SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA with her husband ANGEL ALCALA, vs.
Francisco Deocampo; that the said mother treated the plaintiff, and exhibited
MANUELA ALCALA and JOSE DEOCAMPO, defendants-appellees.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province
of Tayabas, absolving the defendants from all liability under the plaintiff's
complaint, without any finding as to costs.
Juliana Nieva, the alleged natural mother of the plaintiff Segunda Maria Nieva,
married Francisco Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo Deocampo was born.
Julian Nieva died intestate on April 19, 1889, and her said son, Alfeo
Deocampo, inherited from her, ab intestate, the parcels of land described in
Paragraphs V and X of the complaint.
Alfeo Deocampo died intestate and without issue on July 7, 1890. Thereupon
the two parcels of land above-mentioned passed to his father, Francisco
Deocampo, by intestate succession. Thereafter Francisco Deocampo married
the herein defendant Manuela Alcala, of which marriage was born Jose
Deocampo, the other defendant herein.
Francisco Deocampo died on August 15, 1914, whereupon his widow and son,
the defendants herein, took possession of the parcels of land in question, under
the claim that the said son, the defendant Jose Deocampoo (a minor) had
inherited the same, ab intestate, from his deceased father.
On September 30, 1915, the plaintiff herein, claiming to be an acknowledged
natural daughter of the said Juliana Nieva, instituted the present action for the
purposes of recovering from the defendants the parcels of land in question,
particularly described in Paragraphs V and X of the complaint, invoking the
provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
The lower court held that, even granting, without deciding, that the plaintiff was
an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva, she was not entitled to the
property here in question because, in its opinion, an illegitimate relative has no
right to the reserva troncal under the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code.
The first question presented by this appeal is, whether or not the plaintiff is
an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased Juliana Nieva. It appears
from the record that the said Juliana Nieva, while unmarried, gave birth to the
plaintiff on March 29, 1882, and that the plaintiff was duly baptized as
her natural daughter, of unknown father (Exhibit C, baptismal certificate); that
the said Juliana Nieva nourished and reared her said child, the plaintiff herein;
that the plaintiff lived with her said mother until the latter was married to
her publicly, as a legitimate daughter. (See testimony of Antero Gala, pp. 5-6;
Prudencio de la Cuesta, pp. 16-17; and Mamerto Palabrica, pp. 26-27, sten.
notes.)
The foregoing facts, which are not controverted, are analogous to the facts in
the case of Llorente vs. Rodriguez (3 Phil., 697, 699). Under the decision of this
court in that case we are of the opinion and so decide, without rediscussing
here the law and legal principles involved, that the plaintiff Segunda Maria
Nieva is an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva. (See also In
re estate of Enriquez and Reyes, 29 Phil., 167.)
The other and more important question presented by this appeal is, whether or
not an illegitimate relative within the third degree is entitled to the reserva
troncal provided for by article 811 of the Civil Code. That article reads as
follows:
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the
latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is
obliged to reserve such of the property as he may have acquired by operation
of law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line
from which such property came.
The property here in question was inherited, by operation by law, by Francisco
Deocampo from his son Alfeo Deocampo, who, in turn, had inherited it, in the
same manner, from his mother Juliana Nieva, the natural mother of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff is the natural sister of Alfeo Deocampo, and she belongs to the
same line from which the property in question came. Was Francisco Deocampo
obliged by law to reserve said property for the benefit of the plaintiff, an
illegitimate relative within the third degree of Alfeo Deocampo? If he was, then,
upon his death, the plaintiff, and not his son the defendant Jose Deocampo,
was entitled to the said property; if he was not, the plaintiff's action must
fail.1awph!l.net
There can be no question whatever but that, under said article 811 of the Civil
Code, the plaintiff would be entitled to the property in question if she were
a legitimate daughter of Julian Nieva. (Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil., 295.) But in
said article 811 the legislator uses the generic terms "ascendant," "descendant,"
and "relatives," without specifying whether or not they have to be legitimate.
Does the legislator, then, refer to legitimate as well as to illegitimate relatives?
Counsel for the appellant, in a lengthy and carefully prepared brief, attempts to
maintain the affirmative.
This question, so far as our investigation shows, has not been decided before
by any court or tribunal. However, eminent commentators on the Spanish Civil
Code, who have devoted their lives to the study and solution of the intricate and
difficult problems that may arise under the provisions of that Code, have dealt
with the very question now before us, and are unanimous in the opinion that the
provision of article 811 of the Civil Code apply only to legitimate relative. One of
such commentators, undoubtedly the best known of them all, is Manresa. We
believe we can do no better than to adopt his reasons and conclusions, in
deciding the question before us. In determining the persons who are obliged to
reserve under article 811, he says:
Is every ascendant, whether legitimate or not, obliged to reserve? Should the
natural father or grandfather reserve the properties proceeding from the mother
or other natural ascendant? Article 811 does not distinguish; it speaks of the
ascendant, without attaching the qualification of legitimate, and, on the other
hand, the same reason that exists for applying the provision to the natural
family exists for applying it to the legitimate family. Nevertheless, the article in
referring to the ascendant in an indeterminate manner shows that it imposes the
obligation to reserve only upon the legitimate ascendant.
Let us overlook for the moment the question whether the Code recognizes or
does not recognize the existence of the natural family, or whether it admits only
the bond established by acknowledgement between the father or mother who
acknowledges and the acknowledged children. However it may be, it may be
stated as an indisputable truth, that in said Code, the legitimate relationship
forms the general rule and the natural relationship the exception; which is the
reason why, as may be easily seen, the law in many articles speaks only of
children or parents, of ascendants or descendants, and in them reference is of
course made of those who are legitimate; and when it desires to make a
provision applicable only to natural relationship, it does not say father or
mother, but natural father or natural mother; it does not say child, but natural
child; it does not speak of ascendants, brothers or parents in the abstract, but of
natural ascendants, natural brothers or natural parents. (See, for example,
articles 294, 302, 809, 810, 846, 935, to 938, 944 and 945 and 946 to 955.)
Articles 809 and 810 themselves speak only of ascendants. Can it in any way
be maintained that they refer to legitimate as well as to natural ascendants?
They evidently establish the legitime of the legitimate ascendants included as
forced heirs in number 2 of article 807. And article 811, — and as we will see
also article 812, — continues to treat of this same legitime. The right of the
natural parents and children in the testamentary succession in wholly included
in the eighth section and is limited to the parents, other ascendants of such
class being excluded in articles 807, No. 3, and 846. Therefore, the place which
article 811 occupies in the Code of proof that it refers only to legitimate
ascendants. And if there were any doubt, it disappears upon considering the
text of article 938, which states that the provisions of article 811 applies to
intestate succession, which is just established in favor of the legitimate direct
ascending line, the text of articles 939 to 945, which treat of intestate
succession of natural parents, as well as that of articles 840 to 847, treating of
their testamentary succession, which do not allude directly or indirectly to that
provision.
Lastly, the principle which underlies the exception which article 811 creates in
the right to succeed neither admits of any other interpretation. Whether the
provision is due to the desire that the properties should not pass, by reason of
new marriage, out of the family to which they belonged, or is directly derived
from the system of the so-called "reserva troncal," and whether the idea of
reservation or that of lineal rights (troncalidad) predominate the patrimony which
is intended to be preserved is that of the legitimate family. Only to legitimate
ascendants and descendants do article 968 et seq. of the Code refer, arising as
they do from the danger of second or subsequent marriage; only to legitimate
parents do the special laws of Navarra, Aragon, Vizcaya and Cataluña concede
the right to succeed with respect to lineal properties (bienes troncales); only to
the legitimate ascendants does article 811 impose the duty to reserve.
The convenience of amplifying the precept to natural parents and ascendants
may be raised just as the question whether it would be preferable to suppress it
altogether may be raised; but in the realm of the statute law there is no remedy
but to admit that article 811, the interpretation of which should on the other
hand be strict was drafted by the legislator with respect only to legitimate
ascendants. (Manresa, Codigo Civil, vol. 6, 3d ed., pp. 249-250.)
The same jurist, in determining the persons in whose favor the reservation is
established, says:
Persons in whose favor the reservation is established. — This is one of the
most delicate points in the interpretation of article 811. According to this article,
the reservation is established in favor of the parents who are within the third
degree and belong to the line from which the properties came.
It treats of blood, relationship, which is applicable to questions on succession,
according to articles 915 to 920. It could not be otherwise, because relationship
by affinity is established between each spouse and the family of the other, by
marriage, and to admit it, would be to favor the transmission of the properties of
the family of one spouse to that of the other, which is just what this article
intends to prevent.

It also treats of legitimate relationship. The person obliged to reserve it a

legitimate ascendant who inherits from a descendant property which proceeds
from the same legitimate family, and this being true, there can be no question,
because the line from which the properties proceed must be the line of that
family and only in favor of that line is the reservation established. Furthermore,
we have already said, the object is to protect the patrimony of the legitimate
family, following the precedents of the foral law. And it could not be otherwise.
Article 943 denies to legitimate parents the right to succeed the natural child
and viceversa, from which it must be deduced that natural parents neither have
the right to inhering from legitimate ones; the law in the article cited established
a barrier between the two families; properties of the legitimate family shall never
pass by operation of law to the natural family. (Ibid. pp. 251-252.)

Scævola, after a very extended discussion of this same subject, arrives at the
same conclusion as Manresa. "La reserva del articulo 811 es privilegio de
la familia legitima. (The reservation in article 811 is a privilege of the legitimate
family.)" (See Scævola, Codigo Civil, Vol. 14, pp. 211-224, 3401-305.)

Article 943, above referred to by Manresa, provides as follows:

A natural or legitimated child has no right to succeed ab intestate the legitimate

children and relatives of the father or mother who has acknowledged it; nor
shall such children or relatives so inherit from the natural or legitimated child.

To hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural brother,
Alfeo Deocampo, by operation of law, would be a fragrant violate of the express
provision of the foregoing article (943).

