sell, mortgage, encumber or dispose must proceed from the court (Rule 89).
Moreover, the private respondent spouses are not purchasers in good faith as they knew right from the
beginning the the transaction was without judicial approval. Further, the minors' action for
reconveyance has not yet prescribed.

Chua v. Cabangbang

G.R.No. L-23253 ll Mar. 28, 1969 ll Castro, J.

321 332

Dilag

Persons and Family Relations

KEYWORDS:

Hostess, Betty the adopted child

DOCTRINE:

Abandonment terminates parentalauthority

NATURE OF PETITION

:Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal

dismissing Pacita Chua’s

petition for habeas corpus for the custody of her daughter Betty from respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner, when she was still at the primeof youth, worked as a hostess in nightclubs

She slept with different men, but she gotpregnant with 2 children from a certain SySia Lay and 1
daughter with Victor TanVillareal
•

She gave her youngest daughter to acomadre in Cebu

The custody of the other daughter, Betty,was acquired by Mr. and Mrs. Cabangbang

during the former’s early years (4 month

sold)-

They christened her Grace Cabangbang

Petitioner now wants to get custody of Betty-

She contends that Villareal took thechild away and gave her to the couple-

The couple avers that they found thebaby, wrapped in a bundle, at the gateof their residence

ISSUE:

WON the custody of the child can begranted back to the mother

HELD:

NO

, petitioner abandoned the child, thusshe has lost her parental authority over thechild

RATIO:

CFI ruled that the mother was unfit to haveparental authority, as she is not an uprightwoman.-
But SC ruled that it was more of anabandonment rather than fitness thatdivests the mother with
parentalauthorityArt. 332 of the Civil CodeThe courts may deprive the parents of their parental
authority or suspend theexercise of the same if they should treattheir children with excessive
harshnessor should give them corrupting orders,counsels or examples, or should makethem beg or
abandon them.

Therefore, abandonment is one of thegrounds for depriving authority over theparent-

Mere acquiescence to the giving byVillareal to the spouses is not sufficientto constitute abandonment-

But since she waited for a period of 5years before she filed the petition forcustody, it is more believable
that shedid abandon the child-

More proof that she doesn’t really love

the child-

She admitted under oath that shewants the child back so that Sy SiaLay, the alleged father,
wouldresume providing the petitionerand the child support which heperemptorily withheld and
ceasedto give when she gave the childaway-

Also, she expressed her willingnessto drop the case if the spouses paidher in cash and a jeep-

Not to mention that she gave herother child to a comadre in Cebu

because she couldn’t support her

SIDE ISSUE:

Petitioner contends that no child under 7years of age shall be taken away from hermother.-
Moot and academic, as she is already11 years old

We therefore affirm the lower court’s decision,

not on the grounds cited by it, but upon a ground which the court overlooked

Abiera v. Orin

G.R.No. 3236 ll Mar. 27, 1907 ll Mapa, J.

319 332

DantesKEYWORDS:

Sibling war, special administrator

FACTS:

Vicenta, Mariano and Petra Cacao weresiblings. Petra Cacao married Juan Abiera.Petra Cacao died.-

Vicenta married defendant Miguel Orin.They have no children. Vicenta Cacao died.-

In 1898, Mariano Cacao, Juan Abiera andMiguel Orin entered into an extrajudicialpartition of
properties/animals acquiredduring the marriage of Vicenta Cacao andMiguel Orin. Specifically, Orin was
to paythe other two P1,000 each.-

Abiera was representing his children byPetra Cacao. Because of the circumstances,the natural nephews
became heirs of Vicenta Cacao.-

Juan Abiera died. Plaintiff Sebastian Abierabecame administrator of his estate.-

As special administrator, plaintiff demandedthe P1,000 from Orin; lower court decided

in plaitiff’s favor.

ISSUES:
WON Sebastian Abiera may demandpayment as special administrator to the estateof the father of the
heirs?

