Solivio v.

CA

This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of
the first post-war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who died a bachelor,
without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only
surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the
spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent,
Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban
Javellana, Sr.

He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his
marriage in December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before Esteban,
Jr. was born.

Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his second
wife Josefa Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo Provincial High School, brought up
Esteban, Jr.

Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land

in Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24 titles) which she had inherited from her mother,
Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife but no conjugal property was
acquired during her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.

Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr., including a
house and lot where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all
these properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.

During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt
Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to
honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college
education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack without having set up the
foundation.

Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do
with Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to
place his estate in a foundation. Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia
would take care of the proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation,
Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed for her
appointment as special administratrix of the estate of Esteban. Later, she filed
an amended petition praying that letters of administration be issued to her; that
she be declared sole heir of the deceased and that the estate be adjudicated
to her. Rtc RULED IN HER FAVOR.

Four months later, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for

reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of
Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. RTC ruled in favor of
Concordia. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in favor of

Celedonia, his relative within the third degree on his mother's side from whom he
had inherited them

HELD: No.

The persons involved in reserva troncal are:

1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)the ascendant who

inherits by operation of law property from his descendants.

2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the

reservees (reservatarios)relatives within the third degree counted from the
descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from which the property
came.

3. The propositusthe descendant who received by gratuitous title and died

without issue, making his other ascendant inherit by operation of law.

Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable
property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his
mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in
question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in
favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on
his mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an
ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or
brother or sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his
ascendant.
Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or
nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his estate are Articles 1003 and
1009 of the Civil Code which provide:

ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a

surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles.

ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or
sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.

The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them
by reason of relationship by the whole blood.

Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of the

decedent within the third degree in the collateral line, each, therefore, shall
succeed to the subject estate 'without distinction of line or preference among
them by reason of relationship by the whole blood,' and is entitled one-half (1/2)
share and share alike of the estate.
Nieva v. Alcala

Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva,
married Francisco Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo Deocampo was born.

Julian Nieva died intestate and her said son, Alfeo Deocampo, inherited from
her, ab intestate, the parcels of land.

Alfeo Deocampo died intestate. Thereupon the two parcels of land above-
mentioned passed to his father, Francisco Deocampo, by intestate succession.
Thereafter Francisco Deocampo married the herein defendant Manuela Alcala,
of which marriage was born Jose Deocampo, the other defendant herein.

Francisco Deocampo died, whereupon his widow and son, the defendants
herein, took possession of the parcels of land in question, under the claim that
the said son, the defendant Jose Deocampoo (a minor) had inherited the
same, ab intestate, from his deceased father.

the plaintiff herein, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of the

said Juliana Nieva, instituted the present action for the purposes of recovering
from the defendants the parcels of land, invoking the provisions of article 811 of
the Civil Code.

The lower court held that, even granting, without deciding, that the plaintiff was
an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva, she was not entitled to
the property here in question because, in its opinion, an illegitimate relative has
no right to the reserva troncal under the provisions of article 811 of the Civil
Code.

ISSUE:

1. Whether plaintiff is an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased

Juliana Nieva.

2. whether or not an illegitimate relative within the third degree is entitled to

the reserva troncal provided for by article 811 of the Civil Code.

HELD:

1. Yes. It appears from the record that the said Juliana Nieva, while unmarried,
gave birth to the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff was duly baptized as her natural
daughter, of unknown father; that the said Juliana Nieva nourished and reared
her said child, the plaintiff herein; that the plaintiff lived with her said mother until
the latter was married to Francisco Deocampo; that the said mother treated the
plaintiff, and exhibited her publicly, as a legitimate daughter.

The foregoing facts, which are not controverted, are analogous to the facts in
the case of Llorente vs. Rodriguez (3 Phil., 697, 699). Under the decision of this
court in that case we are of the opinion and so decide, without rediscussing
here the law and legal principles involved, that the plaintiff Segunda Maria
Nieva is an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva.

2.

The property here in question was inherited, by operation by law, by Francisco

Deocampo from his son Alfeo Deocampo, who, in turn, had inherited it, in the
same manner, from his mother Juliana Nieva, the natural mother of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff is the natural sister of Alfeo Deocampo, and she belongs to the
same line from which the property in question came.

There can be no question whatever but that, under said article 811 of the Civil
Code, the plaintiff would be entitled to the property in question if she were
a legitimate daughter of Julian Nieva. But in said article 811 the legislator uses
the generic terms "ascendant," "descendant," and "relatives," without specifying
whether or not they have to be legitimate. Does the legislator, then, refer to
legitimate as well as to illegitimate relatives?