For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby
affirmed, without any finding as to costs. So ordered.
ENCARNACION FLORENTINO, ET MERCEDES FLORENTINO, ET AL
On January 17, 1918, counsel for Encarnacion (together with her husband
Simeon Serrano), Gabriel, Magdalena, Ramon, Miguel, Victorino, and
Antonino of the surname Florentino; for Miguel Florentino, guardian ad
litem of the minor Rosario Florentino; for Eugenio Singson, the father and
guardian ad litem of Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores of the
surname Singson y Florentino; and for Eugenio Singson, guardian of the
minors Jose and Asuncion Florentino, filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur, against Mercedes Florentino and her husband, alleging
as follows:
That Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II married the first time Antonia Faz de Leon;
that during the marriage he begot nine children called, Jose, Juan, Maria,
Encarnacion, Isabel, Espirita, Gabriel, Pedro, and Magdalena of the surname
Florentino y de Leon; that on becoming a widower he married the second time
Severina Faz de Leon with whom he had two children, Mercedes and
Apolonio III of the surname Florentino y de Leon; that Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino II died on February 13, 1890; that he was survived by his second
wife Severina Faz de Leon and the ten children first above mentioned; that his
eleventh son, Apolonio III, was born on the following 4th of March 1890.
That of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo's aforementioned eleven
children, Juan, Maria and Isabel died single, without leaving any ascendants
or descendants; that Ramon, Miguel, Victorino, Antonio, and Rosario are the
legitimate children of the deceased Jose Florentino who was one of the
children of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo; that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes,
Caridad, and Dolores are the legitimate children of Espirita Florentino, now
deceased, and her husband Eugenio Singson; that Jose and Asuncion are the
children of Pedro Florentino, another son of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino.
That on January 17 and February 13, 1890, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino
executed a will before the notary public of Ilocos Sur, instituting as his
universal heirs his aforementioned ten children, the posthumos Apolonio III
and his widow Severina Faz de Leon; that he declared, in one of the
paragraphs of said will, all his property should be divided among all of his
children of both marriages.
That, in the partition of the said testator's estate, there was given to Apolonio
Florentino III, his posthumos son, the property marked with the letters A, B, C,
D, E, and F in the complaint, a gold rosary, pieces of gold, of silver and of
table service, livestock, palay, some personal property and other objects
mentioned in the complaint.
That Apolonio Florentino III, the posthumos son of the second marriage, died
in 1891; that his mother, Severina Faz de Leon, succeeded to all his property
described in the complaint; that the widow, Severina Faz de Leon died on
November 18, 1908, leaving a will instituting as her universal heiress her only
living daughter, Mercedes Florentino; that, as such heir, said daughter took
possession of all the property left at the death of her mother, Severina Faz de
Leon; that among same is included the property, described in the complaint,
which the said Severina Faz de Leon inherited from her deceased son, the
posthumos Apolonio, as reservable property; that, as a reservist, the heir of
the said Mercedes Florentino deceased had been gathering for herself alone
the fruits of lands described in the complaint; that each and every one of the
parties mentioned in said complaint is entitled to one-seventh of the fruits of
the reservable property described therein, either by direct participation or by
representation, in the manner mentioned in paragraph 9 of the complaint.
That several times the plaintiffs have, in an amicable manner, asked the
defendants to deliver their corresponding part of the reservable property; that
without any justifiable motive the defendants have refused and do refuse to
deliver said property or to pay for its value; that for nine years Mercedes
Florentino has been receiving, as rent for the lands mentioned, 360 bundles of
palay at fifty pesos per bundle and 90 bundles of corn at four pesos per
bundle; that thereby the plaintiffs have suffered damages in the sum of fifteen
thousand four hundred and twenty-eight pesos and fifty-eight centavos, in
addition to three hundred and eight pesos and fifty-eight centavos for the
value of the fruits not gathered, of one thousand pesos (P1,000) for the
unjustifiable retention of the aforementioned reservable property and for the
expenses of this suit. Wherefore they pray it be declared that all the foregoing
property is reservable property; that the plaintiffs had and do have a right to
the same, in the quantity and proportion mentioned in the aforementioned
paragraph 9 of the complaint; that the defendants Mercedes Florentino and
her husband be ordered to deliver to the plaintiffs their share of the property in
question, of the palay and of the corn above mentioned, or their value; and
that they be condemned to pay the plaintiffs the sum of one thousand pesos
(P1,000) together with the costs of this instance.
To the preceding complaint counsel for the defendants demurred, alleging
that the cause of action is based on the obligation of the widow Severina Faz
de Leon to reserve the property she inherited from her deceased son
Apolonio Florentino y de Leon who, in turn, inherited same from his father
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino; that, there being no allegation to the contrary, it is
to be presumed that the widow Severina Faz de Leon did not remarry after
the death of this husband nor have any natural child; that the right claimed by
the plaintiffs is not that mentioned in article 968 and the following articles, but
that established in article 811 of the Civil Code; that the object of the
provisions of the aforementioned articles is to avoid the transfer of said
reservable property to those extraneous to the family of the owner thereof;
that if the property inherited by the widow Severina Faz de Leon from her
deceased son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de Leon (property which originated
from his father and her husband) has all passed into the hands of the
defendant, Mercedes Florentino y Encarnacion, a daughter of the common
ancestor's second marriage (said Apolonio Isabelo Florentino with the
deceased Severina Faz de Leon) it is evident that the property left at the
death of the posthumos son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de Leon did not pass
after the death of his mother Severina, his legitimate heirs as an ascendant,
into the hands of strangers; that said property having been inherited by
Mercedes Florentino y Encarnacion from her mother (Severina), article 811 of
the Civil Code is absolutely inapplicable to the present case because, when
the defendant Mercedes, by operation law, entered into and succeeded to, the
possession, of the property lawfully inherited from her mother Severina Faz
de Leon, said property had, while in the possession of her mother, lost the
character of reservable property — there being a legitimate daughter of
Severina Faz de Leon with the right to succeed her in all her rights, property
and actions; that the restraints of the law whereby said property may not
passed into the possession of strangers are void, inasmuch as the said widow
had no obligation to reserve same, as Mercedes Florentino is a forced heiress
of her mother Severina Faz de Leon; that, in the present case, there is no
property reserved for the plaintiffs since there is a forced heiress, entitled to
the property left by the death of the widow Severina Faz de Leon who never
remarried; that the obligation to reserve is secondary to the duty of respecting
the legitime; that in the instant case, the widow Severina Faz de Leon was in
duty bound to respect the legitime of her daughter Mercedes the defendant;
that her obligation to reserve the property could not be fulfilled to the prejudice
of the legitime which belongs to her forced heiress, citing in support of these
statements the decision of the supreme court of Spain of January 4, 1911;
that, finally, the application of article 811 of the Civil Code in favor of the
plaintiffs would presuppose the exclusion of the defendant from here right to
succeed exclusively to all the property, rights and actions left by her legitimate
mother, although the said defendant has a better right than the plaintiffs; and
that there would be injustice if the property claimed be adjudicated to the
plaintiffs, as well as violation of section 5 of the Jones Law which invalidates
any law depriving any person of an equal protection. Wherefore they prayed
that the demurrer be sustained, with costs against the plaintiffs.
After the hearing of the demurrer, on August 22, 1918, the judge absolved the
defendants from the complaint and condemned the plaintiffs to pay the costs.
Counsel for the plaintiffs excepted to this order, moved to vacate it and to
grant them a new trial; said motion was overruled; the plaintiffs expected
thereto and filed the corresponding bill of exceptions which was allowed,
certified and forwarded to the clerk of this court.
On appeal the trial judge sustained the demurrer of the defendants to the
complaint of the plaintiffs, but, instead of ordering the latter to amend their
complaint within the period prescribed by the rules — undoubtedly believing
that the plaintiffs could not alter nor change the facts constituting the cause of
action, and that, as both parties were agreed as to the facts alleged in the
complaint as well as in the demurrer, every question reduced itself to one of
the law, already submitted to the decision of the court — the said judge,
disregarding the ordinary procedure established by law, decided the case by
absolving the defendants from the complaint and by condemning the plaintiffs
to pay the costs of the instance.
There certainly was no real trial, inasmuch as the defendants, instead of
answering the complaint of the plaintiffs, confined themselves to filing a
demurrer based on the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint do not
constitute a cause of action. However, the judge preferred to absolve the
defendants, thereby making an end to the cause, instead of dismissing the
same, because undoubtedly he believed, in view of the controversy between
the parties, that the arguments adduced to support the demurrer would be the
same which the defendants would allege in their answer — those dealing with
a mere question of law which the courts would have to decide — and that, the
demurrer having been sustained, if the plaintiffs should insist — they could do
no less — upon alleging the same facts as those set out in their complaint and
if another demurrer were afterwards set up, he would be obliged to dismiss
said complaint with costs against the plaintiffs — in spite of being undoubtedly
convinced in the instant case that the plaintiffs absolutely lack the right to
bring the action stated in their complaint.
Being of the opinion that the emendation of the indicated defects is not
necessary — as in this case what has been done does not prejudice the
parties — the appellate court will now proceed to decide the suit according to
its merits, as found in the record and to the legal provisions applicable to the
question of law in controversy so that unnecessary delay and greater expense
may be avoided, inasmuch as, even if all the ordinary proceedings be
followed, the suit would be subsequently decided in the manner and terms
that it is now decided in the opinion thoughtfully and conscientiously formed
for its determination.
In order to decide whether the plaintiffs are or are not entitled to invoke, in
their favor, the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code, and whether the
same article is applicable to the question of law presented in this suit, it is
necessary to determine whether the property enumerated in paragraph 5 of
the complaint is of the nature of reservable property; and if so, whether in
accordance with the provision of the Civil Code in article 811, Severina Faz de
Leon (the widow of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino) who inherited
said property from her son Apolonio Florentino III (born after the death of his
father Apolonio Isabelo) had the obligation to preserve and reserve same for
the relatives, within the third degree, of her aforementioned deceased son
Apolonio III.
The above mentioned article reads:
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
acquired by the latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from
a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such of the property as he
may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property
came.
During the marriage of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II and Severina Faz de
Leon two children were born, namely the defendant Mercedes Florentino and
Apolonio Florentino III (born after the death of his father). At the death of
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino under a will, his eleven children succeeded to the
inheritance he left, one of whom, the posthumos son Apolonio III, was given,
as his share, the aforementioned property enumerated in the complaint. In
1891 the said posthumos son Apolonio Florentino III died and was succeeded
by his legitimate mother Severina Faz de Leon, who inherited the property he
left and who on dying, November 18, 1908, instituted by will as her sole
heiress her surviving daughter, Mercedes Florentino, the defendant herein,
who took possession of all property left by her father, same constituting the
inheritance. Included in said inheritance is the property, specified in by the
posthumos son Apolonio Florentino III from his father Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino, and which, at the death of the said posthumos son, had in turn
been inherited by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon. Even if Severina left in
her will said property, together with her own, to her only daughter and forced
heiress, Mercedes Florentino, nevertheless this property had not lost its
reservable nature inasmuch as it originated from the common ancestor of the
litigants, Apolonio Isabelo; was inherited by his son Apolonio III; was
transmitted by same (by operation of law) to his legitimate mother and
ascendant, Severina Faz de Leon.
The posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III, acquired the property, now
claimed by his brothers, by a lucrative title or by inheritance from his
aforementioned legitimate father, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II. Although said
property was inherited by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon, nevertheless,
she was in duty bound, according to article 811 of the Civil Code, to reserve
the property thus acquired for the benefit of the relatives, within the third
degree, of the line from which such property came.
According to the provisions of law, ascendants do not inherit the reservable
property, but its enjoyment, use or trust, merely for the reason that said law
imposes the obligation to reserve and preserve same for certain designated
persons who, on the death of the said ascendants reservists, (taking into
consideration the nature of the line from which such property came) acquire
the ownership of said property in fact and by operation of law in the same
manner as forced heirs (because they are also such) — said property reverts
to said line as long as the aforementioned persons who, from the death of the
ascendant-reservists, acquire in fact the right of reservatarios (person for
whom property is reserved), and are relatives, within the third degree, of the
descendant from whom the reservable property came.
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property, while there are
living, within the third degree, relatives of the latter, is nothing but a life
usufructuary or a fiduciary of the reservable property received. He is,
however, the legitimate owner of his own property which is not reservable
property and which constitutes his legitime, according to article 809 of the
Civil Code. But if, afterwards, all of the relatives, within the third degree, of the
descendant (from whom came the reservable property) die or disappear, the
said property becomes free property, by operation of law, and is thereby
converted into the legitime of the ascendant heir who can transmit it at his
death to his legitimate successors or testamentary heirs. This property has
now lost its nature of reservable property, pertaining thereto at the death of
the relatives, called reservatarios, who belonged within the third degree to the
line from which such property came.lawphil.net
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there
are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest
relative, called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person
holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one
more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one
claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the
relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property
came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in article 811 is in the
highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons
who are the relatives, within the third degree, of the person from whom the
reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the
succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law
does not recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part
of one alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third degree of
relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the part
of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the
case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property
came. These reservatarios have the right to represent their ascendants
(fathers and mothers) who are the brothers of the said deceased person and
relatives within the third degree in accordance with article 811 of the Civil
Code.
In this case it is conceded without denial by defendants, that the plaintiffs
Encarnacion, Gabriel and Magdalena are the legitimate children of the first
marriage of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II; that Ramon, Miguel,
Ceferino, Antonio, and Rosario are both grandchildren of Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino II, and children of his deceased son, Jose Florentino; that the same
have the right to represent their aforementioned father, Jose Florentino; that
Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores are the legitimate children of the
deceased Espirita Florentino, one of the daughters of the deceased Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino II, and represent the right of their aforementioned mother;
and that the other plaintiffs, Jose and Asuncion, have also the right to
represent their legitimate father Pedro Florentino one of the sons of the
aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II. It is a fact, admitted by both
parties, that the other children of the first marriage of the deceased Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino II died without issue so that this decision does not deal with
them.
There are then seven "reservatarios" who are entitled to the reservable
property left at the death of Apolonio III; the posthumos son of the
aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo II, to wit, his three children of his first
marriage — Encarnacion, Gabriel, Magdalena; his three children, Jose,
Espirita and Pedro who are represented by their own twelve children
respectively; and Mercedes Florentino, his daughter by a second marriage. All
of the plaintiffs are the relatives of the deceased posthumos son, Apolonio
Florentino III, within the third degree (four of whom being his half-brothers and
the remaining twelve being his nephews as they are the children of his three
half-brothers). As the first four are his relatives within the third degree in their
own right and the other twelve are such by representation, all of them are
indisputably entitled as reservatarios to the property which came from the
common ancestor, Apolonio Isabelo, to Apolonio Florentino III by inheritance
during his life-time, and in turn by inheritance to his legitimate mother,
Severina Faz de Leon, widow of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino II.
In spite of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code already cited, the trial
judge refused to accept the theory of the plaintiffs and, accepting that of the
defendants, absolved the latter from the complaint on the ground that said
article is absolutely inapplicable to the instant case, inasmuch as the
defendant Mercedes Florentino survived her brother, Apolonio III, from whom
the reservable property came and her mother, Severina Faz de Leon, the
widow of her father, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II; that the defendant
Mercedes, being the only daughter of Severina Faz de Leon, is likewise her
forced heiress; that when she inherited the property left at the death of her
mother, together with that which came from her deceased brother Apolonio III,
the fundamental object of article 811 of the Code was thereby complied with,
inasmuch as the danger that the property coming from the same line might fall
into the hands of strangers had been avoided; and that the hope or
expectation on the part of the plaintiffs of the right to acquire the property of
the deceased Apolonio III never did come into existence because there is a
forced heiress who is entitled to such property.
The judgment appealed from is also founded on the theory that article 811 of
the Civil Code does not destroy the system of legitimate succession and that
the pretension of the plaintiffs to apply said article in the instant case would be
permitting the reservable right to reduce and impair the forced legitimate
which exclusively belongs to the defendant Mercedes Florentino, in violation
of the precept of article 813 of the same Code which provides that the testator
cannot deprive his heirs of their legitime, except in the cases expressly
determined by law. Neither can he impose upon it any burden, condition, or
substitution of any kind whatsoever, saving the provisions concerning the
usufruct of the surviving spouse, citing the decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain of January 4, 1911.
The principal question submitted to the court for decision consists mainly in
determining whether they property left at the death of Apolonio III, the
posthumos son of Apolonio Isabelo II, was or was not invested with the
character of reservable property when it was received by his mother, Severina
Faz de Leon.
The property enumerated by the plaintiffs in paragraph 5 of their complaint
came, without any doubt whatsoever, from the common ancestor Apolonio
Isabelo II, and when, on the death of Apolonio III without issue the same
passed by operation of law into the hands of his legitimate mother, Severina
Faz de Leon, it became reservable property, in accordance with the provision
of article 811 of the Code, with the object that the same should not fall into the
possession of persons other than those comprehended within the order of
person other than those comprehended within the order of succession traced
by the law from Apolonio Isabelo II, the source of said property. If this property
was in fact clothed with the character and condition of reservable property
when Severina Faz de Leon inherited same from her son Apolonio III, she did
not thereby acquire the dominion or right of ownership but only the right of
usufruct or of fiduciary with the necessary obligation to preserve and to deliver
or return it as such reservable property to her deceased son's relatives within
the third degree, among whom is her daughter, Mercedes Florentino.
Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute dominion of
the ascendant who inherits and receives same from his descendant, therefore
it does not form part of his own property nor become the legitimate of his
forced heirs. It becomes his own property only in case that all the relatives of
his descendant shall have died (reservista) in which case said reservable
property losses such character.
With full right Severina Faz de Leon could have disposed in her will of all her
own property in favor of her only living daughter, Mercedes Florentino, as
forced heiress. But whatever provision there is in her will concerning the
reservable property received from her son Apolonio III, or rather, whatever
provision will reduce the rights of the other reservatarios, the half brothers and
nephews of her daughter Mercedes, is unlawful, null and void, inasmuch as
said property is not her own and she has only the right of usufruct or of
fiduciary, with the obligation to preserve and to deliver same to
the reservatarios, one of whom is her own daughter, Mercedes Florentino.
It cannot reasonably be affirmed, founded upon an express provision of law,
that by operation of law all of the reservable property, received during lifetime
by Severina Faz de Leon from her son, Apolonio III, constitutes or forms parts
of the legitime pertaining to Mercedes Florentino. If said property did not come
to be the legitimate and exclusive property of Severina Faz de Leon, her only
legitimate and forced heiress, the defendant Mercedes, could not inherit all by
operation of law and in accordance with the order of legitimate succession,
because the other relatives of the deceased Apolonio III, within the third
degree, as well as herself are entitled to such reservable property.
For this reason, in no manner can it be claimed that the legitime of Mercedes
Florentino, coming from the inheritance of her mother Severina Faz de Leon,
has been reduced and impaired; and the application of article 811 of the Code
to the instant case in no way prejudices the rights of the defendant Mercedes
Florentino, inasmuch as she is entitled to a part only of the reservable
property, there being no lawful or just reason which serves as real foundation
to disregard the right to Apolonio III's other relatives, within the third degree,
to participate in the reservable property in question. As these relatives are at
present living, claiming for it with an indisputable right, we cannot find any
reasonable and lawful motive why their rights should not be upheld and why
they should not be granted equal participation with the defendant in the
litigated property.
The claim that because of Severina Faz de Leon's forced heiress, her
daughter Mercedes, the property received from the deceased son Apolonio III
lost the character, previously held, of reservable property; and that the
mother, the said Severina, therefore, had no further obligation to reserve
same for the relatives within the third degree of the deceased Apolonio III, is
evidently erroneous for the reason that, as has been already stated, the
reservable property, left in a will by the aforementioned Severina to her only
daughter Mercedes, does not form part of the inheritance left by her death nor
of the legitimate of the heiress Mercedes. Just because she has a forced
heiress, with a right to her inheritance, does not relieve Severina of her
obligation to reserve the property which she received from her deceased son,
nor did same lose the character of reservable property, held before
the reservatariosreceived same.
It is true that when Mercedes Florentino, the heiress of the reservista
Severina, took possession of the property in question, same did not pass into
the hands of strangers. But it is likewise true that the said Mercedes is not the
only reservataria. And there is no reason founded upon law and upon the
principle of justice why the other reservatarios, the other brothers and
nephews, relatives within the third degree in accordance with the precept of
article 811 of the Civil Code, should be deprived of portions of the property
which, as reservable property, pertain to them.
From the foregoing it has been shown that the doctrine announced by the
Supreme Court of Spain on January 4, 1911, for the violation of articles 811,
968 and consequently of the Civil Code is not applicable in the instant case.
Following the provisions of article 813, the Supreme Court of Spain held that
the legitime of the forced heirs cannot be reduced or impaired and said article
is expressly respected in this decision.
However, in spite of the efforts of the appellee to defend their supposed
rights, it has not been shown, upon any legal foundation, that the reservable
property belonged to, and was under the absolute dominion of, the reservista,
there being relatives within the third degree of the person from whom same
came; that said property, upon passing into the hands of the forced heiress of
the deceased reservista, formed part of the legitime of the former; and that the
said forced heiress, in addition to being a reservataria, had an exclusive right
to receive all of said property and to deprive the other reservatarios, her
relatives within the third degree of certain portions thereof.