HELD:

NO

. The obligation was executed in favor of the heirs, not in favor of Juan Abiera, who wasmerely
representing them. Sebastian Abieracould

only manage Abiera’s estate, not those of

third persons. Juan Abiera cannot transfer hisright to represent his children to Sebastian.The right to
represent the children isattached to parental authority or guardianship.This is a personal right. It died
with Juan Abiera.

Cortes v. CastilloG.R.No. L-16903 ll Mar. 18, 1921 ll Malcolm, J. KEYWORDS:Adulterous mom,

custodyQUICK READ:The mother who was found guilty of adultery was deemed unfit to acquire
custodyof her children from her mother-in-law.FACTS:-Maria Cortes was found guilty of adulteryby the
trial court but Col. Alejandro Herrera,her husband, condoned her and came backto live withher.-On the
suspicion that she might becommitting adultery again, he left, took thekids with him, and stayed with
his mother.He filed an action for divorce, but-He died in the line of duty (he was apoliceman,
apparently) Maria thenproceeded to re-obtain custody of herchildren from her mother-in-law but
thelatter refused.-The trial court sided with the mother-in-law.-Hence this appeal.ISSUES:WON A
woman found guilty of adultery isunfit for custody of her

Silva vs CA and Gonzales, 275 SCRA 604

[G.R. No. 114742. July 17, 1997]

FACTS:

Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local actress, cohabited
without the benefit of marriage. The union saw the birth of two children: Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia.
Not very long after, a rift in their relationship surfaced. It began, according to Silva, when Gonzales
decided to resume her acting career over his vigorous objections. The assertion was quickly refuted by
Gonzales who claimed that she, in fact, had never stopped working throughout their relationship. At any
rate, the two eventually parted ways. Gonzales refused to allow Silva, in apparent contravention of a
previous understanding, to have the children in his company on weekends. Silva filed a petition for
custodial rights over the children before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78, of Quezon City. The
petition was opposed by Gonzales who averred that Silva often engaged in "gambling and womanizing"
which she feared could affect the moral and social values of the children.

The Trial Court judgment is rendered directing respondent to allow herein petitioner visitorial rights to
his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in no case should he take out the children without the
written consent of the mother or respondent herein. No pronouncement as to costs. Silva appeared
somehow satisfied with the judgment for only Gonzales interposed an appeal from the RTCs order to
the Court of Appeals. In the meantime, Gonzales got married to a Dutch national. The newly weds
emigrated to Holland with Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia.

On 23 September 1993, the appellate tribunal ruled in favor of Gonzales. The RTC decision had been
reversed and Petitioner-appellee's petition for visitorial rights is denied as the children concerned are
still in their early formative years of life. The molding of the character of the child starts at home. A
home with only one parent is more normal than two separate houses.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the father is entitled to visitorial rights to his children?

(The right to access of anoncustodial parent to his or her child/children)

HELD:

The biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate children in view of the constitutionally
protected inherent and natural right of parents over their children). This right is personal to the father;
no other person, like grandparents, can exercise this right for him.

Article 150 of the Family Code expresses that "(f)amily relations include those between parents and
children; Article 209, in relation to Article 220, of the Code states that it is the natural right and duty of
parents and those exercising parental authority to, among other things, keep children in their company
and to give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding. The
Constitution itself speaks in terms of the "natural and primary rights of parents in the rearing of the
youth.

Although the Supreme Court’s granted Silva (the father) the visitation rights, but this favorable decision
did not prevent Suzanne (the mother), in the exercise of her parental authority, from immigrating to
Holland with her two children.
Republic vs. Bermudez-Lorino Topic: Subsequent marriage, upon reappearance of absent spouse FACTS:

Gloria Bermudez and Francisco Lorino were married in June 1987. The wife was unaware that her
husband was a habitual drinker with violent attitude and character and had the propensity to go out
with his friends to the point of being unable to work. In 1991 she left him and returned to her parents
together with her three children. She went abroad to work for her support her children. From the time
she left him, she had no communication with him or his relatives. In 2000, nine years after leaving her
husband, Gloria filed a verified petition with the RTC under the rules on Summary Judicial Proceedings in
the Family Law. The lower court issued an order for the publication of the petition in a newspaper of
general circulation. In November 7, 2001, the RTC granted the summary petition. Although the
judgment was final and executors under the provisions of Act. 247 of the Family Code, the OSG for the
Republic of the Philippines filed a notice of appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the factual and legal bases for a judicial declaration of presumptive death under Art 41
of the Family Code were duly established.