This question, so far as our investigation shows, has not been decided before by
any court or tribunal. However, eminent commentators on the Spanish Civil
Code, who have devoted their lives to the study and solution of the intricate
and difficult problems that may arise under the provisions of that Code, have
dealt with the very question now before us, and are unanimous in the opinion
that the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code apply only
to legitimate relative. One of such commentators, undoubtedly the best known
of them all, is Manresa. We believe we can do no better than to adopt his
reasons and conclusions, in deciding the question before us.

It treats of blood relationship, which is applicable to questions on

succession, according to articles 915 to 920. It could not be otherwise, because
relationship by affinity is established between each spouse and the family of the
other, by marriage, and to admit it, would be to favor the transmission of the
properties of the family of one spouse to that of the other, which is just what the
article intends to prevent.

It also treats of legitimate relationship. The person obliged to reserve it is

a legitimate ascendant who inherits from a descendant property which
proceeds from the same legitimate family, and this being true, there can be no
question, because the line from which the properties proceed must be the line
of that family and only in favor of that line is the reservation established.

Further, Article 943, above referred to by Manresa, provides as follows:

A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate

children and relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor
shall such children or relatives so inherit from the natural or legitimated child.

To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural brother,
Alfeo Deocampo, by operation of law, would be a fragrant violate of the
express provision of the foregoing article (943).
Tioco v. Camacho

1. The defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs, Francisco Tioco

de Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs
being said defendant's grandaunt and granduncles.

2. Plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-Camacho have as a common

ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana
Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of defendant.

3. Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four (4) parcels of land
to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs)

4. Toribia Tioco died intestate , survived by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and
their two legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother of
defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-Camacho) and leaving the afore-mentioned four
(4) parcels of land as the inheritance of her said two children in equal pro-
indiviso shares.

5. Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his legitimate children by his wife
Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren Faustino
Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the partition of his estate, three (3) parcels of land
were adjudicated as the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as she had
predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the said three (3) parcels of land
devolved upon her two legitimate children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in
equal pro-indiviso shares.

6. Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without issue, leaving his one-half
(1/2) pro-indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land above-mentioned to his
father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received the said property
subject to a reserva troncal

7. Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rights and interests in the parcels
of land abovementioned were inherited by her only legitimate child, defendant
Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, subject to the usufructuary right of her surviving
husband, defendant Primo Tongko.

8. Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived his only legitimate descendant,

defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.
9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns
one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned as her
inheritance from her mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.

10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice, the
other half of the said seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned by virtue of the
reserva troncal imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino Dizon and under
the laws on intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal advice,
oppose her said claim because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the one-half
pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which interest was inherited by
Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels of
land, by virtue of their being also third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.

lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas
Tioco, as well as the defendant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho, entitled,
as reservatarios, to one-half of the seven parcels of land in dispute, in equal
proportions.

ISSUE: Whether all relatives of thepraepositus within the third degree in the
appropriate line succeed without distinction to the reservable property upon the
death of the reservista, as seems to be implicit in Art. 811 of the Civil Code

HELD:

The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property has
devolved to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on,
there is no further occasion for its application. In the relations between
one reservatario and another of the same degree there is no call for applying
Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the respective share of each in the reversionary
property should be governed by the ordinary rules of intestate succession. In this
spirit the jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has resolved that upon the
death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not to all
the reservatarios as a class but only to those nearest in degree to the
descendant (prepositus), excluding those reservatarios of more remote degree.
And within the third degree of relationship from the descendant (prepositus), the
right of representation operates in favor of nephews.

Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession when there are
relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest
relative, called reservatarios over the property which the reservista (person
holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one
more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one
claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the
relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property
came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the
highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons
who are within the third degree of the person from whom the reservable
property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees
can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize
them as such.

In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part
of one alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third degree of
relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of
reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case
of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came.
... .

Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary

intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are
entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of half blood. If in
determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the
right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share
for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be likewise operative.

In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of

relatives reservatarios to whom the property should be returned; but within that
group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable
rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 811 does not specify otherwise.
This conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance that the reserva being an
exceptional case, its application should be limited to what is strictly needed to
accomplish the purpose of the law.

Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate

succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right thereto
because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the praepositus),
they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the defendant-appellant,
although they are related to him within the same degree as the latter.
As to the reservable property, the reservatarios do not inherit from the reservista,
but from the descendant praepositus. It is likewise clear that the reservable
property is no part of the estate of the reservista, who may not dispose of it by
will, as long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237).
The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista, but from the
descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa,
subject to the condition that they must survive the reservista.