Concerning the prayer in the complaint relative to the indemnity for damages
and the delivery of the fruits collected, it is not proper to grant the first for
there is no evidence of any damage which can give rise to the obligation of
refunding same. As to the second, the delivery of the fruits produced by the
land forming the principal part of the reservable property, the defendants are
undoubtedly in duty bound to deliver to the plaintiffs six-sevenths of the fruits
or rents of the portions of land claimed in the complaint, in the quantity
expressed in paragraph 11 of the same, from January 17, 1918, the date the
complaint was filed; and the remaining seventh part should go to the
defendant Mercedes.

For the foregoing reasons it follows that with the reversal of the order of
decision appealed from we should declare, as we hereby do, that the
aforementioned property, inherited by the deceased Severina Faz de Leon
from her son Apolonio Florentino III, is reservable property; that the plaintiffs,
being relatives of the deceased Apolonio III within the third degree, are
entitled to six-sevenths of said reservable property; that the defendant
Mercedes is entitled to the remaining seventh part thereof; that the latter,
together with her husband Angel Encarnacion, shall deliver to the plaintiffs,
jointly, six-sevenths of the fruits or rents, claimed from said portion of the land
and of the quantity claimed, from January 17, 1918, until fully delivered; and
that the indemnity for one thousand pesos (P1,000) prayed for in the
complaint is denied, without special findings as to the costs of both instances.
So ordered.
CELEDONIA SOLIVIO vs. CA
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 26, 1988 of the
Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 09010 (Concordia Villanueva v. Celedonia
Solivio) affirming the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 13207 for
partition, reconveyance of ownership and possession and damages, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff
and against defendant:
a) Ordering that the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. be
divided into two (2) shares: one-half for the plaintiff and one-
half for defendant. From both shares shall be equally deducted
the expenses for the burial, mausoleum and related
expenditures. Against the share of defendants shall be charged
the expenses for scholarship, awards, donations and the
'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Memorial Foundation;'
b) Directing the defendant to submit an inventory of the entire
estate property, including but not limited to, specific items
already mentioned in this decision and to render an accounting
of the property of the estate, within thirty (30) days from receipt
of this judgment; one-half (1/2) of this produce shall belong to
plaintiff;
c) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P5,000.00 as expenses of
litigation; P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees plus costs.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-43, Rollo)
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr.,
author of the first post-war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who died
a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or
nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner
Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and
(2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his
deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.
He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his
marriage in December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before
Esteban, Jr. was born.
Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his
second wife Josefa Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo Provincial High School,
brought up Esteban, Jr.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of
land in Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24 titles) which she had inherited from her
mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife (p. 325, Record), but no
conjugal property was acquired during her short-lived marriage to Esteban,
Sr.
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only
child, Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she,
her son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all these properties were
transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt
Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation
to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college
education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on February 26,1977
without having set up the foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to
do with Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's
desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother, from
whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent students in
their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased. This
fact was admitted by her in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider the
Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed on July 27, 1978 in Special
Proceeding No. 2540, where she stated:
4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the
immediately preceding paragraph [that herein movant is also
the relative of the deceased within the third degree, she being
the younger sister of the late Esteban Javellana, father of the
decedent herein], because prior to the filing of the petition they
(petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana)
have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a
foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to
their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each
other's house which are not far away for (sic) each other. (p.
234, Record; Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the
proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good
faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed on March 8, 1977 Spl.
Proceeding No. 2540 for her appointment as special administratrix of the
estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Exh. 2). Later, she filed an amended petition
(Exh. 5) praying that letters of administration be issued to her; that she be
declared sole heir of the deceased; and that after payment of all claims and
rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her (p. 115,
Rollo).
After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended
petition, she was declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr.
She explained that this was done for three reasons: (1) because the
properties of the estate had come from her sister, Salustia Solivio; (2) that she
is the decedent's nearest relative on his mother's side; and (3) with her as
sole heir, the disposition of the properties of the estate to fund the foundation
would be facilitated.
On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC) declared her
the sole heir of Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to
pay the taxes and other obligations of the deceased and proceeded to set up
the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" which she
caused to be registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission on July
17,1981 under Reg. No. 0100027 (p. 98, Rollo).
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed
a motion for reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole
heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. On
October 27, 1978, her motion was denied by the court for tardiness (pp. 80-
81, Record). Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed on January 7,
1980 (or one year and two months later), Civil Case No. 13207 in the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 26, entitled "Concordia Javellana-
Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio" for partition, recovery of possession,
ownership and damages.
On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case
No. 13207, in favor of Concordia Javellana-Villanueva.
On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution of its judgment
pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit an inventory and
accounting of the estate. In her motions for reconsideration of those orders,
Celedonia averred that the properties of the deceased had already been
transferred to, and were in the possession of, the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de
Javellana Foundation." The trial court denied her motions for reconsideration.
In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA
GR CV No. 09010). On January 26, 1988, the Court of Appeals, Eleventh
Division, rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court in
toto.Hence, this petition for review wherein she raised the following legal
issues:
1. whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to
entertain Civil Case No. 13207 for partition and recovery of
Concordia Villanueva's share of the estate of Esteban
Javellana, Jr. even while the probate proceedings (Spl. Proc.
No. 2540) were still pending in Branch 23 of the same court;
2. whether Concordia Villanueva was prevented from
intervening in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 through extrinsic fraud;
3. whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva
troncal in favor of Celedonia, his relative within the third degree
on his mother's side from whom he had inherited them; and
4. whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate after
she had agreed to place the same in the Salustia Solivio Vda.
de Javellana Foundation, and notwithstanding the fact that
conformably with said agreement, the Foundation has been
formed and properties of the estate have already been
transferred to it.
I. The question of jurisdiction—
After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner's
contention that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to
entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for partition and recovery of her share
of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl,
Proc. No. 2540) for the settlement of said estate are still pending in Branch 23
of the same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission and
approval of the administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the
residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the proceedings (p. 31,
Record).
It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate
to the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate proceedings,
puts an end to the administration and thus far relieves the administrator from
his duties (Santiesteban v. Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, et al., L-27860, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA
266).
The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring Celedonia
as the sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end of
the proceedings. As a matter of fact, the last paragraph of the order directed
the administratrix to "hurry up the settlement of the estate." The pertinent
portions of the order are quoted below:
2. As regards the second incident [Motion for Declaration of
Miss Celedonia Solivio as Sole Heir, dated March 7, 1978], it
appears from the record that despite the notices posted and
the publication of these proceedings as required by law, no
other heirs came out to interpose any opposition to the instant
proceeding. It further appears that herein Administratrix is the
only claimant-heir to the estate of the late Esteban Javellana
who died on February 26, 1977.
During the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on
March 17, 1978, it was established that the late Esteban
Javellana died single, without any known issue, and without
any surviving parents. His nearest relative is the herein
Administratrix, an elder [sic] sister of his late mother who
reared him and with whom he had always been living with [sic]
during his lifetime.
xxxxxxxxx
2. Miss Celedonia Solivio, Administratrix of this estate, is
hereby declared as the sole and legal heir of the late Esteban
S. Javellana, who died intestate on February 26, 1977 at La
Paz, Iloilo City.
The Administratrix is hereby instructed to hurry up with the
settlement of this estate so that it can be terminated. (pp, 14-
16, Record)
In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court
of First Instance (now RTC, Branch 23), Concordia's motion to set aside the
order declaring Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to have herself
(Concordia) declared as co-heir and recover her share of the properties of the
deceased, was properly filed by her in Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her remedy when
the court denied her motion, was to elevate the denial to the Court of Appeals
for review on certiorari. However, instead of availing of that remedy, she filed
more than one year later, a separate action for the same purpose in Branch
26 of the court. We hold that the separate action was improperly filed for it is
the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal
distribution of the estate.
In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting
dispositions of a decedent's estate, a court should not interfere with probate
proceedings pending in a co-equal court. Thus, did we rule in Guilas v. Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, L-26695, January 31, 1972, 43
SCRA 111, 117, where a daughter filed a separate action to annul a project of
partition executed between her and her father in the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of her mother:
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts and the
remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the
same. The finality of the approval of the project of The probate
court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to make distribution, has
power to determine the proportion or parts to which each
distributed is entitled. ... The power to determine the legality or
illegality of the testamentary provision is inherent in the
jurisdiction of the court making a just and legal distribution of
the inheritance. ... To hold that a separate and independent
action is necessary to that effect, would be contrary to the
general tendency of the jurisprudence of avoiding multiplicity of
suits; and is further, expensive, dilatory, and impractical.
(Marcelino v. Antonio, 70 Phil. 388)
A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of
the decedent is exclusively within the range of the
administratrix proceedings and can not properly be made an
independent action. (Litam v. Espiritu, 100 Phil. 364)
A separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper.
(Pimentel v. Palanca, 5 Phil. 436)
partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate
proceeding (Timbol v. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445,
April 29, 1961; Siguiong v. Tecson, 89 Phil. pp. 28, 30). As
long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been
 complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed
closed and terminated Siguiong v. Tecson, supra); because a
judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not
prevent the heirs from bringing an action to obtain his share,
provided the prescriptive period therefore has not elapsed
(Mari v. Bonilia, 83 Phil. 137). The better practice, however, for
the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share
through a proper motion in the same probate or administration
proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or administrative
proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an
independent action, which would be tried by another court or
Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the
probate or intestate court already final and executed and re-
shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of.
(Ramos v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol v.
Cano, supra; Jingco v. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil.
1082; Roman Catholic v. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960,
107 Phil. 455, 460-461; Emphasis supplied)
In Litam et al., v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the
special proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased
Rafael Litam the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they claimed
that they were the children by a previous marriage of the deceased to a
Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal
properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in
the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the
deceased, that the properties in question were paraphernal properties of his
wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this
Court, we ruled that "such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir
of the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the
exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which
it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the
presentation of the project of partition. (p. 378).
However, in the Guilas case, supra, since the estate proceedings had been
closed and terminated for over three years, the action for annulment of the