HELD:

Art. 238 of the Family Code under Title XI Summary Judicial Proceeding in the Family Law, sets the tenor
for cases scoured by these rules, to wit: Art 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural
rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceeding.
Such cases shall be decided in an expedition

s manner without regards technical rules. The judge of the RTC fully complied with the above-cited
provision by expeditiously rending judgment within ninety (90) days after the formal offer of evidence
by the petitioner. The Court, therefore, finds in this case grave error on the part of both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals. To stress, the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the appeal on ground of lack of
jurisdiction, and reiterated the fact that the RTC decision of November 7, 2001 was immediately final
and executory. As it were, the Court of Appeals committed grave reversible error when it failed to
dismiss the erroneous appeal of the Republic on ground of lack of jurisdiction because, by express
provision of law, the judgment was not appealable. Petition Denied

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS,et.al.

458 SCRA 200 (2005), THIRD DIVISION

Apolinaria Malinao filed a petition before the Ormoc Regional Trial Court for the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of her Absentee Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc. The petition was thereafter granted by
the trial court. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Notice of Appeal. The
trial court disapproved the Notice of Appeal on the ground that the present case is a special proceeding
which requires that a record of appeal be filed and served pursuant to Section 2 (a) Rule 41 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals
contending that the declaration of presumptive death of a person under Article 41 of the Family Code is
not a special proceeding. The CA affirmed the trial court‘s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a person is in the nature of a
special proceeding.

HELD:

Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW contains
Article 238 which provides that unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in the said
Title shall apply in all cases provided for in the Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases
shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.

The petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required and is therefore, a summary proceeding under the Family
Code as her purpose was to contract a valid subsequent marriage, not a special proceeding under the
Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a summary
ordinary proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal from the trial court‘s order sufficed.

FIRST DIVISION
IVY JOAN P. REYES-TABUJARA,

Petitioner,

- versus -

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO A. TABUJARA III,

Respondents.
G.R. No. 172813

Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.

Chairperson,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CALLEJO, SR., and

CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

Promulgated:
July 20, 2006

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Resolutions dated 2 June 2006 and 7
June 2006 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94699.[1] The 2 June 2006 Resolution
restrained Judge Fatima Gonzales-Asdala, Pairing Judge of Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 86, from enforcing her Order dated 31 May 2006 while the Resolution of 7 June 2006 set aside
and nullified the Order she issued on 1 June 2006.

In her Petition, petitioner alleges that she and private respondent were married on 26 November 2000
at the Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila. Their union was blessed with a son,
Carlos Iigo, who was born on 5 July 2002. Apparently, the couples marital bliss was only short-lived for
immediately after their wedding, their relationship was already beset by frequent squabbles which
persisted even after the birth of their son. Despite their problems, petitioner and private respondent,
together with their son, stayed at their conjugal home in Capitol Homes, Quezon City.

Since 11 March 2006, however, petitioner had been staying at her sisters house in Brixton Hills, Quezon
City, because they were awaiting the arrival of their mother from abroad. On 14 March 2006, private
respondent picked up Carlos Iigo, who was with petitioner at that time. The following day, petitioner
notified private respondent that she would fetch the child since she and her sister decided to go to San
Fernando, Pampanga. Private respondent allegedly asked her to wait for him at their conjugal abode as
he had something to give her. Thinking that private respondent was going to hand over to her the
documents pertaining to their separation, petitioner acceded to his request. While waiting for private
respondent, petitioner decided to bring her and Carlos Iigos clothes to the car so they could leave as
soon as private respondent arrived. Much to petitioners surprise, however, private respondent refused
to allow her to take their child. When petitioner remonstrated, private respondent purportedly berated,
insulted, and told her that she could no longer see their son without his permission. Petitioner also
averred that when she tried to wrest Carlos Iigo away from private respondent, the latter hit her several
times and started choking her. Finally, private respondent boarded his car and sped away with their son
in tow.

Petitioner then proceeded to the East Avenue Medical Center to have her injuries treated and also to
Camp Karingal, Sikatuna Village, Quezon City, to report the matter.[2]

Since the 15 March 2006 incident, petitioner has never seen her son and has been barred by private
respondent from going back to their conjugal home. Left with no recourse and prompted by her longing
to see her son Carlos Iigo, petitioner filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus with the RTC, Quezon City, to
compel private respondent to produce their son before the court.[3] The Petition, docketed as Spec.
Proc. No. Q-06-57984, was initially raffled off to Branch 102 of RTC, Quezon City, which issued an Order
dated 23 May 2006[4] the pertinent portion of which provides:
ORDER

Filed before this Court is a verified Petition for Habeas Corpus filed by IVY JOAN P. REYES-TABUJARA,
through counsel, seeking for the production of the minor CARLOS IIGO R. TABUJARA, who is reportedly
in the custody of the respondent Ernesto Tabujara III, residing at No. 72 Berlin Street, Capitol Homes,
Quezon City.

Finding the Petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the same is hereby given due course.

ACCORDINGLY, the respondent Ernesto A. Tabujara III is hereby directed to produce the living person of
the minor CARLOS IIGO R. TABUJARA, before the Court during the hearing of this Petition which for that
purpose is hereby set on 25 May 2006 at 10:00 A.M., and to show cause why, as alleged, the subject
minor has been allegedly restrained of his liberty and detained by him. Observance of the Order is a way
of effecting the return of this writ, as required by law.[5]

On the scheduled hearing, private respondent appeared before the court without Carlos Iigo. According
to him, Carlos Iigo was then vacationing at Tagaytay Highlands and that he did not have sufficient time
to fetch the child for the hearing since he was informed of the courts order only on the evening of 24
March 2006.[6]

In the same hearing, petitioners counsel moved for the consolidation of this case with that pending
before the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 86, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-06-57760, for violation of Republic
Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004. This motion was
granted by the court.[7]

On 25 May 2006, petitioner filed with the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 86, an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
Hear Writ of Habeas Corpus on 26 May 2006 at 8:30 A.M.[8]

Subsequently, Presiding Judge Teodoro Bay of the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 86, issued, in chambers, an
Order dated 31 May 2006 resolving, among other things, the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus for the
person of Carlos Iigo

After considering the records of the three (3) cases consolidated before this Court,[9] the Court resolves
as follows:

1. the child Carlos Iigo R. Tabujara shall continue to be under the custody of the respondent
Ernesto Tabujara III until the Court shall have resolved the issue of custody of said child. This is
necessary to protect the child from emotional and psychological violence due to the misunderstanding
now existing between his parents.

2. the Motion to Admit Amended Petition with Prayer for Temporary Protection Order is
GRANTED. The Temporary Protection Order dated 19 April 2006 is hereby extended until the prayer for
Permanent Protection is resolved.
3. the respondent Ernesto Tabujara III is hereby ordered to bring the child Carlos Iigo Tabujara
to this Court during the hearing of these cases on July 14, 2006 at 8:00 in the morning.

4. the motion for support pendente lite shall be resolved after sufficient details are presented
to support said motion.

5. the respondent, as previously ordered, is directed to turn over the possession of one of the
familys car to the petitioner.[10]

On 31 May 2006, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Order Respondent to Comply with the
Writ of Habeas Corpus with Urgent Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order dated 31 May
2006.[11] The Motion for partial reconsideration pertained to that portion of Judge Bays Order granting
private respondent continued custody over Carlos Iigo in alleged violation of Article 213 of the Family
Code stating:

Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
designated by the court. The court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the
choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.

No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise.
This motion was referred by the branch clerk of court to Judge Fatima Gonzales-Asdala, Pairing Judge of
Branch 86, because Judge Bay was to go on official leave effective 1 June 2006.