project of partition was allowed to continue. Considering that in the instant
case, the estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless, Concordia
had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, We
have opted likewise to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the
interest of justice.
The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. 13207
setting aside the probate proceedings in Branch 23 (formerly Branch 11) on
the ground of extrinsic fraud, and declaring Concordia Villanueva to be a co-
heir of Celedonia to the estate of Esteban, Jr., ordering the partition of the
estate, and requiring the administratrix, Celedonia, to submit an inventory and
accounting of the estate, were improper and officious, to say the least, for
these matters he within the exclusive competence of the probate court.
II. The question of extrinsic fraud—
Was Concordia prevented from intervening in the intestate proceedings
by extrinsic fraud employed by Celedonia? It is noteworthy that extrinsic fraud
was not alleged in Concordia's original complaint in Civil Case No. 13207. It
was only in her amended complaint of March 6, 1980, that extrinsic fraud was
alleged for the first time.
Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for annulment of judgment, is any
act or conduct of the prevailing party which prevented a fair
submission of the controversy (Francisco v. David, 38 O.G.
714). A fraud 'which prevents a party from having a trial or
presenting all of his case to the court, or one which operates
upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but to the
manner by which such judgment was procured so much so that
there was no fair submission of the controversy. For instance, if
through fraudulent machination by one [his adversary], a
litigant was induced to withdraw his defense or was prevented
from presenting an available defense or cause of action in the
case wherein the judgment was obtained, such that the
aggrieved party was deprived of his day in court through no
fault of his own, the equitable relief against such judgment may
be availed of. (Yatco v. Sumagui, 44623-R, July 31, 1971).
(cited in Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 Ed. by Moreno; Varela
v. Villanueva, et al., 96 Phil. 248)
A judgment may be annulled on the ground of extrinsic or
collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, which
connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing
litigant 'outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or
his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated
party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the
case. ... The overriding consideration is that the fraudulent
scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having
his day in court or from presenting his case. The fraud,
 therefore, is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of
the court. (Libudan v. Gil, L-21163, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA
17, 27-29; Sterling Investment Corp. v. Ruiz, L-30694, October
31, 1969, 30 SCRA 318, 323)
The charge of extrinsic fraud is, however, unwarranted for the following
reasons:
1. Concordia was not unaware of the special proceeding
intended to be filed by Celedonia. She admitted in her
complaint that she and Celedonia had agreed that the latter
would "initiate the necessary proceeding" and pay the taxes
and obligations of the estate. Thus paragraph 6 of her
complaint alleged:
6. ... for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the estate
of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. at the lowest possible cost
and the least effort, the plaintiff and the defendant agreed that
the defendant shall initiate the necessary proceeding, cause
the payment of taxes and other obligations, and to do
everything else required by law, and thereafter, secure the
partition of the estate between her and the plaintiff, [although
Celedonia denied that they agreed to partition the estate, for
their agreement was to place the estate in a foundation.] (p. 2,
Record; emphasis supplied)
Evidently, Concordia was not prevented from intervening in the proceedings.
She stayed away by choice. Besides, she knew that the estate came
exclusively from Esteban's mother, Salustia Solivio, and she had agreed with
Celedonia to place it in a foundation as the deceased had planned to do.
2. The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of
the time and place of hearing of the petition is required to be
published (Sec. 3, Rule 76 in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 79, Rules
of Court). Notice of the hearing of Celedonia's original petition
was published in the "Visayan Tribune" on April 25, May 2 and
9, 1977 (Exh 4, p. 197, Record). Similarly, notice of the hearing
of her amended petition of May 26, 1977 for the settlement of
the estate was, by order of the court, published in "Bagong
Kasanag" (New Light) issues of May 27, June 3 and 10, 1977
(pp. 182-305, Record). The publication of the notice of the
proceedings was constructive notice to the whole world.
Concordia was not deprived of her right to intervene in the
proceedings for she had actual, as well as constructive notice
of the same. As pointed out by the probate court in its order of
October 27, 1978:
... . The move of Concordia Javellana, however, was filed
about five months after Celedonia Solivio was declared as the
sole heir. ... .
Considering that this proceeding is one in rem and had been
duly published as required by law, despite which the present
movant only came to court now, then she is guilty of laches for
sleeping on her alleged right. (p. 22, Record)
The court noted that Concordia's motion did not comply with the requisites of
a petition for relief from judgment nor a motion for new trial.
The rule is stated in 49 Corpus Juris Secundum 8030 as follows:
Where petition was sufficient to invoke statutory jurisdiction of
probate court and proceeding was in rem no subsequent errors
or irregularities are available on collateral attack. (Bedwell v.
Dean 132 So. 20)
Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of Esteban
within the third degree on his mother's side was not false. Moreover, it was
made in good faith and in the honest belief that because the properties of
Esteban had come from his mother, not his father, she, as Esteban's nearest
surviving relative on his mother's side, is the rightful heir to them. It would
have been self-defeating and inconsistent with her claim of sole heirship if she
stated in her petition that Concordia was her co-heir. Her omission to so state
did not constitute extrinsic fraud.
Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters
which would defeat one's own claim or defense is not such
extrinsic fraud as will justify or require vacation of the
judgment. (49 C.J.S. 489, citing Young v. Young, 2 SE 2d 622;
First National Bank & Trust Co. of King City v. Bowman, 15 SW
2d 842; Price v. Smith, 109 SW 2d 1144, 1149)
It should be remembered that a petition for administration of a decedent's
estate may be filed by any "interested person" (Sec. 2, Rule 79, Rules of
Court). The filing of Celedonia's petition did not preclude Concordia from filing
her own.
III. On the question of reserva troncal—
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased
was subject to reserva troncal and that it pertains to her as his only relative
within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal provision of
the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads as follows:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant
any property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous
title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree
and who belong to the line from which said property came.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)—
the ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from
his descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the
reservees (reservatarios)—relatives within the third degree
counted from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to
the line from which the property came.
3. The propositus—the descendant who received by gratuitous
title and died without issue, making his other ascendant inherit
by operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956
Ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not
reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the
descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the
properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a
reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within
the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to
properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from
another ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It does not apply to property
inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation
covered by Article 891.
Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews
or nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his estate are Articles 1003
and 1009 of the Civil Code which provide:
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor
children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall
succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or
preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole
blood.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:
Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives
of the decedent within the third degree in the collateral line,
each, therefore, shall succeed to the subject estate 'without
distinction of line or preference among them by reason of
relationship by the whole blood,' and is entitled one-half (1/2)
share and share alike of the estate. (p. 57, Rollo)
IV. The question of Concordia's one-half share—
However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the
deceased to the foundation in honor of his mother, Salustia Solivio Vda. de
Javellana (from whom the estate came), an agreement which she ratified and
confirmed in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider Order dated April 3,
1978" which she filed in Spl. Proceeding No. 2540:
4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner
Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have
agreed to make the estate of the decedent a
foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to
their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each
other's house which are not far away for (sic) each other. (p.
234, Record; Emphasis supplied)
she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she did not
waive her inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of
Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" which
Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime, planned to set up to honor his mother and to
finance the education of indigent but deserving students as well.
Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a judicial
admission, it is conclusive and no evidence need be presented to prove the
agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Granada v. Philippine National
Bank, L-20745, Sept. 2, 1966, 18 SCRA 1; Sta. Ana v. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug.
31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018; People v. Encipido, G.R.70091, Dec. 29, 1986, 146
SCRA 478; and Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 58652, May 20, 1988, 161
SCRA 347).
The admission was never withdrawn or impugned by Concordia who,
significantly, did not even testify in the case, although she could have done so
by deposition if she were supposedly indisposed to attend the trial. Only her
husband, Narciso, and son-in-law, Juanito Domin, actively participated in the
trial. Her husband confirmed the agreement between his wife and Celedonia,
but he endeavored to dilute it by alleging that his wife did not intend to give all,
but only one-half, of her share to the foundation (p. 323, Record).
The records show that the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation"
was established and duly registered in the Securities and Exchange
Commission under Reg. No. 0100027 for the following principal purposes:
1. To provide for the establishment and/or setting up of
scholarships for such deserving students as the Board of
Trustees of the Foundation may decide of at least one scholar
each to study at West Visayas State College, and the
University of the Philippines in the Visayas both located in Iloilo
City.
2. To provide a scholarship for at least one scholar for St.
Clements Redemptorist Community for a deserving student
who has the religious vocation to become a priest.
3. To foster, develop, and encourage activities that will promote
the advancement and enrichment of the various fields of
educational endeavors, especially in literary arts. Scholarships
provided for by this foundation may be named after its
benevolent benefactors as a token of gratitude for their
contributions.
4. To direct or undertake surveys and studies in the community
to determine community needs and be able to alleviate partially
or totally said needs.
5. To maintain and provide the necessary activities for the
proper care of the Solivio-Javellana mausoleum at Christ the
King Memorial Park, Jaro, Iloilo City, and the Javellana
Memorial at the West Visayas State College, as a token of
appreciation for the contribution of the estate of the late
Esteban S. Javellana which has made this foundation possible.
Also, in perpetuation of his Roman Catholic beliefs and those
of his mother, Gregorian masses or their equivalents will be
offered every February and October, and Requiem masses
every February 25th and October llth, their death
anniversaries, as part of this provision.
6. To receive gifts, legacies, donations, contributions,
endowments and financial aids or loans from whatever source,
to invest and reinvest the funds, collect the income thereof and
pay or apply only the income or such part thereof as shall be
determined by the Trustees for such endeavors as may be
necessary to carry out the objectives of the Foundation.
7. To acquire, purchase, own, hold, operate, develop, lease,
mortgage, pledge, exchange, sell, transfer, or otherwise,
invest, trade, or deal, in any manner permitted by law, in real
and personal property of every kind and description or any
interest herein.
8. To do and perform all acts and things necessary, suitable or
proper for the accomplishments of any of the purposes herein
enumerated or which shall at any time appear conducive to the
protection or benefit of the corporation, including the exercise
of the powers, authorities and attributes concerned upon the
corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines in
general, and upon domestic corporation of like nature in
particular. (pp. 9-10, Rollo)
As alleged without contradiction in the petition' for review:
The Foundation began to function in June, 1982, and three (3)
of its eight Esteban Javellana scholars graduated in 1986, one
(1) from UPV graduated Cum Laude and two (2) from WVSU
 graduated with honors; one was a Cum Laude and the other
was a recipient of Lagos Lopez award for teaching for being
the most outstanding student teacher.

The Foundation has four (4) high school scholars in Guiso

Barangay High School, the site of which was donated by the
Foundation. The School has been selected as the Pilot
Barangay High School for Region VI.

The Foundation has a special scholar, Fr. Elbert Vasquez, who

would be ordained this year. He studied at St. Francis Xavier
Major Regional Seminary at Davao City. The Foundation
likewise is a member of the Redemptorist Association that
gives yearly donations to help poor students who want to
become Redemptorist priests or brothers. It gives yearly
awards for Creative writing known as the Esteban Javellana
Award.

Further, the Foundation had constructed the Esteban S.

Javellana Multi-purpose Center at the West Visayas State
University for teachers' and students' use, and has likewise
contributed to religious civic and cultural fund-raising drives,
amongst other's. (p. 10, Rollo)

Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the

Foundation, Concordia is obligated to honor her commitment as Celedonia
has honored hers.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Concordia J.
Villanueva is declared an heir of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled to
one-half of his estate. However, comformably with the agreement between
her and her co-heir, Celedonia Solivio, the entire estate of the deceased
should be conveyed to the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javallana Foundation," of
which both the petitioner and the private respondent shall be trustees, and
each shall be entitled to nominate an equal number of trustees to constitute
the Board of Trustees of the Foundation which shall administer the same for
the purposes set forth in its charter. The petitioner, as administratrix of the
estate, shall submit to the probate court an inventory and accounting of the
estate of the deceased preparatory to terminating the proceedings therein.