Acting on said Motion, Judge Gonzales-Asdala issued an Order dated 31 May 2006, to wit:

WHEREFORE, Ernesto A. Tabujara III or any person or persons acting for and in his behalf and under his
direction is hereby directed to produce the person of minor Carlos Iigo R. Tabujara before the Session
Hall, Branch 87, located at 114, Hall of Justice, Quezon City on June 1, 2006 at 9:00 oclock in the
morning. Failing which, the more coercive process of a Bench Warrant will be issued against said
respondent, without prejudice to a declaration of contempt which may be due under the obtaining
circumstances.[12]

As it turned out, private respondent failed to appear before Judge Gonzales-Asdala on 1 June 2006.
Consequently, through the Order dated 1 June 2006, he was declared in contempt of court and a bench
warrant for his arrest was issued.[13]

Aggrieved by the Order, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals praying for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge
Gonzales-Asdala from: issuing a bench warrant against private respondent; implementing her Order of
31 May 2006; requiring private respondent to turn over custody of Carlos Iigo to petitioner; and taking
further action on Civil Cases No. Q-06-57760, No. Q-06-57857,[14] and Spec. Proc. No. Q-06-57984.[15]

On 2 June 2006, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution restraining the implementation of Judge
Gonzales-Asdalas Order of 31 May 2006.

Later, another Resolution was issued by the Court of Appeals setting aside and nullifying the 1 June 2006
Order of Judge Gonzales-Asdala.

Hence, this Petition for Certiorari raising the following grounds:

JUDGE FATIMA GONZALES-GONZALES-ASDALA ACTED WITHIN BOUNDS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING

THE ORDER DATED 31 MAY 2006, AS WELL AS THE ORDER AND BENCH WARRANTS ISSUED ON JUNE 1,
2006 IN HER CAPACITY AS PAIRING JUDGE OF BRANCH 86 IN THE ABSENCE OF ITS PRESIDING JUDGE.

THE ORDER OF MAY 31, 2006 HAS ALREADY BEEN IMPLEMENTED BEFORE THE ISSUANCE OF SUBJECT
TRO ON JUNE 2, 2006, THUS, THE TRO IS ALREADY MOOT AND ACADEMIC
SIMILARLY, THE ORDER OF JUNE 1, 2006 AND BENCH WARRANT HAVE ALREADY BEEN ISSUED AND
SERVED UPON PRIVATE RESPONDENT ON 1 JUNE 2006 OR EVEN BEFORE THE TRO WAS ISSUED BY
RESPONDENT COURT.

THE MATTER OF THE HABEAS CORPUS HAS BEEN SQUARELY RAISED BEFORE RESPONDENT COURT IN
SUBJECT PETITION, AND RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND
MANIFEST PARTIALITY IN DENYING HEREIN PETITIONERS MOTION TO PRODUCE THE 4-YEAR OLD MINOR
BEFORE THE RESPONDENT COURT.

THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS MUST BE IMMEDIATELY EFFECTED SINCE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO
SOLE CUSTODY OF THE MINOR WHO CANNOT BE SEPARATED FROM HER UNDER ART. 213 OF THE
FAMILY CODE.

Petitioner contends that the subject Petition filed before the Court of Appeals shows that Judge
Gonzales-Asdala was impleaded in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 87 when in fact, she issued
the 31 May 2006 and 1 June 2006 Orders when she was acting as the Pairing Judge of Branch 86. Private
respondents ploy, petitioner argues, has misled the Court of Appeals into believing that Judge Gonzales-
Asdalas Orders violated the rule proscribing the interference by a court with the processes of another
court of co-equal jurisdiction.

Also, petitioner maintains that the temporary restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals had
already been rendered moot by the incidents which occurred prior to their issuance. For one, the
hearing on 1 June 2006 took place as scheduled thereby rendering useless the 2 June 2006 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals. Similarly, the 7 June 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals enjoining the
issuance of the bench warrant became inutile as the bench warrant for arrest was not only issued by
Judge Gonzales-Asdala but said warrant was actually served upon private respondent on 1 June
2006.[16]
Petitioner also claims that private respondent violated Article 213 of the Family Code when he
prevented petitioner from having access to their conjugal abode and by forcibly separating her from
Carlos Iigo beginning 15 March 2006.