SO ORDERED.
ARIQUITA O. SUMAYA v. CA
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in C.A. G.R. No. CV-01292-93, which
affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
of Laguna in the consolidated cases in Civil Case No. SC-9561 and Civil Case
No. SC-957.2
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts in the court a quo, which is
summarized as follows:
Raul Balantakbo inherited from two (2) different ascendants the two (2) sets of
properties subject of this case: 1) A one-third (1/3) interest, pro-indiviso in a
parcel of land situated in Dita, Lilio (Liliw) Laguna and described in paragraph
7 of the complaint in Civil Case No. SC-956 from his father Jose, Sr., who
died on January 28, 1945; and 2) A one-seventh (1/7) interest pro-indiviso in
ten (10) parcels of registered lands described in paragraph 6 of the complaint
in Civil Case No. SC-957 from his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista, who
died on November 3, 1950.
On June 13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single, without any issue, and leaving
only his mother, Consuelo Joaquin Vda. de Balantakbo, as his sole surviving
heir to the real properties above-mentioned.
On November 3, 1952, Consuelo adjudicated unto herself the above
described properties in an Affidavit entitled "Caudal Herederario del finado
Raul Balantakbo" which provided, among others:
I. Que de mi legitimo matrimonio con mi difunto esposo, Jose
Balantakbo, he tenido varios hijos, entre ellos si difunto hijo, llamado
Raul Balantakbo.
II. Que mi referido hijo Raul Balantakbo, fallencio el 13 de Junio de
1952, en la Ciudad de Pasay, durante su minolia de edad sin dejar
testamento alguno.
III. Que el finado Raul Balantakbo al morir no ha dejado descendiente
alguno.
IV. Que soy la unica ascendiente superviviento de mi referido hijo
Raul Balantakbo y por lo tanto su unica heredera formosa, legitima y
universal.
V. Que el finado Raul Balantakbo murio sin dejar deuda alguna.
VI. Que el finado al morir dejo propiedades consistentes en bienes
inmuebles situados en la Provincia de Laguna.
VII. Que dichas propriedades fueron a su vez adquiridas por el finado
Raul Balantakbo per herencia de su difunto padre, Jose Balantakbo, y
de su tia abuela Luisa Bautista.
xxx xxx xxx
(Rollo, p. 29)
On December 21, 1959, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the
property described in Civil Case No. SC-956 to Mariquita H. Sumaya. The
sale was evidenced by a deed attached as Annex "C" to the complaint. The
same property was subsequently sold by Mariquita Sumaya to Villa Honorio
Development Corporation, Inc., on December 30, 1963. On January 23, 1967,
Villa Honorio Development Corporation transferred and assigned its rights
over the property in favor of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. The
documents evidencing these transfers were registered in the Registry of
Deeds of Laguna and the corresponding certificates of titles were issued. The
properties are presently in the name of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative,
Inc., 2/3 share and the remaining 1/3 share is in the name of Sancho
Balantakbo.
Also on December 30, 1963, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo sold the
properties described in the complaint in Civil Case No. SC-957 to Villa
Honorio Development Corporation, Inc. The latter in turn transferred and
assigned all its rights to the properties in favor of Laguna Agro-Industrial
Coconut Cooperative, Inc. which properties are presently in its possession.
The parties admit that the certificates of titles covering the above described
properties do not contain any annotation of its reservable character.
On June 3, 1968, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo died.
On March 4, 1970, Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis, and Erasto, all surnamed
Balantakbo, brothers in full blood of Raul Balantakbo and Luisa, Jose and
Dolores, also all surnamed Balantakbo, surviving children of deceased Jose
Balantakbo, Jr., another brother of the first named Balantakbos, filed the
above mentioned civil cases to recover the properties described in the
respective complaints which they claimed were subject to a reserva troncal in
their favor.
The court a quo found that the two (2) cases varied only in the identity of the
subject matter of res involved, the transferees, the dates of the conveyances
but involve the same legal question of reserva troncal. Hence, the
consolidation of the two (2) cases.
After trial, the court a quo rendered a joint decision in favor of the
Balantakbos, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in both Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants, as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut
Cooperative, Inc. to convey to the plaintiffs —
a) In Civil Case No. SC-956 — the one-third (1/3) interest and
ownership, pro-indiviso, in and over the parcel of land
described in paragraph three (3) sub-paragraph 1, of pages
one (1) and two (2) of this decision;
b) In Civil Case No. SC-957 — the one-seventh (1/7) interest
and ownership, pro-indiviso, in and over the ten (10) parcels of
land described in paragraph three (3), sub-paragraph 2, of
pages two (2) and three (3) of this decision;
c) The plaintiffs are to share equally in the real properties
herein ordered to be conveyed to them by the defendants with
plaintiffs Luisa, Jose and Dolores, all surnamed Balantakbo,
receiving one-third (1/3) of the one share pertaining to the
other plaintiffs who are their uncles:
2. Ordering the Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. to
account for and pay to the plaintiffs the value of the produce from the
properties herein ordered to be returned to the plaintiffs, said
accounting and payment of income being for the period from January
3, 1968 until date of reconveyance of the properties herein ordered:
3. In each of Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957, defendants are to
pay plaintiffs —
a. One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos in litigation expenses.
b. Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos in attorney's fees.
4. Defendants are to pay the costs in each of Civil Cases Nos. SC-956
and 957.
xxx xxx xxx
(p. 46, Rollo)
This decision was appealed to the appellate court which affirmed the decision
of the court a quo in toto. The motion for reconsideration was denied (p.
65, Rollo) by the appellate court which found no cogent reason to reverse the
decision.
This petition before Us was filed on November 12, 1984 with the petitioners
assigning the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:
I. The trial court erred in not finding defendants an (sic) innocent
purchaser for value and in good faith of the properties covered by
certificates of title subject of litigation.
II. The trial court erred in finding it unnecessary to annotate the
reservable interest of the reservee in the properties covered by
certificates of title subject of litigation.
III. The trial court erred in finding that the cause of action of the
plaintiffs (private respondents) has not yet prescribed.
IV. The trial court erred in awarding moral and actual damages in favor
of the plaintiffs by virtue of the institution of Civil Cases Nos. 956 and
957.
Petitioners would want this Court to reverse the findings of the court a quo,
which the appellate court affirmed, that they were not innocent purchasers for
value. According to petitioners, before they agreed to buy the properties from
the reservor (also called reservista), Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo,
they first sought the legal advice of their family consultant who found that
there was no encumbrance nor any lien annotated on the certificate of title
coveting the properties.
The court a quo found otherwise. Upon the death of the propositus, Raul
Balantakbo, the reservista, Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo caused the
registration of an affidavit of self-adjudication of the estate of Raul, wherein it
was clearly stated that the properties were inherited by Raul from his father
Jose, Sr., as regards the subject matter of Civil Case No. SC-956 and from
his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista, as regards the subject matter of
Civil Case No. SC-957. The court a quo further ruled that said affidavit was, in
its form, declaration and substance, a recording with the Registry of Deeds of
the reservable character of the properties. In Spanish language, the affidavit
clearly stated that the affiant, Consuelo, was a lone-ascendant and heir to
Raul Balantakbo, her son, who died leaving properties previously inherited
from other ascendants and which properties were inventoried in the said
affidavit.
It was admitted that the certificates of titles covering the properties in question
show that they were free from any liens and encumbrances at the time of the
sale. The fact remains however, that the affidavit of self-adjudication executed
by Consuelo stating the source of the properties thereby showing the
reservable nature thereof was registered with the Register of Deeds of
Laguna, and this is sufficient notice to the whole world in accordance with
Section 52 of the Property Registration Decree (formerly Sec. 51 of R.A. 496)
which provides:
Sec. 52. CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE UPON REGISTRATION. — Every
conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien attachment, order, judgment,
instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or
entered in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city
where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all
persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering.
Thus, in Gatioan v. Gaffud, G.R. No. L-21953, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 706,
712-713, cited in People v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 74226-27, July 27, 1989, 175
SCRA 597; Garcia v. CA and PNB v. CA, et al., G.R. Nos. L-48971 and L-
40911, both dated January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 380 and Legarda and Prieto v.
Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 600, We held:
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is
constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable,
included therein . . .
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has
examined every instrument of record affecting the title. Such
presumption is irrebuttable. He is charged with notice of every fact
shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an
examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption
cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise,
the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be
destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of
knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be
permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law.
The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public
record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute, any
variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation. . . .
In the case of Bass v. De la Rama, 73 Phil. 682, 685, the rule was laid down
that the mere entry of a document in the day book without noting it on the
certificate of title is not sufficient registration. However, that ruling was
superseded by the holding in the later six cases of Levin v. Bass, 91 Phil. 420.
As explained in Garcia v. CA, et al., G.R. Nos. L-48971 and 49011, January
20, 1980, 95 SCRA 380, 388, which is the prevailing doctrine in this
jurisdiction.
That ruling was superseded by the holding in the later six cases
of Levin v. Bass, 91 Phil. 420, where a distinction was made between
voluntary and involuntary registration, such as the registration of an
attachment, levy upon execution, notice of lis pendens, and the like. In
cases of involuntary registration, an entry thereof in the day book is a
sufficient notice to all persons even if the owner's duplicate certificate
of title is not presented to the register of deeds.
On the other hand, according to the said cases of Levin v. Bass, in
case of voluntary registration of documents an innocent purchaser for
value of registered land becomes the registered owner, and, in
contemplation of law the holder of a certificate of title, the moment he
presents and files a duly notarized and valid deed of sale and the
same is entered in the day book and at the same time he surrenders
or presents the owner's duplicate certificate of title covering the land
sold and pays the registration fees, because what remains to be done
lies not within his power to perform. The register of deeds is duty
bound to perform it. (See Potenciano v. Dineros, 97 Phil. 196).
In this case, the affidavit of self adjudication executed by Consuelo vda. de
Balantakbo which contained a statement that the property was inherited from
a descendant, Raul, which has likewise inherited by the latter from another
ascendant, was registered with the Registry of Property. The failure of the
Register of Deeds to annotate the reservable character of the property in the
certificate of title cannot be attributed to Consuelo.
Moreover, there is sufficient proof that the petitioners had actual knowledge of
the reservable character of the properties before they bought the same from
Consuelo. This matter appeared in the deed of sale (Exhibit "C") executed by
Consuelo in favor of Mariquita Sumaya, the first vendee of the property
litigated in Civil Case No. SC-956, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
That, I (Consuelo, vendor) am the absolute and exclusive owner of the
one-third (1/3) portion of the above described parcel of land by virtue
of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition executed by the Heirs of the
deceased Jose Balantakbo dated December 10, 1945 and said portion
in accordance with the partition above-mentioned was adjudicated to
Raul Balantakbo, single, to (sic) whom I inherited after his death and
this property is entirely free from any encumbrance of any nature or
kind whatsoever, . . . (p. 42, Rollo)
It was admitted though that as regards the properties litigated in Civil Case
SC-957, no such admission was made by Consuelo to put Villa Honorio
Development on notice of the reservable character of the properties. The
affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo and registered with the
Registry would still be sufficient notice to bind them.
Moreover, the Court a quo found that the petitioners and private respondents
were long time acquaintances; that the Villa Honorio Development
Corporation and its successors, the Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut
Cooperative Inc., are family corporations of the Sumayas and that the
petitioners knew all along that the properties litigated in this case were
inherited by Raul Balantakbo from his father and from his maternal
grandmother, and that Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo inherited these
properties from his son Raul.
The obligation to reserve rests upon the reservor, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de
Balantakbo. Article 891 of the New Civil Code on reserva troncal provides:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendant or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of
relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line
from which said property came. (Emphasis supplied)
We do not agree, however, with the disposition of the appellate court that
there is no need to register the reservable character of the property, if only for
the protection of the reservees, against innocent third persons. This was
suggested as early as the case of Director of Lands v. Aguas, G.R. No.
42737, August 11, 1936, 63 Phil. 279. The main issue submitted for resolution
therein was whether the reservation established by Article 811 (now Art. 891
of the New Civil Code) of the Civil Code, for the benefit of the relatives within
the third degree belonging to the line of the descendant from whom the
ascendant reservor received the property, should be understood as made in
favor of all the relatives within said degree and belonging to the line above-
mentioned, without distinction legitimate, natural and illegitimate ones not
having the legal status of natural children. However, in an obiter dictum this
Court stated therein:
The reservable character of a property is but a resolutory condition of
the ascendant reservor's right of ownership. If the condition is fulfilled,
that is, if upon the ascendant reservor's death there are relatives
having the status provided in Article 811 (Art. 891, New Civil Code),
the property passes, in accordance with this special order of
succession, to said relatives, or to the nearest of kin among them,
which question not being pertinent to this case, need not now be
determined. But if this condition is not fulfilled, the property is released
and will be adjudicated in accordance with the regular order of
succession. The fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the resolutory
condition, the efficacy or cessation of the reservation, the acquisition
of rights or loss of the vested ones, are phenomena which have
nothing to do with whether the reservation has been noted or not in the
certificate of title to the property. The purpose of the notation is nothing
more than to afford to the persons entitled to the reservation, if any,
due protection against any act of the reservor, which may make it
ineffective . . . (p. 292, Ibid)
Likewise, in Dizon and Dizon v. Galang, G.R. No. 21344, January 14, 1926,
48 Phil. 601, 603, this Court ruled that the reservable character of a property
may be lost to innocent purchasers for value. Additionally, it was ruled therein
that the obligation imposed on a widowed spouse to annotate the reservable
character of a property subject of reserva viudal is applicable to reserva
troncal. (See also Edrozo v. Sablan, G.R. No. 6878, September 13, 1913, 25
Phil. 295).
 Since these parcels of land have been legally transferred to third
persons, Vicente Galang has lost ownership thereof and cannot now
register nor record in the Registry of Deeds their reservable character;
neither can he effect the fee simple, which does not belong to him, to
the damage of Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado, who acquired the
said land in good faith, free of all incumbrances. An attempt was made
to prove that when Juan Medina was advised not to buy the land he
remarked, "Why did he (Vicente Galang) not inherit it from his son?"
Aside from the fact that it is not clear whether this conservation took
place in 1913 or 1914, that is, before or after the sale, it does not arise
that he had any knowledge of the reservation. This did not arise from
the fact alone that Vicente Galang had inherited the land from his son,
but also from the fact that, by operation of law, the son had inherited it
from his mother Rufina Dizon, which circumstance, so far as the
record shows, Juan Medina had not been aware of. We do not decide,
however, whether or not Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado are obliged
to acknowledge the reservation and to note the same in their deeds,
for the reason that there was no prayer to this effect in the complaint
and no question raised in regard thereto.
Consistent with the rule in reserva viudal where the person obliged to reserve
(the widowed spouse) had the obligation to annotate in the Registry of
Property the reservable character of the property, in reserva troncal, the
reservor (the ascendant who inherited from a descendant property which the
latter inherited from another descendant) has the duty to reserve and
therefore, the duty to annotate also.
The jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the Registry of Property of the