In addition, petitioner takes exception to the ruling of Judge Bay giving private respondent continued
custody over Carlos Iigo. Petitioner argues that said Order not only contravenes Article 213 of the Family
Code but the same is also utterly lacking in any legal and factual bases.

Lastly, in an attempt to bolster her claim that she should have custody over Carlos Iigo, petitioner cites
the Court of Appeals Resolution dated 4 July 2003[17] granting private respondent a mere visitorial right
to their son. This Resolution was issued by the Court of Appeals in connection with CA-G.R. SP. No.
77707.[18]

In his Comment, private respondent argues that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the assailed Resolutions. He contends that Judge Gonzales-Asdala, as the Pairing
Judge of Quezon City RTC, Branch 86, has the authority to step into and take action in a case only when
the presiding judge is on leave, absent, incapacitated, or otherwise unavailable.[19] In this case,
however, she exceeded such authority when she issued her 31 May 2006 Order considering that Judge
Bay, the Presiding Judge was yet to go on leave on 1 June 2006. It was therefore improper for her to
take over the consolidated cases involving the parties herein since Judge Bay was still performing his
duty on 31 May 2006.

Private respondent also disputes petitioners assertion that the acts sought to be restrained by the Court
of Appeals Resolutions were already fait accompli. According to him, the fact that Judge Gonzales-
Asdalas Orders of 31 May and 1 June 2006 were served upon his counsel does not mean that these were
successfully implemented. He avers that, in fact, one of the grounds of his Petition for Certiorari before
the Court of Appeals was the undue haste with which these Orders were successively issued thereby
depriving him of substantial and procedural due process.[20] As the party aggrieved, private respondent
insists that he has the right to question Judge Gonzales-Asdalas Orders before a higher court.

In addition, private respondent asserts that petitioner is guilty of forum shopping. He points out that in
petitioners original complaint in Civil Case No. Q-06-57760, she prayed that she be granted the sole
custody and charge of Carlos Iigo[21] but this was denied by Judge Bay in his Order dated 19 April
2006.[22] Later, petitioner filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus before the Quezon City RTC where she
again raised the issue relating to the custody of Carlos Iigo. Private respondent insists that petitioner is
clearly trying to circumvent the rule against forum shopping by seeking to regain custody over Carlos
Iigo in the habeas corpus case a relief that was already denied her by Judge Bay in Civil Case No. Q-06-
57760.

Private respondent is also of the view that jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus properly lies
with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 86, which has acquired prior jurisdiction over the matter. He points
out that Judge Bay had even scheduled the hearing of the consolidated cases on 14 July 2006 at which
time he is supposed to bring Carlos Iigo to the court.

Preliminarily, we shall address the procedural infirmity obtaining in this Petition.

Petitioner herself admits that the present Petition was filed without her first seeking the reconsideration
of the two assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals. She contends, however, that there were
instances in the past when this Court allowed the filing of a petition for certiorari sans prior recourse to
a motion for reconsideration citing the cases of Candido v. Camacho[23] and Metro Transit
Organization, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.[24]
In the case of Candido, this Court held that:

We have ruled that (a) prior motion for reconsideration is not indispensable for commencement of
certiorari proceedings if the errors sought to be corrected in such proceedings had been duly heard and
passed upon or were similar to the issues already resolved by the tribunal or agency below. Accordingly,
the Court has excused the non-filing of a motion for reconsideration when such motion would be
basically pro-forma in nature and content, and where x x x the questions raised are essentially legal in
nature. In the case at bar, the parties have argued their positions and have been duly heard by the RTC
before it issued the assailed injunction order. Moreover, as the issues involved therein are essentially
legal, the filing of motion for reconsideration assailing the RTCs injunction order may be properly
dispensed with.[25]