right reserved in real property subject of reserva viudal insofar as it is applied
to reserva troncal stays despite the abolition of reserva viudal in the New Civil
Code. This rule is consistent with the rule provided in the second paragraph of
Section 51 of P.D. 1529, which provides that: "The act of registration shall be
the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are
concerned . . ." (emphasis supplied)
The properties involved in this case are already covered by a Torrens title and
unless the registration of the limitation is effected (either actual or
constructive), no third persons shall be prejudiced thereby.
The respondent appellate court did not err in finding that the cause of action
of the private respondents did not prescribe yet. The cause of action of the
reservees did not commence upon the death of the propositus Raul
Balantakbo on June 13, 1952 but upon the death of the reservor Consuelo
Vda. de Balantakbo on June 3, 1968. Relatives within the third degree in
whose favor the right (or property) is reserved have no title of ownership or of
fee simple over the reserved property during the lifetime of the reservor. Only
when the reservor should die before the reservees will the latter acquire the
reserved property, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their
place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives within
the third degree (See Velayo Bernardo v. Siojo, G.R. No. 36078, March 11,
1933, 58 Phil. 89). The reserva is extinguished upon the death of the reservor,
as it then becomes a right of full ownership on the part of the reservatarios,
who can bring a reivindicatory suit therefor. Nonetheless, this right if not
exercised within the time for recovery may prescribe in ten (10) years under
the old Code of Civil Procedure (see Carillo v. De Paz, G.R. No. L-22601,
October 28, 1966, 18 SCRA 467, 473) or in thirty years under Article 1141 of
the New Civil Code. The actions for recovery of the reserved property was
brought by herein private respondents on March 4, 1970 or less than two (2)
years from the death of the reservor. Therefore, private respondents' cause of
action has not prescribed yet.
Finally, the award of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for actual litigation
expenses and two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) for attorney's fees is proper
under Article 2208(2) of the New Civil Code. Private respondents were
compelled to go to court to recover what rightfully belongs to them.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court is AFFIRMED, except for the modification on the
necessity to annotate the reversable character of a property subject of reserva
troncal.
SO ORDERED.
MAGIN RIOSA v. ROCHA
Maria Corral was united in marriage with the deceased Mariano Riosa, it
being her first and only marriage and during which time she bore him three
children named Santiago, Jose and Severina. The latter died during infancy
and the other two survived their father, Mariano Riosa. Santiago Riosa, no
deceased, married Francisca Villanueva, who bore him two children named
Magin and Consolacion Riosa. Jose Riosa, also deceased, married Marcelina
Casas and they had one child who died before the father, the latter therefore
leaving no issue. Mariano Riosa left a will dividing his property between his
two children, Santiago and Jose Riosa, giving the latter the eleven parcels of
land described in the complaint. Upon the death of Jose Riosa he left a will in
which he named his wife, Marcelina Casas, as his only heir.
On May 16, 1917, the will of Jose Riosa was filed for probate. Notwithstanding
the fact that Marcelina Casas was the only heir named in the will, on account
of the preterition of Maria Corral who, being the mother of Jose Riosa, was his
legitimate heir, I Marcelina Casas and Maria Corral, on the same date of the
filing of the will for probate, entered into a contract by which they divided
between themselves the property left by Jose Riosa, the eleven parcels of
land described in the complaint being assigned to Maria Corral.
On October 26, 1920, Maria Corral sold parcels Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10 and
11 to Marcelina Casas for the sum of P20,000 in a public instrument which
was recorded in the registry of deeds on November 6, 1920. On November 3,
1920, Marcelina Casas sold these eight parcels of land to Pablo Rocha for the
sum of P60,000 in a public document which was recorded in the registry of
deeds on November 6, 1920. On September 24, 1921, Pablo Rocha returned
parcels No. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 to Maria Corral stating in the deed executed for
the purpose that these parcels of land had been erroneously included in the
sale made by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas.
The Court of first Instance denied the probate of the will of Jose Riosa, but on
appeal this court reversed the decision of the lower court and allowed the will
to probate. 1 The legal proceedings for the probate of the will and the
settlement of the testate estate of Jose Riosa were followed; and, at the time
of the partition, Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas submitted to the court the
contract of extrajudicial partition which they had entered into on May 16, 1917,
and which was approved by the court, by order of November 12, 1920, as
though it had been made within the said testamentary proceedings.
From the foregoing is appears that the eleven parcels of land described in the
complaint were acquired by Jose Riosa, by lucrative title, from his father
Mariano Riosa and that after the death of Jose Riosa, by operation of law,
they passed to his mother Maria Corral. By virtue of article 811 of the Civil
Code these eleven parcels of land are reservable property. It results,
furthermore, that parcels 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 still belong in fee simple to
Maria Corral, and that parcels 10 and 11 were successively sold by Maria
Corral to Marcelina Casas and by the latter to Pablo Rocha. Lastly, it appears
that Magin and Consolacion Riosa are the nearest relatives within the third
degree of the line from which this property came.
This action was brought by Magin Riosa, for whom the property should have
been reserved, against Maria Corral, whose duty it was to reserve it, and
against Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha as purchasers of parcels 10 and
11. Consolacion Riosa de Calleja who was also bound to make the
reservation was included as a defendant as she refused to join as plaintiff.
The complaint prays that the property therein described be declared
reservable property and that the plaintiffs Jose and Consolacion Riosa be
declared reservees; that this reservation be noted in the registry of deeds; that
the sale of parcels 10 and 11 to Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha be
declared valid only in so far as it saves the right of reservation in favor of the
plaintiff Magin Riosa and of the defendant Consolacion Riosa, and that this
right of reservation be also noted on the deeds of sale executed in favor of
Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha; that Maria Corral, Marcelina Casas and
Pablo Rocha give a bond of P50,000, with good and sufficient sureties, in
favor of the reservees as surety for the conservation and maintenance of the
improvements existing on the said reservable property. The dispositive part of
the court's decision reads as follows:
For the foregoing reasons it is held:
1. That the eleven parcels of land described in paragraph 6 of the
complaint have the character of reservable property; 2. That the
defendant Maria Corral, being compelled to make the reservation,
must reserve them in favor of the plaintiff Magin Riosa and the
defendant Consolacion Riosa de Calleja in case that either of these
should survive her; 3. That Magin Riosa and Consolacion Riosa de
Calleja have the right, in case that Maria Corral should die before
them, to receive the said parcels or their equivalent.
In virtue whereof, the defendant Maria Corral is ordered: 1. To
acknowledge the right of Magin Riosa and Consolacion Riosa de
Calleja to the reservation of the said parcels of lands described in the
complaint, which she shall expressly record in the registration of said
 lands in the office of the register of deeds of this province; 2. To insure
the delivery of said parcels of lands, or their equivalent, to Magin
Riosa and Consolacion Riosa de Calleja, should either of them survive
her, either by a mortgage thereon or by a bond in the amount of
P30,000, without express pronouncement as to costs.
The other defendants are absolved from the complaint.
Inasmuch as the reservation from its inception imposes obligations upon the
reservor (reservista) and creates rights in favor of the reservation
(reservatarios) it is of the utmost importance to determine the time when the
land acquired the character of reservable property.
It will be remembered that on May 16, 1917, Maria Corral and Marcelina
Casas entered into a contract of extrajudicial partition of the property left by
Jose Riosa, in which they assigned to Maria Corral, as her legitime, the
parcels of land here in question, and at the same time petitioned for the
probate of the will of Jose Riosa and instituted the testamentary proceeding.
In support of the legality of the extrajudicial partition between Maria Corral and
Marcelina Casas the provision of section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure is
invoked, which authorizes the heirs of a person dying without a will to make a
partition without the intervention of the courts whenever the heirs are all of
age and the deceased has left no debts. But this legal provisions refers
expressly to intestate estates and, of course, excludes testate estates like the
one now before us.
When the deceased has left a will the partition of his property must be made
in accordance therewith. According to section 625 of the same Code no will
can pass property until it is probated. And even after being probated it cannot
pass any property if its provisions impair the legitime fixed by law in favor of
certain heirs. Therefore, the probate of the will and the validity of the
testamentary provisions must be passed upon by the court.
For the reasons stated, and without making any express finding as to the
efficacy of the extrajudicial partition made by Maria Corral and Marcelina
Casas, we hold that for the purposes of the reservation and the rights and
obligations arising thereunder in connection with the favored relatives, the
property cannot be considered as having passed to Maria Corral but from the
date when the said partition was approved by the court, that is, on November
12, 1920. In the case of Pavia vs. De la Rosa (8 Phil., 70), this court laid down
the same doctrine in the following language:
The provisions of Act No. 190 (Code of Civil Procedure) have annulled
the provisions of article 1003 and others of the Civil Code with regard
to the pure or simple acceptance of the inheritance of a deceased
person or that made with benefit of inventory and the consequences
thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The heir legally succeeds the deceased from whom he derives his
right and title, but only after the liquidation of the estate, the payment
of the debts of same, and the adjudication of the residue of the estate
of the deceased, and in the meantime the only person in charge by
law to attend to all claims against the estate of the deceased debtor is
the executor or administrator appointed by a competent court.
As has been indicated, parcels 10 and 11 described in the complaint were first
sold by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas who later sold them to Pablo Rocha.
In this appeal it is urged that Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha, who were
absolved by the court below, be ordered to acknowledge the reservation as to
parcels 10 and 11, acquired by them, and to have the said reservation noted
on their titles. This argument, of course, is useless as to Marcelina Casas for
the reason that she transferred all her rights to Pablo Rocha.
It has been held by jurisprudence that the provisions of the law referred to in
article 868 tending to assure the efficacy of the reservation by the surviving
spouse are applicable to the reservation known as "reserva troncal," referred
to in article 811, which is the reservation now under consideration.
In accordance with article 977, Maria Corral, reservor, is obliged to have the
reservation noted in the registry of deeds in accordance with the provisions of
the Mortgage Law which fixes the period of ninety days for accomplishing it
(article 199, in relation with article 191, of the Mortgage Law). According to
article 203 of the General Regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law,
this time must be computed from the acceptance of the inheritance. But as
this portion of the Civil Code, regarding the acceptance of the inheritance, has
been repealed, the time, as has been indicated, must be computed from the
adjudication of the property by the court to the heirs, in line with the decision
of this court hereinabove quoted. After the expiration of this period the
reservees may demand compliance with this obligation.
If Maria Corral had not transferred parcels 10 and 11 to another there would
be no doubt that she could be compelled to cause the reservable character of
this property to be noted in the registry of deeds. This land having been sold
to Marcelina Casas who, in turn, sold it to Pablo Rocha the question arises
whether the latter can be compelled to have this reservation noted on his title.
This acquisition by Pablo Rocha took place when it was the duty of Maria
Corral to make the notation of the reservation in the registry and at the time
when the reservees had no right to compel Maria Corral to make such
notation, because this acquisition was made before the expiration of the
period of ninety days from November 12, 1920, the date of the adjudication by
the court, after which the right of the reservees to commence an action for the
fulfillment of the obligation arose. But the land first passed to Marcelina Casas
and later to Pablo Rocha together with the obligation that the law imposes
upon Maria Corral. They could not have acquired a better title than that held
by Maria Corral and if the latter's title was limited by the reservation and the
obligation to note it in the registry of deeds, this same limitation is attached to
the right acquired by Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha.
In the transmission of reservable property the law imposes the reservation as
a resolutory condition for the benefit of the reservees (article 975, Civil Code).
The fact that the resolvable character of the property was not recorded in the
registry of deed at the time that it was acquired by Marcelina Casas and Pablo
Rocha cannot affect the right of the reservees, for the reason that the
transfers were made at the time when it was the obligation of the reservor to
note only such reservation and the reservees did not them have any right to
compel her to fulfill such an obligation.
Marcelina Casas, as well as Pablo Rocha, Knew of the reservable character
of the property when they bought it. They had knowledge of the provisions of
the last will and testament of Mariano Riosa by virtue of which these parcels
were transferred to Jose Riosa. Pablo Rocha was one of the legatees in the
will. Marcelina Casas was the one who entered into the contract of partition
with Maria Corral, whereby these parcels were adjudicated to the latter, as a
legitimate heir of Jose Riosa. Pablo Rocha was the very person who drafted
the contracts of sale of these parcels of land by Maria Corral to Marcelina
Casas and by the latter to himself. These facts, together with the relationship
existing between Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha, the
former a daughter-in-law and the latter a nephew of Maria Corral, amply
support the conclusion that both of them knew that these parcels of land had
been inherited by Maria Corral, as her legitime from her son Jose Riosa who
had inherited them, by will, from his father Mariano Riosa, and were
reservable property. Wherefore, the duty of Maria Corral of recording the
reservable character of lots 10 and 11 has been transferred to Pablo Rocha
and the reservees have an action against him to compel him to comply with
this obligation.
The appellant also claims that the obligation imposed upon Maria Corral of
insuring the return of these parcels of land, or their value, to the reservees by
means of a mortgage or a bond in the amount of P30,000, also applies to
Pablo Rocha. The law does not require that the reservor give this security, the
recording of the reservation in the registry of deeds being sufficient (art. 977
of the Civil Code). There is no ground for this requirement inasmuch as, the
notation once is made, the property will answer for the efficacy of the
reservation. This security for the value of the property is required by law (art.
978, paragraph 4, of the Civil Code) in the case of a reservation by the
surviving spouse when the property has been sold before acquiring the
reservable character (art 968 of the Civil Code), but is not applicable to
reservation known as reserva troncal (art 811 of the Civil Code). In the case of
Dizon and Dizon vs. Galang (page 601, ante), this court held that:
* * * As already intimated, the provisions of the law tending to give
efficacy to a reservation by the widowed spouse mentioned in article
968 are applicable to the reserva troncal provided for in article 811.
But as these two reservations vary in some respects, these rules may
be applied to the reserva troncal only in so far as the latter is similar to
a reservation by the widowed spouse. In the reserva troncal the
property goes to the reservor as reservable property and it remains so
until the reservation takes place or is extinguished. In a reservation by
the widowed spouse there are two distinct stages, one when the
property goes to the widower without being reservable, and the other
when the widower contracts a second marriage, whereupon the
property, which theretofore has been in his possession free of any
encumbrance, becomes reservable. These two stages also affect
differently the transfer that may be made of the property. If the
property is sold during the first stage, before becoming reservable, it is
absolutely free and is transferred to the purchaser unencumbered. But
if the sale is made during the second stage, that is, when the duty to
reserve has arisen, the property goes to the purchaser subject to the
reservation, without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law.
This is the reason why the law provides that should the property be
sold before it becomes reservable, or before the widower contracts
another marriage, he will be compelled to secure the value of the
property by a mortgage upon contracting a new marriage, so that the
reservation may not lose its efficacy and that the rights of those for
whom the reservation is made may be assured. This mortgage is not
required by law when the sale is made after the reservation will follow
the property, without prejudice to the contrary provisions of the
Mortgage Law and the rights of innocent purchasers, there being no
need to secure the value of the property since it is liable for the
 efficacy of the reservation by a widowed spouse to secure the value of
the property sold by the widower, before becoming reservable are not
applicable to the reserva troncal where the property goes to the
ascendant already reservable in character. A sale in the case
of reserva troncal might be analogous to a sale made by the widower
after contacting a second marriage in the case of a reservation by the
widowed spouse.

Since Maria Corral did not appeal, we cannot modify the appealed judgment
in so far as it is unfavorable to her. As she has been ordered to record in the
registry the reservable character of the other parcels of land, the subject of
this action, the questions raised by the appellant as to her are decided.

The judgment appealed from is modified and Pablo Rocha is ordered to

record in the registry of deeds the reservable character of parcels 10 11, the
subject of this complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs. So
ordered.
FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA v. CAMACHO
This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code
on reserva troncal, was submitted for judgment in the lower court by all the
parties on the following "Stipulation of Facts and Partial Compromise":
1. They stipulate that the defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-
Camacho and the plaintiffs, Francisco Tioco de Papa, Manuel
Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs
being said defendant's grandaunt and granduncles.
2. They stipulate that plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D.
Tongo-Camacho have as a common ancestor the late Balbino
Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana Tioco), father
of plaintiffs and great grandfather of defendant. The family
relationship of the parties is as shown in the chart attached
hereto as Annex 'A' and made an integral part of this
stipulation.
3. They stipulate that Romana Tioco during her lifetime
gratuitously donated four (4) parcels of land to her niece
Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs), which parcels of
land are presently covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
A-64165, 64166 and 64167 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila,
copies of which are attached to this stipulation as Annexes 'B',
'B-l', and 'B-2'.
4. They stipulate that Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5,
survived by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two
legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother
of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-Camacho) and leaving the
afore-mentioned four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of
her said two children in equal pro-indiviso shares.
5. They stipulate that in 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate,
survived by his legitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix
(among them plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren Faustino
Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the partition of his estate, three
(3) parcels of land now covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 16545 and 16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila,
copies of which are attached hereto as Annexes 'C' and 'C-l',
were adjudicated as the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco,
but as she had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the said
three (3) parcels of land devolved upon her two legitimate
children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in equal pro-
indiviso shares.
6. They stipulate that in 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate,
single and without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso
share in the seven (7) parcels of land above-mentioned to his
father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received
the said property subject to a reserva troncal which was
subsequently annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title
Annexes 'B', 'B-l', 'B-2', 'C' and 'C-l'.
7. They stipulate that in 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died
intestate, and her rights and interests in the parcels of land
abovementioned were inherited by her only legitimate child,
defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, subject to the
usufructuary right of her surviving husband, defendant Primo
Tongko.
8. They stipulate that on June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died
intestate, survived his only legitimate descendant, defendant
Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.
9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-
Camacho now owns one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels
of land abovementioned as her inheritance from her mother,
Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.
10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon
legal advice, the other half of the said seven (7) parcels of land
abovementioned by virtue of the reserva troncal imposed
thereon upon the death of Faustino Dizon and under the laws
on intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal
advice, oppose her said claim because they claim three-fourths
(3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land,
which interest was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino
Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels of land, by virtue
of their being also third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.
11. The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial
determination in this case the legal issue of whether defendant
Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the whole of the
seven (7) parcels of land in question, or whether the plaintiffs,
 as third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon are reservatarios
(together with said defendant) of the one-half pro-indiviso
share therein which was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from his
son Faustino Dizon, and entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of said
one-half pro-indiviso share, or three eights (3/8) of said seven
(7) parcels of land, and, therefore, to three-eights (3/8) of the
rentals collected and to be collected by defendant Dalisay P.
Tongko Camacho from the tenants of said parcels of land,
minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to
plaintiffs' share in the rentals.
12. In view of the fact that the parties are close blood relatives
and have acted upon legal advice in pursuing their respective
claims, and in order to restore and preserve harmony in their
family relations, they hereby waive all their claims against each
other for damages (other than legal interest on plaintiffs' sore in
the rentals which this Honorable Court may deem proper to
award), attorney's fees and expenses of litigation which shall
be borne by the respective parties. 1
On the basis thereof, the lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco,
Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, as well as the defendant Dalisay Tongko-
Camacho, entitled, as reservatarios, to one-half of the seven parcels of land in
dispute, in equal proportions, rendering judgment as follows:
... . Resolving, therefore, the legal question submitted by the
parties, the court holds that plaintiffs Francisca Tioco, Manuel
Tioco and Nicolas Tioco are entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of
one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso shares or three-eights (3/8) of the
seven (7) parcels of land involved in this action. Consequently,
they are, likewise, entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals
collected and to be collected by the defendant Dalisay D.
Tioco-Camacho from the tenants of the said parcels of land,
minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to
plaintiffs' share in the rentals.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and inasmuch as the parties
expressly waived all their claims against each other for
damages including attorney's fees and expenses of litigation
other than the legal interests on plaintiffs' share in the rentals,
the court renders judgment adjudging the plaintiffs entitled to
three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7) parcels of land described in
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-64165, T-64166, T-64167,
T-16546 and T-16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. The
defendant Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho is hereby ordered to
make an accounting of all rents received by her on the
properties involved in this action for the purpose of determining
the legal interests which should be paid to the plaintiffs on their
shares in the rentals of the property in question.
SO ORDERED. 2
Not satisfied, the defendant appealed to this Court.
The issue raised is whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and
ruled by the lower Court, all relatives of thepraepositus within the third degree
in the appropriate line succeed without distinction to the reservable property
upon the death of the reservista, as seems to be implicit in Art. 891 of the Civil
Code, which reads:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title
from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree
and who belong to the line from which said property came.
(811),
or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant, the rights of said relatives are
subject to, and should be determined by, the rules on intestate succession.
That question has already been answered in Padura vs. Baldovino, 3 where
the reservatario was survived by eleven nephews and nieces of
the praepositus in the line of origin, four of whole blood and seven of half
blood, and the claim was also made that all eleven were entitled to the
reversionary property in equal shares. This Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, declared the principles of intestacy to be controlling, and
ruled that the nephews and nieces of whole blood were each entitled to a
share double that of each of the nephews and nieces of half blood in
accordance with Article 1006 of the Civil Code. Said the Court:
The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a
case of reserva troncal, where the
only reservatarios (reservees) surviving the reservista, and
belonging to the fine of origin, are nephews of the descendant
(prepositus), but some are nephews of the half blood and the
others are nephews of the whole blood, should the reserved
properties be apportioned among them equally, or should the
nephews of the whole blood take a share twice as large as that
of the nephews of the half blood?
xxx xxx xxx
The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish
commentators on the subject. After mature reflection, we have
concluded that the position of the appellants is correct.
The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to
assure the return of the reservable property to the third degree
relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally
came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives
of the inheriting ascendant (reservista).
xxx xxx xxx
The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the
property has devolved to the specified relatives of the line of
origin. But from this time on, there is no further occasion for its
application. In the relations between one reservatario and
another of the same degree there is no call for applying Art.
891 any longer; wherefore, the respective share of each in the
reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary rules
of intestate succession. In this spirit the jurisprudence of this
Court and that of Spain has resolved that upon the death of the
ascendant reservista, the reservable property should pass, not
to all the reservatarios as a class but only to those nearest in
degree to the descendant (prepositus), excluding
those reservatarios of more remote degree (Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 489-490; T.S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los
Registros, Resol. 20 March 1905). And within the third degree
of relationship from the descendant (prepositus), the right of
representation operates in favor of nephews (Florentino vs.
Florentino, supra).
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession
when there are relatives of the descendant within the third
degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatarios
over the property which the reservista (person holding it
subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of
the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be
alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the
reservable property is not among the relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which such property came,
inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811
is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit
of designated persons who are within the third degree of the
person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore,
relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never
be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not
recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of
representation on the part of one alleging his right
as reservatario who is not within the third degree of
relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the
part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned
by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased person from
whom the reservable property came. ... . (Florentino vs.
Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490) (Emphasis supplied) See
also Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and de Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915)
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic
principles of ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that
whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share
double that of brothers and nephews of half blood. If in
determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of
degree and the right of representation of nephews are made to
apply, the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the
whole blood should be likewise operative.
In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the
group of relatives reservatarios to whom the property should be
returned; but within that group, the individual right to the
property should be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary
intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise.
This conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance that
the reserva being an exceptional case, its application should
be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose
of the law. As expressed by Manresa in his Commentaries
(Vol. 6, 6th Ed., p. 250):
... creandose un verdadero estado excepcional del derecho, no
debe ampliarse, sino mas bien restringirse, el alcance del
 precepto, manteniendo la excepcion mientras fuere necesaria
y estuviese realmente contenida en la disposicion, y aplicando
las reglas generales y fundamentales del Codigo en materia de
sucesi6n, en aquehos extremes no resueltos de un modo
expreso, y que quedan fuera de la propia esfera de accion de
la reserva que se crea.
The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of
the new Civil Code's hostility to successional reservas and
reversions, as exemplified by the suppression of the reserva
viudal and the reversion legal of the Code of 1889 (Art. 812
and 968-980).
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate
succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right thereto
because, as aunt and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon
(the praepositus), they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the
defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within the same degree
as the latter. To this effect is Abellana vs. Ferraris4 where Arts. 1001, 1004,
1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code were cited and applied:
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in
case of intestacy nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude
all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from
the succession. This is readily apparent from Articles 1001,
1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that
provide as follows:
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive
with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitle to one-half
of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children
to the other half.
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of
the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares.
Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with
nephews and nieces who are the children of the decedent's
brothers and sisters of the full blood, the former shall inherit per
capita, and the latter per stirpes.
This conclusion is fortified by the observation, also made in Padura, supra,
that as to the reservable property, thereservatarios do not inherit from
the reservista, but from the descendant praepositus:
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor
children of brothers and sisters, the other collateral relatives
shall succeed to the estate.
Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters,
nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the
other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the
succession. This was also and more clearly the case under the
Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that immediately preceded the
Civil Code now in force (R.A. 386). Thus, Articles 952 and 954
of the Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:
Art. 952. In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews
or nieces, children of the former, whether of the whole blood or
not, the surviving spouse, if not separated by a final decree of
divorce shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
Art. 954. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor
children of brothers or sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other
collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate of deceased.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or
preference among them by reason of the whole blood.
It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and
sisters and nephews and nieces inheritedab intestato ahead of
the surviving spouse, while other collaterals succeeded only
after the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the
Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with the
nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters of the deceased,
but without altering the preferred position of the latter vis a vis
the other collaterals.
xxx xxx xxx
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of
succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not
succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the
decedent survive and are willing and qualified to succeed. ...
 ... . It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of
the estate of the reservista, who may not dispose of it by will,
as long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona,
58 Phil. 237). The latter, therefore, do not inherit from
the reservista, but from the descendant prepositus, of whom
the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the
condition that they must survive the reservista. (Sanchez
Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol.
6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310) ... .
To the same effect is Cano vs, Director of Lands 5, where it was ruled that
intestacy proceedings to determine the right of a reservatario are not
necessary where the final decree of the land court ordering issuance of title in
the name of the reservista over property subject to reserva troncal Identifies
the reservatario and there are no other claimants to the latter's rights as such:
property took a "detour" through an ascendant-thereby giving rise to the
reservation before its transmission to the reservatario.
Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the
defendant-appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the
reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed and set
aside and the complaint is dismissed, with costs against the plaintiffs-
appellants.
SO ORDERED.