In Metro Transit Organization, Inc., we declared the general rule to be that a motion for reconsideration
is indispensable before resort to the special civil action for certiorari to afford the court or tribunal the
opportunity to correct its error, if any.[26] The rule however allows the following exceptions:

(a) where the order is a patent of nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;

(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by
the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable;

(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;

(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;

(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the
trial court is improbable;

(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;

(h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and

(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.[27]
An examination of the records reveals the measures that the parties herein have undertaken to have
custody of their only child. Thus, while petitioner has continuously pressed on to regain custody of
Carlos Iigo, private respondent has been steadfast in ensuring that the minor child stays with him. If only
to protect Carlos Iigo from the ill-effects of this virtual tug-of-war between his parents, and to allow the
Court of Appeals to proceed with the resolution of the Petition for Certiorari filed by private respondent,
this Court deems it proper to give due course to this Petition. We believe that the urgent necessity for
the resolution of this Petition is for the benefit of the minor Carlos Iigo and not so much to protect the
interest of any of the parties herein.

In this case, we do not agree with petitioners argument that the questioned Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals have already become moot. To reiterate, Judge Gonzales-Asdala was enjoined by said 2 June
2006 Resolution from performing the following:

(1) implementation and/or issuance of a bench warrant of arrest of petitioner;

(2) implementation of the Order of respondent Judge dated 31 May 2006;

(3) requiring petitioner to turn over custody of his minor son Carlos Iigo Tabujara to private
respondent (petitioner herein);

(4) taking further action and trying Civil Cases Nos. Q-06-57760, Q-06-57857, and Spec. Proc. No. Q-06-
57984.[28]
The general rule contemplates that injunction is only proper to restrain acts being committed or about
to be committed. Nevertheless, consummated acts which are continuing in nature may still be enjoined
by a temporary restraining order.[29]

In this case, it appears from the sheriffs return dated 5 June 2006[30] that Judge Gonzales-Asdalas Order
of 1 June 2006 was indeed served upon private respondent at his office in Makati City, as well as at his
fathers house in UP Diliman, Quezon City, and yet it is not shown that his arrest had been implemented.
Clearly then, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals had not become useless as alleged by petitioner.

Even assuming that, as petitioner insists, the issuance of the bench warrant for the arrest of private
respondent and the conduct of the 1 June 2006 hearing may no longer be restrained still, the remainder
of the acts sought to be enjoined remain the proper subjects of the temporary restraining order issued
on 2 June 2006. Thus, said Resolution was still able to restrain Judge Gonzales-Asdala from compelling
private respondent to turn over custody of Carlos Iigo to petitioner and from taking any further action
with respect to the consolidated cases before the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 86. For these, petitioners
contention regarding the mootness of the impugned Resolutions does not deserve merit.

As regards the issue of whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
impugned Resolutions, we rule in the negative.

It is settled doctrine that grave abuse of discretion is present when there is a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and
gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of law.[31]
In this case, we perceive no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. The assailed
Resolutions were not issued whimsically nor capriciously. As alleged in the Petition before the Court of
Appeals, Judge Gonzales-Asdala was poised to find private respondent in contempt of court and to issue
a bench warrant for his arrest should he fail to comply with her Order dated 31 May 2006. Bearing in
mind that the validity of said Order has yet to be resolved by the Court of Appeals, it was only proper
that the temporary restraining order was issued; otherwise, private respondent would have suffered
irreparable injury should the Court of Appeals decide not to sustain the validity of the 31 May 2006
Order.

Petitioner also prays that we direct the Court of Appeals to effect the writ of habeas corpus issued by
the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 102, by ordering private respondent to immediately produce the minor
child Carlos Iigo either before the Court of Appeals itself or the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 86.

This, we cannot do.

It is worthy to recall here the rule with regard to jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases which this Court
had the opportunity to clarify through In the Matter of Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas
Corpus Richard Brian Thornton for and in behalf of the minor child Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco
Thornton v. Adelfa Francisco Thornton.[32] In said case, we declared that both this Court and the Court
of Appeals still retain their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases despite the passage of Republic Act No.
8369[33] the law conferring upon family courts the exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, thus:

The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129 since, by giving family
courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the lawmakers intended it to be the sole court
which can issue writs of habeas corpus. To the court a quo, the word exclusive apparently cannot be
construed any other way.
We disagree with the CAs reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals
like petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who do not know
the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from
family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a
minor is being transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in
a habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the
intention of the lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of 1997. x x x

xxxx

The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. We rule therefore that RA
8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus
cases involving the custody of minors. x x x[34] (Emphasis supplied.)

It is clear from the foregoing that the trial court, the Court of Appeals, and this Court have concurrent
jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases. As the Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed by petitioner before
the trial court, the latter has acquired jurisdiction over the petition to the exclusion of all others. To hold
otherwise would be to risk instances where courts of concurrent jurisdiction might have conflicting
orders.[35] And, jurisdiction once acquired by a court is not lost upon the instance of the parties but
continues until the case is terminated.[36]
In view of this, we hold that petitioners motion for the production of the minor Carlos Iigo should be
resolved by the trial court. We cannot act on said motion without overstepping the boundary laid down
by the law with respect to jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases. Parenthetically, Judge Bay had already
acted on a similar motion filed by petitioner[37] and had, in fact, set the hearing of the consolidated
cases on 14 July 2006 during which time private respondent should present Carlos Iigo before the trial
court.[38]

Anent the alleged violation of Article 213 of the Family Code, suffice it to state here that this issue is still
the subject of a Motion for Reconsideration pending before the trial court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is hereby DIMISSED. The assailed
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 2 June 2006, restraining the execution of Judge Fatima
Gonzales-Asdalas Order dated 31 May 2006, and the Court of Appeals Resolution dated 7 June 2006
setting aside and nullifying Judge Gonzales-Asdalas 1 June 2006 Order, are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Chief Justice

Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN

Chief Justice

[1] Penned by Associate Justice Arturo G. Tayag with Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio and Japar B.
Dimaampao, concurring.

[2] Rollo, pp. 120-121.

[3] Id. at 50-54.

[4] Id. at 56.

[5] Id.

[6] Id. at 59.

[7] Id. at 60.

[8] Id. at 61-65.

[9] In the Petition before this Court, it is alleged that there were already two pending cases before the
RTC, Quezon City, Branch 86 involving the parties herein. One is for the application for the temporary
protection order and the other is the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.

[10] Rollo, pp. 67-68.

[11] Id. at 69-75.

[12] Id. at 78-79.

[13] Id. at 80-82.

[14] For the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.

[15] Rollo, pp. 84-99.

[16] Id. at 83.

[17] Id. at 116-117.

[18] In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Carlos Iigo R. Tabujara (minor), Atty. Ernesto A. Tabujara III v.
Ivy Joan R. Tabujara and Jennifer R. Barredo; Rollo, pp. 116-117.

[19] Id. at 147.

[20] Id. at 151.

[21] Id. at 169.

[22] Id. at 47-49.

[23] 424 Phil. 291 (2002).

[24] 440 Phil. 743 (2002).

[25] Candido v. Camacho, supra note 23 at 298.

[26] Metro Transit Organization, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 24 at 751.

[27] Id.

[28] Rollo, p. 33.

[29] Florenz D. Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, Vol. I, p. 647.

[30] Rollo, p. 83.

[31] Chua Huat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 53851, 9 July 1991, 199 SCRA 1, 18.

[32] G.R. No. 154598, 16 August 2004, 436 SCRA 550.

[33] The Family Courts Act of 1997.

[34] In the Matter of Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus Richard Brian Thornton for
and in behalf of the minor child Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton v. Adelfa Francisco Thornton,
supra note 32 at 555.

[35] Ong Ching Kian Chung v. China National Cereals Oil and Food Stuffs Import and Export, 388 Phil.
1064, 1077 (2000); Templo v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. L-37393-94, 23 October 1974, 60 SCRA 295.
[36] Deltaventures Resources, Inc. v. Cabato, 384 Phil. 252, 259-260 (2000).

[37] Rollo, pp. 61-65.

[38] Id. at 66-68.