The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary

rests upon the assumption that thereservatario win succeed in,
or inherit, the reservable property from the reservista. This is
not true. The reservatario is not
the reservista's successor mortis causa nor is the reservable
property part of thereservista's estate; the reservatario receives
the property as a conditional heir of the descendant
(prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of origin
from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during
the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that
there being reservatarios that survive the reservista, the matter
must be deemed to have enjoyed no more than a life interest in
the reservable property.

It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of

the reservista, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus (the
appellee in this case) becomes, automatically and by operation
of law, the owner of the reservable property. As already stated,
that property is no part of the estate of the reservista, and does
not even answer for the debts of the latter. ... .

Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is
no doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees would have been excluded by the
defendant-appellant under the rules of intestate succession. There is no
reason why a different result should obtain simply because "the transmission
of the property was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva;" 6 i.e., the
MENDOZA v. POLICARPIO
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a
reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from
which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by
the relatives of the inheriting ascendant.1chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Facts
The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land located in
Sta. Maria, Bulacan: (1) Lot 1681-B, with an area of 7,749 square meters;2 (2)
Lot 1684, with an area of 5,667 sq m;3 and (3) Lot No. 1646-B, with an area of
880 sq m.4 Lot Nos. 1681-B and 1684 are presently in the name of
respondent Julia Delos Santos5 (respondent). Lot No. 1646-B, on the other
hand, is also in the name of respondent but co-owned by Victoria Pantaleon,
who bought one-half of the property from petitioner Maria Mendoza and her
siblings.
Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) and Dominga
Mendoza (Dominga). Placido and Dominga had four children: Antonio,
Exequiel, married to Leonor, Apolonio and Valentin. Petitioners Maria,
Deogracias, Dionisia, Adoracion, Marcela and Ricardo are the children of
Antonio. Petitioners Juliana, Fely, Mercedes, Elvira and Fortunato, on the
other hand, are Valentin's children. Petitioners alleged that the properties
were part of Placido and Dominga's properties that were subject of an oral
partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiel's death, it
passed on to his spouse Leonor and only daughter, Gregoria. After Leonor's
death, her share went to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died intestate and
without issue. They claimed that after Gregoria's death, respondent, who is
Leonor's sister, adjudicated unto herself all these properties as the sole
surviving heir of Leonor and Gregoria. Hence, petitioners claim that the
properties should have been reserved by respondent in their behalf and must
now revert back to them, applying Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva
troncal.
Respondent, however, denies any obligation to reserve the properties as
these did not originate from petitioners' familial line and were not originally
owned by Placido and Dominga. According to respondent, the properties were
bought by Exequiel and Antonio from a certain Alfonso Ramos in 1931. It
appears, however, that it was only Exequiel who was in possession of the
properties.6chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 6, found merit in
petitioners' claim and granted their action for Recovery of Possession by
Reserva Troncal, Cancellation of TCT and Reconveyance. In its Decision
dated November 4, 2002, the RTC disposed as
follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premised from the foregoing judgment is hereby
rendered:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1. Ordering respondents (heirs of Julia Policarpio) to reconvey the three (3)
parcels of land subject of this action in the name of the plaintiffs enumerated
in the complaint including intervenor Maria Cecilia M. Mendoza except one-
half of the property described in the old title, TCT No. T-124852(M) which
belongs to Victorina Pantaleon;cralawlibrary
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel the titles in the name
of Julia Policarpio, TCT No. T-149033(M), T-183631(M) and T-149035(M) and
reconvey the same to the enumerated plaintiffs; and
3. No pronouncement as to claims for attorney's fees and damages and costs.
SO ORDERED.7chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the RTC
decision and dismissed the complaint filed by petitioners. The dispositive
portion of the CA Decision dated November 16, 2006
provides:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the November 4, 2002 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Br. 6, Third Judicial Region, Malolos, Bulacan, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Third Amended Complaint in Civil Case
No. 609-M-92 is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against the Plaintiffs-Appellants.
SO ORDERED.8chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same per
Resolution9 dated January 17, 2007.
In dismissing the complaint, the CA ruled that petitioners failed to establish
that Placido and Dominga owned the properties in dispute.10 The CA also
ruled that even assuming that Placido and Dominga previously owned the
properties, it still cannot be subject to reserva troncal as neither Exequiel
predeceased Placido and Dominga nor did Gregoria predecease
Exequiel.11chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Now before the Court, petitioners argue that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A.
THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES ARE NOT RESERVABLE PROPERTIES, COMING AS THEY DO FROM THE
FAMILY LINE OF THE PETITIONERS MENDOZAS.
B.
THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS
MENDOZAS DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES BY VIRTUE OF THE
LAW ON RESERVA TRONCAL.12chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioners take exception to the ruling of the CA, contending that it is
sufficient that the properties came from the paternal line of Gregoria for it to
be subject to reserva troncal. They also claim the properties in representation
of their own predecessors, Antonio and Valentin, who were the brothers of
Exequiel.13chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Ruling of the Court
This petition is one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The general rule in this regard is that it should raise only questions of
law. There are, however, admitted exceptions to this rule, one of which is
when the CA's findings are contrary to those of the trial court.14 This being the
case in the petition at hand, the Court must now look into the differing findings
and conclusion of the RTC and the CA on the two issues that arise one,
whether the properties in dispute are reservable properties and two, whether
petitioners are entitled to a reservation of these properties.
Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal
The principle of reserva troncal is provided in Article 891 of the Civil
Code:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which
the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a
brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired
by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree
and belong to the line from which said property came. (Emphasis ours)
There are three (3) lines of transmission in reserva troncal. The first
transmission is by gratuitous title, whether by inheritance or donation, from an
ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant called the prepositus. The second
transmission is by operation of law from the prepositus to the other ascendant
or reservor, also called the reservista. The third and last transmission is from
the reservista to the reservees or reservatarios who must be relatives within
the third degree from which the property came.15chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The lineal character of the
reservable property is reckoned
from the ascendant from whom the
prepositus received the property by
gratuitous title
Based on the circumstances of the present case, Article 891 on reserva
troncal is not applicable.
-----
The fallacy in the CA's resolution is that it proceeded from the erroneous
premise that Placido is the ascendant contemplated in Article 891 of the Civil
Code. From thence, it sought to trace the origin of the subject properties back
to Placido and Dominga, determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido
and whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property was received
by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title;cralawlibrary
(2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the
property;cralawlibrary
(3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained the property
from the prepositus by operation of law; and
(4) The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from the
prepositus and who belongs to the (linea o tronco) from which the property
came and for whom the property should be reserved by the
reservor.16chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be
reckoned only from Exequiel's as he is the ascendant from where the first
transmission occurred, or from whom Gregoria inherited the properties in
dispute. The law does not go farther than such ascendant/brother/sister in
determining the lineal character of the property.17 It was also immaterial for
the CA to determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga or
whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel. What is pertinent is that Exequiel
owned the properties and he is the ascendant from whom the properties in
dispute originally came. Gregoria, on the other hand, is the descendant who
received the properties from Exequiel by gratuitous title.
Moreover, Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been
acquired by the descendant or prepositus from an ascendant by gratuitous or
lucrative title. A transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the
recipient does not give anything in return.18 At risk of being repetitious, what
was clearly established in this case is that the properties in dispute were
owned by Exequiel (ascendant). After his death, Gregoria
(descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as inheritance.
Ascendants, descendants and
collateral relatives under Article
964 of the Civil Code
Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the property should be
an ascendant (also known as the reservor/reservista) of the
descendant/prepositus. Julia, however, is not Gregoria's ascendant; rather,
she is Gregoria's collateral relative.
Article 964 of the Civil Code provides for the series of degrees among
ascendants and descendants, and those who are not ascendants and
descendants but come from a common ancestor,
viz:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or
collateral. A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among
ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons
who are not ascendants and descendants, but who come from a common
ancestor. (Emphasis and italics ours)
Gregoria's ascendants are her parents, Exequiel and Leonor, her
grandparents, great-grandparents and so on. On the other hand, Gregoria's
descendants, if she had one, would be her children, grandchildren and great-
grandchildren. Not being Gregoria's ascendants, both petitioners and Julia,
therefore, are her collateral relatives. In determining the collateral line of
relationship, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent to the
relative from whom the computation is made. In the case of Julia's collateral
relationship with Gregoria, ascent is to be made from Gregoria to her mother
Leonor (one line/degree), then to the common ancestor, that is, Julia and
Leonor's parents (second line/degree), and then descent to Julia, her aunt
(third line/degree). Thus, Julia is Gregoria's collateral relative within the third
degree and not her ascendant.
First cousins of the
descendant/prepositus are fourth
degree relatives and cannot be
considered reservees/reservatarios
Moreover, petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they
are not relatives within the third degree of Gregoria from whom the properties
came. The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the
descendant/prepositus?the one at the end of the line from which the property
came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent.19 It is Gregoria in
this case. Petitioners are Gregoria's fourth degree relatives, being her first
cousins. First cousins of the prepositus are fourth degree relatives and are not
reservees or reservatarios.20chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio and
Valentin as Article 891 grants a personal right of reservation only to the
relatives up to the third degree from whom the reservable properties came.
The only recognized exemption is in the case of nephews and nieces of the
prepositus, who have the right to represent their ascendants (fathers and
mothers) who are the brothers/sisters of the prepositus and relatives within
the third degree.21 In Florentino v. Florentino,22 the Court
stated:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there
are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest
relative, called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person
holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one
more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one
claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the
relatives within the third degree belong to the line from which such property
came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 now
Article 891 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of
the designated persons who are the relatives, within the third degree, of the
person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the
fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios,
since the law does not recognize them as such.
x x x Nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios
who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews
of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came. x x
x.23 (Emphasis and underscoring ours)
The conclusion, therefore, is that while it may appear that the properties are
reservable in character, petitioners cannot benefit from reserva troncal. First,
because Julia, who now holds the properties in dispute, is not the other
ascendant within the purview of Article 891 of the Civil Code and second,
because petitioners are not Gregoria's relatives within the third degree.
Hence, the CA's disposition that the complaint filed with the RTC should be
dismissed, only on this point, is correct. If at all, what should apply in the
distribution of Gregoria's estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code,
which provide:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of
brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them
by reason of relationship by the whole blood.
Nevertheless, the Court is not in the proper position to determine the proper
distribution of Gregoria's estate at this point as the cause of action relied upon
by petitioners in their complaint filed with the RTC is based solely on reserva
troncal. Further, any determination would necessarily entail reception of
evidence on Gregoria's entire estate and the heirs entitled thereto, which is
best accomplished in an action filed specifically for that purpose.
A reservista acquires ownership of
the reservable property until the
reservation takes place or is
extinguished
Before concluding, the Court takes note of a palpable error in the RTC's
disposition of the case. In upholding the right of petitioners over the
properties, the RTC ordered the reconveyance of the properties to petitioners
and the transfer of the titles in their names. What the RTC should have done,
assuming for argument's sake that reserva troncal is applicable, is have the
reservable nature of the property registered on respondent's titles. In fact,
respondent, as reservista, has the duty to reserve and to annotate the
reservable character of the property on the title.24 In reserva troncal, the
reservista who inherits from a prepositus, whether by the latter's wish or by
operation of law, acquires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly
transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of ownership belong to him
exclusively.25chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but
subject to the resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor
predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable
property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets the
revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee's rights
are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the
reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees predecease the
reservor.26 (Citations omitted)
It is when the reservation takes place or is extinguished,27 that a reservatario
becomes, by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property.28 In any
event, the foregoing discussion does not detract from the fact that petitioners
are not entitled to a reservation of the properties in dispute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 16,
2006 and Resolution dated January 17, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 77694 insofar as it dismissed the Third Amended Complaint in
Civil Case No. 609-M-92 are AFFIRMED. This Decision is without prejudice to
any civil action that the heirs of Gregoria
Mendoza may file for the settlement of her estate or for the determination of
ownership of the properties in question.
SO ORDERED.